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1St CANADIAN CORPS, ALLIED CONTAINMENT STRATEGY and the BATTLE for the GOTHIC LINE

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1St CANADIAN CORPS, ALLIED CONTAINMENT STRATEGY and the BATTLE for the GOTHIC LINE ANATOMY OF VICTORY: 1st CANADIAN CORPS, ALLIED CONTAINMENT STRATEGY AND THE BATTLE FOR THE GOTHIC LINE By Lee Windsor M.A., History, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1996 B.A. (Honours), History, Acadia University, 1993 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the Graduate Academic Unit of History Supervisor: Dr. J. Marc Milner, (History) Examining Board: Dr. Sean Kennedy (History) Dr. William Kerr (Classics & Ancient History) Dr. Mike Ircha (Civil Engineering) External Examiner: Dr. Ron Haycock (History) Royal Military College of Canada This dissertation is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK March 2006 © Lee Windsor 2006 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, me Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre r€f6rence ISBN- 978-0-494-69345-2 Our file Notre r&f6rence ISBN: 978-0-494-69345-2 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lntemet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extra its substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. ••I Canada For my countrymen asleep in Italy And those who came home to build our Canada Abstract For decades, the Second World War Battle of the Gothic Line was understood as the first phase of a major Allied offensive to rid northern Italy of German forces, and press through the Alps to Vienna in the fall of 1944. As such, the attack on the Gothic Line is usually portrayed as a disappointing failure. The front advanced only forty-five miles after weeks of heavy fighting and tens of thousands of casualties on both sides. Established literature describes how this failure resulted from poor Allied planning and leadership, and superior German Army fighting ability, all of which negated Allied material advantages. This study reconsiders conventional interpretations of the battle by posing new questions about the mission assigned to Allied Armies, Italy (AAI), in what was known as Operation Olive. This study also musters substantial case-study evidence of Canadian Army professionalism and combat effectiveness during this engagement, against a German opponent well matched in size and firepower. Instead of breaking through the Alps, the real Allied mission in Italy in the late summer and fall of 1944 was to prevent any of the high-quality German divisions deployed there from re-locating to check the Allied breakout from Normandy, and subsequent drive on the German border. The task was accomplished by relentlessly attacking, destroying or otherwise pinning German units to the Italian front. It was achieved with the barest minimum of manpower and equipment so as not to detract from the main effort in Northwest Europe. The resulting new interpretation is that the assault on the Gothic Line was a daring and highly successful holding attack conducted with what modern soldiers call "economy of force". The fact that Operation Olive's forward momentum stalled as German formations from all over the Mediterranean region packed into northern Italy to stop it, was the very measure of its success. Allied forces succeeded in creating the illusion of a major threat to the German Reich from the south, thus diverting attention from the primary threat to Germany's western border. In effect, the Gothic Line battlefield was the long right flank of the Normandy breakout. After clearly defining the mission for all Allied forces in Italy, 1st Canadian Corps is used as a test case to examine the nature of combat faced by Allied units in the Gothic Line as they overcame the challenge of conducting a strategic diversion with strictly limited resources. This portion of the study reveals much about relative combat capability. It contributes to a growing wave of historical writing suggesting that the Allies developed highly sophisticated military institutions and methods for defeating the German Army in the Second World War. Such ideas challenge conventional views that the celebrated German Army was only beaten by crudely applied numerical and material superiority. in Acknowledgements This project would not have been possible without the courage and dedication of tens of thousands of Canadians who served in the Italian Campaign during the Second World War. They are the inspiration and focus of this study. Telling their story accurately, so it might be remembered by future generations, is my humble tribute to these men and a few women, who helped define what it means to be Canadian. While researching their story and discovering its full meaning, I was privileged to serve under and alongside the two finest military historians in Canada. Professor Terry Copp at Wilfrid Laurier University taught me the importance of terrain, and mastering 'fine grain' details of combat to illuminate larger questions. During the past decade, while driving together through the hills and fields of Europe guiding Canadian Battlefields Foundation Tours, Terry showed me the value of veterans' memories of their experience, no matter how long after the event. He also taught me that their simple wish and our duty as historians is not to embellish their stories but merely get them right. Professor Marc Milner at the University of New Brunswick taught me to pause and reflect after sifting through mountains of historical evidence. We spent many days snowshoeing through the York County bush, or paddling and sailing New Brunswick waterways. During these informal 'seminars' ideas were roughed out and refined. Likewise, Marc taught me that duty to this cause meant writing history not just for veterans, soldiers, or historians, but for all Canadians. He is a brilliant editor. His pen sliced away much cloudy wording shrouding the argument and story that follows. I must also thank my external examiner, Professor Ron Haycock of the Royal Military College of Canada. Prof. Haycock made the 'great march east' for the oral defence and offered sound and substantial advice for turning this project into a manuscript. Thanks too must go to members of my extended regimental families, past and present, in the VIII Canadian (Princess Louise's) Hussars and the West Nova Scotia Regiment. From them I learned about unit spirit and service to others. I spent many an evening staring with wonder and curiousity at battle honours on the Colours and other wartime memorabilia on the Mess walls of those two proud Italian Campaign units. My dear friends in and around the Canadian Battlefields Foundation acted as sounding boards over the years as the project took shape. They offered advice, fed and housed me on research trips, scrounged sources and gathered names of veterans eager to add their stories. This list includes The Honourable David Dickson, David Patterson, Geoff Hayes, Serge and Janine Durflinger, Jim Wood, Andrew Iarocci, Tim Cook, Roger Sarty, Darren and Joanne Gibb, Scott and Kirsten Sheffield, Chris Madsen, Douglas Delaney, John Rickard, Celine Garbay, Randy Wakelem, Michelle Fowler, Mike Boire, Cindy and Jeff Smith, Evert Stieber, and Brandey Barton. Most important of all is Mike Bechthold who fought alongside the whole way in Europe and at home. This thesis bears his stamp and would never have been completed without his steady input and encouragement. The Department of History at the University of New Brunswick proved the perfect environment to grow ideas. Here is found a mutually supportive, tight-knit IV faculty made up entirely of historians who are at once first class resarchers and teachers. All have made a mark, but especially Peter Kent, Sean Kennedy, Ernest Forbes, Gary Waite, Nancy Janovicek, Bill Parenteau, Steve Turner and Cheryl Fury. The most important support of all from the Department came from our dedicated 'Adjutant' and 'Quartermaster-General' Carole Hines and Elizabeth Arnold. They are the machine that makes the Department function and who kept this project on track, often with sugar, even when the days seemed dark. Thanks must also go to my friends and colleagues in the Milton F. Gregg VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society including David Charters, Brent Wilson and Deborah Stapleford. They endured tales of frustration and hardship and always countered with useful suggestions. My students, all unique and exceptional, shaped this effort with their questions and eagerness to know more about Canada in Italy. Anyone who has ventured down this path knows how trying it can be on family members and how their understanding and support is vital.
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