ANATOMY OF VICTORY: 1st CANADIAN CORPS, ALLIED CONTAINMENT STRATEGY AND THE BATTLE FOR THE GOTHIC LINE

By

Lee Windsor

M.A., History, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1996 B.A. (Honours), History, Acadia University, 1993

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor: Dr. J. Marc Milner, (History)

Examining Board: Dr. Sean Kennedy (History) Dr. William Kerr (Classics & Ancient History) Dr. Mike Ircha (Civil Engineering)

External Examiner: Dr. Ron Haycock (History) Royal Military College of Canada

This dissertation is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK

March 2006

© Lee Windsor 2006 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street 395, me Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre r€f6rence ISBN- 978-0-494-69345-2 Our file Notre r&f6rence ISBN: 978-0-494-69345-2

NOTICE: AVIS:

The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lntemet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extra its substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis.

••I Canada For my countrymen asleep in Italy

And those who came home to build our Canada Abstract

For decades, the Second World War Battle of the Gothic Line was understood as the first phase of a major Allied offensive to rid northern Italy of German forces, and press through the Alps to Vienna in the fall of 1944. As such, the attack on the Gothic Line is usually portrayed as a disappointing failure. The front advanced only forty-five miles after weeks of heavy fighting and tens of thousands of casualties on both sides. Established literature describes how this failure resulted from poor Allied planning and leadership, and superior German Army fighting ability, all of which negated Allied material advantages. This study reconsiders conventional interpretations of the battle by posing new questions about the mission assigned to Allied Armies, Italy (AAI), in what was known as Operation Olive. This study also musters substantial case-study evidence of Canadian Army professionalism and combat effectiveness during this engagement, against a German opponent well matched in size and firepower. Instead of breaking through the Alps, the real Allied mission in Italy in the late summer and fall of 1944 was to prevent any of the high-quality German divisions deployed there from re-locating to check the Allied breakout from Normandy, and subsequent drive on the German border. The task was accomplished by relentlessly attacking, destroying or otherwise pinning German units to the Italian front. It was achieved with the barest minimum of manpower and equipment so as not to detract from the main effort in Northwest Europe. The resulting new interpretation is that the assault on the Gothic Line was a daring and highly successful holding attack conducted with what modern soldiers call "economy of force". The fact that Operation Olive's forward momentum stalled as German formations from all over the Mediterranean region packed into northern Italy to stop it, was the very measure of its success. Allied forces succeeded in creating the illusion of a major threat to the German Reich from the south, thus diverting attention from the primary threat to Germany's western border. In effect, the Gothic Line battlefield was the long right flank of the Normandy breakout. After clearly defining the mission for all Allied forces in Italy, 1st Canadian Corps is used as a test case to examine the nature of combat faced by Allied units in the Gothic Line as they overcame the challenge of conducting a strategic diversion with strictly limited resources. This portion of the study reveals much about relative combat capability. It contributes to a growing wave of historical writing suggesting that the Allies developed highly sophisticated military institutions and methods for defeating the German Army in the Second World War. Such ideas challenge conventional views that the celebrated German Army was only beaten by crudely applied numerical and material superiority.

in Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the courage and dedication of tens of thousands of Canadians who served in the Italian Campaign during the Second World War. They are the inspiration and focus of this study. Telling their story accurately, so it might be remembered by future generations, is my humble tribute to these men and a few women, who helped define what it means to be Canadian. While researching their story and discovering its full meaning, I was privileged to serve under and alongside the two finest military historians in Canada. Professor Terry Copp at Wilfrid Laurier University taught me the importance of terrain, and mastering 'fine grain' details of combat to illuminate larger questions. During the past decade, while driving together through the hills and fields of Europe guiding Canadian Battlefields Foundation Tours, Terry showed me the value of veterans' memories of their experience, no matter how long after the event. He also taught me that their simple wish and our duty as historians is not to embellish their stories but merely get them right. Professor Marc Milner at the University of New Brunswick taught me to pause and reflect after sifting through mountains of historical evidence. We spent many days snowshoeing through the York County bush, or paddling and sailing New Brunswick waterways. During these informal 'seminars' ideas were roughed out and refined. Likewise, Marc taught me that duty to this cause meant writing history not just for veterans, soldiers, or historians, but for all Canadians. He is a brilliant editor. His pen sliced away much cloudy wording shrouding the argument and story that follows. I must also thank my external examiner, Professor Ron Haycock of the Royal Military College of Canada. Prof. Haycock made the 'great march east' for the oral defence and offered sound and substantial advice for turning this project into a manuscript. Thanks too must go to members of my extended regimental families, past and present, in the VIII Canadian (Princess Louise's) Hussars and the West Nova Scotia Regiment. From them I learned about unit spirit and service to others. I spent many an evening staring with wonder and curiousity at battle honours on the Colours and other wartime memorabilia on the Mess walls of those two proud Italian Campaign units. My dear friends in and around the Canadian Battlefields Foundation acted as sounding boards over the years as the project took shape. They offered advice, fed and housed me on research trips, scrounged sources and gathered names of veterans eager to add their stories. This list includes The Honourable David Dickson, David Patterson, Geoff Hayes, Serge and Janine Durflinger, Jim Wood, Andrew Iarocci, Tim Cook, Roger Sarty, Darren and Joanne Gibb, Scott and Kirsten Sheffield, Chris Madsen, Douglas Delaney, John Rickard, Celine Garbay, Randy Wakelem, Michelle Fowler, Mike Boire, Cindy and Jeff Smith, Evert Stieber, and Brandey Barton. Most important of all is Mike Bechthold who fought alongside the whole way in Europe and at home. This thesis bears his stamp and would never have been completed without his steady input and encouragement. The Department of History at the University of New Brunswick proved the perfect environment to grow ideas. Here is found a mutually supportive, tight-knit

IV faculty made up entirely of historians who are at once first class resarchers and teachers. All have made a mark, but especially Peter Kent, Sean Kennedy, Ernest Forbes, Gary Waite, Nancy Janovicek, Bill Parenteau, Steve Turner and Cheryl Fury. The most important support of all from the Department came from our dedicated 'Adjutant' and 'Quartermaster-General' Carole Hines and Elizabeth Arnold. They are the machine that makes the Department function and who kept this project on track, often with sugar, even when the days seemed dark. Thanks must also go to my friends and colleagues in the Milton F. Gregg VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society including David Charters, Brent Wilson and Deborah Stapleford. They endured tales of frustration and hardship and always countered with useful suggestions. My students, all unique and exceptional, shaped this effort with their questions and eagerness to know more about Canada in Italy. Anyone who has ventured down this path knows how trying it can be on family members and how their understanding and support is vital. My father, maple syrup craftsman and Royal Canadian Mounted Police Staff Sergeant (Ret'd) R.George Windsor, LSM, taught me about hard work and about being Canadian. My mother, Emily Windsor, taught me about compassion for my fellow human beings. My grandmother, Mary Ulias, taught me how Canada's war effort was Poland's and the world's war effort. My sister, Heather, made sure life didn't get too serious. Lastly, but certainly not least, is my wife Tammy. Her professionalism, polish, and support is reflected on every page here. She is a symbol of all that is noble and good in the Canadian Public Service. Her personal contributions to this project and to the cause of Remembrance went above and beyond.

At the going down of the sun...

Lee Windsor Fredericton New Brunswick 2006.

v Table of Contents

Dedication p. ii

Abstract p. iii

Acknowledgements p. iv

Contents p. vi

List of Maps p. vii

Introduction: The Italian Campaign: Senseless Tragedy or Necessary Sacrifice? p. 1

Book I: Defining the Mission p. 29

Chapter I: Seize Vienna or Kill and Contain the Enemy? p. 30

Chapter II: Competing Narratives and the Fog of Memory p. 70

Chapter III: Planning to Make do with Less p. 94

Chapter IV: Sir Oliver Leese's Adriatic Solution p. 129

Book II: Executing the Mission p. 160

Chapter V: Canada Prepares to Rejoin the Fight p. 161

Chapter VI: Canada, the Redline and the First German Crisis p. 208

Chapter VII: Race for Green Line I p. 234

Chapter VIII: Struggle on the Tomba Di Pesaro High Feature,

Germany's Second Gothic Line Crisis p. 301

Conclusion: Baiting the Wolf, The Cold Reality of Diversionary Operations p. 359

Table I: Order of Battle And Principle Appointments p. 388

Bibliography p. 359

vi List of Maps*

*A11 Maps are foldouts located at the back of corresponding chapters so they might be employed while reading the relevant chapter or chapters.

Mediterranean Theatre and Southern Europe Following p. 69 (US Army Centre for Military History)

Italian Campaign Front, August 1944 and Concept of Operation Olive Following p. 128 (US Army Centre for Military History)

Gothic Line, Adriatic Sector Following p. 207 (United Kingdom History of the Second World War)

Canadian Operations in the Red Line, 25-28 August 1944 Following p. 233 (Historical Section, Canadian Army General Staff)

Canadian Operations in Green Line I, 30 August -2 September 1944 Following p. 358 (Historical Section, Canadian Army General Staff)

Tomba di Pesaro High Feature, 1:25 000 Scale Topgraphical Survey Following p. 358 Note: 1 Grid Square ' 1 km2

Pursuit from Green Line I to Green Line II Following p. 387

Eighth Army Operations from Green Line II, Coriano Ridge to Rimini Following p. 387 (Historical Section, Canadian Army General Staff)

vn Introduction: The Italian Campaign: Senseless Tragedy or Necessary Sacrifice?

Recent 50th and 60th Anniversary celebrations of Allied victory in the Second

World War cast a warm glow on veterans of that struggle, reinforcing their revered status in the consciousness of participating nations. Those veterans are the heros of what Dwight D. Eisenhower called "The Great Crusade". Their task was to destroy an ideological system that threatened to enslave or exterminate the peoples of the world.

Be they sailors aboard warships or merchantmen in the Atlantic, bomber aircrew in the skies over Germany, or soldiers on the beaches of Normandy, the popular consensus is that they performed their duty well during what American historian Studs Turkel immortalized as "The Good War".1 Canadian General H.D.G. "Harry" Crerar wrote of those veterans that "wherever their birthplace, they were in a desperate game as members of a team and the winning of it, by that team was the only thing that really mattered."2

Evoked as part of this conception of the Great Crusade or the Good War was the idea of purposeful sacrifice. Germany had to be beaten, and the war had to be brought to her. This was certainly done by airmen of the Combined Bomber Offensive, while

Allied armies from both eastern and western fronts fought their way into Germany, finally extinguishing German resistance when the two invading armies met on the River

Jeffery A. Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada's Second World War. (Vancouver: 2004) pp. 3-4.

2 Francis Trevelyan Miller, History of World War II: Armed Services Memorial Edition (Ottawa: 1948).

1 Elbe and elsewhere in 1945. Against this backdrop of direct assault and occupation only one front seemed a comparative failure - only one front failed to lead to Germany - the

Italian front.

The idea that the Italian campaign was a tragic and wasteful chapter in an otherwise celebrated effort is embedded in Canadian popular perceptions of the war.

This was particularly evident during the official government and Royal Canadian Legion pilgrimage to major battlefields in Italy in 2004. Featured among a series of Toronto

Globe and Mail articles about the visit was an editorial capturing the prevailing view.

Columnist Doug Saunders' piece, "Canada's Quagmire in the Italian Mud", claimed that

Canadian troops were sacrificed in a campaign that was "controversial from the beginning and that much of the world considered irrelevant or misguided." The column conveys the bitterness many veterans felt about the experience that left many

"wondering what it had all been about". Saunders emphatically concludes that "most historians now agree that the leadership in Italy B combined with the country's impassable terrain, which would have given pause to more seasoned leaders B made it a campaign that should not have been waged."3 This thesis is about 57 000 Canadian soldiers who took part in that campaign in 1944. The aim is to determine whether their efforts, and the sacrifices made by thousands of them, was worthwhile.

On the larger stage the achievement of Allied forces fighting in Italy is overshadowed by more decisive events in Northwest Europe in 1944. Indeed, western

3 Doug Saunders, ACanada's Quagmire in the Italian Mud", The Globe and Mail (6 Nov 2004) pp. F5 - F6.

2 Allied strategy and nearly all military operations centred on landing an unstoppable army in Normandy to destroy Germany's forces in the field before marching to Berlin. Italian events prior to the "D-Day" landings in Normandy on June 6th held part of the wartime media spotlight and generated some postwar historical attention, especially when tangible strategic goals were at stake.4 Those manifestly clear objects included securing

Mediterranean shipping lanes, seizing airfields from which to strike Germany's southern industry and oil supply, and knocking Italy out of the war. However, these goals were accomplished by the time Rome fell on June 5th 1944, mere hours before British,

Canadian and American paratroopers dropped into Normandy ahead of the massive seaborne invasion. As a result, many historians of the war in Europe label subsequent events in Italy as a "sideshow". For some, the distraction was unnecessary and even counter-productive. The historical debate over why Allied ground forces continued operations in Italy after June 6*, and what these were supposed to achieve, is dwarfed by discourse on Normandy, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Combined Bomber Offensive, the

Pacific War and the Russian Front.5 Yet, between August 25th and November 15th 1944,

4 General Sir Harold Alexander, commander of Allied Armies, Italy(AAI) expressed great concern that his soldiers were forgotten after June 6 by politicians and the media. W.O. 214/34 - Alexander Papers, Letter from General Alexander to the CIGS, 18 July 1944.

5 Only two scholarly works exist in English on the subject, one by a British journalist/participant, and a volume of the British official history series. See: Douglas Orgill, The Gothic Line. (New York: 1967) and W.G.F Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol VI, Victory in the Mediterranean, Part II June to October 1944. (London: 1987). In addition, a small handful of articles and chapters in campaign monographs also exist. Each is addressed below. This compares to many hundreds of titles on the war at sea, in the air and on the western and eastern fronts in the final two years of the war.

3 after the decisive Battle of Normandy concluded, Allied forces in Italy fought their most difficult and intense battle of the entire campaign against the strongest and most violent

German resistence yet encountered. Even veterans of the bitter struggle around Monte

Cassino the previous winter never experienced such German tenacity mixed with the tremendous weight of enemy firepower that they encountered in Italy in the fall of 1944.

The assault on the Gothic Line between August and October 1944 was also a traumatic event for Canada. 1st Canadian Corps, representing nearly half the nation's entire ground force, fought at the centre of this grim struggle until pulled from the front with 50% of its riflemen dead or wounded and the survivors physically and mentally exhausted. Losses were so great that when combined with devastating Canadian casualties in Northwest Europe in the same period Canada's military manpower system collapsed, resulting in the second conscription crisis of the war.6

The viciousness of the Italian fighting caused equal hardship for other Allied participants, including the free Poles, anti-Fascist Italians, India, New Zealand, the

United States, and Great Britain. The British were forced to break up divisions and reduce infantry battalions from four companies to three to produce replacement soldiers

6 To avoid division between English and French Speaking Canadians of the sort that led to domestic violence during the Great War in 1917, Prime-Minister William Lyon MacKenzie King resisted pressure to send conscripted soldiers into combat in the Second World War. The first crisis came in 1942 when legal restrictions on the use of conscripts only for home defence were repealed. Yet, for two more years King insisted the necessity of sending conscripts abroad had not arrived so as not to alienate French Canada. The second crisis came in the fall of 1944 when staggering losses in Europe generated enough public, political and military pressure to force King in November to release conscripts to fill large holes in the overseas army. See J.L. Granatstein. Conscription in the Second World War, 1939-1945: A Study in Political Management. (Toronto: 1969).

4 for remaining units. Yet, for all the suffering and loss of those ten weeks,

"Allied Armies, Italy" (AAI)7 advanced only 45 miles and remained stuck in the rearmost positions of the Gothic Line. The question of whether their gain in "real- estate", with all its First World War allusions, was worth the price is a matter for debate among participants, commentators and historians. On the surface, the Italian campaign in general and the assault on the Gothic Line in particular appear to have been operationally and strategically pointless as well as being executed by tactically inept commanders. In short, the lives sacrificed in Italy after 6 June 1944 were a brutal waste.

Discussion of Italian campaign cost-versus-benefit questions crystalized shortly after the war within a framework describing it as strategically separate from the

Northwest European front. Each, it seemed, had independent and only loosely coordinated goals. After the fall of Rome and the landings in France, Allied goals in

Italy appeared to be Venice, the mountain passes near Ljubljana, and Vienna. In other words, Italy B like France B was a potential avenue of advance directly into the Reich, and success or failure was measured against how far that advance progressed.

Contributors to this debate introduce their work with the idea that operations in Italy were supposed to support those in Northwest Europe, but they nevertheless direct most of their analysis to the question of how well Allied commanders and their armies performed in the drive northward out of Italy aimed at a decisive and potential war- winning result.

7 Allied Armies, Italy is the 1943-44 title for what was an Army Group-sized formation known in Sicily as 18th Army Group and after December 1944 as 15th Army Group.

5 Within this interpretation, the offensive to break the Gothic Line was a failure, stopped by a skilful German defence and in spite of overwhelming Allied superiority in tanks, artillery, and air power. Those historians who acknowledge that the Allies performed some magnificent feats of arms in the opening weeks of the battle profess that any opportunities those successes created were squandered by poor generalship, flawed planning, slow reaction times, and a ponderous administrative and supply system.9 The most notable proponent of this view is former British war correspondent Douglas Orgill, on whose work much subsequent scholarly analysis of the offensive is based. He writes that, "British soldiers are traditionally slow to exploit" and "less likely" to take the

"risky gambles" necessary to press their attacks home. Orgill concludes that the Allied advance through the Gothic Line was too slow to win a decisive victory and in the end brought only "frustration and disillusion".10 John Strawson agreed that the offensive to

"Vienna" bogged down in the "rain, blood, mud and cold" of "the Apennines," leading him to focus on the question of "what had gone wrong and how was it that the Germans,

8 Orgill, p. 12-13, 21.

9 Such works include British and American official histories and Canadian Forces staff studies of the battle by William J. McAndrew, produced after publication of the Canadian Official History, as well as the more recent campaign monographs produced by veterans. See W.G.F Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol VI, Victory in the Mediterranean, Part IUune to October 1944. (London: 1987); E.J. Fisher, United States Army in World War II: Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Cassino to the Alps. (Washington: 1977); William J. McAndrew, "Eighth Army at the Gothic Line: Commanders and Plans." Royal United Services Institute Journal (RUSI), March 1986, "Eighth Army at the Gothic Line: The Dog-Fight." RUSI Journal, June 1986; John Strawson, The Italian Campaign. (London: 1987)

10 Orgill, pp. 131-134.

6 despite Allied air supremacy, had been able to hold the line?"11 Even J. Ehrman's

British official volumes of the Grand Strategy series, arguably the most sympathetic assessment of Mediterranean operations in 1944, conclude that the Gothic Line offensive failed to achieve "a decisive advance" or to avoid another "deadlock" on the

Italian front in the winter of 1944-45. Canadian historians agree. William McAndrew argues that the Allies were unable "to hold the advantage it [Eighth Army] gained with such verve" and that at the "decisive moment" their forces were "unable to move, let

1") alone pursue". The unifying conclusion found in nearly all histories of the battle is that the Allies failed to reach their stated goal of crossing the Po River, seizing Venice, and pressing beyond to Vienna, thus contributing to a possible end of the war by Christmas

1944. This perception about the higher conduct of the campaign continues to inform new work on the subject, including McKay Jenkins' recent study of the United States

Army's highly specialized 10th Mountain Division in The Last Ridge. Jenkins explains that formation's entry into battle in early 1945 as part of an effort to restart a Gothic Line offensive that "bogged down, unable to push through to the Po Valley."13

The parameters of this debate were defined before full disclosure in the late

1980's of the extent to which Allied strategy was driven by intelligence from German

1' Strawson, p. 166.

12 John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol 6 October 1944-August 1945 (London: 1976) p. 40, See also: Vol 5, August 1943-September 1944; McAndrew, ACommanders and Plans", p. 50.

13 McKay Jenkins, The Last Ridge: The Epic Story of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division and the Assault on Hitler's Europe (New York: 2003) p. 132.

7 signals decrypts, known as Ultra. As the most recent volume of The Official

Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War contends,

Ultra decrypts are not just vital to understanding Allied strategic decision-making, they formed the "basis of Allied and Canadian operations".14 This is true of land battles as well; therefore, the history of Allied operations in Italy cannot be complete without knowledge of how they were defined, and, in some instances, limited by Ultra intelligence. Indeed, Ultra evidence reveals an intimate relationship between battles in

Italy and Northwest Europe previously understood by only the most senior Allied commanders. The significance of these revelations became increasingly apparent in the 1980's. However, is was not until thel988 publication of F.H. Hinsley's exhaustive review of Ultra decrypts in his volume of British Intelligence in the Second World War pertaining to events in 1944 and Ralph Bennett's analysis of the implications of that intelligence a year later in Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy that the full impact was revealed.

Hinsley and his team of researchers were the first historians to have "unrestricted access to all intelligence records as well as to other archives."16 Bennett, having served during the war as a top analyst and advisor on information gathered from this source,

14 W.A.B. Douglas; R. Sarty; M. Whitby, No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943 Volume II, Part 1. (St. Catherines: 2002) p. xvii.

F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations: Vol 3, Pi //(London: 1988) and Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy. (New York: 1989).

16 Hinsley, Part Up. ix.

8 provided an insider's perspective. Together they clarified how Allied efforts in Italy and

Northwest Europe were closely tied, not just strategically, but in the day-to-day operational conduct of the war. Hinsley and Bennett also reveal truths about Allied expectations and intentions at the highest levels of command. For decades, the "Ultra

Secret" meant that much about these expectations was simply speculated on or described based on incomplete evidence. Hinsley and Bennett establish conclusively what those expectations were. In the process they unveiled the degree to which Allied leaders

"recognized the interdependence between Overlord and operations in the

Mediterranean".17

Hinsley and Bennett confirm that rather than a competition existing between the campaigns in Italy and Northwest Europe, the former was conceived of and executed to guarantee the success of the latter. The problem with earlier accounts of the Italian campaign, and most recent writing based on them, is that they are too narrowly conceived and fail to view events in Italy, especially after June 1944, as part of a co­ ordinated Allied offensive in the west.

The strategic mission assigned to Allied Armies, Italy (AAI), and thus to 1st

Canadian Corps, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in August 1944 was to continue containing and wearing down as many German divisions as possible so that they could not be withdrawn to face Overlord forces in France. While "contain and wear down" may seem sterile and vague today, the 1944 meaning was clear. Allied units were to pin

17 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations: Vol 3, Pt I (London: 1984) pp. 10 - 11.

9 the twenty-seven Axis divisions defending Italy as part of German Army Group "C" by attacking and destroying as much of their manpower and equipment as possible, and

forcing the balance to remain committed to battle and unable to move elsewhere.

Documentary evidence from high level Allied and German headquarters and from frontline Canadian units suggests that the price paid in the bitter Gothic Line fighting yielded this important containment dividend, especially in light of German will to prosecute the war into 1945. Yet, it is not a prize that can be measured by miles travelled on a map. Instead, victory was achieved by creating a credible threat to

Germany's southern flank, a threat so grave that many of Hitler's best formations remained in Italy while decisive battles raged along the very borders of the Reich. These elite German formations were unable to intervene when the Allies pressed through

Belgium, Holland, and Poland. German units in Italy were so decimated by Allied attacks on the Gothic Line that they had to be reinforced from the precious pool of human and material resources secretly hoarded for Hitler's 1944-45 winter offensive.18

The magnificence of this victory lies in the story of Allied units in battle. It is widely accepted that the lethality of mid-20th century weapons demanded that assaulting forces needed at least three to one odds to carry an attack. This was especially necessary between opponents as well matched in training, preparedness and determination as were the Allies and Germans in 1944. However, in the Gothic Line Allied soldiers attacked without the benefit of numerical or significant material superiority. In most Gothic Line

Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions, 1940-1945. (Munich: 1997) pp. 255-271.

10 engagements attacking Canadian units were equal in numbers and firepower to their defending enemy and on occasion deficient in both. This reality is especially startling considering that Italian terrain and weather heavily favoured the defender. Nevertheless, the Canadians smashed open German defences and destroyed all counter-attacks, not once, but in the first month of the offensive four times in succession, creating a series of crises so great that German commanders believed their armies were in danger of total collapse and destruction. Far from being a lost opportunity to break-through, Canadian and Allied improvisation, innovation, skill and determination succeeded in convincing

German commanders that break-through and total defeat in Italy was conceivable.

Allied Armies, Italy accomplished this feat even though force ratios, terrain, and weather meant any such breakthrough was actually impossible.

Re-labelling the Battle of the Gothic Line a victory at first seems the anti-thesis of all other historical writing on the subject, but in effect it builds on it. Earlier historians of the campaign, who labelled the battle a lost opportunity or a defeat, unanimously identify Allied weakness in Italy after over a quarter of their strength was removed for Operation Dragoon in the French Riviera during the late summer of 1944.

This redeployment occurred while the Allies were in full pursuit of German armies defeated in the great battles for Cassino, the Hitler Line and Rome earlier that summer.

Historians agree that as the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff removed seven divisions19 from the Italian front for Dragoon, Hitler and his commanders moved in half

1 Divisions are generally the lowest indivisible, self-contained administrative and operational organizations. They are the building blocks of modern armies and their relative numbers in Italy, both Allied and German is central to the argument. Depending

11 a dozen fresh German divisions, along with tens of thousands of replacements to re­ build units already there.20 During the summer of 1944, Allied and German infantry strength in Italy equalized. Nor did German units suffer from shortages of ammunition.

The inherent advantage for German defenders offered by restrictive Italian terrain and frequently overcast skies more than made up for any Allied edge in tank, artillery, and air superiority.

The inevitable result of the reduction in Allied strength and infusion of German reinforcements was to slow the Allied pursuit from Rome to a crawl in July, and bring it to a full stop in front of the Gothic Line by August 1944. Exhausted and weakened

Allied divisions needed time to rest, re-supply and organize for a new set-piece offensive if they were to maintain pressure on the Germans. Only an all-out offensive to bash through the Gothic position and drive hard for the Alps could convince the Germans they needed to maintain their heightened strength there. Unfortunately, Overlord priorities, the Dragoon landings, and the overall limitations of Allied military strength in mid-1944 necessitated there would be barely enough resources left in Italy to break into the Gothic Line defences, let alone break through and beyond them.

Existing scholarship acknowledges that the Allied strategic purpose for attacking the Gothic Line was the same as it was throughout the Italian Campaign: to contain and

on type and nationality, divisions range between 12 000 and 20 000 personnel including their own supporting arms and services.

20 See note 6 as well as G.W.L. Nicholson, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Vol. II: The Canadians in Italy. (Ottawa: 1957)

12 wear down German formations. However, most histories stop at identifying the strategic goal. Eighth Army's assault on the Gothic Line, known as Operation Olive, has yet to be evaluated in light of its containment objective and post-Dragoon limitations. Instead it is measured against the traditional Second World War yardstick of the amount of "real estate" captured. For example, the first three Battles of Cassino in early 1944 are viewed almost universally as disasters because they failed to move the front in Italy beyond the

") 1 imposing heights around Monte Cassino. By contrast, the fourth battle which broke the Gustav and Hitler Lines, captured Rome and advanced 200 miles north is recorded as the only significant victory of the campaign. Of that fourth battle, Shelford Bidwell and

Dominick Graham wrote that "at last the Allied high command had resolved to wage war in more enlightened style than the one which ensure the string of failures which had marked the past three months."22 Orgill was less forgiving and wrote off 1944 as "a bitter year B a year of blood and disappointment, lightened only by the triumph of the fall of Rome. The hopes of 1943 withered in the face of the fighting on the Sangro, the stalemate at Cassino and Anzio."23 Significant forward movement provides a primary, if not the only, indicator of success for these and most other histories of Second World

War land campaigns.

General W.G.F. Jackson's influential fourth volume of the British official

21 See for example, Field Marshal Lord Carver, Chapter 5, ASecond and Third Cassino Battles" War in Italy, 1943 -1945. (London: 2001).

22 Dominick Graham; Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943 - 1945, (New York: 1986) p. 222.

23 Orgill, p. 11.

13 history of Allied operations in The Mediterranean and Middle East, compares the

"highly successful" advance to Rome initiated by the fourth Cassino offensive with the

"much less successful autumn battles fought by the Allied Armies in Italy to break into the Po Valley."24 Jackson wrote that the timely arrival of German reinforcements in

September 1944 and mounting Allied losses meant that "the chances for a breach" in the enemy line through which an armoured breakout could be launched, "had vanished".25

In the introduction to his study of the Battle of the Gothic Line, William McAndrew reminds readers that the goal of the fall offensive seemed to be to clear all of Italy and advance to the Alps.26 United States Army official historian Ernest J. Fisher describes how this goal was foiled by a stalwart German defence of the Gothic Line. Yet, effective German resistance, he criticizes, "is insufficient to justify failure to turn what was clearly a deep salient [created in the opening days of Olive] into a breakthrough."

As a result, Fisher lamented, ten days after the offensive started "the possibility of breakthrough, if it indeed ever existed, passed." Forward movement stopped and led to

"stalemate" on the Adriatic front.27

Douglas Orgill writes that the Allies advanced so slowly that by the time they reached the Po Valley, "Generals Rain and Mud arrived" to stop Allied armoured divisions from racing across the numerous water obstacles of the Plain of Lombardy. "It

24 Jackson, Mediterranean Vol VI, Part 2 p. xiii.

25 Jackson, Mediterranean Vol VI, Part 2 p. 305.

26 McAndrew, ACommanders and Plans" p. 50.

27 Fisher, pp. 316-321.

14 was clear" he writes "that Vienna and even the Po were out of reach." "Alexander himself had virtually admitted failure by a broadcast to the partisans on 13 November.

They were ordered to call off large scale operations, and go on the defensive."28 The

official Canadian Army historian of the Italian campaign, Lieutenant Colonel G.W.L

Nicholson, titled his chapter on the fighting in September 1944: "The Offensive is

Checked". In Tug of War Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham complained that the

opportunity to get to the Po River was lost "because of lack of forethought, bad

management, inertia, and passage of no or faulty information." Jackson, Fisher, Orgill,

McAndrew, Nicholson, Bidwell and Graham all ultimately conclude that the operation

failed when forward advance stopped in the fall.

This assessment represents the standard western interpretation as all other

historical works which mention the Italian campaign refer to one or more of these six

core narratives. Even the well-balanced British official series on grand strategy and

coalition planning which, like Bidwell and Graham, is sympathetic to the containment

concept concludes in the end that Olive failed after "the impetus of the advance had been

lost".30 Orgill's final analysis, still held as the standard, opines "Sixty-four days had

passed since Leese's three army corps had rumbled across the River Metauro to open the

Gothic Line campaign; and after all the blood and toil, the two armies were stopped at

28 Orgill, pp. 189, 215.

29 Bidwell; Graham, p. 362.

See John Ehrman, Grand Strategy: Volume V, August 1943 - September 1944. (London: 1956) pp. 361, 526 - 531.

15 the very frontier of victory".31

Because Olive's initial rapid advance turned to a slow and bloody dogfight in

September and then to a turtle crawl in October, historians unanimously see failure.

They see failure to maintain movement on the battlefield, failure to reach the Po, and ultimately failure to reach the "glittering prize" that all soldiers involved were ordered to

strive for, Vienna. The findings from this study make it clear that success in the diversionary attack on the Gothic Line ought not to be measured by the failure to reach

Vienna or even the Po River. Instead, the attack should be assessed by determining whether German commanders were convinced that a threat to Vienna and other vital

German interests existed and was worth responding to with significant amounts of their increasingly stretched military power B and at a time when Allied armies were poised on the Rhine and Russian forces were overrunning eastern Germany.

The efforts of earlier historians to unlock the secret of Allied intentions in Italy

were greatly hampered by a serious underestimation among senior Allied leaders of remaining available German manpower and industrial capacity in the latter half of 1944.

In late August British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Alanbrooke, wrote in his diary that "the Germans cannot hold out much longer." In September, U.S. Army

Chief of Staff General George Marshall issued instructions to his commanders in the

field to be ready for an end of the war in Europe by 1 November 1944 "although he

31 Orgill, p. 215.

32 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke; eds: Alex Danchev; Daniel Todman, War Diaries, 1939 - 45 (London: 2001) 28 August 1944.

16 warned that a "cessation of hostilities may occur at any time." There was a sound basis for this belief. After all, the Allied strategic concept for final victory specified creating conditions for a lightning drive into Germany by first eroding German military manpower and industrial capacity to the breaking point. The British Joint Intelligence

Committee, now known to be the sacred guardians of Ultra information, believed as early as July that that point was within reach. They calculated that the "rate of destruction" inflicted on the enemy during the first six months of the year included over a million battlefield casualties.34 The Committee reported to the Combined Chiefs that

"it was difficult to see how the Germans could carry on past December so long as attacks on all fronts were pressed home." By the eve of the second Quebec conference in early

September 1944, they guessed that collapse could come "quite soon".35

Allied commanders can perhaps be forgiven for not appreciating Germany's irrational decision to support Hitler's plan for a great winter offensive to defeat the western Alliance in a final desperate gamble. Hitler reasoned that in the best case the

Allies might join his quest against Jews and communism or at least quit the war, leaving

Germany alone to face the Soviets. His decision resulted in continued German hope for a favourable peace, and one last comb-out of military age males combined with a final maximum industrial effort at the very moment the Allies desperately needed an

33 Denis Whitaker; Shelagh Whitaker, Tug of War: The Allied Victory that Opened Antwerp (Toronto: 2000) p. 87.

34 This figure includes losses inflicted on the Russian Front.

35Ehrman, pp. 394-403.

17 operational pause after the exhausting battles of the summer of 1944. The willingness, forced or otherwise, of Germans to participate in Hitler's Gotterdammerung (national suicide) breathed new life into Germany's badly mauled armies. Their recovery could not bring victory, but it was enough for one final struggle to the death that guaranteed

Nazi Germany would survive one more winter and that millions more would perish.

This interpretation has evolved since the release of Ultra documents and other post-Cold

War sources, including recent findings by German military historians.36 Most landmark histories of the Second World War in Europe published before the mid -1990's presume the war was winnable in 1944, especially if the Allies were more competent on the battlefield. It is now clear that this was never the case.

Presumptions that victory was possible in 1944 were fuelled by Cold War bi­ polar international affairs and western security concerns. In the midst of east-west tension, western historians studying the battles of 1939-1945 did so often to provide insight to NATO defence policy makers and commanders tasked with defeating the

Warsaw Pact in a Third World War. The Cold War experience is not necessarily unique: military history was traditionally didactic in purpose.37 Nonetheless, this method gained renewed importance in the late 1970's and 80's as academics struggled to

36 Magenheimer pp. 255-57; Bemhard R. Kroener, Rolf Deiter-Muller, Hans Umbreit, Germany and the Second World War: Volume V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Influence, Part II, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources, 1942 - 1945. (Oxford: 2003) p. 990.

37 David A. Charters; Marc Milner; J. Brent Wilson, eds, Military History and the Military Profession (Westport: 1992).

18 make sense of Vietnam and as NATO began to turn from nuclear to conventional

ID military options. By then military history was well established in a pattern of being less interested in expatiating on victory as they were in curing perceived problems and failures in the Allied military system.

This line of historical inquiry was earlier fed by a program run by American staff officers and uniformed historians in the opening days of the Cold War. At that time, when the possibility of a clash with the Red Army was first evident, officers in a newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization were particularly interested in learning from their former German adversaries. German commanders appeared to be the world's leading experts on the art of war, especially modern, fast-paced, mechanized campaigns fought to achieve quick decisions with tolerable casualties. NATO interest was doubtlessly prudent given that the German army was the only one to have recently fought huge Soviet armoured forces. Unfortunately, problems arose when these early chroniclers and those historians who followed them, relied heavily on testimony from wartime German commanders. Many of these German accounts, some provided by prisoners waiting for the gallow and looking to have war crimes sentences commuted, have now being identified as self-serving and often incorrect.39

Other commentators, advocating defence readiness to NATO governments, warned how British and American defence indifference in the 1930's cost them dearly in

Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. (Toronto: 2003) p. 7. 39 James A. Wood, "Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961," The Journal of Military History 69 (January 2005): 123-148.

19 time and lives when war broke out in 1939. In 1983, in the midst of heightened east- west tension and a new conventional arms race David Fraser wrote, "if ever we hear echoes in contemporary events of the wasted twenty years before 1939 we should recall with melancholy what followed, and the young lives lost which realism and preparedness might have saved."40 In this context, the example of inferior numbers of well trained, German mobile troops skilfully led by officers and NCO's who practised their art long before the outbreak of war rather than at the last minute, holding back massed Soviet armoured forces was taken as the model that NATO planners should emulate. This concept was crucial to NATO's conventional deterrence strategy of the

1980's.

Historians adopting this view emphasized great German martial skill and were backed up by Allied veterans respectful of their foe. According to this interpretation, neither the western Allies or the Soviets could match that skill and professionalism, and were left with no choice but to use their overwhelming numerical and material superiority to bludgeon the Germans to death with what John Ellis dubbed, "Brute

Force." Ellis contends that "American, Russian and British commanders made considerably less than optimum use of the resources at their disposal and in almost every theatre serious mistakes were made. This is not to say that there was a wilful disregard for human life, but rather that commanders seemed unable to impose their will upon the enemy except by slowly and persistently battering him to death with a blunt instrument".

In Ellis' model success is measured by miles travelled in great sweeping advances into

40 David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second

20 the enemy's depth to decapitate command elements, or to encircle and isolate the opponents force thus attaining victory with minimal bloodshed. The poorly trained, badly led, citizen soldiers of the western Allies could never replicate Germany's

Blitzkrieg advances into Poland, France and Russia between 1939-41.41

This form of performance measurement perhaps appealed to Cold War historians who were raised in a world united in revulsion at the bloody attritional strategies of the

Great War which bought such limited geographic gains. By that measure, German

"Blitzkrieg" was a vastly superior method. Vietnam may also have influenced historical writing, as much of the operational analysis of Second World War ground combat was produced during or in the aftermath of that conflict in which seemed again to exemplify the folly of measuring success by counting enemy bodies.43

As a result, by the 1980's the "Brute Force" school was the predominant western interpretation of the Second World War. Scholars in this camp joined a chorus of veterans-turned-historians critical of Allied senior leadership. Many of these participants appreciate the unique supporting role of operations in Italy to events elsewhere, but contend that commanders prosecuted the campaign inefficiently. Such clumsiness, often a product of arrogance, petty jealousy, and poor judgement among commanders, needlessly prolonged the campaign and thus the war. These Italian

World War. (Norwalk: 1983) p. x. 41 John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War. (New York: 1990) p. xviii. 42 Paul Fussell is among the most well-known historians to identify the Great War as a cultural watershed after which western understanding of modern war was forever changed. See his: Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: 1975). 43 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History. (New York: 1983) p. 17.

21 campaign historians, mainly from the United Kingdom, fall largely into this second group. This group, including war correspondent Wynford Vaughn-Thomas and campaign veterans Douglas Orgill, John Strawson, and the renowned W.G.F. Jackson, shaped modern interpretations of the campaign by vividly illustrating tremendous hardships endured on bleak Italian mountainsides alternating between oppressive heat and dust in the summer and impassable, bone-chilling mud in winter. No doubt influenced by their own battle experience, frustration with Italian conditions, and personal loss, they gave birth to a sense of futility and waste for generally disappointing gains. Strawson wrote in 1987 that the popular British literary view of the Second

World War campaign in Italy is more akin to the bitter, cynical, anti-war writing about the Great War including all its allusions to young British "lions" dying on muddy hillsides while their "donkey" generals stayed sheltered behind the lines in extravagant

Italian Casas. Strawson even compares the oft cited experience of celebrated writer

Siegefried Sasson in the muddy trenches of the Western Front to the "sheer awfulness" of "Cassino or the Gothic Line".44

The Cold War search for military improvement combined with the participants' critique of generalship to produce a body of historical writing concerned with Allied effectiveness against German armies in Italy, accentuating those battles which produced disaster. The inability to prevent the German evacuation of Sicily, the alleged near defeat at Salerno, the multiple bloody repulses at Monte Cassino, and the supposed

44 Strawson, pp. 18-20. The expression Alions led by donkey's" is often used to describe the British Expeditionary Force in the Great War. It became especially well known after the publication of Alan Clark's The Donkeys in 1961.

22 failure to exploit opportunity at Anzio are among the most popular Italian campaign topics. The problem with this approach is that it does not sufficiently relate how decisions and expectations formed at the strategic level in London and Washington, influenced by Ultra intelligence and German reactions, shaped those battles. This study therefore opens with the question of what Allied commanders sought to achieve in the

Italian campaign strategically and operationally, with the benefit of knowing what they knew or did not know through Ultra, and with the fresh perspective now possible in a post-Cold War world. Most importantly of all, this study contemplates the Battle of the

Gothic Line on the premise that Germany had the resources and resolve to prosecute the war into 1945.

In this context continuing the Allied containment mission in Italy remained crucial, even after the Battle for Normandy was decided. The confusing hopes expressed by some that Vienna was attainable in 1944 were conceived when Germany's collapse still appeared imminent and within a scenario in which Army Group "C" might abandon

Italy for a final stand on Germany's southern frontier. However, senior Allied commanders knew that if Germany did not collapse in 1944 then their soldiers must continue the work of "bleeding and burning" German strength in Italy, to ensure that

Overlord forces could acquire good bases for their assault on the last remaining German armies in the west as early in 1945 as weather conditions would allow. Therefore, in addition to developing a credible threat to Germany's southern flank, Canadian and

Allied success in the Gothic Line must also be measured by the amount of death and destruction inflicted upon German divisions in Italy in light of the limited resources the

23 Allies were willing to make available there.

The approach of renowned Atlantic Canadian historian Ernest Forbes influences this study. His deconstruction of central Canadian stereotypes about the Maritime provinces and his propensity to ask questions of those asking historical questions is equally applicable to building a new interpretation of a battle and indeed an entire campaign.45 The historical method used to frame and seek answers to the questions described above also draws heavily on the work of Terry Copp and the late Robert Vogel at Wilfrid Laurier and McGill Universities respectively. In the 1980's they turned away from traditional military history emphasizing great leaders and key decisions. They pioneered a new method combining a fresh, post-Ultra examination of strategic realities together with a study of combat at the brigade and battalion levels. Their aim was to uncover what happened on the battlefield when soldiers executed command decisions.

In particular, Copp's greatest contribution was to scour a vast array of documentary evidence and interview material to determine how battles unfolded with a type of

"bottom up" perspective associated with his early background in Canadian social history. This method invariably yields new insights on the established history of the

Second World War. Mainly, Copp and Vogel offer a clearer understanding of why events in the past happened the way they did rather than an explanation of why the

Allies could not perform better.46

45 See Ernest Forbes, Challenging the Regional Stereotype: Essays on the 20th Century Maritimes. (Fredericton: 1989). 46 See the Maple Leaf Route series by Terry Copp and Robert Vogel between 1983 and 1988 and Copp's most recent treatise Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. (Toronto: 2003)

24 The method used here is also influenced by the work of Dominick Graham and

Marc Milner from the University of New Brunswick who, beginning in the 1970's, similarly rejected traditional top-down histories of military leadership. Graham and

Milner situate command decisions within the context of how military organizations think, learn, train, and wage war. Milner applied that method in an exhaustive study of

Canadian, British and American documents concerning naval combat in the Battle of the

Atlantic. This resulted in a significant reinterpretation of the Allied campaign against the U-Boats that, like Copp and Vogel's work, seeks to understand why history unfolded as it did instead of why it did not unfold in a manner some participants and Cold War practitioners may have liked.47 In the past three decades, Vogel, Copp, Graham and

Milner gathered compelling evidence that the Allies did not possess the massive numerical and material superiority over the Germans suggested by the "Brute Force" camp. They also found that the Allies developed an effective combat doctrine on land and at sea based on central control of resources and predictable German tactical behaviour. This study adds further weight to those conclusions.

Changing the final verdict on Olive from bungled advance to successful diversion also demands a new look at the language used to describe Allied wartime policy and objectives. Indeed, despite written orders to advance on Venice and Vienna, the goal in Olive was not to advance for its own sake, but to attack so as to pin enemy

47 See Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904 - 1945. (London: 1982) and Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys. (Toronto: 1985); The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive against Germany's Submarines. (Toronto: 1994); The Battle of the Atlantic (St. Catherines:

25 units and kill enemy soldiers in a battle of attrition. Vienna would only be captured when enough enemy force was destroyed. This conclusion refutes the widely held belief that Second World War combat was more fluid, and somehow less lethal and soul- taxing than the static, attritional fighting of the Great War. Yet for decades Allied

Second World War attritional intentions were clouded by temperate language in Allied planning documents emphasizing movement, technology and advance. It was always easier to "sell" Vienna as an objective to soldiers, politicians and voters than the notion that Allied troops in Italy were pawns in a vast battle of attrition.

Measuring Olive, and indeed the entire campaign in Italy, as the massive strategic diversionary operations that they were casts a new light over events there.

Advancing painfully slowly with limited resources in difficult terrain while successfully containing and destroying German units in Italy then becomes less about Allied folly and more about skill, resourcefulness and perseverance. Considering the Italian campaign from this perspective brings the host of logistic, manpower, ethical, moral, and morale problems facing the Allies in Italy into sharper view.

Understanding Olive as a victory also contributes to the growing historical debate over the Canadian Army's role in the Second World War. The dominant scholarly interpretation, rooted in the "Brute Force" approach, is that the Canadian Army of the

Second World War did not live up to the reputation their fathers earned in the Canadian

Corps of the Great War as innovative, well-motivated, battle-hardened professionals.48

2003). See C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III: The Victory Campaign. (Ottawa: 1960); John A. English, Failure in

26 The example of a professionalized, seasoned, highly efficient lsl Canadian Corps in

1944 creating panic in German headquarters during Olive contributes to the work of

Terry Copp and others who dispute the accepted wisdom. The Olive example also

contributes to a broader western challenge to the widely held view that the German

Army was the best in the world, and only defeated through weight of Allied numbers

and material. This study, together with a growing body of literature in Canada, the

United States, and Russia indicates that as often as not, attacking Allied units defeated

defending German units in relatively equal struggles. In the Gothic Line the Canadian

army bested their German opponents not with greater numbers, but with superior

motivation, training, leadership, tactics, and doctrine all wedded to a sound, if brutal,

concept of grand strategy.

This dissertation therefore offers a substantial revision of the Italian campaign in

two ways. The principle and initial objective was to measure the performance of 1st

Canadian Corps in the Battle for the Gothic Line. In particular, the thesis joins the

growing challenge to the argument that Allies armies were tactically and operationally

inferior to their German enemy. Hard fought and skilful Canadian actions in the Gothic

Line prove otherwise. The second major focus of this dissertation is a radical

reassessment of the Italian Campaign itself to demonstrate that battlefield success

produced the intended strategic result. This was an unexpected consequence of

reappraising the primary documents in light of Ultra revelations.

The strategic and tactical lines of inquiry are combined here to address the

High Command: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign. Ottawa: 1995;

27 Gothic Line cost-benefit question from the perspective of Allied strategic decision­ makers, operational planners in Italy and 1st Canadian Corps, one of the combat formations at the centre of the fighting. The opening chapters clarify Allied strategic intentions in the Battle for the Gothic Line. Chapters three and four use these intentions to more clearly define the operational problem in Italy in mid-1944 and to analyze proposed plans to overcome it. Chapter five introduces the Canadians in Italy as the test subject. The remaining chapters examine how strategy and plans were implemented on the battlefield by means of a detailed tactical case study of 1st Canadian Corps in the first two phases of the battle.

J.L. Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. (Toronto: 2002).

28 Book I

Defining the Mission

29 Chapter I: Seize Vienna or Kill and Contain the Enemy?

Allied intentions in Italy remain surrounded by confusion. Much of it stems

from Winston Churchill's boasts about Italy as the "soft underbelly" of Europe, from which he claimed the Allies could launch themselves into the bowels of the German

Reich.49 Indeed, in the midst of the most bitter Gothic Line fighting in September 1944

Churchill told senior Allied leaders gathered for the Second Quebec Conference, that

their primary object ought to be an advance on Vienna. After the war Field Marshal

Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, revealed his frustration with

Churchill's remarks and his concern that they might upset strategic agreements with the

Americans. "We had no plans for Vienna, nor did I ever look at this operation as

becoming possible".50 In reality, neither British or American members of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff harboured illusions of capturing the entire Italian peninsula, let alone

driving through the Alps into Austria, even though Churchill, the British Foreign Office

and certain British commanders sometimes made Americans think otherwise.51

Instead, one consistent goal shaped Allied ground operations on the Italian

Trumbull Higgins, Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American Controversy over the Italian Campaign, 1939-1945. (New York: 1968) p. 219. 50 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries: 1939 -1945. Ed. by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, (London: 2001) p 592. 51 Alanbrooke's published diaries and Marshall's biographer both repeatedly attest to Churchill's public statements interfering with the main diversionary purpose of Italian operations. See Alanbrooke War Diaries and Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945. (New York: 1973). Marshall's field commanders, like Eisenhower, also kept him apprised of Churchill's desire to exploit the "tremendous potentialities" of the "Italian Campaign." George C. Marshall Research Library, Marhsall Papers, Box 67, Letter from General D.D. Eisenhower to Marshall, 11

30 mainland from the outset. That was to draw German reserve strength into battle to pin and kill or otherwise incapacitate as many German soldiers and destroy as much enemy equipment as possible. In the spring of 1943 Overlord52 planning staff determined that with the lift and forces available, the Allies could not build up strength in the French beachhead fast enough to counter German strength known to be either defending the

Atlantic Wall or located in reserve in the western half of Europe. Therefore, a major goal of the Sicily landings in July 1943 and the primary goal of all subsequent Italian operations was to limit the amount of strength that could respond to the invasion of

France by pulling German divisions to the Mediterranean theatre. This diversionary mission continued during and after the successful landings in France and the subsequent victory in the Battle of Normandy. When Allied units reached the German Gothic Line defences in the late summer of 1944 and prepared to breach them, their aim was not to score a decisive strategic victory in itself. Instead, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed General Sir H.M. Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean

(SACMED), to contain and destroy German units in northern Italy to facilitate victory in

Northwest Europe, possibly in 1944, but no later than 1945.53

Some historians, most notably John Ellis, question whether such a containment

August, 1944. 52 Overlord, the code-name assigned to the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe in Normandy was made official on 1 May, 1944. The strategic concept and planning effort existed for years prior to this date and went by various titles, including Operation Roundup. For the purposes of this study, all Allied planning for the main attack across the English Channel will be referred to by the Overlord codename. 53 WO 204/10376: General Sir H.M. Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean personal to General D.D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, 19 June 1944.

31 goal for operations in Italy formed part of an "Allied master plan" or whether it became hindsight justification for a failed campaign. Ellis insists that no comprehensive containment plan existed and that British and American leaders remained divided to the point of inaction on what to do in Italy.5 More recently, Oxford historian Matthew

Jones argued that Allied strategic planning in the Mediterranean was shackled by Anglo-

American rivalry fuelled by justified American mistrust of British imperial aspirations in the region, as expressed by Winston Churchill.55 However, the rigorously researched

Canadian, American and British official histories offer incontestable evidence that containment was indeed the ever-present British and American goal in Italy. The official volumes were corroborated by F.H. Hinsley's more recent works on the impact of highly classified Ultra intelligence which reveals that not only was containment the primary aim in Italy, but that consensus developed between the British and Americans over this strategy, especially when Ultra revealed the degree to which it succeeded at diverting German attention from vital theatres at critical times. This study demonstrates that containment continued to be the primary task in Italy long after D-Day, especially among the campaign's predominantly British senior commanders.

The origins of the Allied containment and attrition strategy in the Mediterranean date back to the first meeting of what became known as the Anglo-American Combined

Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCS) at the Arcadia Conference56, convened immediately

54 John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War. (New York: 1990) p. 289. 55 Mathew Jones, Britain, The United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942- 1944. (London: 1996) pp. 138-141 56 The Arcadia Conference, held from 22 December 1941 to 14 January 1942 in

32 after the United States' entry into the war in 1941. At that landmark summit the two great architects of victory in Europe, soon-to-be British Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, then General Lord Alanbrooke, and United States Army Chief of Staff, General

George C. Marshall, first aired their views on how to prosecute the war. Despite the significant body of literature recounting the rivalry and disagreement between the two, their strategic visions differed more in timing than in substance. Alanbrooke and

Marshall understood that the ultimate defeat of Germany could only be effected by a massive invasion of northwest Europe across the English Channel to destroy the enemy's armed forces and then drive by the shortest route into the German heartland.

Marshall felt a massive buildup and invasion should take place immediately.57

Alanbrooke, however, with four years experience fighting Germans in the last war, and by 1941 over two years in this one, believed that invasion could only succeed when certain pre-conditions were met. Most important among these conditions was that the landing force be of sufficient size to guarantee it would overwhelm known opposition and expand its combat power faster than the Germans could gather forces to defeat it.58

The point of disagreement at subsequent Allied planning sessions was, therefore, when and how to achieve this essential pre-condition.

During the series of Washington conferences from December 1941 to mid-1942, the British delegation convinced their American counterparts that the latter's desire for

Washington, was the first in a series of planning conferences held between President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and their armed service chiefs. It led to further deliberations in Washington in early 1942 during which the broad parameters of Allied grand strategy were agreed to. 57 D.D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe. (Washington: 1948)

33 an immediate cross-Channel attack was not possible in 1942 as Marshall first hoped.

In that year, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) reasoned that their army was still rebuilding and expanding after being evicted from the continent at Dunkirk. It would also take time before sufficient US forces were available to make a decisive move in

France.60 Modern, mechanized armies take years to generate, equip, and train.

Germany, having planned and prepared for war years ahead of the Allies, had a tremendous head start on the force generation process.61 The Combined Chiefs, therefore, agreed that landing the small number of Allied divisions available in 1942 in

France invited disaster, assuming the landing craft to do so were even available. This was especially true given that any landing force would have to race to build up by sea against an opponent possessing use of the most dense and extensive network of east- west road, rail and telegraph communications in the world.

In any event, the landing craft were not available in 1942 or even 1943 in sufficient number to lift and sustain the size of force necessary to win a decisive battle in

France. Nor were the troops, guns and tanks available on the British Isles invasion platform even if the vessels were. To some extent this was due to competing U.S. naval and military requirements in the Pacific theatre and operations in North Africa, but mostly it resulted from the Battle of the Atlantic. In 1942 and early 1943 German U-

58 Alanbrooke, pp. 281 - 282, 437; Pogue, Marshall, pp. 31, 194 - 195. 59 Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942. (Washington: 1959), p. 99. 60 Alanbrooke Diaries pp. 281-282; Porch, p. xii. 61 Fraser, p. x.; Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Firepower. (London: 1985) 62 Howard, p. xix.; Alanbrooke, p. 476.

34 boats inflicted intolerable losses on Allied shipping in the Atlantic. Until the U-boats were checked and shipping lanes secured, the build-up of an invasion force in the United

Kingdom could not proceed with adequate efficiency and economy to succeed.63

Therefore, before Allied industry could focus on building a massive fleet of landing craft and training the crews necessary for the invasion, they must first build ships and train sailors to protect convoys and check Germany's U-boat fleet.64

In the meantime, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Winston

Churchill agreed that militarily and politically, the western Allies could not stand idle while Germany further expanded its military strength and pushed the Soviet Union to the brink of disaster in 1942. The western Allies determined that while they awaited victory in the North Atlantic and prepared the cross-Channel invasion force, efforts must be undertaken to keep the Soviet Union fighting, to commence the long process of eroding

German military capacity, and to demonstrate to an anxious public and to Josef Stalin that the western Allies were not sitting on their hands while Russia fought alone.65

It was agreed in Washington, therefore, that firstly Allied industry would materially assist the Soviet effort and Allied navies would fight to get that assistance delivered. Great efforts were made to supply the Soviet Union with certain specific war materials, including the vast majority of the Red Army's fleet of trucks and jeeps, most of its uniforms and boots as well as fighter aircraft, locomotives, rails, and boxcars to

63 Marc Milner, AThe Battle of the Atlantic," Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War (London: 1990). 64 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Insfluence on Strategy and Operations Vol 3, Pt II (London: 1988) p. 6. 65 Howard, p. xv; Pogue, p. 194.

35 replace losses from Russia's disastrous first year of war. The western Allies also provided enough vital raw materials and fuel to enable Russian factories to quickly recover from the destruction and displacement of 1941 and allowing them to focus on mass production of armaments and ammunition.66

Secondly, Churchill and Roosevelt insisted that the Allies take the offensive with the limited resources at their disposal in 1942-43. These offensive operations fell into three categories. The first capitalized on the one offensive capability the United States and Great Britain devoted significant budgetary and intellectual interest to during the

1920's and 30s; strategic bombing.67 Starting in 1942 and increasing significantly in

1943, British Commonwealth and American bomber fleets struck deep into occupied

Europe at military and industrial targets to limit German capacity to continue the war. It was hoped this bombing would ease pressure on Russia and create conditions for success when the time came for the invasion of France.

The second part of the offensive consisted of an aggressive program of commando-type raids on the Channel coast of which the infamous Dieppe raid of

August 1942 was the largest. These raids were intended to gather intelligence on potential landing sites and German defences, test equipment and amphibious doctrine, and most importantly, convince German planners to divert ground and air assets away

D.M. Glantz; J.M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. (Lawrence: 1995) p. 150. 7 Norman Longmate, The Bombers: The RAF Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945(London: 1983) p. 50.; Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe: 1933-1945. (Secaucus: 1986) p. 8.

36 from the Russian front to protect the Atlantic coast. Ironically, the necessity and success of this raiding program ensured that the cross-Channel invasion, code-named

Overlord in 1943, would face a prepared enemy planning to hurl the invaders back into the sea.

The third category of pre-Overlord Allied offensive operations were much more controversial. They would be accomplished by attacking and destroying European Axis ground forces on the only battlefield in 1942 on which the western Allies were in contact with them; North Africa. In 1941 German forces joined their Italian Allies in the latter's failing campaign against the small British garrison in Egypt. That British and

Commonwealth force protected Middle Eastern oilfields and the vital Suez Canal link to human and material resources throughout the British Empire and Commonwealth.69

In July 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, at the behest of Roosevelt and

Churchill, agreed to deploy a portion of the few British and American divisions that were trained and ready to destroying Axis forces in Africa.7 In addition to defeating

German and Italian armies, these operations would allow U.S. troops and commanders to begin, and British forces to continue, to develop and hone new battlefield technologies and then marry them to tactical methods. The new land front provided institutional and individual combat experience in a comparatively safe and sustainable

Glantz and House assert that in this strategic sense, the Dieppe raid was a significant success, p. 148. 69 David French, The British Way in Warfare: 1688-2000. (London: 1990) pp. 202-204. 70 Howard, pp. xviii-xix; Matloff, 1941-1942, pp. 294-295.

37 theatre.71 These operations also forced Germany and Italy to compete with the Allies in supporting that theatre by sea and air, providing Allied air and naval forces with an opportunity to wreck thousands of tons of Axis shipping and hundreds of aircraft. The latter drain on German resources was particularly felt by the Luftwaffe, which in 1942-

43 became increasingly overstretched as it sought to maintain air superiority in Russia and the Mediterranean while fighting off steadily increasing bomber raids over

Germany.72

The problem with the North African landings was that the American Joint Chiefs were strongly opposed to any operation that diverted resources from a cross-Channel attack in 1943. The British Chiefs originally favoured Mediterranean action as part of

Alanbrooke's vision of "closing a ring" around Germany before the invasion of Europe.

But in the spring of 1942 the British had agreed in good faith with American plans to concentrate all available forces in the United Kingdom for a major 48-division cross-

Channel attack in April 1943. When Churchill and Roosevelt insisted that "the United

States and Britain should be prepared to act offensively in 1942", Marshall and the

American Chiefs opted for smaller scale cross-Channel attack to establish a small bridgehead on the tip of the Normandy peninsula, which could then be expanded as more forces became available, rather than the proposed North African operation. The

British Chiefs were adamant that any operation against France before the Allies were

71 Howard, p. xv.; Even the Americans came to see these operations as providing useful experience, especially in amphibious operations and the employment of airpower. Matloff, 1943-1944, p. 168, Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: 2003). 72 Magenheimer, p. 215.

38 ready would end in failure and thus returned to the African option, soon known as

Operation Torch.

As the difficulty experienced at Dieppe illustrated that August, the British Chiefs were probably correct. Nevertheless, the incident sowed the seeds of mistrust in

American planners who believed they and their President had been duped into Torch by the British, who they suspected were never fully committed to a 1943 cross-Channel attack, were oblivious to the difficulties the Americans faced in halting Japanese expansion, and may even have been insidiously pulling American forces into acting to protect British imperial interests. Nonetheless, on Roosevelt's order, the Joint Chiefs agreed to the North African landings set for November 1942.73 Once involved in active operations in French North Africa, American senior leaders better understood British concerns about the amount of time required to generate an army capable of fighting the

Germans. Early combat with the Wehrmacht in Tunisia revealed that the U.S. Army was far from ready to take on the German army in Europe. "Like the first battles in virtually every American war, this campaign revealed a nation and an army unready to fight and unsure of their martial skills."74 As Douglas Porch observed, in 1942-43

American and British armies still needed time to "acquire fighting skills, audition leaders and staffs, and evolve the technical operational, tactical and intelligence systems

For a complete account of the complex 1942 negotiations see Howard, pp xx- xxv, pp. 246-245; and Matloff, pp. 273 - 296. For a more recent analysis of the Anglo- American Acompetitive partnership" and the Mediterranean strategy see Matthew Jones, Britain, The United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944. (London: 1996). 74 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: 2002).

39 required to invade Normandy successfully in June 1944."

In January 1943, two months after the successful Operation Torch landings, but four months before the final Axis defeat in Tunisia, Roosevelt, Churchill, their political advisors, and the Combined Chiefs met at Casablanca in French Morocco for the next in a series of strategic planning conferences. It was at Casablanca that a number of ideas crystalized, especially that Overlord would not be possible until 1944, and even then, significant efforts must be made to speed the build-up of assault forces in the UK and create conditions for its success. The Combined Chiefs acknowledged that priority must continue to be the defeat of the U-boats which still threatened that build-up. Secondly, the bombing campaign against Germany would be expanded into what became known as the Combined Bomber Offensive. The third and perhaps most important question resolved at Casablanca was where the Allies would strike next once North Africa was liberated. Sicily was chosen for a variety of reasons tied closely to the primary aim of launching the cross-Channel attack in 1944. The British Joint Intelligence Committee

(JIC), guardians of Ultra, informed Allied planners at Casablanca that the Germans had forty-one divisions within range of the proposed Overlord landing area. The Combined

Chiefs agreed that this number exceeded the amount of resistence they could handle in

1943, convincing them to put off Overlord until sometime in 1944 after German reserve strength was reduced or dispersed. The JIC also reported that Mussolini's Fascist government was approaching collapse and would likely fall if one of the Italian home islands was captured. Clearly, if Italy could be knocked out of the war, German units

Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theatre in World

40 would be forced to take over from the large number of Italian formations guarding the

Mediterranean coast and those fighting on the Russian front. Such an extension of

German strength would go a long way toward limiting the number of German formations that could react to Overlord™

In addition, Sicily acted as a giant Axis aircraft carrier astride Mediterranean shipping routes, forcing Allied convoys to sail 12,000 miles around the Cape of Good

Hope to ensure safe passage to and from the Indian Ocean. Capturing Sicily would cut that detour and free hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping capacity at a time when it was thinly stretched.77 Sicily could also serve as a base to threaten German interests in the Mediterranean, particularly their vital supply of natural resources in the

Balkans and the southern coast of France. The Combined Chiefs agreed the mere threat of using Sicily as a base would induce the Germans to deploy reserve forces to shield those interests. In addition, Sicily's airfields could be used to expand the air campaign.

For purely operational reasons, therefore, Sicily made sense. Its proximity to newly established bases in North Africa meant the landings could be supported by land-based aircraft and sustained from North African ports with minimal shipping resources compared to other proposed targets like Sardinia. The target date set for the invasion of

Sicily, code-named Operation Husky, was July 1943.78 But before Husky could be mounted, the fight for Tunisia had to be won.

War II. (New York: 2004) p. xii. 76 Hinsley, Vol III Pt 1, pp. 69-70.; Alanbrooke, pp. 281-282. 77 See Milner, AAtlantic". 78 Nicholson, p. 7.; CCS 155/1, 19 January 1943; CCS 170/2, 23 January 1943 cited in Howard, pp. 621-631.

41 In November 1942, days after the newly landed Anglo-American force began advancing across French North Africa to join forces with British Eighth Army advancing west from Egypt, Hitler and his commanders made a fateful decision. Rather than abandoning a hopeless cause, they poured reinforcements into the Axis pocket in

Tunisia. Many of these were first class formations, and included armoured divisions and the first heavy Tiger tanks.79 While those reinforcements may have been decisive if committed earlier, in 1943 they could only delay the Allied schedule for clearing North

Africa and ensure that when it was finally cleared, Axis losses would be tremendous.

This decision, along with the catastrophic decisions leading to the destruction of German

Sixth Army at Stalingrad at the same time mark the ultimate bankruptcy of German strategic planning. 150 000 Italian and 100 000 German soldiers surrendered to encircling Allied forces in May 1943 in addition to tens of thousands of casualties inflicted upon them in heavy fighting to reduce the pocket. These losses were comparable to the Soviet destruction of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. This German decision marked the beginning of what became a familiar pattern in the Mediterranean.

Over the next year, the Allies took advantage of numerous similar opportunities to maintain continuous contact and thus continual attrition of the German army within the limited Mediterranean battle space. The willingness of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

(German Armed Forces High Command or OKW) and Hitler to deploy limited forces to defend remote southern regions outside their main sphere of military influence allowed the Allies to dominate that comparatively small German force with equally limited

7 David Rolf, The Bloody Road To Tunis: Destruction of the Axis Forces in

42 attacking forces.

General Alanbrooke clearly saw this opportunity in the Mediterranean as early as

July 1942, well before the Allies and Germans heavily reinforced the African theatre.

From then on he worked tirelessly to convince his fellow British chiefs, and the sceptical but not closed-minded Americans. Although the Americans were eventually convinced of the utility of Mediterranean diversionary operations, from the earliest planning sessions they determined that sustaining those efforts could never be allowed to jeopardize the Overlord build-up. This meant U.S. planners would almost never allow the ratio of Allied-to-enemy forces in those secondary theatres to exceed what was necessary to match those of the enemy.80 While this policy was ultimately sound in ensuring Overlord would have the strength it required to succeed, as later chapters demonstrate the practice condemned those soldiers committed to secondary theatres to difficult, dangerous and thankless work.

The next major summit of Allied decision-makers, the Trident Conference, began in Washington the day that the Germans surrendered in Tunisia in May 1943, and short weeks before the scheduled launch of Husky. The main issue for discussion was a continuation of that begun at Casablanca, namely, what to do with Allied Forces in the

Mediterranean theatre once Sicily fell. The conference was notable in that the President and Prime-Minister no longer dictated strategy to the Combined Chiefs, but instead fell in line with their respective service heads. The British delegation argued for

North Africa, November 1942 - May 1943. (London: 2001) p. 23-29. on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 4, June 1 1943- December 31 1944. p. 90, Matloff, 1941-1942, p. 102. 43 Alanbrooke's vision of continuing a ground campaign onto mainland Italy to complete the Italian collapse, creating the vacuum he believed would be filled by German forces.

General Marshall and the American delegation favoured more limited Mediterranean operations because of fears that any move to Italy would jeopardize plans for Overlord in 1944. They were also concerned that an Italian collapse would prompt a German evacuation of Italy, leaving a major Allied force stranded in the southern Mediterranean with no enemy to engage without significant preparation, planning and re-deployment.81

Alanbrooke understood perfectly well that this would never happen.

By the end of the Trident Conference a compromise was reached that satisfied all parties. Indeed, prior to the meeting Marshall wrote to US Secretary of War Henry

Stimson that "our differences are not to be insurmountable." In return for a British commitment to launch Overlord and further expansion of the Combined Bomber

Offensive, the Americans agreed to limited landing operations on the mainland with the expressed purpose of inducing Italian surrender. Marshall and the American chiefs were especially convinced by the prospect of seizing airfields in central Italy from which intensified bombing raids on the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania and other targets in southeastern Germany could be launched. After the meeting Marshall wrote his

President that central Italian airfields offered "a new avenue of approach for our Allied air forces adding something like 1200 miles for which the German must provide air defences." The details of how a limited Mediterranean offensive would be executed

81Matloff,p. 126. 82 Marshall Papers, Marshall to Stimson, 14 Aug 1943. 83 Marshall Papers, Memorandum for the President, 28 Sep 1943.

44 were left vague due to a lack of intelligence as to whether Hitler intended to defend Italy, and to uncertainty over how the Italians might behave after the collapse of Mussolini.

Regardless of how these two unknowns developed, the US Joint Chiefs insisted that by the fall of 1943, seven Allied divisions in the Mediterranean should return to the United

Kingdom in preparation for Overlord™

Allied planners met again at the successful close of operations in Sicily in

August 1943, this time on Canadian soil at Quebec City's Chateau Frontenac. Much of the discussion concerned how much longer and with what intensity Mediterranean operations should proceed. Alanbrooke's case for a open-ended large scale effort in Italy was greatly strengthened by American Lieutenant-General Frederick Morgan, Chief of

Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and the man responsible for Overlord planning.

Morgan revealed his preliminary appreciation that with twenty-nine Allied divisions preparing to land in Normandy, the mission could not succeed until conditions were created whereby only three enemy divisions were available in the landing area with twelve more in the immediate vicinity and fifteen more that could be deployed within two months. The key issue was not so much the number of available Allied divisions, as there would be many more ready in the United States for direct embarkation to France once the operation was underway. Instead, it was amphibious lift and port capacity.

Morgan did not have enough of either to sustain a force larger than twenty-nine divisions until the major ports of Northwest Europe fell to the Allies. This was not likely to happen before a decisive battle with German forces in the west. Therefore, the

84 CCS 234, 17 May 1943 cited in Howard, pp. 640-650.

45 Combined Chiefs agreed for the remainder of 1943 to use their strength already in the

Of

Mediterranean to draw as many German units to that theatre as possible. Morgan's presentation at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 highlighted the growing interdependence between Allied operations in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe.

Promising developments in Italy made the decision on how to exploit victory in

Sicily more pressing. On July 25th 1943, before the last Germans abandoned Sicily,

Italian King Victor Emmanuel III and a group of conspirators led by Marshal Pietro

Badoglio deposed Mussolini and promptly initiated negotiations with the Allies. The new Italian government continued its alliance with Germany until such time as the Allies could guarantee Italian safety from German reprisals. If the Germans quit the peninsula, or the Allies could seize most of it in a lightning stroke, Badoglio was eager not just to surrender but to join in the fight against Germany. Unfortunately for the Italian people, but thankfully for Allied containment strategy, the Germans had no intention of allowing the Italian armed forces to change sides or of giving up the entire peninsula. Sensing

Badoglio's new government was on the verge of making a separate peace, the Germans took Alanbrooke's bait.

In August 1943, Hitler initiated preparations for Operation Achse, a plan to disarm and intern Italian military and naval personnel, seize their equipment and take over their duties. This would be no small task. There were then thirty-four Italian divisions defending the Mediterranean coast from the south of France to Greece, as well

Hinsley, Volume III Part 2, pp. 10-11.

46 as substantial air and naval units. Ultra decrypts allayed Marshall's earlier concerns that the invading Allies might land in a vacuum by providing details of German units moving into the region and the establishment of new formation headquarters to command them. These reports were confirmed when Italian emissaries coming west to negotiate Italy's surrender brought word of the German arrival in Italy and the Balkans, in many cases taking positions adjacent to Italian garrisons. This information reached the Combined Chiefs in the midst of the Quebec Conference.

Sixteen German divisions were in or on their way to Italy, not including forces assigned to Southern France and the Balkans. Some of these divisions came from the counter- invasion reserve in the west, while others were hurried from the Russian front after the

Kursk disaster to meet the new crisis on the southern flank.

In a matter of months, 20% of the entire German Army deployed along the

Mediterranean coast.87 Of particular interest was the substantial German air commitment during mid-1943. German historian Heinz Magenheimer's contends that the massive increase in German fighter production in early 1943 intended to maintain air superiority in Russia and defeat the Combined Bomber Offensive, was entirely bled off and destroyed in the Mediterranean. The result, Magenheimer argues, was a lost

German opportunity to defeat vulnerable Allied bomber streams in 1943 before the

on advent of long-range fighter protection. Instead, the Combined Chiefs were granted

86 The 250 000-man Italian 8th Army served on the Russian Front in 1942 but was largely destroyed in the Stalingrad fighting. Its remnants returned to Italy to rebuild and reinforce the home garrison in early 1943. Magenheimer, p. 218. 87 Bennett, p. 239; Hinsley, Vol IIIpt 1, pp. 103-107. 88 Magenheimer, p. 237.

47 both their wishes of an increasingly devastating bombing campaign against evermore dispersed German air defences, and a major shift of ground forces from vital areas in

France and Russia to meet the growing threat to the southern ramparts of Hitler's

Festung Europa. But, once the Allies began to draw German forces to the

Mediterranean, they would have to act vigorously to ensure those forces stayed put.

Agreeing on the best method of containing the new German arrivals proved almost as difficult as drawing them there in the first place. The problem was that intelligence planners were not certain of whether the Germans intended to hold all of

Italy. As Allied planning for a two-division landing in the toe of Italy and three in the

Gulf of Salerno developed, it first it seemed clear that German forces would fall back on the strong natural defences of the northern Apennines from Pisa to Rimini, thereby abandoning much of Italy. However, as the Quebec Conference progressed, planners became aware of the presence of strong German forces in the south, strong enough indeed to match the limited force the Allies planned to land.89 What the Allies could not know was that Hitler's advisors were divided and Hitler himself crippled with indecision as to how to act. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel advocated holding only in the north, while his former superior, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, insisted the Allies could be held south of Rome. Hitler had yet to conclude on the matter when Canadian,

British and American troops stormed ashore in early September 1943.

Despite the absence of hard intelligence on German intentions a decision still had to be made at Quebec on how far into Italy to proceed. The Americans, still concerned

89 Hinsley, Vol III Pt 1, pp. 100-107.; Bidwell and Graham, Tug of War. Pp. 23-

48 that German units in southern Italy would cut and run for the Alps, opted to limit the advance to the Foggia group of airfields and Rome. General Alanbrooke and Air Chief

Marshal Sir Charles Portal disagreed. They wished to maintain maximum flexibility on the mainland should an opportunity present itself to occupy more of Italy, perhaps as far north as the Po industrial region near Milan and Turin. Portal wanted airfields in the north while Alanbrooke was more concerned with carrying on the fight with the

Germans in Italy wherever they chose to stand. He argued that the presence of strong

Allied forces in Italy was essential to keeping the enemy on guard across the northern

Mediterranean coast as he would be in constant fear of landings in Southern France and the Balkans. If pressure on the Germans was maintained after Rome fell and into the northern Italian plains, Alanbrooke reasoned, "He [Hitler] will be faced with the dilemma that he must abandon an area of great value for the security of his whole position in Southern Europe or reinforce the theatre at the risk of defeat by the Russians or the successful invasion of Northern France by the British and the Americans."

Alanbrooke's enthusiasm for his Mediterranean containment strategy sometimes intimates that he wished to avoid committing Britain to a second bloody clash with

Germany in the fields of France in the same century and instead wished to pursue a plan of gnawing away at the peripheries of Fortress Europe. However, most historians agree that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff never advocated abandoning Overlord in favour of a Mediterranean option, but clung to his conviction that the cross-Channel invasion could only succeed if as much of the German strength within reach of the

26.

49 Normandy landing site was drawn south to face the Italian diversion.

Marshall and the American Joint Chiefs, still not warm to devoting all of the force currently in the Mediterranean to expanded operations in Italy lest the Germans fall back to the Alps, proposed a compromise solution. After the capture of Rome the

Americans agreed to press northward should the opportunity present itself, so long as surplus American strength, the growing French force training in North Africa, and the bulk of air forces and landing craft then in the Mediterranean theatre be removed for an invasion of Southern France in direct support of Overlord. The British agreed to this

'Operation Anvil' compromise, but in reality, the opposing sides of this debate were not far apart. Both believed firmly that the main aim was still to finish Italy off and draw enough German strength away from western Europe to assure Overlord success. '

Once events on the Italian mainland were put in motion, it was up to the

Germans to react and react they did. While pulling back from the toe and foot of the

Italian peninsula after Eighth British Army crossed the Straits of Messina on September

3r 1943, German Tenth Army assembled forces for the anticipated main landing somewhere between Rome and Naples. Within a matter of days after a combined British and American force made a dispersed landing in the wide Gulf of Salerno on September

9th, German units marched to the sound of the guns to mount a series of powerful counter-attacks on the beachhead. Some historians suggested these counter-attacks nearly succeeded. But most agree that German eagerness to attack into the open Salerno

90 Howard, pp. 563-571; Strawson, pp. 13 - 14. 91 CCS 319/5, 24 August 1943. As cited in Howard, pp. 682-692.; Matloff, 1943-1944. p 162-178.

50 plain down from the ring of surrounding high ground brought them into range of Allied observed artillery and naval gunfire, and air attacks under which the Germans suffered such heavy loss as to compel them to withdraw northwards.92 Thus, the second component of Allied Mediterranean strategy, attrition of the enemy, once again bore fruit. In their 1986 analysis of the campaign in Tug of War, Dominick Graham and

Shelford Bidwell contend that the near German success at Salemo convinced Kesselring that the Allies could be held south of Rome.93

In the weeks following the Salerno landings, Ultra reports indicated that unless

Kesselring's forces in the south succeeded in holding back the Allied invasion, no reinforcements would be risked from Rommel's Army Group "B" guarding the Italian coastline further north. Instead, once the Allied lodgement on the mainland was secured at Salerno and a Canadian thrust into the German rear captured the communications hub of Potenza,94 the Germans planned to abandon Rome and conduct a fighting withdrawal to the northern Pisa - Rimini defence line barring entrance to the Po Valley. On the basis of this intelligence General Alexander, commanding Allied Annies in Italy, organized his two armies to pursue the enemy, seize the Foggia airfields, "liberate"

Rome and close up to the Pisa-Rimini Line before the end of 1943. When Eighth Army reached Foggia on 27th September 1943, these tasks still seemed reasonable with the

Lee Windsor, Boforce: A Study of Mobile Warfare in 1943, Canadian Style. (Unpublished Thesis, Acadia University: 1993) pp. 30-33. 93 Graham; Bidwell, p. 103. 94 Lee Windsor, ABoforce: 1st Canadian Infantry Division Operations in Support of the Salerno Bridgehead," Canadian Military History. (Autumn: 1995).

51 limited forces at Alexander's disposal.

In those last days of September, as the small, tired, and logistically stretched

Allied advance began to slow, Hitler changed his mind about Rome. Partly in reaction to deception schemes to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to use Southern

Italy as a base for landings in Southern France or the Balkans and bomber attacks on the

Reich, and possibly because he began to believe Kesselring's optimism that the Allies could be held south of Rome, Hitler issued orders for the withdrawal to cease and positions be developed for a protracted defence. To facilitate this order, new German divisions were dispatched to Italy and reinforcements made available for those savaged in Sicily, Salerno and other September battles.

While Allied riflemen trudging through the increasingly cold inhospitable mud created by the Italian fall rains faced increased German resistance as a curse, General

Alexander quickly recognized the German reaction as something of a blessing. In his post war memoirs he wrote:

The Fuhrer Order to stand south of Rome proved of positive assistance in carrying out the Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive. If the Germans had adhered to their original intention, it would have been very difficult to carry out my mission of containing the maximum enemy forces; an orderly withdrawal up the peninsula would have required only a comparatively small force, aided by the difficulties of terrain. Although we had the initiative in operations, the Germans had the initiative in deciding whether we should achieve our object: they were free to refuse to allow themselves to be contained in Italy.

All danger of such an alarming result was removed by Hitler's decision. From the moment of that decision the German Army undertook a commitment as damaging and debilitating as Napoleon's peninsular campaign, the final result of which was that it saw itself next summer[1944] under the deplorable necessity of

Hinsley, Vol III Pt 1, p. 114; Bennett, p. 252. Bennett, p. 253.

52 pouring troops into Italy to retrieve disaster at the very moment when Allied invading forces were storming the breaches of the crumbling West Wall.97

The decision marked the next point in the German pattern begun at Tunisia, of committing just enough to resources to protract their slow, costly defeat in the

Mediterranean, but never sufficient to turn the tide. German willingness to join in an attritional battle in Italy which they could ill afford put an end to American concerns that

Italy would become a battlefield with no enemy to fight, at least for the foreseeable future.

German commitments to Italy in 1943 fulfilled General Alanbrooke's strategic vision of drawing in and bleeding German reserve strength more than he imagined.

During the September fighting around Salerno, thirteen Allied divisions pinned eighteen

German divisions both at the front and in coast defence. This figure does not include the two new Army Groups established to take over Italian defensive duties in the French

Riviera and the Balkans which later rose to a total of forty. In October, shortly after

Hitler's order to hold south of Rome, a reduced force of eleven Allied divisions held twenty-five divisions in Italy.98

While the strategic aim was thus achieved, it was also threatened by now abundant German strength in Italy supported by weather and terrain suited to the defence. By the end of the October this force ratio brought Allied attacks to a standstill: the operational problem plagued the Italian campaign for the next eighteen months. If at any point the Germans felt secure in Italy and its environs, the Allies ran risk that

97 Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs: 1940-1945, (London: 1962)p.118.

53 enemy divisions might be drawn back to France to prepare for the invasion expected the following spring.

Alanbrooke pressed the American Joint Chiefs to agree to reinforce the

Mediterranean Theatre in the short term to hold enemy forces already committed and to take advantage of what he perceived as an opportunity to lure in even more German strength. In his diary he lamented that "plans and preparations for Overlord must not be allowed to slow down operations in Italy which were themselves one of the most important preparations."99 The Americans would not budge on the issue, insisting that the limited Allied forces already in the theatre would have to suffice to continue the containment mission and the divisions earmarked for withdrawal to the United Kingdom to prepare for Overlord must return.

The only solution left open to Allied armies in Italy if they were to keep the

Germans pinned was to keep them guessing through means of an elaborate counter­ espionage, raiding, and partisan support program to keep them on guard against potential

Allied landings in the Balkans, France and Northern Italy. They must also continue to attack with the same tired and weakened divisions, some of which like lsl Canadian

Division had been in the line with little respite since the Husky landings in July. By the end of the year, after vicious fighting between evenly matched forces in horrific muddy conditions which conjured up memories of Great War battlefields like Passchendaele, the renewed Allied offensive finally butted against the powerful fixed fortifications of the Gustav Line south of Rome.

98 Bennett, p. 253; Ehrman, p344; Hinsley, Part 2, p. 64.

54 In November and December 1943, Eighth Army's bloody offensive on the

Adriatic carried it over the Sangro and Moro Rivers, and culminated in the vicious

Canadian battle for Ortona. Alarming losses, impassible mud, the natural and man- made strength of the Gustav Line, as well as the absence of any material or numerical advantage for attacking forces convinced General Alexander and Eighth Army's commander, General Bernard L. Montgomery, that any large scale flanking operation around Rome was impossible, at least before spring.100

In the new year of 1944 Alexander switched the main Allied effort to the western portion of the Gustav Line. There, US Fifth Army had reached the last line of hills overlooking the mouth of the Liri Valley, the invasion route to Rome. It was well protected by strong German forces and imposing natural barriers like the Rapido-Gari

River and the ominous sentinel which stood on its opposite bank; the Abbaye of Monte

Cassino. As Fifth Army found out during the bitter fight to reach the Rapido in

November and December, the western end of the Gustav was every bit as powerful and well defended as the Ortona front. In fact, before the first attack was delivered on it,

Allied leaders suspected that the combination of natural and man-made defences and the lack of any appreciable Allied numerical advantage made the Gustav line impregnable.

The solution was to outflank the line with the amphibious hook that German commanders feared. Unfortunately, the small amount of amphibious lift Overlord planners allowed to remain in the Mediterranean was sufficient for only three divisions, which in turn had to be scraped up from among Alexander's small Army Group. The

99 Alanbrooke, p. 464.

55 hole left in the line was covered by squeezing Eighth Army west, leaving a tiny covering force at Ortona, including the Canadians. While the plan offered the best prospect of turning the enemy out of a strong position with manouevre and surprise force concentration, it could not address the fundamental force ratio problem, magnified tremendously by Italian winter weather.101 In effect, the assault force did not have the combat power to accomplish what was asked of it.

The amphibious hook began on 22 January 1944 when one British and two

American divisions began landing in the Anzio-Nettuno area, thirty miles south of

Rome. In its first three weeks, Operation Shingle seemed a disaster. The small invasion force failed to penetrate beyond a narrow bridgehead and also failed to divert any attention away from the Cassino front where British and American attempts to link up with the beachhead were checked with great loss. Critics of Shingle, including Winston

Churchill, suggest that a lack of drive among the US Corps commander and his subordinates failed to exploit their initial surprise by driving inland quickly to seize the

Alban Hills and the approaches to Rome.102 Events spawned Churchill's now famous comment on Anzio: he had wanted a tiger thrown ashore and all he got "was a beached whale."

However, the Anzio landing generated more alarm in German headquarters than the Allies realized, playing on Hitler's fear of amphibious threats. The arrival of three

Allied divisions so close to Rome and behind their main field army induced German

100 Tug of War., pp. 118-119. 101 Ehrman, pp. 208-209. 102 Strawson, p. 144.

56 commanders to implement Contingency Plan Marder I. Instead of pulling Tenth Army formations from the still intact Gustav Line, reserve formations located in northern Italy,

Germany and Western Europe were rushed to meet the new threat. Together they amounted to two corps of over nine divisions, including a number of mobile panzer and panzer-grenadier formations, all controlled by Fourteenth Army Headquarters near

Rome. Their mission was nothing short of the complete destruction of the Anzio invasion force.103

Upon arrival in the invasion area new German units were hurled into a piecemeal attack on the Anzio bridgehead. By mid-February, Lord Alanbrooke and others began to grasp that even though Anzio failed tactically, it produced a strategic result that far exceeded expectations. While preventing Allied troops from advancing inland and making their lives worse than miserable, the German counter-offensive, Operation

Fischfang, provided the Allies an opportunity to coordinate ground, air and naval firepower to kill vast numbers of the enemy, thereby committing a second German western reserve army to a battle German High Command could neither afford nor extricate itself from. As a result, Allied Armies Italy now held a full German army group, soon to be known as Army Group "C" in close attritional combat. This development went a long way toward meeting the Overlord success requirements.104

Unfortunately, the commitment of another German Army completely equalized the force ratio in Italy in infantry and artillery, and removed any positional advantage created by landing a corps behind the Gustav Line. Once again, therefore, the front was

103 Hinsley, Vol III, Pt 2, p. 185.

57 threatened with stalemate. To take advantage of this new strategic opportunity and to solve the tactical problem, Alanbrooke and the British Chiefs of Staff proposed committing forces to Italy earmarked for the Anvil landings in southern France originally planned to coincide with Overlord. These forces were already concentrating in North

Africa. Alanbrooke reasoned that this temporary injection of combat power would break the German Gustav line, capture Rome and, most importantly, inflict so much loss on the enemy in the last weeks before D-Day in France that they would have to commit further reinforcements from the west to hold the line in Italy. After observing the violent

German response to Anzio, the newly designated commander of the Overlord forces and planning, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, agreed with Alanbrooke's analysis. By

March 1944 the pair convinced the American Joint Chiefs that Allied Forces in the

Mediterranean should be temporarily stood down from Anvil and "concentrated whole­ heartedly on bleeding and burning Germans divisions where they had apparently determined to fight to the last."105 Therefore, as of March 1944, the strategic relationship between the Italian campaign and Overlord became intimately operational.106 In other words, Allied commanders now intended the renewed spring offensive in Italy not just to be another attritional offensive, but a preliminary supporting

104 Alanbrooke, 14 February 1944. 105 Marshall Papers, Radio 314, Marshall to Eisenhower, 16 Mar 44; Ehrman, pp. 242-247. 1 This refers to the three levels of warfighting practiced by NATO armies today which grew from the Second World War experience. The strategic level includes matters of geo-politics, force generation, inter-continental movement, and the selection of policy, objectives and desired end states. At the operational level, field commanders achieve those strategic objectives using the combat forces at their disposal in a specific theatre. At the tactical level, junior commanders attack, defend and otherwise destroy

58 attack for Overlord. The aim was to smash the Gustav Line's defenders while breaking out of the Anzio bridgehead to encircle Army Group "C'"s western flank. To repair the damage in Italy, German divisions in the west would have to rush in, further weakening their reserve available for France.

The attack was originally planned for April, allowing time for the extra divisions to withdraw and still land in southern France in conjunction with the Normandy invasion in late May or early June. But, delays imposed by thickening German resistence and terrain forced a postponement. At first, the Chiefs on both sides of the Atlantic were irritated at what they perceived to be a lack of drive in Alexander's headquarters.

However, Alexander's personal presentation to the British Chiefs in London convinced them all that frustrating delays in the face of growing German resistence were the very measure of the diversionary success achieved thus far and of the potential to divert and destroy even more German strength if Diadem, the assault on the Gustav Line, was launched with adequate preparations and resources.107

The Combined Chiefs subsequently agreed that instead of Anvil being the direct operational feint, Diadem would serve as the principle diversion of German strength and attention in the west simultaneously with the commencement of Overlord in June. From this point on, the Italian campaign was no longer a separate and distinct theatre from that about to open in Northwest Europe. It was now an integral component of the new

'Western Front'. General Alexander, recognizing this synergy and wrestling with opposing enemy units. 107 WO 214/33, Minutes of British COS(44) Meeting #118, AFuture Operations in the Mediterranean Theatre, 12 April 1944.

59 difficult morale problems resulting from Italian theatre terrain, weather and force ratio challenges, wanted to go so far as to issue an "order of the day" to his soldiers prior to

Diadem, outlining how their diversionary task was critical to Overlord success.

Unfortunately for the soldiers in Italy, whose exploits were about to be eclipsed by events in Normandy, security concerns necessitated that the wording be vague.108

The great diversion opened on 11 May 1944. Even with the influx of Anvil forces the Allies barely mustered 1.5 to 1 odds in their favour, forcing nearly a month of hard fighting before the Gustav and supporting Hitler Lines were breached. The encirclement of Fourteenth German Army was almost completed, all but for US General

Mark Clark's now famous decision to turn left and be first to Rome rather than follow

General Alexander's directive to cut off the escaping Germans. Despite this notorious setback, the offensive was a major strategic success leading to the capture of Rome 36 hours before D-Day.109

Vastly more important to Allied strategy than the fall of an Axis capital were the disastrous losses inflicted on Army Group "C" by Diadem. The fighting strength of twenty German divisions was gutted, reducing them to the combined equivalent of six.

Ultra intelligence confirmed Alanbrooke's prediction that the Germans would replenish those losses from reserve strength otherwise capable of responding to Overlord.

German High Command was desperate to restore the front in Italy well before the Allies reached the unfinished Gothic Line defences and therefore moved in six divisions from

108 WO 214/33, COS(44) Meeting #118. 109 Some recent histories of the war in the Mediterranean continue to portray Diadem as a failure, but these are generally based on pre-Ultra mainstream narratives of

60 Denmark, Hungary, the Ukraine and Croatia. OKW also released tens of thousands of trained soldiers and large quantities of heavy weapons and vehicles to rebuild divisions gutted in the Liri Valley.110 This happened at the very moment OKW was trying to cope with the invasion of France and the Soviet summer offensive.

What was known through Ultra to a minority of senior Allied planners and commanders in the late spring of 1944 is corroborated by recent German scholarship.

The reserve of ground and air forces Hitler gathered under Field Marshal von Rundstedt in 1943-44 for a decisive battle against the channel coast invasion was repeatedly dispersed to "contain" the Allies in Italy. The result was a failure of the 1944 German plan to concentrate superior force to deal a knockout blow to one of the two principal threats to the Reich. Hitler and his staff concluded in late 1943 that the expected Allied invasion of the channel coast offered the only such opportunity. If it could be defeated in its early vulnerable stages, the western Allies would be unable to mount another attempt soon. This would leave Germany a free hand to focus on the Soviet Union.111 In this context, Allied operations in Italy may not have conquered territory quickly, but succeeded brilliantly in guaranteeing the success of Overlord. Field Marshal

Montgomery predicted this general pattern when the campaign on the Italian mainland began the previous September. He also warned that dramatic results should not be expected in Italy given that Overlord was the primary effort and thus the priority for the battle. See Jones, pp. 159-165.; Ellis, p. 337-338. 110 OKW - 1576 AReport on the Fight for the Apennine Position and the Improvement of the Western Alps Position, 15 August - 31 December, 1944." DHH SGR 11/255, pp. 10; Alanbrooke, p. 584.;Bennett, p. 294. 111 Magenhiemer, pp. 244-257.

61 resources.112 As Montgomery's warning implied, diversionary success came at a price.

At the height of the pursuit north of Rome in the summer of 1944, the extra

Allied divisions allotted temporarily to the Italian theatre were removed for the invasion of southern France. Based on the success of Diadem, and the apparent willingness of

Germany to continue pouring further reinforcements into the theatre to stop the Allied advance, Churchill and his military leaders argued in favour of cancelling Anvil. Instead they opted to continue concentrating Mediterranean resources in Italy. They reasoned that continued German attempts to stand and fight as they fell back from Rome indicated they still had no intention of abandoning Italy, offering the Allies a venue to continue to attrit the German Army in the west without pause. Better to destroy continuously in the two sectors of the western front already open, than to pause in one to move into a third which, with all their other problems, the Germans would probably not pay steeply to hold. In mid June, Alexander reported to Alanbrooke that "every time he [Kesselring] stands and fights we kill Germans, take prisoners and destroy material. If he goes on with these tactics he is playing our game and he will soon find his forces too weak to stop us from crossing the Apennines into the Po Valley unless he sends to this Italian front a number of good fresh divisions." In a briefing note to the Prime Minister issued a week later Alexander expressed his hope that the Germans would do exactly that, and that they would make a determined stand on the Pisa - Rimini Line. "I understand that such an enemy course of action is just what is most required to assist our

'" Jones, p. 150. 113 WO 214/15, MA1414 - AAI HQ Memorandum to CIGS, 14 June 1944.

62 other operations [Overlord]."'l4

American political and military arguments to stick to the Anvil plan carried the day. While General Marshall's "cut and run" fears were again allayed by German behaviour in Italy, the American argued that the French Expeditionary Corps, then in

Italy, could no longer be denied the opportunity to join the balance of First French Army in the liberation of France. Together with US Seventh Army, this new army group was guaranteed to provide direct assistance to Eisenhower's armies, even if its arrival meant an operational pause to move forces in the Mediterranean. The matter was decisively resolved by Mother Nature who on 21 June destroyed one of the two artificial Mulberry harbours in Normandy and badly damaged the other. In those circumstances, General

Eisenhower insisted that Anvil must be launched soon, as the great French ports of

Toulon and Marseilles were desperately needed to win the build-up race in Northwest

Europe. Despite eleventh hour pleas by Churchill and his commanders, the British acquiesced.115 Churchill's sentiment was expressed eloquently when he changed the code name for the operation from Anvil to Dragoon, because the British had been

'dragooned' into supporting it.

Unfortunately for the exhausted and badly depleted Allied divisions remaining in

Italy, the transfer of the French Corps and the highly capable US 6th Corps occurred at the same time German reinforcements poured into Italy, stabilizing the front south of the

114 WO 214/15, MA 1434 - AAI HQ Memorandum to Prime Minister, 23 June 1944. 115 WO 214/15 - 16, Correspondence between Alexander, Alanbrooke and Churchill, 6 June - 24 July, 1944.

63 Gothic Line and threatening the theatre with stalemate once again.'16 The problem was magnified when 70% of Allied air power and an equally large share of naval lift and logistic capacity in the Mediterranean was diverted in mid-summer to Operation

1 I -7

Dragoon. It will become apparent in later chapters, that these two oft forgotten elements were particularly debilitating for Allied forces remaining in Italy. Indeed, those instances in the Italian campaign thus far in which relatively equal numbers of

Allied soldiers bested the Germans despite the latter's defensive and terrain advantages occurred when air, sea and logistical strengths supplemented the courage of Allied soldiers.

Despite the reduction of Allied Armies Italy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Alexander's tired troops to mount a fresh offensive to continue containing and wearing down the two German armies in Italy so that none of their component formations could turn to face the Overlord forces in Northwest Europe.'l8 The Supreme

Allied Commander in the Mediterranean and representative of the Combined Chiefs,

General Wilson, issued an unambiguous directive to Alexander. "Your task will continue to be the destruction of German Forces in Italy." Alexander's reduced force of twenty-one increasingly exhausted divisions were to pin the twenty-six recently reinforced Axis divisions in Army Group "C" by attacking and destroying as much of their manpower and equipment as possible, forcing the balance to remain committed to

116 WO 214/16 Telegram from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 22 July, 1944. 117 WO 214/27 SACMED Memorandum to AFHQ Senior Staff, 16 June 1944; WO 214/15, Telegram from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 23 June 1944. 118 WO 214/33 Emergency Operations Directive, Personal from General Wilson to General Alexander, 22 May 1944. F49066; CCS Directive to AFHQ 2 July 1944,

64 battle in Italy and unable to move. Advancing for its own sake was not important, unless it pertained to the above mentioned task.

In the midst of planning for this renewed forlorn Italian offensive, General

Eisenhower's armies won a hard-fought but decisive victory in Normandy by August and began to breakout towards Germany. Now, containing German formations in Italy took on even greater significance. Enemy divisions there were among the best in the

German Army and, unlike their counterparts in Normandy, most were restored to full strength by August.120 Generals Wilson and Alexander clearly understood the

Combined Chiefs instructions that under no circumstances could Allied Armies, Italy relax their pressure and allow these divisions to catch trains for a quick trip to Northwest

Europe in time to help stop the breakout. This task was especially important until enough captured port capacity opened in Northwest Europe to ease over-stretched Allied supply lines from Normandy and to unload fresh US divisions.122

While all concerned remained hopeful about a possible German collapse before the end of 1944, Allied leaders from the Combined Chiefs down to the level of Army and Corps were under no illusions about the strength of Army Group "C"or of the

cited in Ehrman, p. 358. 119 CWM, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) Final Report to Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Italy, 13 August - 12 December, 1944. 120 WO 10416, War Diary, Eighth Army, G-Plans, Enemy Strength Returns, 14 July 1944. 121 WO 214/16, Telegrams between Alanbrooke and Alexander, 22 July - 1 August 1944.; SACMED Report, pp. 52-58. 122 Alanbrooke, 21 June 1944, p. 561.

65 1 9^ natural and man-made strength of the Gothic Line defences. Alexander and Eighth

Army commander General Sir Oliver Leese anticipated that it would take a tremendous effort to convince their reinforced enemy that the shrunken Allied forces in Italy, with drastically reduced air forces and logistical capacity, were a more serious threat to the

Reich than Eisenhower's armies rushing directly towards the German border.124

Operation Olive opened on 26 August 1944, five days after the Falaise Gap fighting ended in Normandy and eleven days after the Dragoon landings on the French

Riviera. Olive dragged on throughout September and October, throughout the battles for the Market-Garden bridgehead, Canadian operations to open Antwerp and American attacks towards the upper Rhine. Few on the Allied side could have predicted the drastic lengths Germany would go to feed replacements into gutted divisions, stem the Allied tide and prolong the killing. However, during those desperate days Allied Armies, Italy succeeded in preventing what could have been an even larger transfer of enemy strength

During final weeks before Operation Olive, Alexander and his staff were became aware of major injection of German reinforcements into the theatre and significant last-minute fortification of the Gothic Line. WO 214/34, Appreciation by CGS, Allied Armies Italy, Future Operational Considerations. 30 July, 1944. 124 Even before the Dragoon reductions, AFHQ predicted that if Anvil went ahead, AAI's remaining force could expect to break the Gothic Line, but not exploit beyond. WO 214/27 SACMED Memorandum to AFHQ Senior Staff, 16 June 1944; After the Dragoon force reductions and throughout the fighting Alexander remained equally realistic that Olive would not likely penetrate far beyond the Gothic Line with no appreciable superiority over the enemy. WO 214/16, Telegrams between Alanbrooke and Alexander, 22 July - 22 September 1944.; AAI and Eighth Army operational and logistical planning notes all indicate Leese and his staff anticipated a protracted attritional battle immediately behind the main Gothic Line. WO 204/586, AAI Administrative Instruction #44, 24 July 1944; W.D. Eighth Army, Operation Instruction 1431, 13 August 1944.WO 214/16, Telegrams between Alanbrooke and Alexander, 22 July - 1 August 1944.

66 from the southern flank of the western front to the northern flank.

Olive successfully prevented this transfer for two primary reasons. For one,

Allied deception plans convinced the Germans that the offensive along the Gothic Line was not the work of twenty divisions, but thirty-six, necessitating the full attention of

Army Group "C". In addition, the Germans held two more armies in the Mediterranean region prepared to repel landings either at Genoa or in the head of the Adriatic Sea by two dozen, largely fictitious, Allied divisions to be lifted on equally fictional landing craft.126

Secondly, the limited Allied force that did participate in Olive crashed against the

Gothic Line defences with a ferociousness the Germans had not yet seen in the Italian campaign. To maintain momentum, the Allies sacrificed most of their tank strength fighting "break-in" battles through four continuous belts of fixed and natural defences in the northern Apennines. In Eighth Army's Adriatic sector, with the Canadian Corps in the lead, each of these belts was breached and counter-attacking Germans slaughtered in such numbers as to cause panic and crisis in German headquarters from Rimini to

Bologna to Verona and to Berlin. A report prepared at Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

(OKW - German Armed Forces High Command) a few weeks after the battle concluded that all thirty-six Allied divisions German intelligence detected in Italy did indeed participate in the battle for the Gothic Line. They reasoned that the intensity of Allied

125 The notion of the Northwest Europe and Italian campaigns as the northern and southern wings of the western front existed primarily in the minds of British military leaders, led by Lord Alanbrooke. Despite their sound defence of this view, its credibility was repeatedly undermined with the Americans by Foreign Office efforts to exert British influence in southeastern Europe. Alanbrooke.

67 pressure there could only be maintained by a thirty-six division force. In fact, pressure was maintained by relentlessly pushing the soldiers in twenty-one Allied divisions beyond the limits of their physical and mental endurance and at great human and material cost.

The price paid in the battle in and behind the Gothic Line was higher than any other in Italy: 48 369 Allied soldiers fell in two months, a remarkable number given the size of the force committed, and considerably more than the 40 000 casualties sustained

1 98 by a larger Allied force during the two months of Diadem. The cost nonetheless yielded an important and tragically unknown victory. It was not one measured by miles travelled on a map. Instead victory was achieved by creating a credible threat to

Germany's southern flank. The threat was perceived so grave that none of the excellent

German formations in Italy left, even though decisive battles raged along the very borders of the Reich. Indeed, the fact that advancing Allied troops in Italy were stopped cold by the commitment of German reserves was the very measure of Olive's success.

Equally important for Allied strategy, by October 1944 many of the trained enemy replacements brought in during the summer were dead or in prison cages.

German casualty figures are difficult to confirm, but will hopefully be clarified soon by the excellent team of scholars working on the German official history of the war.

Estimates available to date suggest Germany suffered losses equal to those of the Allies, but more likely their casualty lists were longer than the Allies by several thousand

126 OKW 1575, p2. 127 OKW 1575, pp. 1-5.; Hinsley, pp. 336 - 342.; Nicholson, pp. 528, 547, 570. 128 WO 214/16, AAI Casualty Report 25 August - 28 October 1944; Tug of

68 names. For example, Eighth Army losses from the start of Olive on 25 August to 21

September 1944 numbered 14 000. Canadian Army official historian G.W.L. Nicholson notes that German losses in the same sector numbered 14 604, but that figure is listed for

15 September "when the battle of Rimini still had seven exacting days to run".129

Replacements of men and weapons lost had to come from the precious stock being hoarded, unbeknownst to the Allies, for Hitler's great winter offensive in Western

Europe.130 Given that the Allies in Italy attacked with infantry parity against German units possessing significant terrain advantages, these figures mark the battle as an Allied attritional victory in what in 1944 was an attritional war Germany could not win.

War., p. 343. 129 Nicholson, p. 563. 130 Magenheimer, p. 257.

69 c# •o- ,g a Hc H n •d © =0 & -Et -m '2 % • S3 0---Q -iad ^P I w© i « « X ni w Chapter II: Competing Narratives and the Fog of Memory

The conclusion that the Gothic Line offensive was a great diversionary and

attritional victory for the Allies cannot be found in most histories of the campaign. It is heavily influenced by post-Cold War, post-Ultra, and modem German research about the year of decision: 1944. Earlier interpretations of the battle are based on the assumption was that the war was winnable before the end of 1944. Historians know now that the

Red Army did not reach its peak strength with massive numerical superiority over the

Germans until late in 1944. Many now acknowledge that the western Allies did not have significant numerical and material superiority until the same time, contingent on

opening up ports like Antwerp. Therefore, strategy in the west in 1944 was predicated

on attriting the German Army to the point that its cohesion broke.131 Only then would

the Allied version of "blitzkrieg" be unleashed. The evidence indicates that Allied planners hoped this might be achieved in 1944, but were prepared that it may not happen until 1945.132 What the Allies found out as late summer turned to fall was that despite

the massive German losses sustained in the summer of 1944, they managed to comb out

and train over one million replacements.133 This could only be done by stripping

Germany's skilled labour force to the bone and relying more than ever before on slaves.

131 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won. (London: 1995) pp 316 - 320; Copp, pp. 19-20, 255-267; Glantz. 132 On the eve of Olive Alanbrooke ordered Wilson's staff and army commanders to be prepared for a protracted battle in northern Italy lasting into 1945. WO 214/34 - Minutes of SAC Planning Conference, 20 August, 1944. For a detailed discussion of fluctuating Allied victory expectations in mid-1944 see Ehrman, Chapter IX AAdvance on Three Fronts".

70 Most of this fresh draft was intended to form the core of the Ardennes counter-offensive force, but a large portion were sent to rebuild the fighting strengths of units decimated on all fronts.134

The result was that German cohesion was restored in the late summer and fall of

1944 at the moment that all Allied offensives ran out of logistic steam and manpower.

The injection of trained Germans into gutted, but still intact and administratively cohesive, armies would prolong the war until 1945. No last-gasp success at Arnhem or

Warsaw or Venice could break the back of the German Army in 1944. The best that could be hoped for were favourable launch points so that when the Allied offensive renewed in 1945, the war could be terminated as quickly as possible.

It is in this context that the 1944 fall offensive in Italy must be considered.

However, instead of assessing it against the containment mission assigned by the

Combined Chiefs, most commentators on the battle measure it against a grandiose vision of driving Army Group "C" out of Italy and forcing the Alps passes into the Danube

Basin or even Vienna. The prevalence of this 'on to Vienna' interpretation given the weight of evidence that the Olive mission was containment requires some explanation.

Those who developed it were intelligent and well informed men. At the time when most mainstream Italian campaign history was penned, especially concerning the period after

D-Day, available evidence seemed to indicate Vienna was the goal. Until the early

1990's a number of barriers prevented historians from confirming the true intent behind

Olive, not the least of which being the full disclosure of all Ultra information available

133 Hinsley, pp. 24-31.

71 to commanders and access to Russian archives and perspectives now possible in a post-

Cold War environment.

The most obvious barrier to a full appreciation of Allied intentions in Italy were

three powerful personalities, British Prime-Minister Winston Churchill, his Foreign

Secretary Anthony Eden, and his Foreign Office representative in the Mediterranean,

Harold MacMillan. From the time Allied troops first waded onto the Italian mainland,

these high profile figures spoke and wrote at length about how Allied goals ought to be

nothing short of complete occupation of all Italy prior to a major drive into the Balkans

and eastern Europe. Lord Alanbrooke complained bitterly in his diary and in his

correspondence with Generals Wilson and Alexander about such statements. He justifiably feared Churchill's rumblings would destroy the case for continuing

diversionary operations in Italy painstakingly made by the British Chiefs of Staff to their

American counterparts, and could lure an impressionable General Alexander into

deviating from his assigned containment goal.135 Skepticism from the Americans and

from historians about British political aspirations in the Balkans during this period was

fed by British pleas to cancel Anvil and maintain a powerful drive into northern Italy,

despite convincing evidence that the British argument was based on sound military and

not political reasons.

To assure the Americans of the British commitment to Overlord, in 1943

Alanbrooke helped create Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean. Led by the

134 Magenheimer, pp. 256 - 257. 135 WO 214/16, Letter from Alanbrooke to Alexander, 1 August, 1944; Alanbrooke, pp. 443, 463, 486 - 495, 561 - 563.

72 unassailable Supreme Commander, General Henry Maitland Wilson, this office ensured that Alexander's army group headquarters in the field obeyed the will of the Combined

Chiefs and was shielded from the whims of Churchill and the Foreign Office.

Alanbrooke wrote in his diary that "Jumbo Wilson was made of much rougher material

[than Alexander] which would not be so pliable and easy to handle" when MacMillan and Churchill attempted to interfere in military matters.136 These and other steps taken by the Combined Chiefs in the summer of 1944 leave little doubt that the once significant control over strategic direction of the war held by Roosevelt and Churchill had waned. In their place their service chiefs steered clear of post-war politics. They remained focussed on winning the war against Germany in accordance with the agreed- upon strategy of delivering the main blow in Northwest Europe, supported by diversionary operations in the Mediterranean with minimal forces and the Combined

Bomber Offensive.137 Nonetheless, Churchill's comments have been used by some as evidence that much more than a diversion was planned in Italy.138

Another less-obvious but equally important factor blurring Allied intentions in

Italy is that there exist two competing narratives describing what Olive was to achieve and how well the mission was accomplished. These rival interpretations originated with the two men responsible for organizing the offensive. One or the other forms the core of

136 Alanbrooke, p. 493. 137 WO 214/34 - Minutes of SACMED Conference with British Chiefs of Staff, 20 August 1944. The Churchill camp consists mainly of American scholars, including the author of the US Army official volume covering the period, see: Ernest Fisher, U.S. Army in World War II: Cassino to the Alps. (Washington: 1977); Accounts as recent as Matthew Jones 1996 study ascribe much more authority to Churchill and thus assume

73 all historical writing on the campaign after D-Day.

The first comes from Field-Marshal Alexander's own despatches and describes a successful diversion accomplished by two armies which made the best of having no significant numerical advantage over the enemy and always being second on the priority list for reinforcements and supply. At the height of the battle Alexander wrote to

Churchill that "the Germans are fighting as hard as I have ever known them to.

Nevertheless we are mauling many German divisions which might otherwise be opposing Ike in the west."139 Few historians other than Alexander's great defenders,

Gregory Blaxland and his former intelligence officer Sir David Hunt, make use of this interpretation.14 Most dismiss Alexander's depiction of events as post-mortem justification for the poor Allied generalship which led to a stalled advance.I41 This view is reinforced by the widely held assessment that Alexander was an adequate diplomat, but a less than stellar commander who lacked "grip" over his subordinates.142

* The second Olive narrative derives from the views of Alexander's Chief of Staff,

Sir John Harding, expressed through his staff appreciations prepared in the summer and fall of 1944 as well as postwar interviews with historians. Harding paints a picture of a great opportunity lost due to American intransigence over Anvil. Whatever chance remained to deal a decisive blow in Italy was then squandered in a failed operation his Vienna goal was the main aim. Jones, pp. 170 - 172. 139 WO 214/16 - Letter from Alexander to Churchill 17 Sept 1944. 14 Gregory Blaxland, Alexander's Generals: The Italian Campaign, 1944 - 45. (London: 1979); Sir David Hunt, A Don at War. (London: 1966) p 268. 141 Jackson, pp. 360 - 361; Strawson, pp 171-172, 195 - 198. 142 The greatest proponent of this view is Alexander's own biographer. See Nigel Nicolson, Alex: The Life of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis. (London:

74 plagued by last minute plan changes, inter-Allied jealousy and the weak leadership of the two field army commanders, Clark and Leese. This interpretation no doubt seemed most credible, since Harding is considered by all to be the mastermind of the plan that

finally broke the Gustav Line deadlock in May 1944 and was the driving force behind any intelligent decisions taken in Alexander's Headquarters.143 Although not directly critical of his commander's ability, Harding's views resonated with historians who

144 were.

Harding's critique grew from his desire to turn the Italian Campaign into

something more than a diversionary backwater. Before Anvil's cancellation he was a driving force behind hopes and plans to bounce the Gothic Line and drive to the Alps before the fall rains arrived.145 He wrote in his diary that, "progress warrants the

assumption that if we press on with all our forces we can get into Austria before winter."146 The ambitious Harding, influenced by Churchill and Harold MacMillan, was

so much fixated on this crusade that Lord Alanbrooke grew concerned over his ability to

properly serve as Alexander's deputy in an operation certain to be difficult and utterly

devoid of glory.147

Like most other Allied senior officers in Italy, Harding was bitterly disappointed when attempts to cancel Anvil/Dragoon failed. Yet he remained hopeful that if enough

1973); see also Jones, p. 165. 143 See W.G.F Jackson, The Battle for Rome. (London: 1969) p. 11 - 18. 144 Jackson, Mediterranean, pp.123 - 127; William McAndrew, AEighth Army at the Gothic Line: Commanders and Plans." RUSI Journal (June: 1986); Strawson, p. 170 - 172. 145 WO 204/1457 - AAI CGS Appreciation #4, 2 July 1944. 146 IWM 96/40A - Lord Harding Papers, Personal Diary, 23 June 1944.

75 reinforcements were scrounged to replace even a portion of the seven Anvil divisions and if Alexander approved his plan for a concentrated attack by Fifth and Eighth Armies toward Bologna, then Army Group "C" could be destroyed against the Po allowing the victorious Allies to press on to Vienna. Unlike Alexander, Harding did not feel the

Germans could or would provide enough reinforcements to Italy to halt a quick and determined thrust.148 However, Harding's plan for the Gothic Line offensive, discussed in Chapter III, was scrapped in favour of one suggested by Leese. According to the

Alexander-Blaxland-Hunt interpretation, this was a change Alexander readily agreed to because it conformed better to AAI's diversionary mission.149 After the battle Harding complained and historians speculated that Leese's change of plan was based more on the latter's personal unwillingness to fight alongside the Americans led by Clark than on sound military reasons.15 However, if personal jealousy is a tool for historical supposition, then it is equally possible that Harding's negative view of Olive was coloured by the fact that his plan was cast aside in favour of Leese's.

Leese's plan proposed a more dispersed attack that would force the Germans to spread their strength to meet two thrusts, one north of Florence and one along the

Adriatic coast. Given the force ratio reality after the final Anvil/Dragoon decision,

Allied commanders other than Harding appreciated that the new plan might result in deadlock somewhere on the Po Valley floor. But there was a longshot encirclement

147 Alanbrooke, pp. 539, 583-584; 612-613; 631. 148 WO 214/34 - CGS, Future Operations Considerations 26 July 1944; WO 204/1457 - AAI CGS Appreciation #4, 2 July 1944; AAI Orders to Fifth and Eighth Armies, 26 July 1944; AFHQ Appreciation Based on AAI CGS Input, 2 August 1944. 149 Blaxland, pp. 155-160.

76 possibility, especially if Germany began to collapse at home. However, even if a deadlock did ensue, it would be one which found most of Army Group "C" pinned along a broad front line rather than stacked in depth in the mountainous centre as they were on the eve of the offensive.1 The plan appealed to Alexander, not least because only a few weeks before Alanbrooke suggested the attack frontage be extended eastward to the

Adriatic coast to create more encirclement possibilities, to capture more port facilities and generally to commit more German divisions to the attritional fight on a broad front.152

Nonetheless, Lord Harding's view that the abandonment of his plan doomed

Olive from the start encouraged most historians to direct their energies to explaining where the operation subsequently went wrong. The British official historian wrote that

Alexander's acceptance of Leese's plan was "the most dramatic and unfortunate decision of the Italian Campaign."153 John Ellis wrote in Brute Force that "Eighth

Army's attacks began on 25 August 1944 and it fared even worse than Harding had feared."154 Subsequent chapters of this study contribute to the debate with evidence supporting Alexander's interpretation.

In fairness to Harding and to historians who base their analysis on his views, most documentary evidence from the period, in the form of operations orders and appreciations, support his suggestion that Olive failed. These orders name geographic

150 Orgill, p. 30; Jackson, Mediterranean, pp.123 - 127; Strawson, p. 171. 151 CWM, SACMED Report, Part III, pp. 52 - 54. 152 WO 214/15 Telegram from Alanbrooke to Wilson and Alexander, 13 & 15 June, 1944. 153 Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 122

77 objectives like crossing the Po River and exploiting to Verona and Venice. They also include training and administrative instructions for crossing the Po and Adige Rivers.155

With such bold objectives stated clearly in the written orders, it is easily comprehensible that historians would dismiss Olive as a dismal failure when it is stopped cold not even halfway to the Po.156

However, a second look this evidence, combined with the realistic expectations expressed privately by Wilson, Alexander, and Leese in the weeks leading up to Olive, indicates those objectives were only expected to be reached in a best-case scenario. In general terms, those orders constitute what could be called "the Gallipoli contingency".

That is, in the event that the enemy is not encountered where he is believed to be located or if he breaks, instead of stopping to await further orders, frontline units should understand what distant objectives they should press towards that would best serve their long term goals. In this particular case, Alexander's scheme for driving on Vienna before Christmas refers to contingency planning as part of the Combined Chiefs concept for Operation Rankin. This plan called for the rapid occupation of Germany in the event that internal German political collapse gave way to military disintegration as had happened in 1918.157

To muddy waters further, in the event Germany continued to resist, Olive

154 Ellis, p. 339. 155 AAI Administration Instruction #44, 24 July, 1944; WO 204/1457 - AFHQ Appreciation of Probable Course of Operations in Northern Italy, 2 Aug 1944. WO 204/586 - 156 William McAndrew 1986 RUSI article on Olive planning captures the orthodox view that the mission was to clear Italy to the Alps and that it failed. See McAndrew, p. 50.

78 objectives were based on expectations that if the Gothic Line were pierced quickly,

Army Group "C" would do what the American Joint Chiefs long feared; cut and run for the Alps. Ultra intercepts and other intelligence indicated that despite Hitler's orders to hold the Gothic Line indefinitely, in the event that it could not be held, plans were prepared for a fighting withdrawal hinged on the great northern Italian rivers back to a

1 CO final defence line in the Alps and along the Piave River known as the Voralpen. Ultra decrypts revealed that if this happened, the Alps line could be defended with at least eight fewer divisions which could be released for the western front.159

This possibility of a German withdrawal concerned Alexander and his staff who estimated they possessed enough strength to breach the Gothic Line but not to exploit beyond it. Such a move fit the profile of German defensive behaviour in the

Mediterranean theatre. Up to the summer of 1944, every time a major defensive belt was defeated, German practice had conducted fighting withdrawals from 100 to 300 miles to the next belt of suitable terrain.160 To deal with this danger Alexander and

Harding insisted prior to and during Olive that Allied armoured divisions be prepared for a rapid mobile thrust to the Po River, not to reach Vienna so much as to ensure that the enemy could not break contact and regain the defensive initiative. Armoured forces would be better able to achieve this goal after the Allies pushed past the Apennines and into the flat open terrain of the Romagna Plains, especially after the anticipated

157 WO 214/34 - Minutes of SAC Planning Conference, 20 August, 1944. 158 WO 214/27 - AFHQ Memorandum, Wilson to Gammell, 16 June 1944. 159 Hinsley, Part III, pp. 342 - 343. 160 WO 204/10416 - Eighth Army Memorandum M/1337, Ammunition Expenditure and German Defensive Behaviour up to Summer 1944.

79 exhaustion of Allied infantry divisions during the fight for the main Gothic Line.161

Unfortunately, the orthodox interpretation is that Allied commanders possessed vain

expectations of armoured exploitation in the "promised land" of good tank country in

the Po Valley.162

What Ultra did not reveal was that the German withdrawal plan, known as

Autumn Mist, was partly a product of successful Allied deception schemes which led

Kesselring to fear another amphibious hook that could trap his entire army group. Little

did Kesselring know that the Allies had nowhere near the resources necessary for such a

move. Kesselring's overestimation of the Allied threat and Alexander's contingency

planning have not been linked in most histories of the campaign. As a result, Allied

orders for an advance to the Po River and Venice led some historians to conclude that

Alexander's preparations for an armoured breakout and major assault crossings of the Po

and Adige Rivers were part of his vain attempts to drive on Vienna and make the theatre

decisive. In reality, although some harboured faint hope in such an outcome, the

armoured breakout and river crossing plans were more about insurance in case the target

group which AAI was supposed to catch and hold, broke and ran.

With the forces available,.reaching the Po River could not be expected unless

every Allied soldier made an extraordinary effort. Alexander, Harding, Clark and Leese

did their level best to encourage this effort, despite their personal realism. At times,

161 WO 204/1457, AAI CGS Appreciation #4 2 Jul 1944; AFHQ Appreciation, 2 Aug 1944; WO 214/34 AAI Future Operations Considerations, 26 Jul 1944; SACMED Planning Conference Minutes, 20 Aug 1944; AAI Future Operations Forecasts, 27 Aug 1944. 162 Orgill, p. 38.

80 such as when they received news of German collapse in Normandy, they even expressed hope that their longshot in Italy might be enough to push Germany over the edge in the attritional war. However, even at their most optimistic moments leading up to Olive, these four men admitted that their chances of seeing the Po River River were "hopes" governed by "luck". Alexander wrote to Alanbrooke that reaching the Po and exploiting beyond it were only possible if his force was not reduced for Anvil/Dragoon. Once

Allied Armies Italy and the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forces (MATAF) were finally cut in mid-summer, Alexander warned Alanbrooke that "my future activities will be much more modest."164

The line between the faint hopes and realistic expectations of the Allied senior leadership in Italy and in London was further blurred by the problem that the soldiers involved, including officers up to the level of division commander, were largely unaware they were part of a massive and dangerous deception, and an elaborate and carefully scripted holding operation. Indeed, Allied troops were told that if they spared no sacrifice, the Olive offensive Amight end the war in Italy."165 Alexander and his army commanders seem to have fostered this message for a combination of reasons. For starters, if the containment mission were to succeed, concealing actual Allied strength and intentions from the enemy was critical. In late July Ultra decrypts revealed that

163 Ellis, p. 289 - 291; Strawson, p. 173; McAndrew, "Commanders and Plans". 164 WO 214/34 - AAI CGS Apprecition of Future Operations, 30 July, 1944; WO 214/16 - Correspondence between Alanbrooke and Alexander 24 - 26 July, 1944; W.D. Eighth Army, G-Plans Section, Appreciation B-3, 9 August, 1944; IWM, Oliver Leese Papers, Letters to Mrs. Leese, 24 & 25 August, 1944; Clark, pp. 369 - 374. 165 Such was the ambitious, but deliberately vague wording of Leese's Personal Message to Eighth Army on the eve of battle. W.D. Eighth Army, Aug 1944.

81 Kesselring correctly predicted that in the event of an invasion of Southern France any renewed offensive on the Gothic Line would be a minor diversion. Only if Allied soldiers themselves believed they were part of something more than a diversion would they be able to convince Kesselring otherwise.166 Indeed, the Mediterranean deception and diversion effort would be greatly served were a captured Allied soldier to reveal to his German captors that his goal was nothing less that Vienna.

Even more important to Alexander and his generals was the maintenance of morale among soldiers who, after western media turned its attention to Northwest

Europe, grew increasingly aware they were stuck in a sideshow theatre and abandoned by the public. Allied soldiers in Italy felt further forsaken by their nations in the summer and fall of 1944 as shortages of equipment and manpower became acute.

According to his biographer, Alexander's great charisma and personal charm were instrumental in preventing this problem from turning into a disaster. Alexander's greatest achievement as a leader was to convince his troops that instead of being the poor second cousins of the much larger Overlord forces, they were an elite group, "and this was due to Alexander's own high concept of its [Allied Armies, Italy] role."

Alexander knew this role was to kill Germans and contain enemy units away from

Northwest Europe, but his soldiers believed it was to roll into Germany's southern frontier and win the war.169

166 Hinsley, Vol. Ill Pt. 2, p. 324. 167 WO 214/16, Personal Message from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 18 July 1944. 168 Nicolson,p. 281. 169 Evidence from Canadian, British, New Zealand, Indian and American archives overwhelmingly indicates that soldiers from Division commander to private

82 There was also no question that some hope existed among senior commanders that the Germans might collapse before the end of the year. This hope was renewed in

August 1944 as news arrived in Italy of the German collapse in Normandy. From

Wilson's headquarters down to Leese's, those few who knew the score believed that one more concerted effort by all Allied forces on the western front could inflict enough casualties on the German Army to break it.170 There was also the prospect that Ultra was right and the Germans would run back to the Alps, in which case the soldiers in

Italy would at least be shipped off to Northwest Europe anyway. It is important to note, however, that never do these hopes appear in the writings of these commanders as expectations. Alexander and his generals, including Harding, remained ever cognizant that the almost irrational German willingness to keep sending their young men to die in

Italy coupled with ideal defensive terrain and the looming rain and mud of autumn meant the Allied contain and kill mission would continue to 1945.171

Their soldiers, on the other hand, grew bitterly disillusioned when the promise of final victory at the outset of Olive proved false and they had to spend yet another muddy winter in Italy, this time in terrain more resembling the Godless, flooded polder country of Belgium and Holland than the hills and mountains of "sunny" Italy. It is also no accident that a large portion of historians who describe Olive as a failure were participants in the battle.

The confusion between Allied diversionary intentions during Olive and written soldier understood their objective to be nothing short of Vienna. 170 WO 214/34 - Letter from Alexander to Leese, 21 August 1944. 171 WO 214/34 - Minutes of AAI Planning Conferences and Future Operations

83 orders conveying more ambitious goals, is further compounded by the more general problem of meaning in Second World War Allied military language. Most often, written orders to advance to a specific location are taken literally to mean that a mission will not be accomplished unless that location is reached and held. The concept of the "advance" was used extensively in Allied military parlance to describe the goal of any ground offensive. The idea that gaining ground indicated success was also widely evident in western media and political circles during the war, and in post-war histories expressing popular frustration in cases where the advance stalled for any length of time. The most notorious manifestations of this phenomenon include the long and bloody Anglo-

Canadian battles in the vicinity of Caen during the Normandy Campaign, and throughout the very gradual advance up the Italian peninsula. Canadian popular historian Mark

Zuehlke describes the latter as "the slow, bloody Allied advance up Italy's long, hard boot."172

However, hidden behind the basic meaning of "advance" is the underlying Allied doctrinal principal that the German Army must be destroyed before a drive to Berlin can occur. Failed attempts to employ modem armoured shock-action to break German positions in North Africa and at Dieppe made senior Allied leaders realize that early

German 'Blitzkrieg' successes in 1939-41 were as much about the weakness of

Germany's opponents as her own strength. Therefore, the 1943 War Office Military

Training Pamphlet titled The Offensive stated that when the opponent is a well-armed,

Appreciations, 2 - 23 October 1944. 172 Mark Zuehlke, The Gothic Line: Canada's Month of Hell in World War II Italy (Vancouver: 2003) p. 11.

84 highly organized modem state like Germany, the first step to defeating its armed power is to "reduce his available manpower and to seize or destroy his industrial resources before he admits defeat". In this sense, capturing enemy-held territory is not an end in itself.173

The Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate field commanders like

Eisenhower, Montgomery and Alexander appreciated that their actual task was to kill

German soldiers and destroy German equipment while their colleagues in the navy protected their own means of generating and projecting force and their air force colleagues worked at wrecking German means.174 The task of destroying the German

Army passed down the chain of command in the form of orders to "advance" to areas known to be defended by enemy units which would then be destroyed with firepower.175

Allied battle doctrine called for a continuous series of carefully planned set-piece

"advances" into prepared German defended zones using large quantities of firepower to limit German capacity to inflict loss on assaulting troops. Weapon technology in the

1940's meant that dug-in and concealed defenders held an advantage over forces moving in the open to attack. Therefore, from 1943 onward, Anglo-Canadian doctrine and training manuals taught that the key to defeating the German Army was capturing defensible terrain it would be compelled to counter-attack.176

173 CWM MPC - W.O. MTP #2, The Offensive, 1943. 174 Lee Windsor, AToo Close for the Guns: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Rhine Bridgehead", Canadian Military History (Spring: 2003). 175 Interview with Major D.M Dickson, former Canadian company commander and brigade operations officer in 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 15 Oct, 2004. 176 War Office: Army Training Instruction # 2 (May 1943) The Co-operation of Infantry and Tanks; Military Training Pamphlet # 41 Parts 1 - 3 (Feb - Jul 1943) The

85 This doctrine was based on predictable German defensive behaviour, namely their practice of immediately counter-attacking Allied units consolidating on newly captured ground. Allied units subsequently took advantage of this near "reflex-like" response by limiting the depth of their advance to commanding terrain in the midst of a

German defended area. Once established on a hillside or in a town, Allied troops placed observed artillery fire directly on now visible enemy positions. The next step was to quickly bring forward an array of weapon systems so that when German infantry and tanks emerged into the open to counter-attack they would be exposed and vulnerable as they moved into carefully sited killing zones. General Montgomery, one of the most important architects of this doctrine, prescribed that vastly more Germans would be killed as they counter-attacked than could be killed during the initial Allied assault.

Only when German counter-attack reserves behind any fortified belt were destroyed could the next consecutive "advance" begin. The exploitation or pursuit with an emphasis on running down and "annihilating" enemy units broken during the set-piece attack would then continue until the next prepared defensive belt manned by fresh or reinforced enemy forces was encountered. The process was to be repeated again and again until there were no more fresh enemy forces to encounter.177

Terry Copp's work on Canadian and British operations around Caen during the battle of Normandy demonstrates how this doctrine successfully eroded German fighting

Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components. 177 Late 1943 and 1944 Anglo-Canadian doctrine and training manuals and training plans are clear that the primary goal of ground operations was to destroy enemy units, particularly by luring German troops into exposing themselves in counter-attacks. Monty quote from ATP 44; MTP #2 1943, p. 34.; also if need be use Monty 19 Aug 42

86 strength to the point where German Army cohesion began to break in mid-August of

1944. In his framework, the number of kilometres advanced south of Caen is less important than the number of casualties inflicted on German units there.178 This study finds that the same doctrine was employed during the summer of 1944 in Italy with one critical difference. Because of its diversionary supporting role, Allied Armies Italy barely had enough strength to "advance" into the successive German defensive belts, kill the occupants and destroy counter-attacking reserves, especially after the Anvil/Dragoon withdrawals. Unlike Montgomery at the end of the Normandy campaign, Alexander did not possess fresh reserves to exploit the breach created when his armies broke open the

Gothic Line.

It is not clear exactly why the attritional, destructive principle underpinning

Anglo-Canadian battle doctrine was concealed by the innocuous term "advance". After landing and living amongst Is' British Division in the Anzio beachhead, BBC War correspondent Wynford Vaughn-Thomas wrote that British officers routinely disguised the ugliness of their trade by discussing it in sporting and other less violent terms.179

This tendency likely grew out of the Great War experience and the subsequent interwar backlash against the attritional "bite and hold" tactics of 1915-1918. Interwar progress in science, technology and air power coupled with Germany's early easy victories won by fast-moving armoured columns seemed to many to have ended the era of what Shane

Schreiber called "hard-pounding" artillery supported infantry attacks that brought final letter in Leese Papers. 178 See Copp, Fields of Fire, pp. 255 - 267. 179 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio, (New York: 1961) p. 21.

87 victory in 1918.180 It is possible that when men like Lord Alanbrooke realized that victory in the 1940's could only come about by returning to the hard-pounding of 1918, albeit with some new technological sophistication, they chose to minimize the use of words conveying Great War imagery. Regardless of why the bloody meaning of the term 'advance' was downplayed in western literature, the fact that Allied Armies Italy did not advance to the Po River and Venice as described in their orders contributed to assessments that Olive failed.

As if these barriers were not enough to keep Allied intentions in Italy shrouded in mystery, formerly classified Ultra decrypts offered an incomplete picture of Germany's situation which further complicating the historian's task. At the time when Olive was planned and executed, Allied leaders assumed the German Army continued to defend northern Italy to prevent the Allies from gaining bomber bases and easy access to the

Balkans offered by the north Italian plains. These prizes could not be as valuable as the

Ruhr and Saar industrial regions or East Prussia which were also threatened by the summer of 1944. Therefore, surely a well organized attack to break the last defensive belt south of the Alps would make the Germans quit Italy and focus their remaining resources on defending more critical areas. That the German Army did not abandon

Italy after Olive must surely indicate that offensive was mishandled. In the absence of contrary information in September and October 1944, Allied commanders in Italy, including Wilson, Alexander and Leese, believed their attack failed to inflict enough

Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War. (Westport: 1997).

88 damage to make the Germans fall back to the easily defensible terrain of the Alps.

Leese expressed his disappointment in the result after the war when he wrote that

"torrential rain"and "fanatical German resistence" brought "active operations to a standstill" by late September 1944.182 After Olive's masterminds went on record that the operation fell short of their hopes, it is difficult to see how historians could arrive at any other conclusion but that Olive failed, despite the fact that Army Group "C" fought more viciously and spent more manpower and resources resisting Olive than any other previous offensive.

After the war, a few observers, including Canada's official historian, Lt Col.

G.W.L Nicholson, observed astutely B and largely unnoticed by subsequent historians B that the Germans fought more tenaciously than originally anticipated in the north because Italian factories and farms were critical to supplying Army Group "C".183 This is only part of the story. The latest findings of the German official history series indicate that in 1944 northern Italian production not only kept Army Group "C" supplied, but residual production was actually transferred to Germany. In fact, much of crucial industrial capacity captured in the Ukraine was moved to northern Italy in late 1943 and early 1944, when it became threatened by the Red Army. The result was that in 1944-

45, northern Italy was a substantial and integral part of the German war economy.184

In addition, Hitler's strategy of dividing the western Allies from the Soviets was

181 CWM, SACMED Final Report to CCS. 182 IWM - Sir Oliver Leese Papers, Unpublished Memoir, p. 11. 183 Nicholson, pp. 459-461. 184 Kroener, pp. 88 - 92; NAC Vol. 20521 - Interview Transcript with Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, pp. 31 - 37.

89 based on keeping Mussolini's ultra-Fascist Salo Republic in being in the north. As long as this was the case, well-paid Italian skilled labourers would not only man their own factories in Milan and Turin, but they could also fill factory jobs in Germany vacated after the last great manpower comb out in the summer of 1944. The preservation of the

Salo Republic also meant there would still be a two-nation fascist alliance to negotiate

1 RS with the west after a successful Ardennes offensive. In practical terms, northern Italy was a crucial component of Hitler's 1944-45 strategy of prolonging the war enough to divide the Allies and prepare his wonder weapons and thus no expense in men or equipment would be spared to hold the Gothic Line in great depth. For the very first time in the Italian campaign, German commanders could trade no more space for time.

The period of "delaying defence" operations came to an abrupt end along the Gothic

Line and field commanders would now be granted most of the necessary resources, particularly in ammunition and replacements, to fight a "permanent" defensive battle.186

Major-General J. Lemelsen, whose elite 29' Panzer Grenadier Division was thrown into the line to stop the Olive onrush, called the clash "the biggest battle of materials fought in Italy." Chief of Staff of German Tenth Army, Colonel Horst Pretzell claimed the battle was "characterized by [a] concentration of material in a confined area, [that] will take its place in history as an example of a battle of attrition in the grand style."1 7

The lengths to which the Germans would go to protect the Milan - Turin

185 Kroener, pp. 90 - 91; F.W. Deakin, The Six Hundred Days of Mussolini. (New York: 1966) pp. 183-216. 186 NAC Vol. 20521 - Kesselring Transcript, pp. 4 - 7, 24. 1 7 Amedeo Montemaggi, Gemmano: La Cassino dell'Adriactio. (Gemmano: 1998) p. 23-24.

90 industrial area are also evident from OKW's reaction to the Dragoon landings in south

France. Instead of concerning themselves with defending French ports or checking the

Allied advance northward up the Rhone Valley, German priorities centred on reinforcing the Maritime Alps to prevent Army Group "C" and the Italian industrial zone being outflanked from the west. Plans were even prepared to deploy a major infusion of air forces direct from the dwindling Reich air defences of thirteen bomber and fighter groups to Italy in the event that Army Group "C" was broken or if an amphibious hook

1 DO threatened their encirclement and the safety of North Italy.

None of this was known to the Allies at the time of Olive, or to historians until recently. Throughout the fighting AAI Chief of Staff, General Harding, constantly pressured Allied divisions to push to their original Po River, Verona - Venice objectives, irrespective of their alarming losses, impossible weather conditions and the utter exhaustion of Allied soldiers because he continued to believe Kesselring's armies would 1RQ abandon northern Italy at any moment and bolt for the Alps. Interestingly, it was the allegedly unperceptive Alexander who finally realized that something in northern Italy was so precious the Germans were prepared to pay any price to defend it. On November

13th 1944 he wrote to General Wilson that the Combined Chiefs need not fear that Army

Group "C" would cut and run as a result of the pressure applied by Allied Armies Italy. There are no doubt political, economic and psychological factors which I am unaware of, which make it impossible for me to explain why the Germans continue to hold on to occupied Italy with so much tenacity and at such cost. I am unable to think of any reason why they should change their policy during the

188 OKW- 1576, p. 6. 189 WO 214/34 - Minutes of AAI Planning Conference, 2 October 1944; CGS 429 & 451, Future Plans Appreciations, 10 and 23 October 1944.

91 next two months. In other words I can see no reason to suppose that the enemy will ever withdraw voluntarily to the line of the Adige to the Alps.

So long as the German Army continued to pay dearly to hold the rearmost positions of

the Gothic Line and the polder country of the Romagna, Alexander reasoned that his

diversionary/attritional mission against an equal sized force was well served in the

bloody broad-fronted dogfight south of the Po that Olive turned into.190 Unfortunately

the damage was already done and history went on to record that Olive bogged down

when September rain turned the Romagna into a morass, giving the Germans breathing

space and the opportunity to defend sodden terrain that a few weeks before Allied tanks

could have rolled across with ease.

All of these factors of personality tensions, the need for secrecy, hidden meaning,

and incomplete intelligence led historians to believe that Operation Olive was supposed

to rid Italy of German presence once and for all and because it did not, it failed just like

so many other Allied offensives in 1944. John Ellis sums up the common view in Brute

Force that Allied offensives in Italy, and elsewhere started out strong based on good

staff work and surprise, but always failed to exploit their initial success.191 William

McAndrew wrote that the opportunity to deal a devastating blow to the German Army was foiled, leading him to question "what had gone wrong?" However, as this chapter demonstrates, even though Allied planners expected that chasing the Germans out of

Italy may be one possible outcome of the Olive offensive, it was not the main object of

190 WO 214/34 - MA 647, Future Operations Report to AFHQ from AAI, 13 Nov 44. 191 Ellis, p. 339. 192 William J. McAndrew, AEighth Army at the Gothic Line: The Dogfight",

92 the operation. If Olive is re-assessed in terms of what modem soldiers call an "economy of force" attack, conducted by limited forces, then its outcome no longer fits Ellis and

McAndrew's judgment. In fact, it becomes one of the great Allied victories of the

Second World War.

RUSI Journal. (June: 1986) p. 61.

93 Chapter III: Planning to Make do with Less

The great battles on the Italian mainland between 1943 and 1945 must be entirely re-considered in light of how Allied strategy was carefully conceived to disrupt

German defences in western Europe in the last half of the Second World War. This is especially true for battles like the Gothic Line, where Allied diversionary strategy was implemented with deliberately limited numbers of men, weapons and supplies, or what military theorists call "economy of force". Therefore, the next step in crafting a new history of the Gothic Line offensive is to consider how Allied commanders planned to turn this diversionary strategy into practice. To date, the Battle for the Gothic Line has been set within the narrow confines of the Italian theatre and measured against the erroneous speculations and post-war memoirs of senior politicians and some key officers. As a result, the assumption that the operational plan to attack the Gothic Line was fundamentally flawed forms the basis for judgements that the offensive was a disappointing Allied failure. The great British doyen of the Second World War in the

Mediterranean, W.G.F. Jackson, captured the commonly accepted wisdom when he wrote that the plan selected to break the Gothic Line represented the "most dramatic and unfortunate decisions taken during the Italian campaign." From such a prejudiced launching point, histories of this battle invariably become inquisitions into how the plan faltered on the battlefield.

However, when weighed against the strategic requirement to contain and destroy

193 W.G.F Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol VI, Victory in the

94 the largest possible number of German troops with the smallest possible Allied commitment, the plan to attack the Gothic Line appears quite sensible. The plan's chief architect, General Sir Oliver Leese, well understood his diversionary mission supporting

"the main front in Northwest Europe" and the limitations on that mission imposed by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff.194 In the second half of 1944, achieving Allied strategic goals in Italy became more difficult than ever.

The arrival of substantial German reserve forces and replacements in Italy after the climactic battles south of Rome in May and June 1944, even as as Operation

Overlord commenced, ensured the latter's success. But if the Allies were to continue to control German capacity to respond to the offensive in Northwest Europe for the remainder of that critical year, General Alexander and his army commanders had to give the new enemy reinforcements cause to stay. The simple solution was to continue attacking northward relentlessly, denying German Army Group "C" respite to rebuild shattered divisions or to finish building Gothic Line fortifications before wet fall weather magnified enemy strength. Alanbrooke and the British Chiefs of Staff encouraged Alexander's armies to finish off as many weakened German units as possible before they reached a next fortified winter defence line. "In our view the

Germans are playing into your hands by standing and fighting south of the Pisa-Rimini

[Gothic] Line," Alanbrooke cabled to Alexander on 29 June 1944, "it is a heaven sent opportunity of destroying Kesselring's Army and drawing in further German

Mediterranean, Part II June to October 1944. (London: 1987) p. 119. 194 IWM, Sir Oliver Leese Papers, Unpublished memoir p. 2.

95 reserves."195

The task seemed feasible in the heady days of June when the Germans were on the run and the American Joints Chiefs entertained British appeals to cancel

Anvil/Dragoon. The latter would allow the extra divisions allotted to Allied Armies

Italy in the spring of 1944 to remain. Therefore in July a pall fell over Allied Force

Headquarters in Casserta when word came that Dragoon would go ahead and seven first rate French and American divisions would immediately pull out of the line to prepare for it. Word came as German reinforcements, mountainous terrain, over-extended supply lines and periods of intense rain turned the rapid pursuit north from Rome into a series of tough battles at hastily sited German positions along the Dora Line south of Lake

Bolsena, the Albert Line at Lake Trasimene and later in the Amo River Valley on the approaches to Florence.1 OKW ordered Kesselring's armies to resist there to buy time for Organization Todt and its slave labour force to build enough fixed fortifications in the Gothic Line to stop the Allies for the winter if not indefinitely.197 As Alanbrooke's message to Alexander implies, German attempts to hold central Italy enabled the Allies to inflict more damage than if the enemy broke contact and withdrew behind a demolition screen. However, the mounting difficulties described above meant AAI paid

195 WO 214/15 - Alexander Papers, 59131 CIGS, Telegram, Alanbrooke to Alexander, 29 June 1944. 196 WO 214/15 - Alexander Papers, Message from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 28 June 1944; IWM, Leese Papers, Letter from Leese to M Gen. John Kennedy, 25 July 1944. 197 Lt-Col. Pretzell, Ops Offr. German Tenth Army, Material for Presentation of the Battle of Rimini, Aug 44-Feb 45 pp. 1-3; F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol 3, Pt II (London: 1988) pp. 311-312.

96 an increasingly heavy cost for the attritional payoff.

The main problem was that the removal of seven divisions and 70% of air units from Alexander's order of battle drastically weakened his capacity to wage offensive war, and especially to breach the Gothic Line which promised to be as powerful as the blood-soaked Gustav position. The most debilitating loss were three colonial Algerian and Moroccan mountain divisions and the rest of Marshal Juin's French Expeditionary

Corps, which performed so well in the high country around Cassino. Perhaps naively, given French desires to join in the liberation of their homeland, Alexander and Harding counted on their availability for breaching the Gothic Line, anchored as it was along the rugged Northern Apennines. When Allied force reductions and German increases became reality in July, Alexander's staff developed grave doubts about whether there was enough Allied strength remaining in Italy to keep up offensive pressure at all, let alone breach a major fortified line.198

Before the decrease was confirmed, Alexander's campaign plan called for a portion of his armies to rest during the summer and absorb the lessons of Diadem while still keeping a sizable force pressing the withdrawing enemy. Experience with the

Gustav Line taught that only a fresh, full-strength, and specially trained breakthrough force could smash man-made fortifications sited on defensible ground, especially in the short weeks remaining before the fall rains. Alexander and Harding therefore planned for a third of Allied divisions to rest in reserve at any one time. This would ensure a fresh and replenished pursuit force could relieve formations exhausted in what was

198 Ernest Fisher, U.S. Army in World War II: Cassino to the Alps. (Washington:

97 expected to be a vicious and climactic battle along the Gothic Line. That pursuit force

would then pour through the breach and run surviving defenders into the ground before

they could escape over the Po to the Alps.199 Rotating units in and out of the front on

such a scale was a luxury never before experienced in Italy where force ratios made it

common for formations to stay in the line almost continuously.200 The gruelling and

nearly uninterrupted strain endured by Allied divisions since September 1943 meant that

a substantial break was vital to bury the dead, restore morale and integrate new

replacements if formations were to continue functioning at all.201

Alexander's staff also learned in Operation Diadem that the key to inflicting

damage on a numerically similar enemy manning powerful defences was to covertly

concentrate Allied combat power along a key section of an extended German front.

Doing so achieved temporary local superiority during the initial assault, allowing lead

formations to wreck front line German units and snatch pieces of dominating ground

from which they could shoot up counter-attacking reserves in accordance with Allied,

and particularly British, doctrine. In this fashion, German reserve divisions shifted to meet the Allied threat in the Liri Valley in late May and early June were ground up one by one until there were few left to stop Eighth Army forward momentum or to block the

well-timed American breakout at Anzio in their rear. After the battle, Alexander's Chief

1977) p. 310. 199 WO 204/1457 - AAI CGS Appreciation #4, 2 July 1944. 200 For example, except for a brief training period prior to Diadem, 1st Canadian Division had been in the line since the Battle of the Moro River in early December 1943. Diadem itself represented the only such opportunity for the relief of formations due because of the temporary injection of extra Allied divisions for this, the main Overlord diversion.

98 of Staff, General Sir John Harding detailed their expectations of enemy behavior based on Diadem and other experience. "From all we know of the enemy's mentality and methods it is fair to assume that when the attack develops he will fight his hardest to hold his positions and will utilize all his reserves in attempts to seal off points at which we succeed in penetrating." Decoding Harding's language in light of British attack doctrine reveals how German attempts to "seal" the breach were welcomed by the Allies as opportunities to destroy a large portion of the enemy force.202 When the enemy line was sufficiently weakened Allied units could force a "penetration deep enough and wide enough to make the position untenable and admit of exploitation."2 3 Exploitation translates into closely pursuing a fleeing enemy force to either encircle it, destroying it with firepower from ground and air as it retreats or smashing it before it can re-organize, should it turn to fight.

Alexander hoped to repeat this process for the coming attack on the Gothic Line, although this time his army group faced a larger enemy. Local superiority could not last as long as it did in Diadem. With any luck the Germans would buy deception schemes that a landing was planned near Genoa or the head of the Adriatic and keep substantial forces on those coastlines for a few critical weeks. However, once they identified the

201 This issue is explored in the Canadian case in the following chapter. 202 The concept of destroying German forces as they counter-attacked features most prominently in British and Commonwealth battle doctrine. US Army doctrine placed more emphasis on destruction of the enemy in their initial assault using firepower and massed infantry and tanks. However, the Americans were still more than capable of using firepower to inflict loss on a counter-attacking enemy: Anzio being a notable example. See Graham and Bidwell, Tug of War, p. 376. 203 WO 214/34 - AAI, Note on the Present Situation and Future Plans, 30 July 1944.

99 main assault, the Germans could make use of the dense Po Valley network of roads, railways and rivers to rapidly transfer reserves from quiet sectors. That meant a great battle was destined to take place when German reserves collided with the Allied breakthrough force. Alexander and his generals envisioned this collision occurring on ground of their choosing, well past the Apennines and the powerful Gothic positions, where Allied pilots and artillery observers could better see and therefore more efficiently inflict loss upon enemy maneuvering in the open. Alexander wrote to Churchill how he anticipated and "prayed" that the Germans would "try and stand on the Pisa - Rimini line". If the Germans did stop to hold and if his own armies were left intact, Alexander believed he could win a destructive battle on the Gothic Line and still "mass such a powerful force of fresh troops, guns, tanks and air against them that a breakthrough into the Po valley should not only split them in half, but finally eliminate Kesselring's two armies." Alexander estimated the result would be an open road to Vienna or the deployment of at least ten more German divisions to Italy and thus a brilliant diversionary success.205

Timing for this great battle was critical, for Allied commanders in Italy had all experienced how winter weather strangled off road movement. Therefore, they knew they must breakthrough the main Gothic Line defences and secure their chosen battleground quickly or not at all. The requirement for rapid breakthrough and exploitation in the coming battle was emphasized from Army Group Headquarters down

204 WO 214/33 - AAI CGS Appreciation #3, 19 June 1944. 205 WO 214/15 - Telegram from Alexander to Churchill, 19 June 1944. 206 W.G.F Jackson, The Battle for Italy. (London: 1967) p. 121; Jackson,

100 through to the two field armies, their corps, divisions and ultimately to the infantry sections and tank crews that would execute the plan.207

The July Dragoon withdrawals killed the viability of Harding's original plan to crack the Gothic Line in the centre and continue the offensive on the same axis used during the pursuit from Rome. Yet, Harding clung to his concept of attacking through the Apennines from Florence to Bologna even after he was informed AAI must be reduced. In July, he and Alexander were not prepared to give up the possibility of scoring a decisive victory in Italy and thus turned their efforts to scrounging units to replace those leaving for France.209 They were encouraged by the Combined Chiefs, who were unanimously supportive of the Italian campaign after seeing how well it diverted German attention from Overlord in the summer of 1944. When new Ultra intelligence revealed Kesselring's orders to stand "permanently" on the Gothic Line, offering the promise of continued enemy containment and attrition, American and

British service chiefs promised Alexander three new American and Brazilian divisions, a

Greek Mountain Brigade and to swap the tired British 5th Division for the rested and highly effective 78th. But these formations would not be ready for major operations until well into the fall. Alexander also proposed to equip and train complete divisions from the assortment of former partisans and anti-fascist ex-Italian soldiers known as the Corps

Mediterranean, p. 61 - 65. 207 WO 214/34 - AAI Planning notes 30 July, 44; W.D. Eighth Army - Planning Notes, 3 August, Operation Instruction 1431, 13 August, 1944; W.D. 1 Cdn Corps, Operation Instruction #22. 208 WO 214/34 - Future Operational Considerations, CGS AAI, 30 July, 1944. 209 WO 214/16 - Alexander Papers, Correspondence between Alexander and Alanbrooke, 22 Jul -1 Aug 1944.

101 of Italian Liberation, (CIL) along British Army lines.211 In a similar vein, arrangements were discussed to use Poles captured in German service in Normandy to form two new infantry brigades and possibly even a new division in 2nd Polish Corps. These latter two schemes were only partially successful. Foreign Office reservations about mobilizing

Italians and equipment shortages hampered efforts to improve CIL units with British weapons, although Italian numbers and responsibility did increase.212 In the Polish case, heavy casualties in 1944 meant that replacements from Normandy could at best make good the losses and reconstitute the corps' replacement pool for future operations.

None of these forces could reach the front before the fall rains, but knowledge of their coming encouraged Harding, Alexander, Leese and Clark not to spare their existing manpower and resources in an all or nothing shot at wiping out Army Group "C" in and around the Gothic Line and before it could make a run for the Alps. Alexander told

Leese in late August that, "I am convinced that we can and must take risks to exploit the success I am confident you will achieve in your main attack. We can even risk a few bloody noses. Hesitation or over-caution at this stage of the war will merely prolong the agony and cost us more in the end I'm sure." While these matters were decided that summer, Allied commanders and planners remained unaware of the degree to which north Italy was critical to the Germans and therefore the amount of human life and material the enemy would expend to hold it. It will become evident in subsequent

210 WO 214/16 - Telegram from Alanbrooke to Alexander, 26 Jul 44. 211 WO 214/16 - Message from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 25 Jul 44. 212 WO 214/16 - Telegram from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 18 Jul 44.

102 chapters that Allied willingness to push "relentlessly and "not flinch at losses"213 against a desperate enemy proved pivotal in fighting Kesselring's divisions to a standstill that fall in front of Bologna.

Without clear knowledge of German intentions, Harding still believed in late

August that the combined weight of Fifth and Eighth Armies might drive an unstoppable wedge in the centre of the Gothic Line. The central Florence-Bologna axis was the shortest route to the Po River, allowing for rapid exploitation so as to prevent Kesselring escaping across the broad watercourse. The route was made even more appealing that

July when Harding's operations and intelligence staff determined that German defense construction was incomplete in the mountain passes. Harding's planners also argued that the major roads in the area ran north-south along river valleys rather than across them. These would afford fewer enemy opportunities to set up fall back positions compared to the numerous east-west river lines bisecting highways on the east and west coasts.214 Therefore if AAI could push through the Apennines in good summer weather,

Harding and Alexander envisioned a decisive battle developing around Bologna as

Army Group "C" folded in its wings to meet the Allied penetration.215 If the Germans broke and ran, Alexander planned to focus his limited air power on wrecking Po bridges and ferries to trap retreating German units against the wide river.

In July Harding optimistically advocated a quick breakthrough to the Po and a rapid drive to Venice and Verona which could "virtually sever communications between

213 WO 214/34 - Message from Alexander to Leese, 21 Aug 44. 214 Ellis, p. 339.; Jackson, Mediterranean pp. 68-71.; Orgill, p. 29. 215 WO 214/15 - Alexander Papers, Correspondence between Alanbrooke and

103 the enemy forces in North Eastern Italy and those to the west".216 If they could pull this off, Allied armoured divisions had a chance to reach "the foothills of the Alps" and push

"the enemy over Piave River" before the end of the year. The Allies would then be in a position to deliver a major strategic blow to the Reich through the Ljubljana Gap

"according to the way in which the situation developed and the time of the year."217

This operational concept was not much different from Harding's plans in June which was drafted before German reinforcements arrived in Italy to slow the pursuit and before it was clear how difficult the Battle of Normandy would become.

Instead of crafting a new plan after Dragoon was authorized, Alexander and

Harding remained engrossed in attempts to cancel Dragoon or find alternative means to maintain their fighting power. However, it is worth noting that Alexander never lost sight of his diversionary task. He and Harding simply refused to accept that Vienna should be ruled out as a possibility should the Germans choose not to defend Italy after a decisive battle in the Gothic Line.218 Meanwhile, Generals Clark and Leese kept up the pressure on an increasingly powerful enemy retiring out of the Tuscan plain into the rugged ground on the southern fringes of the Apennines. They set off in pursuit back in

June with assurance from AAI Headquarters that the southern France landings would be called off and their armies left intact. Indeed, the British Chiefs of Staff contributed to this forlorn desire. As late as the end of June, Lord Alanbrooke kept Alexander's hopes alive that Anvil/Dragoon could be cancelled even though the CIGS cautioned his

Alexander and Churchill and Alexander, June - July 1944. 216 WO 204/1457 - CGS, AAI Appreciation No. 4, 2 Jul 44. 217 WO 214/34 - AAI Future Operations Forecast, 27 Aug 44

104 subordinate to remain focussed on "the destruction of Kesselring's Army" and not on

7 I Q dreams of Vienna. It therefore came as a shock to learn "that the whole of Gen.

Juin's French Corps and three experienced American divisions and their best Corps commander and Corps headquarters were to leave for France." Leese later wrote, "It was a bitter blow B gone in one fell swoop were our dreams of driving at speed through the plains of Venezia."220

Afterward, Clark and Leese struggled to re-align their formations and fill gaps created by departing French and American units while battling increasing resistence in central Italy along the Amo River Valley. Fresh and rebuilt German divisions packed into the area, blocking the approaches to Florence. Leese described the problem created when the Germans realized that "5th Army had sent away several divisions and they [The

Germans] accordingly thinned out their troops between Leghorn and the sea." British

10 Corps and the Poles contained nine German divisions in the northeastern Apennines and the Adriatic sector "but the remainder of German divisions were organized in depth north of Florence."221 Leese's highly capable Chief of Staff, Major-General Geoffrey

Walsh, told senior staff and officers in Eighth Army, that "Florence" was indeed "the key to the future. Unfortunately it was just as obvious to the enemy as to ourselves."222

To keep up offensive pressure, Leese and Clark fed divisions resting and training for the Gothic Line assault back into the front ahead of schedule. These included 2nd

218 WO 214/15 - Telegram from Alexander to Alanbrooke, 28 June 44. 219 WO 214/15 - Telegram from Alanbrooke to Alexander, 29 June 1944. 220 IWM, Leese Papers, AWe Are Cheated of a Great Prize in Italy", part of Leese's unpublished memoirs. 221 IWM, Leese Papers, unpublished memoirs, Chapter 14,p. 1

105 New Zealand, 4th and 8th Indian, and 4th British Divisions and nearly all of Clark's remaining formations.223 Therefore, not only was Alexander denied his breakthrough reserve, he could only afford to keep five of his 20 divisions out of the fighting and fresh and ready for the renewed offensive. Even with this premature commitment Walsh wrote, "we had lost the momentum" in the pursuit north from Rome and "it was difficult to disguise our intentions" of driving on Bologna.224

Under these circumstances Leese began to question the wisdom of Harding's plan to attack the Gothic Line's centre where the enemy front line seemed strongest. "If we had been left alone, we might have achieved a decisive success. As it is, we shall achieve limited success."225 His doubts were reinforced on 3 August when he visited his most trusted corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sydney Kirkman, then directing 13th

Corps through difficult fighting on the road to Florence. Kirkman, suffering from a lack of mountain-equipped units, explained how rugged terrain between Arezzo and Florence thwarted bringing his full artillery compliment to bear on strong German infantry positions or maneuvering against them with his armour. The problem was magnified by a change in German behavior from holding strongly on selected and widely separated ridge lines as had been the pattern to date, to holding "every" ridge and hill. Kirkman convinced Leese that a major Eighth Army offensive on the Gothic Line on this axis, without French mountain troops, would be disastrous. Kirkman felt that German units

222 IWM, Leese Papers, Eighth Army CoS Talk, 25 Aug, 44. 223 Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 42; Blaxland, pp. 157 - 158 224 IWM, Leese Papers, Eighth Army CoS Talk, 25 Aug, 44. 225 IWM Leese Papers, Leese to ACIGS, 25 July 1944. 226 Rowland Ryder, Oliver Leese (London: 1987) pp. 183-186.

106 defending the mountain passes could keep Eighth Army in check "indefinitely". Instead, he advocated secretly shifting Leese's assault force to the Adriatic coast, where the terrain was better suited to Eighth Army's mechanized combat power.227 Leese was inclined to agree:

The situation had now changed. The Germans had assessed correctly the weakness of the Fifth Army, and also the direction of the main Eighth Army thrust. The country between Florence and the Gothic Line was difficult and overlooked by dominating ground; and frontal assault seemed likely to be a costly operation. It was doubtful whether, with the limited number of divisions now available, we could both carry out a successful frontal assault in this sector 77R

and afterwards have sufficient strength to exploit the success gained.

Kirkman's suggestion and Leese's quick acceptance of it were influenced by recent experiences employing armour in Italy. In Diadem and in several of the June and

July battles, armoured regiments equipped with Sherman and Churchill tanks penetrated en masse into the depth of German defence lines after successful infantry and artillery break-in attacks. Armour was not used alone in these breakthroughs, but in equal proportion to and often in control of accompanying infantry. This was new. The common mix was 3:1 infantry to armour, in which individual squadrons were placed under command of infantry battalions during break-ins.229 The practice conformed closely with General Montgomery's armoured doctrine in Normandy. It was

u' Bidwell; Graham, Tug of War p. 348. 228 IWM, Leese Papers, Memoirs, p. 2. (Add letters to Kennedy describing Arezzo and 6SAAD actions) 229 WO 204/7594 - Eighth Army Memorandum 19175, ACooperation of Infantry and Tanks, 28 June 1944; IWM, Leese Papers, Letters to Montgomery, 11 June, 10 July, 19 August 1944. 230 Lt-Gen. G.G. Simonds memorandum on AOperational Policy for 2nd Canadian Corps" formation staff, 17 Feb 1944, cited in Terry Copp, Fields of Fire (Toronto: 2003) p. 269 - 276.

107 especially successful when used in hilly, but not mountainous, parts of Italy where the superior climbing ability of the Sherman and Churchill enabled the vehicles to manouevre where German defenders did not expect concentrated tank activity.231

The key to this penetration battle based on armour was employing longer range medium artillery to support armoured-infantry breakthrough teams after the latter drove beyond the range of field guns. The aim was not necessarily a final breakthrough, as this would not come until the German Army in Europe was sufficiently reduced in manpower. Rather, the aim was to inflict loss on German units retreating in the open after they were driven from the protection of dug-in positions. The running armoured battle would continue until the next major enemy line of defence was encountered.

Kirkman became a master of this type of operation in 1944 and lectured on the subject throughout Eighth Army.232 It was the latest adaptation of proven Eighth Army set-piece bite and hold attack doctrine used throughout the British Army ever since El Alamein.

The difference was that the 'bites' were getting bigger. However, as 13th Corps moved up the Amo Valley in late July 1944 they ran out of foothills and into the Northern

Apennines proper. While Kirkman's tanks could climb hills, they could not climb mountains, nor could his supply trucks and gun tractors. 13th Corps' was forced to conduct infantry attacks on enemy infantry dug-in in comparable strength and supported by artillery resources which grew by the day.233 The combination of difficult terrain and

231 WO 170/275-6 V Corps W.D. Operation Olive Planning Instruction No. 1, 16 Aug 44. 232 NAC Vol 19501 - W.D. Eighth Army, Report on the Use of Armour in Italy in Mountains, 8 April, 1944. 233 IWM, Leese Papers, Letters to ACIGS, 25 July, 1 August 1944.

108 a powerful enemy stalled Kirkman's thrust around Florence in late July. If the offensive was to restart with the Allied forces left in Italy, it would have restart somewhere else.

Events on the Adriatic coast further convinced Leese that Kirkman was right about shifting Eighth Army weight there. In the third week of July, Lieutenant-General

Wladislaw Anders' 2nd Polish Corps captured the major port town of Ancona. The attack featured all the trappings of Kirkman's method, including an infantry break-in followed by an armoured breakthrough. However, instead of breaking across the open coastal plain, Anders' 2 Polish Armoured Brigade and attached infantry attacked inland, across dry river beds and into the foothills. They outflanked strong German defences on the coastal plain around Ancona, seized key, defensible ground and then destroyed large portions of the German 278th Division sent to retake it in accordance with German defensive doctrine.234

The Polish attack at Ancona, like Kirkman's operations in the Tuscan foothills, used medium artillery for close support to armoured battlegroups penetrating deep behind the enemy. Meanwhile, German artillery that withdrew beyond range of medium guns was partly subdued by using of air power in the "counter-battery" role. Desert Air

Force fighter bombers hunted likely reverse slope positions for hostile artillery batteries and mortars. Foothills were a vital part of the armoured infantry battle group equation.

They negated the normally long range and effective German tank and anti-tank guns which could otherwise stand off from over 1000 yards to destroy Allied tanks at will.

Leese was deeply impressed by these developments and wrote about them at

234 Gregory Blaxland, Alexander's Generals: The Italian Campaign, 1944-45.

109 length to his friend John Kennedy, Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff and to his mentor, General Montgomery.235 The successes at Arezzo and especially at Ancona became models for a plan Leese proposed to Gen. Alexander and Lt-Gen. Harding on 4

August under the wing of a Dakota transport plane on the Orvieto airfield near Lake

Bolseno.236 Leese emphasized how much German strength had built up in Florence-

Bologna area.237 He therefore proposed to secretly move most of his army to the foothills and coastal flats along the Adriatic in a reverse of the great manouevre successfully orchestrated weeks before Diadem. Leese argued to his chief that if "we could do this we might once again achieve surprise." Leese's case must have been convincing, for Alexander immediately agreed and set off the next day to make the necessary arrangements with Mark Clark's Fifth Army Headquarters.

Under the new plan, Eighth Army would attack first, along the Adriatic coast towards Pesaro and Rimini. Kesselring would be forced to strip his densely packed centre to feed a grinding attritional tempest. When the centre appeared sufficiently weakened Alexander would signal Fifth Army to open a renewed attack, or what he called "the one-two punch", along the Florence-Bologna route. Leese and his staff knew it was a long shot given the amount of dry weather left in 1944, the strong German forces left in the region, and their own weakness. But if all went well, Tenth German

(London: 1979) pp. 145-155. 235IWM, Leese Papers, Letter to Montgomery, 1 August 1944. 236 For a detailed account of this meeting and the sequence of events which followed see Jackson, Mediterranean, Chapter XI AThe Plan is Changed". 237 IWM, Leese Papers, Eighth Army Chief of Staff s Talk Notes, 25 August 1944. 238 IWM, Leese Papers, Unpublished Memoir, p. 2.

110 Army might be cut off. Even if it was not and forward movement turned once again to a slow attritional slog, then at least Alexander's two armies would have cleared the worst of the mountains and be spread across a broad enough front to deploy all their firepower and with enough roads between them to shift the weight left and right to keep the enemy off balance for as long as they were required to keep them tied down. "Above all, we must not be caught in the Apennines when winter fell."240

Clark, also concerned with the viability of Harding's plan in light of the Anvil withdrawals, quickly bought into the new concept, but with the stipulation that 13th

British Corps come under his command. This would enable him to attack along the few roads in the extremely rugged terrain between the main Fifth and Eighth Army thrust lines and then concentrate 2nd US Corps on Bologna while 4th US Corps probed on a broad front on the western end of the line.241 Ironically, Sydney Kirkman, who gave birth to the idea so his beloved corps could avoid continued mountain fighting, would therefore have to press on in high country. Leese recognized that the shortage of Allied units in Italy left no alternative.242 After the war Leese wrote, "I at once knew I had to agree, and yet I struggled in my mind to think of some way to maintain the Eighth Army intact and not once again to have my whole plans of resting my divisions totally disorganized - and to find myself once more, as I was at Cassino, hopelessly short of divisions rested and trained for subsequent offensive operations." Though disappointed

239 NAC RG 24 vol 10500, W.D. Eighth Army, G-Plans, Note on an Attack in the East Coast Sector, 3 Aug 44. 240 IWM, Leese Papers, CoS Talk, 25 August 1944, p. 6. 241 Mark Clark, Calculated Risk. (New York: 1950) p. 390. 242 IWM, Leese Papers, Memoirs, pp. 2 - 4.

Ill that all Commonwealth forces could not come under his command, Leese saw the military necessity of allotting Clark enough strength to screen the removal of Eighth

Army from the Florence area, to attack on a broad front and be still be ready to take advantage of encirclement opportunity resulting from his own surprise attack on the

Adriatic.243

Leese's plan was far less ambitious than Harding's vision of completely annihilating Army Group "C'and pressing into the Alps by fall. Instead, Leese and

Walsh felt the best they could hope for was to "break the Gothic Line and penetrate into the Po Valley with a secure L of C [line of communication] before winter."244 Their scheme to relocate Eighth Army's centre of gravity to the east coast was better suited to sustaining the logistic demands of this kind of continued attrition and containment- driven campaign. Eighth Army could be supplied from Ancona and by rail from Ortona, rather than trying to sustain both armies through the mountain passes in winter. This made better sense to Alexander's own logistic staff who had been struggling to find a way to supply Harding's pipedream drive to the Alps. They seemed more realistic than the Chief of Staff in recognizing that the summer withdrawals of troops, planes and resources for Dragoon meant spending another winter in Italy. They therefore concerned themselves with long-term sustainment of units in a continued attritional battle somewhere between the current front and the Po River. In July Alexander's quartermaster instructed AAI base units that they "must remain focused on furthering the

243 IWM, Leese Papers, Memoirs, pp. 3 - 4. 244 WO 204/10416 - Eighth Army G Plans, M/1338: Assault on the Rimini-Pisa Defence Line. (Date?)

112 battle in Italy and pulling up the tail and moving depot stores from south to north in anticipation of a lengthy stay."245 Later in the fall as the battle developed, the German decision to hold as far south of the Po actually eased the Allied logistic situation by enabling Fifth and Eighth Armies to fight on manageable lines of communication using bases, ports and railheads established and cleared of enemy demolitions during the summer.

Leese was not the only one to question the soundness of Harding's plan. The

ACIGS, Maj-Gen. Kennedy wrote to his friend General Leese that "recent developments had led me to expect a change in the plan to break the Gothic line."246 For his part,

General Alexander accepted the proposal so quickly because he recognized that Leese and his corps commanders no longer had confidence in the original concept and because the new one allowed for his favoured method of " 'the two handed punch' or, more orthodoxically [sic] expressed, the strategy of attacking two points equally vital to the enemy either simultaneously or alternatively in order to split the reserves available for the defence."247 The method worked well in the late spring when alternating blows from the Liri Valley and Anzio broke German armies south of Rome. Alexander's method created conditions in which counter-attacking enemy reserves could be killed off in penny-packets and not permitted to concentrate for a coordinated counter-offensive.248

The plan also conformed with Lord Alanbrooke's wish for a broad front attack forcing

245 WO 204/586 AAI Administration Instruction No. 44, 24 Jul 44. 246 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter from Kennedy, 22 August 1944. 247 ADespatch by Field-Marshal Alexander: The Allied Armies in Italy from 3r September 1943 to 12 December 1944",The London Gazette, 6 June 1950, p. 2943. 248 IWM, Leese Papers, Precis of Chief of Staff s Talk to Eighth Army Senior

113 the full resources of Army Group "C" to defend a long extended line where much of it could be destroyed. Alanbrooke wanted whatever surviving Germans that remained to be so embattled on that line that they would be unable to interfere in the fighting in

Northwest Europe which, in the late summer and fall, was still in a critical stage.

Indeed, Alanbrooke and Air Marshall Portal suggested that so long as "the main objective assigned by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was to "hold and destroy" German armies then in Italy, it did not matter where that process occurred. However, if the enemy continued to allow himself to be tied to north Italy and killed there in quantity, then the Combined Chiefs would be satisfied.249 Even Harding admitted that Alexander saw merit in Leese's plan, as his own was hamstrung by the summertime loss of momentum and mountain troops resulting from the Anvil/Dragoon withdrawals.250

Despite the apparent acceptance of the Eighth Army commander's suggestions,

British official historian and Italian campaign veteran, Gen. W.G.F. Jackson, sharply criticizes Leese for tampering with Harding's plan:

It is far from easy to make so great an alteration in operational policy at so late a stage with forces as large as the Allied Armies in Italy without paying heavy penalties in terms of waste of preparatory effort and resources, of confusion and uncertainty at lower levels, and, above all, of loss of time, which with the approach of autumnBonly two months awayBwas to prove a critical factor in the balance between success and failure.

Officers, 25 Aug 44. 249 These suggestions by Alanbrooke and Portal were made partly in reaction to SACMED plans for an Adriatic amphibious end run to the Istrian peninsula in Yugoslavia should the Germans try to break contact in the event the Gothic Line was pierced. WO 214/34 - Minutes of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Planning Conference 20 Aug 44 with Harding, Wilson, Clark and all the British Chiefs of Staff present. Alanbrooke, pp. 554 - 555. 7 SO Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 123. 251 Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 119. 114 Jackson, and some other historians of the campaign, judge that Leese's plan change resulted in a three-week delay starting the Gothic Line offensive in the remaining critical weeks of good weather.252

Jackson is especially critical of Leese's motives for the change which he felt were less about military matters and more about personal feelings towards Gen. Clark.

Jackson's appraisal is largely based on Harding's account prepared for the British official history team, in which Harding wrote:

Gen. Leese was still very jealous of Gen. Clark over the capture of Rome when the two armies had fought more or less on the same axis. He ... wanted to make quite certain that credit for the next Allied success ... should go to him alone. This would be ensured if 8 Army fought its battle well away on one flank where there could be no question of 5 Army having had any effect on the result.

Harding then damningly claimed he and Alexander remained convinced that the original plan was "militarily correct". On the matter of Leese and Kirkman's lost confidence in that plan, Harding bemoaned how he "had to pay attention to such considerations, however unworthy."253

While Leese's dislike of Clark and his disgust with his American counterpart's decision to capture Rome rather than obey orders to trap German Tenth Army back in

May and June may have played some role in Leese's proposed plan, there is little evidence to prove it beyond Harding's speculation. Although Leese's letters home to his wife betray a certain contempt for Clark, it is of a more professional nature and

252 Trumball Higgins, Soft Underbelly. (London: 1968) p. 183; Field Marshal Lord Carver, The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Italy, 1943 -1945. (London: 2001)p227. 253 Lt-Gen. John Harding's account for Central Mediterranean Force History,

115 reflecting differences in Anglo-American approaches to war rather than the jealous motives Harding describes. After US Fifth Army entered Rome, Leese wrote home that he was less concerned about the glory of capturing the city than with the matter of

Clark's missed opportunity to destroy even more of Tenth Army. "We could be in

Venice by now if not for it!"254 If Leese was personally jealous of Clark and wanted to win accolades for himself then he told or wrote no one of it.

In contrast, evidence of the military merit of Leese's plan is plentiful. Leese and

Walsh understood their strategic mission and Alexander's intent to inflict maximum loss on the German Army in a controlled attritional process. "We've got to fight a big battle somewhere. We elected to fight it on ground of our own choosing were we can use to the best advantage our superiority in armour, guns and air."255 Not only was the ground along the Adriatic end of the Gothic Line more suited to Eighth Army firepower-based bite and hold doctrine, but in August only four German divisions defended the sector.

Two of those had their infantry strength significantly eroded fighting the Polish Corps.

Eighth Army could concentrate nine divisions against them, even if only four were fresh and ready for a major set-piece assault. That included the two divisions of 1st Canadian

Corps. This surprise concentration would give Leese a narrow window of advantage in infantry strength. The other advantage Leese's chosen battleground offered was that

Tenth German Army would have to fight along the Adriatic coast always looking over its left shoulder to the wide expanse of what seemed like excellent landing beaches cited in Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 123. 254 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter to Mrs. Leese, 10 July 1944. 255 IWM, Leese Papers, CoS Talk, 25 August 1944, p. 7.

116 along the seaside resort towns from Cattolica to Ravenna. Allied deception and counter­ intelligence efforts successfully played on that fear.256

The destructive, attritional goal behind Leese's Olive concept was hidden in

Anglo-Canadian military language which called for "bringing the enemy to battle in favourable conditions" and getting "as far through the mountains as possible since these would allow him to delay us even with inferior forces." In military terms, Eighth Army was to "exploit surprise" and "attack in depth" to penetrate fixed fortifications quickly, and meet enemy reserves on ground which allowed deployment of weapon systems on a broad front with good fields of fire. In simpler terms, Leese and Walsh sought to avoid protracted fighting between the Metauro and Foglia Rivers where the rugged Apennines come closest to the sea and where a smaller German force could hold back Eighth

Army's mechanized strength with delaying actions fought covering demolitions on narrow roads and treacherous switchbacks. Therefore, Leese and Walsh planned to use their temporary infantry advantage to attack all four German divisions almost simultaneously, destroy their fighting power and secure good tactical defensive positions on a broad but manageable ten-mile front north of Pesaro and the Foglia River. There they would meet an expected onrush of German divisions and pulverize them with observed artillery fire as the enemy moved up through the open. "Assuming surprise, it becomes necessary that the initial penetration is as deep and rapid as possible, so that by

256 Allied deception efforts before and after Leese's plan change, known as Operations Ottrington and Ulster respectively, played to German fears of a landing somewhere in the upper Adriatic. Not only were the forces and craft not available for such a landing, but shallow water and low beach gradients off the northern Adriatic coasts of Italy precluded any such landings from ever occurring. Jackson,

117 the time he can bring up his reserve formations we meet him as far north as we can."

This meeting was expected to take place either in the rolling hills in and behind the main

Gothic Line defences, or preferably, on the flat polder country north of Rimini.258

This plan for efficiently killing enemy soldiers and destroying their equipment is deeply rooted in British Army doctrine that grew from the North African experience under the guidance of Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, who was still Leese's greatest mentor. In the summer of 1942, as this doctrine was being refined prior to the Battle of

El Alamein, Montgomery wrote to his corps commanders, including Leese, that "holding strongly"on "dominating ground" which he dubbed "pivots" in British Army parlance, was the key to success. If they are "held strongly and the troops fight and do not give in, we cannot lose." Montgomery saw that these tactical defensive positions with good fields of fire facilitated the destruction of enemy troops and vehicles. "Based on the strongly held pivot...it is armoured forces and guns, plus air that win battles in wide open spaces." That ground "must be so important to the enemy that he will be forced to attack our armour on it, and therefore on the ground of our choosing."259 Later, as Field

Marshal in Northwest Europe, Montgomery never lost sight of the destructive aim of operations and consistently used numbers of German soldiers killed and captured in relation to his own to describe battlefield performance and made little mention of ground

Mediterranean, p. 98-99, 130-131 257 NAC, WD Eighth Army, G Plans Paper M/1348 Appendix B-4, The Attack in the East Coast Sector, 9 Aug 44. 258 IWM, Leese Papers, AThe Battle for the Gothic Line", pp. 5 - 6. 259 IWM, Leese Papers, Eighth Army Commanders Personal Memorandum #2, 19 Aug 42. For a detailed explanation of the development of Montgomery's doctrine in North Africa see Neil Barr, Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein (London:

118 gained. When writing to Leese about progress in the Battle of Normandy in early July of

1944, Montgomery emphasized that "we have taken 51 000 PW's (prisoners) and buried a vast amount of German dead."260

Appreciating Leese's stated objectives in the context of British Army offensive doctrine makes it is clear that the Eighth Army commander's intent was not to capture ground for its own sake, but to secure terrain best suited to destroying advancing enemy forces according to time and space. Therefore, if enemy units rushing in from other sectors arrived in the main Gothic Line and potential fallback positions on the ridges between Rimini and Pesaro at the same time as Leese's army, his planned battle of annihilation would occur there. However, in a best-case-scenario his depth attack would shatter the four German divisions holding the Adriatic flank and roar through the Gothic

Line before others arrived to fully man it. Then the battle of annihilation would take place on the Po Valley floor. Either way, Leese and Walsh wanted their tanks, anti-tank guns, machine guns, mortars, rifles and artillery in well prepared positions on a wide interlocking front commanding clear fields of fire when the rushing Nazi hordes arrived.

Once that battle developed and began to consume German formations from all over

Italy and especially along the Florence-Bologna axis, then Alexander would unleash

Clark's Fifth Army. If those hordes were fatally attrited before the weather broke, again in a best case scenario, Eighth Army might be in a position to run the enemy to the ground like a tired fox, disrupting any German attempt at an orderly withdrawal to the

Alps. The optimists believed that if the wet weather held off long enough and the

2005).

119 Germans tried to make a run for it, there just might be a chance to cut off Vietinghoff s

Tenth Army as it packed into the Adriatic corridor to stop Leese's blow. Tenth Army and the Army Group "C" reserves might be encircled and trapped between Leese, the

Adriatic Sea, the Po River Delta and Clark's army if the latter broke through the mountains to Bologna and the Po bridges.261

In that light, Gen. Jackson's criticism that Leese's plan change cost three weeks of good weather seems justified, especially looking ahead to 21 September when 1st

Canadian Corps reached the Po Valley only to be stalled by heavy fall rains, a grounded air force, overflowing rivers, washed out bridges, and mud. Three extra weeks of dry weather would surely have allowed Leese's armoured divisions to race across the Po plain, link up with Clark and finish off the defeated enemy. However, Jackson's analysis does not consider the degree to which both Fifth and Eighth Armies were consumed in the fight to get to the Gothic Line. Harding himself predicted earlier that summer, that removing the extra French and American divisions from the line "would force an administrative halt in front of the Pisa-Rimini Line that would destroy our chances of getting to Ljubljana before winter."262 Historian and veteran of the campaign, Gregory Blaxland, believes Harding's prediction was correct. Florence, the starting point for Harding's offensive plan, was only partially secured "nearly a month later than their C-in-C [Alexander] had forecast" and at a considerably higher cost in

IWM - Leese Papers, Letter from Montgomery to Leese, 7 July 44. WO 214/34 - Alexander Papers, AAI Future Operations Forecast, 27 Aug 44. WO 204/1457 - AAI CGS Appreciation #4, 2 July 1944.

120 lives and resources than anticipated.

The reality was that the limited forces available for Operation Olive presented

Allied staffs in Italy with a conundrum in August 1944. Their armies needed time to rest

and re-organize if they were to deliver a heavy enough blow to break the Gothic Line.

Indeed, Leese was already concerned in July that the dwindling supply of replacements

coming to the Mediterranean due to to priority going to formations in France, and a

looming British manpower crisis, would require breaking up his battalions to rebuild

others. Yet German resistence only continued to grow on the approaches to Florence.264

To make matters worse, with every passing day Germany's Todt Organization

completed more concrete machine gun emplacements and drilled more bunkers into mountainsides in the hills overlooking the mountain roads to Bologna and along the

Adriatic coast. It was these two areas German planners deemed the most threatened by

overland attack.265 In light of this need for an 'operational pause', Leese's decision to

switch the weight of assault away from the high density of German units defending the

Gothic Line north of Florence to face comparatively smaller forces on the coast makes

sense. Oddly, after his scathing condemnation of Leese, Jackson's official history

admits "the battle for Florence had drawn many of the best German divisions into that

sector" in late August, as if to validate the Eighth Army commander's decision to move

east.266 However, concerns over lost time form only a part of the Olive condemnation.

263 Blaxland, pp. 155-163. 264 IWM, Leese Papers, Letters to Mrs. Leese, 28 July, 30 July, 1944. 265 NAC, Tenth German Army War Diary, Order No. 1 for Strengthening the Gothic Position, 14 June 44. Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 126.

121 Jackson argues that Leese's plan was based on the false assumption "that the east coast would be much easier for Eighth Army's main thrust than the northern Apennines, which are for the most part steep rolling hills with only about 10-15 000 yards' depth of truly mountainous country along the watershed of the range." Jackson highlights the concerns of Leese's own staff that although the east coast sector was less mountainous, behind it stood a maze of water-courses in the low-lying, reclaimed "polder" country of the southeastern Po plains. This terrain would hardly be the "promised-land" of good tank country, especially when the fall rains arrived.267 Most historians of the campaign agree with this assessment. John Ellis wrote that the area behind Leese's chosen battleground was "sliced up by numerous rivers that would require a whole series of organized river crossings, the mounting of which must deny Eighth Army any chance of building up a decent head of steam to penetrate deep into the German positions or get around their flanks." Ellis concludes that Alexander's acceptance of Leese's plan change reflects his command weakness.268 John Strawson put an even sharper point on the critique. "All this area was thought by some of the 8th [sic] Army planning staff to be good going for tanks! How swiftly they were to be disillusioned."269 Douglas Orgill agrees that the terrain beyond the Adriatic end of the Gothic Line offered few

"opportunities for exploitation" and that Alexander's willingness to abandon Harding's mountain attack for the watery plain was "another instance of the readiness to see the

Jackson, Mediterranean, pp. 122 - 125. Ellis, p. 339. Stawson, p. 173.

122 other man's point of view that inhibited Alexander as a commander."270 This widely held criticism warrants analysis, especially since Alexander's support for Leese is so often used to illustrate his alleged unsuitability for the job of Army Group commander.

It is true that all the high country in the central Apennines does not qualify as mountains. But the steep hills, narrow valleys and limited roads running down both sides of the central range would not permit the use of armour, artillery or even infantry units on a sufficiently broad front to allow their combined firepower to defeat deep, continuous and interlocking German hilltop positions, except by bloody frontal assault.

Eighth Army already learned this during the July delay battles and US Fifth Army would soon discover it when its part of Olive opened in September 1944. The Americans also learned that even if the main fortified positions in the central sector were smashed, the ridges between the Gothic Line and Bologna offered just as many defensive opportunities for an enemy with the resources and the will to hold as the wet Romagna plain in the east.271 Furthermore, as already indicated, Leese and his staff were aware of the limitations posed by Po Valley watercourses, but felt those obstacles could be more easily overcome than the mountains for an army dependant on tank and artillery firepower to overcome its problem of having infantry parity with the enemy. Leese's plan to draw German strength away from the central front to the coastal plain also promised to give the mountain-experienced divisions of 2nd US Corps a fighting chance when the time came for them to re-open the attack toward Bologna.272

270 Orgill, pp. 31 -32. 271 Fisher, p. 326. 272 IWM, Leese Papers, CoS Talk, 25 August 1944, p. 6.

123 The question yet to be considered, concerning Leese's plan, is how the Allies expected the Germans to react to a major offensive on the Gothic Line. It has been established that Allied planners and commanders in Italy had no knowledge of the strategic importance of the Po Valley to German war aims. Therefore, many of them, especially the Americans, feared that once the Gothic Line defenders were sufficiently bloodied and their fortifications breached, German Army Group "C" would bolt and run for the Alps.273 This concern was reinforced by previous experience in North Africa and

Italy. When their "permanent" defensive belts were breached, the Germans usually conducted fighting withdrawals across considerable distances while new defenses were prepared on the next major defensible geographic barrier. In this light, the terrain beyond the Gothic Line was studied by Leese, Alexander and Clark not so much in the context of how the Germans could defend it, but how they would utilize it for delaying operations to cover their withdrawal to the Alps. Allied experience in Italy also taught that small numbers of German engineers and infantry could delay an Allied pursuit in mgged hill country far more easily than on flat ground were obstacles could be bypassed.274 For their part, many Allied soldiers in Italy looked forward to the flat country of the Romagna, whether it proved to be good going for tanks or not, because they were weary of always being under observation and thus accurate shell and mortar

77S fire from German positions on high ground. Leese and his Chief of Staff, George Walsh, were aware of the disadvantages

273 WO 214/34, Alexander Papers, CGS Future Operations Forecast, 27 Aug 44. 274 IWM, Leese Papers, Letters to Montgomery, 11 June, 10 July 44. 275 Syd Frost, Once a Patricia. (Toronto: 1988) pp. 312-313.

124 posed by an Adriatic attack and identified them to Alexander when they first proposed the plan change. They knew that innumerable rivers and streams there ran between hill spines and across their front. Beyond Rimini, they knew the ridges were replaced by a dense river, canal, and irrigation ditch network. Leese's planning staff realistically noted that if the German Army stood and fought after the Gothic Line was pierced and "we are caught in the Ravenna-Forli area, we will get bogged down as it is a wet area."276 The main roads did mn north-south, but all crossed rivers and ridges creating plenty of obstacle opportunities for German engineers as well as a series of switch defence lines for the German main force.277 Leese and Walsh were prepared to run these risks and commit Eighth Army to a protracted attritional battle with German reserves in the low wet ground if it meant they could fight it beyond the force-magnifying defences of the

Gothic Line and the shattered remnants of the four divisions initially guarding its

Adriatic wing.

Leese and his staff were also conscious they would eventually face their old

Italian adversaries, Generals Rain and Mud. However, Polish experience around

Ancona demonstrated that most of the potentially dangerous rivers in the main fortified area could be forded and bypassed by well trained tankers and engineers in the dry weather of late summer. If only they could get beyond Rimini and the Marrechia River before the rains arrived, they just might convince Army Group "C" to mn for the Alps.

In the event, Eighth Army accomplished this goal and German generals were begging to withdraw to the Alps exactly as Allied planners expected. What they could not know

276 W.D. 8th Army, G-Plans Appreciation, 3 August 1944.

125 was that Germany was preparing to fight on another year and mount a major counter- offensive in the coming winter. Therefore Hitler and Kesselring were unwilling to abandon Italian industry and agriculture.

The tendency to weigh battlefield decisions with hindsight must be avoided.

Students of this battle must remember that when Leese proposed his plan in early

August, Allied staff officers worried that their 20 divisions were insufficient to push through the Gothic Line, let alone exploit beyond it. If that happened, Army Group "C" could hold the line through the winter with a reduced force and free divisions for use in

Northwest Europe. A plan that offered a surer bet for destroying some German strength and penetrating to flatter terrain on which the Germans must commit significant force to hold was, in the end, considered the best option for carrying out AAI's containment goal. Jackson's and other criticisms of this plan are important to address for they are the basis for most historical accounts which describe Olive as a failure. Perhaps the most interesting observation about the Olive concept comes from Field Marshal Kesselring.

The German theatre commander told postwar interrogators that Allied intentions were comparatively easy to ascertain given the nature of the terrain and their ties to landing beaches. However, Kesselring noted that "starting in the fall of 1944 and from then on, the Allied leadership became more imaginative and thus more dangerous for us."278

If any further evidence was necessary to convince Alexander, Leese and Clark of the need for an alternative to assaulting the Gothic Line in its mountainous centre, it came in the form of a little-known effort by the two Indian Army divisions of Richard

277 Orgill, pp. 28-31.

126 McCreery's X Corps. Orders for Operation Vandal were issued on 2 August, before

Leese's proposal to Alexander. The intent was to close up to the main Gothic Line defenses in the rugged, thousand-metre elevations along the upper Arno River Valley and Highway 71 in preparation for executing Harding's original plan. Indian, Gurkha, and British soldiers from 4th and 10th Indian Divisions fought like lions in these mountains for a week between 3 and 10 August against two German divisions manning powerful hilltop defences. The fighting reinforced a number of lessons, including how it was nearly impossible to move heavy weapons and tanks into good firing positions to kill or even suppress German defenders in such high country. It proved equally difficult to supply troops in this terrain, which forced divisions to attack on narrow frontages sustained by single jeep roads carved into hillsides by straining engineers. These limited frontages eliminated the possibility of wide outflanking maneuvers. Broken country even made it difficult for Indian sub-units to support each other with small arms fire, sometimes resulting in the isolation and decimation of entire companies. Nevertheless, resolute Indian and Gurkha infantrymen pressed their attacks home with the burst of grenades, the points of their bayonets and their dreaded Kurkri knives. They proved that ground could be taken in the mountains and that the Germans would die as they emerged to counter-attack with the same predictability as anywhere else.27 However this could only be accomplished by paying at a heavy price in the lives of Allied infantrymen, a key commodity in such short supply in Italy.

278 NAC, Kesselring Interrogation Report, pp. 27-28. 279 Dharm Pal, Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War: The Campaign in Italy, 1943-45. Calcutta: Saraswaty Press Ltd., 1960, pp. 343 -

127 If the Allied diversionary mission was going to work, Alexander's armies needed to kill more Germans than they lost themselves. Doing so required firepower and the terrain to employ it on. The Adriatic river valleys and flood plains of the Romagna offered the best ground on which to employ tried and tested Allied combined-arms doctrine. In contrast, the mountain ridges of the Apennines north of Florence afforded the Germans with an opportunity to practice their own permanent defence doctrine against a primarily infantry force. Once these facts sank in at Allied headquarters, plans were immediately put in motion to march the British and Commonwealth troops of

Eighth Army to the east coast.

360.

128 THC APPROACH TO THE GOTHIC LINE CONCEPT OF OPERATION 01 K'E 25 Aucjus' 1944

Gotttic I tne Amo River Line Plani-pd Asuscr^ m' «I i k Planned Axi>. of Secondary Attack

iiah Br 2dNZDiv I3n Chapter IV: Sir Oliver Leese's Adriatic Solution

While Generals Harding, Alexander, Leese and Clark debated the final form of the assault on the Gothic Line, 1st Canadian Corps moved back into the line on 5 August

1944 at Florence as part of the current plan to attack towards Bologna. Word of the plan change found 1st Canadian Infantry Division dueling with German snipers and helping anti-Fascist partisans hunt down pro-Fascist holdouts on the south bank of the Amo

River beside the famous Ponte Vecchio. The division was clearing its startline in preparation for a drive through the Central Apennines and awaiting the balance of the corps moving northward to Tuscany.280 By 8 August, 1st Division extracted itself from its surreal Renaissance urban frontline and began the great march east to the Adriatic coast.

Within the three weeks from the time of Leese's plan change to the suggested start date of 25 August, Eighth Army carried out the monumental task of moving hundreds of thousands of men and tens of thousands of vehicles across the Apennines under the noses of the Germans. Considering the limited time available, the poor existing road network and the exhaustion evident among formations involved in the July battles, the completion of this move is regarded as one of the great organizational and engineering accomplishments of the war. By 1944, with four years of combat and logistic management in a variety of terrain and climates behind it, Eighth Army was a model of administrative and operational efficiency. Orders were turned into action in

280 W.D. 1 CID, 1 Cdn Corps, 2-8 Aug 44.

129 remarkably short time.

The "great march east" also marked the first in a series of contributions to

Leese's concept of operations by the Canadian Army that makes the Battle for the

Gothic Line stand out as a major national achievement. The east-west road network in

Italy was totally unsuited to military traffic, especially the volume required for Eighth

Army's re-deployment. Compounding this problem was a shortage of wheeled tank

transporters. The bulk of Sherman tanks and Sherman-based self-propelled guns would

made their way to the coast under their own power, while the less road worthy

Churchills of 21 British Tank Brigade traveled on the massive 34-wheel transporters.

The winding Highway 3, built on the ancient Via Flaminia that connected the Roman

empire to its Adriatic bases, could handle wheeled traffic, but would be destroyed by

thousands of churning tank tracks. If it rained, Operation Olive would bog down before

it started. Even after the move east, Highway 3 was to be a key line of communication

for the looming dogfight on the Adriatic. All the more essential that its hard surface be

preserved for rubber-tired vehicles during the wet weather to come.

The problem was solved by the Royal Canadian Engineers, who constructed a

120 mile one-way tank track along secondary roads running parallel to the main lateral

highway. Their story testifies to how quickly Eighth Army adapted to its new mission.

Orders from Leese's Chief Engineer to 5l Canadian Armoured Divison's Commander,

Royal Engineers (CRE), Lt-Col. J.D. Christian, to have this road operational by 15

August, only arrived on the night of the 7th. Christian later wrote: "This was no small

281 Jackson, Mediterranean pp. 119-128.; Linklater, pp. 308-311; Shepperd, p.

130 undertaking as a brief study of the map of this area will show." It took three days of often frustrating reconnaissance by foot, jeep and airplane, followed by five days of intense labour by the majority of Canadian divisional and corps engineer units to cut the

787 new road out of the hillsides, but it was finished on time as ordered. It is still used today by local rural traffic.

Not only was the great march east a testament to the work of the engineers, military police and higher headquarters staffs who planned it, it was also a demonstration of the merits of the Sherman tank. Many of these vehicles traveled 400 miles before going into action and did so with minimal breakdowns. This would not be the last time that the mechanical reliability of the Sherman tank would pay off for the

Eighth Army in Operation Olive. Overall, the effort amounted to a kind of Allied

'blitzkrieg", employing mobility and counter-intelligence to achieve strategic, operational and tactical surprise.

Leese's plan change also created a challenge for Allied signals and intelligence services. Prior to Eighth Army's move east, Alexander's intelligence staff mounted a deception scheme to shield Allied intentions and disperse German units across Italy and its northern coastline. The plan was largely based around 1st Canadian Corps. Like their fathers in the First World War, the Canadians in Italy earned a reputation as tough

309. 282 NAC, W.D. 1st Canadian Corps, RCE, Report on Operations in Italy, Aug- Oct 1944 Vol. II, p. 7; DHH - Lt-Col. J.D. Christian Papers, CRE 5 CAD, Personal War Diary, 8-10 Aug 44. G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume II, the Canadians in Italy, 1943-45 (Ottawa: 1956) p. 497. 283 Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, British and American Tanks of World

131 assault troops, specially suited for bashing through fixed fortifications. In the summer of

1943 the Canadians formed a key part of the amphibious strike force in Sicily and

Calabria. They led the Eighth Army thrust to turn the German flank at Salemo in

September 1943, they nearly ruptured the Gustav Line defences at the Moro River and

Ortona in December 1943 and then they forced the decisive breach in the Hitler Line in

May 1944. These achievements, combined with the obvious Canadian absence from the front in the summer suggesting they were preparing for something, convinced

Kesselring's intelligence staff that locating 1st Canadian Corps was the key to determining where the next major offensive would develop.284

The problem for the Allies was that in accordance with Harding's original plan, they attempted to convince the Germans that the Adriatic sector was the most threatened part of the Gothic Line. They did so by creating the illusion, through false signals traffic mostly, that 1st Canadian Corps was concentrating behind the Poles in the coastal belt.

Once the decision was taken to deliver the main assault in this area, Eighth Army

Intelligence staff frantically re-directed their efforts so it would appear that the original deception scheme was a hoax to draw German attention away from a renewed attack in

7RS the central Apennines. In conjunction with this counter-intelligence effort, known as

Operation Ulster, Eighth Army units made their way to coastal concentration areas under strict wireless silence and with unit patches and other insignia removed. It is unclear to

War II (New York: 1981) p. 114.; Jackson, Mediterranean p. 131. 284 German War Diaries for this period are filled with references to attempts to locate the Canadians. The fact that 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade operated independently from 1st Canadian Corps was the source of much confusion for German intelligence, Hist Sect Rpt #27.

132 what extent the Germans fell for either cover plan.

Leese's critics, especially Jackson, argue that Allied deception operations did not stop Kesselring from taking advantage of the Allied pause during the first three weeks of

August to reorganize his forces. Some German divisions even moved out of the

Florence sector including two transferred to the Adriatic area as if in anticipation of

Leese's move. When Operation Dragoon began on 15 August, two more divisions were ordered out of Italy altogether to meet the new threat in central France.287 It therefore seemed as though the summer operational pause compromised the Allied containment mission. At the time though, German re-deployments did not raise concern. Two days after the Dragoon landings began ACIGS Maj-Gen. Kennedy wrote to Leese about how the latest intelligence reports suggested "it is possible that the enemy may rob his Italian armies to reinforce his army on the Franco-Italian frontier. The development of the situation is certainly in favour of a drive to Vienna."288 Developments in southern

France did seemed to give Leese fresh hope that the enemy's Mediterranean perimeter defence would be stretched thin, giving Eighth Army a better force ratio on the Adriatic and a fighting chance of encircling and destroying Army Group "C". If that could be done, it was no longer inconceivable that his army could "drive into southern Germany

7R0 this year", should the enemy opt not to plug the hole Italy that he hoped to tear open.

In the event, Leese's hope proved false, as did any fears of his superiors that the

285 Orgill, p. 33. 286 Nicholson, Italy pp. 288-294. 287 Jackson, Mediterranean pp. 144-145. 288 IWM, Leese Papers, Correspondence from Kennedy to Leese, 22 Aug 44. 289 IWM, Leese Papers, Unpublished memoir, p. 6.

133 diversion mission was failing in the summer of 1944. The Germans remained ever alert to the Allied threat. The two crack divisions withdrawn from Italy, 3rd and 15th Panzer

Grenadier, were shattered in the summer and in need of rebuilding before they could return to fight on any front. They were immediately replaced by the first-line 34th and

98th Infantry Divisions recently reconstituted in the Balkans.290 In addition, divisions moved to the Franco-Italian border remained close enough that they would be dragged into the attritional battle about to begin along the Apennines. The total German effort expended to man the Gothic Line and the coastal defences protecting northern Italian industry and food production continued to cut into the strength available to defend

Germany's borders.

Concerns that Leese's Olive plan, the pause it required and the last-minute reversal of deception efforts gave the enemy a better opportunity to meet an Adriatic attack, fail to consider how Allied actions kept Kesselring guessing about where the next blow would come. Indian attacks southeast of Bologna in the second week of August tied a large portion of German Army Group "C" to the central mountain passes.291

Those divisions that did leave the central front in mid-August were responding to Allied deception activity indicating another corps-sized landing loomed on the Ligurian coast.

Kesselring's fears about such a landing were shared by Hitler and OKW who saw the greatest potential threat in Italy in late August as a follow-up landing around Genoa to support Dragoon, unhinge the Maritime Alps positions, seize the Milan-Turin industrial basin and role up Gothic Line from behind. German planners also worried that a landing

290 Hinsley, Part 2, pp. 324 - 327.

134 at head of the Adriatic could outflank the Gothic Line from the east and encircle Tenth

Army. With half of Army Group "C" thus destroyed, Fourteenth Army would have to abandon the Fascist Salo Republic and retreat to the Alps. This could not be allowed to happen. These fears explain the deployment of German divisions to the Adriatic coast, not to the Gothic Line, but further north in the vicinity of Ravenna as part of the long perimeter defence. Kesselring and the German high command believed that over

36 Allied divisions were poised to strike in Italy with more available in Africa.293

Interestingly, the Germans worried that Dragoon forces advancing into southern France would turn east to cross the Maritime Alps to seize the Turin and Milan industrial areas.

As a result, in the days prior to Leese's assault, another two powerful and recently rebuilt German divisions were ordered away from the main Gothic Line to reinforce the

Martime Alps.294

The cumulative result of these German deployments in August was to stretch

Kesselring's twenty-seven divisions in a thin perimeter running from the French border down the Italian Riviera to Pisa, across the outpost positions in front of the Gothic Line and back up the Adriatic coast all the way to the Istrian Peninsula in Yugoslavia.295

Kesselring rightly concluded that the Allies only had sufficient strength and logistic

291 Pal, Indian Armed Forces, pp. 350 - 357. 292 NAC - German Army Group AC" Captured Records, MS B-270, Postwar interview with Field Marshall Kesselring and General Siegfried Westphal ARegarding the General Strategy During the Italian Campaign". 293 DHH SGR 11/255 OKW - 1576 AReport on the Fight for the Apennine Position and the Improvement of the Western Alps Position, 15 August - 31 December, 1944.", pp. 1-2. 294 OKW- 1576, p. 6. 295 OKW- 1576, pp. 8-11

135 capacity for one more major offensive operation in the Mediterranean theatre that summer, so once its centre of gravity was correctly identified, he could strip divisions off the long perimeter and pile them into the threatened area. He remained convinced that the offensive would be accompanied by an Anzio-style amphibious hook. In reality, beach gradients and the absence of sealift precluded any such amphibious landings.

However, Kesselring's consistent fears, reinforced by deception efforts, meant Leese and

Alexander's concept of secretly concentrating for a surprise blow against this perimeter and then defeating German reserve divisions one or two at a time just might work.

Kesselring's fear of being outflanked from the sea was so strong that even after Olive began, he held back some of his best divisions to guard the coasts behind the Gothic

Line even after the first wave of Eighth Army's offensive crashed through the outpost line and were rushing the teeth of the Gothic Line itself296 The real test for the new

Olive plan was to manage the arrival of enemy formations rushing to the Adriatic from other parts of the perimeter.

Manning that perimeter directly opposite Leese's divisions was Col-Gen. Von

Vietinghoff s Tenth German Army consisting of 51st Mountain Corps and 76th Panzer

Corps. In mid-August, Lieutenant-General Traugott Herr's Panzer Corps was armoured in name only, as it possessed no actual tank divisions. But this does not reflect the power that Herr would wield once the battle began and some of the best panzer and panzer-grenadier formations in the German Army were fed into his section of the line when the principle Allied threat became apparent. On the eve of the attack, however,

296 OKW- 1576, pp. 25-27.

136 Herr's Corps mustered only four divisions. Two of those had been badly weakened during the summer as 76th Corps struggled to hold back the Polish Corps' onslaught on their delaying positions. After a brief respite following the Battle of Ancona 2nd Polish

Corps once again bore down on Herr's coastal wing on 19 August 1944, in operations to close up to the Gothic Line itself. At that point von Vietinghoff s headquarters staff grew concerned about reports from Fascist agents of an Allied buildup taking place behind the Poles. Kesselring was less convinced and assumed any movement on that front merely aimed to move up the Allied right to keep in line with the centre at

707

Florence.

German 76l Corps fears were shared by Tenth Army staff who strongly suspected their front would be the centre of gravity of a forthcoming Allied attack on the

Gothic Line. It was obvious to German planners that there were only two places to assault the Gothic Line for a modem road-bound army; the Florence-Bologna passes and the Adriatic coast. Both were in Tenth Army's area of responsibility and both were the focus of the summer defensive construction efforts. With surprising foresight, his staff believed their Adriatic flank was at particular risk to Eighth Army's superiority in tanks and guns and the ease with which they could mount a smaller, tactical-level amphibious 7 OR hook and parachute drop behind the main lines of resistence.

While Tenth German Army predicted they would face the next major offensive, they had no idea when it would come. They also competed for resources against

Kesselring's concern over the Ligurian coast, close as it was the German strategic centre 297 Pretzell Report, p. Hist Sect Rpt #27, p. 11.

137 of gravity in northern Italian industrial zone. After all, as the new German official history concluded, "the loss of the Plains of Lombardy would have meant the provision of extra supplies for the German forces committed in Italy and a substantial loss of war material flowing from the Milan-Turin industrial basin to German armament." Thus,

German commanders and staff officers knew exactly what was at stake in the coming battle. For the first time in the Italian Campaign, they no longer held the option of withdrawing.300 No matter how bloody and desperate the coming battle would become and no matter how many men and shells were needed to feed the reaper, the Po Valley must not fall.

Tenth Army staff remained most concerned about the thinly spread nature of

German formations in Italy. Von Vietinghoff requested to have several mobile divisions moved into reserve along the Via Emilia near Forli from where they could rapid move to a variety of threatened areas in the east. Army Group "C" headquarters would hear none of it. Field Marshall Kesselring was more concerned with developments in southern

France resulting from the Dragoon landings. He also presumed it would take some time before Alexander could mount another major effort in Italy and when it did come, it was most likely aimed at Genoa as part of a two prong drive on Milan.301 For now, 76th

298 Pretzell Rpt, p. 3. 299 B.R. Kroener, Germany and the Second World War, Vol V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Influence, Part 2, Wartime Administration, Economy and Manpower Resources, 1942 - 1945. (Oxford: 2003) pp. 396-8, 666 - 694. 300 Pretzell Report, p. 2. 301 As late as 27 August, Kesselring believed that any operations in the Adriatic sector would be diversionary, to prevent a German attack into the flank of the American and French forces advancing in southern France. Hist Sect Rpt # 27 pp. 12, 25; Pretzell Report, pp. 3-4.

138 Corps would have to make do with four divisions.

Kesselring was, however, prepared to commit infantry, air defence, and naval

coastal artillery units to the Adriatic coast behind Herr's corps. These were organized

into 73rd Corps, under Tenth Army command and defended the coast between the

rearward positions of the main Gothic Line and Ravenna. The formation consisted of

the 98th and 162nd (Turcoman) Infantry Divisions backed by large concentrations of heavy anti-aircraft guns of the Luftwaffe's 25th Flak Division and Kriegsmarine coastal batteries manning powerful fortifications north and south of Rimini. Thus Von

Vietinghoff and Herr's concerns were partly eased in that these positions, known as the

Galla Placidia, could protect the coastal flank and act as depth positions for the weak point of the main Gothic Line where it descended from the mountains down to the

Adriatic plain.302

The decision to commit resources to the area but not to put them under control of the field commander who needed them most meant that Leese would get his wish of an

initial window of force superiority. But 73r Corps' resources, manpower, and defensive

installations were all located in or close enough to the multiple belts of the Gothic Line that they would significantly influence the later stages of the battle. Accounts of the battle make few references to this formation or the existence of the Galla Placidia position that it manned, perhaps because it was the Canadian Corps that doggedly fought through it,in September.303 In spite of defensive preparations and Tenth Army warnings

302 NAC, Luftflotte 2 Ultra Decrypts, 23 June & 18 Aug 44; Pretzell Report, pp. 3-6. 303 Is' Canadian Corps does not figure prominently in accounts of the Battle,

139 in the last days before the offensive commenced in late August, Army Group "C" remained oblivious to the immediate Adriatic threat. It was not until Canadian, British,

Indian and Polish soldiers came racing across the Metauro that higher German headquarters began to get some inkling that the storm was being unleashed.

Given the extended nature of the Italian perimeter defence, German formations in the Gothic Line were ordered to hold outpost and delay positions as far in front of the main positions as possible. This was a continuation of Kesselring's summer policy to buy more time to complete defence construction. In August, as Allied units closed in, these outposts were also to provide advance warning of a large scale offensive. Once the forward screen identified the main Allied axis of attack they had to halt it for one to two weeks, so that the elite 26th Panzer and 29th and 90th Panzer-Grenadier divisions could move in from staging areas near the centre of the perimeter. Kesselring figured that the high density of road, river and rail communications in the Po Valley would enable his centrally located mobile reserves to respond to an offensive wherever it materialized, be it Liguria, the Central Apennines or the Adriatic. These divisions would then occupy the main fixed concrete positions in the Gothic Line together with troops retiring out of the delay position. Based on their own lessons from the Liri Valley fighting in May, the

Germans recognized how it was essential that troops fighting the delay battle retire in good order before their strength had been expended so they could occupy a section of the especially Douglas Orgill's The Gothic Line, until after William McAndrew, Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell enter the debate in the late 1980's. However, these three scholars are concerned mainly with the Canadian breakthrough of the first belt of the Gothic Line at the end of August. The difficult fighting later in September in the Galla Placidia is then explained in the context of a lost opportunity to race to the Po rather

140 main line of resistence.

Kesselring had every confidence that his soldiers could execute his defensive strategy and man whichever section of the perimeter was threatened with sufficient strength to stop the Allies for the winter. He believed German units manning the outpost lines were more effective than their Allied opponents who never seemed able to take advantage of his weakness. He also assumed the next Allied attack would start small and develop "only gradually so that they [it] could be recognized in time."305 His over- confidence was yet another product of Allied deception which made Kesselring believe his troops were consistently performing well against "colossal Allied superiority" instead of what were actually strictly limited offensives by comparatively small Allied forces.3 6 Kesselring's over-estimation of opposing strength and amphibious capability coupled with his faith in his perimeter defence strategy created conditions for an Allied diversionary success.

Much about German deployments was known to Allied planners based on intelligence from Army "Y" Service tactical radio intercepts, air and ground reconnaissance reports, and prisoner interrogations, despite a temporary lull in the number of Ultra decrypts received in the last weeks before Olive. As a result, forward dispositions and the location of major mobile divisions likely to move into the area after the assault began were relatively well known. The only substantial piece of battlefield than the second phase of defeating the primary defenders. 304 Kesselring Interrogation, pp. 8- 10, 19. 305 Kesselring Interrogation, p. 27. 3 6 Report by Col von Bonin, Senior General Staff Officer at German Army Group AC"; Kesselring Interrogation, p. 26.

141 intelligence missing was the extent of the Galla Placidia defences and the proximity of

73rd Corps to the main Gothic Line.308 For the most part, however, the widely dispersed

German deployment played to General Leese's plan to secretly concentrate Eighth Army in the east to defeat enemy divisions in detail.

That concentration was nearly complete by the third week of August, but moving

Eighth Army to the Adriatic sector was only the first test of the organizational abilities of George Walsh and the Eighth Army staff. In a matter of days, they developed an army-level plan to carry out Alexander's containment mission. The simplicity of their design for breaking the Gothic Line and crippling Army Group "C" concealed how difficult it would be to execute with the forces available. Eighth Army was to smash through the outpost positions along the Metauro River at the mn and use its momentum to speed through the outer delay positions and onto the main line of resistence along the

Foglia River before the enemy could reinforce it. When the expected German reserves did arrive, it was hoped they could be engaged beyond the Gothic Line defences. If possible, Leese hoped to meet those reserves as far to the north and away from the

Pesaro-Rimini corridor so they would be denied the use of the river and ridge lines there as fall back positions.309 If this could not be done, Eighth Army would drive hard through those positions and defeat any German divisions sent to meet them until the enemy completely broke, or was drawn into battle on a long front. To do so at the very least Leese's forces needed to get past Rimini and onto the Po Valley floor. If that were

307 Hinsley, pp. 332 - 226. 308 WO 170/275, W.D. 5th Corps, Intelligence Summaries #363 - 368. 309 McAndrew, "Commanders and Plans", p. 51.

142 achieved and the front was still fluid, Bologna and Ferrara were the next aiming points.310

Eighth Army's offensive would be supplied through Ancona. The port was only captured by 2n Polish Corps on 18 July.3" This left little time to repair and expand facilities to receive the 4000 tons of fuel and supplies per day, necessary for the operation. To this would be added a further 2600 tons per day arriving by rail from depots at Ortona and Assisi. Fuel was pumped from Ancona to the forward unit supply dumps by means of a four inch pipe, laid by a special constmction engineer unit. Given the minimal time available to finish this work due to the plan change, administrative staffs and engineers performed miraculously to assemble the vital stores prior to the attack.312

Providing Eighth Army with overwhelming air power proved more of a challenge due to the transfer of the vast majority of Mediterranean Allied air resources to support Operation Dragoon. Leese could still count on the full support of the RAF's

Desert Air Force [DAF]. This included five RAF and South African Fighter-Bomber

Wings and two of light bombers, one of medium, a night-fighter squadron along with several extra medium and heavy bomber squadrons from the Mediterranean Allied

Tactical and Strategic Air Forces.313 However, the DAF could not compare to the vast numbers of aircraft available to Allied armies in Northwest Europe, therefore they would

310 IWM, Leese Papers, CoS Talk, 25 Aug 44. 311 Anders, pp. 186-192.; Jackson Mediterranean pp. 81-84. ^ 17 Jackson, Mediterranean pp. 131-133. 313 The Desert Air Force was the name given to the Royal Air Force fighter and fighter/bomber squadrons that supported the ground forces in Italy. The name is a carry 143 have to be task-focused to achieve any meaningful effect. The one saving grace was that the Luftwaffe no longer seemed to be a threat in the Mediterranean so that all fighter squadrons heretofore maintained in air superiority missions re-roled during the summer to become fighter-bombers. That included the Royal Canadian Air Force's 417 "City of

Windsor" Squadron, which was re-equipped and retrained to use 500 lbs bombs and

20mm cannons.314

The airmen went into action a full week before the start date, hitting supply dumps, rail yards, fortifications and other targets all around Kesselring's perimeter. Air reconnaissance squadrons completed sweeps of the battle area to provide updated air photographs. On D-3 the air attacks were redirected at the lateral roads on which reinforcements would travel once the battle began. In keeping with Operation Ulster deception effort, targets in the central region were heavily attacked, wireless traffic was kept to a minimum and no airfields in the Adriatic region were used until after Olive began. Once Eighth Army's attack started, DAF squadrons would shift their focus to support of ground operations.315

On the ground, Eighth Army's main assault would be delivered by the fully rested and replenished troops of 1st Canadian Corps and 5th British Corps. The latter included the fully rested 46th (North Midland) and 56th (London) Infantry Divisions supported by 7 and 25 Armoured Brigades, as well as 4th British and 4th Indian Infantry over from the days in North Africa. 314 Correspondence with Stewart Egglestone, 417 Squadron Ground Crew, 12 January 2003. 315 NAC - W.D. I Cdn Corps, Report on Air Operations 24 August - 22 September; Jackson, Mediterranean pp. 134-138.

144 Divisions, both of which were prematurely committed to the July pursuit battles.

Therefore 4th British Division was not prepared to take to the field on D-Day and the

Indians would have to attack without benefit of a major rest and regeneration period.

Secondary efforts to broaden the attack frontage would be carried out by the badly depleted and exhausted formations of McCreery's 10th Corps and 2nd Polish Corps.316

Lieutenant General W.A. Anders' 2nd Polish Corps, consisting of the 3rd

Carpathian and 5th Kresowa Infantry Divisions and 2 Polish Armoured Brigade, formed the right shoulder of the attack. These soldiers had been fighting up the Adriatic coast since June. This ordeal, coming so soon after the desperate battles at Cassino in May, sapped their energy and consumed their immediate supply of trained replacements.

Leese realized their role in the coming battle must be limited, at least until they had three weeks to rest, retrain and absorb reinforcements.317 The Polish mission in Olive would therefore first be to screen Eighth Army's buildup and then to advance on its right shoulder, up the coast road from the Metauro River, to Pesaro at the mouth of the Foglia.

Instead of attacking the heavily defended city, they were to mask it with one division and use the balance of the corps to seize the hills to northwest of it to isolate the German

W.D. Eighth Army, Operations Instruction 1431, 13 Aug 44; IWM, Leese Papers, Chief of Staff Talk, 25 Aug 44. 317 While all Allied Armies were suffering from replacement shortages in 1944, 2nd Polish Corps' problem was particularly acute. A substantial new mass of Polish reinforcements would become available from captured Poles who had been conscripted to serve in the German Army and who promptly surrendered to the western Allies in Normandy. However, these would not be trained and ready till later in the fall. In August, all trained manpower was exhausted, especially after the heavy losses in the Battle for Monte Cassino, and the drive to Ancona in the middle of the summer. The Corps was in need of a period or reorganization. W. Anders, An Army in Exile (Nashville: 1981) pp. 180-192.

145 garrison. Polish experience at Ancona coupled with memories of street fighting at

Ortona and heavily fortified towns in the Liri Valley combined to shape this plan.

In the initial planning Leese proposed to place his most powerful force,

Lieutenant-General Charles Keightley's 5th British Corps, on the Polish left. Keightley

possessed the four infantry formations and supporting tanks listed above for the fight in

- the Gothic Line and against the enemy reserves. He also controlled the newly formed 1st

British Armoured Division. This division was to be committed when enemy

cohesiveness wavered and the Germans began to cut and mn to avoid complete

destruction, as they had done south of Rome in June. Then the tank-infantry

battlegroups of the armoured division would launch into the pursuit, grabbing pivot

positions amid the retreating enemy, shooting him up and generally "running the tired

fox to the earth."319 As they moved past the Poles masking Pesaro, 5th Corps would take

over the entire coastal plain and Anders' men would go into army reserve for their badly

needed break. Keightley's Corps would also take over the main coastal road, Highway

16, the "via Adriatica" as his main line of communication.

Further left, 1st Canadian Corps would seize control of the foothills and steep

ridges dominating Keightley's flank.320 On the extreme left, inside the most remote

parts of the northern Apennines, McCreery's tired 10th Corps with only 8th Indian and 6lh

British Armoured Division, would bridge the long gap between Fifth and Eighth Armies.

318 Operations Instruction No. 22, War Diary, I Canadian Corps, August 1944. 319 WO 170/275 - WD 5th Corps, Olive Planning Instruction #1,16 Aug 44. 320 W.D. Eighth Army - G Plans Section Appreciation B-3, 9 Aug 44.

146 Given the mass of vehicles about to be jammed onto the limited Adriatic road network when 5th and 1st Canadian Corps drove through the Gothic Line, Leese and Walsh opted to hold their army reserve some distance back from the front. This reserve consisted of

2nd New Zealand Division, also in need of a rest after fighting near Florence, and the newly arrived 3 Greek Mountain Brigade which likewise needed more preparation time.

These formations would be committed in the later stages of the battle when German reserves piled into the sector, or to a pursuit in a best-case scenario.321

In spite of the constricting space of the coastal corridor, Leese lined all three attacking corps abreast rather than attempting to squeeze one through the others following a "break-in". Experience in the Hitler Line the previous spring taught that passing one corps through another in the confusion of battle led to traffic jams rivaling morning rush hour in any modem city which would slow the pace of the advance.

Instead, he opted for a grouping that would make each corps area "long, narrow and rather congested."322 However tight these corps areas must be, Leese and his staff felt it better to have them under the direction of only one corps headquarters which could carefully manage a series of traffic circuits on country roads within their boundaries rather than repeating the mistake of May. D-Day for the assault was scheduled for 25

August.

General Leese put the tentative plan to his Corps Commanders at a conference held at Canadian Corps Headquarters on 8 August. Bums and Keightley readily agreed

321 Eighth Army Order of Battle, 25 Aug 44, Jackson, Mediterranean p. 225; Blaxland, p 158. 322 NAC - WD Eighth Army, G Plans, Note on an Attack in the East Coast

147 but the Poles offered an alternative. Their experience in the coastal belt taught that

German defenses and demolitions were more troublesome the closer they were to the sea. Highway 16, especially its bridges and culverts, was a focal point for German demolitions. The built up areas around this road were also easier to defend, with plenty of stone and concrete buildings that could be easily converted into strongpoints. The entire port city of Pesaro was turned into a fortress that was by far the strongest position anywhere in the entire Gothic Line. The Poles advised that whenever they ran into this sort of difficulty they hooked inland into the rolling hills on roads that were much less developed, but still intact. Based on the Polish experience up coastal corridor thus far, the sector originally drawn by 5th Corps would have been ideal for outflanking the built up coastal area. However, the permanent defence line on the Foglia River was unlike any of the delaying positions tackled by the Poles up to then. Prepared and continuous

Gothic Line positions extended well inland, past the town of Montecchio, beyond which the defences were less continuous and took the form of interlocking strong points where the rolling hills gradually turn into the more rugged foothill country of the Apennines around the Monte Gridolfo.

Based on this advice, Leese had Bums and Keightley's formations trade places, putting the Canadians in the moderately good tank country of the heavily fortified centre and the British in the close country of the Apennine foothills where it was hoped the

171 defences would be least prepared. The move conformed to the Eighth Army policy adopted during the summer of aggressively employing Sherman and Churchill tanks,

Sector, 9 Aug 44.

148 both with superb climbing ability, in "country where the enemy considered it impossible for tanks to be used."324 This policy was intended to help overcome Allied manpower shortages by adding more direct firepower to assist comparatively smaller infantry forces with the break-in to the main defences, and to use massed tank formations to press through the gaps created to 'pivot' points on the hills beyond.

The decision to place the powerful British corps on the left attracted attention from Canadian historians who contend it had a negative outcome. Unlike their British counterparts, Canadian scholars including the official historian G.W.L. Nicholson and

William McAndrew are quite understanding of the decision to transfer Eighth Army to the Adriatic. Instead, McAndrew in particular, is far more critical of Leese's final selection of corps tasks because it appears to be the source of a lost breakthrough opportunity for 1st Canadian Corps and therefore the overall failure of Olive.

McAndrew's research, originally compiled for Canadian Land Forces Staff College study tours of the battlefield in the early 1980s, contributes to the history of these events by inserting the pivotal Canadian story, barely mentioned in British accounts such as

Orgill's, into the common narrative of the battle.325 Among the results of McAndrew's study is condemnation of Leese's decision to switch 5th Corps' inland and away from the good tank country on the coastal plain behind the Gothic Line. This ground was instead allotted to the Canadians. McAndrew argues that "at the decisive moment the force (5th

323 McAndrew, "Commanders and Plans", p. 55. 324 WO 170/275 - WD 5th Corps, Personal Memorandum by Lt.-Gen. C.F. Keightley, 16 Aug 44. 325 McAndrew's work forms the basis of the Gothic Line chapter in Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham's landmark one volume history of the Italian Campaign,

149 Corps) meant to chase a defeated enemy was misplaced on ground where it was unable to move, let alone pursue." McAndrew argues that this decision was made worse by

Leese's lack of confidence in the command ability of Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Bums.

The army commander was unwilling to assign any extra, non-Canadian divisions to

Bums' Corps to take advantage of any opportunities that developed in the coastal zone,

17f» at least until it was too late. McAndrew's analysis that Leese misplaced his breakthrough corps and then stubbornly refused to provide the Canadians with reinforcements to exploit their unexpected success in the opening phases of the battle is now a central feature in assessments of Olive as a failure.

McAndrew's critique will be returned to in subsequent chapters, but it is worth noting here that it is admittedly based on the assumption that the Allies intended to drive the Germans back to the Alps. McAndrew's interpretation also draws attention away from the other factor that encouraged Leese to move the Canadians to the centre of the assault. Intelligence reports indicated the Gothic Line was strongest in the centre.

Regardless of what Leese thought of Bums as a corps commander, Canadian troops were adept at fighting through deadly fixed, wired, mined, concrete and steel fortifications as 177 they did so successfully in the Hitler Line back in May. It was therefore logical to assign the Canadians to the toughest and deepest part of the Gothic Line (not including

Pesaro which would be masked rather than assaulted directly). In the final analysis then,

Leese's deployment seems to be a rational use of his limited forces to accomplish the Tug of War and also influences Jackson's British official history. 326 McAndrew, ACommanders and Plans," pp. 53 - 56. 327 Jackson, Mediterranean, p. 231.

150 difficult task of breaking the Gothic Line and then checking Army Group "C" beyond it.

It is also worth remembering here that commanders seldom have the luxury of knowing everything about their enemy. Generals Alexander, Harding, Leese, Walsh, and their staffs could not know with how tenaciously the German Army would defend the Gothic

Line. They did not know what awaited them on the other side. And they did not know how superbly and successfully 1st Canadian Corps would fight its way through the strongest of German positions.

The Gothic Line, originally called the "Apeninne Position" by the Germans, was renamed the Green Line in June 1944. Hitler did want not such a dramatic sounding title to be associated with defeat should the position be breached. The Green Line generally ran from Pisa in the west to Pesaro in the east. The Adriatic sector was the most heavily developed, as it could not take advantage of the same type natural mountain defenses as the central Apennines. Work on the line began in 1943 but did not proceed far until the Gustav defences were pierced in May 1944. That June, Field

Marshall Kesselring issued what was known to the Allies as "The Gothic Order".328

Defensive constmction was accelerated dramatically using the German Todt engineering organization, a Slovak engineer brigade and 15 000 Italian labourers pressed into service by Italian Fascist Salo Republic.

Italian partisans were increasing their activity in 1944, partly in reaction to the kind of forced labour conscription carried out in the summer. To counter the partisan

328 Order Nos. 1 + 2 for Strengthening the Gothic Position, W.D. H.Q. Corps Witthoeft, Venetian Coast Command, 14, 21 June, 1944. 329 Orgill, p. 28.

151 sabotage threat while the defenses were under constmction, Kesselring committed several German SS, Order Police and even Wehrmacht units to the area, supported by the Italian Fascist Blackshirt Militia.330 These organizations, particularly the

Blackshirts, dealt with the partisan problem using the tools of bratality, torture, and fear, which even the Germans admitted probably only added to the problem by convincing more Italians to take up arms to avenge the terrorism of the Germans and their Italian puppets.331

The section of Green Line faced by Eighth Army consisted of a number of lines in front and behind a main line of resistence along the Foglia River. The first position was an advanced outpost line or "Vorfeld" set up on the north bank of the Metauro with the purpose of providing early warning of a major attack. Ten kilometres behind the

Vorfeld was the Red Line. The terrain in this zone is extremely ragged with high and steep hills reminiscent of central Sicily. The Red Line was a delay-battle position manned by three 76th Corps divisions and part of a fourth. This line could not resist indefinitely, but it was strong enough to halt a limited advance, either stopping a holding attack or forcing the Allies to deploy a force to defeat it thus revealing their intentions.

The Germans estimated that the process of driving in the outpost zone between the

Metauro and Foglia Rivers would take seven to fourteen days, giving Tenth Army the time they needed to move in reinforcements to help man the Green Line. When this was completed, the Red Line defenders would make a fighting withdrawal back across the

Gothic Order No. 1, p. 4. F. Von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope (Novato: 1963) p. 269.

152 Foglia and join in the defence of the main position.332

The main line of resistence on the north bank of the Foglia River was known to the Germans as Green Line I. The position possessed a good deal of natural strength as it forced the attacker to descend into the Foglia valley, cross the river and 1000 to 2000 yards of open valley floor under the observation and fire of weapons sited in the hills rising sharply on the north side of the Urbino - Pesaro road. German engineers liberally planted mines on the river flats, crossing points and approaches leading to the heights on the north side. Along with the mines was a dense network of barbed wire entanglements described by Leese as "by far the most formidable that we have come across in Italy".333

Behind the mines and wire lay a deep anti-tank ditch running parallel to main road north of the river. The high ground north of the Foglia consisted of relatively steep, but open ridges with good fields of fire, which rose to commanding peaks overlooking the entire battlefield. On the heights, concrete machinegun emplacements, complete with deep dugouts to protect the crews from artillery fire, covered every square inch of the approach in interlocking killing zones. Mortar and anti-tank gun, and assault gun pits were also developed and surrounded by covering infantry positions. The spurs miming north from the river bank concealed several deadly Panther turrets dug in to cover draws and roads. These spurs commanded all the approaches from the valley floor onto the high ground north of the river which was defended in depth with nests of anti-tank guns and machinegun posts.334

332 Pretzell Rpt, pp. 32-34. 333 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter to ACIGS, 8 Sep 44. 334 Nicholson, Italy p. 497.

153 Germany's hopes for 1944-45 did not allow for the Allies to penetrate the Green

Line and enter the Po Valley. However, German experience in the Gustav and Hitler

Lines made them as skeptical of the invincibility of fixed defence lines as much as it made the Allies confident they could breach them. Therefore German planners reconnoitered a series of switch positions behind Green Line I should that position become untenable. Historians largely dismiss this "hastily executed project"335 because

Eighth Army staff believed themselves that the positions were only roughly surveyed and had no fortifications built on them.336 In fact, the Adriatic zone was "was planned in such a way as to allow the defence sufficient space in the rear areas for withdrawal in the case of need to yet other prepared positions which would still bar the enemy from the

Plains of Lombardy." The first of these switch positions, known as Green Line II, was anchored in the Galla Placidia coastal defences around the resort town of Riccione and stretched southwestward inland along two ridges dominating the coastal plain. These ridges, the first running through Misano and the second through Coriano and San

Savino, nearly merge together at the hilltop village of Gemmano.337 This terrain is naturally powerful for a defender, perhaps more so than Green Line I, because it allows for excellent observation and fields of fire over broad plains and gently rolling hills, permitting the Germans to maximize the long ranges of their anti-tank, tank and machine guns. The large quantities of mortars and artillery pieces that reinforcing German units brought with them in the later stages of the battle were fired from the protection of

335 Nicholson, Italy, p. 527 336 W.D. Eighth Army, CoS Briefing, 25 Aug 44. 337 NAC - Pretzell Report, p. 5.

154 reverse slope positions behind the low ridges.

The second major switch position was part of a continuous depth network running back from Green Line II to the long sharp ridge running down from the mountaintop Republic of San Marino through San Fortunato to Rimini and every low ridge and village in between. This position is sometimes referred to by both sides as the

Rimini Line. A German withdrawal to Green Line II and the Rimini Line involved swinging the entire front inwards to the inland ridges like a door. Any attempt by the

Allies to force their way up the coastal road would meet Galla Placidia fortifications to their front, all the while driving across the new German front with their left flank exposed and under observation and fire.

German depth positions were even sited and prepared behind the Rimini Line, on the Po Valley floor stretching back to the Savio River. Because these positions lay in the heart of the Galla Placidia and 73rd Corps' area, prepared fortifications were both completed and under construction, and always on natural barriers such as water obstacles. While these were originally organized to defend against seaborne attack, in

August they were elaborated to handle any threat, be it from the sea, an airborne drop or a breakthrough in the Green Lines. On top of that, once the battle began, the substantial constmction engineer and labour battalions working on Green Line I immediately moved a few miles to the rear to assist 73rd Corps engineers with the development of these defences. Similar fall back defences were both planned and constructed on the natural defences behind the main Gothic Line in Fifth Army's zone in the central Apennines.338

338 Pretzell Report pp. 6 - 8,

155 Regrettably, none of these details were known to the Allies on the eve of battle. Little did they know that instead of cutting and running after Green Line I was irrevocably defeated, Army Group "C'planned to fight on in their depth positions no matter how much it cost them.

Allied misunderstanding about the German intent to hold the Gothic Line at all costs muddied the waters about whether this battle was a success for sixty years. Further complicating that assessment were developments in Northwest Europe in August 1944.

On 25 July Operation Cobra launched by First US Army, followed closely by supporting attacks south of Caen including Second British Army's Operation Bluecoat and First

Canadian Army's Operations Totalize and Tractable, started the final phase of the

Normandy campaign. True to form, the Germans responded with their own counter- offensive at Mortain which sealed their fate by exposing their best formations to annihilating Allied defensive firepower. These actions were the last of a two-month series of attritional, bite and hold style attacks that finally destroyed the German Army's capacity to fight there.339 By mid-August, the infamous Falaise Pocket formed around the collapsing enemy front. A week later the Battle of the Falaise Gap was over and the great race for the German border began, merely three days before the start date for the renewed offensive in Italy.

As early as the beginning of August Lord Alanbrooke advised General Alexander to expect major things "to happen in the next three months as the Boche are about to

156 break." At that time, with the Germans still fighting hard around Florence and the

Gothic Line promising to be such a difficult obstacle, it was difficult to imagine.

However, the campaign in the Mediterranean never occurred in a vacuum and during the summer of 1944 its major players were always attuned to events in Normandy, especially since they mostly all had a clear sense of their mission to ensure the success of the Overlord venture. On the day the Falaise Gap fighting ended, General Leese received a letter from his friend General Kennedy, who kept him informed about events in France since Overlord began. Kennedy wrote, "developments of the last week in

Normandy have been remarkable.. .It seems pretty certain that the Boche is finished in

France. Anything that gets away from south of the Seine will be disorganized and useless for months to come, and there are no divisions of the first class north of the

Seine."341 In this sense, the Italian containment mission took on even greater significance. German divisions there were some of their best and, unlike their comrades in Normandy, many were back to full strength or nearly so in August. Under no circumstances then, could Allied Armies, Italy allow these divisions to catch a train to

Northwest Europe to help stop the breakout from Normandy, at least until enough port capacity was captured to ease over-stretched supply lines and to unload fresh US divisions for which there were not space for in Normandy.

Kennedy also told his friend that the British Joint Intelligence Committee, which managed the Ultra file, "have estimated, very reasonably that it will be impossible for

340 WO 214/16 - Alexander Papers, Letter from Alanbrooke to Alexander, 1 Aug 44. 341 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter Kennedy to Leese, 22 Aug 44.

157 Germany to continue the struggle beyond December of this year. As for my own opinion, I shall be very disappointed if the Boche does not fold up much sooner." Leese himself wrote to his wife a few days before that he wondered how much longer the

Germans could last. "If we can crack his armies on every front, the whole thing might crumble."342 On 25 August, Lord Alanbrooke wrote in his diary that "news of German decay on all fronts continues to be almost unbelievable."343 At first, news of Germany's impending collapse did not take hold in Italy, for they had every indication that the enemy had the strength and resolve to fight yet another bitter battle. However, it was also in the third week of August that Alexander and his generals learned of the move of four divisions from their front. As described above, two were merely re-deploying to another section of the Italian perimeter and two others were being replaced, so there was no overall reduction in strength. But on the eve of the renewed offensive, it gave Leese new hope that his containment attack just might be able to fulfil John Harding's dream of clearing out of Italy. He wrote his wife that "If only we have luck, we might get a complete break. It would be wonderful if we can get into the Po Valley quickly."344 His friend General Kennedy was even more optimistic about the German redeployment.

"The development of the situation is certainly in favour of a drive to Vienna."345

The news created a growing sense of euphoria among senior Allied commanders in Italy that turned into new confidence and drive for their armies. It seemed that capturing Vienna before year end might be possible after all. This energy would spur the

342 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter to Mrs. Leese, 16 Aug 44. 343 Alanbrooke, p. 585. 344 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter to Mrs. Leese, 25 Aug 44.

158 20 Allied divisions left in Italy to perform their greatest feat of arms yet, the kind necessary to convince their powerful foe manning strong defences that the north Italian industrial and agricultural basin, and therefore German strategy as a whole, was in peril.

Unfortunately it also fostered the perception that the war could be won before the end of

1944. When it was not, participants felt betrayed and historians searched for what went wrong. Whatever the flaws of Eighth Army's plan and whatever misunderstandings about German intentions existed, at the end of August, the plan that saw 1st Canadian

Corps embark upon its most successful battle of the entire war was put in motion.

345 IWM, Leese Papers, Letter Kennedy to Leese, 22 Aug 44.

159 Book II

Executing the Mission

160 Chapter V: Canada Prepares to Rejoin the Fight

The complexity, difficulty and magnitude of Allied achievements during

Operation Olive is best illuminated in combat where soldiers and junior leaders put plans into practice. The following chapters describe the struggle, by one corps and its component units, to implement Allied containment strategy in Italy in August and

September 1944. It is at this lower, tactical level of war that a reasonably clear picture of combat can be historically re-constructed. Events on the Operation Olive frontline reveal much about the armies involved and the nations that raised them. In this case the men of 1st Canadian Corps are the focus because of their central, yet little understood role in the battle. Telling their story and measuring their success against the real mission asked of them challenges assumptions found in many histories of the Second World War that describe all Allied soldiers as inferior stock compared to their German counter­ parts. What follows, then, is a case-study in Canadian combat effectiveness.

The relationship between the combat performance of various national armies and the political, strategic, economic, and social conditions from which they emerge lies at the heart of the three-volume essay collection entitled Military Effectiveness, edited by

Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray. This study became a landmark in the field in the 1990s as academic historians rekindled their interest in military matters after the

Cold War. More recently, it spawned a single volume synthesis of Second World War historical writing which grafts older assumptions about combat effectiveness onto new research in the fields of grand strategy, diplomacy and the economic and socio-cultural

161 history of the war. Renewed interest in the period is linked to developing inter­

disciplinary scholarship on twentieth century war and growing popular interest in the

Second World War generated during 50th and 60th anniversary celebrations of 'Victory in

Europe'. However, in such broad studies of how politics, ideology, and group

psychology influence military organizations and how they perform, something must

suffer. Most often, the enormously complex investigation of battle is left to others. The

articles in the Military Effectiveness series, and the single-volume history it produced

rely upon assumptions about battlefield performance found in official histories and Cold

War-era literature of the war.347

Until recently, the debate was dominated by historians such as John Ellis, Russell

Weigley, Martin van Creveld and Carlo D'Este who argue that the western Allies in the

Second World War failed to develop an effective method of war fighting and suffered

considerably from poor leadership.348 John Ellis captured the substance of these views

in 1990 in Brute Force. Ellis argues that unsophisticated, amateurish Allied

commanders could only defeat the German Army by bludgeoning it to death with

overwhelming material and numerical superiority. One of the central tenets of this

"Brute Force" model is "that the Germans were superior to all of their opponents in

terms of tactical military competence." Ellis built on American historian Trevor

346 Williamson Murray; Alan Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: 2000). 347 Lee Windsor, AUpdating the Official Gospel: Canadian Military History's Third Wave," Acadiensis (Spring: 2004). 348 See: Russell Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington: 1981), Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London: 1983), Carlo D'Este, Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943 (New York:

162 Dupuy's quantitative system to measure combat effectiveness which indicated that "the

Germans were consistently better than the Americans and British in ground combat

capability in World War II."349 In Canada, John A. English, Brereton Greenhous and

William J. McAndrew make similar arguments.

The problem with the "Brute Force" model is that it is selectively supported by

examples of military difficulty or disaster with little attention paid to wider historical

circumstance. John A. English's influential work, Failure in High Command, analyzes

the most problematic parts of Canadian battles in Normandy such as the rebuff of 9

Canadian Brigade's vanguard company-group on 7 June 1944 and the "Worthington

Force" catastrophe on Hill 140 during Operation Totalize. However, English neglects highly successful components of those same battles such as 7 Canadian Infantry

Brigade's destmction of German counter-attacks between 7-10 June 1944, the highly

successful opening phase of Totalize or the brilliant 4th Canadian Armoured Division

night attack on Hill 195.350 Most importantly, English does not consider the degree to

which Canadian operations contributed to real theatre-level goals of destroying German

units or how they foiled German plans. For the most part, Canadian academic historians

of the Italian campaign developed a similar focus. W.J. McAndrew's 1987 Military

Affairs article, "Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily 1943", uses

selected artillery-dominated battles to argue how rigid Canadian planning seriously

1988). 349 John Ellis, Brute Force (London: 1990) p. xviii, See also: Trevor Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions & War (New York: 1979). 350 See Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: 2003)

163 hampered battlefield opportunism. Brereton Greenhous chose the controversial decision to attack into the urban battlefield of Ortona as a case-study in poor leadership for his

1989 Canadian Defence Quarterly article, '"Would it not Have Been Better to Bypass

Ortona Completely...?' A Canadian Christmas, 1943."

However, for all the examples of problems and inefficiency in the Canadian and other Allied armies, there are others that exemplify the opposite. Indeed, a counter­ argument to the "Brute Force" interpretation is growing among western historians. In his study of the United States Army's 88th Infantry Division in the Italian campaign entitled Draftee Division, John S. Brown follows the path of the first American all- draftee formation to go into combat. He discovers that "tiny cadres of professionals had been able to mold masses of erstwhile civilians into proficient fighting organizations."351

Brown is also known for challenging the quantitative theories of Trevor Dupuy, by pointing out flaws in the sampling system that skewed the results. Brown suggests that

Dupuy's findings fostered a "mythology of German combat superiority" that lends support to the "Brute Force" model.352 Picking up where Brown leaves off in the

American military effectiveness debate is Michael Doubler, whose study of American operations in Northwest Europe, concluded that the United States Army adapted quickly to the new battlefield and developed an effective combined arms doctrine.353 James

Carafano's After D-Day and Russell Hart's Clash of Arms produced similar findings in

351 J.S. Brown, Draftee Division (Lexington: 1986) p. 159. 352 J.S. Brown, "Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and the Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: A Reconsideration", Military Affairs January 1985: pp. 16-20. 353 M.D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy (Lawrence: 1994) pp. 1-9.

164 2000 and 2001 respectively/54

In the last twenty years, Terry Copp has led an emerging Canadian response to the "Brute Force" model with studies like the Maple Leaf Route series and The Brigade, which traces the path of 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade from its creation, through training and into action. Close evaluation of this formation down to the battalion level in training and combat reveals that "the Anglo Canadian armies developed a clear and coherent battle doctrine before the invasion of Northwest Europe," and that it proved to be very effective at destroying the opposing force.355 His work culminated in a definitive two volume re-evaluation of the Canadian experience in Normandy and northwest Europe in Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy and Cinderella Army:

The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-45. To those who suggest the Allies only succeeded against a more skilful German opponent by resorting to overwhelming numbers and material employed in an unimaginative manner, Copp counters that these advantages are vastly overstated, especially considering the Germans most often held the more significant advantage of defending dug-in positions. In such circumstances Copp contends that Normandy "was a victory won primarily by Allied soldiers employing flexible and innovative operational and tactical solutions to the challenges confronting them"356

See: James Jay Carafano, After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout. (Boulder: 2000); Russel A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy. (Boulder: 2001). 355 Terry Copp, The Brigade: Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1939-45 (Stoney Creek: 1992) p. iii. 356 Copp, Fields, p. 13, Lee Windsor, AUpdating the Official Gospel: Canadian Military History's Third Wave", Acadiensis, Volume XXXIII Number 2, Spring: 2004.

165 This is not a new approach but rather a continuation of theories first advanced in the official British, American and Canadian histories. Each of these official studies centred on an effort to determine how these western armies, each with tiny interwar establishments that paid only modest attention to the intricate theories of modem war, were able to rapidly expand and adapt to meet the challenges of the 1940's battlefield and emerge victorious. In the end, however, some of the official volumes, like W.G.F.

Jackson's study of British operations in Italy and C.P. Stacey's work on the Canadians in

Normandy, contributed to the Bmte Force model by suggesting that the citizen armies made up in numbers what they lacked in finesse.

The official histories and other works like The Brigade and Draftee Division, which offer balanced perspectives of both well and poorly fought battles of specific

Allied formations, inspired case studies of particularly successful actions. Detailed, sharp-end examinations such as Oliver Haller's "The Defeat of the 12th SS" and this author's "Boforce" and "Too Close for the Guns" approach events from a company/squadron level, illuminating those aspects of the Canadian and Allied way of war that are often missed by broad, selective studies of failure.357 One purpose of this present study is to add to this debate with a close inspection of Canadian actions in the

Gothic Line. In doing so it reveals how and why 1st Canadian Corps was able to achieve one of the most stunning victories in Canadian military history.

357 Oliver Haller, AThe Defeat of the 12th SS" Canadian Military History, (Spring: 1994), Lee Windsor, "Boforce: 1st Canadian Infantry Division Operations in Support of the Salemo Beachhead," Canadian Military History, (Autumn: 1995), AToo Close for the Guns: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Rhine Bridgehead," Canadian Military History, (Spring: 2003).

166 Understanding that victory in Italy sheds light on the question of whether the citizen army Canada began assembling in 1939 generated the professional ethos, technical skill and combat effectiveness necessary to wage sophisticated modem, industrial war against the deadly German foe by 1944, the year of decision. Was five years sufficient time for a tiny 3000-man regular army to turn a rapidly mustered pack of volunteer amateurs and partly trained militiamen into an effective field army? Great

•ICQ

War historians contend that is exactly what Canada accomplished in the Great War.

However, a majority also argue that hard-won professional characteristics such as iron discipline, competent leadership and staff work, and the capacity for self-evaluation and innovation established in the Canadian Army by 1918, disappeared in the interwar period.359 Notwithstanding Copp's new work, many historians still conclude that these characteristics were not restored in the Second World War to the same degree, resulting in consistent problems with Canadian formations and commanders. Therefore, another aim of the following chapters is to establish how the attributes associated with Great

War success were most evident during 1st Canadian Corps' largest, longest, costliest, and most difficult battle of the Italian Campaign.

Existing British and Canadian literature describes how the Battle for the Gothic

Line started well for the Canadians and their parent Eighth Army, mainly due to the surprise and numerical and material superiority created by Leese's plan change. Despite

358 See: Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War (Westport: 1997). 359 See: J.L. Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: 2002), Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: 1988).

167 these advantages, the offensive later fell apart and failed to achieve expectations despite overwhelming Allied superiority in armour, artillery and air power. According to

William McAndrew, "Exploiting initial success, gained by carefully managed set-piece

attacks, was a problem the Allies seldom mastered in Italy." The Canadian success was thus tarnished because whatever "advantage it gained with such verve" was lost due to

leadership, doctrine and planning flaws, even if those flaws were Leese's.360 Therefore, the one-off Canadian success in the early stages of the battle is not enough to challenge

established operational histories of the war, suggesting Canada's citizen army was not as

effective as their German opponents, and never reached the professional pinnacle of

their forefathers at the heart of the war-winning Amiens Offensive in 1918.

McAndrew's condemnation of Oliver Leese and assessment of Olive as a failure

does not establish the Battle for the Gothic Line as one of Canada's great military

victories but, he is responsible for raising awareness of Canada's contribution to the

operation. Earlier British writing on the subject ignored Canada's contribution

altogether. Perhaps understandably, British historians chose to highlight the efforts of

5th British Corps. Douglas Orgill's 1967 work, The Gothic Line, epitomizes this neglect

by discussing Canada's achievements late August and early September 1944 in four

pages.361

In 1985 McAndrew, in partnership with Brereton Greenhous, embarked on a

study tour of the battleground and conducted interviews with several notable

360 William J. McAndrew, "Commanders and Plans" p. 50, "The Dog Fight, pp. 61-62. 361 Douglas Orgill, The Gothic Line: The Italian Campaign, Autumn, 1944

168 participants. Their main finding was that Canadian formations, especially during the first stages of the battle, performed exceedingly well and thus went from playing a supporting role to being the spear point. Their study formed the basis of a series of Staff

Rides mn by the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College to instmct contemporary Canadian Army officers on the successful Canadian contribution to a battle ultimately botched by poor higher direction. In 1986, their findings were introduced to a wide public audience when they were used as the basis for the Gothic

Line chapter of Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham's Tug of War, among the best and most popular one-volume histories of the campaign. The McAndrew-Greenhous study was also incorporated into the British official volume for this period, W.G.F.

Jackson's The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume VI, Victory in the

Mediterranean, Part II, June to October 1944, which remains the most balanced and complete account of Eighth Army operations in the second half of 1944. Published in

1987, Victory in the Mediterranean explores all external and internal factors contributing to the outcome of Operation Olive, and gives due credit to Canadians for making the decisive breach in the Gothic Line. However, the broad scope of this work, by necessity, curtails any detailed analysis of 1st Canadian Corps effort.

That was the task for the Canadian Army Field Historical Section, under Lt-Col.

G.W.L. Nicholson which produced in The Official History of the Canadian Army in the

Second World War: Volume II, The Canadians in Italy. This work is a monument to good scholarship and remains the foundation of all historical writing on the subject, not

(New York: 1967) pp. 63-66.

169 least because of its assembling, translation and usage of German records. Together,

Nicholson and McAndrew illuminated the story of Canada's important contribution to the Battle for the Gothic Line. But both studies are limited by scope in the degree to which they could examine the intimate tactical details of combat. Yet it is this facet of

Canada's experience in the Second World War that yields insight into questions of motivation, training, military skill, junior leadership, and equipment performance, all of which illuminate grander decisions taken by policy makers in London and Ottawa.

Popular historian Mark Zuehlke took tentative steps in the direction of tactical history in his more recent works on the Canadians in Ortona, The Liri Valley and The Gothic Line.

While Zuehlke is not an historian who pays rigorous attention to evidence and chronology and therefore contributes little to our knowledge of the battle, his interviews with soldiers enhance our understanding about the nature of combat during these difficult missions.

This study builds on this foundation of Canadian historical research by illuminating the historical circumstances made Operation Olive so difficult, and then how 1st Canadian Corps met the challenge of implementing their difficult containment and attritional task against a powerful enemy. Ultimately that challenge was met in a series of small, battalion-sized actions skilfully coordinated by an effective Corps headquarters. If the complexities of this battle are to be fully understood, then the historical spotlight must be directed at the actions of the rifle companies and tank squadrons that won that myriad of small actions. Canada's top-ranking officer in Italy,

Lieutenant-General E.L.M Bums, argued himself that once his Corps plan was put in

170 motion the leadership of general officers became largely irrelevant. Instead, the leadership skills of lieutenant-colonels commanding units and the junior officers and sergeants under them determined the battle's outcome.362 The success or failure of a single platoon of 30 soldiers to seize and hold a key piece of high ground has considerable consequences at the highest military and political levels. A corporal leading a ten-man rifle section can destroy a machine-gun nest which may be holding up his battalion and in turn his entire division. A single shot by a German anti-tank gunner into a command tank can bring an armoured regiment to a standstill. While strategic and operational plans and the conduct of senior leadership are critical considerations, it is only when the soldiers' story of combat is mixed with them that all circumstances influencing a battle's outcome are clear. The details of frontline combat are readily available, but buried deep in unit war diaries and radio message logs as well as in reports compiled in the immediate aftermath of battle. From these documents, the action can be pieced together by historians like a crime scene by detectives. Fortunately, Second

World War military operations are among the best documented events in Canadian history. The activity of Canadian Army formations is recorded in tremendous detail, hour by hour and often minute by minute, at all headquarters from Corps to individual battalions. In addition to daily entries, officers responsible for war diaries included all documents considered useful for later research on the unit's actions as appendices.

These include operations orders, movement tables, target lists, nominal roles, maps, air photographs, routine orders, medal recommendations, and training schedules. Two

362 E.L.M Bums, General Mud

171 particular types of documents found in war diary appendices are especially valuable for historical research. Within some infantry battalions and armoured regiments, the junior officers commanding the sub-units were required to submit written accounts of the actions of their particular company or squadron in a battle. These accounts, known as after action reports, provide fine-grain information which was often not included in the unit's daily diary entries.

A second document, the formation message or operations log, contains a written record of all incoming and outgoing radio and telephone messages. Because it is found in all war diaries from brigade level and above, this source is more consistent than other appendices. The logs are also the most accurate because they are composed as events occur and are not dependant on human memory, which can be impaired or coloured by the strain of battle. In this study of the Gothic Line, personal and official accounts of events are examined against the message logs, resulting in an highly accurate re­ construction of the Canadian role in Operation Olive. Once the course of events is reconstmcted in detail, its meaning and relation to broader questions becomes clear.

Among those broad questions surrounding Canada's role in the Battle of the

Gothic Line, Canadian Army effectiveness is undeniably the most important. Closely connected is the issue of Canadian command ability. German field commanders are generally portrayed as being skilled professionals, expert at innovation and making do with less. In contrast, Allied leaders are portrayed as inept, lacking in imagination and totally reliant on material superiority.363 The Canadian attack on the Gothic Line offers

363 Creveld, Fighting Power, pp. 163-169.

172 a contrary picture, demanding a re-evaluation of Canadian military leadership.

A close reading of Canadian battle records also sheds light on assumptions about comparative weapons capabilities. Many students of the Second World War contend that in spite of Allied superiority in quantity of weapons, the Germans possessed a qualitative superiority that matched their vaunted tactical skill on the battlefield. In particular, their heavy Panther and Tiger tanks and their self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, with high velocity 75 and 88 millimetre guns, were well known in Northwest

Europe for being able to pick off thinly armoured Allied Sherman tanks long before the

Germans came within range of the underpowered Sherman guns.364 The answer to the question of armoured vehicle performance in Northwest Europe, usually decided by gun power and armour protection, is insufficient to explain armoured warfare in Italy. The ground in the Foglia valley is very different from the wide open plains of eastern

Normandy. The often steep hills and dry, loose soil of the Foglia valley added new factors to the armour equation, including climbing and river fording ability, engine and suspension reliability, and most importantly, speed. The experience of Canadian armoured regiments in the Gothic Line does not permit the Sherman tank to be written off as a failure and reinforces British Lieutenant-General Sydney Kirkman's views on the particular value of armoured forces in the Italian environment.

Most of all, the tactical picture emerging from Canadian war diaries and radio

364 The notion of German weapon superiority reaches beyond historical accounts and is embedded in western collective memory of the Second World War. See Martin Walker's Washington Post 7 June 2004 editorial on the 60th Anniversary of D-Day in Normandy in which he writes AGerman tanks were better, and so were their machine guns, their infantry weapons and their anti-tank guns."

173 logs reveals the difficult reality of executing a grand diversion with economy of force are most apparent at the tactical level. The nature of the war in Italy as a secondary campaign not only affected the planning and execution of operations, it also presented a number of morale problems. The strain of combat was magnified in Italy by a belief among soldiers that the battles they were risking their lives to fight were not contributing as much to the defeat of Germany as those being fought in Northwest Europe. This problem was compounded by a chronic shortage of everything from first rate equipment and ammunition to food, amenities, and even beer rations and especially fresh soldiers to replace losses suffered particularly by the infantry. Add to this the painfully slow rate of advance through difficult terrain with unbearable extremes of weather, and the result is a rate of battle exhaustion casualties far in excess of that found in Northwest Europe.3 5

Canadian success in the Gothic Line must be considered against this collision of grand strategic necessity and individual mentality.

The case-study of 1st Canadian Corps' in the Gothic Line necessarily starts with a discussion of who and what this organization consisted of on the eve of battle, and how they planned to carry out their task assigned by Eighth Army Headquarters. When

Operation "Olive" was launched the corps was composed of 1st Canadian Infantry

Division, 5th Canadian Armoured Division and the 21 British Army Tank Brigade.366 1st

Division was well seasoned, having been active in the theatre since landing in July 1943 as an assault division during Operation Husky on Sicily. Over a full year of combat

365 Terry Copp; William McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion (Montreal: 1990) pp. 8- 10. 366 For Detailed Order of Battle, see Table I.

174 gained them experience in every type of battle that had so far occurred during the Italian campaign. Their first experience in fighting Germans came in Sicily where the "Red

Patch Devils" pursued enemy rearguards on foot, overcoming a series of increasingly powerful delay and blocking positions, and generally proving and honing their war- fighting skills at the unit and brigade level, before being pulled out of the line to prepare for the invasion of the Italian mainland. After landing at Reggio di Calabria the division mounted vehicles of every sort, and chased the German demolition engineers up the

Calabrian peninsula in a dazzling display of mobile warfare. They also fought through the bitter, wet and muddy Italian winter, mounting river crossings closely supported by artillery and mastering the art of fighting as a division in a set-piece battle, using "bite and hold" doctrine against an enemy no longer intending to yield ground in the advance positions of the Gustav Line. 1st Division wrote the book on urban warfare during it fight to clear Ortona, known as "Little Stalingrad". They fought with tanks and artillery in close support, and with little more than their own integral battalion infantry weapons. They faced every kind of enemy soldier the Germans had to offer, from second rate line infantry to elite grenadiers to parachutists to panzer troops. These actions gave the division time to get to know itself and eliminate many weak links at a time with Eighth Army and Anglo-Canadian doctrine was still being refined. Officers and senior NCOs who could not handle their jobs had been replaced by younger keener men, hardened by months in action. In 1944, the division was commanded by Major-

General Chris Vokes, a permanent force officer who commanded 2 Canadian Infantry

367 Shaun Brown, "The Rock of Accomplishment: The Loyal Edmonton

175 Brigade in Sicily and took over the Division shortly after the landing on the mainland.

5 Division and the Corps Headquarters were a different matter. These organizations arrived in theatre late in 1943 and were assigned to the dirty Adriatic patrol war. Therefore, prior to the Liri Valley, neither formation headquarters had any experience with high-intensity offensive operations. Experience counted as much as training at this point in the war, given how Anglo-Canadian armoured doctrine was still being defined. It was only in early 1944 that Sydney Kirkman's ideas for the use of armour in Italy took shape and that Field Marshal Montgomery's doctrine for the use of armoured divisions was established for units training in the United Kingdom for landings in Normandy. There was some opportunity for 5 Division's brigades and units to "shake out" when they occupied the front line north of Ortona in early 1944.

The most significant event occurring during this period was the action near the Areilli

River. The armoured division's 11 Infantry Brigade was tasked with relieving 3 Brigade, which was guarding a section of front. The relief came just as General Alexander ordered Eighth Army to mount small scale diversionary attacks in the Adriatic region to draw attention away from Fifth Army's offensive in the Monte Cassino area. 11 Brigade was thus committed to one such attack, at night, on a narrow front, in terrible weather and with limited fire support against strong enemy forces manning fixed fortifications as its first taste of combat.369 The result was disastrous; heavy losses and total confusion

Regiment at Ortona", Canadian Military History. Autumn 1993: pp. 10-23. 368 The full story of 1st Canadian Division's long and distinguished record in the Italian Campaign is described in G.W.L. Nicholson's volume of the official army history, The Canadians In Italy, 1943-45. 369 Nicholson, Italy pp. 364-366.

176 causing some men to drop their weapons and flee. Far from being a success at blooding the new Brigade, after the Areilli, it had to be carefully nursed and retrained to recover the confidence lost by the men in their leaders.370

This task was carried out by the new divisional commander, Major-General

B.M."Bert" Hoffrneister. Hoffrneister, known as the best Canadian division commander of the war, had led his own militia unit, the Seaforth Highlanders, through Sicily. When

Maj-Gen Vokes took command of 1st Division, he appointed Hoffrneister as his replacement to command 2 Brigade. Thus when he took over 5th Canadian Armoured

Division just prior to the attack on the Hitler Line, Hoffrneister was one of the few

Canadian divisional commanders to have combat experience in this war, both at the

771 junior and senior levels. Douglas Delany's brilliant new biography of Hoffrneister describes his subject as "one of the most able Canadian or British divisional commanders" of the war, honed by "twenty-two months of combat experience."372

Operation Diadem in May 1944 was the first real test of 5th Canadian Armoured

Division as well as the headquarters of 1st Canadian Corps and its new commander,

Lieutenant-General E.L.M. "Tommy" Bums. Bums was a permanent force officer with experience in the previous war, but none yet in this one. Many valuable lessons were learned in those first corps-level operations that were put to good use later in the Gothic

Line. Diadem was a set-piece battle in the Eighth Army tradition, bom in the North

African Desert. The formula of closing up to the main line of resistence, patrolling it

370 Interview with Hoffrneister. 371 J.L. Granatstein, The Generals (Toronto: 1993) p. 189. 372 Major Douglas E. Delaney, The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffrneister at War

177 and pounding it with artillery to drive the enemy underground while crossing the killing zone and punching a hole in the line with infantry and armour, proved itself on a number of occasions for Eighth Army and it served the Canadians well in their attack on the

Hitler Line. This time, according to Kirkman's developing armoured doctrine, armoured-infantry battlegroups forces penetrated beyond the holes carved by the infantry, exploiting only so far as could be covered by medium artillery so as to shoot up the retiring enemy.373 Overall, the operation was a success, but several problems arose as the fighting developed that prevented it from being viewed within Eighth Army as a complete success.374 By the time the Canadians attacked the Gothic Line, these problems had been analyzed and their lessons absorbed by the Corps. It was partly due to this experience that the breaking of the Gothic Line was so successful.

The two most important problems General Bums identified with the Canadian attack on the Hitler Line involved assault frontage and traffic control. In a report compiled after the battle, Bums suggested a corps should always attack fixed fortifications with two divisions. Attacking on a narrow one-division front in the Hitler

Line allowed the Germans to concentrate defensive fire and inflict devastating losses, especially to battalions from the western provinces in 2 Canadian Brigade. To further reduce loss, Bums felt tanks should be used aggressively in this "break-in" phase of the battle as well as the breakout. Both assaulting divisions should then make their assault with two brigades forward, each deploying one battalion up with tanks amongst them

(Vancouver: 2005). 373 E.L.M. Bums, General Mud (Toronto: 1970) p. 141. 374 W.J. McAndrew, "Fifth Canadian Armoured Division: Introduction to

178 providing direct fire support against strong points. Reserve battalions would follow behind, ready to drive the attack deep into the rear of the main line of resistence to seize enemy mortar positions and reinforce the "bite" before German reserves arrived for the inevitable, and planned for counter-attacks.375

The narrow attack frontage in the Hitler Line also caused enormous traffic congestion, particularly during the pursuit when Canadian 5th and British 6th Armoured

Divisions competed for the limited road space available in the Liri Valley.376 To fix this problem Bums recommended greater emphasis on traffic control both in the planning and execution of operations. He tackled this problem before the Gothic Line by creating special traffic control units out of surplus light anti-aircraft gunners to supplement his two military police companies normally assigned to such duty.377 Bums also emphasized that the Royal Canadian Engineer task which must take precedence over all others was to develop and maintain roads up to the battle area as soon, and more often sooner, than it was safely possible. Route maintenance must come even before direct assistance with the assault, for without established routes to move support weapons, reinforcements, armour and supplies on, the assault would slow.378

Other problems encountered in the Liri Valley were thought, perhaps unfairly, to be the product of inexperience. General Bums wrote that 5th Armoured Division's

Battle", Canadian Military History Autumn 1993: pp. 52-54. 375 Report by Lt-Gen. Bums, AThe Set-Piece Attack: Lessons from the Breakthrough of the Hitler Line", W.D. 1st Cdn Corps, June 1944. 376 Jackson, Battle p. 243. 377 35th Battery, 1st Cdn LAA Regt. became No. 35 Canadian Traffic Control Unit as of 15 June. Nicholson, Italy p. 481. 378 W.D. CCRE 1st Cdn Corps, Aug 1944.

179 pursuit from the Hitler Line had at times been overly cautious, and in part he faults

770 himself for not recognizing this timidity and driving the division on. Neither Bums nor the men of Hoffrneister's the "Mighty Maroon Machine" were to make that mistake again when the opportunity to exploit a breach presented itself again in the Gothic Line.

Calling on his First World War experience and reports from his medical services,

General Bums appreciated that most of his casualties were caused by enemy artillery and mortar fire in spite of the tremendous weight of shot delivered on German positions.

This problem was addressed by restoring the primacy of counter-battery shooting for longer range medium and heavy regiments of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Echoing the deeds of once Lt.-Col A.G.L. McNaughton in another war, the Canadian Corps Counter-

Battery Officer and staff made good use of this increase in firepower and used the summer of 1944 to train intensely.380 In future, the gunners would also drastically reduce the preparatory barrage so as not to give the enemy warning of a pending attack.

Known enemy defenses and gun positions would only be engaged after H-hour to prevent the defenders from withdrawing to unknown alternate locations. '

Among the more telling indicators of the level of military professionalism and skill evident in the Canadian Corps in the wake of Diadem was the 'lessons learned' review process itself. That process was now an integral part of 1st Canadian Corps' way of doing business since the winter when 1st Division reverted to Canadian Corps command after seven months of campaigning in Sicily and Italy under a British Corps.

379 Bums, General Mud p. 158. 380 Canadian War Museum, Notes on the History of 1 CBO Staff, RCA 1945. 381 Bums, ALessons".

180 The story of the division's resentment toward the level of paperwork foisted on them by the untried corps headquarters is legendary. Modem military historians assume this rancour is indicative of a 1914-18 mind-set among Second World War Canadian senior officers, which prevented them from adapting to the fast-paced nature of modem mechanized warfare in the 1940s. Ironically, much of that "paper-pushing" appears to have contributed to the Canadian Army's victories over German forces in the great battles of 1944-45. Among the most labourious administrative chores were the operational narratives and 'lessons learned' reports requiring battle participants to analyze recent actions and draw conclusions for improving combat efficiency. These reports do indeed date back to the Great War. First World War historians agree that such documents were a key ingredient to the remarkable Canadian Corps' success in

1915-1918.383

These reports were sometimes the result of or the briefing notes for lessons- learned conferences held in every headquarters down to unit level, and in every type of unit from the fighting infantry battalions to administration and quartermaster organizations that kept everything from ammunition and fuel to pay and mail flowing forward in action. Unit and small formation conferences held during the summer rest culminated in a large Corps Training Conference attended by all senior officers down to the rank of Lt.-Col.384 These conferences ensured that the latest innovations and tactics

382 J.L Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War. (Toronto: 1993) pp 107-108. 383 Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire : The Canadian Corps in the last 100 days of the Great War. (Westport: 1997). 384 Tooley, p. 246.

181 tried and tested in one unit were disseminated throughout 1st Canadian Corps. Indeed these conferences combined with General Bums' and Leese's own observations to form the basis of the advanced training plan to ready the Corps for its key role in the coming battle. It was at conferences like these that problems with command experience, counter-mortar fire, flank protection, attack frontage and the associated traffic congestion were fully digested and solutions crafted.

Studying the lessons of past action, itself the mark of professionalism, raises the question of leadership. There was not enough room in the Liri Valley for two corps and their administrative tails to function. Maj-Gen. Vokes suggested the problem could easily have been dealt with in the Hitler Line if General Leese had placed all attacking divisions under Bums' command. However, Leese was unwilling to place an extra formation under the command of an inexperienced corps commander. Leese's confidence in Bums was not improved after his trial by fire either. In spite of satisfactory performance of the Canadian Corps in its first battle, the Eighth Army commander was not impressed by Bums' leadership and did not believe him fit to command. On 8 July 1944, Leese wrote to his wife that "I shall be glad to get rid of him, if I can arrange it, it is so vital to have efficient corps commanders."386 How much this assessment was based upon Leese's own dislike of Bums' cold, sarcastic personality is debatable.387

It is also quite likely that Leese was trying to justify his decision not to give

385 Chris Vokes, Vokes: My Story (Ottawa: 1985) p. 159. 386 IWM, Leese Papers, letter to Mrs. Lesse, 8 July 1944. 387 Granatstein, pp. 132-133.

182 Bums an extra division. Blaming Bums for incompetent handling of the Hitler Line pursuit drew attention away from the fact that Leese's decision to cram two corps into a space that could barely fit one caused most of the delays that prevented Diadem from being a more complete victory. Furthermore Bums did not endear himself to his Army commander when he pointed out Leese's mistake in his after action report.388 "His

[Bums's] critique was candid and well-founded; it was also not the sort to establish helpful communications with Leese whose capacity for self-criticism does not seem to be well developed."389

Considering that he led lsl Canadian Corps to victory in its two biggest battles,

Lt-Gen. E.L.M. "Tommy" Bums has not been granted much attention in Canadian military history. Part of this is due to the overall neglect of the Italian campaign, but more significant is Bums' personality. His cold, introverted, intellect did not inspire confidence in his subordinates or, as we have seen, his superiors. In spite of his military ability, Bums did not fit in socially with the British Eighth Army "club". "He made no effort that I could see to become a member of the club. And I must say I think half of one's military ability is bound up in one's ability to garner and hold a position of trust with one's pals and peers."390 Bums seemed the opposite of the other Eighth Army corps commanders like the flamboyant and outgoing Anders of the Poles, Freyberg of the New

Zealanders, and Leese's dear friends "Syd" Kirkman and "Dick" McCreery. It is clear from detailed his correspondence with Mrs. Leese that Sir Oliver highly valued personal

388 Bums, ALessons." 389 McAndrew, "Commanders and Plans", p. 54. 390 Vokes, p. 158.

183 relationships and social interaction with his subordinate commanders. Unlike the other

Eighth Army corps commanders, Bums was not one to host Leese for meals or cocktails, although later in the summer he took up the practice, as if acknowledging that his position depended on them. Interestingly enough, it was after one such lunch at

Canadian Corps headquarters in July that Leese softened his position on Bums slightly.

Leese wrote his wife that night that "I admired Bums today, for the first time he said with some confidence that he could do the job and intended to do so."391

Bums' personality was noticed by his fellow Canadians as well. His mid-1943 performance assessment notes: "Difficult man to approach, cold and most sarcastic.

Will never secure the devotion of his followers." This report goes on to report that while

Bums' personality hampers his leadership potential, he is still an outstanding officer.

"Has probably one of the best staff brains in the Army and whilst he will lead his

707 division successfully he would give greater service as a high staff officer." The report presents the heart of the problem. Tommy Bums is undoubtedly one of Canada's greatest military thinkers of the Second World War, yet his inability to lead and inspire men in battle denied him the glory of a victorious corps commander.

How was it then that such a man presided over two of Canada's greatest battles?

Most certainly it was because General Bums was blessed with two very able divisional commanders, each of whom more than made up for his leadership deficiencies. It also seems clear that Bums possessed the astuteness, strength of character and knowledge of

391 IWM, Leese Papers, Letters to Mrs. Leese, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 20, 31 July, 2 Aug 1944 392 Granatstein, p. 130.

184 his own man-management shortcomings to appreciate that he must make full use of their leadership abilities. Bert Hoffrneister had been an outstanding militia officer before the war as well as a businessman in spite of his lack of university education. Most importantly, the Vancouver bom infantryman possessed those natural qualities of leadership that Bums did not. J.L. Granatstein called him "A man of powerful personality and striking magnetism, Hoffrneister was the classic leader, someone men wanted to follow."393 Douglas Delany argues that Hoffrneister possessed an

"understanding of human nature, combined with his strong personality and his sensitive disposition, helped him read his subordinates and prescribe the right actions to draw on their potential." In short, he was both a natural leader and a product of extensive combat experience.394 The militia general chose to lead by example whether in training or in battle, the most famous instance being his training of 11 Infantry Brigade after their

Areilli River debacle. Hoffrneister personally led each company through a live fire exercise in which the troops were expected to follow dangerously close to a creeping barrage. Hoffrneister had first demonstrated his abilities as a trainer when he was given command of his own regiment, the Seaforth Highlanders, after completing staff college in 1942. At the time of his appointment the regiment was in poor condition and the

Brigade commander, none other than Chris Vokes, gave Hoffrneister the difficult task of bringing up the standard. The superb combat performance of the Seaforth Highlanders in Sicily and Italy is the evidence of Hoffmeister's success. His personal belief in keeping his soldiers informed down to the lowest private, corresponded with Eighth

393 Granatstein, p. 194.

185 Army policy and his highly motivated and inspiring personality made him the ideal commander of an armoured division designed for aggressive pursuit action.395 In a letter to General Crerar back in England, Bums wrote that the difficulties encountered by 5th

Canadian Armoured Division in the Liri Valley were in no way a reflection of its hard driving commander but on the inexperienced troops.396

General Bums could also count on Maj-Gen. Chris Vokes. Vokes was not so well received by his superiors at the time or historians since. Field Marshall

Montgomery labeled him a satisfactory division commander, but unsuitable for any higher formation, a view taken up by General Crerar.397 Whether or not Vokes was corps commander material or not should not get in the way of evaluations of his command of 1st Canadian Division. Chris, and his younger brother Fred Vokes, were bom in Ireland to a professional soldier of the Royal Engineers. While the boys were still young, their father was seconded to the Royal Canadian Engineers and posted to the

Royal Military College in Kingston. Both sons would enter the college and go on to careers in Canada's tiny Permanent Force. The older Chris chose the path of his father and became an engineer while Fred became a cavalry officer. General Vokes' engineer background would serve him well in the Italian campaign which was very much a sapper's war. To round out his career, Vokes attended the full-length peace time staff college course at Fort Frontenac in Kingston and had served briefly as the commanding

394 Delaney, p. 353. 395 Unpublished Interview with General B.M. Hoffrneister by B. Greenhous and Dr. W. McAndrew. DHH. 396 Daniel G. Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers (Toronto: 1991) p. 290. 397 Granatstein, p. 134.

186 officer of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry before taking over 2 Canadian

Infantry Brigade in 1942.398 When General Guy Simonds was evacuated from southern

Italy in 1943 with jaundice, Vokes was appointed to relieve him and went on to lead the division in the tough battles around Ortona and the Moro River. Vokes had a reputation for being a foul mouthed, hot tempered bully. He trained and commanded by using the more traditional military style of instilling fear in subordinates, but nevertheless, he took good care of his soldiers' needs and most importantly, he got the job done.399 He was a steady force in times of crisis and was tough enough to make the kind of decisions that made weaker men break. Another key to the success of lsl Canadian Corps was that

Hoffrneister and Vokes made a very good team. They had a long history of service together in 1st Division and a healthy respect for each other's ability.400

Between the corps commander's grasp of the principles of war and the leadership abilities of the division commanders, 1st Canadian Corps stmck an effective balance that served well in the Gothic Line. During the summer months while the Canadians rested and trained for the next major operation, General Burns put his energies into identifying and correcting his corps' shortcomings in staff work. General's Hoffrneister and Vokes concentrated on training to ensure that junior leaders would not repeat Diadem mistakes and that the lessons of that battle would disseminate throughout the ranks. This preparation could only take the corps so far in its next major battle. General Bums himself understood that the senior leader's job was largely completed by the time a plan

398 Vokes, pp. 1-10, 15-16, 33, 65, 86. 399 Interview with Maj-Gen. M.P. Bogert, GSO 1, 1st CID. 400 Interview with Hoffrneister; Vokes, p. 134.

187 was executed. From there on in, the most important leadership would be provided by the brigade and battalion commanders.401

The Canadian Corps that prepared to smash the Gothic Line in the late summer of 1944 possessed a wealth of talented brigade level officers. Two of the three brigade commanders in 1st Division led their formations successfully in the Liri Valley. Bdr.

J.P.E. "Paul" Bematchez, former commanding officer of the Permanent Force, French

Canadian Royal 22e Regiment had served with particular distinction, leading 3 Infantry

Brigade in its highly successful assault on the Hitler Line.402 Toronto-bom Bdr. G.T.

"Graeme" Gibson led 2 Canadian Brigade in their difficult battle in the Liri and had before that commanded 3 Brigade on the Upper Sangro and Moro River actions the previous fall. Although not an RMC type, Gibson was a Permanent Force officer from the Royal Canadian Regiment and graduate of the British Staff College at Camberley.

Bdr. J. A. "Allen" Calder was the only one of the three lsl Division commanders to go into the Gothic Line with no prior experience commanding a Brigade, although he had plenty of action leading the divisional support group, the Saskatoon Light Infantry

(MG).403

In contrast, all of the brigadiers in 5l Division that participated in Operation

Olive were leading brigades for the first time, although like Allen Calder, they had all logged long months commanding battalions. In 11 Brigade, Bdr. T.E. Snow was fired for his failure to drive his men forward in the Liri. Snow was replaced by one of the top

401 Bums, pp. 150-151. 402 Nicholson, Italy pp. 420-421. 403 Nicholson, Italy; The Canadian Who's Who, Volume 34, 1944 (Toronto:

188 Canadian brigadiers of the war, I.S. "Ian" Johnston. Johnston was a prewar militiaman and Toronto lawyer. He had also served as the director of Maple Leaf Gardens, making him popular with the countless hockey fans under his command. He joined the famous

48th Highlanders in 1930 and rose to command them by the time they landed in Sicily.

The officer commanding 5 Armoured Brigade was equally promising. Bdr.

J.D.B."Desmond" Smith, who had led the Brigade in the Liri, was moved up to corps headquarters to take over the Brigadier, General Staff (BGS) post. Bdr. I.H. "Ian"

Cumberland was chosen as his successor. After graduating from RMC in 1927, this native of Port Hope Ontario, went into the civilian autoparts industry and joined the militia Governor General's Horse Guards. He rose to command his unit just after the outbreak of war and led them during their very successful operations on 5th Division's flanks in the Liri Valley. The man he replaced, Desmond Smith, was a Permanent Force

Royal Canadian Dragoon and RMC graduate.404 Despite leadership shortcomings in the

Liri, he performed well in his new staff job as BGS. It is interesting to note that when

Operation Olive was launched, the commander of lsl Division and his three brigadiers were all Permanent Force, while their 5lh Division counterparts were all militia.

Other key individuals involved in the planning and execution of Operation Olive were the corps and divisional representatives of the Royal Canadian Artillery and

Engineers. The Corps Commander, Royal Artillery (CCRA), Bdr. E.C. Plow, the 1st

Division CRA, Bdr. W.S. Zeigler, and the 5th Division CRA, Bdr.H.A. Sparling, were all

1944). 404 Canadian Who's Who.

189 RMC graduates and Permanent Force officers of the Royal Canadian Artillery. By

August of 1944 they all had considerable experience in their highly technical craft. The detailed preparation of these skilled gunners for a set-piece battle in the Foglia Valley had a significant impact on the outcome of the battle. The Corps and Divisional engineering officers were equally competent and experienced.406 The senior 5th Division engineer, Lt.-Col. John D. Christian, an RMC graduate, pre-war militia gunner and mine engineer in Kirkland Lake, Ontario, typified the kind of dual military and civilian background that ably prepared many senior Canadian commanders for their taxing jobs in this war.407

Over the summer, a new position for a brigadier was created in 1st Canadian

Corps. The operations of armoured divisions consisting of one infantry and one armoured brigade in Italy up to and including Diadem proved this combination was unbalanced and unsuited to the local environment. A second infantry brigade was required so that when one reached the limit of its endurance in the Italian hills, another could pass through and carry on alongside the fast-moving armour. The reorganization was initiated in all Commonwealth armoured divisions by General Leese, but in order for the Canadian division to be altered, General Bums first required permission from

Canadian Military Headquarters in London. CMHQ approved, but did not possess any resources to help create a new brigade. Therefore, 12 Canadian Infantry Brigade was

405 Who's Who. 406 Nicholson, Italy p. 500. 407 DND, DHH Biographical files, Lt-Col. J.D. Christian B DND OBE Press Release, 10 May 1945. Douglas Delany notes Bert Hoffmeister's blend of civilian management and military leadership expertise that made him such an effective division

190 cobbled together with troops already existing in the theatre. 5 Armoured Brigade's battle-tested motor rifle battalion, The Westminster Regiment, formed the core of the new brigade. To this was added the 4th Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards, formerly 1st

Division's reconnaissance regiment. Bums chose them because the survivors already had some infantry experience.409 Armoured recce soldiers are often called upon to dismount from their armoured cars for foot patrols and small infantry attacks on isolated enemy delay positions. Surviving Dragoon Guardsmen were thickened with infantry replacement soldiers from reinforcement units at the Canadian rear-echelon support base at Avellino.410

That left only one more battalion to round the brigade out. With Allied air superiority no longer contested by the Luftwaffe in mid-1944, new uses for surplus anti­ aircraft artillery units in theatre were developed in British, US and Canadian armies.

Some were turned into traffic control units. Heavy 3.7 inch units were employed as counter-mortar artillery, but one Canadian unit had its 40mm Bofors guns taken away and was re-equipped as infantry.41' The 89lh and 109th Batteries of 1st Canadian Light

Anti-Aircraft Regiment were transformed into the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish

Regiment, although the name change did not take effect until after they fought their first

commander. See Delaney, Hoffemeister. 408 Bums, p. 169. 409 Dancocks, p. 292. 410 W.D. 4PLDG, Jul 1944. 41' US Fifth Army likewise made use of anti-aircraft gunners forming an entire, three-battalion regimental group in the composite divisional-sized Task Force 45. See: Ernest Fisher, US Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Cassino to the Alps. (Washington: 1977).

191 infantry battles in September.412 The proud gunners were thickened with drafts of experienced infantry NCO's and officers transferred from other regiments, convalescent depots, and some new stock from reinforcement units. One such sergeant was former

Cape Breton Highlander, Fred Cederberg, author of one of the best known Canadian

Italian Campaign memoirs, The Long Road Home. Cederberg recalled how the mix of gunners and infantrymen in the "bastard unit" did not initially fly so well, at least until the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Dick reminded the men "You're all

Canadians, you're all on the same side, and you all know what you have to do B help win a war we didn't start."413

The motley collection of battalions was first commanded by the able RCR veteran, Bdr. Dan Spry during its training period. Just before the start of Olive 12

Brigade was taken over by the veteran Perth Regiment commanding officer, newly promoted Bdr. J.S.H. Lind, after Spry was sent to Northwest Europe. With only a few short weeks to prepare before attacking the Gothic Line, the new brigade was not up to the standard of other formations in the corps and would have to be used cautiously.414

Nevertheless, the presence of an extra infantry brigade would ease the burden on Bdr.

Johnston's three seasoned regiments during the coming battle.

The long winter of deprivation and lonely patrol warfare on the Ortona salient followed by the most intense and bloody fighting encountered in theatre to date in May

412 Nicholson, Italy pp. 480-481. 413 Fred Cederberg, The Long Road Home (Toronto: 1984) p. 144. 414 By 23 August, only five days before they would be committed, the Lanarks had no Medium Machinegun tripods and only three 6 pounder anti-tank guns. The Divisional War Diarist expressed his concem on that day that the Brigade would not be

192 1944, meant that time out of the line between the Liri Valley battle and the Gothic Line

offensive was vital to 1st Canadian Corps. In June, when the corps first went into

reserve, the first priority was rest in areas where soldiers need not be concerned with the

immediate prospect of death. Terry Copp and William McAndrew's important study of

Second World War battle exhaustion casualties in the Canadian Army points to the

importance of resting in safety to the process of restoring mental health. The corps

settled into the now peaceful upper Volturno Valley near Naples, were initially soldiers,

particularly infantry soldiers were allowed to finally sleep the sleep of the dead, followed by hot regular meals. Tired and abused bodies thus began to mend. Minds, all

traumatized to one degree or another in the ordeal of combat, began to heal with rest and

food enjoyed in peace. Perth Regiment veteran Stan Scislowski writes of those days:

No more going hungry, and plenty of water to drink. No 88's or mortars to fear, no ripping bursts of MG 42's, no trenches to dig. Also, we could walk about anywhere without fear of being blown sky high on a mine. They'd long since been cleared away and the land made safe for man and beast. Peace and quiet. How wonderful it was down in this little tucked- away comer of Italy out of sound of shot and shell! It was exactly what we needed to bounce back and start to enjoy life again.415

One important step towards restoring the mental health of the corps for its next

action was burying the dead of the last. Boots were shined, webbing "blancoed", cap badges polished and bands formed up in temporary regimental cemeteries laid out and

decorated with care by survivors. A recurring sentiment expressed in Second World

War infantrymen's memoirs is the lack of time to mourn when friends fell during an

advance for soldiers conditioned to press on close to the barrage and onto the objective.

ready for the coming action. W.D. 5 CAD, 23 August 1944.

193 Sometimes it was only after the action died down that the impact of violent loss was felt.

Official war diaries from every unit in the Corps confirm that regimental funeral parades were a central feature in unit activities in the immediate aftermath of battle. For a society as deeply Christian as was Canada in the 1940s and for units that became families during training and action, the importance of such ceremonies cannot be dismissed. Indeed, the role of organized religion as a whole, routine worship services in and out of the line, lectures by unit padres on why the war must be won, and counselling services were central to the well-being of each unit.

Another parade held that summer played a role in restoring the corps' sense of purpose. That was the review by King Geroge VI in July. Once again, buttons were shined, uniforms cleaned and this time the much of the corps paraded in front of sparkling guns, tanks and vehicles. At first glance the expected soldiers' griping about the exercise suggested the event was nothing but an annoyance, taking time away from more meaningful training and pleasurable leisure.417 However, closer scrutiny reveals that the visit by the King of Canada, a symbolic head who meant a great deal more to the nation in the 1940s than now, seems to have rekindled in the men of the Corps and other

Commonwealth formations visited a sense that their efforts in Italy were still important to the war effort. Indeed, all were aware of the virtual disappearance of the exploits of the "D-Day Dodgers", as the Canadians in Italy became known, from major western

415 Stanley Scislowski, Not All of Us Were Brave (Toronto: 1997) p. 226. 41 Laurence F. Wilmot, MC, Through the Hitler Line: Memoirs of an Infantry Chaplain (Waterloo: 2003) 417 Farley Mowat, always an outspoken critic of pomp and circumstance has little good to say about this parade and other distractions from soldier's leisure time.

194 newspapers after events in Normandy began stealing the spotlight after 6 June 1944.

"We knew for certain now that the Italian Campaign would be relegated to that category known as the 'forgotten front'".418 It was one thing to mn a diversionary mission in Italy with an economy of force when the soldiers felt their hardships were adequately reported on by the media and thus validated by their countrymen. To do so with the sense that those back home had forgotten became a theatre-wide problem General Alexander was acutely aware of. The Army Group commander appealed to Lord Alanbrooke not to let his beloved armies be forgotten.419 For many soldiers that parade in July marked their closest bmsh with royalty and a very memorable event in their lives. The symbolic nature of the visit was not lost on the elite tankers of Lord Strathcona's Horse who shined, painted, polished and drilled for three days prior to the event.

When the Royal party reached the right of our line, the Colonel was introduced and was invited to join the King in the back seat of his car; His Majesty, sitting high up on the back seat in very informal style, asked the CO. many questions and seemed very deeply interested in the attitude and welfare of the rank and file. Following the inspection, the Royal party returned to the saluting base where he presented the Victoria Cross to Major Jack Mahony. After three rousing cheers, the King left the parade ground and the units marched off.420

If the King cared enough to visit, the coming mission must indeed be important.

Other important activities took place during that summer which helped restore individual humanity and prepare soldiers for the great challenge to come. Regular

The Regiment (Toronto: 1973) p. 195. 418 Stanley Scislowski, Not All of Us Were Brave (Toronto: 1997) p. 223. 419 WO 214/16, Alexander Papers, Letter from Lord Alanbrooke to Alexander, 1 Aug 44. 42 J.M. McAvity, Lord Strathcona 's Horse(Royal Canadians): A Record of Achievement (Vancouver. 1996) pp. 108-109.

195 swimming trips to quiet holes in the Voltumo River and 48-hour beach holidays on the beautiful Tyrrhenian coast, leave passes to Naples, Caserta, Rome and other rest centres, site-seeing tours to the Pompeii ruins, dental check ups, new uniforms, socks and boots, fresh fruit and even rations of ice cream all helped repair souls injured by the first difficult five months of 1944. Among the most important of such activities were trips to the movie halls set up by "the K of C [Knights of Columbus] and other auxiliary units" showing popular films "which all enjoyed", be it in an commandeered Italian theatre, a bam or just a tent.421 The value of motion pictures as an escape for young men forced to commit terrifying unnatural acts in between long bouts of boredom is a subject that needs much further study.

Sporting events for all, especially baseball, were another key escape. The best athletes competed in large organized tournaments widely attended in the Corps.

However, equipment was made widely available so all could play for recreation and exercise.422 As Terry Copp illustrates in his work on the Canadian Army in Normandy, such events also played an invaluable role in maintaining fitness and developing teamwork and strengthening relationships between leaders and soldiers at the rifle section and platoon level. This training aspect was particularly critical that summer, given the large number of replacements necessarily fed into the Corps after the bitter Liri

Valley fighting.

Even more important to the integration of replacements into regimental families

421 Thomas H. Raddall, West Novas: A History of the West Nova Scotia Regiment (Halifax: 1986) p .213. 422 Robert Tooley, Invicta: The Carleton and York Regiment in the Second

196 was sub-unit tactical training. Platoons ran through range practices on all weapons, route marches and basic small unit drills in the attack and defence allowing new soldiers to get acquainted with how their new regimental family adapted written doctrine to suit their own experiences and needs.423 More importantly, new soldiers got acquainted with their platoon mates and section commanders and likewise, junior leaders got a taste of what the new blood was capable of, physically and mentally. For old hands, not unlike professional athletes, emphasis on fundamental skills was critical to keeping units sharp and ensuring battle craft remained second nature.

On top of tactical refresher training, advanced and mission-specific exercises prepared the Corps to break the Gothic Line. At first the emphasis was on combined arms skills ensuring that all four combat services worked in concert. Experience both -in the Great War and so far in the second proved that the symbiotic union of infantry, engineers, tanks and guns was the guarantor of tactical success. Infantry and armoured officers down to the level of platoon commander were taught how to direct artillery fire so that the absence of artillery forward observers could not prevent employing the long- range might of the guns.424 Field engineers practiced mine lifting and bridge constmction drills by day and by night. Riflemen and tankers of 5th Division rehearsed infantry-tank tactics, alternating which arm was to be dominant depending on terrain.

Their efforts centered on Sydney Kirkman's and Field Marshall Montgomery's prescriptions for deep armoured division bite and hold operations, well beyond the

World War (Fredericton: 1989) p 246. 423 Tooley, p. 245. 424 Nicholson, Italy, p. 479.

197 enemy main line of resistence.

1st Division's infantrymen practiced with the slower and heavier Churchill

"Infantry" tanks of British 21 Army Tank Brigade. The 6-pounder gun of the Churchill

IV was virtually obsolete by 1944, although still useful for smashing bunkers and houses. To give the brigade a better edge, brigade field workshops refitted over 100

Churchills with guns and mantlets off wrecked Sherman tanks. New shipments of

Churchill IV's had also arrived from England equipped with a British version of the

American 75mm gun found on Shermans. The brigade also possessed a number of

Sherman and light Stuart "Honey" tanks employed in fire support, command and recce roles. The result was a mixed bag of armoured vehicles requiring a range of parts and ammunition from the brigade quartermaster.425 But, even though the formation was a supply clerk's worst nightmare, the regiments comprising Bdr. Dawnay's 21 Tank

Brigade were still able to render sterling service to Vokes' men when the time came.

Indeed, the mixed composition of the Dawnay's tank squadrons added to their capability and capacity to adapt to rough Italian terrain. The brigade's ad hoc doctrine used mixed troops deployed with two heavily armoured Churchills forward, with the leading infantry and two of the better gunned but vulnerable Shermans located a few hundred yards behind in hull down positions, providing over-watch and direct gunfire support on call with their accurate and powerful 75mm high explosive ammunition. Additional high explosive firepower for smashing machine gun positions came from two "Close

Support" Churchills in each Squadron Headquarters troop equipped with the new 95mm

425 M.A. BeWis, British Tanks and Formations: 1939-1945 (Cheshire: 1986) p.

198 howitzer. Such a combination might be ill-suited for the great tank battles of Normandy, but worked well busting through German fixed defences and fortified houses in the

Canadian sector of the Gothic Line.426

Training was not restricted to the fighting troops of 1st Canadian Corps. Equally important among the lessons learned from Diadem was the need for a more efficient command, control, communications and intelligence effort from Bums' own Corps headquarters through to the divisions and brigades. After considerable discussion and consultation with Eighth Army staff about where improvements were required, a series of rigourous command post, signals and traffic control exercises were conducted for

Canadian HQ staffs.427 Canadian capacity to organize set-piece battles was not in question. The aim of headquarters' re-organization and training was to improve efficiency at managing mobile armoured actions. This type of engagement would certainly occur whether the main German line was breached, completely collapsed, or if the enemy attempted a fighting withdrawal to the Alps. After thinking through the Liri

Valley pursuit experience, Bums understood that his commanders and troops must be organized and inspired to aggressively "overtake and destroy what is left of the enemy's main forces; particularly, his guns, vehicles and administrative echelons. It is therefore essential that we advance faster that he can get these clear. Hence the prime requisite in

478 pursuit is speed."

56. 426 Peter Gudgin, With Churchills to War: 48' Battalion Royal Tank Regiment at War 1939-45 (Gloucestershire: 1996) pp. 122 - 127. 427 W.D. 1st Cdn Corps, 1st CID, 5th CAD, Jul-Aug 1944. 428 Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Bums, ALessons of the Pursuit from the Melfa to Anagni"

199 1st Canadian Corps planning and training took a different turn on 9 August 1944,

when Bums and his staff were informed of Eighth Army's new plan. Word came after

Corps deployment to the central Apennines, in line with General Harding's original plan, was underway.429 Canadian formation staffs, therefore, immediately set to work

extracting 1st Division from positions along the Amo River near Florence's Ponte

Vecchio and orchestrating a move to the Adriatic and a plan of attack once there. The

importance of surprise to Leese's new plan meant secrecy and security were paramount.

The men removed all insignia from their uniforms identifying them as Canadian as well

as formation signs on vehicles. They were forbidden to leave behind any litter with the

word "Canada" printed on it. They were even under strict instructions not to talk to any

locals, a difficult task for Canadians well known for womanizing and scrounging.430

Eighth Army planners hoped 1st Canadian Division's brief stay on the Amo, where it

engaged in a week-long sniper duel along Florence's river banks, would help conceal the

great march east.431

While staffs planned, units ran through a series of exercises to practice infantry

attacks across rivers at night. In accordance with Leese's plan to msh the Gothic Line,

these exercises emphasized surprise by stealthy crossings without artillery barrages.

Infantrymen covered engineers as they de-mined and prepared vehicle crossings so that

when the sun rose, supporting armour was across the river and ready to shoot the

W.D. 1st Canadian Corps, June 1944. 429 Jackson, Mediterranean p. 127. 430 The Canadians had the highest rate of venereal disease in all of Eighth Army. Copp; McAndrew, Exhaustion p. 91. 431 W.D. 1 Cdn Corps, Aug 44.

200 infantry forward. Already skilled field gunners worked on further improving how quickly they could hitch up, bound forward, bed and site their guns and be ready to fire.

It was up to the gunners to guarantee that forward troops always had strong artillery concentrations to call on delaying strong points as they mshed towards their collision with the enemy main force. Most importantly, they had to be ready at a moment's notice to smash that enemy force when it counter-attacked. Heavy anti-aircraft gunners and gunners in the medium and heavy regiments honed counter-battery skills and tactics with the support of 1st Survey Regiment, RCA and its hostile battery location equipment.432

The plan General Bums and his 1st Canadian Corps staff prepared for their role in the coming battle yields insight into their overall professionalism and the confidence the commanding general had in his subordinates. It also refects the level of Canadian experience in Italian terrain and battle savvy about the still powerful German enemy.

From the first day of planning at Corps Headquarters, the emphasis was on speed and surprise to "attack and destroy the enemy" sited on a series of high features which overlooked and thus dominated the road network in the Corps' area of responsibility.433

Experience to date revealed how the enemy skillfully used automatic weapons and anti­ tank guns to vigorously defend commanding high ground and fortress-like stone villages. From these features German observers could direct devastatingly accurate artillery and mortar fire on moving Allied troops, even when their own flanks were threatened. Only when faced with complete encirclement or if killed or captured in a direct attack would such positions finally fall. Hilly Italian terrain and the commanding

432 Notes on Exercise Grampion and Canyon, W.D. 1 CID; 5 CAD, Aug 1944.

201 nature of such positions, especially when part of a continuous chain of permanent defences as in the Gustav and Gothic Lines, often meant encircling attacks in lower country faced the full wrath of the enemy's prepared killing zone without sufficient supporting fire to drive the Germans to the bottom of their holes to keep them from firing. The solution was directly attacking commanding features with maximum firepower and destroying the defenders before moving onto the next dominant location.

Planning appreciations prepared in August demonstrate that General Bums and his staff appreciated how critical it was to control high terrain in his own corps' area and further inland in 5th Corps' area.434

Planning instructions and operations orders were issued verbally and on a need to know basis as early as 9 August when word of the plan change first arrived, but the fine details necessary for the written Operations Instmction took until 21 August to arrange.

Operation Olive was divided into four distinct phases for Eighth Army. The first involved 5th British and 1st Canadian Corps coming into the line behind and then passing through a 2nd Polish Corps screen intended to shield Eighth Army's concentration along the Adriatic till the last possible moment. At H-Hour all three corps would advance abreast in three narrow corridors and establish bridgeheads over the Metauro River. The next phase required the three corps to rapidly close the distance through the outpost positions of the Red Line between the Metauro and the Foglia. Subtly buried in orders to

"advance" to specific locations was the usual Anglo-Canadian doctrinal sub-text that the

433 W.D. ICC, OpInstr#22 434 W.D. I Cdn Corps, Preliminary Notes for Appreciation by GOC 1 Cdn Corps, 7 Aug 44.

202 task included destroying as much of 76 Panzer Corps' fighting strength as possible.

Phase III was the most crucial component, consisting of operations to break the main

Gothic Line or Green Line I in good weather so as not to be stuck under the guns of the fortified line when winter hit. Phase IV involved the exploitation to Rimini and beyond.436 Again, hidden in this sterile description of movement to specific locations is the understanding that enemy formations in and around the Gothic Line must be substantially attrited before the Corps moved beyond to the last three low ridge lines before the Po Valley, on which they could consolidate and smash follow-on reserve formations anywhere and everywhere they found them.

The Eighth Army directive issued to General Bums specified that the most important Canadian Corps task was reaching the strongest part of Green Line I, ideally before the first wave of German reinforcements arrived to fully man it. In this context, the Canadian Corps HQ prepared two alternative plans for phase I and II. Maj-Gen.

Vokes' 1st Infantry Division, backed by 21 British Armoured Brigade's tank circus, would lead off through the Poles to carry out a silent crossing of the Metauro on the night of 25/26 August, just as they practiced earlier in the month. The guns would remain silent until 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades each had two assault battalions established in the bridgehead. Once the first four battalions were across, the guns would open up, first to cover Canadian engineer field companies de-mining and improving crossing sites for vehicles, and then the movement of tanks and towed support weapons

435 The opening statements and success indicators described in daily entries to the AEighth Army Intelligence Narrative Synopsis of Operation Olive" focus on the losses inflicted on specific enemy units. W.D. Eighth Army, Aug 44.

203 into the bridgehead to reinforce the initial bite. At dawn on 26 August the assault battalions, each supported by a Churchill squadron, would drive north with all possible speed. First they were to quickly destroy any enemy found defending the hill features at

Mombaroccio and Monteciccardo, on both sides of the Arzilla creek. These controlled the entire Corps area including their key roads and were, therefore, defensive focal points in the Red Line. 1st Division orders demanded these positions to be taken with all speed "before the enemy realizes we are attacking in strength". Once the Germans defending them were killed or captured, Vokes' division would own the south side of the Foglia River Valley. From there 1st Division would "send recce and fighting patrols to determine the strength of the enemy garrison." With a bit of luck, the Germans would not have time to assess the danger and bring up reinforcements to man Green Line I before the Canadians were upon them.437

It was here that the two alternatives came into play. If Green Line I was lightly manned, Vokes was to press on, secure crossings over the Foglia River and penetrate the defences. After that, Maj-Gen Hoffrneister would pass 5th Armoured Division through and race north to cut the coastal Highway 16. The Canadians would therefore "pinch out" the Polish Corps assigned to mask the heavily fortified and garrisoned port city of

Pesaro, possibly trapping its defenders, before driving on to Rimini. However, if 1st

Division patrols found the Germans manning Green Line I in strength, Hoffrneister was to bring his division up on the left in preparation for a set-piece attack.438 This second

436 W.D. I Cdn Corps, Operations Instmction No. 22, 21 Aug. 437 Ops Instr #22. 438 Ops Instr #22.

204 option satisfied General Bums' post-Diadem recommendation that set-piece attacks be

delivered by two divisions on a broader front than was employed at the Hitler Line.

Ideally, the set-piece attack ought to be delivered by two infantry divisions, with the

armoured division waiting in reserve to press through breaches and seize 'pivots' in the

German depth. Unfortunately, the unbalanced Canadian Corps had to make do with what

it had in Canadian formations. General Leese would not release an extra non-Canadian

infantry division to work under Bums' command for the reasons mentioned above.

Leese would change his mind when operational necessity demanded it, and after Bums

and his corps headquarters staff proved their battle management abilities in the coming

fight for the Red and Green Lines.

The central tenent of Bums' orders were the three key high features dominating

the Canadian area in the Red Line and Green Line I, near Mombaroccio, Ginestreto, and

Tomba Di Pesaro respectively. All junior leaders and soldiers involved were informed

of the importance of a quick seizure of that terrain as the key to terminating German

ability to observe and fire on their movement and likewise to use the same high ground

to observe and fire on the Germans as they either withdrew or counter-attacked. The plan conformed closely to Anglo-Canadian doctrine and Eighth Army's tried and true

operational method.

It is worth noting that Bums' orders contrast with Charles Keightley's 5th British

Corps' plan. Reflecting his corps' pursuit role, Keightley's instractions emphasized

driving rapidly northward to achieve Leese's goal of defeating the main weight of

439 McAndrew, "Commanders and Plans", p. 52.

205 German reinforcements on more open ground, away from Green Line I. However, the

late August euphoria that crept into Eighth Army as a whole took particular hold in 5th

Corps. Keightley did build his initial plan around capturing the dominant Monte

Gridolfo feature quickly. After that was done, 5th Corps orders and Keightley's personal memorandum to his subordinates suggested that if pushed hard German morale might crumble and their pursuit might well carry them over the Po to the Alps. Keightley can hardly be faulted given that this is exactly what his superiors began to strongly hope for in late August based on available intelligence from across Europe.

Therefore, 5th Corps' orders to attack beyond the Gridolfo feature towards

Rimini did not specify which high ground was critical and instead emphasized an early crossing of the Marrecchia River at the edge of the Po Valley. On the eve of battle

Keightley encouraged his officers that their advance to the Marrecchia and beyond must be "violent", "ferocious" and employ masses of armour in rugged terrain to compensate for infantry weakness. Now was the time, Keightley wrote, that risks ought to be taken to push the Germans to their breaking point. These messages were conveyed throughout

Eighth Army, including in 1st Canadian Corps. What is different about 5th Corps is that while Keightley did not entirely abandon Montgomery's principle of controlling firm bases on dominating ground, he did encourage knots of resistence to be bypassed by his massed armoured forces, in an almost German blitzkrieg style.440 This encouragement contributed to mis-communication within his corps leading to a failure to capture key

440 WO 170/275 B W.D. 5th British Corps, Olive Planning Instmction # 1, Corps Commander's Personal Memorandum to Division Commanders 16 Aug 44, Operations Order #7, 21 Aug 44.

206 hills that caused serious difficulty for all of Eighth Army later in the battle.441 As a result

Bums's options were negatively limited. Unfortunately, Canadian difficulties created by

Keightley's planning choices put the final bullet in 'Tommy' Bums's Second World

War career and command reputation. Nonetheless, before that happened, Bums' own plan for cracking Green Line I was put in motion, resulting in one of the greatest

Canadian feats of arms in the Second World War.

441 The details and result of this mis-communication are discussed in the final chapter.

207 n ^V-.c**' «5>g3 $ s Chapter VI: Canada, the Redline and the First German Crisis

In the spirit of his predecessor and mentor Field Marshal Montgomery, General

Sir Oliver Leese set an optimistic tone for his army on the eve of Operation Olive almost as if he intended to cross the Alps. He delivered a rousing briefing at the Jesi town theatre to senior staff officers in Army headquarters and all four corps, priming them to deal what he was beginning to hope just might be the final blow to Army Group "C", especially if the advance was pressed "mthlessly" and pockets of resistence "left behind to be cleaned up later". The Canadian official historian, Lt.-Col. Nicholson wrote that

"Sir Oliver's racy informality, the clarity of his presentation, the scope of his discourse, and his abounding confidence made an impression that his audience were unlikely to forget."442 Word was also passed to every soldier in Eighth Army by means of a special

Commander's Message distributed to units and read aloud the night before the assault.

You have won great victories. To advance 220 miles from Cassino to Florence in three months is a notable achievement in the Eighth Army's history.B To each one of you in the Eighth Army and the Desert Air Force my grateful thanks. Now we begin the last lap. Swiftly and secretly, once again, we have moved right across Italy an Army of immense strength and striking powerBto break the Gothic Line. Victory in the coming battles means the beginning of the end for the German Armies in Italy. Let every man do his utmost, and again success will be ours. Good luck to you all.

The message was sanguine about the future, but carefully worded not to promise too much and made no direct reference to Vienna. Nonetheless, many Eighth Army soldiers succumbed to the late August Allied euphoria. "Drive carefully if you want to see

442 Lt.-Col. G.W.L. Nicholson, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the

208 Vienna" the Engineer route-markers appealed, perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek.

Although the man hardest hit by that euphoria, even Leese did not lose sight of his mission to contain the enemy to his front, killing as many as possible in the process. 1st

Canadian Corps likewise answered that call.

The problem with Leese's rhetoric is his suggestion that Eighth Army was larger and more powerful than ever before. That message conceals how difficult it was going to be to destroy or contain twenty-seven German divisions with twenty-one Allied. At least one historian uses such statements and the fact that the Leese's plan bought him numerical superiority for the initial assault to argue that the Canadians should have been able to advance from the Metauro to the Foglia more quickly than they did. Instead, the late Brereton Greenhous's 1985 Canadian Forces College 1985 staff study contends that as often as not, leading Canadian units became lost in the broken terrain, stalled in the hills when radio contact was lost and were stopped longer than necessary by German demolitions. He argues that small numbers of the enemy in the corridor between the two rivers were sufficient to significantly slow the rush to Green Line I. "The advance from the Metauro had not been as rapid as had been hoped for when the battle began because of the skilful delaying actions of the enemy, the problems posed by terrain, and the unwillingness of brigade and unit commanders to by-pass strongpoints." Greenhous is correct that both Bums and Vokes were would have liked to cross the ten miles to the

Foglia quicker. Both men had clear orders and first-hand experience with how difficult

Second World War: Volume II, The Canadians in Italy (Ottawa: 1956) p. 499. 443 Brereton Greenhous, AS* Canadian Armoured Division in Operation Olive" (Unpublished Department of National Defence Directorate of History Study: 1985) pp. 9

209 it was to break thick defence lines when they were fully manned. However, hindsight is every bit as useful in exonerating actions as it is in condemning. The story of Canadian actions in those four days in August, pieced together in the context of a new appreciation of Allied and German intentions, sheds light on an important but little-known outcome of that time. Unbeknownst to the Allies, the Red Line was more than just a early warning outpost line. German Army High Command (OberKommando der Wehrmacht

- OKW) intended it to be strong enough to permanently stop continued corps-sized diversionary attacks by the Poles on the Adriatic with the three available divisions. If a more substantial threat materialized in the sector, Red Line defenders would identify and check it for seven days or until three and a half more divisions and a dozen more artillery battalions could transfer from other parts of the Italian perimeter to man Green

Line I's Adriatic sector.444 Red Line defenders were also supposed to live long enough to take over their own section of the permanent line of resistence on the Foglia.445 As it turned out, 1st Canadian Infantry Division might not have moved as fast as its own leadership wanted, but it attacked much more vigourously and quickly than the Germans anticipated. The Canadians also ended enough German lives in the Red Line so as to present Lt.-Gen. Herr with a serious problem when the time came to man Green Line

r 446

-13. 444 H.Q. Corps Witthoeft, Venetian Coast Command, Order #2 for Additional Constmction in the Green Line, 21 Jun 44. 445 AMaterial for the Presentation of the Battle of Rimini, Aug 44 - Feb 45", by Lt.-Col. Horst Pretzell, Operations Officer, Tenth German Army pp. 6-11. 446 German Tenth Army staff requests to pull back to Green Line I and bring it up to full six and a half division strength in21 mid-Augus0 t were refused by OKW. The The following chapters illustrate the kind of drive and hard fighting it took to disrupt the German Army's operational concept for holding the Gothic Line, and to convince them that Allied Armies, Italy were a more of a threat than they were. When considering the early stages of Olive, students of the campaign ought not to forget that the plan's success was contingent on Eighth Army's main strength being available intact in or around Green Line I B beyond the Foglia B to battle the anticipated mass of

German reserves that would inevitably sweep into the area. For that to happen, only a portion of Leese's total strength could be allotted to breaching the Red Line. Each of his three corps would assault into the Red Line with a single division, plus 8th Indian covering the mountain flank.447 The rest were stacked behind in some depth and preserved to set up a killing machine to the north. Overall, four Allied divisions would crash into 71st Infantry and 1st Parachute Divisions, and elements of 5th Mountain and

278th Infantry Divisions manning fortified positions in ragged defensible ground. This was hardly the margin of superiority that Eighth Army's ten divisions to 76th Corps' equivalent of three suggested.

In keeping with this principle of husbanding strength, on the night of 25 August,

1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades splashed across the shallow Metauro with four battalions to secure crossing sites for 21 British Armoured Brigade's tanks. Brigadiers

Allen Calder and Graeme Gibson were to close up to the Foglia River by any means they chose, Vokes' only stipulation being that they do so fast. Calder and Gibson each held initial battle would be fought in the Red Line according to the original defensive plan. Pretzell Report, p. 12. 447 W.D. Eighth Army, Operations Instmction 1431, 13 Aug 44.

211 back a reserve battalion in accordance with sound military practice. Paul Bernatchez's

3r Brigade was likewise held as divisional reserve to remain fresh for Green Line I. The artillery opened up shortly thereafter to shield the engineers and wreck counter-attacks.

Unfortunately, the opening of Allied operations on the Adriatic flank coincided with a

German withdrawal from the "Vorfeld" to the Red Line. The withdrawal was aimed to shorten 76th Panzer Corps' front and release 5th Mountain Division from the sector to shore up what Allied deception efforts convinced the Germans was a serious threat to another more vulnerable portion of the Italian perimeter in the industrial north along the

Maritime Alps.448 Stepping back to the strategic picture for a moment, this deployment was one of many made late that summer which spread Army Group "C" all over what was left of German held Italy and the Mediterranean coast in response to German fears and Allied deception efforts. It meant that in a few more days, when General von

Vietinghoff and Field Marshal Kesselring attuned to the danger on the Adriatic, they could only gradually pull their playing pieces back from the far reaches of the perimeter into Leese's killing zone.

Unfortunately, at the tactical level the withdrawal into the main Red Line positions also meant that while the Metauro was crossed without casualties, most of the massive artillery barrage delivered in the early morning hours of 26 August fell on empty enemy positions.449 Hours earlier, 76th Corps received permission to pull back from their outposts on the Metauro, into the main Red Line delay positions. Given the

448 OKW -1576, AReport on the Fight for the Apennine Position and the Improvement of the Western Alps Position, 15 August - 31 December, 1944." DHH SGR 11/255, p. 8.

212 finite amount of ammunition available for the Italian theatre, this waste of firepower was most unfortunate. British and Canadian intelligence staff, alarmed that the withdrawal might mean the Germans were alert to the pending danger, took comfort when prisoners revealed that the barrage caught at least some units of the enemy's 1st Parachute Division in the open as it withdrew. The sight of dead paratroopers in the Metauro Valley eased the minds of some Canadian and Polish soldiers who had faced these tough opponents on a number of occasions.

As they abandoned the Vorfeld, German engineers performed their usual tasks of mine laying and demolition, preventing the tanks from keeping pace with the leading infantry brigades. Just as in the pursuits in Sicily and in south Italy, this did not stop

Canadian scout-sniper platoons, rifle companies and dismounted artillery Foward

Observation Officers (FOO's) from pressing into the hills without tanks. They faced the first armed resistence mid-moming on 26 August when machine-gun outposts and platoon-sized delay positions opened fire on the lower slopes of the Monte della Mattera high feature guarding the Arzilla River. These positions covering roads and other likely approaches were swarmed in succession over the course of the day as Canadian battalions leapfrogged companies forward relentlessly.

To add a dose of the surreal to the 26 August experience, in the middle of the small, company-sized battles, Sir Winston Churchill arrived in the Corps area along with General Alexander. The pair first climbed to the church square in Montemaggiore in the centre of the Canadian startline overlooking the Metauro to observe the battle's

449 Pretzell Rpt, p. 9.

213 progression. The location is still known by locals today as "Belvedere Churchill" and includes a stone monument and a museum to mark the occasion. Not content to stay so far behind the action, the Prime Minister insisted on pressing closer to advancing troops until he found himself in the tactical headquarters of the Royal Canadian Regiment in

Sahara. At the time, RCR companies were "teeing up" an attack on a delay position.

The RCR's Anti-Tank Platoon Leader, Captain E.H. Shuter, recalled:

As Mr. Churchill peered at the enemy positions through binoculars our supporting twenty-five pounders opened up in the rear. The Prime Minster lowered his glasses, looked around for an instant and in a voice that bespoke a warrior's satisfaction on being on a battlefield, exclaimed, 'Ah! Cannon.' He was indeed too far forward for a person of his importance; General Alexander showed considerable concern over his safety. The couple left and within a half-hour a concentration of enemy mortar bombs fell where the eminent visitors had stood.

It was as close as the Prime-Minister ever came to the front line in the Second World

War.451 General Alexander described the visit in his post-war memoirs.

What really frightened me was that we were going over ground which hadn't really been swept for mines, and in addition shells and stray bullets were whizzing around. But I got him safely to a farmhouse overlooking a valley. [RCR HQ] We could hear the machine-guns of the infantry going rat-tat-tat-tat just below us; and on the hill in front, which couldn't have been more than 1,200 yards away, our tanks were creeping up under the ridge, advancing a little, then firing and coming back, to duck the German anti-tank gun fire, which their action had drawn. Winston saw it all like a demonstration, and was as happy as the proverbial sand-boy.452

News of Churchill's presence in the Corps area spread quickly and helped remind the

450 W.D. 1 Cdn Corps, 27 Aug, 44. 451 G.R. Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment: Volume Two, 1933 - 1966 (London: 1967)p.151. 452 Field-Marshal, the Earl of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945 (London: 1962)p.137.

214 Canadians and the rest of Eighth Army of the importance of their mission to destroy the

Germans in Italy.453 They still could not know how poor the odds were of accomplishing it.

On the Canadian left, "C" Company of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada mounted a series of quick, aggressive small unit attacks making good use of company support weapons, including Bren light machine guns and 2-inch mortars as well as rapidly directed concentrations of field artillery, rather than waiting for Bdr. Dawnay's tanks and the engineers to clear the German obstacles. By mid-day "C" Company had cleared several outposts and two platoon strongpoints alone at a cost of three wounded

Highlanders. The latter platoon fortress covered Monte della Mattera itself and was protected by an armoured self-propelled assault gun. Twenty-seven German prisoners were rounded up among the corpses after the two positions fell. Already, therefore, on the first day of action, the Canadians had a toe-hold in the Red Line.454

Bdr. Gibson wasted no time aggressively working to secure the rest of the feature that afternoon. This time the heavy Churchill tanks of 145th Battalion, Royal Armoured

Corps were able to help after 1st Division's engineers had repaired or by-passed the obstacles on the main road up the mountain. Major F.D. Colquhoun's "B" Company of the Seaforths dashed off on the main road, riding atop a squadron of 145 RAC tanks in an attempt to quickly snatch control of Covento Beato Sante and Point 393. The

Churchills shuddered to a halt on the saddle between Monte della Mattera and the

Convent in front of several impassible craters in the road. Colquhoun's riflemen leaped

453 W.D's. RCR; 1st Canadian Corps, 26 Aug 44.

215 down from their rides just in time to be caught in a carefully prepared ambush. This half of the German battalion position on the Mattera feature was stronger and more alert now. Thick pre-registered machine-gun and mortar fire blasted the Seaforths as they scrambled off the tanks. Four died and 12 more were wounded in the process, including

Colquhoun himself. One of his platoon leaders, a Lieutenant Thirlwell, ran to the rear of the Churchills and directed their main guns in a duel with the German machine guns and another self-propelled gun which joined the fight. By the afternoon Thirlwell took over the company and fought them into the cover of several houses further along the saddle, thus occupying the attention of the Convent's defenders to the west.455

Meanwhile, Calder's brigade was pushing towards the Convent on the eastern slopes of the feature. Toronto's 48th Highlanders were pinned on the exposed slope by machine guns, mortars, 75mm high explosive rounds from an anti-tank gun platoon position and a pair of 20mm anti-aircraft guns. 48th Highlander veterans would likely take exception to Greenhous writing off this firepower as "light resistence" which should have been "bypassed". Even the generally fair Official History implies that it was the Germans who performed better on the 26th, managing to force delays while offering only "very slight opposition" and "sporadic" bursts of fire.456 Storming it with infantry alone could doubtlessly work, but Vokes and his brigadiers had to consider that the division was just starting what Leese warned would be a campaign of many weeks.

They could ill afford heavy losses so early in the attack. Dawnay's tanks, the cover of

454 W.D. Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (SHC), 26 Aug 44. 455 W.D. SHC; W.D, Operations Log, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 26 Aug 44. 456 Nicholson, Italy, pp. 506 - 507.

216 darkness and a more coordinated, two-brigade attack with strong artillery preparation must therefore be the solution. In fact, Calder made a sound choice to outflank Point

393 on which the Convent sat with his reserve unit, the Hasting's and Prince Edward

Regiment. Bypassing the strong point with its commanding view and leaving it to fire into the rear of an attack on what promised to be a more difficult position on the next ridge did not seem wise. Therefore, with the front and left of the Convent position occupied by the Seaforth and 48th threats, the "Hasty Ps" set off in a hook to the right with a squadron of 12th Royal Tank Regiment. Alan Ross's company led the way in a text-book Italian campaign-style infantry tank attack with the infantry-advancing a few hundred yards ahead to protect the tanks from anti-tank guns and hand-held anti-tank weapons hidden by rough country. Meanwhile tanks blasted German machine gun and rifle positions under the direction of Ross and his platoon leaders. In this way, the company destroyed a platoon strong point protecting the eastern slope of the hill. The position included a 75mm gun and the two 20mm fast-firing anti-aircraft guns that had caused trouble earlier.457

The naturally strong hill-top convent position, manned by a company and backed by heavy weapons and forward observers, could still generate substantial firepower, which meant that any further movement towards it would be met by vicious fire, including growing concentrations of mortar and artillery fire. With light fading on the

26th, Calder sensibly opted to wait for the cover of darkness and a thorough plastering of the hill by Canadian guns before sending the RCR onto the hill to deliver the coup-de-

457 W.D. 48th Highlanders of Canada; Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, 26

217 grace. On the other side of the hill, Thirlwell's depleted Seaforth company pulled out of its houses to allow for the bombardment.

As all this was proceeding on the right, Gibson kept the action moving on the

Canadian left by pressing the Loyal Edmonton Regiment north westward along a finger of high ground protruding from the ridge commanding the Arzilla River Valley and the village of Mombaroccio. The "Loyal Eddies" pushed along under covering fire from a

145 RAC Squadron firing from hull-down positions around Monte della Mattera. With the onset of darkness and the prospect of legendary Canadian night infiltration before them, events moved quickly to anti-climax. Surrounded on three sides in Covento Beato

Sante and with positions around the highest peak at Mattera already destroyed, survivors of the battalion of 211 Grenadier Regiment abandoned their positions and hustled across the Arzilla to help make a stand on the last major ridge line barring access to the Foglia

Valley and the main belt of defences on Green Line I. At Monte Marino, the Loyal

Eddies slipped into an enemy battalion headquarters with bayonets fixed in the last hours of the 26l . They bagged eight more prisoners and the battalion's transport, consisting of seven horses. Thanks to aggressiveness of 1 and 2 Canadian Brigades, most of the

German unit was overwhelmed and destroyed in place before it could withdraw. Only

24 hours had elapsed since the Canadian attack opened.458

The spirited defence on 26 August provided every indication the German 76th

Corps intended to make a resolute defence on the Monteciccardo-Ginestreto ridge.

Aug 44. 458 W.D.'s Loyal Edmonton Regiment; Royal Canadian Regiment; 1 Canadian Infantry (CIB) Brigade; 2 CIB 26 Aug 44.

218 General Vokes knew the ridge screened his main goal in the Foglia Valley and must therefore be overcome quickly if he was to avoid the bloodshed his division faced in the

Hitler Line in May. However, a commanding ridge dominating all roads and covering a major tank obstacle like the Arzilla River would be no easy position to capture. As with the Convent on point 393, it was essential to destroy the enemy on the ridge and conquer the ground while keeping 1st Division's strength intact for the most important part of the battle still to come. Therefore, major concentrations of artillery and even air strikes paved the way for the assault crossing of the Arzilla River on the morning of 27

August.459

That morning, it was also necessary to gain the last pinnacle in the upper Arzilla

Valley at Point 396 around Monte San Maria. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light

Infantry leapfrogged companies towards the height over the morning until checked by mortars and machine guns in extremely steep, hilly terrain. Post-war author and hard- charging company commander Major Collin McDougall had a section of supporting

Vickers medium machine guns man-packed on to a neighbouring hill together with two of his platoons, while Churchills from 145 RAC worked up the road. Late in the afternoon, after laying down shell concentrations, McDougall gave the signal for the

Brens, rifles, Vickers, and tank guns to blaze away at the hill-top hamlet while he stormed it with his remaining third platoon. The Patricias radioed that they owned point

396 at 17:45. Once firm on the peak at the left corps boundary, McDougall's men helped shoot neighbouring British 46th Division units onto their objectives so they might

459 W.D. 1 CID, 27-28 Aug.

219 keep pace with the Canadians. In once instance they shot up a German company that emerged into the open, withdrawing across Patricia fields of fire to escape a British attack on Monte Gadio. The total number of casualties inflicted on the enemy is unknown, but several concentrations of observed artillery were put down on them from the commanding height.460 The Canadians knew well the importance of owning Italian hill tops. It would not be the first time in this battle that such ownership paid handsome attritional dividends. What is also important is that these were not great battles managed by generals. They were lonely, isolated actions won by the skill, resolve and leadership of young corporals, sergeants, lieutenants and majors like Collin McDougall.

Over in the centre, the Patricia's sister regiment, the Loyal Eddies, and the central Canadian brigade's Hasty Ps and the 48th Highlanders were driven to ground by large calibre shells, mortar bombs and bullets on the Arzilla Valley floor. To make matters worse, the valley walls were extremely steep and cut by extensive ravines, leading to frequent communication breakdowns and sub units getting lost. Armchair generals eager to lay blame ought to take heed, though, as the valley is challenging enough for foreign motorists to negotiate with clear daylight and road signs. It is easy to imagine how the most disciplined troops with the best field skills could become disoriented with the addition of heavy fire, dust and smoke. In the end, confusing situation or not, the slopes of Monteciccardo-Ginestreto Ridge could not be ascended without significant Canadian loss of life until darkness enabled infiltration.

In the event, apparently the Germans were not expecting the Canadians to push

460 W.D. PPCLI; 2 CIB 27 Aug 44.

220 as quickly as they did and were caught unprepared. Not long after midnight, "A"

Company of the Loyal Edmontons stealthily picked their way up a near sheer, but brush- covered slope onto the small plateau containing Monteciccardo's main street running along the narrow crest of Point 384 to find it empty and silent. Today's visitors to the quaint and peaceful village can scarcely imagine what kind of misery it contained that night in 1944. Minutes after arriving, the Edmontons heard the sound of jackboots on the steep road into town on the other end of the main street. Their after-action report describes "A Company of Germans, marching in 3's appeared at the other end of the main street, obviously coming in to set up defences." Apparently the Red Line positions south of the Arzilla were supposed to give sufficient warning to the rest of 211

Grenadier Regiment and the rest of 76th Corps to man the main Red Line defences.461

71st Division's commander significantly underestimated the time it would take for the

Canadians to smash up his outer defences and press into the main Red Line, even if most

Canadian historians complain they took too long. The lead Loyal Eddy platoon had just enough time to hastily site two Brens and rifle positions covering the street. Oblivious

German infantry, marching with weapons slung and helmets dangling from their webbing, were allowed to a point half way down the mountaintop main street before the

Bren gunners and riflemen cut loose. Solid weapons handling skills in the Loyal Eddies, sharpened in the summer training period, paid off well for 60 to 70 German soldiers were cut down in the initial fusillade. Survivors of the ambush fled to the rear and for a time it looked like the balance of the Edmontons could easily join "A" Company to

461 W.D. 1 CID, Intelligence Summaries, 27-28 Aug 44.

221 consolidate in the village and secure this toehold on the ridge.

A few moments more revealed just how important holding the Red Line on the

Monteciccardo-Ginestreto Ridge was for the enemy. Monteciccardo itself, projecting itself southward as an outcrop of the ridge protecting the Arzilla River, was not just to be a company strong point, but a full battalion position reinforced by tanks or what were more likely STUG III self-propelled assault guns from 71st Division's Anti-Tank

Battalion. The first of those STUGs turned round the last bend on the switchback road leading into town behind the ambushed company and lumbered down the road toward the Eddies. The balance of the battalion from 211 Grenadier Regiment stormed down either side of the street, keeping pace with the well armoured STUG. A hot fire-fight quickly demonstrated "A" Company was vastly outgunned, forcing them to pull back to some cover at the eastern end of the ridge, just outside of town. The encounter battle cost the company 30 dead and wounded. Ten more Edmontons were missing and presumed still stuck in the village, including the Company commander and the Company

Sergeant-Major. This constituted a nearly 50% reduction in fighting strength.

Thankfully, the remaining three Loyal Edmonton companies were on their way to assist. In the early hours of 28 August, they fought their way up the steep slopes of Point

394, smashing up an enemy platoon, sealing the German battalion into the village itself and preventing them from setting up a proper defence of the potentially dangerous ridge, from which artillery observers could direct accurate fire for several miles back to the hills south of the Arzilla. The tight Edmonton ring formed around the village also

462 W.D. LER, After Action Report 26 - 28 Aug 44.

222 meant the Edmontons controlled most of the narrow switch-backed road into town from the south. Churchills and Shermans from 145 RAC's "C" Squadron drove up this road at dawn, after getting past the myriad of demolitions and obstacles on the bottom of the

Arzilla Valley. The drive was made safely as the British tanks were shielded from any anti-tank fire by the steep bank.

The morning was spent making careful preparations for a coordinated daylight attack with what was essentially an equally matched enemy force dug into a build-up area. Brereton Greenhous is critical of how long it took to tee this attack up, but it is understandable given that a first light storming of the town would result in losses unacceptable to the regiment. Instead, steps were taken to guarantee success by reducing the enemy's ability to observe and fire on the attackers. German machine gun nests and outposts at the edge of town were mopped up by platoon-sized attacks. In addition, the highly accurate and hard-hitting M-10 self-propelled 3 inch anti-tank guns from lsl Anti-

Tank Regiment, RCA were called up to blast apart the tower of a thickly walled monastery in the main village piazza from which German artillery and mortar observers were directing accurate fire, making any movement difficult. The morning was also used to lay on an artillery fire plan and thoroughly douse the hilltop with high-explosive shells.

At 13:15 a firebase consisting of several Churchill tanks and "A" Company's survivors, opened a hail of bullets and tank shells from the eastern end of the main street. The fire covered "D" Company which during the morning worked its way to the edge of town closer to the other end of the street, along with the rest of the tanks. In the

223 next 45 minutes "D" Company shot its way into the monastery garden to find itself embroiled in a bitter close-quarter battle in the compound which was turned into a two- company German redoubt. The main floor and tunnels underneath the building were still intact, despite the observed and thus accurate concentrations of shell fire that slammed into it during the morning. The lead platoon actually clawed its way into the building, only to be cut off from the rest of the company. The half squadron of 145

RAC Churchills clawed in vain up the steep bank behind "D" Company. They then skirted westward around the plateau until they reached the main road at the north edge of town. As British tanks rounded the last 90 degree switchback behind the monastery, the lead Churchill commanded by "C" Squadron's Battle Captain took a hit at short range, probably from the STUG III. The blazing tank blocked the narrow road, forcing the rest of the tanks to take up somewhat protected firing positions 100 yards from the monastery wall.463

So began a 15-minute long rain of tank fire on the wall from both ends of the street, which enabled survivors of the separated Edmonton platoon to break out of the building carrying two wounded men. A stalemate developed that afternoon as both sides tried to gain fire supremacy. The German fortress could still generate enough fire in all directions that the attack was halted. The seasoned Lt.-Col. H.P. "Budge" Bell-Irving, with the division since landing in Sicily, realized a new fire plan was needed to pin- down the defenders before storming the fortress with greater strength, at least if he

W.D. LER AAR, 26 - 28 Aug 44; 2 CIB; 1 CID, 27-28 Aug 44.

224 wished to avoid senseless loss. That plan was laid on for the same afternoon but had to be postponed till evening when the division's artillery was diverted to support

Calder's 1 Brigade in action further east on the Monteciccardo-Ginestreto ridge.

Instead, Bell-Irving's final assault became part of a coordinated divisional attack.465

Contrary to Greenhous's interpretation of the action on this ridge, the rest of the

Division did not stand idle waiting for the Loyal Eddies to secure Monteciccardo.

Calder's men crossed the Arzilla in line with 2 Brigade on 27 August, advancing on three peaks on the eastern end of the ridge, including the village of Ginestreto itself and points 268 and 146 to the right. Lead companies of the Hasty Ps and the 48th leapfrogged through strong points on the valley floor, at least until the ground in their area opened into a gradual and more open slope, making it much easier for German bullets and shell fragments to sweep the slopes and find their mark. Darkness carried the two Canadian battalions closer to the crest, but the enemy there was tenacious.

Calder's men had the unfortunate luck of attacking on the uglier side of a German divisional boundary between 71st Infantry and 1st Parachute Division, recently extended because of the near annihilation of the German battalion south of the Arzilla, along with another in the Polish zone and heavy losses inflicted on a third in British 46th Division's sector.466 The eastern end of Ginestreto Ridge was taken over by two battalions of the elite and full strength 4th Parachute Regiment, part of a now continuous belt of Red Line

464 Bell-Irving is most known for his service with the Seaforth Highlanders with which he travelled overseas with, commanded a company with in Sicily. After the war he remained associated with the Seaforths for 60 years in various capacities including service as Honourary Colonel. 465 W.D. LER AAR, 26 - 28 Aug 44; 2 CIB; 1 CID, 27-28 Aug 44.

225 defenses running all the way to the sea with no gaps to be exploited.

In this sector the engineers could not build a ford and de-mine the soft bottomed

Arzilla and other obstacles on the valley floor until 28 August. So it was not until the afternoon of that day, while the Edmontons dueled it out around their monastery, that 12

RTR Churchills reached the straggling 1 Brigade battalions on the exposed slope with forward platoons and companies pinned down and cut off. Calder worked through the day to reorganize his battalions and 12 RTR's tanks and to blast the ridge with all the artillery available, along with several air strikes by Spitfires configured for a ground- attack role. His renewed, three-battalion assault was part of a divisional deliberate attack across the full width of the ridge, including a final assault on the German redoubt in Monteciccardo.

The survivors of 211 Grenadier Regiment in Monteciccardo, recognizing their position was hopeless, took advantage of the darkness to make good their escape,

leaving only stragglers and isolated snipers to be mopped up. The day cost the Loyal

Edmontons 34 more dead and wounded bringing the butcher's bill for the village to 64.

The right side of the divisional attack also succeeded that night but the paratroopers,

among the most disciplined and diehard Nazis among German soldiers in Italy, gave up

the crest reluctantly.467 Using haystacks set alight to illuminate the battlefield, their

466 Pretzell Rpt, pp. 12-13, OKW Rpt 1576, pp 1 - 2. 467 | st parachute Division is the most famous of all German formations that fought in Italy. It stood out as an elite, highly motivated organization with substantial combat power, far beyond that normally associated with lightly equipped airborne troops. The division's fame grew from status as Field Marshal Kesselring's "Fire Brigade"; shunted around to threatened sectors including Ortona in 1943 and Monte Cassino in early 1944. The division was also known for its high morale and fealty to

226 machine guns raked the slopes. After being hit by a faustpatrone anti-tank rocket, one

Af.9

12 RTR Churchill crew was burned as they bailed out by a Paratroop flamethrower.

However, with the anchor point of the ridge at Monteciccardo lost, it was only a matter of time before the entire high feature was in the Canadian hands. 76th Corps issued orders on the night of 28/29 August for a general withdrawal back to Green Line I.4 In the early morning hours, 4 Parachute Regiment abandoned the ridge and fell back across the Foglia. Between them the two Ontario regiments suffered 75 men killed and wounded to buy the ridge, but on the morning of 29 August the Gothic Line was in sight.470

Victory in the steep hills on both sides of the Arzilla River was achieved not just by aggressive and skilled infantry action. Determined work by Royal Canadian

Engineers in the rapid drive north, as often as not under mortar, shell and sniper fire, ensured that Bdr. Dawnay's tanks could lend their weight of fire to 1st Division's rifle companies. The engineers also made it possible for equally aggressive employment of

Bdr. Ziegler's well disciplined divisional artillery and attached regiments from Corps.

These gunners were highly professional and hard driving. They and the engineers manage to keep 1 and 2 Brigades under a continuous field artillery umbrella throughout

Hitler, which meant few were ever captured. Number six on the list of German Parachutist's 'Ten Commandments' translates as "Never surrender. Your honor lies in Victory or Death." US Military Intelligence Service, "German Parachutists", Intelligence Bulletin. (September: 1942). For a discussion of German Parachute Division elite status, morale and combat motivation see James Lucas, Storming Eagles: German Airborne Forces in World War Two. (London: 1988). 468 W.D.'s LER, Afteraction Report; HPER; RCR; 48th H; 1 CIB; 2 CIB; 1 CID, 28 - 29 Aug 44. 469 Pretzell Report, pp. 22-28.

227 the Red Line fighting. The rapidity with which the field artillery regiments hitched, loaded, moved up, bedded in and opened fire again gave Calder and Gibson the firepower they needed to launch small unit quick attacks and more deliberate formation assaults with very little notice.471 In essence, the guns were always ready to fire complete with ready ammunition reserves far sooner than the Germans could anticipate or plan for in their defensive strategy. This sterling work by Canadian sappers, gunners and Royal Canadian Army Service Corps ammunition trackers would now give Vokes and Bums some flexibility in choosing what should happen next.

To date Canadian historians understandably followed the lead of Generals Bums and Vokes and their concerns over the level of resistence faced in the Red Line and the three and a half days it took to breach it, especially with their great desire to reach Green

Line I before it was manned. As a result 26 - 28 August have not gone down in the pages of history as a major component of the great Canadian triumph in the Gothic Line.

Yet, in light of Allied containment and attrition strategy and German operational plans

for defending the Po Valley, the fight for the Red Line represents a critical first step in making Leese's plan to defeat Army Group "C" work. The problem is that because

Allied planners had no idea how vital the Po Valley was to Germany, they were in

August 1944 completely unaware of how much effort and life the enemy would expend

holding on to it. In tactical terms, it meant Army Group "C" would continue to hold and

die as far south as possible. Eighth Army and in September, Fifth Army would indeed

be able to smash up German divisions in succession as they were fed into the attritional

470 W.D.'sHPER, 48H, 29 Aug 44.

228 battle. What begins to become apparent with the Canadian example in the Red Line is that the killing process would occur further south than originally forecast.

At the tactical level what is important about the Canadian action in the Red Line is that the position was breached well ahead of 76th Panzer Corps' schedule and that in the process German casualties were higher than anticipated. 211 Grenadier Regiment was all but annihilated. 71st German Infantry Division's two other regiments manning the Red Line suffered almost as badly in front of the British and Polish Corps. This crisis sent shock waves rippling up the German chain of command, unleashing the flow of enemy units that would see Operation Olive take its originally conceived form as a grinding attritional holding attack. When the assault on the Red Line opened on 26 and

27 August, Kesselring reported to OKW that it was most likely a continuation of the limited diversionary offensive of the sort the Poles had been conducting all summer aimed at containment and interference with German redeployment. Not one to be reckless, however, he also realized that it could be the beginning of a major operation.

As a precaution 26th Panzer Division was ordered to assemble at Imola as Army Group

Reserve, while one of its battle groups, based on the 67 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was to concentrate near Rimini-Ravenna472 in readiness to move to Green Line or Galla

Placidia coast defences as the situation warranted. Thus, as the fighting for Convento

Beato Sante raged, Kesselring was still on the lookout for other threats to his perimeter.

At the same time and closer to the Adriatic reality, Tenth Army staff and General

Herr's headquarters anticipated the Allied centre of gravity for any major operation in

471 NAC - W.D. RCA 1 CID, CRA's After Action Report, pp. 4 - 5.

229 the Adriatic section of the Gothic Line would develop on the coastal road, where their defenses were the strongest. The identification of strong British and Canadian formations working further inland along the boundary between 71st Division and the

Paratroopers came as a surprise. General von Vietinghoff and Major-General Heidrich of the Parachute Division were also recalled from leave in Germany now that the situation had been deemed serious.473 German staff officers also decided 71st Division should be rotated out of the line for rest and reinforcement with the fresh 98th Infantry Division then guarding the Galla Placidia. However, they reached this conclusion before that division was completely wrecked and before they realized the full power of the storm breaking over them. Obviously then, before the relief of the 71st could be effected,

Eighth Army, with the Canadians leading in the centre, pierced 71st Division's front, forced the commitment of its divisional reserves and then destroyed most of them. This development, coupled with the magnitude of air and artillery bombardment in the

Adriatic sector and the identification of the Canadian and 5th British Corps in the assault, convinced Kesselring's headquarters that Vietinghoff s Tenth Army was being hit by a major Allied offensive. The Red Line disaster sounded the alarm in Kesselring's Army

Group headquarters, convincing him to release the balance of 26th Panzer forward from

Imola to the Green Line and to move 29th Panzer Grenadier Division eastwards to provide a new reserve in the Adriatic sector.

As if Kesselring needed more convincing, it came in the form of a copy of

472 OKW-1576, pp. 10-11. 473 Pretzell Rpt, pp. 11-15. 474 OKW-1576, p.ll.

230 Leese's message for the troops that had found its way into German hands. Based on this information, a clear picture of Allied intentions was emerging at the headquarters of both Army Group "C" and Tenth Army. The Tenth Army War Diary records the

German appreciation of Allied intentions on the night of 28 August. "By committing

fresh formations and by superior weight of armoured and air formations, he[Eighth

Army] is seeking to destroy our formations forward of the Green Line, with the objective

of then quickly passing through the Green Line in the Direction of Rimini."475

Much has been made of the capture of this message as further evidence of a bungled operation.476 In the context of containment and destmction this development is both a curse and a great blessing. It guaranteed the enemy released forces that made for

hard fighting and bitter losses in the coming weeks. Yet wording like "the last lap" and

"beginning of the end of German armies in Italy" helped to further convince Kesselring

and his planners that the Allied offensive was more dangerous that its actual strength

made it and that it was nothing short of a major encirclement, which still might include

an air or seaborne landing in the Galla Placidia in support. While Tenth Army felt the

main worry was the Gothic Line itself, Kesselring and OKW viewed the buildup around

Florence earlier in the summer and the new attack along Adriatic as the main thrusts of

an encirclement attempt by twenty-five or more divisions. Their intelligence, based on

dummy Allied message traffic, convinced them that as many as seven more divisions,

including a fictitious additional Polish Corps, were still available for landings behind the

front in the head of the Adriatic in the Galla Placidia position, or in Istria the second part

475 Hist Sect Rpt #27, p. 28.

231 of the encirclement. Kesselring, therefore, was unwilling to commit all his reserves to a decisive battle in Green Line I and instead built strong forces to oppose both options. As in the Battle of Normandy where Allied deception efforts kept a German army pinned in

Belgium and Holland until it was too late to turn the attritional tide, so too did

Kesselring's fears mean that German units would be fed to Eighth Army gradually enough that the comparatively small Allied force could manage the violence on its own terms. Alexander's bait was snatched.

In spite of the alarm over the rapid collapse of the Red Line and the destmction of 71st Division, the German senior leadership still felt confident they could contain the

Allied attack. Kesselring and his staff believed the characteristic overcautiousness of

Allied offensive operations meant that the threatened sector could be reinforced and counter-attacks launched long before the Allies could take advantage of any tactical surprise they achieved.478 In the Adriatic, Tenth Army worked under the assumption that after deploying for a major attack on the Red Line, Eighth Army would pause for several days to bring up its administrative tail just as it had in Calabria in 1943, and at

Anzio and the Liri Valley in 1944. It could take a week for artillery to be moved forward, ammunition stockpiled, fireplans prepared and patrols to be conducted. This would still give Tenth Army time to transfer reserves to Green Line I and extricate 71st

Division's remnants. 7 The Germans did not know that every soldier in Eighth Army

476 Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory (New York: 2004) p. 622. 477 OKW-1576 pp. 2-3. 478 Post War interview with Kesselring and Westphal on Army Group "C" and Italian Strategy. 479 Hist Sect Rpt #27

232 had been impressed by the need to keep rolling forward even if it meant open flanks and strained supply lines to ensure that the Gothic Line was breached before winter. The period between the German abandonment of the Red Line and the Allied attack on

Green Line I turned into a race to see which army could reach the north bank of the

Foglia first and in strength.

233 Borgo ^ Santa Maria0 V Rimlnl>, M^P ^ 'Osteria Nuova fo > SANU^fc,- Pesaro MARINO/jV Montecchio

N> Urblno0

\\e>, MAP 18 \

nr^

MOUNT CAR80NE

MONTE DELLE I Monte FORCHE*' Colours show heights Santa in metres above sea AMOUNT «. Maria ievel as below: GAUDIO, MOMBAROCCiQ 100-200 -

200-300.

CONVENTO 300-400. MONTE SANTE L.FLLA MATTERA* 400 S00. MOUNT SAN GIOVANNI

MONTE Borgo

THE ADVANCE MONTEMAGGIORE^ TCHHE MOUN1 GOTHICDlfE GRIDOLF 26-29 AUGUST 1944 0 12 3 MILES I MONDAY

Canadian Forces Allied Forces

ONLY PRINCIPAL ROADS SHOWN

FOSSOMBRONE m Chapter VII: Race for Green Line I

Caught up in the wave of euphoria that swept the Western Allies in the late summer of 1944 after the fall of Antwerp and early success for Operation Olive in Italy,

General Sir Oliver Leese made an unfortunate observation that shaped histories of the war in Italy. He wrote that in addition to Green Line I being only partially manned due to

Eighth Army's rapid approach to it, it also lacked depth, being laid out in a thin strip on rising, easily observed ground north of the Foglia river with "everything in the shop window."480 In the same document and in other letters to colleagues, Leese also revealed Green Line I and its depth positions, as well as German will to hold them, were much stronger than originally forecast. As if to confirm views about Leese's poor leadership and planning, some historians gravitated to the "shop window" comment, using it to describe the next three day phase of Operation Olive as an "easy" advance through a largely unmanned, incomplete defence line. Douglas Orgill's one volume survey of the battle picks up on Sir Harold Alexander's equally problematic remark that

"we swept through the line [Green Line I] almost as if it wasn't there." Orgill, a journalist by profession, also pays scant attention to Canada's contribution to this phase of the battle. To a some degree both of these shortcomings are addressed by later British and Canadian scholars, but because Orgill's book remains the only single-volume history of the Battle for the Gothic Line and thus oft referenced, perceptions linger that

480 IWM, Sir Oliver Leese Papers, Unpublished Memoir, pp. 9-10.

234 the fight for Green Line I was easy and the Canadian role was minor.

While there is no question that difficult and bloody fighting lay in store for

Eighth Army well into the fall of 1944 as two powerful and evenly matched army groups collided, it is also apparent that the battle for Green Line I was anything but a walkthrough. Reflecting Germany's desperate need to hold the Po Valley at all costs, fighting in 1st Canadian Corps' sector of Green Line I proved difficult and exhausting and therefore influential on the Corps' ability to operate in its aftermath. In the end, the

Canadians smashed open Green Line I, caused panic in German headquarters, and won laurels for the nation, but as Canadian and Commonwealth War Cemeteries scattered in the Foglia Valley and the hills beyond reveal, victory did not come cheap. Close examination of that pivotal 72-hour period reveals much about the courage and resolve mixed with solid leadership, military skills and doctrine that were necessary to make

Allied 'economy offeree' diversion plans bear fruit. It also reveals the high level of professionalism and effectiveness reached by the Canadian Army in the Second World

War.

By 30 August, Hitler and OKW staff came to believe that the Allied attack through the Red Line in the Adriatic sector was not diversionary, but part of an attempt to encircle and destroy Army Group "C", likely in concert with an amphibious hook in the Venice or Istria areas. Hitler therefore gave his blessing for a major redistribution of the German perimeter defence in Italy. Fourteenth Army was to shorten its front by withdrawing to the main Gothic Line in the central Apennines to free up formations for

4 ' Douglas Orgill, The Gothic Line: The Autumn Campaign in Italy, 1944

235 the Galla Placidia position to repel landings or to shore up Green Line I as needed.

German perceptions were fed by Allied deception efforts as well as the speed and violence of the Red Line assault. Together, these events contributed greatly to the mse that the Allies possessed enough military power in the Mediterranean, and the necessary naval and air strength to strategically move it, to win a decisive and strategic victory .

This redeployment meant that the clock was now ticking for Alexander's armies in their plan to grind up Army Group "C" in a battle of managed attrition. The re-alignment assured that even if Green Line I was pierced quickly, there would be more battles against fresh enemy divisions in the hills beyond it. Nonetheless, the immediate concern for Eighth Army and the Canadians was getting through the thick belts of mines, wire, anti-tank ditches, steel machine gun posts and concrete bunkers of Green Line I with as few casualties as possible.

Canadian observers peering through binoculars on the southern rim of the Foglia

Valley could see for themselves how the manmade defences in Green Line I were made more formidable by the very different terrain they now faced. The ground over which the next phase of the battle was to take place differed markedly from the extremely steep

3-400 metre elevations around the Red Line. Indeed, in the area between the Metauro and Foglia Rivers the foothills of the Northern Apennines reach the sea. Once the barrier of Ginestreto-Monticiccardo ridge is crossed, the countryside opens dramatically.

Bmsh covered forty-five degree and higher grades are replaced by slightly less steep and

(London: 1967) pp. 55 - 65. 482 OKW -1576 AReport on the Fight for the Apennine Position and the Improvement of the Western Alps Position, 15 August - 31 December, 1944." DHH

236 high, but much more open, slopes on the north side of the Foglia. More importantly, those hills rise like a wall from the wide river flats of the Foglia Valley. What lay spread before the Canadians were very good fields of fire for German weapons dug in and concealed in Green Line I.

The significant resistence encountered in front of the Foglia across Eighth

Army's front convinced Leese and his Corps commanders that the option of "gate­ crashing" Green Line I was unlikely and the alternative of a deliberate set-piece assault must be prepared for. Orders were thus issued for 5th Canadian Armoured Division to take its place in the line. During the night of 28/29 August, 5th Division's 11 Infantry

Brigade prepared to relieve 1st Division's exhausted 2 Brigade on the Ginestreto end of the ridge area, while the infantry division's 3 Brigade moved up to relieve the equally tired and bmised 1 Brigade northwest of Monteciccardo on the right. By nightfall on 29

August the three battalions of Bdr. Ian Johnston's 11 Brigade plus the attached Princess

Louise's Dragoon Guards from 12 Brigade were in position in the high ground overlooking the Foglia. They were to conduct patrols and prepare for a set piece assault on the night of 2/3 September. The Irish Regiment of Canada and the PLDG sent a company each to Castello and Apsella on the lower slopes to secure the villages as observation posts and bases for patrols across the river. Patrols from the Irish and the

Cape Breton Highlanders wasted no time in ranging out onto the valley floor and over

SGR 11/255, pp. 8-10. 483 W.D. 11 CIB, September 1944, Report on Operations, 30 August - 14 September.

237 the river. In the meantime gunners prepared fire plans, engineers improved the supply road system and Service Corps tmckers stockpiled ammunition and stores for a major assault.

Early intelligence reports indicated the Germans might not yet have fully manned

Green Line I, as reinforcing 98th Infantry and 26th Panzer Divisions were still in transit

and would take several more days to arrive.485 Generals Bums, Anders and Leese met on the morning of 30 August to discuss these reports and their options. In spite of

General Anders's concern that his corps would not be ready, Bums and Keightley's troops were, so it was agreed not to wait for more Germans to arrive. H-Hour for

Canadian and British Corps attacks was moved up 24 hours to the night of 1/2

September.486 When Bums returned to his headquarters around 1000, he was informed

reconnaissance patrols found no signs of enemy activity at all. The evening before, the

Cape Breton Highlanders already pushed two patrols across the river. These patrols

located a good crossing point and bagged an unsuspecting German prisoner who seemed

quite surprised to see Canadians that far north. With this one exception the only enemy

positions that were identified as being manned were the strong defenses on top of point

120.487 Two more patrols sent out the following morning included field engineer

officers to ensure the river crossing site was suitable for infantry and tanks. Cape Breton

scouts also discovered that one of the three northward running roads in the 11 Brigade

484 W.D., 11 CIB, 29 August. 485 WO 170/275 - W.D. V Corps, Intsums 361 - 363, 30 Aug - 1 Sep 44. 486 W.D. 1 Canadian Corps, Operations Log 1070, 30 Aug 44. 487 W.D. CBH, Patrol Report 29 August.

238 488 area was free of mines and obstacles. Apparently it was left open for German use.

Between the surprised prisoner and the unobstmcted road it seemed the German defenders in this portion of the Gothic Line were unaware of the danger to their front.

To the right of the "Capers", the Perth Regiment put one patrol across the river shortly before midnight on 29 August. It returned some hours later to report that no enemy were sighted but that large numbers of mines had been encountered. The Perth

CO, Lt-Col. Reid, went forward himself to recce a crossing near Montelabbate at 0930 while the Corps Commander was still conferring with Generals Leese and Anders.

While in the vicinity of this crossing, Reid's party came very near to becoming victims of their own air force when a flight of four Desert Air Force Kittyhawks unloaded their ordnance in the area.489 It seems that neither the Perth Regiment or the Cape Bretoners were informed of the air plan for that day until after they had sent more patrols out.490

This error proved fortuitous as the Cape Breton patrol made it to the main road to Pesaro north of the river in broad daylight, still encountering no enemy. West Nova Scotia

Regiment patrols in the eastern part of the Canadian Corps area also failed to locate any enemy positions, although like the Perths they detected plenty of mines.491

As 30 August wore on and more reports came in from infantry and engineer patrols as well as from air observers, the intelligence picture became clearer. Decisions were taken at a number of different headquarters to move immediately to establish a bridgehead over the Foglia. The sequence of which headquarters were the first to act is

488 W.D. CBH, Patrol Report 30 August. 489 W.D. The Perth Regiment, 30 August. 490 W.D. 11 CIB Operations Log, 30 August.

239 not entirely clear, as orders to advance were issued at the battalion level and all the way up to General Lesse almost at the same time. It would seem that there was a general recognition at all levels of command that immediate action to take advantage of the apparent opportunity meant the Gothic Line could still be "Gate-Crashed". This scenario is plausible given that it was Eighth Army policy to keep every soldier informed right down to the lowest trooper, private, gunner and sapper.492 Everyone in Eighth Army was well briefed that the faster they advanced, the greater the likelihood they would not have to slug it out among manned, fixed defences as they had in the Hitler Line.

Canadian historian Douglas Delaney's new research into Maj.-Gen. Hoffrneister's leadership confirms that when faced with the prospect of an unmanned line, neither the commander of the Canadian armoured division or Ian Johnston, his forward brigade commander, needed orders from Corps to revert to gate-crashing plans conceived of before the assault.493

All across Eighth Army's front divisions were either ordered or took the initiative to push strong fighting patrols of company strength across the Foglia, even though this meant calling a halt to medium bomber sorties by the Desert Air Force laid on as part of the set-piece plan. If the company fighting patrols were successful they were to be reinforced by battalions until a lodgement had been secured.4 This would be followed

491 W.D. WNSR, 30 August. 492 W.D. 5 CAD, History of Operations, Lessons Learned Part IV. "The importance of putting everyone in the picture to at least crew commander and section leader level was again proven.", See also, PPCLI After Action Report, September, 1944. Douglas Delaney, The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffrneister as Military Commander (Unpublished PhD Dissertation: 2003) p. 319. 494 W.D. Lt-Gen. E.L.M. Bums, 30 August.

240 by a drive to the coastal road and on to Rimini.

In the Canadian Corps sector, these patrols were to begin crossing at 1700 on 30

August. To call them patrols is somewhat misleading. In effect there were to be four company-sized probing attacks across the Canadian front. If these leading companies encountered significant resistence, then the remainder of their parent units would be close enough behind so that a battalion attack could be immediately teed up, complete with a squadron of armour and supporting artillery. The hastily issued order caught some units unprepared. The 11 Brigade support group, the Princess Louise's Fusiliers, had allotted positions for its medium machine-gun platoons and 4.2 inch mortar batteries, but when the orders for the quick attack were received at 15:15 on 30 August, those positions had not even been surveyed much less occupied.495 In spite of the initial confusion, the participating units managed to reach their jumping off points on time, although zero hour was pushed back to 17:30.496

The timings for the attack are interesting to note. By starting at 17:30 there was a possibility that the objectives could be taken before sunset. It also meant that if the

Germans tried to stand then any Canadian battalion attacks supported by artillery would not be delivered until after dark. This plan was reflective of the Corps' policy for conducting river crossing operations at night which was developed during the training period earlier in the summer. The bridgehead was to be secured at night, by infantry with engineers echeloned behind to prepare tank crossings and clear mines under cover

495 W.D. 11th Independent Machine-Gun Company (Princess Louise's Fusiliers), 30 Aug 1944. 496 W.D. 5 CAR (VIII New Brunswick Hussars), 30 Aug 1944.

241 of darkness. Supporting armour would cross the river by dawn in preparation for the next leg of the advance just as it had on the Metauro and Arzilla Rivers.497 After the war

General Bums noted,

From this point on, it may be said that the battle to get through the Gothic Line and to seize the commanding high ground about two and a half miles beyond it... was mainly a battalion and regimental commander's battle. The way this gate-crash battle had to be fought laid the responsibility mainly on the lieutenant-colonels, who rose to the occasion and gave notable examples of leadership.498

The attack plan was a combination of gate-crash plans made in the weeks before the battle and the set-piece attack laid on for the night of 1/2 September. Unit tasks and boundaries were the same. In 1st Division's area on the right, the West Nova Scotia

Regiment would attack towards Borgo Sant Maria along the lateral road and then seize the high ground above the village. To their left, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light

Infantry of 2 Brigade were given Osteria Nuova and the surrounding heights as their objective. 1100 metres left of Osteria Nuova, the Perth Regiment of 11 Brigade was to capture Hill 111 overlooking a pass through which the main road to Tomba Di Pesaro ran. The Cape Breton Highlanders were to take Montecchio and Hill 120, which would secure the junction of the main lateral road and the Tomba Di Pesaro road inside the village as well as the western shoulder of the pass.

Johnston's 11 Brigade units would each have a squadron of the VIII New

Bmnswick Hussars in support while 1st Division's assaulting battalions would each have

W.D. 5 CAD, Outline for Exercise Canyon, 10 Aug 1944. Bums, General Mud p. 185.

242 a squadron from 48th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment.499 The inclusion of 2 Brigade meant Gibson's units must return to action early from reserve positions behind the Red

Line where they were resting, eating and re-supplying. Maj.-Gen. Vokes ordered the brigade to come back into the line on 30 August. Some degree of traffic congestion had to be expected as thousands of vehicles and men worked quickly to put the combination plan into effect with only hours notice. Congestion slowed 2 Brigade's march so that the PPCLI attack could not be delivered until well after the other three units were on their way.500

The probing attacks would not be preceded by an artillery barrage, but if resistence was encountered, artillery concentrations could be brought down rapidly.

Canadian artillery staff officers had been preparing a detailed fire plan for breaking a fully manned Gothic Line since the night of 27/28 August. These plans involved identifying known and possible enemy positions from aerial photographs. Potential targets and easily identifiable features such as farms, copses, and crossroads were given map reference numbers and recorded on gridded air photos, which were in the hands of assaulting infantry and tank units and the gunners behind them. The numbered air photos enabled forward units to bring down fire on trouble spots faster than by normal means, and with or without the aid of artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOO's).50

After a morning of watching, waiting, followed by frantic preparations, the time to move finally arrived. The West Novas were the first to cross the Foglia. Their

499 W.D. 1 CID; 5 CAD, 30 Aug 1944. 500 W.D. 2 CIB, 30 Aug 1944. 501 W.D. HQ RCA, I Cdn Corps, Aug 1944.

243 commanding officer, Lt-Col. Ron Waterman, briefed his company commanders at mid- afternoon at 1400. "B" company would cross the river first and if no enemy were encountered, proceed to the high ground at point 133. Once "B" company, under

Captain J.H. Jones, was snug on this hill the remainder of the battalion was to join up and consolidate this bridgehead.5 2 "B" Company was already across the river by 1630, almost an hour before 11 Brigade's battalions started their advance. This lead did not last long, for ten minutes after crossing the river the Jones' company ran into a dense minefield. This problem was not unexpected, as this minefield had been identified by reconnaissance patrols on the night of 29/30 August. After looking unsuccessfully for a gap, the company continued picking its way directly through the mines. As the lead platoons neared what they thought was the main lateral road they came under intense machine-gun and mortar fire. When the men dove for cover many detonated "Schu" mines.503 Some inched forward on their bellies and reached the road but enemy fire increased pinning them in the ditch on the south side.

What "B" Company thought was the road was only a secondary track halfway between the river and the main lateral. For two hours Jones' men tried repeatedly to push forward but remained pinned among the mines along the road. Casualties mounted, especially from the Schu-mines which tore the feet off dozens of soldiers.

502 W.D. WNSR, 30 Aug 1944. 503 A Schu-Mine consists of a small charge packed in a wooden casing making it immune to electronic mine detectors. The mine is buried just below the soil surface and is triggered when stepped on. The charge is powerful enough to blow the foot off the victim but not kill him on the principle that it takes more men to look after a wounded soldier than a dead one. U.S. War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces (Baton Rouge: 1990) p. 487.

244 With dusk approaching, Lt-Col Waterman ordered his three remaining companies to cross the river and join "B" company along what was still thought to be the main road.

By midnight this move was complete and Waterman had come forward himself to direct the battle. He ordered "D" company to pass through "B" and take the battalion's objective. "C" company would follow behind in depth. As these orders were being issued the battalion position was under machine-gun and mortar fire.

Dawn broke on 31 August as the two assault companies slipped northwards along a gully. "D" and "C" companies could not get much past the road when they too were driven to the ground by intense enemy fire.504 Unfortunately, the West Novas had played right into German hands. They were attempting to advance through a carefully prepared German killing zone designed to first pin and then bleed unsuspecting prey.

Waterman's full fighting strength was now deployed in the middle of a section of the

Gothic Line fully manned by 1st Parachute Division. Unlike other sections of Green

Line I, defences in this area were largely completed and untouched by Desert Air Force bomber runs which lifted mines and damaged wire entanglements elsewhere. 30 minutes after advancing into the firestorm, Waterman recalled "D" and "C" companies to the slim protection of the gully under the cover of smoke fired by 2 Field Regiment.505

This order was carried out with extreme difficulty and more soldiers lost feet to Schu- mines as they tried to make their way to the rear. Casualties included Major A.

Nicholson and Captain S.D. Smith, commanding the two leading companies and further adding to the confusion. To make matters worse, Ron Waterman, like many a Second

504 W.D. WNSR, 31 Aug 1944.

245 World War battalion commander, reached his personal breaking point after too many months of combat and being responsible for sending young men to die. Padre Laurence

Wilmot, much loved by the regiment, witnessed the decent into darkness taken by his dear friend as the situation grew more desperate. Wilmot chillingly describes

Waterman's response to the attached FOO and 48th RTR liaison officer's offers of fire support for a renewed battalion attack. These offers came after Bdr Paul Bernatchez denied his initial requests for the same for the initial company probe on the first afternoon. "This is the infantry's day. We will show you how wars should be fought and won. We don't need artillery and we don't need tanks. This is our day!"506

Unfortunately the unit needed both badly, but even with that support, all they could hope to achieve was extricating the pinned forward companies. By 0900, 31 August, quick action by surviving officers reunited the regiment in the protection of the gully where it remained until ordered by 3 Brigade Headquarters to return to the south bank of the river at 1430.5 7 After he saw Waterman lose his grip, Padre Wilmot grabbed his medical bag and made off into the minefield to do what he could to recover the wounded.

Hopes that the Gothic Line in this sector was not yet manned were dashed.

German paratroopers inflicted 76 casualties on the West Novas, including 20 dead.

Most of the rest were missing feet. For this loss, the men from the Annapolis Valley and the South Shore of Nova Scotia had little to show, at least in terms of measuring

505 W.D. 2 Fd Regt RCA, 30 Aug 1944. 5 Laurence F. Wilmot, MC, Through the Hitler Line: Memoirs of an Infantry Chaplain (Waterloo: 2003) pp. 77 - 78. 507 W.D. WNSR, 31 Aug 1944. 508 Nicholson, Italy p. 515

246 effect by ground captured. However, their location in the midst of 1st Parachute

Division's killing zone occupied much of its defensive fire attention throughout 30 and

31 August. Their sacrifice helped draw attention away from efforts by Princess

Patricia's activity to the immediate left after darkness fell on the 30th. In effect, they were the proof the utility of General Bums' Hitler Line lesson to disperse German defensive fire by attacking on a broad front. Meanwhile, several thousand metres to the far left, 11 Brigade faced similar circumstances.

On the western edge of the Canadian sector another Nova Scotian Regiment ran into difficulty. German soldiers facing the Cape Breton Highlanders were also now prepared and snug in powerful fortifications. Lt-Col. R.B. Somerville issued his orders at 1515 on 30 August, over an hour after the West Novas were briefed. Cape Breton's

"B" company would also make the probe. They crossed the river at 1730 and immediately deployed two platoons forward in the open ground in front of the steep face of point 120. The lead platoons stopped short of the base of the hill to cover the leapfrogging reserve platoon as it passed through and then proceeded up the slope.

Around 1830, as the point section neared a saddle less than 100 metres left of point 120, the storm broke. German machine-gun fire poured into the Nova Scotians from what seemed like all sides and various ranges, shredding the point section. The quick-thinking platoon commander led another of his sections to the right under the cover fire of the platoons at the base of the hill and took the highest point on the crest from which much of the fire was coming. After killing two Germans the flanking section took the last hapless machine-gunner prisoner, but this brought little respite. Not

247 only was heavy fire coming from other positions on the crest, but also from behind the platoon and from neighbouring Point 111, the Perth objective.509

The left hand platoon tried to work its way up the hill while German attention was directed on the lead platoon, but as it got halfway up the steep slope it was pinned to the dirt. As the platoon leader attempted to direct the platoon two inch mortar crew on a

German position, all three were hit, adding to the confusion. Try as they might, the remainder of the company at the base of the slope, including three dismounted sections from the battalion's carrier platoon, could not bring enough fire to bear to ease the pressure on the forward elements. "B" company was stopped cold and would need help if it was going to extricate itself.

Lt-Col. Somerville had his artillery FOO douse Hill 111 with smoke shells to cover his men from the vicious flanking fire coming from there. ' The smoke screen helped to some extent, but there were still plenty of Germans in front of the Highlanders and they had allowed "B" Company to get too deep into their killing zone and too close to their trenches and pillboxes for artillery to help. German constmction engineers had turned Hill 120, already a naturally strong position with almost cliff-like slopes, into one of the most powerful fortified points in the Gothic Line. "A" Company, following behind, was in no position to help either, as it too was pinned in what little cover it could find in the ditches of the main lateral road, 100 metres in front of where the slope became very steep. Behind them "C", "D", and Support companies established a base of fire in the relative protection of a creek bed, 700 metres south of the road. From there,

509 W.D. CBH, After Action Report, 30 Aug 1944.

248 Somerville directed Princess Louise's Fusiliers' supporting Vickers medium machine- gun fire. He also brought up his own 6 pounder anti-tank gun platoon and set them up on the lip of the gully.51' Given the close quarter, confused fighting on the hill in front, these weapons could not fire in intimate support, but they did blaze away on the fringes of the fight, helping to isolate the contested area. German artillery contributed further to their helplessness by shelling the area heavily. The predicament was made worse when the "B" company wireless was knocked out. This challenge was overcome by the forward company commanders who established their headquarters together near the road as darkness fell and informed Somerville of the situation using "A" company's still functioning radio.

Upon learning of the fate of his lead companies, Somerville requested permission to withdraw his forward troops so he could mount a proper battalion attack. Vast quantities of German artillery and mortar shells rained down on pre-registered areas making any attempt to bounce the position impossible. Somerville's permission came at

2230 so darkness provided some protection for the withdrawal from accurate machine- gun and rifle fire. So too did Private Alphonse Hickey of Whiteny Pier, Cape Breton.

His section commander, Sergeant Dan MacDonald later recounted how Hickey "told the others to give him their Bren gun magazines, said that he would stay for a short time and he would see them later." He would not. Instead, he spent his last minutes on earth blasting away at German muzzle flashes, covering the escape of "B" Company's survivors, until a concentration Canadian shells splattered the hill to catch the returning

510 W.D. 11 CIB, Operations Log, 30 Aug 1944.

249 enemy and screen the Cape Breton withdrawal. Another "B" Company survivor,

Ignatius MacNeil, believes that Hickey was "fully aware that if the enemy did not kill him our own artillery would. As "B" Company pulled back Hickey's gun could be heard firing, and then the artillery barrage started." Unfortunately there were no witnesses to the act and thus no well-earned Victoria Cross for Alphonse Hickey, only his body lying over his Bren amid five spent magazines and a number of dead Germans.512

The returning companies brought five prisoners with them, all from 26th Panzer

Division. This came as quite a shock to the soldiers of 5th Division who thought their opponents would be members of the badly weakened 71s' Infantry Division. The prisoners said that their unit had just relieved the 71st that day.513 This division was at nearly at full strength, fresh and made up of the best trained soldiers the German army could field in late summer of 1944.514

Somerville consolidated his companies at his fire base along the river gully.

From there another attack was scheduled to go in at 0115, 31 August. This attack would be preceded by a 30 minutes pasting of Hill 120 by every weapon capable of firing on it.

Major Kierstead's "B" Squadron Sherman tanks of the VIII New Bmnswick Hussars and a troop of M-10 tank destroyers added their fire to the barrage, along with 25 pounder field-guns, the medium-machine guns of the Fusiliers, and the mortars and anti-tank guns of the Cape Breton support company. Kierstead's tanks could provide little more

511 W.D. CBH, 30 Aug 1944. 512 Alex Morrison, The Breed of Manly Men: the History of the Cape Breton Highlanders. (Toronto: 1994) pp. 228-229. 513 After Action Rpt, W.D. CBH, 30 Aug 1944. 514 1 st Para had just received a draft of 2000 trained replacements. Pretzell Rpt,

250 than fire support for the time being, though, as they were stuck in a rather precarious position in the middle of a minefield. Two tanks were already knocked out as a result.

The rest would have to wait for engineer support to get further forward. In the hours after the Cape Bretoners first crossed the river, the sappers of 1 Field Squadron, Royal

Canadian Engineers, worked to build a ford for the tanks across the river and a path through the minefields on the other side. VIII Hussars tanks and vehicles from other supporting units were late reaching this crossing when all units were caught in a traffic jam caused by a misinterpretation of orders by the traffic control unit. Early reports of

11 Brigade's success convinced Hoffrneister to concentrate his divisional reconnaissance unit, the Governor General's Horse Guards, behind the leading infantry to be prepared to break out. The Guards had priority over other formations, but the traffic control unit took this to mean that they had priority over tanks, M-lOs and heavy weapons carriers supporting 11 Brigade.515 The problem, partly a result of the rapid change of plans on

30 August, was eventually sorted out in the darkness and did not hamper operations significantly. That the tangle was unclogged so quickly is another indication of the cool

Canadian professionalism at this point in the war.

Unfortunately for "B" Squadron of the Hussars and their accompanying troop of

M-10 tank destroyers from 98th (Bmce Peninsula) Anti-Tank Battery, problems were just beginning. After clearing the traffic jam and climbing the river bank on the north side in the midst of heavy shelling and mortaring, the Hussars somehow missed the marked route through the mines and drove right into them, losing two Shermans. It was decided p. 9.

251 to remain tight until dawn and support the Cape Breton attack from this position on the river flats, even though that meant sitting exposed to the heavy German shellfire. Thus clearing a safe lane for close tank support was part of the combined plan. Circumstances prevented it from working smoothly, but the junior leaders on the scene made the best of a difficult situation and at no time gave up in their efforts to carry out the spirit of their orders.516

The second Cape Breton attack went in with two companies forward. "A"

Company was to take point 120 while "D" Company advanced on point 119 on the left to spread out the German response and storm the strong position on a broader front.

Enemy machine guns on Point 111 to the right no longer interfered, as the Perth

Regiment had destroyed them shortly after 2030, 30 August. The Germans waited till both companies got onto the slope before opening fire. The darkness and proximity of leading troops to German positions meant close fire support from the Shermans and M-

10s was impossible. Rather than risk further casualties in an unnecessary frontal attack,

Brigadier Johnston ordered the Cape Bretoners to withdraw again. This withdrawal took some time, as the area was under continuous shellfire; it took until dawn on 31 August for all the companies to return.517

On the other side of Montecchio, the Perth Regiment was able to secure a toehold in the German line, thanks in part to the Cape Breton Highlanders occupying the attention of the Point 120 fortress position. Lt-Col Reid's battalion moved across the

515 W.D. 11 CIB, After Action Report 30 Aug-14 Sep 1944. 516 W.D. VIII NBH, After Action Report 30 Aug 1944. 517 W.D. CBH, After Action Report, 31 Aug 1944.

252 river about the same time as the Highlanders on their left. The Foglia river bends away from the lateral road between the line of advance of the two 11 Brigade battalions, giving the Perths 500 yards further to travel between the river and their objective. Major

Harold Snelgrove's "B" Company advanced along a mine-free road and just reached the junction with the anti-tank ditch and main lateral road when Germans positions opened on the 'Capers' to the left.518 Heavy mortar and machine-gun fire drove the leading

Perth Company back to the river. When the shooting started, the lead platoon was scrambling over the bridge left intact in the anti-tank ditch. The bridge and surrounding area lay within the "beaten zone" for a fast firing MG 42 dug in and fixed in its medium, sustained-fire role. The lead two sections of the front platoon were all struck down by bullets in moments. Reid called for artillery concentrations on the hill to screen the withdrawal of his survivors back to the river as there was no cover in their area.519 The great distance between where the Perths were forced to withdraw to and the objective left German machine-gunners and mortarmen on Hill 111 without an immediate threat to their front, thus enabling them to pour flanking fire into the Highlanders.

This situation could not be allowed to last long. Reid wasted little time teeing up another assault, this time with Major "Frenchy" Blanchett's "A" Squadron of the New

Bmnswick Hussars in tow. As the men waited in nervous anticipation for the next attack to commence, they could hear West Novas and Capers laying exposed in the open forward on either side of them being pelted with bullets and shells. "D" company of the

Perths, cracked off at 2030 under cover fire from the Hussars, with "A" company

518 W.D. The Perth Regiment, 30 Aug 1944.

253 following in depth. With darkness limiting their vision and 75mm shells from the

Hussar's Shermans pounding the hillside all around them, German machine gunners could not fire effectively as the Perths advanced across the river flats. Nor could the enemy expect help from the supporting position on point 120 as the Germans on that hill were fully occupied with the men of Cape Breton. This time the Perths avoided the road at least until they crossed into a marked mine field. Private Stan Scislowski recalls events that terrifying night:

Someone off to my left closer to the road had gone up on a mine. It wasn't an ear-ringing bang like the Teller mines made, so I knew it could only be one of the small anti-personnel Schumines. A few more paces and two more men went up, the lower extremity of their legs mangled by the searing blasts. We stopped dead, afraid to go on. We were trapped smack in the middle of a minefield, there was no getting away from it. Then I heard Blackie Rowe's stentorian voice hollering from behind, 'Get your goddamn asses moving! Come on! Move! Move! Move! Haul your asses!' I turned to Gord and said, 'Holy shit! The crazy sonofabitch is determined to get us all killed!' We resumed the advance, but with cold fear in our hearts. Again I turned to Gord, T can't see us getting out of here alive.' He didn't even have time to agree with me when bang, down he went. My first instinct was to stop and help him somehow, but Blackie kept barking at us to keep moving, so I moved on.521

The Germans on Point 111 held the eastern flank of 26th Panzer Division's position.522 Further to the east stood 1st Parachute, but due to poor co-ordination between enemy formations, the potential to bring devastating fire into the Perth right flank was lost. Scislowski, Sergeant Blackie Rowe and the rest of Captain Sam Ridge's

"D" Company at least did not have to endure machine gun fire in the mine field. Just to

519 W.D. 11 CIB, Operations Log, 30 Aug 1944. 520 W.D. Perth Regt, 30 Aug 1944. 521 Stanley Scislowski, Not All of us Were Brave (Toronto: 1997) pp. 251-252. 522 Intelligence Summary, W.D. PLF, 1 Sept 1944.

254 be sure, the Hussars pasted the hills both to the right and left of the Perth objective, firing directly into the muzzle flashes from German automatic weapons.523 When the men from Stratford, Ontario reached the lateral road and the bodies of their "B"

Company mates scattered near the anti-tank ditch bridge, they hit the deck. Once again, junior leaders rose to the challenge and kept the battle moving. Stan Scislowski recalls how Sergeant Rowe paused to observe the behavior of the German machine gun crew covering the bridge. With Teutonic regularity the crew fired bursts lacing the area around the crossing point at 20 second intervals. Rowe hustled his platoon across the killing zone in pairs during the pauses. Before long the entire company was across and formed up at the base of the hill. Right behind them on the cleared road was the lead troop of Shermans from Frenchy Blanchett's "A" Squadron, blasting the ridge line with high explosive shells and machine gun bullets. Under Hussar covering fire, Ridge ordered the company to fix bayonets and storm the long hill to Point 111. In a torrent of blood-curdling yells heard all the way back to the river and blazing away at the hip with

Tommy and Bren guns, "D" company swept onto the crest. The prospect of cold

Canadian steel was too much for the Panzer Grenadiers defending the hilltop. "A trench full of Jerries were standing their with their hands high, all crying out in unison

'Kameraden! Kameraden! Kameraden!' A beautiful sight."524 Ridge reported the first

Perth objective secure at 2200. Visitors to the site today can visit the Canadian dead laid out at the Montecchio Commonwealth War Cemetery at the foot of Point 111 and see how close the neighbouring Cape Breton and West Nova battlefields are. The Perths

523 W.D. VIII NBH, After Action Report, 30 Aug 1944.

255 forced a tiny crack in Green Line I, but it was made possible by Nova Scotian sacrifice on the flanks.

Without giving the German defenders a chance to breathe and assess their predicament, "A" Company of the Perths quickly passed through Ridge's men as they dug in and prepared to smash up German counter-attacks against Point 111. "A"

Company worked its way in the darkness around the northern edge of the hill in behind the German depth position on Hill 147, 500 metres northeast of 111. Only an hour after

111 was secure, "A" company reported that Point 147 was in Canadian hands, further solidifying the Perth hold in the middle of the German line.525

Fortunately for the Allies, the successful Perth attack in the last hours of

Wednesday, 30 August was delivered at a critical point. Hoffmeister's division carved itself a toehold in the German main line of resistence. Lt-Col. Reid's men won their victory along the boundary between the Parachute and Panzer divisions, creating a very dangerous situation for the Germans and an important opportunity for the Canadians.

The narrow penetration was far from secure though, and a quick response from the

Germans could seal off and destroy the Perth bridgehead.

In order to widen the breach and secure the right flank, "C" Company of the

Perths was ordered to cross the small draw to the west and seize Hill 115. 1st Parachute

Division held strong positions at the head of the draw and on the opposite side and were thus sited to stop any advance coming up. These positions were equally effective in pouring fire into the exposed left flank of "C" Company, which hustled back to the main

524 Scislowski, pp. 255 - 256.

256 Perth position and dug in. "B" Company also came up to reinforce the toehold. Lt-Col

Reid dug his soldiers and support weapons in, set up artillery defensive fire tasks and prepared to take on counter-attacks in accordance with Anglo-Canadian doctrine. The

Gothic Line might have been breached but whether this hole could be taken advantage of remained to be seen. It would take another 36 hours of hard fighting for the outcome to be certain.

When it was decided within the Canadian Corps that the line could still be bounced by taking quick action on 30 August, each of the two Canadian divisions had one brigade forward. Experience in the Hitler Line suggested that an attacking corps should have at least two divisions up each with two battalions attacking and the rest stacked close behind. This method ensured that the fortifications would be attacked with enough momentum to destroy enemy mortar and depth positions, but also on a broad enough front so that the defenders would be unable to concentrate fire at any one point as happened in the Liri Valley when German flanking fire inflicted severe casualties in

1st Canadian Infantry Division.527 Within 5th Armoured Division, the problem was dealt with by reinforcing 11 Brigade with two extra battalions, the Princess Louise's Dragoon

Guards and the Westminster Regiment, both of the newly created 12 Brigade. Thus the

Brigade was still able to attack with the suggested two battalions yet have enough reserves to exploit any penetration.

In 1st Division's area, Major-General Vokes handled the rapidly changing

525 W.D. Perth Regt, After Action Report, 30 Aug 1944. 526 W.D. Perth Regt, 30 Aug 1944. 527 Bums, Lessons.

257 situation by ordering 2 Brigade into the line on the left of 3 Brigade. 1 Brigade had bom the bmnt of the fighting in the first phase of the battle. 2 Brigade, while still recuperating from the fighting during the approach to the Foglia, was in much better shape to go back into the line ahead of schedule. Regardless of 2 Brigade's condition, when Brigadier Gibson received his orders he was well behind the front line. Road congestion meant the 10 kilometre march to the assembly area took five hours.528 As a result the brigade could not launch its battalion probe until well after the other Canadian regiments were in action. By 1800 on 30 August, Maj-Gen. Vokes was on the radio urging 2 Brigade to catch up to the other battalions already over the river. Brigadier

Gibson arrived at the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry area at 2130 to find the commanding officer Lt-Col. Rosser had collapsed with malaria. Major R.P. Clark, the second in command, took over the battalion and issued orders for an attack to commence in the morning.529 Gibson told Clark they could not afford to wait that long and the

Patricias must get cracking as soon as possible to ease the pressure on the rest of the forward battalions.

It was five minutes past midnight when "C" Company started off. The unit splashed through the river very close to the Perth crossing at Montelabbate. The company reached the intermediate objective on a road junction 900 yards from the main lateral road at 0430 on the morning of 31 August. "D" Company advanced to the same road, 700 yards to the right. This was the same road the West Novas reached when they

528 W.D. 2 CIB, 30 Aug 1944. 529 W.D. PPCLI, After Action Report, Aug-Sep 1944. 530 W.D. 2 CIB, 30 Aug 1944.

258 mistakenly reported that they were on the main lateral road. From these positions, using

textbook fire and movement drills, "C" and "D" Companies, as well as the Battalion's

improvised platoon of medium machine-guns mounted on Bren carriers, remained firm

and covered Collin McDougall's "B" Company as it leapfrogged past towards Osteria

Nuova.531

The sun was rising when "B" company encountered part of the same deep minefield complete with wire entanglements that stopped the Novas the night before.

The Patricia company pressed on through the defenses, perhaps fearing the daylight and

German observation more than the mines. Maj. McDougall recalls,

This is a nerve wracking experience. We moved off in single file, 11 platoon leading. We had to go down a path which, like the area on both sides of it was heavily mined. After we got through that, with some casualties [3], we crossed the anti-tank ditch, also mined, which mns parallel with the river for some distance.532

Private Paul Blais remembered how the Company Sergeant-Major stood aside the

column keeping a sharp eye to ensure that the men kept five steps between each other

should they be come under fire among the mines. Thankfully they did not. German paratroopers must have thought there was only a small patrol to the front for they did not open up, despite the detonation of Schumines in the area, including at the edge of the

anti-tank ditch where Blais remember that "our Padre kneeled on a shoe mine, to which

531 W.D. PPCLI, 31 Aug 1944. 532 Report by Maj. C. MCDougall, OC "B" Coy, PPCLI. After the war Major McDougall wrote the novel Execution about a fictitious Canadian battalion in Italy, based largely on his personal experiences.

259 he lost his leg at the knee." When the Germans finally realized the Canadians were making a grab for the town, "B" Company was already in the comparative safety of the mbble.534 Lieutenant Egan Chambers led the msh after being wounded when one of his men triggered a Schu-mine. Ignoring his wounds, Chambers formed his platoon up near the anti-tank ditch and charged into the mins. For his efforts, Chambers was awarded the Military Cross.535 Osteria Nuova, like all other built up areas in the Foglia valley, was leveled to provide German positions on the heights above clear fields of fire out on the river flats.536 The opportunity for the Germans to repel 2 Brigade's penetration with heavy losses was lost partly to McDougall's gutsy move and partly thanks to the West

Nova debacle a few hundred yards east, which still drew German mortar and artillery attention well into Thursday, 31 August. The Princess Patricia's were now the second

Canadian battalion inside the Gothic Line.

At dawn on 31 August, two Canadian battalions waited impatiently inside their toehold. The Canadian Corps' attack fell on the German divisional boundary precisely at the moment when 67 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 26th Panzer Division began to take over a section of the line. That section was supposed to be properly handed over by 71st

Division, but the units assigned from 211 Grenadier Regiment ceased to exist after meeting the Canadians in the Red Line. German Tenth Army staff was aware of this weak spot, recognizing that advance units of the new division would not reach the line

533 Correspondence with Private Paul Blais, AB" Coy, PPCLI 16 Jan 2003. 534 W.D. PPCLI, After Action Report, Aug-Sep; Report by OC B coy, PPCLI 31 Aug 1944. 535 Recommendation for the Military Cross for Lt. E.E. Chambers, W.D. PPCLI, Aug 1944.

260 until 30 August.537 Once in position it would take time for enemy soldiers to familiarize themselves with the ground they were to defend. The Germans could only hope that the attacking Canadian, Polish and British formations paused in front of the Foglia to bring up their administrative tails. Had Eighth Army kept to its schedule and launched its attack on the night of 1/2 September, 26th Panzer Division would have ample time to deploy all its formations and to become well "acquainted with its positions". The same was true for 98th Infantry Division coming into the line to the west in front of British 5th

Corps.538

On 31 August the Germans lost the race. In the Canadian sector the penetration was significant on the morning of 31 August, but still very small. A dramatic opportunity nonetheless lay open to the Canadian Corps. Just as aggressive action on the part of the Germans could still contain the bridgehead, a determined thrust through this weak point could crack the Gothic Line beyond repair. Throughout the next 48 hours, confusion was the dominant sensation among participants, German and Canadian, but it was the latter who overcame it more quickly and more resolutely. Canadian units engaged in this battle always kept one goal in sight; the high ground around Tomba Di

Pesaro. Officers and soldiers alike were told that this high feature was the key to Green

Line I and needed to be seized swiftly while the Germans were off balance. This mission oriented approach, demanding maximum initiative from junior commanders, is

536 Gothic Order #1, p. 6. 537 W.D. German 10th Army, 29 Aug 1944 in Hist Sect Rpt #27. 538 Hist Sect Rpt # 27. The Commander of German 76th Panzer Corps identified the chief reason for the quick penetration of Green Line I was that the Allied attack was delivered before 26 Panzer Division was familiar with its positions.

261 often described as a unique characteristic of the German Army known as

"Auftragstaktik".539 It has seldom been documented in Canadian military history, but by

1944 was common practice in Italy.

Well before dawn on 31 August, steps were taken to secure the bridgehead. 11

Brigade's reserve battalion, the Irish Regiment of Canada, was originally echeloned behind the Cape Breton Highlanders to be ready to pass through to Mont Marrone on the left.540 However, instead of reinforcing the floundering Highlanders, Bdr. Johnston shuffled the Irish to the right and through the Perth bridgehead to attack point 120 from the right flank, with "C" squadron of the New Bmnswick Hussars in support. The Irish, under Lt-Col. R.C."Bobby" Clark, received their orders sometime after 0300 on the morning of 31 August. Shortly thereafter, Lt-Col. Reid was informed over wireless that

Point 111 would serve as the firm base for the Irish attack and the Perths would provide whatever fire support they could.541

The Irish movement into the Perth position took quite some time. In preparation for the drive on Mont Marrone, the Toronto regiment concentrated at their patrol base in

Apsella. The order to shift to the right meant they had to travel along the lateral traffic choked road south of the river and cross at Montelabbate. They were further delayed by a blown bridge over a creek just east of Montelabbate. The lead company, along with the Hussar squadron, did not reach the Perths until 0800 on 31 August.542 With the sun

539 Glen Scott, "British And German Operational Styles in World War II", Military Review October 1985: pp. 39-41. 540 After Action Rpt, W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 541 Operations Log, W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944 542 After Action Report, W.D. 11 CIB, Aug 1944.

262 well up, the battalion crossed the river flats under observation of the Hill 120 fortress.

German artillery and mortar fire controllers were quick to direct the fire of every heavy weapon they could on the Irish.

Moments after climbing onto Point 111, Clark's companies took cover wherever they could find it as German mortar bombs and shells rained down. "A" Company was caught completely in the open, blowing many of the men into small pieces and ripping limbs off of others. Throughout the destmction, Private Gorden Joseph Hickson, an "A"

Company stretcher bearer exposed himself to the spraying shell fragments tending to the wounded, earning himself a Mention in Despatches. When the barrage finished only 50 men were left standing in the company.543

The shelling slowed but did not stop attack preparations and the regiment made ready to assault at noon on 31 August. That the move was carried out at all is reflective of the professionalism and perseverance of the Canadian Army and of the Irish Regiment in particular. To move five kilometres in darkness, fighting through traffic, bypassing numerous obstacles, dodging artillery and mortar shells as well as machine-gun bullets, reaching the forming up place only to be pounded by some of the heaviest concentrations of high explosives encountered in the entire Italian campaign and then launch an attack is a tribute to Canadian arms.

Prior to the Irish attack, Hill 120 was subjected to a furious bombardment. This barrage included the fire of all four 4.2 inch mortar platoons of the Princess Louise's

W.D. Irish Regiment of Canada, After Action Report, 31 August.

263 Fusiliers, which dumped a total of 300 bombs on the hillside in only seven minutes.

5th Division' field artillery also 'stonked'545 the hill along with the 75mm guns of the

Hussars and the 3-inch self-propelled M-10 anti-tank guns of the 98th (Bmce) Battery.

In spite of all the weight of shot and shell it is unlikely that it did more than shake the defenders up, as they were well protected in the strongest fortifications in the

Canadian sector. Deep concrete bunkers and dugouts shielded the German machine-gun and mortar crews from all but the most direct hits from the heaviest guns. Yet while the defenders may physically have been unharmed, the mental strain on them would be significant. Crouching in a dark confined space while deafening blasts shook the walls violently could not have been easy to endure and doubtlessly impacted morale.

Prior to the attack, Major Cliff McEwen's "C" Squadron of the Hussars positioned itself on the western slope of point 111 on the right flank of the Irish who were deployed with two companies up. "A" Company cracked off first, with two troops of Major McEwen's tanks moving with the riflemen for close support while the balance of the squadron remained on the startline laying down heavy covering fire on Hill 120.

Major Kierstead's Squadron, still on the Foglia Valley floor with the Cape Bretoners, also pelted the hill. The lead Irish company aimed not for Hill 120 but for Casa

Checchi, at the tip of another finger of high ground 700 yards behind the one on which

120 sits. The move immediately drew the fire of most of the German weapons on and around the main position that could still fire. A pair of enemy self-propelled guns

544 W.D. 11 Independent MG Coy (PLF), 31 Aug 1944. 545 A 'stonk' refers to a concentration of shells or mortar bombs, more limited in time and space compared to a 'barrage'.

264 located some distance to the northeast also opened up on the group. McEwen's

Shermans took these guns on and fire from them ceased although it is difficult to confirm a kill at 1000 yds range.546

If the Canadians took the high ground behind Hill 120 then the German avenue of retreat would be cut off. In fact, "A" Company's advance occupied the Germans so much that they failed to notice "D" Company creeping directly up the slope of Hill 120.

In minutes the panzer grenadiers were face to face with the Toronto Irish. Sergeant F.J.

Johnston, commanding the leading platoon, personally took out several machine-guns posts. His Military Medal recommendation states that his action was "instrumental in the capture of point 120". Sergeant Johnston was wounded during this action at which point one of the section leaders took over as platoon commander. Private R.L. Dawson took command of the section, driving it forward and destroying several more German positions. Dawson was also recommended for a Military Medal.547

These displays of superb junior leadership are but two examples of the aggressive soldiering and "Indianer Krieg"548(or good field craft) that enabled the Irish

Regiment to quickly overcome German resistence on Hill 120. They took four German officers and 117 other ranks prisoner. There were few Canadian casualties in the actual attack, 18 were killed and 32 wounded during the approach to the startline, mostly in

"A" Company. The Irish success paid handsome dividends. With the Germans winkled

546 After Action Report, "C" sqn VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944. 547 W.D. IRC, August Appendices, Recommendations of Sgt. F.R. Johnston and Pte. R.L. Dawson for the Military Medal. 548 This term, literally meaning Indian War, is used in the German Army to describe effective small-unit infiltration tactics often practised by Canadian infantry

265 out of point 120, the Canadian bridgehead was secure on the fringe of high ground immediately overlooking the Foglia River valley. The next task was to destroy German depth positions on the heights of Tomba Di Pesaro, because in this section of the Green

Line I, enemy defences were indeed not all "in the shop window." The mission was already underway before the Irish began their attack.

Early on the morning of 31 August, just after the Irish were ordered to pass through the Perths, Maj-Gen. Hoffrneister made a fateful decision. He recognized his division had its foot in the door and that the Germans were off balance. Hoffrneister also realized he would have to act quickly if he were to take advantage of the situation before the Germans reacted. The decision was thus taken to commit 5 Armoured

Brigade to not only push the door open, but knock the whole house down. The high ground around Tomba Di Pesaro was the identified by both sides as the key to this sector of the Gothic Line. Visibility on the southern slopes and re-entrants of this feature is limited, but once on top the Republic of San Marino and Rimini are clearly visible almost twenty miles away, not to mention the 5th Corps battlefield a few miles inland.

If those peaks fell to the Canadians, observed artillery fire could be directed onto

German fighting and support units for miles in all directions making Green Line I wholly untenable. The plan for taking these hills appears simple, but in reality rapidly changing circumstances rendered plans obsolete only a short time after being conceived.

In such conditions, the junior commanders would have to be relied on to ensure that their actions conformed to the principle goal of capturing Tomba di Pesaro. In essence 5 battalions.

266 Brigade's tank regiments attacked into enemy depth positions even as fighting in the cmst of Green Line I was raging. The scheme closely resembled First Canadian Army's

Operation Totalize in Normandy three weeks earlier, a key difference being that spare infantry units to attach to tanks breaking in were in short supply in this economy of force diversion.

Brigadier Cumberland issued his first set of orders for the coming operation at an

"O" group at 1630 on 30 August. Lt-Col. Fred Vokes of the British Columbia Dragoons and Lt-Col. Jim McAvity of the Lord Strathcona's Horse, were warned that 11 Brigade patrols penetrated the Gothic Line and the possibility of a breakout existed.549 The divisional reconnaissance unit, the Horse Guards, was already concentrating just behind the river and would lead the breakout. In preparation for this plan the Dragoons and the

Strathconas were to concentrate just north of the river in a draw between two fingers running north from the river. The western side of this draw was formed by Hills 111 and 147 which were to be captured by the Perth Regiment that night. The eastern side consisted of Hill 115 and was to be taken by the PPCLI. There the tanks of 5 Brigade would marry up with infantry battalions for form battlegroups to break out into the open and seize a crossing over the Conca River supported by the Corps medium artillery.550

The crossings would be the "pivots" new Anglo-Canadian armoured doctrine called for.

This was the plan as it was understood by the armoured crewmen of the British

Columbia Dragoons as they drove through Wednesday night and into Thursday morning

W.D. BCD, 30 Aug 1944. W.D. 5 CAB, After Action Report. 30 Aug-14 Sep 1944.

267 to the draw codenamed "Erindale".551 The Dragoons called it "Death Valley".

Brigadier Cumberland's initial plan was based on the assumption that 11 Brigade would be able to punch through the main line of resistence and secure the dominating high ground around Tomba Di Pesaro with the help of the New Bmnswick Hussars.

This perception changed Wednesday evening as it became clear that while the Germans had been caught off guard, they were not giving up the Gothic Line easily. Maj.-Gen.

Hoffrneister changed the plan when it became apparent that 11 Brigade would not be able to capture the Tomba Di Pesaro feature without more help. With the time not yet ripe for armour led battlegroups to breakout, 5 Brigade would instead feed its armoured regiments to Bdr. Cumberland managing the break-in battle. The Horse Guards were to move off the road and make way for the Dragoons to lead the brigade into Erindale. At the base of the draw, the Dragoons were to marry up with the Perth Regiment and tee up an attack on Point 204, the first of three key peaks on the Tomba Di Pesaro feature. The

Strathconas were to link up with the Westminsters and follow up behind, being prepared to deploy as the situation warranted.552

This plan was prepared and the orders for it issued while the Dragoons were still on the long tiring drive from concentration areas far to the south. It is not clear how the change in orders reached Vokes but sometime during the approach he was made aware of the change in plan. To Lt-Col. Vokes the need for rapid movement seems to have overridden the usual Eighth Army practice of putting everyone in the know prior to

551 Personal Accounts of the BCD operations in the Gothic Line related to unit historian R.H. Roy, September 1962. 552 W.D. 5 CAB After Action Report, Aug-Sep 1944.

268 going into action. Instead Vokes issued his orders over the radio while on the move to

Erindale. By necessity, these orders had to be brief. With the exception of the squadron commanders and battle captains, the Dragoons still thought they were on their way to a harbour area where they would be fed breakfast and perhaps get a few hours rest as they had been driving hard for some time. The orders were received so late in the move that most of the tanks still had the muzzle covers fixed on the end of their main guns as they covered the last few hundred yards into the forming up area.

A recce party under Captain Jack Letcher went forward to Erindale first to check for mines and tank obstacles. The group turned left of the main lateral road into the assembly area where they set to work clearing mines and cutting through the wire entanglements they found there. Just as the first squadron was coming into sight, two soldiers from the PPCLI approached and explained that they had some badly wounded men back across the road that needed attention. Capt. Letcher and Lieutenant Russell went along with them to see if they could help. As they neared the wounded Patricia, he howled in agony causing Russell to dash forward to his aid. He ran right onto a

Schumine that tore his leg from his body. Lt. Russell died hours later of his wounds. A fragment from the mine caught Capt. Letcher in the head and knocked him out. Letcher regained consciousness to find that Russell had been evacuated and that firing had broken out back in Erindale.554

"A" Squadron led the column into the area where the recce party was working.

553 BCD Personal Accounts, G.E. Eastman; R.W. Green; D.F.B. Kinloch; J.G. Tumley, 1962. 554 BCD Personal Accounts, J. Letcher, 1962.

269 The squadron leader, Major G.E. Eastman, rather dangerously traveled at the head of the column, as he expected to enter a safe 'harbour' area. The plan was for "A" and "C"

Squadrons to move into Erindale and form up in the supposed shelter of the draw. "B"

Squadron and the RHQ group would follow behind in a regimental box formation.

Eastman's tank did not get far into the open area at the bottom of the draw before a rocket from a 'Faustpatrone', or bazooka, crashed into the tank behind him. The

Sherman burst into flames and rolled backwards, locking tracks with the tank behind it and causing it to bum also.555

The tank hit was commanded by the squadron battle captain, Dick Sellars, who was the only member of the crew not wounded by the blast. After helping his men escape the "brewing" tank, Sellars grabbed his Thompson sub-machine gun and charged the German trench in front of him from which the rocket had been fired. Major

Eastman's Sherman sat just in front of the trench but his gunner could not depress the gun mantle enough to fire at it. Eastman had his driver manouevre to the right end of the trench while he exchanged hand grenades with the Germans in it. The squadron leader pitched No. 36s out of his hatch while the Germans hurled "potato masher" stick grenades back. Once he had his tank alongside the trench Eastman had his gunner traverse the turret so the gun pointed down the length of it. From this point on it only took two shells from the 75mm gun to convince the German defenders that their war was over.556 A white flag stuck out of the mouth of a dugout from which a reinforced

555 W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944; BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman, Letcher, 1962. 556 Medal Recommendation, Captain R.B. Sellars, W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944; BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman, 1962.

270 platoon of Germans came streaming out with hands in the air. The group was led by an

outspoken sergeant who spouted loudly as the prisoners were searched by dismounted

Dragoons. Major Eastman put an end to the Feldwebal's protests by removing his belt,

forcing him to hang on to his pants. The Dragoons assumed that the Germans let the

recce party go about its business hoping to catch an unsuspecting rifle battalion as it

formed up.5 7 They probably did not count on dealing with fifteen medium tanks

packing into the small space manned by very determined British Columbians.

Until Captain Sellars had his tank shot out from under him, the unit still expected

to be moving into to harbour to have breakfast and orders. But the battle to secure the

"Erindale" concentration area did not end there. Eastmans's squadron came under fire

from German positions at the head of the draw and from the right side on which point

115 sat, thick with German paratroopers.558 Yet when the Perths had seized the right

side of the draw, the Germans they captured came from 26lh Panzer Division. Although

they had no real idea of the significance during the confusion in Death Valley on the

moming of 31 August, the west coast armoured soldiers concentrated precisely along the

German divisional boundary. This was by no means accidental however, the senior

Canadian commanders were very aware that a strong thrust along this boundary could

snap Green Line I.559

Taking advantage of this opportunity would not be easy, as there was still no sign

557 BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Green; Letcher; Tumley 1962. 558 BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Kinloch, 1962. 559 The Canadians knew that their axis of advance fell along the German boundary as prisoners from both divisions were taken on 30 Aug. Intelligence Summary #99, W.D. I Cdn Corps, 31 Aug 1944.

271 of the supporting infantry from the Perth Regiment. In addition to the direct fire coming

from the high ground above "Erindale", German artillery and mortar rounds began

falling all around, no doubt directed by forward observers on the hill to the right. The heavy shelling forced the Dragoons in the lead squadron to "button up" which added to the confusion as the unit was unaccustomed to forming up for an advance with all hatches locked down. Because of the poor visibility offered by the tank periscopes,

Allied crew commanders adopted the practice of directing their vehicles with their hatches open. The practice resulted in more casualties among vehicle commanders, but

it was considered to be more dangerous to go into action with the hatches down leaving

the tank practically blind. However, there was too much metal being hurled around the

area to think about that for now.5

Eastman's squadron had no time to adopt any formation or transmit orders to

individual tanks before the battle of "Death Valley" began, thus when Major Tumley's

"C" squadron pulled off the road into the harbour area shortly after the first batch of

German paratroopers had surrendered, they found chaos. Lt-Col. Vokes tried to regain

control of the situation and find out from his lead sub-unit what was happening. This

was impossible as only the battle-captain's tank was netted on the regimental frequency

and at that moment, Captain Sellars' tank was burning quite fiercely.561 After a number

560 BCD Personal Accounts, Green, 1962; R.H. Roy, Sinews of Steel: The History of the British Columbia Dragoons (Kelowna: 1965) p. 294. 561 1944 radio technology still required considerable bulk for the dependable, long-range tank and artillery radios. Frequencies could not be changed rapidly so each tank squadron's 'Battle-Captain' or second-in-command, carried two radios at the expense of less ammunition. One was netted with the sixteen tanks of the squadron while the other connected the squadron to regimental, brigade and cooperating infantry

272 of unsuccessful attempts to raise "A" squadron, Major Tumley's battle-captain, Captain

Stubbs, came on the air and informed Vokes that "C" squadron was intact and ready to move. Vokes ordered Tumley to take his tanks immediately up to Hill 204 with all haste and to hold onto the hill until relieved by the Perth Regiment, which they were assured, would follow very shortly.562 None of the survivors remember exactly whose idea it was for the Dragoons to attack without infantry, nor can it be found in the written record.

This has led many to speculate that Lt-Col. "Freddy" Vokes made the decision on his own without orders from Brigadiers Cumberland or Johnston. Both the Dragoons' regimental historian, Reginald Roy, and Vokes' brother Chris, commanding 1st Division, agree that it was probably the former recce officers call. In his post-war memoirs,

Christopher Vokes wrote the following commentary on his brother's charge.

He always had to be in the lead where things were happening. Another thing: he had come from commanding a reconnaissance regiment (GGHG) and was used to pushing off in front. And there was another circumstance: He was under pressure from his brigade headquarters to "get on with it", to burst through the Gothic Line if at all possible. This may have led to his chance taking this time, the final chance he shouldn't have taken.563

Reginald Roy also suggests that "pressure from the top to go full tilt must have overmled in some measure normal military caution."564 It will become clear that the risk paid off.

If Green Line I, manned and prepared as much as it was, was to be attacked in front and in depth simultaneously, sometimes tanks must fight alone and pay the price. Leese nets as the situation dictacted. 562 Fereley Z.M. Personal Account of the break into the Gothic Line, 30-31 Aug 1944 by the BCD. Interview with R.H. Roy, 1962.; BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman, Tumley, 1962; W.D., BCD's 31 August. 563 Major-General Chris Vokes, Vokes: My Story (Ottawa: 1985) p. 165.

273 warned his corps commanders that such action might be necessary in this economy of force diversion where Eighth Army had no significant numerical infantry advantage, but did have more tanks. This was just one of the ways they convinced German high command they were more powerful than they actually were.

Major Tumley quickly passed these orders over the radio to his troop leaders who in turn issued orders to individual tanks. Tumley's squadron drove quickly through the carnage at the bottom of the valley and made their way to the high ground at the northern end of the draw. One "C" Squadron tank was missed in this passage of information. As the radio orders were being issued 4 Troop's Sergeant Eric Waldron was directing his Sherman off the road into Erindale. A German mortar bomb exploded on the front deck knocking him into a dazed heap on the turret floor. Major Tumley hopped aboard the stalled Sherman to check on the crew. When Waldron's bloody and bmised head emerged from the commander's hatch and reported that all was well with the exception of his broken nose, Tumley directed him to his troop's position at the end of the draw.565

Seeing Tumley's squadron successfully climb the slope leading to Point 204,

Major Eastman acted without orders from regimental headquarters. First, he re­ organized his scattered tanks and then on his own initiative, they cracked off northward based on information received at the unit briefing given the day before by Lt-Col. Vokes identifying Tomba Di Pesaro as the key feature in the divisional area.566

564 Roy, Sinews p. 307. 565 Interview with Fereley; BCD Personal Accounts, E. Waldron, 1962. 566 Interview with Fereley; BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman, 1962.

274 By the time Eastman's tanks were moving, "C" Squadron was well on its way to the objective. Tumley pushed his tanks forward in box formation with two troops forward and two troops covering and his Headquarters Troop in the middle. Shortly after starting off, Lieutenant Zeke Fereley's 3 Troop spotted the muzzle flash from a

German "Nashorn" self-propelled 88mm anti-tank gun straight in front of them. The concussion knocked part of the camouflaging off the German vehicle, exposing its thinly armoured flank to the tankers. It was apparently firing on targets to the left and given its location it was likely part of the duo firing on the New Bmnswick Hussars supporting the Irish attack going in at this same time.567 3 Troop gunners took their time zeroing in, but once they found the range, the 75mm guns of three Shermans pounded the German gun into metal splinters while the machine-guns laced the area all around the position to catch any supporting infantry.

Major Tumley consolidated his squadron on the intermediate objective, artillery reference point 244 and reported to Regimental Headquarters. Vokes again ordered them to press on to 204 and wait for the Perths. Tumley, in reaction to Fereley's encounter, had his 1 Troop bound forward while the balance of his Sherman crews scanned the ground for enemy movement. Not only did they fail to spot any Germans, they also quickly lost sight of 1 Troop, which strayed off course to the left and over the left crest of the finger they advanced along. Attempts to locate them by flare and radio failed and the squadron was forced to carry on without them. It was later learned that all three Shermans of 1 Troop were smashed by a thick German anti-tank gun line on

567 After Action Report, "C" Sqn, VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944.

275 Monte Marrone covering the main north-south road to Tomba Di Pesaro. Thirteen men out of the fifteen British Columbians in 1 Troop were killed, including several burned alive inside their crippled tanks. Two of the tanks were so thoroughly destroyed that the bodies of the dead crewman were never recovered.569

Before making the next bound, Tumley was joined by the remainder of

Eastman's squadron, including Capt Sellars, who had commandeered another tank.

Tumley's squadron then led off with Eastman's tanks following.57 The advance was made under scattered shellfire but the greater enemy at this point in the moming was terrain. To avoid the anti-tank gun screen that destroyed 1 Troop, drivers hugged the right side of a finger of high ground mnning from their target at Point 204 all the way back to Erindale. The ground on top of this finger was cut with countless, irregular rises and falls that limited the view of any one of the Dragoon's Shermans to tens of metres, making command and control difficult. The broken ground with its steep slopes and loose, dry soil also pushed Sherman engines and tracks, not to mention drivers, to their extreme limits. Indeed, that the Dragoons could get forward at all was due to the excellent work of the drivers and to the impressive off-road performance of the Sherman tank.571 Its reliable suspension and powerful engine gave the Allies some degree of tank superiority over the less manoeuvrable German machines in the rugged terrain of the

Italian peninsula, especially in hill-climbing.

568 Fereley Rpt. 569 BCD Personal Accounts, G.T. Dodd; Fereley; Tumley; Waldron, 1962; W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944. 570 W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944. 571 Interview with Fereley; BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Tumley;

276 In spite of good equipment and superb driving skill, the path followed by the

Dragoons up to 204 was most arduous, resulting in a large number of slipped or broken tracks and even some rolled tanks.572 Eastman's command tank slid into a large hole and rolled onto its side followed quickly by another. In Lt. Zeke Fereley's 3 Troop, two tanks out of three threw tracks in loose soil almost simultaneously. The problems for crews in immobilized vehicles did not end there. It was the crew's duty to remain with a repairable tank and await recovery teams. These stationary Dragoon tanks were deep in the German defensive belt and made ideal targets for German artillery forward observers. One of Fereley's tanks was blasted into scrap iron by a heavy German shell that landed square on top of it, pulverizing the five men that served it.573

With 1 Troop hopelessly lost, and only one tank left in two others, Tumley led his headquarters group and his last intact troop, commanded by Lieutenant R.W. "Bud"

Green to Casa Bachiania, 700 yards short of the final objective. Only six tanks still functioned in the squadron. Eastman and Sellars joined them after detaching a troop to cover the left flank from Casa Montessco, another farm 500 yards to the east. Tumley's personal example of bravery and leadership enabled the British Columbians to make it as far as the Casa. Dragoons in his squadron recall that in the thick of this charge,

Tumley was leaning out of his hatch from the waist up issuing new orders to his sub- units by radio and gesturing with his hands at the same time.574

Zeke Fereley, with only his own tank left mnning in his troop, almost made it to

Waldron, 1962. 572 BCD Personal Accounts, Green, 1962. 573 Interview with Fereley.

277 the objective as well. On Tumley's orders Fereley advanced some distance to the right of the rest of squadron to protect that flank from any German threat. Fereley reached the main ridge and turned west towards Hill 204 when one of the tracks slipped off in the gravelly soil. The crew knew that once immobilized, they had lost one of the Sherman's most important defensive weapons, speed. They had hardly the time to think their predicament through when the first high-velocity German shell glanced off the side of the tank. Fereley ordered everyone to bail out because it would only be a matter of seconds before the next armour-piercing shell found its mark. The last of five men jumped free when the second shell struck and the Sherman burst into flames. Six more shells pummeled the tank so violently that by the time the German anti-tank gunners had had enough, the turret of Fereley's tank had been lifted out of the hull and thrown onto the ground. The unforgiving hills of Tomba di Pesaro yielded another victim and apparently the flank to the right of Point 204 was well defended.575

As the mixed "A" and "C" Squadron force covered the last few yards below the crest of Hill 204, Capt Sellars spotted one of the deadly Panzertrum. These Panther

Tank turrets were set into concrete bases connected to a bunker complex for the crew and ammunition. Panzertrum were usually protected by infantry and other mobile anti­ tank guns, but there did not seem to be any other Germans nearby. Much to the relief of the Canadian tankers, the long barreled 75mm high velocity gun on the Panther turret never did open fire. If it had, it is probable that none of the Dragoons would have made it onto the hill. Luckily, the crew of the Panzertrum were snug inside their bunker, no

574 Interview with Fereley.

278 doubt seeking shelter from Canadian artillery harassing fire which pounded the area intermittently for days. The crew and their potentially devastating weapon were captured without a fight by Capt Sellars who again dismounted from his "horse" to act as an his squadron's infantry support, this time accompanied by Major Eastman. This action, along with his other unhorsed foray back in Erindale, earned Sellars the Military

Cross.576

After winkling the German gun crew out of their bunker the squadron deployed hull-down along the crest facing northwest, towards the village of Tomba Di Pesaro.

The village, and Monte Peloso slightly east of it, were the next objectives of 5th

Canadian Armoured Division and key to the Adriatic wing of Green Line I. All together by 1330, the British Columbia Dragoons had only 12 tanks on and around Hill 204.

Eastman still had one of his troops several hundred metres back at Casa Montescco to cover the left rear of the position.577 By sighting the majority of their tanks to cover the left front, the Dragoons atop 204 clearly perceived that any German counter-attacks would develop from Tomba Di Pesaro only 2000 yards away.

While preparing for a German counter-attack and waiting for their supporting infantry, the British Columbians dismounted to clean their area out with their Thompson sub-machine guns and grenades as it was thick with snipers. One German soldier managed to lob a grenade into the hatch of an "A" squadron tank, blowing apart its commander, Sergeant Warman and his gunner. The tank was still mobile and had to be

575 Interview with Fereley. BCD Personal Accounts, Tumley; Waldron, 1962. 576 Medal Recommendation, Captain Richard Bartley Sellars, W.D. BCD, 31 Aug.

279 driven back off the crest, complete with its grisly contents, to clear the field of fire of the others. That same German scored six hits with his pistol around the commander's hatch

of Eric Waldron's tank before Waldron traversed his turret around and let him have it

with the coaxial machinegun and a handful of grenades.

It was extremely difficult for tank soldiers to do their own job of manning their

75mm and machineguns, watching for enemy counter-attacks and act as infantry to

secure their position from marauding German snipers. German artillery made the

Dragoons' stay on 204 even more unpleasant by hurling an increasing number of shells

in their vicinity. Fortunately, most of these shells were of low trajectory and either burst

on the slope in front of 204 or passed overhead and burst further down in the draw

behind it.57 Visitors to the Point 204 Monument today can see how the crest and

sloping ground south of it create a bowl, protecting the defenders from observation from

the higher peaks around it and most kinds of fire, save for high trajectory mortar bombs.

Indeed this terrain characteristic made that piece of real estate valuable to the enemy.

As was German doctrinal custom, they would want it back, and as was also Anglo-

Canadian custom, German attempts to recover it would be expensive and play to Allied

attritional plans.

In the meantime, during the next few hours, the Dragoons on the hilltop grew

increasingly anxious that the Germans might realize that this small Canadian armoured

group outran its parent division. The BC Dragoons believed the Germans were about to

577 BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Tumley, 1962. W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944. 578 BCD Personal Accounts, Waldron, 1962. 579 BCD Personal Accounts, Dodd; Eastman; Tumley, 1962.

280 react very strongly to wipe their little band off the map. This perception is quite understandable given the Dragoons' apparently forlorn position, but it is not quite accurate. In reality, it is quite safe to say that mid day Thursday, the Germans were more confused than the Canadians and quite unaware that 5th Canadian Division penetrated so deeply into their lines.

Not long after the grenade killed Sgt. Warman and wrecked his tank, Eric

Waldron happened to look behind him towards a low stone wall surrounding a cemetery,

300 yards behind his position on the road to Pozzo Alto. What he spotted was unusual to him, but a scene becoming commonplace in this fast paced operation. An unsuspecting half company of 40 German infantry marched around the far side of the wall oblivious to the 12 Sherman tanks concealed close by. The marching soldiers were on their way to set up infantry defenses around the Panzertrum, unaware it was already in Canadian hands. Waldron's gunner power traversed the turret to the rear and took careful aim. The muzzle flash of Waldron's main gun was the first indication those

Germans had that anything was wrong and before they could react, a 75mm high explosive shell tore through the enemy ranks. Several other tanks from "C" Squadron

fOA joined in the shoot as the survivors scrambled for cover.

Moments later, dust clouds on the road leading northwest to Tomba Di Pesaro alerted the Dragoons to another threat. Major Tumley ordered his men to hold their fire until they could identify the oncoming vehicles, as it was quite possible that they were

New Bmnswick Hussars operating on the left rear around Point 136. About the same

580 BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Tumley; Waldron, 1962.

281 time the Dragoons determined that two German self-propelled guns and a Panther tank were bearing down on them, the Germans realized 204 was no longer in their hands and they turned off the road behind a knoll 500 yards northwest, near the location of another

Panzertrum.581

The mixed bag of German armoured vehicles and the infantry half-company were both from the still-arriving 26th Panzer Division moving in to take up positions supporting the two fixed Panther turrets. The Dragoons just beat the enemy to the critical piece of real estate, but had no idea of the precarious situation the Germans faced. Participants' post-war accounts of the action are filled with references to the

British Columbia position being surrounded and how it seemed the Germans let the

Dragoons on to 204 so they could be isolated and destroyed. With petrol mnning low, shells raining all around them, snipers taking pot-shots, Germans advancing from all sides and no help in sight, it is easy to see why the Dragoons would believe themselves to be on the receiving end of a colossal error on the part of higher headquarters. Yet when all the scattered pieces of evidence are put together, it appears that the charge of the British Columbia Dragoons with the loss of so many men and machines had accomplished far more than most students of the battle give credit.

What was more important than just getting to Point 204 was that "A" and "C"

Squadrons stood their ground on it in spite of their bleak situation mid Thursday afternoon, 31 August. Their trials were not yet over, however. As the afternoon wore

581 BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Tumley; Waldron, 1962; W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944; Ops Log, W.D. I Cdn Corps, 31 Aug 1944. 582 BCD Personal Accounts, Dodd; Eastman; Green; Tumley; Waldron, 1962.

282 on, the Germans realized that the vital piece of ground was in Canadian hands and every effort possible must be made to destroy them. Unless the tiny foothold was reinforced with infantry soon, it was quite likely that Germans would do just that.

When another dust cloud appeared to the southeast, the defenders thought that help might have finally arrived from the New Bmnswick Hussars or Lord Strathcona's

Horse. As the column neared them the Dragoons made out their own regimental headquarters group of four Shermans, two of them being command tanks with dummy guns. But Lt-Col. Vokes' group traveled along the eastern exposed side of the finger capped by Point 204. They missed the objective and headed towards Mont Peloso and the muzzles of the German armour hiding behind the knoll. Before the Dragoons on 204 could convince Vokes by radio that the hill he was heading toward was not their objective, the column was blanketed in dust and smoke.583 Three out of the four headquarters tanks were destroyed in a storm of German tank and self-propelled gunfire.

Vokes and his crew escaped their brewing vehicle before the commanding officer climbed aboard the last tank in the group, far enough back as to be out of the line of fire of the German armour. Vokes and this tank, commanded by Corporal E.E.

Mather, made their way to the protection of 204, bringing the total number of operable

Shermans there back to 12. From this point on the Germans maintained a high volume of flat trajectory fire at the crest of Point 204, preventing any kind of movement.

Fortunately the surviving headquarters tank was equipped with a radio netted to 11

Brigade's frequency, which was used to inform higher headquarters of the situation and

583 BCD Personal Accounts, Green, 1962.

283 to call in artillery concentrations. One of these mixed field and medium artillery stonks destroyed a Panther tank on the left that had taken up residence in a nearby bam to take pot shots at the left flank of the position.584

As Vokes conferred with his two squadron commanders on the cutbank road behind the crest of 204, a heavy concentration of German mortar fire slammed into the hillside. The high angled trajectory of mortars meant the steep crest could not protect the Dragoons from the plunging bombs. One round landed a few yards from the three officers, knocking them all down. The two majors escaped with minor injuries but the blast ripped open Vokes' stomach, leaving those around him with little hope for his survival. The mortar stonk also wrecked radio antennas and hampered communications to the rear. Trooper Bonnefant, from Tumley's squadron, volunteered to mn across the fire swept ground to the south to bring forward a light "Honey" tank from Recce Troop to evacuate Vokes to the rear, where he died soon after. Before leaving the position,

Vokes gave one more fateful order to his men. Under no circumstances where they to abandon their hill until relieved by the Perth Regiment which, he still insisted, would arrive shortly.585

For sometime after Majors Eastman and Tumley led their Shermans into the fray,

Major Kinloch waited anxiously back at "Erindale" for the Lt-Col Reid's Perth

Regiment. Midway through the moming, Vokes suggested to Kinloch that the Perths must have missed the rendezvous point and gone on to follow up the leading Dragoons.

584 BCD Personal Accounts, Tumley; Mather; Eastman; Dodd; Waldron, Green, 1962. Ops Log, W.D., HQ RCA 5 CAD, 31 Aug 1944. 585 BCD Personal Accounts, Eastman; Tumley, 1962.

284 Vokes thus ordered his remaining sub-unit to move on towards 204, pick up the lost

Perths and support them onto the objective. However, sleepy German anti-tank gunners covering the top of the draw that Eastman and Tumley's squadrons pass comparatively unmolested, were now awake. Several of Kinloch's tanks were hit and brewed up on this ascent. When "B" Squadron radioed its situation report at the top of the draw,

Vokes barked that the Perths were not out in front after all and they had just arrived in

Erindale. Kinloch was to bring his remaining tanks back to the startline to tee up a proper infantry-tank attack. The trip back into the draw was almost as bad as the drive out. Major Kinloch felt the crack of several 88mm shells passing as close as ten feet from his Sherman as it hustled to the rear.5 6

The Perth Regiment filed into the bottom of the draw at the same time that the tanks returned from their foray about 1230.587 The infantrymen from southwestern

Ontario had been either fighting or digging for 20 hours, and that was already after a grueling forced march to get into position to launch their attack on time the day before.

They had yet to be re-supplied with food and water as the battalion's support echelon was far behind them. To make matters worse, the midday heat of the late Italian summer

coo was nearly unbearable. Lt-Col Reid of the Perths told Kinloch his battalion could not do anything until they had a few hours rest, some food and most importantly, water.

Kinloch could see for himself that Reid's men were collapsing with exhaustion, giving him no choice but to wait in the bottom of the draw while the rest of his regiment clung

586 BCD Personal Accounts, Kinloch, 1962. 587 Ops Log, W.D., I Cdn Corps, 31 Aug 1944. 588 W.D. PLF, 31 Aug 1944; BCD Personal Accounts, Green, 1962.

285 to the top of their hill. While they waited, Kinloch's crews divided up their own limited water and food supplies among the spent infanteers.

The Dragoons were not the only unit to attack deep while the fight for the forward line was still ongoing. While they waited for reinforcements on 204, other units in 1st Canadian Corps fought to secure the their flanks and to widen the hole punched in the German defenses. The shortage of infantry for the depth battle continued to pose a challenge, but the Corps rose to the occasion. The tank troopers from British Columbia were not the only armoured soldiers to be thrust out "into the Blue", without infantry support on 31 August. Cavalrymen from Canada's other coast also sallied deep inside the Gothic Line.

At 0800 Thursday morning, while preparations were underway for the Irish attack on Hill 120, Brigadier Johnston suggested to Lt-Col Robinson, commanding the

New Bmnswick Hussars, that his "A" Squadron drive on to the original Irish objective of Mt. Marrone, on another finger leading onto the Tomba Di Pesaro high feature.590

The two remaining squadrons were sufficient to support the coming attack on Hill 120.

Bdr. Johnston, like Cumberland and Hoffrneister, recognized that the Germans were off balance and every effort must be made to take advantage of that. The extra squadron would otherwise sit idle until Hill 120 was cleared. If no resistence was encountered then the gamble would pay off, but even if the Hussars did encounter German troops then it could hold up and keep those Germans from reinforcing 120 and also help protect left flank of the BCD drive to 204. Lt-Col Robinson agreed and by 0830 Frenchy

589 BCD Personal Accounts, Kinloch, 1962.

286 Blanchett's "A" Squadron rolled north along the Tomba Di Pesaro road.

Within three quarters of an hour Blanchett's tanks carefully worked 800 metres up the valley leading to Mont Marrone, ever on the lookout for enemy ambushes. When the lead troop moved past Casa Checchi, trouble began. One tank shuddered as an anti­ tank round fired from the farm, slammed into its thin side armour. German infantry lobbed grenades into the hatch of another. As the crews bailed from the disabled tanks they were cut down by machine-gun fire. Two wounded New Bmnswick crewman were then finished off with bayonets. The other "A" Squadron crews watched in horror and stirred to a frenzy, they proceeded to eliminate the German troops whose trenches they had driven into, collecting payback for their fallen comrades. Like the Dragoons fighting off to their right, the squadron fought half as tankers and half as dismounted infantry. The unit's after action report records that one young tank commander, so angered by the butchering of his wounded mates, killed an enemy soldier by closing his hands around the German's neck. When it was over, 25 German bodies and a wrecked

75mm anti-tank gun were strewn around them. This small battle ensured the success of Lt-Col. Clark's attack on the Panzer Grenadiers on Hill 120, as the farm lay directly along the approach of the Irish diversionary attack to be delivered shortly after noon.

After cleaning out the enemy infantry, Major Blanchett ordered his lead troops on to their intermediate objective, Point 136. This spur, laying between the Marrone finger and the one the BCD's advanced along, was reached without further incident but when

590 W.D. VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944. 591 Operations Log, W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 592 After Action Report, W.D. VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944.

287 the first two tanks moved over and down into the draw between it and the final objective, they both were blasted by anti-tank gun fire from positions on Monte Marrone and a farm in the bottom of the valley. Fortunately no injuries resulted from either hit.

Blanchett then halted his squadron on the reverse slope of 136 to size up the situation.594

"Frenchy" as he was known in the regimental family and a native of "Hussar country"595 around Sussex, New Bmnswick, dismounted from his 33 ton "horse". He crawled up to the crest and surveyed the ground and then directed supporting artillery in several "Mike" targets596 on German positions on the next ridge and at the farm. After the smoke cleared, the squadron roared forward again, hoping the artillery had smashed

German anti-tank guns. Unfortunately, German gun positions in this powerful and deep section of Green Line I were too well dug-in and concealed, for when the first tank exposed itself it was immediately hit by another high velocity shell. At this point,

Blanchett opted to sit tight and wait for infantry support. If he attempted to mn his fast, but vulnerable Shermans across 1700 yards of open ground against the thick anti-tank gun screen, then there would be no "A" Squadron tanks left to consolidate on the objective.

Nevertheless, his location on Point 136 put them in a position to cover the

593 After Action Reports, W.D.'s 5 CAB, VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944. 594 After Action Report, "A" Sqn, VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944. 595 The VIII Hussars is the Active Militia unit in the Sussex-Kennebicasis Valley region of New Bmnswick. The Regiment has a long attachment to the area, having evolved from a Loyalist cavalry unit settled there in the 1780s. See: Douglas How, 8th Hussars. (Sussex: 1964) 596 A "Mike" target involves the concentration of all the guns of one full artillery regiment on a single target. All guns postpone whatever harassing or other lesser missions they are engaged in, to participate in the "Mike" shoot.

288 Canadian left flank and cut the important road along the top of the Marrone finger to

Tomba Di Pesaro by fire. The tanks remained their in turret down positions, popping up in different locations to shoot on targets of opportunity for the rest of the day. They stayed on the spur until the late afternoon when the Cape Breton Highlanders arrived with "B" Squadron.597 Even though Blanchett's men did not secure their objective, they did contribute much to the overall battle. Their action cut off 2nd Battalion of 67 Panzer

Grenadier and sealed it to the fate the Toronto Irish visited upon them Thursday afternoon. They also carried out their other important task of having good positions to observe and fire on any German movement to cut off the critical BCD attack on 204.

These points are missed in the official report on the day's action by Major Wrinch, the historical officer attached to 5th Division, which describes both "A" squadron's mission and that of the BCD's as "failures".598 The reports of these officers formed the basis of the official history produced after the war. Because it did not reach the physical goal assigned to it, "A" Squadron's unsupported tank attack to Point 136 did not even warrant a sentence in the end product of the official history. It is a minor omission, but one which reveals how Second World War military language measuring performance by movement often hides whether or not units succeed in carrying out the implicit spirit of their orders, which in all cases meant gaining positions from which they could destroy enemy units or prevent the same from happening to their own.

Back on "Dragoon Hill" the grim situation began to improve as the sun set on 31

August. The plan at the start of the day called for a British Columbia Dragoons/Perth

597 After Action Reports, 5 CAB; VIII NBH, 31 Aug 1944.

289 Regiment battlegroup to take Point 204 before pushing on to Mont Peloso and Tomba

Di Pesaro. This infantry-armour battle group would be followed by another made up of

Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) and the motorized infantry of the

Westminster Regiment. The second group would be in position to either exploit any gains made by the Perth/Dragoon force, or to leapfrog it and take over the advance if the initial spearhead was blunted by heavy German resistence.599 While this plan was obviously not adhered to absolutely, the basic Anglo-Canadian armoured doctrinal concept behind it guided the developing battle.

At 08:45, 31 August in keeping with the original plan, the Shermans of Lord

Strathcona's Horse under command of Lt-Col J.M."Jim" McAvity, were ordered to cross the river and concentrate in Erindale. Delays began immediately as the tanks clattered down the road from the heights overlooking the Foglia valley. Heavy German shellfire added to traffic problems in this area, forcing the Strathconas to halt on the steep road from where they had a spectacular view of the efforts of the BCDs clearing "Erindale".

It would seem that when it came to the number of guns, mortars and ammunition to load in them, the Germans were well prepared to hold Green Line I. It is also telling that despite a sound counter-battery plan and steady Allied fighter-bomber patrols for hostile batteries, many German guns and mortars still fired with impunity on 31 August. No counter-battery plan can ever suppress all enemy guns, but the sheer number of German guns defending the Gothic Line from well concealed and deeply dug-in reverse slope

598 Historical Officer's Narrative, p. 65 599 Plan outlined during "O" group at 5 CAB HQ at 0200, 31 Aug. W.D. 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944.

290 positions made the task more difficult. So too did the reduction in Allied airpower in

Italy. While reasonably steady, Desert Air Force patrols could not be constant over the

entire front. Overwhelming, Allied air power in the Gothic Line was not.

With his lead tanks so close to the river, McAvity was not about to sit and wait

for the traffic to clear while the rest of his division fought alone up to the cmcial high

ground. He tasked his Second in Command and Recce Troop Leader to find a fording place over the Foglia further east.600 Once one was located, the Strathconas turned off

the road and drove some distance to the right before swinging down into the Foglia

where the powerful Chrysler Multi-bank engines of the M4A4 Shermans pushed the

tanks easily across the river bottom and up the north bank onto the flats above. On the

other side of the river was a northward mnning road leading straight to Erindale.

Because the British Columbias were still fighting to clear their forming up area at

the time, McAvity and Bdr. Cumberland decided the Strathconas should hang back until

"Erindale" was secure, rather than crowding more vehicles into the small, confined

space.601 This delay was put to use by refueling the tanks and feeding the men and

waiting for the Westminsters to catch up. The Westminsters were still some distance

back, as indeed much of 5lh Division was still en route to forming-up areas when the

Wednesday afternoon attack started. As was becoming clear, the advantage of pressing

into Green Line I early outweighed the problems of having the division stmng out for

miles. Nonetheless it came with a price of a critical shortage of infantry during

600 Lord Strathcona's Horse After Action Report by Lt-Col McAvity, W.D. 5 CAB, 1 Sep 1944. 601 Ops Log, 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944.

291 Thursday's break-in battle.

While this was going on, Lt. Brunet's Strathcona Recce Troop went to work clearing mines and rooting out snipers on the road to Erindale. The versatile recce soldiers nearly finished their task and were about to blow the sides of the anti-tank ditch to make it passable when a troop of 48 RTR Churchill tanks lumbered up the road trying desperately to reach the Patricias in Osteria Nuova. Despite Bmnet's warning that the last few mines had not yet been cleared, the British tankers took their chances. As the

45-ton machines neared the ditch, each hit anti-tank mines, completely blocking this route to the Strathcona's. When the order to move up to Erindale came in at 1400,

McAvity's "Horsemen" were forced to back track to the river and re-cross on the Perth's cleared road to Montecchio, and then double back east along the lateral road, losing a good deal of time in the process.

Recce Troop then took up its favoured role leading the regiment into action.

Their cut down, low profile, Stuart "Honey" tanks, bristling with machine-guns, scurried to the top of the draw while the Shermans poured into the bottom, near the German trenches that gave the Dragoons trouble earlier in the day.603 By this time, units from 1st

Canadian Division had secured the spur that made up the right side of the draw so the

Strathconas were free to form up for battle in comparative safety. "A" and "B"

602 LSH After Action Report, W.D. 5 CAB, 1 Sep 1944. 603 "The Recce Troop of an armoured regiment consists of 11 light American General Stuart or "Honey" tanks. From these the Turrets were removed and instead a .50 Browning machinegun is mounted. The vehicle carries a crew of five and its firepower also includes a .30 Browning, a Bren Gun, a Piat and four Tommyguns." Lt. E.J. Perkins. "Crossing the Melfa River", Canadian Military History Autumn 1993: p. 35.

292 Squadrons moved to the top of the draw, taking up covering positions on the left and right respectively. They reported firm at 1600 at which point Major C.A. McEwen's "C" squadron bound past them, making for the next crest. Minutes later, a message came from Division headquarters that a German counter-attack was materializing on left flank.

Now was time to "hold" the "bite" and kill some of the enemy. All advancing units in the area were ordered by radio to halt and take up good firing positions.604

Earlier that afternoon artillery observers flying in light aircraft, known as Air

Observation Posts or Air OP's, spotted ten German "tanks" scattered along the road leading northwest out of Tomba Di Pesaro and in the village itself.605 A concentration of enemy troops was also spotted further up the road.606 At first it seemed as though this force was on the move, but later it appeared to halt as if waiting for orders.607 Ten

German tanks accompanied by infantry so close to a very fragile Canadian bridgehead was enough for General Hoffrneister to hit the alarm and prepare his division to repel a counter-attack. For the two Dragoon squadrons on 204 and the Hussar squadron hull down on 136 this meant little more than staying put and keeping their eyes peeled to the northwest.

The Strathconas were a different story. The report caught them in the middle of a squadron bound. Lt-Col. McAvity was ordered to hold his lead squadron on the

604 Ops Log, 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944. 605 It is doubtful that the vehicles spotted by the Air Observer were German tanks. German order of battle documents report no units in the area at that time capable of fielding that many tanks. A battalion of Panther tanks from 4 Panzer Regiment was detailed to reinforce 1 Parachute Division on 31 August but would not arrive until two days later. Hist Sect Rpt #27, pp.36-37. 606 Ops Log, 1 Cdn Corps, 31 Aug 1944.

293 intermediate crest at 1000 metres behind Point 204 and lend support to the BCDs.

McAvity strengthened his position with attached M-10 tank destroyers with their powerful three-inch, high velocity guns along the intermediate ridge left of "C" squadron.608 From there the gunners from 82nd Anti-Tank Battery RCA covered the

609 open ground to the northwest between Blanchett's Hussars and the Dragoons. In af matter of minutes, the well-drilled regiments of 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade established a well prepared tank killing zone thirsty for prey.

The Perth Regiment likewise stood fast on the high ground surrounding Erindale.

Also in the area were the Cape Breton Highlanders, who were earlier ordered to link up with the Hussars at Hill 136 and push out to Mt Marrone. The Capers received notice of the potential German counter-attack ten minutes after they set off for their objective at

1615. Lt-Col Somerville ordered his battalion back to their defensive positions at their startline near Hill 120. On top of Hill 120, the Irish prepared to defend their newly won

610 prize.

With his infantry and armour preparing to hold their bite, Hoffmeister's gunners swung into action to pound the Germans to dust before their attack could get started.

The divisional field artillery as well as the medium guns of 1 Canadian AGRA conducted a number of shoots in the Tomba Di Pesaro area throughout the moming. 607 Ops Log, 5 CAD, 31 Aug 1944. 608 3-inch guns of the M-10's were of considerably higher velocity and had greater weight of shot than the 75mm Sherman guns. However, they were not nearly as powerful as 17-pounder guns found on M-10's and modified Sherman tanks in use in Northwest Europe. These effective weapons did not reach the secondary front in Italy till very late in 1944. 609 Ops Log, 5 CAD; After-Action Report, 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944.

294 One of these shoots started a large fire in the village itself which could be seen for miles away. Some medium and heavy regiments shooting in 5th Division's area were ordered to cease fire around noon in preparation for a move forward. This order was countermanded as events on the Canadian left developed and the guns of 1st and 2nd

Canadian Medium Regiments went back into action, firing on Tomba Di Pesaro.61'

Whether the guns, and indeed the entire division, overcautiously halted its advance to respond to a threat or to wisely take advantage of an opportunity to destroy enemy units moving in the open depends on how much is understood about the Anglo-Canadian method of defeating the German Army and the finer details of that afternoon.

As with countless other "consolidations" in countless other battles, Thursday afternoon gave the Canadians yet another opportunity to lure Germans out of concealment and protection and into the open where they could be killed. In this instance, like many others, the killing would be carried out by the guns. In addition to field and medium artillery shoots directed at German positions by forward observers and infantry and tank commanders, the Air Observer also joined in, calling for a "Mike" target on the German tanks he spotted on the Tomba Di Pesaro road. 2 Canadian

Medium Regiment was at the Air OP's disposal and all sixteen of the regiment's 4.5 inch guns pumped shells into the last reported location of the German tanks. Two dozen

25 pounders of 11th Field Regiment added weight to the concentration.612

Given the rich nature of the target, 1st Canadian Corps' senior gunners piled

610 Ops Log, 11 CIB, 5 5CAD; W.D. CBH, IRC, 31 Aug 1944. 611 After-Action Report, 1 Cdn Md Regt, 25 Aug- 28 Oct 1944. 612 After Action Report, 1 Cdn AGRA, Operation "Olive". Ops Log, 5 CAD, 31

295 more weight of shot to the storm already falling on the enemy counter-attack. The target was upgraded first to "Uncle" in which all of 5 Division's field artillery takes it on, and then to a "Victor" where all guns of all calibres available to the Canadian Corps opened up not just once, but four times in succession at the direction of the air OP. To make life even more difficult for the Germans, two flights of fighter-bombers were directed onto the target by 'Rover David' forward air controllers in the area.

In retrospect, the vehicles probably were not tanks but self-propelled artillery pieces which would from the air could easily be mistaken for tanks. As well as being base areas for 4 Parachute Regiment, Tomba Di Pesaro and Monteluro were the concentration points for much of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery on the Parachute right flank, both towed and self-propelled.614 Whatever the case, the threat of counter attack had cleared by 1700 and all units were ordered to carry on with their missions. 15

Available evidence is not clear on whether the German armoured column was either obliterated then or dispersed to cover and later destroyed individually. Interestingly, the

British Columbia Dragoon War Diary contains a photograph of a another Panzertrum sited in the 'epicentre' of the firestorm. This gun turret endured a series of concussions powerful enough to shake its deep casemate from the earth and tip it forward onto the

Aug 1944. 613 Operations Log, 1 Cdn Corps, 31 Aug. 'Rover David' was the name for the Desert Air Force forward air controller group that operated with the Canadian and Polish Corps in the Gothic Line. It consisted of pilots travelling in armoured vehicles equipped with radio links to the ground forces and the fighter bombers circling overhead. Alan Wilt, "Allied Air Cooperation in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1945", in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington: 1990) pp. 208-209. 614 Counter Battery Office Intelligence Report # 8, 1 Sep.; W.D. VIII NBH, 31 Aug-1 Sep 1944.

296 muzzle.

During the lull in which Canadians prepared for counter-attacks, Lt-Col McAvity met up with Lt-Col. Reid of the Perth Regiment and made arrangements for the infantry to follow the tanks up to Point 204. Events of the next several hours gave rise to an unfortunate misunderstanding. Lt-Col. Nicholson's official history616 relying on the

"unofficial narrative" written by the I Canadian Corps' historical officer617 describes the

Strathcona/Perth force advancing against heavy resistence, to rescue isolated BCD squadrons who "accomplished very little" while taking heavy losses. This judgement is based upon the mistaken assumption that the Strathconas, together with the Perth

Regiment, fought a difficult action to reach Point 204 during which they captured the

"50 prisoners".619

In fact, the main body of the Strathconas faced virtually no enemy resistence aside from sporadic mortaring and the odd snap shot from the small concentration of

German armour behind the knoll west of 204. The 50 prisoners were snipers and stragglers captured by Lt Burnet's Recce Troop over the course of the entire day, from their mine clearing operations near the anti-tank ditch to their final mn to 204 along the right side of the spur. The recce soldiers also mopped up the crews of a few self- propelled guns that infiltrated behind the BCD's.621 The events are further confused by

615 Ops Log, 5 CAD, 31 Aug 1944. 616 Nicholson, Italy pp. 517-518. 617 Historical Officer's Narrative, p. 64. 618 Historical Officer's Narrative, p. 64. 619 Hist Offr's Narrative, p.64. 620 LSH After Action Report, W.D. 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944. 621 W.D. LSH, 31 Aug 1944.

297 the poorly recorded Perth War Diary which makes mention of the unit being held up by heavy machinegun fire from the right side of Erindale and coming under heavy shellfire both from German and Canadian Artillery.622 While these events did all happen, they occurred during the morning, before Hill 115 and the right side of Erindale were captured by 1st Division and while Major Kinloch's "B" squadron was attempting to return to the bottom of the draw after their abortive attempt to link up with the other

British Columbia squadrons. Closer inspection of this relief operation demonstrates that the bloody charge of the British Columbia Dragoons on 31 August, in spite of the heavy losses incurred, ripped a decisive gap in the Gothic Line. The tanks of Lord

Strathcona's Horse and the infantry of the Perths did face a good deal of shelling and sniper fire as they moved up to 204, but they did not have to fight their way up as has been suggested. 4

As soon as Recce Troop and "B" Squadron arrived on the objective, "C" squadron joined them. The M-lOs of 82nd Battery then moved ahead to the intermediate crest behind them to obtain better fields of fire over the open ground on the left. The only real problem for the Strathconas in the late afternoon came from Pozzo Alto, to the east. Lt-Col. McAvity was told that by that point in the day that the village was already taken by 1 st Canadian Division. This was partially tme. The Seaforth Highlanders from

2 Brigade were pinned in front of the town and while not in control of it, they could at

622 W.D. Perth Regt, 31 Aug 1944. 623 The Perth War Diary records that the BCD's outran them. No doubt this view was taken because the Perths entered the draw as Kinloch's squadron was fighting its way up to the intermediate objective. W.D. Perth Regt., 31 Aug 1944. 624 After Action Report, W.D. 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944.

298 least occupy the attention of the paratroopers there and keep them from bothering the right flank of the advancing Perths and Strathconas in the same way that Frenchy

Blanchett and his New Bmnswick Hussars occupied Monte Marrone's defenders.

Nonetheless, as a precaution, McAvity positioned Major J.S. Ussher's "A"

Squadron hull down along the spur mnning southwest to point 133.626 From here 75 mm Sherman guns lent fire support to the neighbouring Seaforths and kept Pozzo Alto's defenders bottled up. At 17:44, the Strathconas reported that they were snug on Hill 204 with the BCD's. All four tired and still thirsty Perth companies arrived on foot by 2035, albeit still without their support weapons, and immediately set to work digging in.627

"D" and "B" Companies dug in on the forward slope of 204 in front of the Strathcona tanks.

One can only imagine the overwhelming sense of relief felt by surviving British

Columbia Dragoons when, after a desperate charge and lonely, day-long fight on Point

204, they finally heard the roar of aircraft-engine powered "Honeys" and then caught the beautiful sight of some fifty Shermans of Lord Strathcona's Horse climbing up the finger behind them to guarantee Canadian ownership of Point 204 and save them from what they assumed was imminent death or capture. The bmised and battered Dragoons were allowed to go to the rear for some hot food before drifting off into the deep sleep of exhaustion. The Perths, equally tired and hungry and 41 fewer than when they started,

625 W.D. Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 31 Aug 1944. 626 After Action Report, Lt-Col. McAvity; W.D. SeafHofC, 31 Aug 1944. 627 Ops Log, 5 CAD, 31 Aug 1944. 628 W.D. BCDs, 31 Aug.; BCD Personal Accounts, 1962.

299 had to stay.629 There would be fewer still by dawn. 5th Canadian Armoured Division now had a substantial bite into vital German territory. The enemy wanted it back. The stage was set for a dramatic effort to hold the bite and use it to destroy the defenders of

Green Line I.

629 W.D. Perth Regt, 31 Aug 1944.

300 Chapter VIII: Struggle on the Tomba Di Pesaro High Feature,

Germany's Second Gothic Line Crisis

By early Thursday evening, 31 August, 1st Canadian Corps controlled terrain the

German Army desperately wanted back, and therefore completed the first doctrinal step for an Anglo-Canadian "advance". Now the time was ripe to move to the second step, utilizing that terrain to kill as much of 1st Parachute and 26th Panzer Division's fighting strength as possible. The next 24 hours were thus spent using the high ground gained in the centre of the Corps' sector to outflank and destroy enemy units still manning Green

Line I, and to cut down others rising from the shelter of bunkers and trenches to counter­ attack.

It is a stretch to say as the sun went down that evening that defensive positions around Point 204 were secure, but the Canadians did have enough combat power on both sides of the hill to provide some flank protection, or at least early warning of any potential threat. On the left, the Cape Breton Highlanders went back into action after their tough battle the night before. They were ordered to link up with the New

Bmnswick Hussars and push to Monte Marrone earlier in the day. A combination of soldier's fatigue and the counter-attack alarm delayed the Highlander's advance, but by midnight they married up with their supporting Hussar Squadron and were preparing for a night march to Frenchy Blanchett's "A" Squadron, NBH position from where they would attack from Friday, 1 September at dawn.630

630 W.D. CBH, 1 Sep 1944.

301 On Hill 204, the situation looked hopeful despite the fact that the Perth's

supporting anti-tank, mortar and machinegun platoons were not able to reach them. The

absence of that defensive firepower was made up for by the presence of McAvity's

Strathconas, who Hoffrneister ordered to remain on the position through the night and be

ready to continue the advance at daybreak. The Shermans of the Strathconas possessed a

massive amount of defensive firepower, each mounting a medium .30 calibre Browning

machinegun and a heavy .50 calibre machinegun in addition to the 75 mm main gun

capable of firing a very effective high explosive shell devastating to enemy infantry.

Many of the machineguns were dismounted from tanks and dug in just behind and above

two Perth Companies on the forward slope. Two others, with more Strathcona machineguns and tanks held the reverse slope in depth positions and in case of

encirclement.631 Several British Columbia tanks damaged during the day and unable to

move down the hill under their own power were ordered to remain on the hill with their

crews to help defend the position.

Overall command of Hill 204, given Hoffrneister's direction that Bdr. Johnston's

11 Brigade headquarters was to remain in control of what was still a break-in battle,

went to the infantry commander, Lt-Col. Reid. Reid sent out patrols, set up observation

posts and a defensive fire plan with the artillery forward observer. With complete

darkness just minutes away, tank commanders and rifle section leaders got acquainted

with each other's positions as best they could.632 In spite of having to dig-in in darkness

631 LSH After Action Report, W.D. 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944. 632 J.M. McAvity, Lord Strathcona's HorsefRoyal Canadians): A Record of Achievement (Toronto: 1947) p. 121.

302 and having little time to co-ordinate defensive arrangements, Reid's command, and the

Canadian Army in general, was well drilled in the art of consolidating to face counter­ attacks, well armed, situated in depth on dominating terrain and totally unprepared to give up the prize. The new defenders of Hill 204 did not wait long for ownership of the vital ground to be challenged.

On the Canadian right, 1st Canadian Division also made important advances on

31 August, using 5th Division's gains to lever themselves forward. This leverage was vital given that German paratroopers defending this area were better prepared to meet the Canadian attack than 26' Panzer Division, and that 1st Canadian Division and its supporting 21 Armoured Brigade had already been in action for five days in difficult country.

It is also worth noting that 1st Division's infantrymen and the British tankers spent two months living and training together during the summer, testing and honing the latest in Anglo-Canadian armoured-infantry tactics. The team was therefore almost as well acquainted and drilled as Hoffineister's close-knit "Mighty Maroon Machine", if not quite as flexible for fast-moving mobile operations. The kind of combined arms teamwork found in Hoffineister's formation, together with 5 Division's strong desire to improve upon its performance during the Hitler Line pursuit, gave 1st Canadian Corps a flexible and very aggressive weapon. The combination of the slower moving, but very powerful infantry division and heavy tank brigade occupying the attention of fully manned fortifications on the right, while the armoured division took advantage of the _ gap on the left, proved to be a formula for success. With the outcome on the right so

303 closely linked to the speed of the armour, it is possible that had Canada's section of

Green Line I been assaulted with two infantry divisions as some commentators suggested it should have, the end result could have been very different.633

76th German Panzer Corps was hard pressed to contain 5th Canadian Armoured

Division's deep penetration, as well as the broad pressure of 1sl Canadian Infantry

Division. To compensate for the annihilation of 71st Division, followed by the destmction of II Battalion, 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 1st Parachute Division was ordered to extend westward again to fill the gap and take on both Canadian divisions.

While Hoffineister's men may have thrust deeper into the German defenses, Vokes's steady progress, supported by Brig. Dawnay's heavy Churchill tanks, would prevent the

Parachute Division from diverting its full attention to the more dangerous threat on Point

204. In particular, 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade helped secure the right shoulder of the deep gash ripped into the German line by the British Columbia Dragoons.

During the moming of 31 August, the companies of Princess Patricia's Canadian

Light Infantry, supported by Churchills and Shermans from 48th Royal Tank Regiment, stmck out northwards for the high ground overlooking Osteria Nuova and Erindale.634

The first Patricia task was to clear their left and make contact with the armoured division. This job was made easier by the presence of the British Columbia tanks in

"Erindale". After taking casualties crossing the minefields, "C" company worked their way beyond the mbble of Osteria Nuova to flank a strong German company position

633 William McAndrew, Brereton Greenhous and others charge that Leese made a fatal mistake in not giving Bums control of a British infantry division for the break-in, leaving 5th Armoured fresh for the break-out.

304 along the lateral road at a junction near the mouth of Erindale. When the smoke cleared,

96 enemy prisoners were rounded up, not including those killed in the assault.635 But the gutting of 1st Parachute Division was just beginning.

Using strong point assault tactics reminiscent of Canadian battalions at Vimy and

Amiens in the last war, the Patricas employed the tried and tme method of leapfrogging fresh companies from the two newly won fire bases to clear out bunkers and pillboxes on Point 115. Fire coming from that hill caused much trouble for the British Columbia

Dragoons earlier in the day, especially in Major Kinloch's squadron.636 A squadron of

48th RTR Churchills was assigned to assist "D" company in this difficult task. Orders were issued at 1030, but it was 1230 before the Patricia company neared the hill top.

German paratroopers on Point 115 poured down a high volume of small arms and machinegun fire on their attackers; at the same time more paratroopers attempted to counter attack the PPCLI fire base on the right. Acting Patricia CO, Major Clark, and his FOO took this opportunity to blast the enemy moving in the open with strong concentrations of artillery delivered moments after the call reached the supporting field guns. The gridded air photographs and quick reference numbers prepared by the gunner staff paid off handsomely. Meanwhile, in another example of text-book fire and movement, British tanks blazed away at the peak of Point 115, as "D" Company platoons assaulted up.637 Good tactics on the approach were not enough to break these

German paratroopers, who fought on in spite of having their bunker complex infiltrated.

634 W.D. 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 635 W.D. PPCLI, 31 Aug 1944. 636 BCD Personal Accounts, Kinloch, 1962; W.D. BCD, 31 Aug 1944.

305 Once on the crest, Patricias used grenades and Tommy guns and well coordinated section-level attacks to clean out trenches and bunkers one by one. "B" Company and the 48th RTR Churchills moved up to join the close quarter fighting. Private Paul Blais came up in that second wave. His memories of that day offers a glimpse of just how formidable a foe 1st Parachute Division was, even when hope of victory was gone.

As we reached the top of the hill we were immediately pinned down by enemy fire. One of our tanks was knocked out next to me. A comrade on my right, about 6 feet away was riddled with machine gun fire to his chest. I had just glanced at him and saw the bullets hit his chest and at the same time I dove for the ground, saying to myself "I'm next!", which, of course, never happened. He was killed instantly and I remember his name was Slyzuk. I crawled behind the tank and soon moved on.

It took an hour of violent action, and dozens of miniature battles led by corporals and sergeants inside this enemy company fortress, before the Patricas declared Point 115 secure at 1350. Only 23 more prisoners were taken here, but an unknown number of dead paratroopers lay in the bottom of bunkers. Perhaps most telling is that the skilled

Canadian infantry and British tankers accomplished their grisly task with a loss of only six men. In fact, John Slyzuk of Ashville, Manitoba, survived the chest full of German bullets only to be killed in the last weeks of the war, helping to liberate Holland.

With the Patricias left flank secure and the immediate threat to 5th Division's penetration removed, Major Clark shifted his effort to clearing out his right. Indeed, he was already preparing to do this while the ugly battle for Point 115 raged. The defensive artillery fire Clark called down on the German counter attack around noon provided a screen behind which "A" company and 48th RTR's "B" Squadron formed up for their

637 W.D. PPCLI; Ops Log, 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944.

306 assault. More artillery was brought down by way of a preliminary bombardment on the unit's main objective, Point 133.639

Again, in textbook fashion, "A" Company and their accompanying Churchills cracked off as soon as the flanking Point 115 was reported snug.640 The usually sparsely-worded unit war diary records that the Patricias crawling up the long bald slope of Point 133 faced a "murderous" rain of mortar and shellfire that added six more names to the casualty list. "Murderous" as the German defensive fire may have been, it could not stop the attack. By 1445, Major Clark reported to Brigadier Gibson that "JohnBull"

(Point 133), and thus all the high ground overlooking the Foglia in 2 Brigade's area was in Canadian hands.641

The Patricias had done well so far, but they were reaching the limit of their endurance. It was time for another battalion to take over 2 Brigade's advance. Late

Thursday moming, General Vokes ordered Brigadier Gibson to be ready, along with 21

Tank Brigade, to breakout to the coast should German resistence crumble. The Loyal

Edmonton Regiment and 12th RTR were alerted for this task. As a preliminary and to firm up 5th Division's penetration,

Thomson's Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and 145th Royal Armoured Corps were ordered to move on the village of Pozzo Alto, 1000 yards east and slightly south of Point

638 Correspondence with Private Paul Blais, "B" Company PPCLI, 16 Jan 2003. 639 W.D. PPCLI, 31 Aug 1944. 640 The basic principle of Fire and Movement calls for an advancing force to always maintain one "foot" or subunit on the ground to cover with fire, the movement of another. 641 W.D. PPCLI; Ops Log, 2 CIB; W.D. 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944.

307 204. The village was strongly defended by elements from 1st and 2n Battalions of 4

Parachute Regiment.643 Those paratroopers posed a major threat to the Dragoons on

204.M4 It was up to the Seaforths, also from British Columbia, to ensure that 4 Para was too busy fighting off the threat to themselves to bother the Dragoons to the west.

Before the Seaforths could move, something had to be done about the heavy

concentrations of German mortar fire coming from positions on the far Canadian right,

in 3 Brigade's area. However, the combination of strong resistence to initial West Nova

attacks and good progress by 2 Brigade and 5th Canadian Armoured Division, convinced General Vokes to abandon further daylight attacks in the Borgo S. Maria and

Hill 131 areas on 31 August. Instead Brigadier J.P.E."Paul" Bematchez was to move his remaining two infantry battalions of 3 Brigade, the Royal 22e Regiment and the Carleton and Yorks, into the bridgehead and make ready to clean out the Corps' right flank under the cover of darkness. Like the Irish at Point 120, 3 Brigade would use 2 Brigade's firm foothold on Point 133 to outflank the Parachute killing zone in front of Borgo Santa

Maria, which guarded yet another nest of pillboxes and bunkers atop Point 131. In addition, Bematchez put two companies of his former regiment, the Royal 22e or

Vandoos, under command of the Corps' armoured reconnaissance unit, the Royal

Canadian Dragoons. This force, added to Dawnay's British tanks, was to be ready for a dash to the coastal road to cut off German paratroopers holding back the Polish Corps

642 W.D. 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 643 W.D. PLF, 31 Aug 1944. 644 Pretzell Rpt p. 8.

308 around the fortified city of Pesaro.

While it made sense not to reinforce the failed West Nova attempt in this area, 3

Brigade's plan meant that German mortars around in the Borgo S. Maria - Point 131 strong point were free to bring down devastating observed fire on any attempt by 2

Brigade to press beyond the protection of Point 133 in daylight. Enemy observers in the

131 strong point could also see into and bring down fire on 1st Division's eastern-most river crossings, hampering the build up of men and material for the formation's drive to the sea. The solution was to neutralize the German threat by fire rather than manouevre.

A major counter-mortar mission was arranged utilizing all sixteen heavy 4.2 inch mortars of the Divisional support unit, the Saskatoon Light Infantry(M.C), as well 3

Field Regiment's twenty-four 25-pounder guns .646

Mission planning was made easier because 1 st Canadian Army Group, Royal

Artillery (1 CAGRA) was responsible for all counter-battery shooting on the entire

Eighth Army front.647 The Counter-Mortar Section alone had at its disposal forty 4.2 inch mortars, two regiments of self-propelled 105mm guns and two troops of 3.7 inch heavy anti-aircraft guns. The 105s and 3.7 HAA guns were particularly useful because their airbursting shells could detonate over top of the enemy's usually deep mortar pits, raining shrapnel down on the crew and hopefully wrecking the mortar. Also deployed were several "four-pen" recorders and three sound ranging and flash spotting observation

645 W.D. 3 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 646 W.D. 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 647 An Army Group, Royal Artillery was the organization tasked with controlling the medium and heavy artillery. Each army corps had an AGRA which provided a centralized structure for command and control of all the artillery resources of the entire

309 posts operated by 1 Canadian Field Survey Regiment, RCA. These assisted gunners and mortarmen in locating hostile batteries along with frequent shell reports from forward troops.648 Even with all these resources, the job was difficult because the weapons signature of infantry mortars is slight and difficult to detect. The weapons themselves are very light and man portable allowing them to be moved to from position to position with ease. While a great deal of success was achieved in limiting the effectiveness of the German guns, German mortars still managed to kill and wound large numbers of

Canadians.649 A modem mechanized army of 1944 was still very much at the mercy of a dug-in, well disciplined army equipped with mortars, machineguns, good observation and plenty of ammunition. The defensive aspect of war still reigned supreme.

As Thursday's decisive action developed on the edge of the Tomba di Pesaro high feature, General Bums leaned more heavily on Vokes to be ready to cut the coast road as soon as possible. Indeed, reflecting the deep armoured battles in the Canadian centre and left, the new attack on Pozzo Alto would see the Churchills and Shermans of

145 RAC take the lead while the Seaforths followed close behind in support. The two units concentrated south of the Foglia during the moming where they were well briefed on the developing situation and opportunity on the Tomba di Pesaro feature. Orders to move up and assault Pozzo Alto finally came at 1430, shortly after the Princess Patricias reported that Hill 115 was secure and that German defenses on Hill 133 were about to corps in set-piece operations. 648 W.D., Seaf H of C, appendix, Rough Counter-Mortar Plan, 1st Cdn AGRA, 31 Aug 1944. 649 66% of casualties during the period from 25 August to 30 September were caused by mortar and shellfire. Quarterly Report, July-September 1944, Royal Canadian

310 crack. Two squadrons of 145 RAC, each accompanied by a Seaforth company, were to cross the river into the PPCLI area and push north over the hills to Pozzo Alto. In the military language of the time, their orders included that, depending on the nature of resistence, they were to keep going on to Point 119, 1500 yards northeast, while the remaining tank squadron and two rifle companies moved up to consolidate the village.651

This instmction should not be interpreted to mean that capturing the more distant Point

119 was the most desired outcome and indicator of success. Instead, the order meant that if 4 Parachute Regiment was not waiting in Pozzo Alto to be destroyed, it should be sought out, pursued and indeed destroyed wherever it could be found.

In the event, 4 Para was waiting in the village which happened to be another of

Green Line I's deadly, fortified resistence nests. After the combined force crossed the

Foglia River into the smoke, dust, shell bursts and general confusion of the battle area, the plan began to break down. "D" Company and one Churchill squadron successfully passed through the PPCLI positions in Osteria Nuova and formed up in the shelter of

Point 133. This took time, however, and the sun was beginning to set as the small vanguard crossed the highly exposed, broad, but shallow draw between the Patricias' forward slit trenches and the village of Pozzo Alto. German artillery observers used the last remaining daylight to direct a torrent of shell and mortar fire onto the approaching troops, forcing them to the ground to seek cover in shell holes and whatever other dips and folds they could find protection in until darkness gave respite from the accuracy of

Army Medical Corps History of the War in Italy. 650 W.D. PPCLI; Seaf H of C; 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 651 W.D. 2 CIB; SeafHofC, 31 Aug 1944.

311 the shelling. German machineguns added to the deluge. Yet, even though "D"

Company was pinned down by heavy enemy fire, they fulfilled a greater mission of holding German attention on a broad and deep front. In part this was accomplished by pushing forward to find cover as close as possible to German trenches, pillboxes and fortified houses in Pozzo Alto.652

"B" Company of the Vancouver militia battalion had a tougher time reaching the battle area. They crossed the river at Castello, met up with their tanks, climbed aboard and rode them up to the lateral road east of Osteria Nuova. From there the infantry dismounted and together with the armour travelled some distance up the road so they could take their place as the right wing of the advance.

Osteria Nuova is only two kilometres from the still active Borgo S. Maria - Point

131 strong point and in no time "B" Company marched too far east into its killing zone.

It was not the defenders of Borgo S. Maria that stopped the Highlander advance, though.

1st Division's counter-mortar program was still underway and heavy 4.2 inch mortar bombs began falling among the exposed infantry who quickly made for cover, but not before four men were struck down by fragments.653 Not realizing his unit was so far east, the company commander reported that "friendly" mortar fire was hitting his troops in Osteria Nuova instead of Borgo S. Maria, thus the barrage continued.654

Mortar fire posed no serious danger to the tanks of "A" Squadron, 145 RAC, unless they stayed still and waited for direct hits on engine blocks, so with only a few

652 W.D. SeafHofC; 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 653 After Action Report, "B" coy, W.D. SeafHofC, 1 Sep 1944. 654 Ops Log, 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944.

312 hours of daylight left the squadron commander decided, like the 5 Division armoured regiments to the west, to press on without infantry and carry on with his mission.655

None of these decisions to operate tanks alone were accidental or isolated. Eighth Army verbal instmctions passed down through various command levels, emphasized speed over caution for this action in order to make up for what was soon to be a situation where enemy infantry and artillery units achieved parity. With tanks rather plentiful in this stage of the battle, armour must press on without infantry, especially when opportunities to push the hill-climbing Churchills and Shermans into areas the Germans were not likely to expect tank action. That is exactly the kind of situation found on the

Tomba di Pesaro high feature.

When the 145 RAC squadron turned north on the main road to Pozzo Alto they discovered the nature of German anti-tank weakness in the high country: 400 yards from the top of Hill 131 one lone German towed anti-tank gun guarded the approach from the valley. This gun and its protecting infantry were firing into the flank of the

Seaforths advancing on Pozzo Alto and thus had to be eliminated. After some textbook armoured fire and movement, the tankers shot one troop right onto the position where it destroyed the anti-tank gun. Dismounted British tankers rounded up 50 shaken up paratroopers, all dazed from having been under heavy Canadian shellfire for most of the day. Once again, dismounted tankers fighting in the depths of Green Line I made a critical difference.656

Darkness was too close for the tankers to think about going on though or even

655 Ops Log, W.D. 2 CIB, 31 Aug 44.

313 holding out in such an exposed position. Unlike the Canadians on Point 204, the British tankers had no intention of holding a hillside position through the night with no infantry, especially when the Germans were still holding the higher crest in strength only a short distance away. The squadron clanked back to Borgo Santa Maria where it picked up the sheltering Seaforth company before moving to a harbour area. The group paused briefly in the fading light to clean out an isolated German machine-gun platoon from

Point 109 just east of Hill 133 on the same spur. The twenty man enemy platoon manned pillboxes containing seven medium machine-guns between them yet it only took one Seaforth platoon and one tank to convince them the war was over. 5

When it became apparent that "D" Company of the Seaforths was going to sit tight in shell holes and slowly deepening trenches just short of Pozzo Alto until sundown, the commanding officer of 145 RAC ordered his two squadrons to consolidate back in the safety of their harbour area.659 This left "D" company alone to face the defenders of Pozzo Alto through the night.

At 2045 on the night of 31 August a patrol from the forlorn band of Seaforths crept up the steep bank at the edge of the town and determined the village was defended by a full company of paratroopers. Nonetheless, "D" Company's commander decided to make an attempt to msh the defenders, whom he hoped were broken by the severe

656 W.D., 1 CID, Ops Log, W.D. 2 CIB, W.D. SeafHofC, 31 Aug 44. 657 The Seaforth War Diary mistakenly reported Hill 131 was secure. As the Royal 22e Regt found out the next day, defences on this hill were among the toughest in the Gothic Line and the defenders had no ideas about giving up easily. W.D. SeafHC, 31 Aug 1944. 658 After Action Report, "B" Coy, SeafHofC, 1 Sep 1944. 659 Ops Log, 2 CIB, 31 Aug 1944.

314 shelling visited upon them for the last several hours. Unfortunately, protected as they were by deep bunkers, the German parachutists were not ready to abandon their positions. Their fire repelled two Seaforth attempts to msh into the town with rifles and

Bren guns blazing. One of the platoon commanders, Lieutenant F. Henderson, was wounded in each of the two mshes, yet he ran back into the village a third time to rescue one of his wounded soldiers.

Rather than give up their toehold at the edge of town Lt.-Col. Syd Thomson ordered "D" company to lie "Doggo" for the remainder of the night until the tanks arrived in the morning to finish the job.661 Doing so would avoid the need for infantry to re-cross the long killing zone in front of town. In a tactic often used by the Germans, the proximity of the opposing positions made it near impossible for German guns and mortars to shell "D" Company without endangering their own troops. This forward position also offered a firm right shoulder for the defenders of Point 204 to the west by pinning the closest enemy strong point to that key location to a close quarter stand off.

The Desert Air Force did its part to ensure that the Germans stayed in the dark about the developing battle, even if they did not have the strength to limit the flow of new German units into the battle area. The Germans still held the advantage of holding the highest ground above the Foglia Valley in the Canadian sector and thus had good observation for their artillery, which grew more powerful as reinforcements arrived. The limited DAF was employed to offset that advantage and to hunt for German artillery batteries. All Allied aircraft passing the Tomba Di Pesaro feature while returning from

660 W.D. SeafHofC, 31 Aug 1944.

315 any mission to the north were ordered to strafe it. 1st Canadian Corps reports on air action during Operation Olive admitted this strafing probably did little material damage, but that the purpose was not necessarily to destroy targets but to keep German observers' heads down.662

By the evening of 31 August the expanding Canadian wedge driving onto the

Tomba di Pesaro high feature put 76th Panzer Corps in a difficult situation, made worse because General Herr's staff knew little of what was happening on his left wing facing the Canadians. 1st Parachute Division, notorious for its failure to pass information to higher headquarters at the best of times, was particularly negligent in the last week of

August, no doubt partly due to the absence of the divisional commander, Major-General

Richard Heidrich.663

Just how little information 76th Corps possessed on 31 August is reflected in

General Herr's report to Tenth Army that initial British and Canadian advances were checked by Green Line I defences.664 At the Headquarters of 1st Parachute Division, the picture was only slightly clearer. Heidrich's paratroops completely lost contact with

26th Panzer Division on their right, thanks to the disintegration of 71st Division and the presence of what they assumed was only a handful of Canadian tanks on Point 204. 4

Parachute Regiment was ordered to restore the line in this area and eliminate the minor

661 Ops Log, 2 CIB, 1 Sep 1944. 662 Report on Air Operations: 24 Aug - 22 Sep 1944, HQ 1 Cdn Corps, p. 4. 663 Jackson, Mediterranean pp.247-248. 664 Pretzell Report p. 13. 76th Corps Reported that it had halted Eighth Army's advance along a line Montegrifaldo-Mt. Marrone-Pozzo Alto by 31 August.

316 armoured threat.

To the right of the paratroopers, 1st Battalion of 67 Panzer Grenadier Regiment virtually ceased to exist. All the grenadiers of 5, 6, and 7 companies were dead or making their way to Canadian prisoner of war cages, thanks the skillful and determined action of 11 Canadian Brigade and the New Bmnswick Hussars. A score of 8 Company survivors were all that was left, and they were incapable of effective resistence. The other battalion of 67 Panzer Grenadier in action that day was divided between fighting with General Whitfield's 46th British Division further to the west and holding the shoulder of the Canadian breach with the anti-tank gun screen on Monte Marrone. 26th

Panzer Division's other infantry formation, 9 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, would also be consumed in the fight to stop growing British 5th Corps threat further inland at Monte

Gridolfo. There General Keightley committed his 56th (London) Infantry Division to the break-in battle, hoping to turn the German line in what they all hoped were lighter Green

Line defences in the foothills as per Leese's plan.667 That left 1st Parachute Division to staunch the Canadian rip in Green Line I on their own.668 While this situation created a force ratio offering better prospects for success around Tomba di Pesaro, it ought not to be forgotten that lsl Canadian Corps had already suffered losses while destroying four enemy battalions and parts of two others. The Corps then had to take on nearly the full weight of one of the best divisions in the Wehrmacht whose fighting power was magnified by the fortifications they manned. Yet the Corps could not allow itself to be

665 I Canadian Corps Intelligence Summary # 100, 1 Sept; Pretzell Report, p. 13. 666 W.D., I Cdn Corps Int Sum #100, 1 Sep 1944. 667 WO 170/275 - W.D. 5 Corps, Op Instr # 7, 21 Aug, entries, 31 Aug 44.

317 consumed by this fighting for there would be many more enemy divisions arriving in the coming weeks. This was hardly the overwhelming numerical and material superiority the Allies were supposed to have possessed.

In spite of the gap in front of the Canadians, the situation looked quite promising for the enemy on Herr's flanks. On the left in the coastal belt, Polish mechanized patrols put some pressure on the port of Pesaro, but the defences there were the strongest of the entire Gothic Line and the Poles were too weakened by their July and early August exertions to do more than mask them.669 On the German right, 5th British Corps pushed almost as deep into the German defences as the Canadians, but in this area fortifications were much less linear than those facing Bums's men. Instead they consisted of a series of fortified hill positions, all mutually supporting and making maximum use of the rugged terrain. The British official historian and a veteran of the operation, Lieutenant-

General W.G.F. Jackson, described how "all major tactical features had been fortified, mined and wired with lay-back positions thought out, and sometimes dug, behind them."670 Thus even though Lt-Gen. Keightley's 5th Corps advanced as far as the two

Canadian divisions, they still had several more belts of enemy lay-back positions to deal with before they could break out beyond the Gothic Line. These positions would not be an issue if another disturbing pattern was not developing. The series of deep hill top positions needed fresh units to man them. 9 Panzer Grenadier Regiment's arrival to face the British around Monte Gridolfo was only the start of a flood of German

Jackson, Mediterranean p. 243. 669 W.D. 1 CID, Aug 1944. 670 Jackson, Mediterranean p. 243.

318 reinforcements reacting to the danger in the foot hills. The scattered remnants of 71st and 278th Infantry Divisions also formed battlegroups in the area, backed by fresh 98th units moving in to assist as well.671 It seems Polish General Anders and his staff were correct that the high ground commanding the coastal plain was the key to the Gothic

Line. The trouble was that the Germans recognized it too and by Thursday 31 August they took steps to make up for weaker fortifications by packing more troops into the area.

None of this would matter if the gap between 26th Panzer and 1st Parachute

Divisions was not sealed, especially for the Green Line I fixed defences the Germans hoped to hold until winter.672 Therefore, in the twenty-four hours after the BC Dragoons seized it, Point 204 was the focus of 76th Corps' defensive efforts. German Tenth Army was still quite ignorant of these events. Not until late in the day on 1 September was the gravity of the situation fully realized in by General Vietinghoff and his Chief of Staff,

General Wentzell. Only then did they give orders for 76th Panzer Corps to withdraw back across the Conca river to escape complete annihilation.673 Prior to this realization, the German leadership continued to believe that Green Line I was defensible and their counter-attacks to keep it that way generated opportunities for the Canadians to kill the enemy.

In preparation for the first counter-attack on Point 204, German mortars and artillery began ranging as soon as the sun went down on 31 August and the threat of

671 WO 170/275 - W.D. 5 Corps, Intsum 363, 1 Sep 44. 672 WO 170/275 - W.D. 5 Corps, Op Instr # 18, 2 Sep 44. 673 Pretzell Rpt p. 15.

319 roving Allied fighter-bombers subsided. This shelling added to aggravation caused by a

rather large number of snipers. The latter problem was dealt with by a Perth patrol

which rounded up a total of 12 prisoners. 74 By 0100, early Friday morning, German

gunners finished ranging and probing. The Strathconas and Perths report that about that

time shelling changed from "heavy" to "very intense" indicating something big was

about to happen.675 Fortunately, the Canadian defenders were well dug in when the barrage began and casualties were comparatively light, although as a final farewell to the

British Columbias at least two of their damaged Shermans on the hill were finished off by direct shell hits. One of these, on the west side of the peak, burned intensely for

some time, lighting up much of the battle area. 7 One crew escaped with their lives, but

all five of the other now lay side by side in the Montecchio War Cemetery at the bottom

of the hill: they were the last Dragoons killed in the fight for Point 204.

The noise of bursting shells concealed the movement of German armour. When

the noise stopped, two German STUG III assault guns lumbered into the middle of the

position, behind Major Bill Milroy's "B" Squadron, but in front of the M-10 troop. The

enemy armoured vehicles pumped shells into the rear of the "A" Squadron overlooking

Pozzo Alto.677 The vehicles approached from the direction of the knoll between Tomba

di Pesaro and the Canadian line, and were probably part of the same armoured force

driven off the road earlier in the afternoon and that subsequently destroyed Lt-Col

Vokes's four RHQ tanks.

674 McAvity, Strathcona p. 122. 675 W.D. Perth Regt; LSH After Action Report, Lt-Col. McAvity, 1 Sep 1944. 676 BCD Personal Accounts, 1962; W.D. LSH, 1 Sep 1944.

320 Fire from these guns also signaled the start of an infantry assault. 100 paratroopers had crept forward under the protection of the barrage and then mshed Perth trenches on the left side of the hill. Some managed to get into the Perth trench line on the forward slope, in "B" Company's area. A vicious, hand-to-hand fight ensued, during which the forward "B" Company platoons fell back from their trenches, up to the crest where the dismounted Strathcona machineguns were situated with the depth platoon.

Lance-Sergeant K.M. 'Blackie' Rowe led a "B" Company platoon back down the hill to recover the forward position three times before finally succeeding. In doing so,

Rowe's men destroyed a German platoon, killing twenty outright and capturing the remaining ten. For his efforts, the NCO earned the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

Several more medals were won during this vicious close-quarter battle in the darkness.

The close nature of the fighting made it difficult to call in artillery, which continually stood ready to fire on lucrative targets and back the defenders up at a moment's notice. The medium guns of 1 Canadian AGRA never did get the call to fire, but 25 pounders from 17th Field Regiment, more accurate and better suited to close support, fired several missions under the direct control of the forward observer, Captain

J. A. Wolfe. One of those strikes was directed at the two STUG Ills near Lt-Col Reid's headquarters. In order to get the shells on target, Wolfe called them directly onto his

677 LSH After Action Report, W.D. 5 CAB, 1 Sep 1944. 678 Company defensive battle drill calls for the deployment of two platoons forward and the third behind in a reserve or depth position, W.D. Perth Regt, 1 Sep 1944. 679 Medal Recommendation, Lance-Sergeant K.M. Rowe, DCM; W.D. Perth

321 own position.

Back on the contested north face of 204, another Perth rifleman, Private R.D.

Saunders, took over his section after his corporal and 2i/c were both wounded. Saunders held his handful of men together against repeated mshes by the paratroopers, the best the

German Army had to offer, earning for himself the Military Medal.681 Based on interviews with participants, the Canadian Corps Historical Officer wrote in his report that dismounted Strathcona machineguns were particularly decisive in sweeping the paratroopers from the slopes of Point 204. One Strathcona tanker, Trooper Harold

Boettcher, fought in vain with his .30 calibre bowgun and even his pistol to keep his tank from being overrun. When this proved futile due to the limited traverse of the bowgun, he hopped out of his tank and climbed aboard another "B" Squadron tank commanded by his Troop Corporal, J.B. Matthews, another DCM winner who at the time was attempting to engage the German self-propelled guns. Boettcher got behind the .50 calibre anti-aircraft machinegun on top of Matthews turret and opened fire. The

.50 calibre Browning machinegun is a powerful weapon, capable of engaging targets as far as 3000 metres away. At close range, the fire from this heaviest of automatic weapons cut clean through much of the cover the paratroopers attempted to hide behind.682 Trooper Boettcher remained exposed on top of the tank as the turret traversed

Regt, 1 Sep 1944 680 W.D. 17 Fd Rgt, RCA, 1 Sep 1944. 681 Medal Recommendation, Pte. R.D. Saunders, MM; W.D.Perth Regt, 1 Sep 1944. 682 The .50 calibre Browning M2 Heavy Machinegun is so powerful that it is considered to be an anti-armour weapon. It is also so effective that it was still in use by almost all western armies until the end of the century.

322 and fired on the STUGs, all the while hosing the enemy with half inch bullets. No

German soldier got close to the Canadian line in his area. All this time, Boettcher made a perfect target for the Germans as he was silhouetted by the light of the flaming BCD

Sherman. He was later wounded after the sun came up and the battle progressed, but

£01 earned the Military Medal for his gallantry.

To add to the confusion, the Germans moved two more "armoured vehicles" up the hill. This time they came up the north slope right between "B" and "C" Squadrons.

These "tanks" turned out to be farm tractors intended to make the Canadians believe they were being attacked on three sides. The ruse failed to have the desired effect, though, and the Canadian infantrymen and armoured crewmen quickly dealt with this empty threat.

Canadian troopers and riflemen on the north and west sides of 204 were doing well killing German paratroopers, but something had to be done with the two German self-propelled guns which had infiltrated the dead ground between the reverse slope and the base of the hill. Neither tank nor M-10 fire could be employed at the vehicles now between Canadian sub-unit positions without the risk of fratricide. Lt-Col. Reid's solution was to personally lead a tank-hunting team armed with all available PIAT's.684

Reid and his band of hunters crept out of the comparative safety of the Perth perimeter on 204, through the darkness to the German guns. As the neared the enemy, Reid's tiny force discovered the STUGs were protected by a halftrack load of German infantry.

683 McAvity, Strathcona pp. 123-4. 684 After Action Report, Lt-Col. McAvity. PIAT, or Projector, Infantry, Anti- Tank, is the British equivalent to the bazooka. It fired a large shaped charge that had to

323 Nonetheless they stealthily crept close enough for Reid himself to score direct hits on both German guns. Getting so close also put them in grenade range of the dismounted section. Volleys of "potato-mashers" burst around the hunter group after they revealed themselves by firing. Reid was struck twice by grenade fragments, but refused to be evacuated and continued to direct the defence of the hilltop.685 Stan Scislowski recalls how this was Reid's first action commanding the unit and how before that night he had yet to earn the close-knit Perth's tmst. "Bill Reid proved to everyone in the regiment that he wasn't the kind of battalion commander who directs his men from well out of the line of fire." Reid won the prestigious Distinguished Service Order for his actions and

"we were pretty damn proud of him, and pretty damn proud of ourselves too, for what we'd accomplished."686

Isolated pockets of Germans continued to probe and snipe until 0600, 1

September when the position was finally reported quiet.687 The Canadians held this precious piece of ground and destroyed the second major counter attack, but not without cost. Two Strathconas were killed and another sixteen wounded, almost all from "B"

Squadron and including the Squadron commander, Bill Milroy, the battle captain and three of the five troop leaders. The Perths lost another 64 men throughout Thursday and the during the night battle, bringing their total number of casualties in the battle for the Gothic Line tol05 from all ranks, including the commanding officer and six platoon be delivered from only a few metres away to be effective. 685 W.D. Perth Regt; W.D. 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944. 686 Scislowski, p. 273. 687 W.D. 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944. 688 McAvity, Strathcona p. 124.

324 commanders.689

When the sun exposed the battlefield, Point 204's owners counted forty enemy

dead on the slopes, and 25 prisoners.690 More wounded and dead were likely dragged

off in the darkness. An unusually large portion of the attackers carried two types of

German hand held anti-tank rocket launchers known as "Faustpatrone" and "Ofenrohr".

In fact, the first German platoon to msh the position had no small arms at all and carried only the launchers and grenades.691 The Faustpatrone, Italian theatre name for the

"Panzerfaust", was a one-man weapon capable of reaching effectively out only 30 yards.

Likewise, the Ofenrohr or "Panzershreck", was a copy of the American bazooka, was operated with a two man crew and could fire out to 120 yards. Obviously the

Germans expected to infiltrate among the tanks. This discovery prompted the Corps

Historical Officer, Captain L.A. Wrinch, to speculate the Germans did not see the Perths reach Point 204 at last light and that their counter-attack force expected to find only tanks on the hilltop.693 Whatever the German paratroopers expected to find or hoped to

do, the Canadians stopped them cold and achieved their prime purpose of further

draining Germany's manpower pool.

Other positive Canadian activity took place during the night as the left flank was

expanded by the Cape Breton Highlanders and the VIII New Bmnswick Hussars. This

689 Field Returns, W.D. Perth Regt. 2 Sep 1944. 690 W.D. Perth Regt; LSH; Corps Int Sum #99, 1 Sep 1944. 691 After-Action Report, W.D. 5 CAB, 31 Aug 1944. 692 U.S. War Dept., Handbook on German Military Forces (Baton Rouge: 1990) pp. 317-318317-318. 693 Bi-monthly SummarieSummar s of Operations of I Canadian Corps by Capt. Wrinch, Hist Offr 31 Aug-31 Dec, 1944.

325 operation was halted the late afternoon by the false counter-attack alarm. But by 1730 on 31 August, the Capers were back on the move with Major Kierstead's "B" Squadron of the New Bmnswicks accompanying them. 4 Not long after starting their march, the battalion had to hold up and dig in again and wait for their heavy weapons platoons and an attached M-10 troop, tied up in traffic congestion near Montecchio.695 Waiting was a pmdent course of action, seeing as those weapon systems were part of the infantry battalion's toolbox, vital for handling counter attacks. The traffic jam was German in origin as 5th Division's Engineer Squadrons worked round the clock in that area, lifting mines and building a 40 foot Bailey Bridge at Montelabbate. German gunners made these tasks difficult by pounding the area with steady shellfire, which increased dramatically at night when the threat of Desert Air Force fighter bombers flying counter- battery missions diminished.696

While German shellfire delayed the engineers and Cape Breton Support

Company, it failed to stop them, and before midnight, Lt-Col. Somerville's force concentrated 1200 yards northwest of Point 120. Somerville requested that his battle group be allowed to hold fast, get some rest and hit the objective in the moming.

Brigadier Johnston informed him that was out of the question and that his force was to push on and take Mt. Marrone as soon as possible.697 Johnston understood that in order to take advantage of the enemy confusion, his units would have to be ready to strike hard

694 W.D. CBH, 31 Aug 1944. 695 W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 696 W.D. Commander Corps Royal Engineers, 31 Aug; Report On Air Operations, 24 Aug- 22 Sep 1944, HQ I Cdn Cps. 697 Ops Log, W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944.

326 again in the morning to push the Germans off of the remainder of the Tomba Di Pesaro feature. He intended to clean out the deadly anti-tank guns of Monte Marrone that night and use the ridge as a firm base to push into the town of Tomba Di Pesaro at dawn.698

The town itself, and its accompanying height Monte Peloso, were the next objectives of

5th Division. Johnston made it clear to Somerville that no matter how tired his men were or how many snipers lurked in the darkness, the Cape Breton Highlanders would hold the top of the Mont Marrone when the sun rose. Johnston was no doubt inspired to push that much harder given that General Hoffrneister spent most of the day at 11 Brigade's tactical headquarters observing the battle.699 General Hoffineister's confidence and professionalism was contagious and his mere presence was often a contributing factor in the achievements of his soldiers.700 The night attack gamble paid off, as the Cape

Bretoners and the two Hussar squadrons secured Mt. Marrone after winkling out a few snipers. The anti-tank guns vanished under the threat of encirclement from the Canadian and British sides of Marrone.

31 August had been a great day for 1st Canadian Corps, but the next two days were to bring much greater acclaim, as the British official historian notes:

1 st and 2nd September were proud days for I Canadian Corps. In spite of fatigue in the dust laden atmosphere and stifling heat which enveloped the battlefield in the first days of September, morale was unquestionably high as every man sensed that he was writing an important page in Canadian History.701

698 W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 699 Ops Log; Appreciation by Brig Johnston, W.D. 11 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 700 Hoffrneister, more than any other Canadian general officer, gave much thought to the problems of leadership. He constantly sought new ways to motivate men at all levels of command. Granatstein, Generals pp. 194-199. 701 Jackson, Mediterranean p. 246.

327 The British and Canadian official histories quite correctly maintain that both Canadian divisions accomplished much on 1 September, but the official accounts do not emphasize how the bitter and confused fighting of 31 August made the large gains of the next day possible.

The capacity for General Richard Heidrich's 1st Parachute Division to halt the

Canadian advance through Green Line I was substantially hampered by the loss of Point

204. The rise, barely discemable until standing on it, actually blocked observation of the

Foglia Valley from the higher peaks on the same feature to the north. The steep drop behind it also facilitated the buildup of Canadian combat power for the next phase of battle in relative safety.

However, the loss of 204 did not mean the Germans were ready to abandon

Green Line I. Heidrich's paratroopers still commanded all routes to the north from strong defences on Monte Peloso and Monte Luro. The Germans also had yet to commit their sizable divisional reserve to the battle. The taking and holding of Point 204 set the stage for the defeat of the Canadian nemesis in Italy, 1st Parachute Division. But the battle with the paras and 26th Panzer Division was not yet over. Both Canadian divisions would have to drive hard on 1 September to follow through the dramatic success of the day before.

Close examination of the heavy fighting across the Canadian front on 1

September reveals much about German perceptions of what transpired in the previous thirty-six hours, and of what they still believed possible. General Herr and his staff clung to the belief that strong action could stabilize the front in the depth positions of the

328 Gothic Line. Indeed, captured communications and reports for 31 August and for much of 1 September indicate the Germans believed that the timely arrival of 26th Panzer

70?

Division contained Eighth Army's surprise offensive.

1st Parachute Division's left wing, manning the powerful fortifications along the

Adriatic around Pesaro, had still not been threatened and reported only patrolling activity on the part of 2nd Polish Corps.703 On the German right, British 5th Corps initially made progress but by the night of 31 August the German defenders were regaining their balance. Ad hoc battlegroups formed from 71st Division survivors, reinforced by 9 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, slipped back onto the high ground around

Mondaino during the night, forcing the British to retake the heights and foiling

Keightley's plan for a renewal of his advance on 1 September.704

The gap created by the Canadian thrust around Tomba Di Pesaro gave cause for concern, but with 1st Parachute Division still in good shape, the situation did not appear desperate. General Herr's orders for 1 September were a mirror of what 4 Parachute

Regiment tried alone the night before. Heidrich was to dispense with small, local attacks and mount a major divisional counter attack to throw the Canadians off of the high ground and restore communications with 26th Panzer Division.705

German plans hinged on two elements. In keeping with standard Wehrmacht defensive procedure, the most critical element involved attacks on the enemy centre of

702 Hist Sect Rpt #27, pp. 35-36. 703 Hist Sect Rpt #27, pp. 36-38. 704 Jackson, Mediterranean pp. 249-250. 705 Pretzell Rpt, p. 13.

329 gravity.706 4 Parachute Regiment re-organized for another onslaught on Point 204, which was obviously the principle Canadian axis of advance. This time the Germans intended to attack in strength and avoid the mistakes of the night before. In particular, they concentrated artillery resources to an extent usually associated by historians with

Allied attacks. 4 Para's set-piece assault would be supported by ample numbers of mortars, nebelwerfers, self-propelled guns and 76th Corps' medium artillery while the rest of the division extended inland to free them up.707 Two battalions of the regiment were already notably weakened from the previous day. The regimental group would thus be reinforced with the divisional reserve consisting of the Parachute Engineer and

Machinegun Battalions.708 Even liberal allowances for para losses on 31 August puts the fighting strength in this counter-attack force at 1200 or more infantry soldiers, plus heavy weapons and self-propelled guns. They hoped to face the single Canadian infantry battalion and tank regiment identified on the hill during the night.709

The second element of the German plan called for the vigorous defence of Hill

706 ,,-j^g Qerrrians prefer heavy concentrations of fire and powerful, co-ordinated counterattacks by mobile reserves of all arms the main effort being made opposite the point where the enemy is making his main attack." U.S. War Department, Handbook p. 233. 707 Intelligence reports from the Counter-Battery Office at 1st Cdn Corps reports that enemy heavy guns and nebelwerfers engaged Hill 204 on 1 September and where subsequently fired on by Canadian medium artillery. Canadians on Hill 204 report heavy concentrations of all types of fire on that day as well. Counter Battery Intelligence Report #8, W.D. 1st Cdn AGRA; W.D. 4PLDG, W.D. LSH, 1 Sep, 1944. 708 This information comes from the identification of bodies and interrogation of prisoners after the fighting ended on 1 Sep. Intelligence Summary, W.D. PLF, 2 Sep 1944. 709 In fact, by dawn there were about 700 Canadian riflemen from the Perths and 4PLDG on 204. These were backed, as their doctrine demanded, by considerable firepower from attached supporting tanks, anti-tank guns, mortars and machineguns.

330 131, in front of 1st Canadian Division. If 204 could be recaptured and 131 held, then something of a frontline would be re-established in the 76th Corps' centre. Point 131 served as the anchor connecting 4 Para on the Tomba feature with 1 and 3 Parachute

Regiments extending down to Pesaro and the sea. Point 204 and 131 could also serve as a firm shoulder behind which the Pesaro garrison could withdraw if necessary.710

The Canadians had other ideas about where the frontline would be by the end of

1 September. 1st Canadian Corps Operations Instmction #26, issued on the afternoon of

31 August, directed both Canadian divisions to exploit the gains made that day by destroying the enemy on the rest of the high ground immediately in front of them, before driving down into the coastal plain and cutting off the left wing of the German Parachute

Division in Pesaro. Hoffineister's men were to take Monte Peloso and Tomba Di Pesaro before sweeping down from the hills to San Giovanni just south of the Conca. Vokes's infantry with Brig. Dawnay's tanks were to take Monte Luro in conjunction with a Polish

Corps attack on the right, and then drive to the Renaissance-era walled town and castle at Gradara, which guarded access to the plain along the coastal highway. With both

Canadian divisions on the flats and controlling the coastal highway, the next step was to secure crossings over the trickle of the Conca in preparation for a drive on Rimini.71'

Before 1st Canadian Division thrust to Monte Luro, General Vokes's intended to use 2 Brigade's high ground to firm up his right flank and destroy the resistence nest that

W.D. Perth Regt, 4PLDG, LSH, 1 Sep 44. 710 Pretzell Rpt, p. 13. 71' Op Instr # 26, W.D. I Cdn Corps, 31 Aug 1944.

331 caused so much trouble for the West Novas on 30 and 31 August.712 If the division's drive to the coast was to be sustained, then the main road mnning from Borgo St. Maria to Monte Luro must be secured, as well as nearby river crossings. The road and the crossings were still commanded by the Borgo St. Maria - Point 131 strongpoint.

The mission of destroying this resistence nest was given to Lt-Col. Jean Allard's

Royal 22e Regiment of 3 Brigade. Bdr. Pat Bogert, divisional operations officer, who took over for Paul Bematchez when the latter was injured in an observation plane crash, explained to Allard that resistence should be light, especially since the Seaforths were operating well to the north, at the edge of Pozzo Alto, and intended to take that village at dawn on 1 September.713 The French Canadians had no idea they were marching towards a critical hinge in the German defences. Far from being a mopping up operation to pave the way for 21 Tank Brigade to break out of the Gothic Line, the "Vandoo" attack on Point 131 would be a bloody continuation of the break-in battle, and the next step in the defeat of the Parachute Division.

The mission was made more challenging given that the earlier on Thursday

Allard gave up two of his companies to the Royal Canadian Dragoon (RCD) battlegroup held in reserve for a breakout. To reinforce the "Vandoos" for the attack on Hill 131,

Allard was given a company of the Carleton and York Regiment from the Saint John

River Valley in New Bmnswick. No tanks would assist the French Canadians because there were none to be spared. Dawnay's three British tank regiments were spread between refitting, supporting the Seaforths at Pozzo Alto, and keeping squadrons in

712 W.D. 3 CIB, 1 Sep 1944.

332 reserve ready to lead a breakout with the RCDs. Some support came from 4 Field

Engineer Company sappers assigned to help clear the extensive mines and obstacles surrounding the resistence nest.714

The engineers finished lifting mines by 0415 on Friday moming, in time for

Allard's three companies to pass through without a casualty to take Borgo St. Maria. In addition to hoping enemy opposition would be light, the Quebecois715 also counted on help from a coordinated Polish 3 Carpathian Division attack up the spur mnning parallel to the one on which Point 131 sat.716 While the Carleton and York company held a fire base at the bottom of the hill, Allard side slipped his two "Vandoo" companies around the left side of the strong point through 2 Brigade's bridgehead into the defended belt.

They first moved Point 109, cleared the day before by the Seaforths. Captain Y. Dube, commanding "B" Company, was unaware the Seaforths left a platoon on the hill and before his point section could identify the soldiers defending the position as friendly they tossed a grenade injuring a Highlander.717 The value of attacking from this flanking base made up for the unfortunate incident because from there "B" Company crept into the village from the rear, surprising the defenders who beat a hasty retreat along the

71 8 lateral road to the east. While the German Paratroopers gave up forward positions in the village and on

713 W.D. 3 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 714 W.D. 3 CIB, 31 Aug 1944. 715 By mid-1944, replacement shortages from Quebec meant that Acadian New Bmnswickers accounted for a significant portion of Vandoo strength. 716 W.D. 1 CID, 1 Sep 1944. 717 W.D. SeafHofC, 1 Sep 1944. 718 After Action Report, "B" Company, R22eR, 1 Sep 1944.

333 the valley floor without a fight, they were not going to let go of well-fortified Point 131.

The defences on this hill were among the strongest of the Gothic Line, consisting of deep bombproof shelters and concrete machine-gun positions. On the Canadian right, the Polish Corps was still spent from its long bitter pursuit of the German Army all the way from Ancona, and could mount little more than strong fighting patrols toward the neighbouring spur.719 This meant 1 Parachute Regiment holding Green Line I in the

Polish sector was largely untouched. To protect their flank from being turned, elements of 3 Para prepared to hold Point 131 at all costs.

Not long after dawn broke, "D" Company of the Vandoos first reported difficulty from brisk enemy machinegun fire coming from a fortified house on the forward slope of Hill 131. Forward Observation Officer, Captain W.H. Howarth, used the gridded air photos to quickly and accurately bring down a salvo of 25 pounder shells, smashing the house to mbble.720 The "mop-up" job seemed to be progressing smoothly as the

Vandoos worked their way south of the crest.

Further up the hill, German machine-gunners protected in concrete pillboxes held their fire until "D" company was in the middle of crossfire almost on top of Hill

131. At 0715 from only a few hundred yards away, a number of fast firing MG 42 medium machine-guns cut swaths in the Vandoo ranks. They tried several times to msh the Germans head on, but each time machinegun fire from the pillboxes and other supporting positions on the crest prevented any advance. Attempts to push platoons around the flanks were also stopped cold as the carefully laid out resistence nest was

719 W.D. 1 CID, 1 Sep 1944.

334 well prepared for all around defence.721

"D" Company took what cover was available and poured fire into the bunkers while they recovered their dead and brought their wounded to safety. The ambush occurred just as Allard moved his Tactical Headquarters and the Carleton and York company into Borgo St. Maria. Captain Dube's company was in no position to help either. Dube pushed his men 700 yards east on the lateral road towards the Polish boundary before being been pinned down by more concrete protected machinegun posts on the lower slopes of Hill 131. It would take time to respond to "D" company's frantic calls for ammunition and reinforcements.

Capt. Howarth did a commendable job of directing Canadian 25 pounder shoots onto the pillboxes only 100 yards away from the riflemen. The company commander had his soldiers dig slit trenches in preparation for the "friendly" artillery stonk.722

Howarth repeatedly exposed himself to adjust the guns directly onto the target until he was cut down by a burst of machinegun fire. The bombardment could do little but momentarily suppress the fire coming from the thick concrete bunkers.7 Even Desert

Air Force fighter bombers were called in to help, although they could not drop their ordnance very close to the target for fear of hitting the Vandoos and it was doubtful their ordnance was of sufficient size to make a difference.724

While trying to extract his company and move them north to support "D"

720 W.D. R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 721 After Action Report, "D" Company, R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 722 After Action Report "D" coy R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 723 W.D. R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 724 W.D. R22eR, 1 Sep 1944.

335 Company, Capt. Dube was severely wounded. The Battalion Intelligence Officer,

Captain J.H.C. Simard, was ordered up to take over but that took more time.725 After two hours, both forward companies were still no further ahead. "D" Company was the worst off with their numbers of dead and wounded climbing fast and ammunition almost exhausted.

One or two tanks could have made the difference since the only anti-tank gun guarding the strong point was taken out the evening before. Yet still no tanks were available, as all Canadian and British armour were concentrated for the breakout battle developing on the Tomba feature. The only armour in the vicinity were the wheeled armoured cars of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, but they were unable to climb the steep embankment on the Pozzo Alto road to reach "D" Company.726

Jean Allard threw in his reserve to try to link up his separated sub-units. "C"

Company of the Carleton and York Regiment moved up between the two Vandoo companies and cleaned out two fortified houses east of "D" Company. This took some of the pressure off "B" company but they were still taking heavy fire from the two pillboxes on the forward slope. Allard's troops could not get any closer to the main position on top of the hill, at least not without some kind of mobile armoured machine- gun.727

Shortly after noon, the enterprising French Canadians came up with a solution.

While RCD armoured cars could not climb the steep bank beside the Borgo St. Maria -

725 After Action Report, "B" CoyR22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 726 After Action Report, "D" Coy R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 727 Ops Log, 3 CIB, W.D. R22eR, 1 Sep 1944.

336 Pozzo Alto road, tracked Bren Carriers from the Vandoo Carrier Platoon could just make it after 4 Field Company sappers blew a gap in it. Four carriers, each armed with a

Vickers Medium Machinegun, drove up to the "D" Company lines by 1400. From this point the action developed swiftly.

The Vandoos drenched the hilltop with smoke bombs from their two-inch mortars, covering the approach of the "armour". The carriers clambered to within a few feet of the firing slits of the pillboxes and let loose with long bursts of .303 Ball. The riflemen followed up quickly clearing the paratroopers out with grenades, Tommy guns, boots and bayonets. Like the "Fallshirmjager" at Point 115, those in the Point 131 resistence nest fought to the bitter end. The brief but violent attack was finished half an

778 hour after it started: only seven parachutists were taken prisoner.

The Royal 22e Regiment now dominated the battlefield from this height, but they still had plenty of work ahead of them to consolidate their prize and mop up pillboxes still holding up "B" company further down the slope.729 Even with the central core of the resistence nest stove in and the hope of meaningful defence evaporated, paratroopers in the outer works refused to stop shooting. While the Vandoos and their attached

Carleton and York company mounted a seemingly endless series of small unit attacks on every single pillbox around Hill 131 through mid day and into Friday afternoon, the

Germans moved a Panzer IV medium tank into the area in a desperate attempt to hold the shoulder of the Canadian breach in the Gothic Line.730 One tank was not enough to

728 After Action Report, "D" CoyR22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 729 W.D. R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. 730 W.D. R22eR, 1 Sep 1944. A PanzerKampfwagen IV is the a medium tank

337 evict the new owners, nor could it help much about the storm on the main heights of the

Tomba feature.

Immediately left of the Vandoos, the gap in the German line was widening. As 3

Brigade's attack on the 131 strong point was reaching fever pitch at first light, a squadron of 145 RAC tanks arrived at the outskirts of Pozzo Alto, where "D" Company of the Seaforth Highlanders still lay in waiting. As the heavy Churchills smashed fortified houses, pillboxes, and laid down cover fire with their machineguns, the

Seaforths worked their way through the streets. The Vancouver unit's war diary reported the fighting as "close" and that skillful use of infantry weapons like the Bren light machinegun and the PIAT for blowing holes in walls were keys to success.7 ' The

Seaforths were legendary for this kind of fight as they were one of the two Canadian battalions that fought through the streets of Ortona, nine months earlier. Most veterans of that street battle were killed or wounded in the intervening months, but replacement soldiers who joined the regiment since were surrounded with those who were wounded and returned after convalescence. Embedded in those old hands was the spirit of Ortona and the now standard urban doctrine that became a fixture of 1st Canadian Division. The

Seaforths thus made short work of the resistence nest in Pozzo Alto, their task made somewhat easier by buildings and the steep slope the village stretched across helping to restrict enemy fields of fire.

By 0900 the reserve companies arrived to assist with the mouse-holing and room roughly equivalent in size to the Sherman. By 1944, Pzkw IV's were armed with a 75mm high velocity gun. This vehicle formed the bulk of German tank strength in Italy. 731 W.D. SeafHofC, 1 Sep 1944.

338 clearing. While three companies worked away, Major "Ollie" Mace's "B" Company, and

"A" Squadron 145 RAC pressed deeper into the defended belt to Point 119, 1500 yards northeast and on the same spur as 131. They reported it snug within an hour.732 With that hill in Canadian hands, the Point 131 resistence nest was cut off. Just like the battle of Point 120 the day before, the combination of a deep armoured hook to cut off the enemy position coupled with pressure on the front, brought about the destmction of a well-entrenched enemy force.

The collapse of effective German resistence on the right shoulder of the

Canadian breach at Point 131 wrecked 1st Parachute Division's plan for holding Green

Line I. All other hopes for the German restoration of the line rested on the battlegroup that was formed to re-capture Hill 204 that same Friday. With 5th Canadian Armoured

Division also preparing to attack, a final climactic battle for Green Line I was in the offing.

To take advantage of Wednesday's opportunity, the battle in 5th Division's area developed rapidly and before the entire formation was in place and ready for action.

Fighting then proved more vicious than expected. General Hoffrneister's men therefore spent Friday moming consolidating base areas, bringing up fresh formations and supplies, evacuating the dead and wounded, and sorting out the chaos of the last 48 hours in their lines of communication. On the left flank the Irish Regiment of Canada marched toward the Cape Breton firm base at Mont Marrone. Their part of the 11

Ops Log, 2 CIB, 1 Sep 44.

339 Brigade plan was to capture the village of Tomba Di Pesaro itself.

The German defence in this area was in total disarray. As previously indicated, the infantry responsible for defending it, 11/67 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, were finished. Its few dozen survivors from 8 Company defended two strong points north of

Point 120, but were bypassed by the Cape Breton night march to Mont Marrone. The platoon reported to higher headquarters that they were cut off.734 The isolated grenadiers occupying two fortified houses opened fire on the Irish as they marched unsuspectingly up to the Cape Breton lines. This resulted in a slight delay as the Irish and their supporting "horses" took time to mop these positions and finish off 11/67 Regiment for good. It took two hours. Most of the platoon surrendered when faced with the prospect of close combat, yielding twenty-eight prisoners.

While the threat from German infantry was now minimized, there were still plenty of German anti-tank guns and a few Panther tanks lurking about on the Canadian left. In the confusion of 31 August though, German efforts to co-ordinate an effective anti-armour defence of the Monte Marrone area had failed. For the most part the

German's armour and anti-tank artillery scattered around the spurs southwest of Tomba di Pesaro acted on their own and were thus destroyed one by one, or retreated in haste when darkness fell Thursday night.

While Lt-Col Clark's Irish and the accompanying Sherman tanks of "C"

Squadron of the New Bmnswick Hussars set out for their concentration area behind

733 After Action Report, W.D. 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944. 734 Operations Log, W.D. I Cdn Corps, 1 Sep 1944. 735 Ops Log, W.D. 11 CIB, IRC, 1 Sep 1944.

340 Mont Marrone, the Hussars' "B" Squadron, the Cape Bretoners and the attached anti­ tank gunners of "B" troop, 98 (Bmce) Anti-Tank Battery mopped up around Marrone and prepared it as a fire base for the drive on Tomba.736 Major Kierstead's Hussars employed their Shermans very aggressively. He detached a troop 1000 yards to the northwest at Casa Mirra, along with a platoon of Highlanders for close protection. The tiny force, commanded by Squadron Battle Captain R.S. McLeod, first took on a Panther tank and a small band of enemy infantry around the farm. Mcleod's team destroyed the

Panther, and killed or captured the grenadiers from 67 Regiment's 1st Battalion before taking up fire positions overlooking Tomba Di Pesaro and the main road leading out of it to the west. Around noon, the Hussar troop used this advantageous position to open a

"semi-indirect" shoot on the village and road. The Hussars were skilled in the art of making the most of their accurate 75mm guns, maximizing the range at which they could hurl high explosive shells by firing at slightly higher trajectories. They had developed these skills over the previous winter of deprivation on the Ortona front when artillery ammunition shortages forced them to act as supporting artillery during the infamous "Tollo Crossroads Shoot".737 This threat to the Parachute flank just prior to the launching of their divisional counter-attack on Point 204 drew the fire of several anti-tank and assault guns in the village, and the towed guns of Marrone which had apparently relocated there. At least three of these were picked off, either by Capt.

Mcleod's tank gunners or air and artillery strikes.738

736 W.D. VIII NBH, 4 AT Regt RCA, 1 Sep 1944. 737 Nicholson, pp. 382-3 738 Operations Log, 5 CAD; After Action Report, "B" Sqn, VIII NBH, 1 Sep 341 Each Sherman carried 97 rounds of 75mm ammunition, and after two hours of sustained firing, the troop at Casa Mirra exhausted its supply. Major Kierstead and Capt

McLeod solved this problem by exchanging troops. The Bruce Battery's M-lOs and the

Cape Breton 6 pounder anti-tank gun platoon could defend Monte Marrone from enemy armour if need be, so rather than waiting passively for the Irish to arrive, the Hussars continued to make use of their excellent fire position to harass the Germans. Three troops from Kierstead's squadron rotated through the farm in this fashion, pumping hundreds of high explosive and armour piercing shells into German positions around

Tomba. The Germans tried to put a stop to this firing Friday afternoon with an infantry platoon attack towards the farm. This party was spotted and engaged by Hussars machineguns, as one troop was in the process of spelling another off.739

In addition to the three German armoured vehicles and two towed guns knocked out by the New Bmnswicks on 31 August, another two Panthers and three 75mm STUG

III assault guns were destroyed along with a half dozen or so towed anti-tank guns on 1

September. Some of this German equipment was destroyed by direct fire from

Shermans and M-lOs, while artillery fire, directed by Hussar squadron commanders and

FOOs, finished off the rest. If the large number of German heavy weapons destroyed on this flank had been left unmolested to better co-ordinate their fire and tie in with their infantry protection, they would have presented a difficult obstacle to the Canadians.

1944. 739 After Action Report, "B" Sqn VIII NBH, 1 Sep 1944. 740 After Action Report, 5 CAB; Operations Log, 5 CAD, 1 Sep 1944. The Hussars observed and directed several Mike and Uncle targets from their forward positions on the left over the two days.

342 Had the initial Canadian attack on Green Line I been delivered any later than Wednesday evening, the enemy would have had ample time to organize those scattered resources into a powerful defence.

While 11 Brigade's left wing closed in on the approaches to Tomba Di Pesaro from the southwest, the main act played out on the forward slopes of Point 204. Bdr.

Johnston originally planned for the Perth Regiment and Lord Strathcona's Horse to attack Monte Peloso at dawn, after the Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards relieved Reid's men on Hill 204. Given what the Perths had been though in the last 48 hours though, to ask them to go on was impossible. Johnston ordered the Guards to put in the attack instead, in spite of it being their first action as an infantry battalion.741

Lt-Col. W.W.G. Darling and his command group reached the Perth/Strathcona lines by 0800 that moming. Immediately he set out on a reconnaissance with an artillery observer and Major Jack Smith commanding "C" Squadron of the Strathconas, which was to provide Darling's men with close support. When the recce party returned, all of the Guards' subunits, still known as squadrons (i.e. companies) and troops (platoons) from their armoured recce days, were assembled in the protection of Point 204's reverse slope. The importance of that location as a safe forming up place was further revealed minutes earlier when Darling's men covered the last few hundred yards to it and were caught by heavy concentrations of German shells. This was just an introduction to what

German gunners had in store for them.742

As if giving warning of how the German Army intended to hold the Po Valley at

741 After Action Report, 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944.

343 all costs, the ever more powerful collection of German artillery building in the Gothic

Line's lay back positions pulverized the Canadians on Point 204 with the most intense

shelling that any of them had yet encountered in Italy.743 To soldiers hugging the bottom

of slit trenches around "Dragoon Hill" it must have seemed as though every heavy gun in

the German Army was shooting at them. This perception was not far from the tmth, as

the hill was the principle target for all guns and mortars in 76th Panzer Corps in

preparation for the divisional attack on the most threatened part of Green Line I.744

The savage bombardment caused a number of problems for the Dragoon Guards

and the Strathconas as they made their best efforts to organize their assault. To begin

with, on returning from their recce the command group was caught by a salvo of mortar bombs and nebelwerfer rockets, killing among others, "B" Squadron's commander.745

A short time later Captain D.J. Burke's "A" Squadron, slated to lead the attack, was

caught in the open by a German artillery strike as it moved to the startline. The shelling

was so concentrated and intense that it started several grass fires and scored three direct

hits on tanks. Three officers and 30 soldiers were dead or dying with another 100 or so

/4'W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 743 The 1st Div CRA reports that this was the heaviest shelling experienced in the entire campaign. That distinction would be superseded in coming weeks as more German reinforcements packed into the Adriatic front. After Action Report, W.D. RCA 1 CID, 1 Sep 1944. 744 German defensive doctrine dictates that "When part of a battle position is lost, the area is taken under artillery fire to annihilate enemy forces which have penetrated it." This fire is followed by the main counter-attack. U.S. War Dept. Handbook pp. 233-234. 745 W.D. 4th Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards, 1 Sep 1944. Nebelwerfers are a German six-barrelled, towed rocket/mortar system. They were known to Allied soldiers as 'Moaning Minnies' due to the whining sound emitted as the projectiles approached their target.

344 B including nearly all the remaining strength of "A" Squadron B "off their rockers" as the ground all around them empted in smoke and fire.746

German shell and mortar fire pounding Canadian defenses on Point 204 not only delayed the Canadian attack, it also covered the approach of four German battalions massing for an assault to re-take the peak.747 Some of the shelling came from self- propelled guns, two kilometres north at Monte Luro. This fire was spotted by the air OP who promptly brought 4.5 inch guns of 2 Canadian Medium Regiment into action to silence them. The 4.5s and heavy 155mm howitzers of 1 Canadian AGRA also did their best to fire counter-battery shoots on enemy gun positions, whose fire on 204 revealed them to the air observer.748

Meanwhile, the recently converted Guards suffered from a shortage of fully trained infantry officers and NCOs. After the death of one experienced infantry

"squadron" commander and two troop leaders on this day and another the day before, the problem grew more acute. In addition, approximately one third of the riflemen in the battalion were not old recce salts but brand new replacements, taken on over the summer and with no experience of any kind.74 The older Guardsmen had plenty of spirit and quite a bit of seasoning from their recce days, conducting small dismounted attacks on delaying posts, but pulling off a full scale battalion attack with tanks was something very

746 W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 747 Intelligence Summary, W.D. PLF, 1 Sep 1944. 748 W.D. 2 Cdn Med Regt, 1 Sep 1944. 749 W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. Major K.E. Richardson, OC "A" Squadron had been killed the day before by mortar fire.

345 different. Even if they had more experience, nothing in Italy to date compared to the kind of shelling encountered that Friday. As air observers and 1st Canadian Survey

Regiment directed Canadian counter-battery fire onto more and more hostile batteries, enemy shelling began to drop off. The time had come for eastern Ontario's 4th Princess

Louise's Dragoon Guards to attack.

"B" Squadron, taken over by Lt. P.M. Moore, and the LSH "C" Squadron crossed their startline on the west side of 204 just after 1300. 75mm guns on the Strathconas'

Shermans pumped shells onto Monte Peloso in the distance, directly in front of the infantry and at anything in between which looked like a possible German position. Tank machineguns also sprayed the hedges and bushes on the front and flanks. Almost immediately, the lead sections came under fire from paratroopers that had crept forward under the cover of the German barrage. After advancing a few hundred yards across the saddle between the hills, heavy small arms fire broke out all over the slopes.751 The lead sections had advanced into the main German forming up area.

The Guards' war diary records that "The inexperienced troops tended to go to ground under the withering fire and required a great deal of leading on the part of the officers."752 1 and 2 Troops of Major Smith's Shermans followed the first wave of infantry, and it was their aggressive fire and movement that carried the green but spirited

Guardsmen forward. Bow machineguns on the Shermans sprayed wheat stooks and hedges while the main guns pounded nearby farm houses and bams into mbble. The

750 After Action Report by Lt-Col Darling, W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 751 W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 752 After Action Report, 4 PLDG, 1 Sep 1944.

346 balance of Smith's squadron remained on 204, laying down covering fire until the next wave of two Guards squadrons started forward.753

Dozens of German paratroopers were mowed down in exposed positions behind low stone walls and hedges where they waited to launch their own attack. The Germans gave back as good as they got, though, and Canadian casualties began to mount alarmingly after the first hour of this collision battle.754 It was an "encounter battle" of sorts as neither force manned cohesive defensive positions and both wrestled for control of the saddle. The first phase of action occurred only 300 yards from the startline, giving some indication of how close the Germans were to launching their own assault.755

Darling's men and Smith's tankers destroyed the lead enemy company in its forming up area just behind a small knoll, capturing fifty and killing dozens.

After defeating that company, the next problem came from a farm farther left.

Machinegun and mortar fire poured from the Casa at an unusually high rate, cutting down dozens of recce soldiers from the first wave. The ranks of the leading two squadrons were badly thinned out and neither could continue. The second wave with

"A" Squadron on the left and "D" on the right moved on the Casa located on the road to

Marrone.75 3 Troop and the HQ group of the Strathcona squadron followed this second wave while 4 Troop hung back, laying down covering fire. Also traveling with the second wave were two Sherman tanks manned by officers of the Royal Canadian

Artillery who directed concentrations of field gunfire around the objective and the

753 After Action Report, "C" Sqn, LSH 1 Sep 1944. 754 W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 755 Ops Log, 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944.

347 various trouble spots along the way. Between the two gunner officers, forty-eight 25- pounder field guns of 11th and 17th Field Regiments were at their disposal to shoot the

Guards onto Peloso.758

Capt. Burke, who took over "A" Squadron only the day before, after Major

Richardson's death, led his men and several tanks around to the left to attack the casa. In a daring, but costly assault, Burke's squadron charged into the barnyard and wiped out the paratroopers defending it. In addition to dead Germans, when the Guards overran the farm they discovered a large number of support weapons. Apparently this farm, with its good field of fire facing the left front of Point 204, was to be the firebase for the

German attack. The bulk of the support weapons had thus been concentrated here, including two 60mm mortars, five Ofenrohrs and some two dozen MG 42 medium machineguns of the Parachute Machinegun Battalion.759 Only eight Canadians were still standing with Burke when resistence from the Casa ended. They were soon joined by

Lt-Col. Darling who had come up to take personal control of the battle.

The small band waited until "D" squadron could mop up several houses on the right side of the saddle before advancing any further. The Strathcona's 4 troop under Lt.

W.J. Brown had been ordered to bound up on the right. Together with a party of

Guardsmen led by Major Salter, two machinegun posts on the eastern slopes of the

756 W.D. 4 PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 757 After Action Report, "C" sqn LSH, 1 Sep 1944. 758 W.D. HQ RCA 5 CAD, 1 Sep 1944. 759 W.D. 4 PLDG; After Action Report, "C" Sqn LSH, 1 Sep 1944. Except in emergency situations or special circumstances enemy weapons are not employed. Identification of enemy positions is most commonly accomplished by weapons sound recognition thus the use of captured weapons increases risk of 'friendly fire' accidents.

348 saddle were silenced by the tanks. Brown's three 75mm guns made short work of the

German strongpoints.

Salter and Brown's action brought both the right and left wings of the Canadian attack roughly into on either side of the Point 203 knoll that shielded German armour the day before. Darling's much reduced combat team prepared for the final drive to the top of the hill. Captain Eagan, one of the artillery forward observers, remained with the leading troops, directing high explosive salvos onto German positions. The 4PLDG war diary records that Eagan carried out his work dangerously close to the enemy and with no reguard to his personal safety.761 Indeed, the decisive events taking place all around

1st Canadian Corps' area during this critical three-day period were not the responsibility of any one man or unit, but of all men and units working in close cooperation, simultaneously and with countless extraordinarily brave men like Capt. Eagan going beyond what was expected of them.

The slope leading to the peak of Mont Peloso is extremely steep and was recently plowed. In spite of these hazards, Lt. Brown assured Lt-Col. Darling that the ground was negotiable for his nimble Shermans. Darling instmcted Brown to drive halfway up to the crest, under covering fire from the rest of the Strathcona squadron. When the tanks reached the halfway point, Darling's 40 remaining soldiers would rush past them,

7r»7 and storm the crest. The plan came off without a hitch, even though the Sherman drivers had a tough

760 W.D. 4PLDG, LSH, 1 Sep 44. 761 W.D. 4PLDG, 1 Sep 1944. 762 W.D. 4PLDG, LSH, 1 Sep 44.

349 time churning through the loose dry soil on the slope. After stopping 100 metres from the objective, Brown's tanks laid waste to any structure within their range, with both their machineguns and main armament. The Guardsmen did not exactly "msh" up to the crest either, instead crawling on their hands and knees through the freshly turned and shell riddled soil on the over-50-degree slope. The sight of 40 dirty, sweaty, and very angry Canadians crawling forward with bayonets fixed and grenades primed convinced the few remaining defenders still alive to beat a hasty retreat down the hill to a copse of woods. The tiny force of infantry and armour reported the location of the wood for the gunners and announced their ownership of Monte Peloso at 1600, Friday afternoon. To celebrate, Lt. Brown produced a bottle of whiskey from the turret of his Sherman and the small group of Canadians toasted the first successful infantry attack of the 4th Princess

Louise's Dragoon Guards.763

On the enemy side, with the loss of so many men and so much equipment around

Monte Peloso and Monte Marrone, and their firm right shoulder at Hill 131 smashed, the back of Green Line I was broken. 1st Parachute Division was in a state of complete panic, its headquarters having little clue of the condition or even the location of many of its units.764 Their four battalions that massed to counter-attack were smashed, leaving hundreds of dead on the saddle beneath Monte Peloso. Survivors were either rounded up into prisoner cages or fled the scene in disarray. But the Canadians were not about to ease the pressure on the Germans and allow them to regain their balance on the Tomba feature. Little did they know that the paratroopers had not the forces or the inclination to

763 W.D. 4PLDG, LSH, 1 Sep 44.

350 take back Peloso and restore the line. Nevertheless, 1st Canadian Corps prepared for continued, deliberate attacks to gain control of the remaining high ground on the Tomba feature while the Corps artillery and Desert Air Force Fighter Bombers pounded Tomba

Di Pesaro and Monte Luro.

On Mont Marrone, the Irish Regiment of Canada with "C" Squadron from the

Hussars passed through "B" Squadron and the Cape Bretoners and pushed up towards II

Cassone, 700 yards up the road closer to Tomba Di Pesaro. That farm would be their startline.765 At 1830 the Irish were nearly ready to put in their attack. The only thing preventing them from moving was that their supporting armoured squadron was nearly out of fuel. Given the level of resistence encountered all over this feature on Friday,

Clark would not attack without as much fire support as could possibly be amassed.

With Major McEwen's tanks unable to accompany the Irish any further, Lt-Col.

Clark called on the heavy mortars of the Princess Louise's Fusiliers to support the lead sections right into the village.767 Major Keirstead's squadron pulled off Marrone after being replaced with a squadron of Horse Guards. However, the recce regiment tanks were ordered to conserve ammunition in readiness to exploit north with the Westminster

Motor Regiment, the moment Tomba Di Pesaro was secure. Clark could get plenty of fire support from the Strathconas on Hill 204 and from the Guards on Peloso, but he still wanted more. With all the German strength encountered in the last two days Clark was

764 Jackson, Mediterranean p. 248. 765 Ops Log, 5 CAD, 1 Sep 1944. 766 W.D. IRC, 1 Sep 1944. 767 Ops Log, 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944. 768 Ops log, 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Sep 1944.

351 probably not being over cautious in bringing overwhelming firepower to bear on a potential hornets' nest.

The Fusiliers from Halifax gave Clark exactly what he wanted. Their 4.2 inch mortar platoons rained 400 bombs on the village in a space often minutes and raked it over with two medium machinegun platoons set up on Peloso with the Guards.769 To this was added an "Uncle" mission by the divisional artillery.770 Clark unleashed his wild Irishmen next, and into the smoke and fire they charged.

With much of the rest of the division watching from higher ground and holding their breath, a call came over the radio from the centre of Tomba Di Pesaro at 2022. For one thing, the village was now to be called "Bobby Clarkville". Also, as soon as it could be arranged, the regimental support echelon was to bring up a mm ration. A cheer went up. The only German captured in Bobby Clarkville was a terrified gunner from the

Parachute Anti-Tank Battalion. He said that two companies of his battalion arrived on

31 August. All he knew was that they no longer existed.771

With the success of the Toronto Irish in "Bobby Clarkville", offensive operations for the weary soldiers of 5th Canadian Armoured Division on this triumphant first day of

September ceased. Standing patrols and listening posts were established, anti-tank guns brought up and slit trenches dug to protect against harassing German shellfire. It was time for the division to catch its breath and take time to relish in the glory of its

769 W.D. PLF, 1 Sep 1944. 770 "Uncle" Targets are engaged by the full weight of divisional artillery, in this case, three regiments of twenty-four 25 pounder field guns. W.D. HQ RCA 5 CAD, 1 Sep 1944. 771 Ops Log, 11 CIB, 1 Sep 1944.

352 achievement. The Horse Guards and the Westminsters would have to wait until dawn to cut into the German rear.

The last Canadian operations of 1 September 1944 were conducted by 1st

Division and 21 British Tank Brigade. Like the anti-climactic Irish attack on Tomba di

Pesaro, 1st Division's attack on Monte Luro revealed the extent of the destmction of 4

Para's battlegroup near Mont Peloso, and the loss of Hill 131 crippled 1st Parachute

Division. The Canadians expected Monte Luro, the highest point on the Tomba Di

Pesaro feature, to be heavily defended, but the paratroopers had little combat power left

777 to defend this naturally strong position.

With 145 RAC and the Seaforths forming a firm base at Pozzo Alto and Casa

Magi, Brigadiers Dawnay and Gibson planned to attack in stages. Lt-Col. 'Budge' Bell-

Irving's Loyal Edmonton Regiment and 12th RTR would leapfrog companies and squadrons forward from Pozzo Alto to a farm 1000 yards east of the objective. Using the farm as a firebase, the force would wheel left and hit Monte Luro from the flank.

This attack was actually teed up in the afternoon but was postponed until 5 Division cleaned out the strong enemy presence on Peloso and Tomba Di Pesaro and the Corps' guns could be directed on Luro.773

The next stage of the plan consisted of the Princess Patricias and 48th RTR jumping off from Casa Magi to a key road junction northeast of Monte Luro. The Royal

Canadian Dragoons with their attached companies of the Royal 22e Regiment would follow hot on the heels of the Patricias, ready to msh north to the coast, to cut the main

772 W.D. I Cdn Corps; 1 CID, 1 Sep 1944.

353 road and seal in any German units not yet withdrawn from Pesaro.774

In preparation for these attacks, Monte Luro received the heaviest concentrations of artillery fire in the Canadian sector. As soon as the area had come within range, three days ago, a harassing fire program began on Monte Luro and Tomba Di Pesaro to add to the constant strafing and bombing by Desert Air Force fighter bombers.775 This fire increased in tempo on 1 September as Gibson's riflemen and Dawnay's tankers worked their way closer, culminating in a detailed fire plan of linear and timed concentrations on the peak and reverse slopes by field, medium, and heavy 7.2 inch guns just prior to the final assault that evening.776

The heavy weight of shot delivered on the round hill top had the desired effect, thoroughly demoralizing the defenders. Lead platoons had a brief tussle with survivors manning a smashed position in the Casa Cinelli farm on the right of the hill. Among the prisoners captured was the crew of an 88mm gun taken with their weapon still intact.

The crew of a Panzertrum was also rounded up from one of these deadly devices by 12th

RTR. The turret was apparently poorly situated and like the others encountered thus far,

777 unprotected by infantry.

Bell-Irving's "B" and "C" Companies continued on towards Monte Luro with a squadron of Lt-Col. H.H. van Straubenzee's Churchill tanks in close support. Sometime near 2100 the lead Loyal Eddy platoons entered the leveled hamlet on the peak to find an

773 Ops Logs, 1 Cdn Corps, 2 CIB; W.D. 49 LER, 1 Sep 1944. 774 Ops Log, 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Sep 1944. 775 W.D. 1 CID, 1 Sep 1944. 776 W.D. HQ RCA I Cdn Corps, 1 Sep 1944. 777 W.D. LER, 1 Sep 1944.

354 elaborate system of trenches, dugouts and pillboxes all abandoned by the Germans. In a post-action interview with the Corps Historical Officer, Captain J.A. Dougan, commanding the lead rifle company, recalled that his men "walked onto the objective, took four prisoners and reorganized."778

The relentless shelling and strafing of Monte Luro paid off. The garrison, thinned out for the counter attack on Point 204 earlier that day, retired to safer ground on the north side of the hill with the intention of returning to their positions as soon as the heavy shelling stopped. With the Loyal Eddies following the barrage so closely, the

Germans had no time to scale the hill before the Canadians were on top. Monte Luro's new occupants then used the opportunity of holding good ground to grind up a counter­ attack that materialized when the former owners tried to return up the steep north slope.

Those not killed by the Loyal Eddies joined the rest of their division fleeing north into the darkness.779 By midnight the Princess Patricias and the Churchills of 48th RTR were firm at the road junction to the northeast after having encountered no enemy. With 1st

Parachute Division reeling from its bloody nose and the high ground now entirely in

Canadian hands the pursuit could begin.

It was obvious to the German Tenth Army commander, General von Vietinghoff, and his operations officer, Lt-Col. Pretzell, that by Friday evening, 1 September any opportunity to hold back Eighth Army on the south side of the Conca was lost.780 With this in mind, Vietinghoff ordered the withdrawal of 76th Panzer Corps to a delaying line

778 Nicholson, Italy p. 522. 779 Ops Log, I Cdn Corps, 1 Sep 1944. 780 Col Runkel, 76 Pz Cps CoS communication with AOK10, 15:35, 31 Aug

355 from Pisano in the west through Monte Luro to Mont Castellaro in the east on the night of 1/2 September. This would be followed by a further withdrawal on the night of 2/3

September to a new permanent defence position in Green Line II mnning from

Gemmano to St. Clemente to Riccione.781

Obviously the Canadians had already wrecked this plan, punching through the notional first line at Monte Luro before it ever came into existence. On 2 September

German rearguards fought desperately at the castle of Gradara to hold back the charging

Canadians in daylight, but as darkness gathered and night attacks were prepared, the survivors fled. Before the day was over elements of both Canadian Divisions were poised on the south bank of the Conca River and the Coast road was cut. 1 Canadian

Brigade, now rested after its tough battles during the approach to the Foglia, thmst over the river that night with the Royal Canadian Regiment leading the way on the right782, and the Westminsters and former anti-aircraft gunners of 12 Brigade's Lanark and

Renfrew Scottish on the left.783

The sacrificial enemy rearguard actions at Gradara and Fanano and a premature retreat allowed most of 1 and 3 Regiments of the Parachute Division to escape across the

Conca but in doing so 4 Para Regiment ceased to exist, with well over 70% of its soldiers dead or in Canadian prisoner cages. The bulk of the Division's irreplaceable anti-tank and 88mm dual purpose anti-aircraft guns were also lost.784

1944, as sited in Jackson, Mediterranean p. 244. 781 Pretzell Rpt, p. 15. 782 W.D. 1 CID, 2 Sep 1944. 783 W.D. 12 CIB, 2 Sep 1944. 784 Hist Sec Rpt #27, p. 40.

356 The escape of part of the Parachute Division to fight on into September is a sore point among General Leese's critics who suggest that an extra division or armoured brigade under Canadian command would have given the Corps enough combat power to trap the Pesaro garrison. This analysis does not take into consideration how much fighting it took to break the Tomba feature on 1 September, how the Pesaro garrison bolted on that same day, and how the Canadian Corps area and road network was already packed with troops and armour. Anyone standing on Monte Luro today can also see how a strong battalion position with dozens of machineguns, mortars and anti-tank guns in the walled town of Gradara commanding the roads in all directions could easily hold out in the daylight hours. It might be tme that Vokes and Dawnay could have organized a more streamlined pursuit force with units they deliberately held in reserve, but it is doubtful such a force could have accelerated the capture of Gradara.

Unfortunately, debate on this question detracts from the real significance of the

Canadian achievement in Green Line I. That achievement has less to do with the tactical details of cutting off the Pesaro garrison and more to do with the perception of crisis created in German higher headquarters. The crisis was even greater than the last one when 71st Division and the Red Line were wrecked. The latest emergency reverberated all the way up to OKW in Germany. That is ironic, given that it is the tactical details of breaking Green Line I, capturing its carefully constructed force-amplifying defences and the gutting of German battalions defending it is precisely what caused that panic. The great 1st Canadian Corps assault on Green Line I, perhaps one of the greatest feats of

Canadian arms of the war, was over. Unfortunately, in this economy offeree diversion

357 the reward for the Canadian soldier in Italy was not a rest and a pat on the back from the folks at home, but fresh new enemy divisions to fight as even more reinforcements were mshed to the Adriatic to hold the Gothic Line and keep the Allies out of the Po Valley.

Kesselring immediately released 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to the front to stop the Canadian breakthrough. As the gravity of the crisis became apparent, he also transferred 356th Infantry Division from the still quiet Florence sector. 90th Panzer

Grenadier was also moved away from the Maritime Alps to the threatened area. OKW grew concerned that the fall of Green Line I forced Kesselring to strip the perimeter defence when the threat of amphibious landings near Genoa and a renewed drive through the Maritime Alps still seemed apparent. They were equally alarmed about the possibility of the Gothic Line being turned by this Adriatic breakthrough, which they evidently were not concerned so much about if the attack came in the Florence sector, with its numerous lay back positions and large troop density. OKW staff officers admitted after the battle that they came to see this attack on the Adriatic flank as the best use of the Allied advantage in tanks and planes, compared to mountain pass routes they expected, but they criticized the Allied failure to strategically exploit their penetration with the amphibious hook they kept expecting.785 These kinds of German criticisms must be considered in the context of their dramatic overestimation of Allied assets and capabilities in the Mediterranean, deliberately inflated by Allied deception plans. 1st

Canadian Corps actions fed these fears. The very measure of their success was to draw more enemy strength upon themselves.

785 OKW-1576, pp. 10-11.

358 TREBWO -LteH Conclusion: Baiting the Wolf, The Cold Reality of Diversionary Operations

Smashing the Red Line and Green Line I as August 1944 gave way to September marked the beginning of a long, grinding battle against the German armies in Italy that dragged on until November in the cold, sodden "polder" country of the Romagna plain.

In September, with the Canadians leading, Eighth Army induced two more major emergencies in German headquarters forcing the enemy to commit ever more resources to maintain a stable front. From 10 September through to the end of October 1944 US- led Fifth Army joined the dogfight and added to German panic in Italy. In the end, all

Army Group "C" divisions were drawn from perimeter positions and cycled through the attritional battle. In the language of another war in another hell-like place called

Verdun, Kesselring's armies were "bled white". Despite a steady stream of replacements arriving by train, fighting strength in embattled divisions drained at least

50%), with many dropping well below that. In addition, German commanders continued to overestimate Allied capability, assumed the offensive against the Gothic Line would continue with the same ferocity and that an amphibious hook still loomed.786 Therefore, instead being robbed of units for service on other fronts, Army Group "C" received tens of thousands of replacements and orders to hold "Upper Italy" at all costs.

Hitler and Wehrmacht planners did not believe Kesselring's divisions were in

786 Army Group AC" lost 14 000 casualties by mid-September but received 9000 replacements. By month's end, Army Group AC" was short by 23 800 men. OKW promised 20 000 more replacements along with orders to hold the Gothic Line at all costs. October cost 34 285 for which 24 000 replacements were provided. November added another 29 000 casualties and 9400 replacements. DHH SGR II 255 - OKW 1576

359 any position to help on the main fronts during the critical months of September and

October 1944 as Eisenhower's armies crossed the great rivers of Northwest Europe and made ready to invade Germany. Threatened with collapse on all fronts and denied use of his powerful formations in Italy, Hitler therefore committed portions of Germany's final reserves, carefully assembled in mid-1944 for his winter Ardennes Offensive, to stave off defeat in the fall of 1944. In November, after Antwerp opened to Allied shipping and new American formations arrived in strength, German plans for a final counter-offensive in the west to collapse the Allied coalition and secure an acceptable peace, were mined once and for all. His winter attack, later known as the Battle of the

Bulge, was delivered with watered down strength against increasingly powerful

American armies. German historian Heinz Magenheimer sums up his country's predicament and the interdependence of their three land fronts in late 1944:

Any setback in one area that could not be corrected by local means implied that valuable reserves would have to be drawn from B or denied to B another area. On the other hand any major success on one front offered the chance of freeing reserves for despatch to another front where they were more urgently needed.

Germany's last fighting strength, created in desperation, fought with skill and determination to the bitter end, mere kilometres from the factories providing their arms and ammunition. But after decisive defeats in late 1944, the German Army could not escape its fate. It was only a matter of time before the final blows could be delivered on all fronts and the destmctive reign of Nazi Germany put to an end in 1945. Operation

Olive represents a small component of the total Allied effort to defeat Germany, but it

AThe Fight for the Apennines Position, 15 August - 31 December 1944." pp. 22 - 26, 51.

360 was a well executed and underappreciated part that contributed greatly to the attrition war and denied "valuable reserves"to the decisive fronts where and when they were most

"urgently needed".787

The tremendous Canadian victory on the Tomba di Pesaro high feature went a

long way towards containing and attriting Army Group "C" in Italy, but that strategic

achievement has been hidden for decades. Canada's breakthrough in the Gothic Line accomplished the mission of generating a threat perception in German headquarters and the movement of large forces to stop it. This goal was attained more quickly than expected on 1 September 1944 and unfortunately fostered a growing misunderstanding in Eighth Army that German defences were cmmbling and the enemy was about to make

for the Alps. This misunderstanding contributed to historical interpretations that a great

opportunity presented itself to General Sir Oliver Leese. Canadian success in the first

days of September coincided with Allied intelligence problems in identifying the

number and arrival time of German formations rushing to the Adriatic area.788 It also

coincided with the dramatic armoured blitzkrieg then underway in Belgium and the

southern Netherlands, where Second British Army was on the verge of capturing the

mighty port of Antwerp. "Hitler is in headlong retreat on all fronts" went Eighth Army

78Q

intelligence summaries on 3 September. The next day, an intercepted report from the

Japanese Ambassador in Berlin revealed that Hitler authorized Operation Herbstnebel;

787 Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler's War. (London: 1998) pp. 255-258. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol 3, Pt II (London: 1988) p. 342. 789 WO 170/275-6 V Corps W.D. Operations Order 18, 2 Sep 44; Operations Order 19, 3 Sep 44; Intsums 363, 1 Sep 44; 364, 2 Sep 44; 365, 3 Sep; 366, 4 Sep 44;

361 the expected deliberate withdrawal to the Alps for the expressed purpose of holding that line with small forces to release major formations to reinforce decisive theatres.790

The intelligence picture developing in Charles Keightley's 5th British Corps and in Eighth Army Headquarters suggested that the dogfight phase of the battle was concluding and the pursuit should commence. Keightley, an experienced Italian campaigner, ordered his 1st British Armoured Division pursuit force to msh northward from its concentration area many miles to the rear. The order came ahead of schedule, and ahead of the call up of 4th British Infantry Division, which was next on the planned list of units to commit to the attritional dogfight. His decision doubtlessly seemed sensible at the time given available intelligence and that a German attempt to cut and mn was what Allied field commanders and the Combined Chiefs most feared. A timely launch of 1st British Armoured Division into the midst of a retreating enemy might prevent such an escape.

Instead, tragedy stmck. Historians agree that the mshed move forward of Major-

General Hull's 1st Armoured Division resulted in a disaster of the highest order when the formation's armoured brigade launched an unsupported charge into what they thought was a cmmbling enemy front. 2nd British Armoured Brigade drove headlong into the teeth of densely packed German anti-tank, infantry and artillery units manning Green

Line II, the first of the Gothic Line's major layback positions. The problem was magnified by confusion between 5th Corps headquarters and its 46th Division. In the excitement and euphoria, orders to secure the full length of the Coriano-San Clemente-

368, 6 Sep 44.

362 Gemmano ridge line as a base for further operations were mis-interpreted. The dominant high ground on either side of the valley 1st Armoured Division negotiated was still in German hands. The problem was further compounded by Keightley's decision to accelerate the deployment of 1st Armoured Division. The division's armoured brigade arrived first and led off, while the lorried infantry battalions were still stuck in traffic well behind the front. When Hull's tanks burst over the saddle between Coriano and

Gemmano, they were blasted to bits by strong German positions to their front and on both flanks, and by devastatingly accurate observed artillery and mortar fire.

The result for 5th Corps tank crews driving into Green Line II was described in typically understated, but nonetheless clear British Army language by Stuart Hamilton, a squadron commander in 8th Royal Tank Regiment.

The valley was so narrow that it was impossible to deploy a two- squadron front. On our right flank the ground was not good with ditches, hedgerows, buildings etc. and on our left the ground rapidly rose up into the mountains and the position was very strongly held indeed with mines, wire, dug-in guns and infantry. Of course with the Jerries on the mountain tops observing exactly where we were going and what we were doing the whole time, we came under extremely heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire and were just 'stonked' to blazes. It was 7Q7

absolutely chronic.

By the beginning of the second week of September, the ground in front of Gemmano -

Coriano ridge was a wasteland of burning British tanks.

The decisions leading to these tragic events drew much criticism from

/yu Hinsley, p. 343. 791 WO 170/275-6 V Corps W.D. Operations Order 18, 2 Sep 44; Operations Order 19, 3 Sep 44. 792 Stuart Hamilton, MC, Armoured Odyssey: 8th Royal Tank Regiment in the Western Desert, 1941 - 42, Palestine, Syria, Egypt 1943-44, Italy 1944 - 45. (London:

363 commentators on this battle, and are employed as evidence of Eighth Army's poor generalship and inability to fight mechanized manouevre battles. Douglas Orgill,

William McAndrew, Shelford Bidwell, Dominick Graham, and W.G.F. Jackson agree that Oliver Leese's already flawed plan completely fell apart when the unsupported

British tanks were picked off in the first week of September. McAndrew complains that it was during this time that "the finest Canadian Corps action of the war" which created the opportunity for a decisive breakthrough that could "alter the course of the war" was not "effectively exploited" and thus lost.793 Bidwell and Graham argue that the "battle was lost because of lack of forethought, bad management, inertia, and passage of no or faulty information and the failure of what throughout the Italian campaign proved to be a second rate infantry division."794 This last comment refers to 56th (London) Infantry

Division, responsible for seizing the high country around Gemmano.

Like the initial Olive plan, Leese and Keightley's direction of the battle and the

consequences of their early September decisions should be evaluated in light of the

Allied containment and attrition mission. Keightley's decision may have caused horrific

losses and terrible suffering for all units in Eighth Army, but the error in itself did not

stop the advance in early September. Instead, forward movement was halted by the very

success of the diversionary plan which resulted in the timely arrival of substantial enemy

1995) p. 109. 793 William McAndrew, RUSI Journal. ACommanders and Plans," pp. 53 - 56; Douglas Orgill, The Gothic Line. (London: 1967) pp. 79-81; W.G.F Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol VI, Victory in the Mediterranean, Part II June to October 1944. (London: 1987) pp. 247-253. 794 Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Firepower. (London: 1985) pp. 361-362.

364 forces to stop what seemed to German commanders to be a potential disaster. A telling indicator of German concern was the September arrival of a Luftwaffe Medium Bomber

Group diverted from the 'Air Front' over Germany. For the first time since the winter of

1943-44, German bombers made nightly raids into Eighth Army's gun areas and supply parks behind the front.7 5 Casualties from these raids mounted in early September, necessitating the re-deployment of Allied heavy anti-aircraft and night fighter units which had not been needed in Italy in such roles for many months.796

Massed British armoured forces charging Green Line II added to German perceptions that a sizable threat existed in Italy, out of proportion to real infantry and artillery resources available for the attack. German Tenth Army Operations Officer Lt-

Col. Horst Pretzell later wrote that with this Aincreased violence, the Battle of Rimini reached its climax, and with it the critical stage for the defence."797 Pretzell was referring to German infantry and artillery strength in the Adriatic sector of the Gothic

Line which, since Operation Olive began, grew to match Eighth Army's, especially as the latter expended its strength in continuous bite and hold attacks against strong defensive positions. Keightley's premature armoured thmst and failure to seize key high ground condemned Eighth Army to a swirling, confused and desperate battle to control the last remaining ridges barring entrance to the Po Valley, but it did not forfeit an

795 In the summer of 1944 German aircraft production concentrated on fighters for defence against the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive on German cities, or on bombers for costly reprisal raids on Allied base areas in Northwest Europe and even cities in the United Kingdom. See: Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat. (Maxwell AFB: 1983). 796 W.D. 5 CAD, 5-10 Sep 44. 797 Lt-Col. Pretzell, Ops Offr. German Tenth Army, Material for Presentation of

365 opportunity. With both sides possessing determination to succeed, high-quality combat forces and comparable logistic resources, an attritional fight to a standstill in the back end of the Gothic Line was inevitable. An Allied breakthrough opportunity was not lost because one never existed.

The problem facing historians trying to make sense of this bloody collision is that the Germans did not make their final stand on the Po River or in northeast Italy where Allied commanders predicted. Instead the Germans clung tenaciously to innumerable Gothic Line layback positions along the edge of the Po Valley. Secondly,

Allied planners and intelligence staff remained in the dark until late in the battle as to how important these positions were to the enemy, how strong they were and how much manpower and equipment the Germans were prepared to sacrifice defending them.

Therefore, when the outcome is assessed against Allied expectations, it is easy to reach a negative conclusion about this battle. In a war of movement measured by ground gained, 'bogging down' so close to the start point suggests failure. However, in a close- run war of material and attrition measured by numbers of soldiers and weapons contained or destroyed, the location for the climatic battle means little. The magnificence of Allied achievements in Italy was thus for years hidden because the fight to a standstill with Army Group "C" occurred much closer to the attack startline than expected. Unfortunately, once expectations grew of reaching the Alps by winter or that the war was all but over, the short 45 mile advance to the edge of the Po Valley was a disappointment to every Allied soldier and commander involved. Acclaimed Canadian the Battle of Rimini, Aug 44-Feb 45 pp. 17-18.

366 writer and veteran of those dark days, Farley Mowat, wrote that the old hands in his

Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment reached the point where they "had given of their reserves to the last dregs and who were afraid that one more battle would see them smashed into palpitating inner dust."798

The furious and difficult nature of the September 1944 fighting magnified the disappointment. Keightley's decision did not affect the strategic aim of Operation Olive, but it made executing it more difficult. In early September the Germans packed their front with infantry, well equipped with plenty of their highly effective mortars and MG

42 machineguns, long-range high-velocity anti-tank guns, and even heavy Tiger tanks.

German fighting units were backed by the strongest concentration of artillery yet assembled in Italy and suffered no shortage of ammunition for any of their weapon systems. The shift in the balance of combat power came as Eighth Army ran low on artillery ammunition. Intense summer battles throughout Europe and Germany's suicidal resistence consumed shell stocks and shattered ammunition requirement estimates. The problem was especially acute for medium and heavy artillery regiments tasked with counter-battery shooting on ever more numerous 'hostile batteries'.799 More

German guns and fewer Allied shells combined with bad weather and less flying time for a smaller Desert Air Force. This meant the large concentration of German artillery, directed from mountaintop observation posts, could fire with impunity more than ever before in Italy. A walk through nearby Commonwealth War Cemeteries today attests to

798 Mowat, p. 232. 799 Ref. WO 214 vol34 Alexander Papers, Alexander to CIGS, Report on Operations 11 Sep 44.

367 German artillery lethality in September. Higher than average numbers of Allied

supporting echelon soldiers lay buried in those cemeteries. Most were killed by German

shells as they went about their vital, but usually comparatively safe tasks of supplying, maintaining and feeding the fighting troops in Eighth Army all the while under the

watchful eyes of German artillery spotters high atop the inland hills. Canadian unit war

diaries record dramatically higher than normal loss rates among supporting troops during

this period. The number of direct hits on exposed vehicle harbours, transport convoys

and even field kitchens is alarming. For example, on the night of 11 September German

shells crashed into Royal Canadian Engineer 10th Field Squadron's bivouac area,

destroying vehicles and equipment. A direct hit on the Squadron's kitchen truck during

an evening feeding killed twelve sappers and seriously wounded twelve more.800

Visitors to the now peaceful mountaintop village of Gemmano can see for themselves how there were simply not enough places to shield the tens of thousands of

Commonwealth soldiers on the coastal plain below from observed artillery fire.

September was equally difficult for 5th Corps formations. For example, 56th

(London) Division, the formation blamed by Bidwell and Graham for poor performance,

endured a "greater weight of enemy artillery fire [than] was experienced by this Division

in any other action in Italy." September's balance of force ratios and firepower

hampered 56th Division's ability to function according to normal doctrine and practice.

The best possible counter-battery effort could not slacken the fire of German guns, making it increasingly difficult for the Londoners to secure their 'bites' with enough

800 Report on Operations, 5 CAD, "The Gothic Line: Part I, W.D. 5 CAD, Sep

368 soldiers and heavy weapons intact to carry out the critical 'hold' phase of battle. The divisional after-action report records how "very heavy shelling by the enemy brought out the fact that neutralization and knocking out of enemy arty [artillery] helps the attack more than anything else. The heavy infantry casualties were largely caused by shelling.

Infantry commanders are confident that British infantry, supported by armour, can take on any position, capture it, and hold it, provided they do not suffer excessive casualties from shelling."801

Terrain at the edge of the Apennines often prevented London brigades from attacking on any more than a single company front. The only way to move at all was to limit enemy observation by attacking at night and through great physical and engineering feats, pushing a few tanks and heavy weapons up to add firepower to the defence at first light. This only worked in the increasingly rare good weather when fighter-bombers could keep some German observers and gunners ducking for cover. But even then, 56th

Division staff described how "enemy shellfire is still unstoppable, in part because enemy had excellent gun areas hidden in Apennines foothills and multiple positions in depth which could be switched at random. Enemy batteries only fired for 18 - 24 hours before moving." As often as not, curtains of German mortar bombs blasted follow-on companies and smashed up heavy weapons moving up to reinforce bites. The division was virtually powerless to halt the rain of fire from so many German medium and heavy mortars and lead companies were often unable to hold their bites. The result was that

44. 801 WO 204/8046 - Notes of the Gothic Line Fighting, W.D. 56th Infantry Division, 2 Oct 44.

369 56 Division objectives took long days to secure in September and only after a heavy price in British blood.802 This scene described by the Londoners is not at all like the typical one of Allied domination of the battlefield with artillery and air power prevelant in Second World War histories.

The armoured cauldron that drew 5th British Corps into a desperate stmggle to destroy powerful German forces on the inland ridges also gave agonizing shape to

Canadian operations in September as 1st Canadian Corps pushed over the flat coastal belt. They fought for nearly two weeks with an open left flank and for three under careful German observation from the inland hills. Their front was blocked by increasingly powerful enemy forces savagely defending Galla Placidia coastal fortifications, including countless reinforced buildings in the seaside resort areas between Cattolica, Riccione and Rimini.

The remarkable Canadian success in Green Line I did not win glory as much as it earned all of Eighth Army the dubious honour of having more and better armed Germans to fight in September. But such is the nature of diversionary holding attacks. The Olive mission meant 1st Canadian Corps must continue to 'advance' even though the advantages of surprise and force superiority were long gone. Twice more the Canadians were ordered to attack and destroy the fighting strength of German divisions in and behind major defensive belts. The next round occurred after being pinned on the coastal plain for a week under some of the heaviest and most accurate German shelling of the

802 WO 204/8046 - Notes of the Gothic Line Fighting, W.D. 56th Infantry Division, 2 Oct. 1944.

370 war in Italy.803 Finally, on the night of 12/13 September 5th Canadian Armoured

Division turned its bulk inland to attack Coriano Ridge. They formed the right wing of a

5th British Corps attack on Gemmano-San Savino aimed at mbbing out Green Line II for good. In a well-coordinated night assault, Ian Johnston's 11th Infantry Brigade, backed by New Bmnswick Hussar Shermans, leaned into their supporting barrage, stormed the crest and took their bite. As per the now familiar formula, Johnston's brigade group then fought at point blank range with counter-attacking reserves from the newly arrived

29th Panzer Grenadier Division in the shell-ravaged streets of Coriano and in trenches and bunkers on either side of it. In the process that division's 15th Panzer-Grenadier

Regiment spent heavily in men and tanks before satisfying themselves that Canada owned Coriano Ridge. In addition to battlefield casualties, hundreds of Germans surrendered after the Canadians bashed into their positions from the east and the British rolled them up from the south.804

This set-piece attack collapsed Green Line II, pulverized the latest German arrivals and once again caused panic for von Vietinghoff, who begged for either more reinforcements or permission to withdraw. The reaper's work had not finished and again he received reinforcements. Despite American attacks north from Florence, OKW feared an Allied breakthrough at Coriano and released two more divisions from the

803 All units in 1st Canadian Corps reported that during the middle two weeks of September 1944 they endured the most violent enemy mortar and shellfire of the entire campaign. In the static days before the offensive was renewed on 12 Sep, enemy shelling inflicted a steady toll of lives among Canadian forward units, causing concern in divisional and Corps Headquarters. W.D. 1 CID, 5 CAD, 1st Cdn Corps, 4-22 Sep 44. 804 W.D.s 1st Cdn Corps, 5 CAD, 11 CIB, 8 NBH, Perth R, CBH, IRC, 12-14 Sept 44.

371 Mediterranean perimeter to shore up the front there, in addition to 90 Panzer Grenadier

Division already on its way. This commitment satisfied the Germans for the time being that Eighth Army's advance was thwarted and the Adriatic front was stabilized.805

However, the Gemmano - Coriano Ridge assault was but the beginning of a renewed

Eighth Army offensive, this time with all its infantry formations in line. Leese's army, with a reinforced Canadian Corps in the lead, hurled itself at great cost across the last remaining miles of German artillery and anti-tank killing zones between Green Line II and the Rimini Line. The latter stood on the last high ground barring access to the Po

Valley, rising from Rimini on the coast, through to San Fortunato Ridge in the Canadian area and on to the mountaintop Republic of San Marino in 5th Corps' sector.806

Seven days of the most intense and bitter fighting of the entire campaign carried

1st Canadian Infantry Division onto the slopes of San Fortunato Ridge. There Kesselring committed his last remaining reinforcements, including 90l Panzer Grenadier Division and his emergency reserve of two heavy Tiger tank battalions. By then, the desperate

German commander was scraping the bottom of his manpower pool and plugging holes in his line with 20 Luftwaffe Division cobbled together from superfluous but still competent and motivated air force ground crew personnel. On the night of 19

September, now famous Canadian regiments like the West Novas, the Loyal Eddies, the

Seaforths and the Hasty Ps, skilfully infiltrated or fought through thick defences under the cover of darkness. When the sun rose they killed counter-attacking enemy infantry and shot up Tiger tanks in quantity. As the sun climbed higher in the sky, the broad flat

805 OKW- 1576, p. 12.

372 plains of Romagna and the Po Valley spread before them. Victory, it seemed, was theirs. But it was not to be.

Thirty days of continuous, high-intensity combat pulled in and ground down the

German defenders, even as it wore out the attackers. Yet, neither had the option of breaking off the battle. Instead, the two tired and comparably sized forces met again on the floor of the Po Valley in the last week of September, just in time for the fall rains to wash out bridges, turn fordable creeks into raging torrents and transform reclaimed

'polder' country into a morass. Much like Generals Leese and Walsh predicted it would,

Operation Olive lost forward momentum when the Germans chose to defend the countless canals, irrigation ditches and rivers of the flat Romagna Plain. Fifth Army drove hard in the Central Apennines until late October, but as Sydney Kirkman feared, only with great difficulty.808 Attacks continued all along the Allied front well into

November as Alexander's two armies did their best to keep relentless pressure on Army

Group "C". However, October and November saw no more grand corps and army scale battles. The men, ammunition, and dry weather for such endeavours were gone. Instead a series of small brigade and sometimes divisional operations were mounted to keep

German units engaged and to maintain a steady attrition of their human and material resources. The desired result was achieved, but only with a steep daily expenditure of human life. In fact, Eighth Army lost as many casualties slugging it out in countless

806 W.D. Eighth Army, 1 Cdn Corps, 807 Eighth Army General Staff Intelligence Narrative, W.D.s 1st Cdn Corps, 1 CID, 3 CIB, 2 CIB, WNSR, CYR, HPER, LER, R 22e R, 17 - 22 Sep 44. 808 Ernest Fisher, US Army in World War II: Cassino to the Alps. (Washington: 1977) p. 325.

373 unknown actions on the Po Valley floor as they did during the dramatic September clash in the Gothic Line.809 Relentless precipitation falling among German shells wrecked the drainage system in the reclaimed farmland, making the battlefield into a wet muddy hell that destroyed the souls of many Allied infantrymen who managed to survive the

carnage. Lest history judge these extraordinary hardships and sacrifices as futile, it

ought to be remembered that such was the cost of baiting the wolf.

The September 1944 chain of events that led to the heartbreaking fall stmggle in the mud was no conspiracy or case of poor judgement by incompetent, jealous

commanders. Instead, rational, clear-thinking men made the best decisions they could with the information available. Unfortunately for a few critical weeks that information led them to underestimate the strength, capability and will of the German Army to resist.

History measured success in the Gothic Line against what Allied generals themselves thought they could accomplish against an enemy they mistakenly perceived to be on the brink of collapse. However, the reality of German defensive strategy in late 1944 and

the amount of combat power they could still generate meant that Operation Olive could

only continue writing off German strength and keeping it away from decisive operations

in Northwest Europe. Leese wrote later how he realized "the enemy opposite the Eighth

Army front was strong in men and material, if not greater in strength than the Eighth

Army."810 With no more surprises or force advantages, there could be no Allied race to

Vienna in 1944.

809 WO 214/16 - Alexander Papers, Memorandums from Alexander to SACMED on casualties to day, 3, 28 Oct 44. 810 NAC MG 37 III Bl 1, vol 62, War Diary, General Observations on the Visit

374 However fruitless the small October bites into enemy territory might seem compared to goals like the Alps or Vienna, they continued to have the desired effect.

The Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Henry Maitland

Wilson, reported that German resistence on the Romagna Plain was "fanatical" with the most limited advances provoking the hoped-for immediate German "counter-attacks,

Q I 1 regardless of loss." By mid-October, Allied intelligence sources gave no indications of German withdrawal plans or requests for Army Group "C" divisions from more decisive fronts. Instead, Kesselring's armies fought on and bled in front of Bologna and Ravenna. That suited the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington and

General Alexander. For all the hopes expressed by senior Allied leadership about reaching the Alps, Alexander never lost sight of Lord Alanbrooke's assignment for his army group. Even after the September euphoria, Alexander understood that regardless of where the front lay his duty was "to maintain pressure on Kesselring's armies with sufficient strength to ensure that he cannot withdraw divisions prematurely for service 81 "\ elsewhere." By November, Alexander grew cognizant that the German decision to resist on a broad front south of Bologna facilitated his containment and attrition goals.

The experienced old soldier appreciated that the long German defence line on the edge of the Po Valley was the best location in Italy to facilitate his mission. Any other stand on the Adige River or the Alps would permit a much shorter enemy front. Alexander to Italy of Col. The Hon. J.L. Ralston - Minister of National Defence. Oct 1944. 811 Wilson, H.M., AReport by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Italian Campaign, Part III, 13 August to 12 December 1944". (1946) p. 82. 812 Wilson, H.M., AReport" p. 79.

375 wrote to the SACMED on 13 November that a shortened enemy front "could release about twelve [German] divisions." Therefore the greatest contribution the Allied

Armies in Italy can make to assist major offensives on the Western and Eastern fronts" was to maintain pressure on the existing long front line in Italy and to continue

"inflicting losses in personnel and material on the enemy." l

The German decision to defend an extended front in mostly open country vindicated Sir Oliver Leese's August plan change and Alexander's "one-two punch" operational concept. Knowing how tenaciously the Germans held Gothic Line positions in both the Central Apennines and Adriatic fronts, it is difficult to see how narrow thrusts up the river valleys to Bologna alone could force the Germans to defend on such a long, exposed line. As Lt-Gen. Kirkman prescribed and US Fifth Army found out, the mountain front offered no advantage to the attacker in surprise or mobile firepower.

Attacks on the central mountain front succeeded only when the enemy thinned the sector out to free reinforcements for the Adriatic crisis. Once that crisis abated in October, weakened German mobile units burned precious fuel driving back to the mountains to stop Fifth Army's second punch.

Even the Germans recognized how the extended front brought "nothing but disadvantage to the defence in view of the consequent thinning out of the fighting

8 1 S force." The long front and toll in dead, wounded or captured Germans stretched

813 WO 204/10376 - Memorandum from SAC Med to CoS, 9 Oct 44. 814 WO 214/34 - Alexander Papers, MA 647 Memorandum from Alexander to Wilson. 13 Nov 1944. 815 NAC vol. 20429 - German Tenth Army War Diary: The Battle of Rimini, Aug 1944 to Feb 1945, Report by Lt-Col. Pretzell, Operations Officer, p. 21.

376 Kesselring's armies enough that they could only shift small reserve forces around the front in reaction to the limited Allied attacks. These reserves were never enough to score a significant reverse. Allied deception efforts and Kesselring's ongoing amphibious landing fears lengthened the front further, ensuring that a portion of Army

Group "C" maintained watch on beaches that could never be attacked. While these coastal defence tasks provided opportunities to spell off German divisions mauled in the

Gothic Line with fresher formations, they kept the German line thin enough that

Alexander's limited attacks were sufficient to occupy Kesselring's entire force and keep the latter constantly begging OKW for more men to feed into the grinder.

One reason historians have not fully accepted operations around the Gothic Line as a successful diversion is that in the aftermath German generals reported their satisfaction with the outcome they believed resulted from their skilful defense. German commanders criticized Allied generalship and failure to make better use offeree

"superiority". Field Marshal Kesselring believed his armies scored a major victory by halting an Allied breakthrough and refers to the "Battle of the Apennines as a famous page in the military history of Germany."816 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht's after­ action report admonished the Allies for not exploiting the "tactical and strategic possibilities" offered by their early breakthrough or of the "encircling landings" they continually feared.817 German Tenth Army Operations Officer, Lt-Col. Pretzell, was somewhat more realistic. He assessed that "stubborn defensive fighting during the battle

o 1 f. Cited in Amedeo Montemaggi, Gemmano: La Cassino dell 'Adriatico (Gemmano: 1998) p. 25. 817 OKW- 1576, pp. 10-11.

377 had so robbed the enemy assault forces of their striking power" that a major Allied threat to "upper Italy" was checked. However, Pretzell also appreciated how this bmtal fighting consumed all available German infantry strength. He observed that only the

"unsettled autumn weather" which filled countless ditches, streams, and rivers allowed

"hard-hit German divisions" to hold the line by waging "a war of dams and dykes".

Nonetheless, the overall tone of his report suggests Tenth Army was on the verge of collapse. Only the poor handling of "far superior" Allied resources and their failure to aggressively exploit successful attacks forfeited the opportunity to decisively defeat the exhausted Germans.818

German criticisms of the Allied assault on the Gothic Line reveal more about how enemy commanders were deceived by deliberately inflated Allied strength reports than about how close Eighth Army was to a decisive breakthrough. At the time their opinions and reports were compiled, German commanders remained ignorant of the fact that the thirty-six Allied divisions attacking them were a fiction, and that the naval and air strength to mount an amphibious landing in the theatre did not exist. In concluding they won a major success against a far superior force, German commanders therefore failed to appreciate how their sacrificial defence of northern Italy played into Allied plans - and how they had been driven back relentlessly by a weaker enemy.

Convincing the Germans that they faced a dangerous threat by a much larger force required Alexander to aggressively drive his formations and equipment beyond the limits of their endurance. Some, like 1st British Armoured Division, were pushed to the

818 Pretzell Report, pp. 22 - 26.

378 point of collapse, with survivors parcelled out as replacements to rebuild other weakened formations. Even then, all British infantry battalions changed from a four- company structure to three in October for lack of trained riflemen.819 In the Canadian case, long casualty lists from August and September in Italy combined with heavy losses in France and Belgium to collapse the replacement system. After seeing the manpower shortages for himself during a fall visit to Italy, Canadian Minister of National Defence

Col J.L. Ralston demanded that home defence conscripts be released for overseas service, spurring the second conscription crisis of the war.820

The strain on human beings pushed to their limits and beyond was not obvious in the first phases of the Gothic Line fighting, but grew cumulatively. In the Canadian case, the intangible, potentially destmctive enemy of battle exhaustion did not seriously weaken the corps until the later stages of the fighting in September and October. Before launching Operation Olive the combination of rest, training and the infusion of reinforcements to replace losses from May 1944 brought the Corps to a high standard of physical and mental strength. Morale also lifted from the impression made on Canadian soldiers that this operation was to be the final offensive in Italy. When the rate of neuropsychiatric casualties did rise in September, it correlated with prolonged combat, rising casualties, dwindling supplies and reinforcements, wet, cold weather and a growing realization that the Germans were not going be driven out of Italy as easily as

81 G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume II: The Canadians in Italy, 1943 - 1945. (Ottawa: 1956) p. 562. 820 NAC MG 37 III Bl 1, vol 62, War Diary, General Observations on the Visit to Italy of Col. The Hon. J.L. Ralston - Minister of National Defence. Oct 1944.

379 hoped in August.

When battle exhaustion became problematic, the total number of cases was kept manageable due to the implementation of a treatment system for neuropsychiatric casualties by No. 2 Canadian Exhaustion Unit.822 Moderate stress casualties were treated in rest stations with two to three days of sleep and relaxation in areas safe from shells and bullets. More serious cases were rehabilitated in Special Employment

Company's where patients contributed to the war effort in the safety of the rear areas with badly needed manual labour.823 Whenever possible, preventative measures were taken by rotating complete battalions out of the line for short breaks at the beach resorts of Cattolica where they could catch a swim, a movie, hot food and a safe night's sleep.

This system enabled both Canadian divisions to attack with the vigour and endurance of a much more powerful force in September, thereby contributing to the great Allied mse.

In October, increased enemy strength, deterioating weather and battle damage in rear areas as the front moved north made the relief program more difficult. Dry billets and rest areas became rare commodities. Available evidence thus indicates that battle exhaustion did not critically hamper 1st Canadian Corps' effort in the Gothic Line

874 proper, but it became chronic during October's bitter holding attacks. Despite the understandable rise in neurophysiatric casualties, the majority fought on in terrible

821 Total NP casualties for the week between the opening of Olive and the breaking of the Gothic Line on 1 September are 72 all ranks for the Corps. The following week's total is 136 all ranks. W.D. No.2 CEU, Aug-Sep 1944. 822 Report on Psychiatry in the Field, W.D. No.2 Cdn Exhaustion Unit, June 1944. 823 Report on Psychiatry in the Field, Sept 1944, W.D. No.2 CEU, Sep 1944. 824 W.D.'s 1 CID, 5 CAD, Sep-Oct 1944.

380 weather and terrain conditions on the Po Valley floor. No doubt, many of those who stayed in the line sacrificed pieces of their sanity in the process. But their courage and dedication to duty in the face of absolute misery contributed immeasurably to mission success.

Getting the Germans to take the bait was also made possible by the military effectiveness of Allied combat units in Italy. As often as not in the Gothic Line, Allied soldiers outfought comparably sized German units. They did so with a modicum of air support and with dwindling supplies, a shortage of artillery ammunition and infantry manpower. All the while the enemy grew ever stronger as they fell back on northern

Italian bases, gathered forces from less threatened sectors and defended wide open terrain offering excellent fields of fire for their long range machineguns, anti-tank guns, mortars and artillery. That Allied units fought in the Gothic Line, more often than not, without significant advantages in numbers, material or firepower over their enemies defies accepted wisdom about Allied and German military effectiveness in the Second

World War.

In this sense, much credit for the Allied diversionary victory in September 1944 should go to 1st Canadian Corps. By the summer of 1944 this formation was at the peak of its form. It possessed the skill, experience, innovativeness and professionalism their fathers were known for at Vimy Ridge and Amiens in the Great War. Each time Eighth

Army broke through enemy defenses and caused a German crisis in the Gothic Line, the

Canadian Corps led the attack. Their performance, both in the fluid early days of the operation and in the arduous later stages, challenges conventional views of the Canadian

381 Army in the Second World War as a blunt instmment incapable of rapid manoeuvre or battlefield opportunism. Rather, 1st Canadian Corps displayed remarkable flexibility by fighting five distinct types of actions in radically different terrain during Operation

Olive. These included swarming delay positions in the semi-mountainous Red Line, an armoured break-in action on the ridges of Green Line I, a mechanized pursuit across rolling hills to Riccione and Coriano, a prolonged set-piece battle in depth on open, fire- swept coastal flats along Green Line II and the Rimini Lines and finally relentless holding attacks on the wet Po Valley polders. In each of these actions the Corps distinguished itself. The most important features of their success were combined-arms coordination and doctrinal sophistication. No one service branch acted alone and soldiers had a strong sense of what tasks their comrades from other arms could perform for each other. This was particularly evident with the artillery, which achieved a level of flexibility enabling quick platoon and company attacks to be supported by concentrations and barrages on enemy positions with minimal notice. These quick

'concentrations on call' forced German soldiers to the bottom of field fortifications and limited their ability to fire on approaching Canadian infantry. Even the smallest scale infantry and armour assaults delivered in the Gothic Line were almost always preceded and accompanied by bursting 25 pounder shells landing among German trenches and pillboxes. This suppressive fire, combined with heavy counter-battery shooting and mixed with aerial counter-battery fighter-bomber missions accounted for comparatively small Canadian losses among strong Green Line I fortifications.825

825 W.D. 1 CID RCA, CRA Report on Operations of 1 Canadian Infantry

382 Canadian tactical and doctrinal sophistication was also evident in the way the vulnerable, but fast and agile Shermans and steep climbing Churchills shot riflemen onto

German positions after being directed onto targets by leading infantry sections. With the exception of the extraordinary circumstances at Point 204, Monte Marrone and the Point

131 anti-tank position, when opportunity and tactical necessity warranted extra risk,

Canadian and supporting British tanks worked behind a screen of riflemen protecting them from all but the most carefully prepared anti-tank defences. Canadian and British tank duels with German defenders on the steep slopes of the Mattera-Monteccicardo and

Tomba Di Pesaro features demonstrate that the question of Second World War tank performance must be reconsidered. The excellent cross country and climbing abilities of

Churchill and Sherman tanks played a decisive role in this Canadian victory. The difficult advance to Monteccicardo and Hill 204 could not have been made without these armoured vehicles crawling up grades that German defensive planners did not think tanks could negotiate. Churchill and Sherman climbing ability and mechanical reliability was maximized by highly trained British and Canadian crews who made superb use of broken Italian countryside to compensate for thinner armour and inferior gun-power, dramatically limiting the advantages German armoured vehicles and antitank weapons possessed.826 Therefore, in the Canadian case, Sydney Kirkman's lessons for aggressively employing armour in rough Italian terrain, learned early in 1944, proved to

Divisional Artillery, 24 August B 22 September 1944. 826 The German high command recognized the Sherman tank was superior to their own in the difficult terrain of Italy, especially when combined with the excellent fire and movement tactics employed by the crews. Interview with Kesselring and Westphal. pp. 41-42.

383 be a critical element in overcoming Allied infantry parity with the enemy.

Artillery and tanks were not the only weapons employed to suppress enemy fire while approaching their positions or to destroy counter-attacks. Canadian units imaginatively employed an array of additional weapons systems in their combined arms teams, including infantry battalion support weapons from integral Bren Carrier, Anti-

Tank and Mortar Platoons as well as attached divisional heavy mortars and medium water-cooled machineguns. Divisional light and heavy anti-aircraft guns and towed and self-propelled anti-tank guns were also used in non-traditional roles to add direct fire support to forward troops in the attack and defence. However, unlike their counterparts in Northwest Europe, 1st Corps did not receive the latest flame throwing armoured vehicles or 17 pounder armed Sherman tanks until December 1944.827 These last two systems proved highly effective in Northwest Europe. Such were the consequences of duty on the secondary front.

Tactical air support from the Desert Air Force was another key component of successful Canadian and Eighth Army operations in the Red Line and Green Line I. The full measure of airpower effectiveness is difficult to assess. While roaming fighter- bombers doubtlessly hampered daylight movement of men and vehicles, little evidence exists to measure damage inflicted on German positions. In all cases where DAF fighter-bombers attacked enemy positions, large concentrations of artillery were also laid on the same targets. Most evidence indicates the greatest air contribution lay in keeping

German artillery observers and gunners huddled inside bunkers and dugouts instead of

827 Nicholson, Italy, p. 607.

384 carrying out their deadly work. The clearest indicator of this air effect came when its absence due to bad weather enabled growing concentrations of German artillery behind

Green Line II to fire on an unprecedented scale. Nonetheless, when the weather was clear, the DAF made an impact. Early in the fighting, before the September rains arrived, German 76th Corps' staff reported that the combination of devastating artillery

878 and roving air power critically hampered their ability to defend Green Line I.

If close air support was influential on good days, the importance of longer range medium and heavy bombers is overstated in most histories of Operation Olive. This is no doubt due to German assessments that medium bombers were decisive in wrecking the extensive minefields in the Foglia Valley just before the Canadians poured into the 87Q

Gothic Line. Those same German officers apparently did not observe the Perths,

Patricias and West Novas fighting through intact and deadly minefields on 31 August.

Likewise, it should be remembered that 70% of Alexander's air strength was withdrawn from his control to support Dragoon in southern France. The Mediterranean Allied

Tactical Air Forces (MATAF) were thus drastically limited in the number of interdiction sorties they could fly against the German transportation grid as Kesselring fed reserves into the Adriatic cauldron, especially compared to the scale of air effort during the fighting around Rome in May. This is less a criticism than an observation of the extra challenges imposed on Allied troops fighting on the secondary front in Italy.

Such challenges make Canadian and Allied achievements in the Gothic Line all 828 Hist Sect Rpt #27, p. 37. 829 Hist Sect Rpt #27, p. 37; Pretzell Rpt, p. 37. 830 Jackson, Mediterranean, pp. 134-136.

385 the more impressive. Far from being an inflexible instmment, 1st Canadian Corps developed a plan for attacking the Gothic Line that encouraged junior leaders to take the initiative and exploit battlefield opportunities. Canadian field grade officers and senior

NCOs then rose to the occasion, displaying a high standard of competent and aggressive leadership. In the confused fighting in the high ground in the Red Line and Green Line

I, Canadian junior officers and non-commissioned officers conformed their actions to the principal goal of securing the dominant Mattera-Monteccicardo and Tomba Di

Pesaro high features, denying enemy observation and facilitating the application of their own observed fire. This mission-oriented approach contrasted sharply with the German defensive effort, which lacked co-ordination and direction.

In the final analysis, Anglo-Canadian doctrine and Italian Campaign strategic goals called for disciplined, efficient, highly trained soldiers and innovative leaders to manage an intricate system for killing or capturing the enemy in large quantities based on "bite and hold" doctrine. This attrition-oriented and firepower-based system, proven effective in the Great War, once again demonstrated how it was the only method possible to defeat a well equipped, trained, motivated and numerically similar enemy.

This system was a key component in the great diversionary victory won on the Gothic

Line in the fall of 1944. The other vital components of that victory in Italy, and indeed in the Second World War, were effective Allied combat forces like 1st Canadian Corps.

Those Allied formations rarely, if ever, had the luxuary of bludgeoning the German

Army to death with overwhelming numbers and material as 'Brute Force' histories suggest. Instead of sheer numbers, Allied and Canadian units counted on skill-at-arms,

386 determination, and courage. Appreciating the complexities of the Gothic Line victory renders earlier views of the battle as an Allied blunder and German defensive victory obsolete.

Syd Frost, commander of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry's improvised mobile medium machine gun platoon, summed up how efficient his countrymen became at carrying out the Combined Chiefs of Staff orders to contain and wreck Army Group "C" in northern Italy in the second half of 1944:

The war had become serious, dirty, never-ending, toe-to-toe, slugging it out with a desperate, ugly foe. It was no longer a free wheeling, Popski- type pursuit in open country. It was a battle of attrition. It was a task for which only professional soldiers need apply. The Patricias had become professionals. Killing was their business. In short, the regiment had matured into an efficient killing machine. That the regiment still had spirit was undeniable. Only it was a different kind of spirit B one of cold resolve to finish off the enemy and the war.831

831 C. Sydney Frost, Once a Patricia (Nepean: 1997) p. 307.

387 qaSan Martino d — L ^elle_ THE .RIMINI

^ ADVANCE TO RIMINI

JV / 3-22 SEPTEMBER 1944 <3v 4 MILESfc =JMIL£S .Monticello or* Canadian Forcas.. . nta Maria^ 0^^ ^ *» Allied Force* ••• aaaa m+~ San Lorenzo Le Grazie, **& \ in Monte a ONLY PRINCIPAL ROADS SHOWN

Coyignar _

MOUNT Fortun^Vf f. FAGIOLO o\V

fSan MartinoLJl"'© vSEP > TVr >» MAP 20

4 SEP N\.-£ Sant' ^iilina PALAZZO •"=: DES VERGERS 'SS^J (As!; ,-»septan Lorenzo CASA1 <^dS^^Goffeggiano iSan Lorenzo^ in Strada iiccione Marina WEST No^3 CASA -* • MONTJf -MONTC . f^#^Sant' Antimo^ 0 flCCIONE DELL- ^#v, ^6>ISSE,5-^-> #rV* Ceriano ARB0RETA#USV %^jW°'u/ % hettodel VA^ „.N Molino KVAV^

t;ssp c^®^W„Qs^p^aJetto 4 »IRISHy 3 I SEP <*->«- PALAZZO VV^ . ^ feKLnigo °*•^ CECCARINI ^ ^~ San Patrignano /ICerasolo ISSEP Santa Maria . ^7 ^, 53 SEP 02 jMOUNTv^^s, 4t Passano ^GALLERA ><> V 43»" IND^fc- .. % (GURKM^X V\ LORRIED Sol X^ ^ ** BN REPUBLIC n—-Sensoli OF San Savino #^% ^sProce I Mnntp

Table I Order of Battle and Principle Appointments

Eighth Army

5th British Corps Lt-Gen. C. Keightley

1st Armoured Division Maj-Gen. Hull 4th (Indian) Infantry Division Maj-Gen. Holworthy 46th Infantry 'North Midland' Division Maj-Gen. Hawkesworth 56th Infantry 'London' Division Maj-Gen. Whitfield 7 Armoured Brigade 25 Armoured Brigade

2nd Polish Corps Lt-Gen. W. Anders

3rd Carpathian Rifle Division Maj-Gen. Duch 5th Kresowa Infantry Division Maj-Gen. Sulik 2 Polish Armoured Brigade

10th British Corps Lt-Gen. R. McCreery

10th (Indian) Infantry Division Maj-Gen. Reid 9 Armoured Brigade

Army Reserve 4th Infantry Division Maj-Gen. Ward 2nd New Zealand Division Lt-Gen. Freyberg 3 Greek Mountain Brigade

Canadian Corps: General Officer Commanding: Lt-Gen. E.L.M. Burns Brigadier, General Staff: Bdr. J.D.B. Smith Corps Commander, Royal Artillery: Bdr. E.C. Plow Corps Commander, Royal Engineers: Bdr. C.A. Campbell

Corps Units: Royal Canadian Dragoons (1 Cdn Armd Car Regt.) The Elgin Regiment (25 Armd Delivery Regt.) 7 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment RCA 1 Survey Regiment RCA

388 The Lome Scots (1st Corps Defence Coy)

1st Canadian Corps, Royal Canadian Engineers 9 Field Park Company 12 Field Company 13 Field Company 14 Field Company lsl Canadian Infantry Division: General Officer Commanding: Maj-Gen. C.Vokes General Staff Officer I: Lt-Col. M.P. Bogert Commander, Royal Artillery: Bdr. W.S. Zeigler Commander, Royal Engineers: Lt-Col. E.H. Webb

The Saskatoon Light Infantry (MG)

1st Canadian Infantry Division, Royal Canadian Artillery 1 Field Regiment RCHA (25 pounders) 2 Field Regiment RCA (25 pounders) 3 Field Regiment RCA (25 pounders)

1st Canadian Infantry Division, Royal Canadian Engineers 2 Field Park Company 1 Field Company 3 Field Company 4 Field Company

1 Canadian Infantry Brigade: Bdr. J.A. Calder Royal Canadian Regiment The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment 48th Highlanders of Canada

2 Canadian Infantry Brigade: Bdr. T.G. Gibson Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada The Loyal Edmondton Regiment (49th)

3 Canadian Infantry Brigade: Bdr. J.P.E. Bematchez Royal 22e Regiment The Carleton and York Regiment The West Nova Scotia Regiment

5th Canadian Armoured Division: General Officer Commanding: Maj-Gen. B.M. Hoffrneister

389 General Staff Officer I: Lt-Col. H.H. Angle Commander, Royal Artillery: Bdr. H.A. Sparling Commander, Royal Engineers: Lt-Col. J.D. Christian

Princess Louise's Fusiliers (MG) Governor General's Horse Guards (3 Cdn Armd Recce)

5th Canadian Armoured Divison, Royal Canadian Artillery 17 Field Regiment RCA (25 pounders) 11 Field Regiment RCA (25 pounders) 8 Field Regiment RCA (self-propelled 105mm)

5th Canadian Armoured Division, Royal Canadian Engineers 4 Field Park Squadron 1 Field Squadron 10 Field Squadron

11 Canadian Infantry Brigade: Bdr. I.S. Johnston The Perth Regiment The Cape Breton Highlanders The Irish Regiment of Canada

12 Canadian Infantry Brigade: Bdr. J.S.H. Lind 4th Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards The Westminster Regiment Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment

5 Canadian Armoured Brigade: Bdr. I.H. Cumberland Lord Strathcona's Horse (2 Cdn Armd) VIII Princess Louise's New Brunswick Hussars (5 Cdn Armd) The British Columbia Dragoons

1 Canadian Army Group, Royal Artillery: Bdr. W.E. Huckvale 1 Medium Regiment RCA (4.5 inch) 2 Medium Regiment RCA (4.5 inch) 5 Medium Regiment RCA (5.5 inch)

21 British Army Tank Brigade: Bdr. D. Dawnay. 12, Royal Tank Regiment 48, Royal Tank Regiment 145 Battalion, Royal Armoured Corps (8th Duke of Wellington's Regiment)

390 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

Directorate History and Heritage, Department of National Defence:

Canadian Documents:

Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Christian, Commander, Royal Engineers, 5th Canadian Armoured Division. DHH Biography Files

Diary of Major R.C.H. Dumford, Chaplain(P), The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, June 1943-June 1945. DHH Biography Files

Fereley, Z.M. Personal account of the break into the Gothic Line 30-31 Aug 1944 by the British Columbia Dragoons. Interview with R.H. Roy, unit Historian. 958.001 DI.

Interview with General B.M. Hoffrneister by B. Greenhous and Dr. W. McAndrew. (Unpublished)

Letters from veterans of the British Columbia Dragoons recieved by R.H. Roy, BCD Historian. Recieved by Army Historian 8 Apr. 1965. 958.005 D2

Wrinch, J.A., Historical Officer. Summaries of Operations of I Canadian Corps. Aug- Dec, 1944. 224C1.013 D13.

Captured German Documents:

Army Group "C", Italy, Strategy, Kesselring and Westphal answer questions on general strategy during the Italian Campaign. 981 SOM.D144

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Report # 1576, "Report on the Fight for the Apennine Position and the Improvement of the Western Alps Position, 15 August - 31 December 1944. SGR 11/255.

HQ Corps Witthoeft, Tenth German Army. Order No. 1 for Strengthening the Gothic Position. 4 June 1944. 981AZ. D58.

Order No. 2 for Additional Construction in the Green Line. 22 June 1944. 981AZ. 60.

391 Pretzell, Horst. Operations Officer, German Tenth Army. Material for Presentation of the Battle of Rimini., Translated by DHist. 981.011 D3.

Report No. 27, Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters. The Italian Campaign: The Battle of Rimini and the Subsequent advance to the River Ronco, 11 Aug-31 Oct. Information from German Military Documents regarding Allied Operations in general and Canadian Operations in Particular. Compiled by Capt. Steiger, 28 September 1949, AHQ Rpt D27.

National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24:

Unit/Formation War Diaries

War Diary; Eighth British Army.

War Diary; 1st Canadian Corps. Canadian Section, General Headquarters 1&2 Echelon, Allied Armies, Italy Corps Commander, Royal Artillery Royal Canadian Artillery, Corps Troops Corps Commander, Royal Engineers Royal Canadian Engineers, Corps Troops 1st Canadian Counter-Battery Office 1st Survey Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery

War Diary; 1st Canadian Infantry Division. War Diary; 5th Canadian Armoured Division.

War Diary; 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade. War Diary; 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade. War Diary; 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade. War Diary; 11 Canadian Infantry Brigade. War Diary; 12 Canadian Infantry Brigade. War Diary; 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade.

War Diary; 2 Canadian Armoured Regiment (Lord Strathcona's Horse)(Royal Canadians). War Diary; 5 Canadian Armoured Regiment (VIII New Brunswick Hussars)(Princess Louise's). War Diary; 9 Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons). War Diary; 3 Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (Governor General's Horse Guards). War Diary; 1 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons).

War Diary; Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

392 War Diary; Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. War Diary; (49th)Loyal Edmonton Regiment. War Diary; Royal 22e Regiment. War Diary; West Nova Scotia Regiment. War Diary; Perth Regiment. War Diary; Cape Breton Highlanders. War Diary; Irish Regiment of Canada. War Diary; 4th Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards.

War Diary; Royal Canadian Artillery, 1st Canadian Corps. War Diary; ls! Canadian Army Group, Royal Artillery. War Diary; Royal Canadian Artillery, 1st Canadian Infantry Division. War Diary; Royal Canadian Artillery, 5th Canadian Armoured Division.

War Diary; 1 Canadian Medium Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 2 Canadian Medium Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 5 Canadian Medium Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 1 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. War Diary; 2 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 3 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 8 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 11 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 17 Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery.

War Diary; 4 Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 7 Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 16 Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 82 (Gaspe) Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery. War Diary; 98 (Bruce) Anti-Tank Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery.

War Diary; Royal Canadian Engineers, 5th Canadian Armoured Division. War Diary; No. 2 Canadian Exhaustion Unit, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps. Medical History of the War; Quarterly Report, July - September 1944, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps. War Diary; Lt-Gen. E.L.M. Bums, General Officer Commanding I Canadian Corps.

Other NAC Documents

MG 37 III Bl 1, Papers of J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence.

German Luftflotte 2 Ultra Decrypts.

Report on Operations in Italy by Colonel von Bonin, Senior General Staff Officer at German Army Group "C".

393 Report on the Italian Campaign, 1943-45, As Seen by the Enemy. Prepared by Lieutenant-General Fritz Wentzell, Chief of Staff, Tenth German Army Headquarters, 17 Dec 1945.

Canadian War Musem

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED), Final Report to Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Italy, 13 August- 12 December 1944.

Military Training Pamphlet Collection.

National Archives of the United Kingdom (Formerly the Public Record Office)

War Office 170, War Diaries, 5th British Corps and Component Formations.

War Office 204, Allied Forces Mediterranean Theatre, Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War, 1941 - 1948.

War Office 214, Earl Alexander of Tunis, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre: Papers, 1941 - 1946.

Imperial War Museum (United Kingdom)

Lord Harding Papers.

Sir Oliver Leese Papers.

George C. Marshall Research Library

George Catlett Marshall Papers.

Published Document Collections

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, Volume III. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.

The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 4, June 1 1943- December 31 1944. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

War Diaries: 1939—1945, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. Danchev, Alex; Todman, Daniel, Eds. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001.

394 Monographs

Alexander of Tunis. The Alexander Memoirs. London: Cassell, 1962.

Anders, W. An Army in Exile: the Story of the Second Polish Corps. Nashville: Battery Press, 1981.

Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943. New York: Owl Books, 2003.

Bellis, M.A. British Tanks and Formations, 1939-45. Wistaston: M.A. Bellis, 1987.

Bennett, Ralph. Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy. New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1989.

Bidwell, Shelford; Graham, Dominick. Tug of War: The Battle for Italy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

— , Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904 - 1945. London:

Allen and Unwin, 1982.

Blaxland, Gregory. Alexander's Generals: The Italian Campaign, 1943-1945. 1979.

Blumenson, Martin. Anzio: The Gamble That Failed. New York: 1963. Brown, John S. Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II. Lexiington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986.

Bryant, Arthur. Triumph in the West, 1943-46. London: Collins, 1959.

Bums, E.L.M. Manpower in the Canadian Army. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1956.

General Mud. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970.

Carafano, James Jay. After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Carver, Field Marshal Lord. The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Italy: 1943- 1945. London: Pan Books, 2001.

Chamberlain, Peter; Ellis, Chris. British and American Tanks of World War II. New York: Arco Publishing Inc., 1981.

Charters, David; Milner, Marc; Wilson, J. Brent. Military History and the Military

395 Profession. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Clark, Mark W. Calculated Risk. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.

Copp, Terry; McAndrew, William J. Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in The Canadian Army, 1939-45. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990.

Copp, Terry. The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1939-1945. Stoney Creek: Fortress Publications, 1992.

Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003.

Dancocks, Daniel G. The D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945. Toronto: McCelland and Stuart Inc., 1991.

Deakin, F.W. The Six Hundred Days of Mussolini. New York: Anchor Books, 1966

D'Este, Carlo. Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome. New York: Harper and Collins, 1991.

Doubler, Michael. Closing with the Enemy: How the GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-45. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994.

Douglas, W.A.B; Sarty, R; Whitby, M. No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Seocnd World War, 1939-1943 Volume II, Part 1. St. Catherines: Vanwell, 2002.

Ehrman, John. Grand Strategy: Volume V, August 1943 - September 1944. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956.

Eisenhower, D.D. Crusade in Europe. Washington: Doubleday, 1948.

Ellis, John. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War. New York: Viking, 1990.

English, John A. Failure in High Command: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign. Ottawa: Golden Dog Press, 1995.

Fisher, E.J. United States Army in World War II: Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Cassino to the Alps. Washington: Centre of Military History, United States Army, 1977.

396 Fraser, David. And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983.

French, David. The British War in Warfare: 1688-2000. London: Routledge, 1990.

Frost, Syd. Once a Patricia. Toronto: Borealis Press, 1988.

Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Glantz, David M; House, J.M. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1995.

Graham, Dominick; Bidwell, Shelford. Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943-1945. New York: St Martin's Press, 1986.

Granatstein, J.L. The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1993.

Conscription in the Second World War, 1939-1945: A Study in Political Management. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969.

Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping Peace. Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 2002.

Greenhous, Brereton. Dragoon. Ottawa: Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983.

Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: Master of the Battlefield. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. Hamilton, Stuart, MC. Armoured Odyssey: 8th Royal Tank Regiment in the Western Desert, 1941- 42, Palestine, Syria, Egypt 1943-44, Italy 1944 - 45. London: Tom Donovan Publishing, 1995.

Harris, Stephen J. Canadian Brass. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.

Hart, Russel. Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

Higgins, Trumbell. Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American Controversy Over the Italian Campaign. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968.

Hinsley, F.H. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume II, Part II, Volume III, Part I & Part II. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1988.

397 How, Douglas. 8th Hussars. Sussex: Maritime, 1964.

Howard, Michael. Grand Strategy: Volume IV, August 1942 - September 1943. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1972.

Hunt, Sir David. A Don at War. London: Routledge, 1969.

Jackson, Sir W.G.F. Alexander of Tunis. London: Batsford, 1969.

The Battle for Italy. London: Batsford, 1967.

The Battle for Rome. London: Batsford, 1969.

The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume VI, Victory in the Mediterranean, Part II June to October 1944. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1987.

Jenkins, MaKay. The Last Ridge: TheEpic Story of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division and the Assault on Hitler's Europe. New York: Random House, 2003.

Johnston, Stafford. The Fighting Perths. Stratford: Perth Regt. Veterans Association, 1984.

Jones, Matthew. Britain, The United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-1944. London: MacMillan, 1996.

Kamow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

Kerry, A.J.; McDill, W.A. The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers. Ottawa: Military Engineers Association of Canada, 1966.

Keshen, Jeffery. Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada's Second World War. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004.

Kesselring, Albert. Kesselring: A Soldier's Record. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970.

Kitching, George. Mud and Green Fields: Memoirs of Major-General George Kitching. St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 1993.

Kuhn, Volkmar. German Paratroops in World War II. London: Ian Allen, 1978.

Kroener, B.R.; Deiter-Muller, R.; Umbreit, H. Germany and the Second World War: Volume V, Organization and Mobilization oftheGerman Sphere of Influence, Part II, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources, 1942-

398 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Linklater, Eric. The Campaign in Italy. London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1977.

Longmate, Norman. The Bombers: The RAF Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945. London: Hutchinson, 1983.

Lucas, James. Storming Eagles: German Airborne Forces in World War Two. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1988.

Magenheimer, Heinz. Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions, 1940-1945. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1997.

Matloff, Maurice. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959.

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959.

McAvity, J.M. LordStratcona's Horse. Toronto: Bridgens, 1947.

Miller, Francis Trevelyan Miller, History of World War II: Armed Services Memorial Edition. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948.

Millett, Allan R.; Murray, Williamson. Military Effectiveness, Vol II: The Interwar Period, Vol III: The Second World War. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988.

Milner, Marc. North Altantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys. Annalpolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985.

The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive Against Germany's Submarines. Annalpolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

The Battle of the Atlantic. St. Catherines: Vanwell, 2003.

Montemaggi, Amedeo. Gemmano: La Cassino dell'Adriactio. Gemmano: Municipality of Gemmano, 1998.

Montgomery of Alamein. Memoirs. London: Collins, 1958.

Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe: 1933-1945. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1983.

Nicholson, G.W.L. The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World

399 War: Vol.11: The Canadians in Italy. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957.

The Gunners of Canada Vol II. Toronto: McCelland and Stewart, 1972.

Nicolson, Nigel. The Life and Times of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis. London: Atheneum, 1973.

Oldfield, J.E. The Westminster's War Diary. New Westminster: Mitchell Press, 1964.

Orgill, Douglas. The Gothic Line. New York: Norton, 1967.

Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. London: Norton & Company, 1995.

Pal, Dharm. Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War: The Campaign in Italy, 1943-45. Calcutta: Saraswaty Press Ltd, 1960.

Pogue, Forrest, George C Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943 - 1945. New York: Viking Press, 1973.

Porch, Douglas. The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theatre in the World War II. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.

Raddall, Thomas. West Novas. Liverpool: Thomas Raddall, 1947.

Rolf, David. The Bloody Road to Tunis: Destruction of Axis Forces in North Africa, November 1942 - May 1943. London: Greenhill Books, 2001.

Roy, R.H. Sinews of Steel: The History of the British Columbia Dragoons. Toronto: Charters Publishing Co., 1965.

The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. Vancouver: Seaforth Highlanders of

Canada, 1969.

Ryder, Rowland. Oliver Leese. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987.

Senger Und Etterlin, Frido von. Neither Fear Nor Hope. Novato: Presidio, 1989. Shepperd, G.A. The Italian Campaign: 1943-45, A Political and Military Re­ assessment. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Schreiber, Shane. Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997.

Stevens, G.R. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 1919-1957. Vol III.

400 Montreal: Southam Printing, 1958.

The Royal Canadian Regiment, 1933-1966. London: London Printing, 1967.

Tooley, Robert. Invicta: The Carleton and York Regiment. Fredericton, New Ireland Press, 1989.

United States War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.

Vaughan-Thomas, Wynford. Anzio. New York: Holt & Rinehart, 1961.

Vokes, Chris. Vokes: My Story. Ottawa: Gallery, 1985.

Whitaker; Denis; Whitaker, Shelagh. Tug of War: The Allied Victory that Opened Awtwerp. Toronto: Stoddart, 2000.

Wilt, Alan F. "Allied Cooperation in Sicily and Italy, 1943-45." Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Cooling, B.F. ed. Washington: Office of the United States Air Force, 1990.

Windsor, Lee A. Boforce: A Study of Mobile Warfare in 1943, Canadian Style. Unpublished BA (H) Thesis, Acadia University, 1993.

Zuehlke, Mark. The Gothic Line: Canada 's Month of Hell in World War II Italy. Vancouver: Douglas & Mclntyre, 2003.

Articles

Brown, John S. "Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and the Mythos of Wehrmacht Superiority: A Reconsideration." Military Affairs. January 1985.

Brown, Shaun R.G. "The Rock of Accomplishment: the Loyal Edmonton Regiment at Ortona." Canadian Military History. Autumn 1993.

Dupuy, Trevor N. "Mythos or verity? The Qualified Judgement Model and German Combat Effectiveness." Military Affairs. October 1986.

Granatstein, J.L. "Hoffrneister in Italy." Canadian Military History. Autumn 1993.

Greenhous, Brereton. '"Would it Not Have Been Better to Bypass Ortona Completely...?' A Canadian Christmas, 1943." Canadian Defence Quarterly. April 1989.

401 Haller, Oliver. "The Defeat of the 12th SS: 7-10 June 1944." Canadian Military History. Spring 1994.

McAndrew, William J. "Eighth Army at the Gothic Line: Commanders and Plans." Royal United Services Institute Journal (RUSI), March 1986.

— "Eighth Army at the Gothic Line: The Dog-Fight." RUSI Journal, June 1986.

"Fifth Canadian Armoured Division: Introduction to Battle." Canadian Military History. Autumn 1993.

"Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily-1943." Military Affairs, July 1987.

Scott, Glen L. "British and German Operational Styles in World War II." Military Affairs. October, 1985.

Wood, James A. "Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program, 1945-1961," The Journal of Military History. January 2005.

Windsor, Lee A. "Boforce: 1st Canadian Infantry Division Operations in Support of the Salemo Bridgehead, Italy 1943." Canadian Military History. Autumn 1995.

"Too Close for the Guns: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Rhine Bridgehead", Canadian Military History. Spring: 2003.

402 Windsor, Lee A. 27 Edward Street Fredericton New Brunswick Home Phone: (506) 455-5248 Work Phone: (506) 458-7418 Fax: (506) 453-5068 email: [email protected] ASSETS/SKILLS:

*EXTENSIVE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE OF PAST AND PRESENT MILITARY AFFAIRS *IN-DEPTH KNOWLEDGE OF STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT, AND OPERATIONS OF CANADIAN FORCES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH/ANALYSIS *DYNAMIC PUBLIC SPEAKING AND WRITING •STRATEGIC PLANNING •PROJECT MANAGEMENT •EVENT CO-ORDINATION •MEDIA/PUBLIC RELATIONS

EDUCATION:

University of New Brunswick

September 1999 - 2006, Ph.D. in History

Concentration: Canadian and International Military History, Second World War, Canadian Army operations 1943-45 Dissertation: Anatomy of Victory: Allied Containment Strategy, 1st Canadian Corps and the Battle for the Gothic Line Awards: Graduate Teaching Assistantship; Lord Beaverbrook Scholarship

Wilfrid Laurier University

September 1994 - May 1996, Master of Arts in History

Concentration: Canadian and International Military History, Canadian Army operations 1943-45 Thesis: Quansem Hep: 1st Canadian Corps Breaks the Gothic Line, Summer 1944. Awards: Graduate Teaching Assistantship; Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation Bursary to attend 1995 Study Tour to Normandy and Northwest Europe Acadia University

September 1989 - August 1993, Bachelor of Arts in History;

Concentration: International Military History, Canadian Army operations 1943-1944 Thesis: "Boforce:" A Study of Mobile Warfare in 1943, Canadian Style. Awards: BA with Honours EMPLOYMENT:

July 2006 - Present: Deputy Director, UNB Brigadier Milton F. Gregg VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society (Gregg Centre)

September, 2005 - June 2006: Project Coordinator, UNB Centre for the Study of War and Society -Coordinated Department of National Defence funding renewal process; -Assisted with creation of new Centre after amalgamation of former MSS Program and UNB Centre for Conflict Studies; -Serve as UNB representative on Carleton University Model NATO Advisory Board, Oversee academic content and direction of the conference, lead crisis simulation team; -Canadian Forces Liaison; -Public and media outreach; -Coordinate local New Brunswick battlefield study tours and Canadian Forces student familiarization visits. -Manage Work-Study student employees and volunteers; -Assistant to Acting Director, duties same as below.

September 2004 - Present: Part-time Instructor, UNB Department of History -Teach undergraduate courses in military history at the first, third and fourth year levels; -Designed, coordinate and teach 3rd year undergraduate course/study tour of the Italian Campaign on location in Italy through UNB's Rome Intercession Program.

September, 2000 - April 2005: Part-time Instructor, UNB Arts 1000 Program -Tutorial Leader for Arts 1000: Introduction to Western Intellectual Development Course; -Faculty Advisor for students in their first and second years of university.

September 2000 - August 2005: Part-time Assistant to Director, UNB Military and Strategic Studies Program -Faculty advisor to First Place UNB teams at 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 Carleton University Model NATO Conferences, responsible for team selection and training; -Serve on Carleton University Model NATO Advisory Board and co-organize event; -Co-ordinate events including public lecture series, local military history tours and student visits to Canadian Forces Bases; -Assist with project grant applications; -Manage student program inquires.

September 1998 -August 1999: Policy Consultant, Canada Student Loans Program, Human Resources Development Canada -Worked in consultation with Departments of Finance, Justice and stakeholder groups to improve interest relief and debt reduction policies and regulations; -Prepared internal departmental and ministerial briefing materials; -Provided input for public and Parliamentary inquires.

June 1997 - November 1998: Assistant Coordinator, Conference of Defence Associations Institute -Designed and conducted research projects on Canadian Forces operations; -Developed and implemented communication and public education programs; -Conceptualized and produced seminars and workshops; -Designed and maintained CDAI and CDA websites; -Responded to media inquires; -Liaised with other defence studies organizations; -Co-ordinate volunteer work.

June 1996 - May 1997: Researcher/Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations Institute (DND Intern) -Produced research and editorial material on national and international military affairs; -Assisted director in organizing seminars and workshops.

1 September 1994 - 30 April, 1996: Wilfrid Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies -Teaching/Research Assistant; -Graded examinations and assignments; -assisted with production and distribution of Canadian Military History.

MILITARY SERVICE:

1997, No. 2 Field Intelligence Platoon -Intelligence Operator

1993 -1994, VIII Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) -Crewman, Reconnaissance Troop, "B" Squadron

1989 -1993, West Nova Scotia Regiment -Weapons Detachment Commander, 1 Platoon, "A" Company

1988 - 1989, VIII Canadian Hussars(Princess Louise's) -Crewman, Reconnaissance Troop, "A" Squadron

PUBLICATIONS

"The Secret War: How the Canadian Forces Struggled, and Still do, to Stabilize the Post-Cold War World", Literary Review of Canada. March: 2005.

"Updating the Official Gospel: Canadian Military History's Third Wave", Acadiensis, Volume XXXIII Number 2, Spring: 2004.

"Too Close for the Guns: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Rhine Bridgehead," Canadian Military History, Spring: 2003.

Introduction to "Operations of 1st Canadian Infantry Divisional Artillery, 24 August - 22 September 1944" by Commander, Royal Artillery 1st Canadian Infantry Division, Canadian Military History, Spring: 2003.

"Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Enforcement of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993", Canadian Military History. Summer 2000; reprinted in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin. Volume 4 Number 2, 2001. Currently in production for reprinting in a War and Canadian Society reader published by Nelson-Thompson of Toronto, edited by Dr. Jeffery Keshen and Dr. Serge Durflinger of the University of Ottawa. Book Review of Ortona: Canada's Epic World WarIIBattle By Mark Zuelkhe, for Canadian Military History Book Review Supplement, Fall: 2000.

'The Battle for Sicily: A Study in Joint Coalition Operations", Unpublished seminar guide package prepared for the Canadian Forces College, Spring 2000.

"Boforce: 1st Canadian Infantry Division Operations in Support of the Salemo Beachhead," Canadian Military History, Autumn: 1995.

COURSES TAUGHT

ARTS 1000 The Development of Western Thought (2000 - 2005) This course explores the significant concepts that have shaped the development of Western civilization from the time of Ancient Greece to the present day. HIST 1815 An Introduction to the History of Warfare (Fall 2005) Course introduces students to tactics, technology, battle control, logistics and management. Developments will be examined by studying selected campaigns and battles. HIST 4804 The Second World War Sea, Land, and Air Campaigns (Winter 2003, Winter 2005) Examines the campaigns, their technical and tactical developments, and principal command personalities. HIST 4806 Canadian Defence Forces (Fall 2004, Summer 2005) After sketching the period of British military responsibility, this course traces the development of the regular Canadian forces and the militia up to the present. Introduces students to contemporary defence problems.

The following two courses were designed, approved by the History Department and delivered based on doctoral research. The latter course is delivered through UNB's Intersession Program in Italy based on the Canadian Battlefields Foundation Study Tour model.

HIST 3804 The Mediterranean Theatre: Strategic Crossroads of the Second World War, 1940- 1945 (Winter 2006) This course introduces the Military History of the Second World War through an in-depth look at the Mediterranean campaigns fought by the Western Allies against Italy and Germany. These campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy generated a mixture of agreement, tension and compromise between American, British and Russian decision makers at the time and have been fodder for writing and debate among historians ever since. HIST3810 The Second World Warm Italy (Intersession 2005 and planned for Intersession 2006) Explores the rise of Fascist Italy, its alliance with Nazi Germany, and the bitter struggle waged against them by the Allies and anti-fascist Italians from 1943-45. Taught on location throughout Italy, and centres on visiting historic sites, monuments and battlefields. Italy's unique geography made the campaign especially difficult for its participants and provides students with the subject for much of their study. Although the course addresses the campaign as a whole, special attention is paid to the highly successful, yet little known, Canadian contribution to the battles at Ortona, the Liri Valley and the Gothic Line. PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS/BATTLEFIELD GUIDING

Guide/Historian, University of New Brunswick, Canadian Battlefields Foundation Public Study Tour to Sicily and Italy, April 2006.

"Atlantic Canadians and the Italian Campaign." Service Club Presentation delivered to Southeastern NB Genealogical Society November 2005, Fredericton Rotary Club Spring 2005, Fredericton Pro-Bus Club Spring 2005.

"Last Battles in Europe: A Remembrance Day Tribute." Presentation to Chipman Regional High School and Chipman Legion, 10-11 November 2005.

Guide/Historian, Joint University of New Brunswick, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canadian Battlefields Foundation Public Study Tour to Belgium - Holland - Germany, October 2005

"VIII New Brunswick Hussars and Maritime Regiments at War in Italy." Keynote address to VIII Canadian Hussars Regimental Association Annual Dinner, November 2004.

"Canada and The Second World War in the Mediterranean." Guest Lecture to Grade 10 History Class at Leo Hayes High School, Fredericton New Brunswick, April 2004

"Serving Canada: Careers Related to Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs." Presentation at Parrsboro Regional High School Career Fair, Parrsboro Nova Scotia, April 2004.

Guide/Historian, Canadian Battlefields Foundation Public Study Tour to Vimy - Dieppe - Normandy, August 2004

Assistant Guide/Historian, Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation Public Study Tour to Belgium-Germany-Holland, August-September 2003

Guide/Historian, Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation Student Study Tour to Sicily and Italy, May 2003

Assistant Guide/Historian, Canadian Military History Public Study Tour to Vimy-Dieppe-Normandy, August 2002

Assistant Guide/Historian, Canadian Military History Public Study Tour to Belgium-Germany-Holland, August-September 2001

Assistant Guide/Historian, Canadian Military History Public Study Tour to Vimy-Dieppe-Normandy, August 2000

"Canada and the Italian Campaign, 1943-45." Guest Lecture given to History 347, Canada in the Second World War Course at Wilfrid Laurier University, February 2000.

"Canadian Peace Enforcement Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," Presented to the United Services Institute of Ottawa, November 1998.

"Media Myth versus Operational Reality: CF Operations in the 1990's" & "Consent By fire: CF Enforcement Operations in Medak, Croatia, 1993" Guest lectures to History 341, Canadian Military History Course at Wilfrid Laurier University, March 1998. CONFERENCE PAPERS:

"The Italian Campaign: Failure to Puncture the Soft Underbelly or Successful Strategic Ruse?" Royal Military College of Canada Military History Symposium, March 2005.

"Only Professionals Need Apply: Canadian 'Economy of Force' Operations in Italy after D-Day" Society for Military History Annual Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, February 2005.

"Long Right Flank of the Normandy Breakout: The Strategic Utility of the Italian Campaign, After D-Day", XV Annual Laurier Military History Colloquium, May 2004.

"Seize Vienna or Contain the Enemy: Measuring Canadian Success in the Italian Campaign, 1944." Canadian Historical Association Annual Meeting, May 2003.

"Too Close for the Guns: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Rhine Bridgehead." XIII Annual Wilfrid Laurier Military History Colloquium, August 2002.

"Tanks Among the Hilltops: Challenging Second World War Doctrinal Stereotypes." Society for Military History Annual Conference, May 2001.

"Professionalism Under Fire: 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in the Medak Pocket, Croatia 1993." XI Annual Wilfrid Laurier Military History Colloquium, May 2000.

"Is Canadian Military History Canadian History?" X Annual Wilfrid Laurier Military History Colloquium, May 1999.

"I Canadian Corps Smashes Gothic Line and Operational Myth" VIII Annual Wilfrid Laurier Military History Colloquium, May 1997.

"1st Canadian Infantry Division Captures Potenza" VI Annual Wilfrid Laurier Military History Colloquium, May 1995.

POPULAR MEDIA PUBLICATIONS

"Fredericton Judge Also a War Hero," New Brunswick Telegraph Journal, 11 November, 2002.

"Peace Enforcement Operations", ON TRACK: Journal of the Conference of Defence Associations. 28 August, 1998.

"Rwanda 1994: Historian Rebuts Saturday NightView" VANGUARD: The Official Magazine of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Volume 2, Number 6. 1997.

"The Gothic Line, 1944: Sons of Vimy Prove Their Mettle," VANGUARD: The Official Magazine of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Volume 2, Number 5. 1997.

"Canadian Troops Brought Peace to Somalia", Ottawa Citizen. 22 July, 1997. "Political Will, Military Capability: Recipe for Balkan Peacekeeping," VANGUARD: The Official Magazine of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. Volume 2, Number 4. 1996.

CDA Institute News Spotlight. (Editorials) Location: www.cda-cdai.ca

20 July, 1997 - "Critics Forget Canadian Troops in Somalia Accomplished Mission." 7 June, 1997 - "Despite Setbacks, Canadian Troops Keep Order in Haiti's Streets." 11 April, 1997 - "CBC Helps Shatter Peacekeeping Myth/ltalian-led Multi-National Force Deploys to Albania." 21 January, 1997 - "Canada's Latest NATO Contribution Deploys to Bosnia." 14, November, 1996 - "Canadians Best Choice for Leading UN Mission to Zaire." 21 October, 1996 - "Top British Peacekeeper Blames Media for Distorting Fact." 10 October, 1996 - "Canadian Battle in Croatia Makes Headlines." 19 September, 1996 - "National Elections in Bosnia Mark Beginning of Reconciliation." 3 September, 1996 - "Reserves Conduct Brigade Level Exercises Across Country." 10 August, 1996 - "Large Weapons Cache Seized in Croatian Police Station."

MEDIA INTERVIEWS:

2-16 March 2006 - "Canada's Mission in Afghanistan" Global Evening News(NB), CBC News (NB), CTV Evening News (Atlantic), CBC Radio, Fredericton, Moncton, Saint John, Rogers Community Radio (NB), Rogers Community Television 4 September 2005 - "Last Carleton and York Regiment Reunion" A7V Evening News 13 November 2004 - "Black Friday: the Battle for Woensdrecht, 1944" ATV Evening News 6 June, 2003 - "Juno Beach Centre Grand Opening" ATV Evening News 11 November 2000 - "Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation helps young people understand their nation's wartime past." ATV Evening News 23 January, 1997 - "Military Leadership and Change in the 1990's," CBO Morning 9 January, 1997 - "Purpose and Role of Canada's Armed Forces," CBC In the House November, 1997 - "Canadian Preparedness for Operation Griffon," Time Magazine Interviewed by Nisid Hajari and quoted in 25 November article "Risks and Rewards of Rescue."

COMPUTER SKILLS: DOS, Windows XP Operating Environments Corel Word Perfect, Quattro Pro, Corel Draw Microsoft Word, Frontpage, Explorer, Publisher, Access, Excel

VOLUNTEER WORK:

•August 2000 - Present, Member, Canadian Battlefield's Foundation - Public awareness, battlefield guiding, fund raising.

•January 2000 - Present, Assistant Troop Scouter, 1st St. Margaret's Scout Troop Fredericton, New Brunswick

* November 1997 - August 1999, Assistant Troop Scouter, 1st Vars/Navan Scout Troop Navan, Ontario REFERENCES:

Professor J. Marc Milner, Director, Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society; History Department Chair University of New Brunswick P.O. Box 4400, Fredericton NB, E3B 5A3 Work (506) 458-7428, Home (506) 459-4742, [email protected]

Professor Terry Copp, Director, Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, (519) 846-5493, [email protected]

Professor Peter Kent Co-Director of the University of New Brunswick's Intersession Program in Rome, Former Dean of Arts University of New Brunswick, P.O. Box 4400, Fredericton NB, E3B 5A3 Work (506) 447-3118, Home (506) 453-0919, [email protected]

Additional References

Lieutenant Colonel David Patterson Director, Militia Command and Staff Course, Land Forces Command and Staff College Station Forces, Kingston K7K 7B4, Work (613) 541-5802, [email protected]

Professor Gary Waite, Director of Graduate Studies, Department of History University of New Brunswick, P.O. Box 4400, Fredericton NB, E3B 5A3 Work (506) 452-6158, [email protected]

Professor Debra Johnston, Arts 1000 Coordinator, University of New Brunswick P.O. Box 4400, Fredericton NB, E3B 5A3, Work (506) 458-7827, [email protected]