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Combat Intelligence u R«Ur 408.3. y^ 11/ Uto FM 3 O -ï> CJ kt*t»r. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL COMBAT INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY The Pentatron.ÄfGffiy JANUARY 1960 Km 1A518. Patagón Washington, D.C. 20310 FM 30-5 C 1 FIELD MANUAL COMBAT INTELLIGENCE FM 30-5 HEADQUAETERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Cil ANGES No. 1 WASHINGTON 25, D.C., « Jime 1961 FM 30-5,6 January 1960, is changed as follows : Delete throughout this manual all references to "Theater Army Replacement and Training Command (TARTC)" and substitute therefor: Theater Army Replacement System (TARS). Substitute throughout this manual TALOG for "TALogComd." 1. Purpose and Scope ******* c. (Superseded) Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Com- ments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be pro- vided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evalua- tion. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 9. Counterintelligence Counterintelligence is inseparable from the intelligence operations. For this reason, * * * Counterintelligence activities include— 10. Specialized Categories of Intelligence * * * * * * * /. (Added) Terrain intelligence which is processed information on the military significant natural and manmade characteristics of an area. See FM 30-10. g. (Added) Weather intelligence, which is weather information interpreted in relation to its effects upon personnel, equipment and material, and the area of operations. For example, data concerning temperature and wind is weather information ; when interpreted in terms of wind chill and operational implications of this wind chill, the information becomes weather intelligence. 24. Combined Operations a. In combined operations * * * participating armed forces. Sub- ject to policies established by the supreme commander of the com- bined force, certain intelligence operations may be a combined effort TAGO 6294B—Mny 570487''--61 ' by all the nations making up the force. Combined efforts avoid • * * types of intelligence. * ****** 25. Joint Operations a. In unified operations and joint actions, the basic intelligence function is unchanged. However, the force * * * organization and procedures. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), sets forth the functions, responsibili- ties, and procedures for intelligence operations for unified oper- ations and joint actions. b. The function of the intelligence division, J2, of a joint staff is to produce timely intelligence of the area of operations and the enemy. Each service component * * * such an SOP : * ****** 30. Relation of Intelligence and Operations a. Intelligence operations within * * * combat and service. The degree of success achieved in operations by the Army in accom- plishing its mission in the field will be directly effected by the in- telligence which it develops and uses. Tactics and strategy * * * of intelligence operations. ******* 40. Intelligence Officer The intelligence officer * * * acquired or denied. The intelli- gence officer should also have a basic understanding of the weather elements and their influence upon personnel, material, equipment, and terrain. 48. U.S. Army Security Agency Units U.S. Army Security * * * higher USASA units. See FM 32-10. Make the following changes in figure 3 : Air Defense Change block on to Air Defense Arty Brigades Arty Brigade Infantry Delete block on Brigade Figure 5. Rescinded. Make the following change in figure 7 : Field Army Field Army Change block on Air Defense to Air Defense Units Arty Units TAQO 6294B 68. Visual Air Reconnaissance * * * + d. Visual reconnaissance missions include the following: **«■*#** (3) Route reconnaissance is observation along lines of communi- cation such as roads, railroads, and waterways, to determine condition of the route or enemy activity along it. It is car- ried * * * supplement area search. ******* (5) (Added) Contact reconnaissance is a means of locating isolated units out of contact with the main forces. Pre- arranged air-ground signals are a requisite and they will be prescribed by the area air commander. Air reconnaissance units will establish and maintain contact with isolated units as long as necessary or possible. 102. General a. Intelligence is a basic requirement in operational planning. The effectiveness of any unit in the accomplishment of its mission is related directly to the availability of intelligence. Intelligence needs must * * * of collection operations. ******* 109. Target Acquisition Planning a. Early in the planning stage of an operation a list of potential targets is developed. Such factors as * * * aggressive intelligence exploitation. ******* 115. Essential Elements of Information (EEI) a. The critical items of information regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain needed by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence to assist him in reaching a logical decision, are the essential ele- ments of information (EEI). EEI are items * * * special atten- tion to * * *." ******* 132. Field Army a. Field army counterintelligence * * * at lower units. Army counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security are based on support of tactical operations and later transfer of territorial responsibility to TALOG. ******* c. Theater and TALOG counterintelligence personnel and units may be temporarily attached to the field army to assist in counter- 3 TAG0 C294B 0 intelligence operations and to provide continuity of control when the TALOG assumes field army territorial responsibilities. 149. General * * * • d. Electronic warfare activities can— (1) Jam enemy radio receivers. » * e * ISOo E'esîrerîk Warfeire Inîelligenœ Operations » * * * # • ♦ b. The field use of EW includes— * * » o $ « » (2) Active ECM counter (jam, blind, deceive, redirect, or pre- maturely detonate) enemy electronic communications re- ceivers, detection devices, guidance systems, or fuzing sys- tems. Certain active ECM * * * and operations officers. 1132. General # * tt * * • * &. Biological warfare (BW) is the use of living organisms or their toxic products, to produce disease or death of men, animals, or plants. Included in the term "biological warfare" is the use of chemicals to cause harm to plants. c. Toxic chemical agents or biological agents may cause enemy ac- tivities which make the collection of information easier. For example, the use of persistent toxic chemicals may cause the enemy to vacate an area in which he has been well concealed. 155. Âir Defense Intelligence Systems a. General. The rapidity of * * * functions and agencies. No one service is charged with the overall mission of providing air defense inielligence and flight identificaticn to the other services. Each service normally contributes some early warning and iden- tifketion information to the joint air defense effort. Army air defense forces in the combat zone may frequently encounter sit- uations in which the early warning received from other services is either too little or too late, and primary dependence will be upon the air surveillance means of the field army. The provision of adequate, timely, reliable, and continuous air defense intelli- gezjce is the ftmction of the air defense intelligence system. The system consists of a series of integrated radar and communications networks. TAGO 6294B c. (Superseded) Defense Acquisition Radars. These systems in- clude radars that can acquire targets for a specific air defense area and can furnish early warning information to other air defense areas. * * * * * • * 156. Intelligence Requirements for Air Defense a. The intelligence requirements for air defense are generally the same as the requirements for the theater army air defense command listed in appendix XIII. ******* 161. Intelligence Training and Maneuvers ******* c. (Added) Intelligence training should include an understanding of weather elements to the extent that personnel can intelligently use weather information. Emphasis should be placed on the effects of weather upon tactical operations, personnel, weapons, equipment, terrain, and movement. APPENDIX III COLLECTION OF RADIOLOGICAL INFORMATION 2. Radiological Monitoring ******* b. Monitoring Reports. (1) Initial report. The initial contact with radioactivity of one rad per hour (rad/hr) dose rate or higher is reported through command channels (except as indicated later) as a FLASH message giving location, dose rate, appropriate shielding information, and time detected. Initial reports are * * * unit is located. For example, a corps unit located in a division area submits monitoring reports to the division CBRS. ******* APPENDIX VI DISSEMINATION MEANS ******* 8. Radiological Contamination Estimates and Reports ******* &. Fallout predictions are * * * of arrival points. Eadiation pre- dictions are * * * and subordinate units. Make the following changes in figure 21 : ISUM NUMBER 144 * * * PATROL REPORTS BATTERY 152MM HOWITZERS AT R303292 PD PRISONERS CONFIRM LOCATION 2D BATTALION CMM 17F MECZ RIFLE REGIMENT VICINITY * * * POSITION MOST PROBABLE. TAGO 6294B 5 APPENDIX XI INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 6. Committed Forces i. Usually a G2 * * * terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army a statement of the number of armies and army groups the enemy has committed also is included. For example, "The com- mitted forces facing this army group
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