N R 1 JANUARI/MARS 2017 Security for sale Swedish guns to Russia in the 19th century by Petter Wulff Resumé Sverige har varit en av världens största vapenexportörer i många decennier. I den rollen har landet haft att hantera två skilda förhållningssätt och den tänkbara konflikten dem emellan: Hur ska statens säkerhet avvägas gentemot kommersiella villkor? Artikeln beskriver hur en potentiell konflikt mellan dessa förhållningssätt under1800 -talet betraktades och hanterades. Det gäller den svenska exporten av artilleripjäser till den militära huvudfienden Ryssland. Artikeln diskuterar hur denna idag tämligen otänkbara export kunde komma till stånd. Exporten kan ses som acceptabel bara på vissa villkor, men de var inte uppfyllda i detta fall. Den kommersiella logiken kom med andra ord att äventyra statens säkerhet. sweden has been one of the world’s largest XIV John, to establish a pro-Russian policy exporters of weapons for many decades, and after Sweden’s loss of Finland, was resented, during this time only Israel has exceeded its not to say detested, by army officers.2 A per capita sales of weaponry.1 In this capacity Russian attack was expected to come by sea Sweden has had to deal with two major ideas across the Baltic, and the capital, Stockholm, and their possible conflict – state security and was seen as a primary target.3 One leading commercial logic. The story to be described military thinker (and a future founding father and analyzed here is about a conflict between of Sweden’s general staff of the army) went these ideas in 19th century Sweden. so far as to conclude in 1860 that the slow Swedish mobilization system would make it A security geography difficult to defend the capital.4 Here again, the obvious rationale for the Swedish mili- At that time, Russia was Sweden’s geographi- tary system is seen to be protection against cally dominant neighbor. It covered all the the great eastern neighbor. landmass east of Sweden and the Baltic Sea. This included Finland, which had been taken from Sweden in 1809, ending centuries of A gun geography its being part of Sweden. Such a geopolitical One of the parts of the military system was background made it natural for the Swedish gun production. It was a non-military part military system to see the threat as coming where the commercial logic came in, as pro- from the east. Its ultimate rationale should be duction had been in private hands since the to protect the country against an attack from Thirty Years’ War in the 17th century. At the the vast and great power that lay there. same time the state held an eye on production. To be sure, Russia was seen as the main Directives in the 1830s said that an artillery enemy in military circles. An expression of officer should be present during “the casting this is that the move of the new king, Charles and production”.5 That is, there should be 158 ANALYS & PERSPEKTIV Figure 1. Sweden’s iron can- nons were produced outside of the main iron mining area at the time. (Cannon area in dotted circle. Beside Åker there was Finspång and Stavsjö). Illustration by the author. a military presence throughout the process to run this rather capital-intensive kind of of cannon-making. iron goods manufacturing. Swedish cannons were mainly of iron but There may also have been a metallurgical were, curiously enough, produced outside reason why cannons were produced outside of the main iron mining area. That area of the main mining area. Cannon-making stretched in an east-west band across Sweden required iron ores, or mixes of ores, of spe- a bit north of Stockholm, while the cannon cial quality. This is illustrated in a contract production sites lay further south and closer with the Swedish government, where the ore to the capital. There had been more than a was stipulated to come from five different half-dozen sites, but in the early 19th century mines, each contributing its precise share only three remained. to the mixture.7 This specific location of cannon production Around the middle of the 19th century the could have historical, social or metallurgical leading site for the production of Swedish reasons. Historically, the crown had initiated (iron) cannons was Åkers Styckebruk. It could cannon production and was likely to have be reached from Stockholm by lake or land. wanted sites within reasonable reach from Early in the century its cannon production Stockholm. Socially, the cannon production had run into economic trouble, and a new area “swarmed with aristocratic families”.6 manager had been called in around 1820. They would have had the resources needed He embarked on what can be seen as a two- 159 N R 1 JANUARI/MARS 2017 pronged strategy. It consisted of first finding idea. I can, however, think of three possible new markets for the existing products and legitimations for the export effort. then finding new products. Our interest here Firstly, if the weapons were not of top is mainly with the new markets – or rather quality they would present a limited threat with one new market – namely Russia. to Sweden. Secondly, if they were of high quality, export was more dubious but could A new market – Russia have been a price to pay to ensure the sur- vival of the industry. A third possibility for There is a considerable amount of docu- accepting the export from a security perspec- ments concerning Russia in the Åker archive. tive would be that the weapons were of a Surviving contracts show a vast increase in non-offensive character. gun barrel deliveries in the 1830s, as can be Regarding the first possibility we can see seen in the diagram below. in the diagram that the Swedish armed forces We see that the new market expanded bought Åker cannons along with Russia. The rapidly, so that soon there were more deliv- weapons were obviously seen to be qualita- eries to our main adversary than to our own tively adequate for defending Sweden, and armed forces. It was obviously good com- there is no indication in the Åker archive mercial logic to send hundreds of cannons that the cannons sold to Russia should have to a power willing to pay for them. But how been of a different and less high quality. On could such sales be accepted from a security the contrary, some years after the massive point of view? For someone brought up in deliveries1 recorded in diagram, the tsar of- Sweden of the Cold War era it is an alien fered gratifications to the workers at Åker 300 250 200 150 100 Numberof cannons 50 0 1832 1 833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 Figure 2. Cannon deliveries from Åker in the 1830s. Deliveries to Russia (solid line) as compared to de- liveries to the Swedish army and navy (dashed line). From: The Åker archive, e:3. 160 120 100 80 60 40 Number cannonsof 20 0 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1 300 250 200 150 100 Numberof cannons 50 0 1832 1 833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 ANALYS & PERSPEKTIV 120 100 80 60 40 Number cannonsof 20 0 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 Figure 3. Three kinds of cannons exported to Russia – heavy artillery (solid line), light naval artillery (dashed line), and light army artillery (dotted line). From: The Åker archive, e:11.1 “by virtue of the zeal displayed by them”, character and couldn’t be used in an attack indicating how pleased he was with the crafts- on Sweden. It is a hypothesis that needs manship behind the cannons.8 So the first careful analysis. security legitimation possibility can be ruled out as an explanation of the export. A non-offensive export? The second possibility means that ex- We can get an indication of the possible porting to Russia was seen as a temporary non-offensiveness of the cannons exported, measure to overcome failing demand else- if we look at what kinds of cannons were where – a measure to keep the people at Åker delivered. It turns out that they were of three employed and not lose their manufacturing kinds – heavy artillery, light army artillery, skill and competence, thereby securing fu- and light naval artillery. ture domestic deliveries of cannons. But we Before proceeding, a technical comment know that exports to Russia continued after should be made on the two diagrams present- the 1830s – albeit on a smaller scale. After ed, as the number of cannons in figure2 for the technological breakthrough recorded a specific year does not equal the number in in Wahrendorff’s 1840 patent for breech- figure3 . (For instance the number of cannons 9 loading, there seems to have been a shift from has a peak for 1837 in figure2 but according quantitative to qualitative acquisition; with to figure3 there were no cannons exported sometimes contracts for only a single can- that year). The reason for the discrepancy is non.10 So this was not a temporary measure that figure2 shows cannons delivered, while as suggested by the second explanation. figure 3 shows the number of cannons in A third alternative could be that the can- contracts. Between the signing of a contract nons sent to Russia had a purely defensive and actual delivery of the contracted goods 161 N R 1 JANUARI/MARS 2017 more than a year could pass. Sometimes the A preliminary conclusion to be drawn casting did not give the desired quality and from these descriptions is that the pieces had to be done again. exported were probably partly, but not com- Inspecting and test firing the cannons could pletely, of an offensive character.