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DEFENSE AGENCIES Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 3701 North Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22203–1714 Phone, 703–526–6630. Internet, www.darpa.mil. Director ANTHONY J. TETHER Deputy Director JANE A. ALEXANDER The Defense Advanced Research development projects and conducts Projects Agency is a separately demonstration projects appropriate for organized agency within Department of joint programs, programs in support of Defense and is under the authority, deployed forces, or selected programs of direction, and control of the Under the military departments. To this end, the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Agency arranges, manages, and directs Technology & Logistics). The Agency serves as the central research and the performance of work connected with development organization of the assigned advanced projects by the Department of Defense with a primary military departments, other Government responsibility to maintain U.S. agencies, individuals, private business technological superiority over potential entities, and educational or research adversaries. It pursues research and institutions, as appropriate. For further information, contact the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 3701 North Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22203–1714. Phone, 703–526–6630. Internet, www.darpa.mil. Defense Commissary Agency 1300 ‘‘E’’ Avenue, Fort Lee, VA 23801–1800 Phone, 804–734–8253. Internet, www.commissaries.com. Director MAJ. GEN. ROBERT J. COURTER, JR., USAF Deputy Director PATRICK NIXON Chief, Support Staff LAURA R. HARRELL The Defense Commissary Agency was operational supervision of the established in 1990 and is under the Commissary Operating Board. The authority, direction, and control of the Agency is responsible for providing an Under Secretary of Defense for efficient and effective worldwide system Personnel and Readiness and the of commissaries for selling groceries and 193 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 02:17 Aug 24, 2002 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00193 Fmt 6995 Sfmt 6995 W:\DISC\189864TX.XXX txed01 PsN: txed01 194 U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL household supplies at low, practical 22333–0000. Phone, 703–540–6278 or prices to members of the military 703–540–6207. services, their families, and other Procurement and Small Business authorized patrons, while maintaining Activities For information, contact the high standards of quality, facilities, Director of Acquisition, Capital products, and service. Investment Business Area, Defense Commissary Agency, 1300 ‘‘E’’ Avenue, Sources of Information Fort Lee, VA 23801–1800. Phone, 804– 734–8529. Employment General employment Publication A Business Guide for inquiries should be addressed to the Marketing to the Defense Commissary Human Resources Operations Division, Agency is available free of charge from Defense Commissary Agency, 5001 the Director of Acquisition (see address Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA above). For further information, contact the Defense Commissary Agency at 804–734–8253, or 800–669–5063 (toll free). Internet, www.commissaries.com. Defense Contract Audit Agency Suite 2135, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–6219 Phone, 703–767–3200. Internet, www.dcaa.mil. Director WILLIAM H. REED Deputy Director MICHAEL J. THIBAULT The Defense Contract Audit Agency was They include evaluating the acceptability established in 1965 and is under the of costs claimed or proposed by authority, direction, and control of the contractors and reviewing the efficiency Under Secretary of Defense and economy of contractor operations. (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. Other Government agencies may request The Agency performs all necessary the Agency’s services under appropriate contract audit functions for DOD and arrangements. provides accounting and financial The Agency manages its operations advisory services to all Defense through 5 regional offices responsible for components responsible for procurement approximately 81 field audit offices and contract administration. These throughout the United States and services are provided in connection with overseas. Each region is responsible for the negotiation, administration, and the contract auditing function in its settlement of contracts and subcontracts. assigned area. Regional Offices—Defense Contract Audit Agency Region Address Director Telephone CENTRAL ............. 6321 E. Campus Circle, Irving, TX 75063–2742 ............. Francis P. Summers, Jr. 972–753–2513 EASTERN ............. Suite 300, 2400 Lake Park Dr., Smyrna, GA 30080– Richard R. Buhre ............ 770–319–4400 7644. MID–ATLANTIC .... Suite 1000, 615 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19106– Barbara C. Reilly ............. 215–597–7451 4498. NORTHEASTERN Suite 300, 59 Composite Way, Lowell, MA 01851–5150 Dave Dzivak .................... 978–551–9715 WESTERN ............ Suite 300, 16700 Valley View Ave., La Mirada, CA William R. Serafine ......... 714–228–7001 90638–5830. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 02:17 Aug 24, 2002 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00194 Fmt 6995 Sfmt 6995 W:\DISC\189864TX.XXX txed01 PsN: txed01 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 195 For further information, contact the Executive Officer, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Suite 2135, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–6219. Phone, 703–767–3265. Internet, www.dcaa.mil. Defense Contract Management Agency 6350 Walker Lane, Alexandria, VA 22310–3241 Phone, 703–428–1700. Internet, www.dcma.mil. Director BRIG. GEN. EDWARD M. HARRINGTON, USA Deputy Director THOMAS E. BRUNK The Defense Contract Management contract management in support of the Agency was established by the Deputy military departments, other DOD Secretary of Defense in 2000 and is components, the National Aeronautics under the authority, direction, and and Space Administration, other control of the Under Secretary of designated Federal and State agencies, Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and foreign governments, and international Logistics). It is responsible for DOD organizations, as appropriate. For further information, contact the Public Affairs Office, Defense Contract Management Agency, 6350 Walker Lane, Alexandria, VA 22310–3241. Phone, 703–428–1969. Internet, www.dcma.mil. Defense Finance and Accounting Service Room 920, Crystal Mall 3, Arlington, VA 22240–5291 Phone, 703–607–2616. Internet, www.dfas.mil. Director THOMAS R. BLOOM Deputy Director REAR ADM. MARK A. YOUNG, USN The Defense Finance and Accounting finance and accounting records for Service was established in 1990 and is DOD. It is responsible for preparing under the authority, direction, and annual financial statements for DOD and control of the Under Secretary of for the consolidation, standardization, Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial upgrading, and integration of finance Officer. The Service is responsible for and accounting requirements, functions, making all payments, including payroll processes, operations, and systems in the and contracts, and for maintaining all Department. For further information, contact the Corporate Communications, Room 417, Crystal Mall 3, Arlington, VA 22240–5291. Phone, 703–607–2716. Internet, www.dfas.mil. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 02:17 Aug 24, 2002 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00195 Fmt 6995 Sfmt 6995 W:\DISC\189864TX.XXX txed01 PsN: txed01 196 U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL Defense Information Systems Agency 701 South Courthouse Road, Arlington, VA 22204–2199 Phone, 703–607–6900. Internet, www.disa.mil. Director LT. GEN. HARRY D. RADUEGE, JR., USAF Vice Director MAJ. GEN. J. DAVID BRYAN, USA Chief of Staff COL. PATRICK R. MORIARTY, USMC Established originally as the Defense the interoperability of the infrastructure Communications Agency in 1960, the with theater and tactical command and Defense Information Systems Agency control systems, NATO and/or allied C4 (DISA), is under the authority, direction, systems, and those national and/or and control of the Assistant Secretary of international commercial systems that Defense (Command, Control, affect the DISA mission. It is responsible Communications, and Intelligence). The for the DOD telecommunications and Agency is responsible for planning, developing, and supporting command, information processing facilities and control, communications, computers, systems, such as the Global Command and information systems that serve the and Control system, and supports needs of the President and the Secretary national security emergency of Defense under all conditions of peace preparedness telecommunications and war. It manages the defense functions of the National information infrastructure and ensures Communications System. For further information, contact the Public Affairs Office, Defense Information Systems Agency, 701 South Courthouse Road, Arlington, VA 22204–2199. Phone, 703–607–6900. Internet, www.disa.mil/ disahomejs.html. Defense Intelligence Agency The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301–7400 Phone, 703–695–0071. Internet, www.dia.mil. Director VICE ADM. THOMAS R. WILSON, USN Deputy Director MARK W. EWING Chief of Staff JOHN K. KIEHM The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Federal Government. DIA produces was established in 1961 and is under the foreign military intelligence for national authority, direction, and control of the foreign intelligence and Assistant Secretary of Defense counterintelligence products; coordinates (Command, Control, Communications, all DOD intelligence collection and Intelligence). DIA provides timely, requirements; operates the Central objective, and cogent military Measurement and Signature Intelligence intelligence to soldiers, sailors, airmen, Organization; manages the Defense and marines and to the
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