Blood at the Crossroads: Making the Case for a Global Arms Trade Treaty 2

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Blood at the Crossroads: Making the Case for a Global Arms Trade Treaty 2 BLOOD AT THE CROSSROADS MAKING THE CASE FOR A GLOBAL ARMS TRADE TREATY Amnesty International is a global movement of 2.2 million people in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion – funded mainly by our membership and public donations. Amnesty International Publications First published in 2008 by Amnesty International Publications International Secretariat Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom www.amnesty.org © Copyright Amnesty International Publications 2008 Index: ACT 30/011/2008 Original language: English Printed by Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publishers. Cover photo: A US soldier aims his weapon at a man who has just been shot by another soldier for failing to stop in Mosul, northern Iraq, on 23 July 2003. US troops had been on high alert in the area after a shootout the previous day in which two sons of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein were killed. © AP Photo/Wally Santana TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction..............................................................................................................5 2. Illustrative cases of irresponsible arms transfers ...............................................12 3. Colombia - small arms supplies fuel grave human rights abuses.....................13 3.1 Guerrilla groups .................................................................................................14 3.2 Paramilitary groups............................................................................................14 3.3 Security forces ...................................................................................................16 3.4 Importing small arms .........................................................................................17 3.5 Illicit small arms supplies ..................................................................................18 3.6 Procuring arms through brokering.....................................................................19 3.7 Lessons from the Colombia case .......................................................................21 4. Côte d’Ivoire – a belated UN arms embargo.......................................................22 4.1 Rearming on all sides before the UN embargo..................................................25 4.2 Shopping lists of arms........................................................................................27 4.3 Lessons from the Côte d’Ivoire case..................................................................28 5. Guatemala - exacerbating violent crime..............................................................29 5.1 A legacy of arms ................................................................................................29 5.2 Failing to protect human rights..........................................................................30 5.3 Continuing small arms supplies.........................................................................32 5.4 Lessons from the Guatemala case......................................................................33 6. Guinea - arms used for excessive force against protestors.................................34 6.1 Deliveries of arms to Guinea during 2003-06....................................................38 6.2 Lessons from the Guinea case............................................................................39 7. Iraq - unceasing small arms supplies worsen carnage and despair ..................39 7.1 US Funded Military Sales to Iraq ......................................................................44 7.2 Sub-contracting..................................................................................................45 7.3 Military equipment supplied by the UK ............................................................50 7.4 Arms procurement by the Government of Iraq..................................................51 7.5 NATO military equipment donations ................................................................53 7.6 Commercial sales of military equipment ...........................................................53 7.7 Recirculation from seizures and stockpiles of weapons ....................................53 7.8 Inadequate training and accountability of Iraqi security forces.........................57 7.9 Lessons from the Iraq case.................................................................................59 8. Myanmar – ongoing misuse of arms transfers....................................................62 8.1 Imposing the crackdown....................................................................................63 8.2 Main suppliers of military equipment to Myanmar ...........................................63 8.3 Abuses since the crackdown ..............................................................................67 8.4 Arms embargoes on Myanmar...........................................................................68 8.5 Responding to the repression.............................................................................69 8.6 Lessons from the Myanmar case........................................................................70 AI Index: ACT 30/011/2008 Amnesty International Blood at the Crossroads: Making the case for a global Arms Trade Treaty 2 9. Somalia - continuing inflow of arms worsens a human rights catastrophe......71 9.1 The UN arms embargo on Somalia....................................................................75 9.2 Clandestine deliveries to armed groups via Eritrea ...........................................77 9.3 Arms deployed from Ethiopia...........................................................................79 9.4 Alleged use of weapons that are inherently indiscriminate ...............................82 9.5 Lessons from the Somalia case..........................................................................83 10. Sudan and Chad - arms flows fuel attacks in Darfur.......................................84 10.1 Continued armed clashes affecting civilians....................................................84 10.2 The UN arms embargo on parties to the Darfur conflict .................................87 10.3 Arms supplies to Sudan and deployments in Darfur .......................................90 10.4 Arms supplies via Chad ...................................................................................97 10.5 Lessons from the case of Darfur ....................................................................100 11. Uganda - disproportionate military force and abuse of small arms .............101 11.1 Uganda government’s forcible disarmament program ..................................102 11.2 Counter-operations against pastoralists and Turkana warriors......................103 11.3 Lessons from the Uganda case......................................................................105 12. Ensuring an ATT has realistic scope................................................................106 12.1 Covering all conventional arms .....................................................................106 12.2 Covering all types of transfers .......................................................................107 13. How to apply human rights standards to arms transfer decisions................109 13.1 International human rights instruments .........................................................109 a. The UN Charter..............................................................................................109 b. Human rights treaties .....................................................................................110 13.2 States’ human rights obligations....................................................................112 a. IHL and human rights law during conflict.....................................................113 b. International criminal law..............................................................................114 13.3 Key concepts for applying international human rights law ...........................114 a. Preventative not Punitive Approach...............................................................115 b. Fairness and Objectivity ................................................................................116 13.4 Practical application of international human rights law to transfer decisions116 a. Recipient state’s attitude ................................................................................116 b. Assessing the nature of the conventional arms and its end-use/end-user ......118 c. Assessing the nature of the conventional arms ..............................................118 d. Assessing the End–User.................................................................................118 e. Risk of Diversion ...........................................................................................120 f. Reaching a decision........................................................................................120 g. At what point does a risk become “substantial”?...........................................121
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