N r 1 januari/mars 2017 Security for sale Swedish guns to Russia in the 19th century by Petter Wulff

Resumé Sverige har varit en av världens största vapenexportörer i många decennier. I den rollen har landet haft att hantera två skilda förhållningssätt och den tänkbara konflikten dem emellan: Hur ska statens säkerhet avvägas gentemot kommersiella villkor? Artikeln beskriver hur en potentiell konflikt mellan dessa förhållningssätt under1800 -talet betraktades och hanterades. Det gäller den svenska exporten av artilleripjäser till den militära huvudfienden Ryssland. Artikeln diskuterar hur denna idag tämligen otänkbara export kunde komma till stånd. Exporten kan ses som acceptabel bara på vissa villkor, men de var inte uppfyllda i detta fall. Den kommersiella logiken kom med andra ord att äventyra statens säkerhet.

has been one of the world’s largest XIV John, to establish a pro-Russian policy exporters of weapons for many decades, and after Sweden’s loss of Finland, was resented, during this time only Israel has exceeded its not to say detested, by army officers.2 A per capita sales of weaponry.1 In this capacity Russian attack was expected to come by sea Sweden has had to deal with two major ideas across the Baltic, and the capital, , and their possible conflict – state security and was seen as a primary target.3 One leading commercial logic. The story to be described military thinker (and a future founding father and analyzed here is about a conflict between of Sweden’s of the army) went these ideas in 19th century Sweden. so far as to conclude in 1860 that the slow Swedish mobilization system would make it A security geography difficult to defend the capital.4 Here again, the obvious rationale for the Swedish mili- At that time, Russia was Sweden’s geographi- tary system is seen to be protection against cally dominant neighbor. It covered all the the great eastern neighbor. landmass east of Sweden and the Baltic Sea. This included Finland, which had been taken from Sweden in 1809, ending centuries of A gun geography its being part of Sweden. Such a geopolitical One of the parts of the military system was background made it natural for the Swedish gun production. It was a non-military part military system to see the threat as coming where the commercial logic came in, as pro- from the east. Its ultimate rationale should be duction had been in private hands since the to protect the country against an attack from Thirty Years’ War in the 17th century. At the the vast and great power that lay there. same time the state held an eye on production. To be sure, Russia was seen as the main Directives in the 1830s said that an enemy in military circles. An expression of officer should be present during “the casting this is that the move of the new king, Charles and production”.5 That is, there should be

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Figure 1. Sweden’s iron can- nons were produced outside of the main iron mining area at the time. ( area in dotted circle. Beside Åker there was Finspång and Stavsjö). Illustration by the author. a military presence throughout the process to run this rather capital-intensive kind of of cannon-making. iron goods manufacturing. Swedish were mainly of iron but There may also have been a metallurgical were, curiously enough, produced outside reason why cannons were produced outside of the main iron mining area. That area of the main mining area. Cannon-making stretched in an east-west band across Sweden required iron ores, or mixes of ores, of spe- a bit north of Stockholm, while the cannon cial quality. This is illustrated in a contract production sites lay further south and closer with the Swedish government, where the ore to the capital. There had been more than a was stipulated to come from five different half-dozen sites, but in the early 19th century mines, each contributing its precise share only three remained. to the mixture.7 This specific location of cannon production Around the middle of the 19th century the could have historical, social or metallurgical leading site for the production of Swedish reasons. Historically, the crown had initiated (iron) cannons was Åkers Styckebruk. It could cannon production and was likely to have be reached from Stockholm by lake or land. wanted sites within reasonable reach from Early in the century its cannon production Stockholm. Socially, the cannon production had run into economic trouble, and a new area “swarmed with aristocratic families”.6 manager had been called in around 1820. They would have had the resources needed He embarked on what can be seen as a two-

159 N r 1 januari/mars 2017 pronged strategy. It consisted of first finding idea. I can, however, think of three possible new markets for the existing products and legitimations for the export effort. then finding new products. Our interest here Firstly, if the weapons were not of top is mainly with the new markets – or rather quality they would present a limited threat with one new market – namely Russia. to Sweden. Secondly, if they were of high quality, export was more dubious but could A new market – Russia have been a price to pay to ensure the sur- vival of the industry. A third possibility for There is a considerable amount of docu- accepting the export from a security perspec- ments concerning Russia in the Åker archive. tive would be that the weapons were of a Surviving contracts show a vast increase in non-offensive character. deliveries in the 1830s, as can be Regarding the first possibility we can see seen in the diagram below. in the diagram that the Swedish armed forces We see that the new market expanded bought Åker cannons along with Russia. The rapidly, so that soon there were more deliv- weapons were obviously seen to be qualita- eries to our main adversary than to our own tively adequate for defending Sweden, and armed forces. It was obviously good com- there is no indication in the Åker archive mercial logic to send hundreds of cannons that the cannons sold to Russia should have to a power willing to pay for them. But how been of a different and less high quality. On could such sales be accepted from a security the contrary, some years after the massive point of view? For someone brought up in deliveries1 recorded in diagram, the tsar of- Sweden of the Cold War era it is an alien fered gratifications to the workers at Åker

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Figure 2. Cannon deliveries from Åker in the 1830s. Deliveries to Russia (solid line) as compared to de- liveries to the and navy (dashed line). From: The Åker archive, e:3.

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Figure 3. Three kinds of cannons exported to Russia – heavy artillery (solid line), light (dashed line), and light army artillery (dotted line). From: The Åker archive, e:11.1

“by virtue of the zeal displayed by them”, character and couldn’t be used in an attack indicating how pleased he was with the crafts- on Sweden. It is a hypothesis that needs manship behind the cannons.8 So the first careful analysis. security legitimation possibility can be ruled out as an explanation of the export. A non-offensive export? The second possibility means that ex- We can get an indication of the possible porting to Russia was seen as a temporary non-offensiveness of the cannons exported, measure to overcome failing demand else- if we look at what kinds of cannons were where – a measure to keep the people at Åker delivered. It turns out that they were of three employed and not lose their manufacturing kinds – heavy artillery, light army artillery, skill and competence, thereby securing fu- and light naval artillery. ture domestic deliveries of cannons. But we Before proceeding, a technical comment know that exports to Russia continued after should be made on the two diagrams present- the 1830s – albeit on a smaller scale. After ed, as the number of cannons in figure2 for the technological breakthrough recorded a specific year does not equal the number in in Wahrendorff’s 1840 patent for breech- figure3 . (For instance the number of cannons 9 loading, there seems to have been a shift from has a peak for 1837 in figure2 but according quantitative to qualitative acquisition; with to figure3 there were no cannons exported sometimes contracts for only a single can- that year). The reason for the discrepancy is non.10 So this was not a temporary measure that figure2 shows cannons delivered, while as suggested by the second explanation. figure 3 shows the number of cannons in A third alternative could be that the can- contracts. Between the signing of a contract nons sent to Russia had a purely defensive and actual delivery of the contracted goods

161 N r 1 januari/mars 2017 more than a year could pass. Sometimes the A preliminary conclusion to be drawn casting did not give the desired quality and from these descriptions is that the pieces had to be done again. exported were probably partly, but not com- Inspecting and test firing the cannons could pletely, of an offensive character. How much also take time; as could possibly negotiations of a threat to Sweden they represented is over contractual details. If these procedures difficult to assess, but to the officers at the had not been completed before the end of the time you would expect the cannon sales to year, the Gulf of Finland would be blocked have been a matter of concern. by ice and it would take well into the next year before the cannons could be shipped. A possibility to find an answer One kind of cannons exported was heavy In the late 1850s an opportunity arose to artillery, which is here seen to comprise can- obtain more definite evidence about the even- nons shooting 24 pound cannonballs (“can- tual offensive role of the Åker cannons in ons de 24” in the wording of the contracts). the Russian military system. It was when This kind of artillery would tend to be heavy Sweden sent its first military attaché to S:t and difficult to move and employ in an of- Petersburg. Here was a chance to investigate fensive campaign, so it might be seen as on site both Russian military potential in defensive; But only for the army. If the can- general and, more specifically, whether the nons were mounted on naval vessels it was Swedish military equipment exported could a different matter. They would then tend present a threat to Sweden. to be a threat to Swedish naval forces and The attaché started reporting in autumn coastal installations. 1858, and in one year he sent home as many Another kind of cannons exported was as 30 reports about the situation in Russia. the light army artillery. It consisted of two Coming back in the summer of 1860 he wrote types called mortars and licornes. Mortars five more reports. The communication with were typically used to shoot over the pro- high-level Russian representatives he refers tecting walls of a fortified place. They were to is writtenin French, which may mean that generally much smaller and lighter than other his own knowledge of the Russian language types of artillery and could therefore fairly was limited. easily be brought along on an offensive cam- On the more general question of Russia’s 11 paign. The licorne was a Russian hybrid military potential the attaché made a number between the high-shooting and the of interesting observations. He noted that far-shooting ordinary cannon. It had been infantry units were being equipped with 12 used in the Russian field artillery, so this up-to-date rifle technology “on the widest type too would probably have been useful scale”.14 The modernization is confirmed in an offensive role against Sweden. some years later, when he reported that the The third kind of cannon exported was whole Russian army had been provided with a light naval artillery piece called “carron- rifles of the French Minié type. 15 ade”. Judging from a description of it as “a A guided tour in the S:t Petersburg arsenal short-range naval weapon with a low muzzle with its bronze cannon production convinced velocity for merchant ships”, it was not much him that this was “a magnificent installation”. of a naval threat. It is, however, said to have In other words the arsenal seems to have been found a niche role on warships.13 a place for making good quality products.

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It also held modern products – the attaché located much closer to its coastline would saw two Krupp steel cannons being bored rather emphasize the threat of a sea-borne for . Russia’s own iron cannons were invasion. made at another site, Petrozavodsk on lake Even if the information was not alarming, Onega, which had a canal system linking it the attaché showed Russia to be in good to S:t Petersburg. The attaché noted that the shape militarily, exceeding his expecta- Petrozavodsk cannons of late had been made tions.20 Moreover, it was steadily modern- “with special care” – once again indicating izing. The impression of his data is that the a Russian capacity for quality output. The threat from the east should not have been attaché found this fact lamentable, but not taken lightly. with regard to Sweden’s security. Instead, he On the more specific question, whether saw the quality of the Russian iron cannons the military equipment exported could be as something to be lamented with regard to a threat to Sweden, the attaché had very the diminishing sales possibilities for Swedish little to say. He comments, in passing, that cannon makers.16 in the Russian field artillery utilized “as is Even if he was an army man, the attaché well-known, only metal cannons”;21 with also had things to say about the navy. When “metal” here used as a name for “bronze”. he got an opportunity to see the naval port This is a rather perplexing comment. To my of Kronstadt close to S:t Petersburg, he gave knowledge Åker only delivered iron pieces, a detailed account of the visit. The fleet of and the mortar and licorne types were de- steam vessels there is said to consist of 19 signed for field use. The insertion of “as is ships, with two of them having as many as well-known” indicates that the attaché has 130 cannons each. He sees a steam frigate not investigated the matter himself. Neither equipped with a couple of the “in America do we get any information about the car- famous Dahlgren cannons” – another indica- ronades exported. tion of a Russian interest in modern military About the export of heavy artillery, we equipment. In an overall assessment of the learn just a little more. In a report, it is noted Russian navy’s conversion to steam he finds that the Russian navy has bought a piece of that: “the orders laid in foreign countries, the Åker’s new breech-loading technology and zeal with which work at home is carried out, found it quite useful.22 The navy’s positive and the generosity with which steam ship attitude indicates that new breechloader companies are encouraged give sufficient orders might come. How should Sweden evidence of a serious resolution to give this respond to such requests? weapon a respectable strength”.17 To the attaché the answer to the question In another report, he notes that the navy is clear: It is to be wished, says he, “that (and not only defensive fortifications) had our cannon foundries summoned all their been supplied with Petrozavodsk iron can- strength and introduced the improvements nons.18 He also reports about plans being of other countries in the mode of production proposed for a new naval port at the mouth to be able to retain the confidence, which of the Gulf of Finland. Such a location is said has hitherto made way for profitable sales to be “without doubt rather advantageous”.19 abroad, without which it would hardly be You might wonder about the attaché’s per- possible for them to continue an activity spective here, as the advantage would be to of such great importance to Sweden and Russia. To Sweden, having the Russian navy its defence”.23 In this sentence the attaché

163 N r 1 januari/mars 2017 refers both to profit and defense – that is, and therefore harmless to Sweden; or that the both to commerce and security. But they are export to Russia was a temporary measure not equally important. What he proposes is, to ensure the survival of cannon production. in my reading, that Sweden should make Neither is seen to hold as an explanation of every effort to sell top quality weaponry to what occurred. Russia – regardless of its threat potential to We know that the Swedish cannon foun- Sweden. This is a remarkable comment to dries were private enterprises. Their owners’ come from a representative of the Swedish primary obligation was to the foundry and state security system. its workforce and from that perspective any sales opportunity was welcome. The owner The power of commerce could not be expected to have a military background or defending the principle of Let us summarize. Russia was the main se- state security. His guiding light was the com- curity threat to Sweden. It was close, vast, mercial principle. and potentially resourceful. Still, cannons On the other hand, officers of the armed th were exported there in the 19 century. forces were employed to be guided by the To me, employed as a defense analyst in state security principle. There was an officer Cold War Sweden, it is an amazing piece of surveillance and control system for cannon information that calls for an explanation. production and therefore a military insight How could Sweden sell weapons to its main into what went on. Why then did the mili- adversary? tary representatives not veto cannon sales to Looking closer there seems to be two Russia? One possible explanation is that the problems involved in the case presented. king had adopted a pro-Russian stance and, Firstly, how could Sweden ever embark on with the foundry manager well connected at a Russian sales endeavor? Secondly, why court, military objections could have been did it not come to an end, when a military felt to be futile. However, if there had been attaché got a chance to look into the matter concerns within military circles, the subject and assess the threat potential on site? Let us of weapons export could at least have been look at the first problem first – the rise of the discussed internally. Army officers could cannon export to Russia in the 1830s. have voiced their objections or doubts in We must concede that the export could the journal of the Swedish War Academy, have been fairly unproblematic to the security and navy officers could have used their pro- of Sweden. If the equipment exported could fessional journal for a similar purpose. But be classified as defensive, it should have been looking through the journal issues of the militarily acceptable. A preliminary analysis 1830s I have found nothing more than a of the kinds of cannons exported indicates, mention of the fact that Russia “had found however, that most of them did not have it to their advantage” to buy cannons from that character. Most probably they had an Sweden.24 The rule of commerce was not offensive potential. The character of the questioned. cannons can therefore hardly explain why it was accepted to have them exported. Two other possible legitimations of the Coming close – but not seeing export are discussed in the text – that the When Sweden sent out a military attaché cannons would have been of poor quality to Russia in the late 1850s, it represented a

164 ANALYS & PERSPEKTIV chance to find out more about the military of the tsar’s peaceful intentions.28 He was might of the eastern neighbor – and espe- obviously flattered by the attention from the cially to what extent the cannons exported sovereign, and he might have extrapolated from Sweden could contribute to that might from the tsar’s manners toward him, that and enhance the threat to Sweden. The at- Russia could be trusted to behave well in taché, however, only took on part of this task, relation to Sweden. when he sent home information regarding Personal influences thus may have turned Russia’s modernization of infantry, artillery the attaché’s focus away from pursuing a and navy but communicated next to nothing security perspective. But he went further about where and how the empire’s Swedish than losing a security focus, when he actively cannons were employed. recommended his country make every effort The attaché took great pleasure in hearing to sell top quality weaponry to Russia. This that his reports were read and appreciated by recommendation clearly violated a basic the king as well as the minister of terrestrial rule of thumb of security policy: Don’t sell defense to which his reports were addressed.25 weapons to your main adversary! The king’s interest could be attributed both Should we from his recommendation con- to his former role as head of the artillery and clude that the attaché was out of his wits to a friendship with the attaché, who had and that Sweden made a deplorable mistake been his aide.26 This possibly complicated when electing him as its first military repre- the military chain of command to the attaché sentative abroad? I think not. He appears to and can have made him receive fewer (mili- have seen cannon production to be in the tary) instructions about what to investigate commercial realm, despite its state security than he would otherwise have had. In other consequences. Other representatives of the words, it might have weakened the security military system seem to have held the same perspective link. As noted above, the man- view. I think the story illustrates the power ager of the site where the cannons were cast and quantitative appeal of the commercial also had a background at the royal court, logic and how it tends to affect the perspec- and this might have made the commercial tive of anyone coming close to it. Even today principle more prominent at the expense of we have to be wary not to be carried away the security perspective. by its power. Another possible explanation for the An early version of this text was presented th limited investigation of the Russian threat at the 24 International Congress of the could be found in the way the attaché was History of Science, Technology and Medicine, received in S:t Petersburg. He describes how Manchester July 2013. amiable the tsar was to him,27 and when the mobilization of four Russian army corps The author is a former defense analyst (FOI) made others apprehensive, he assured them and licentiate of technology (KTH).

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Notes

1. SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace 10. Op. cit., The Åker archive, see note 7, e:111, Research Institute, http://armstrade.sipri.org/ 1849-08-15, 1856-08-22, 1856-09-15. armstrade/html/export_toplist.php (2016- 11. “Mortar (weapon)”, Wikipedia, 08); “List of countries by population”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_ Mortar_%28weapon%29. (2016-08) of_countries_by_population. (2016-08) 12. “Licorne”, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia. 2. Ericson, Lars: ”Från sällskap till org/wiki/Licorne. (2016-08) akademi 1796–1870”, in Norberg, Erik 13. ””, Wikipedia, https:// (ed.): Fäderneslandets försvar. Kungl en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carronade. (2016-08) Krigsvetenskapsakademien 1796–1996, 14. Björnstjerna, Oscar Magnus, report 1859-01- Atlantis, Stockholm 1996, p. 98. 19, p. 1; Major Oscar Magnus Björnstjerna’s 3. Cronenberg, Arvid: “Säkerhetspolitik reports are in The Military Archives, och krigsplanering”, in Hugemark, Bo Generalstaben, Statistiska avd, EIa, Ryssland, (ed.): Neutralitet och försvar. Perspektiv Stockholm. på svensk säkerhetspolitik 1809–1985, 15. ibid., 1866-10-15, p. 1. Militärhistoriska förlaget, Stockholm 1986, 16. ibid., 1859-05-25. p. 47. 17. ibid., 1859-09-03. 4. Ericson, Lars: ”Hugo Raab och värnplikten” 18. ibid., 1859-05-25, p. 3-4. in Artéus, Gunnar: Hugo Raab. Förkämpe 19. ibid., 1859-03-28, p. 4. för ett modernt försvar, Försvarshögskolan, 20. ibid., 1859-01-05, p. 11. Stockholm 2003, p. 78. 21. ibid., 1859-05-25, p. 3-4. 5. Wrede, Fabian: “Års-berättelse af 22. ibid., 1859-03-02, p. 3-4. föredraganden för artilleriet” in the 23. ibid., 1859-05-25, p. 4-5. Royal War Academy Proceedings, Kungl 24. Helling, p. E.: “Kanontillverkningen i Sverige, Krigsvetenskapsakademien, Stockholm 1834, jemförd med den i andra länder”, The p. 69. Royal War Academy Proceedings, Kungl 6. Hildebrand, Karl-Gustaf: Swedish Iron in Krigsvetenskapsakademien, Stockholm 1837, the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: p. 362. Export Industry before the industrialization, 25. Op. cit. Björnstjerna, Oscar Magnus, see Jernkontoret, Stockholm 1992, p. 146. note 14, p. 1. 7. The Åker archive, Åkers styckebruk, Martin 26. Svenska arméens anciennetets- tour- och von Wahrendorff, F VII, e:1, 1850-06-06, rang-rulla (The army’s list concerning p. 5. order of precedence), Landtförsvars- 8. Ibid., e:113, 1842-02-15. Departementets Commando-Expedition, 9. Wulff, Petter: “A Steel Disc and its p. A. Norstedt & söner, Stockholm 1857. Consequences”, ICON, Journal of the 27. Op. cit., Björnstjerna, Oscar Magnus, see International Committee for the History note 14, 1858-11-30, 1859-01-05 and 1859- of Technology, Institute for the History 07-16. of Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, 28. ibid., 1859-06-12, p. 3. Warszawa 2015.

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