United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees December 2019 MISSILE DEFENSE Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace with Emerging Threats GAO-20-177 December 2019 MISSILE DEFENSE Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace with Highlights of GAO-20-177, a report to Emerging Threats congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found MDA is developing missile defense The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is experiencing delays getting the threat capabilities to defend the United assessments needed to inform its acquisition decisions. Officials from the States, deployed forces, and regional defense intelligence community—intelligence organizations within the allies from missile attacks. However, Department of Defense (DOD)—told GAO this is because they are currently missile threats continue to emerge, as overextended due to an increased demand for threat assessments from a adversaries continue to improve and recent upsurge in threat missile activity, as well as uncertainties related to their expand their missile capabilities. transition to new threat processes and products. The delays are exacerbated The National Defense Authorization because MDA does not collectively prioritize the various types of threat Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a assessment requests submitted to the defense intelligence community or provision that GAO annually assess provide resources for unique requests, as other major defense acquisition and report on the extent to which MDA programs are generally required to do. Without timely threat assessments, has achieved its acquisition goals and MDA risks making acquisition decisions for weapon systems using irrelevant objectives, and include any other or outdated threat information, which could result in performance shortfalls. findings and recommendations. This report is a public version of a classified MDA has increased its outreach to the defense intelligence community over report GAO issued in May 2019, which the past few years, but opportunities remain for further engagement on key addresses (1) the challenges MDA and threat-related processes and decisions. Specifically, MDA provides the the defense intelligence community defense intelligence community with limited insight into how the agency uses face in meeting the agency's threat threat assessments to inform its acquisition decisions. MDA is not required to assessment needs and (2) the extent obtain the defense intelligence community's input, and instead has discretion to which MDA engages the defense on the extent to which it engages the defense intelligence community. intelligence community on missile However, the defense intelligence community is uniquely positioned to assist defense acquisitions. GAO reviewed MDA and its involvement is crucial for helping MDA keep pace with rapidly MDA's threat-related acquisition emerging threats. Moreover, this limited insight has, in part, prevented the processes and interviewed relevant defense intelligence community from validating the threat models MDA builds officials from the defense intelligence to test the performance of its weapon systems. Without validation, any flaws community, MDA, test community, and or bias in the threat models may go undetected, which can have significant warfighters. Information deemed implications on the performance of MDA's weapon systems. MDA and the classified by DOD has been omitted. defense intelligence community recently began discussing a more suitable What GAO Recommends level of involvement in the agency's acquisition processes and decisions. GAO is making three Actions Needed for MDA to Improve Collaboration with the Intelligence Community and Keep recommendations to improve how Pace with Emerging Threats MDA: prioritizes and resources its threat assessment needs; obtains input from the defense intelligence community on key threat-related processes and decisions for missile defense acquisitions; and validates its threat models. DOD concurred with all three recommendations, citing actions it is already taking. While DOD has taken some positive steps, GAO believes more action is warranted. View GAO-20-177. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Note: the threat missile coverage depicted is notional and not representative of MDA’s actual threat coverage. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 3 Mounting Challenges Are Delaying the Availability of Threat Assessments, but Opportunities Exist to Help MDA Receive the Information It Needs 12 Opportunities Exist for MDA to Further Engage the Defense Intelligence Community on BMDS Acquisition to Address the Challenges of Keeping Pace with the Threat 24 Conclusions 37 Recommendations for Executive Action 38 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 Appendix I Defense Intelligence Components Responsible for Assessing Foreign Ballistic Missiles 43 Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46 Tables Table 1: Defense Intelligence Community’s Roles in Supporting the Missile Defense Agency 8 Table 2: Revision to Defense Intelligence Community’s Threat Assessment Processes and Products 15 Table 3: Completion Status of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Validated Online Lifecycle Threat (VOLT) Report 16 Table 4: Defense Intelligence Community Components Responsible for Assessing Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats 43 Figures Figure 1: Ballistic Missiles of North Korea and Iran 5 Figure 2: Overview of Ballistic Missile Ranges 6 Figure 3: Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture 10 Figure 4: Ballistic Missile Flight Testing, 2005-2016 13 Page i GAO-20-177 Missile Defense Figure 5: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Potential to Collectively Prioritize Threat Assessment Requests in the Intelligence Community’s Queue 21 Figure 6: Meetings between Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Defense Intelligence Community to Coordinate on Threat Modeling Efforts, January 2015 - December 2018 36 Abbreviations BMD ballistic missile defense BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation CRBM close-range ballistic missile DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIBMAC Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee DOD Department of Defense DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile MDA Missile Defense Agency MRBM medium-range ballistic missile NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center OTA Operational Test Agency SRBM short-range ballistic missile VOLT Validated Online Lifecycle Threat U unclassified This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page ii GAO-20-177 Missile Defense Letter 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 December 11, 2019 Congressional Committees The threat of ballistic missiles to the United States, deployed forces, and regional allies continues to increase, as indicated by recent missile tests by foreign adversaries that have demonstrated both increased capabilities and the potential to reach the United States. Ultimately, the challenge for the United States is how to contend with these foreign adversaries’ threat capabilities, which are becoming more mobile, reliable, accurate, and capable of achieving longer ranges. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working to address this challenge by developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to detect, track, and defend against these threats to the homeland and abroad. MDA uses information on foreign adversaries’ missile capabilities, which is primarily derived from threat assessments prepared by the defense intelligence community (Defense Intelligence Agency and the military services’ intelligence production centers), to inform its BMDS acquisition decisions. Defense acquisition and intelligence leaders have recognized that greater consideration of threat capabilities in design and testing decisions throughout a weapon system’s lifecycle can reduce developmental costs and operational risk.1 With today’s rapidly evolving threat capabilities, it is not only fiscally prudent to ensure that weapon systems are informed by defense intelligence community threat assessments, it is also vital to our national security, as each decision shapes future defensive capabilities. Various National Defense Authorization Acts since 2002 have included provisions for us to prepare annual assessments of MDA’s progress toward meeting its acquisition goals. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, included a provision for us to report annually on the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, and include any other findings and recommendations on MDA’s acquisition programs and accountability, as appropriate.2 To date, we have issued 16 reports citing MDA’s progress and challenges in developing and delivering the BMDS, including our 1Paul Reinhart and Brian Vanyo, “Improving Threat Support for DoD Acquisition Programs,” Defense AT&L, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (Ft. Belvoir, VA: May-June