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State, agricultural policy, and rural development in a developing country: The case of post-1965 Zaire
Mokoli, Mondonga M., Ph.D. The American University, 1989
Copyright ©1989 by Mokoli, Mondonga M. All rights reserved.
U-M' 300N.ZecbRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106
STATE, AGRICULTURAL POLICY, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: THE CASE OF POST-1965 ZAIRE by - Mondonga M. Mokoli submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology Signatures of Committee: Chairman: >Q #<4XJ M<^
j^y, 'jk&=^
Dean ofl the College
23 May 1989 Date
1989 .q The American University \p\^^> Washington, D.C. 20016
THE AMEBICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Q COPYRIGHT
BY
MONDONGA M. MOKOLI
1989
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED STATE, AGRICULTURAL POLICY, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN A
DEVELOPING COUNTRY: THE CASE OF POST-1965 ZAIRE
by Mondonga M. Mokoli ABSTRACT
This study evaluates the overt and underlying relevancy of the priority which the state in post-1965 Zaire has accorded to the agricultural and rural sector for socio economic development. The study examines the indicators provided by the conventional agricultural and rural development theories. These indicators show over time that that sector has not received a necessary and a sufficient financial support, and lacked political will and commitment, to materialize its assigned and intended goals.
The study indicates that the basic objective of the agricultural and rural policy in Zaire has been political, not socio-economic. It has been a political mechanism of mobilization and control of the rural people who have been attempting to overthrow the state because of its inability to carry out national and rural socio-economic development. The study demonstrates that the failure of the agricultural policy to carry out rural socio-economic development in Zaire is rooted in the nature and the role of
ii the state in this country. The state in post-1965 Zaire is a socialistic superstructure, which stands on a capitalistic economic infrastructure set up by the Belgian colonial administration during the expansion of capitalism on a world scale. This incompatible juxtaposition of a socialistic superstructure with a capitalistic infrastructure, in the same social formation has engendered the structural conflicts and blockage of the Zairean system in favor of the few who hold the key state offices and have utilized them to establish their economic bases and expand their ideologico- political influence.
The study calls for the mastery of the state in post-1965 as the sine qua non and a minimum achievement without which there is considerable doubt as to whether post-1965 Zaire can proceed beyond its present stage of national and rural socio-economic underdevelopment. It encourages the development of microstrategies, which have been productive and have been providing the rural people with some income. The rural people must be very cautious with whatever development initiatives and policies which the state in post-1965 Zaire would undertake on their behalf.
iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In many social circumstances, words are powerless to express the entire feelings a person has after going through an important step of his life such as the formal education. At this point, my memory goes especially to my loved parents Mokoli Mondonga and Eyanga Ibesoa, you who were the first ones to take me to school, and insisted that I go through the whole schooling process, in spite of the sufferings. While, today I am through this process, you are not with me to harvest the results of your labor. I also think of my loved brothers Ebonda Mokoli and Issongho Mokoli, and my cousin Mwazaka Molema, you who left me alone so early.
While I miss all of you in this visible world, I also feel that you are with me and communicate with me. You are my facilitators. I always do with you what I am unable to accomplish by myself. You are not dead. You still exist, although in the immaterial and invisible form. To my daughters, and all the children who count on me for survival, I would like to thank you for your part of sacrifices. I did not mean to give up my responsibility as a father. I would have been with you while schooling had we a responsible socio-political system which can, at least, take care of its employees while they are abroad for
iv training. To you, Dr. Bonita M. Bundy for your attention, affection and love to me, I am very grateful... Similarly, I think of the Mokoli's, Ibesoa's, Makombo's, Mwazaka's, Sukakumu's, Mbila's, and the Mwakobila's for your supports. To United States government, especially the Fulbright Foundation, for giving me this opportunity to come to pursue my education in the United States. I thank you very much. I have learned a lot from my programme, not only at school, but out of school as well. I think that I have accomplished what you were expecting from me. However, I am not sure whether you have learned from me, and if so, how much? My grant terminated, and without any financial support, I have reached my initial goals. This is to say that money is a necessary but not a sufficient factor for someone to materialize his or her plans. This is also eloquent enough to argue that underdevelopment, the situation which characterizes my country, is not only a social negativity, but it is also a social positivity which trains people to cope with their existential conditions.
An important part of my thanks go to my professors in the sociology and anthropology department at the University of Lubumbashi, Zaire, as well as to those in the sociology department at The American University for their insightful teachings, which have placed me at the intersection of several theoretical perspectives and practical experiences. I also think of Dr. Barbara H.
v Kaplan, you who, regardless of your health problems, have been very supportive of me. My special thanks go to you Dr. Jurg K. Siegenthaler, Dr. Kenneth Kusterer, and Dr. David Hirschmann for having accepted to be my dissertation advisors. Your guidance and advice have been productive. Overall, I remain particularly grateful to you, Dr. Siegenthaler. You have been not only my professor, but also my academic advisor, and my dissertation chairman as well. Besides your outstanding and scholarly competence, your ability in understanding and assisting students from different cultures and educational backgrounds in their particular problems and ways of expressing them is a rare and a dear quality in this environment. To me you are a real sociologist, i.e, you transcend the simple sociological rhetoric, and thus remain a model which I will follow in my academic career.
God bless all of us and help us build a free, a peaceful and a prosperous world. A world where each of us will enjoy the fact of being born. Such a world becomes a reality only if, altogether, we work toward the identification and the mastery of all social obstacles which block the development of mankind.
vi MAPS
vii viii ZAIRE AND ITS REGIONS yf^f
ix ZONES IN ZAIRE
X- ETHNIC GROUPS IN ZAIRE
xi aBAIORC O I Iw. I li«ara S 8ata>a*4« -<••.! S la*a*aa o '11 BiKi'D^sia I Ban** •22 lata.)* '11 Ea:j>»t«« •-V a*ta ill Mlt.ia 114 I t,-:,. Hi 9ata»a* t I..I 121 Bata»a« aaa laMwua :0 la-»aia • II la*9i*«a o aatiaatnaoaaa ti Ir ABSTRACT ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv MAPS vii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 1 Socio-Geographical Overview of Zaire 5 Farming Systems 8 Land Tenure 10 Crop Transportation and Storage 11 Transportation 11 Road Transportation System in Zaire ... 12 River, Railway and Air Transportation System in Zaire 14 Crops Storage 16 The Linkage Between the State, Agricultural Policy and Rural Development in Post-1965 Zaire 17 The Colonial Period 17 The 1960-1965 Post-Colonial Period 27 The Situation in Post-1965 Zaire 29 Post-1965 Zaire's Agricultural Development Policy 31 Definitions of Terms 35 II. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 40 Theoretical Framework 40 Methodological Framework and Techniques of Data Collection 42 Literature Review 48 The State in Developing Countries with Reference to Africa and Zaire 48 Overview of the State in Developing Countries 48 The State in Post-1965 Zaire 61 Objectives of MPR, the "Party-State" ... 65 Agricultural Policy and Rural Development in Developing Countries: An Overview ... 75 xiii Approaches to Rura] Development 77 Indicators of Agricultural and Rural Development Policy 84 State's Financial Expenditures for Agriculture 84 Availability and Use of Agricultural Credit 85 Availability and Efficiency of Farm Markets 85 Price Policy 86 Farmer Participation in Policy Formulation 87 Agricultural Research Investment 88 Personnel 88 Possible Agricultural Policy Effects 89 III. STATE'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN POST-1965 ZAIRE 92 Agricultural Expenditures 92 Contribution of Agriculture to Total Exports 100 Share of Agricultural Imports 101 Availability and Use of Agricultural Credits and New Techniques 103 Agricultural Credits 103 Agricultural Techniques 110 Market and Pricing Policies 110 Market Policies 110 Pricing Policies 112 Personnel 120 Agricultural Research 123 Organizational and Institutional Issues . . . 125 IV. RESULTS OF THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO RURAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ZAIRE 128 Recapitulation of State Agricultural Policy in Zaire 128 The Overall Results 148 Rural People's Reaction 155 V. CAUSE OF FAILURE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF THE STATE'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN POST-1965 ZAIRE 165 Cause of the Failure of Rural Development in Post-1965 Zaire 165 The Hidden Agenda of State Agricultural Policy in Post-1965 Zaire 177 xiv North Shaba Rural Development Project: A Concrete Case of State Political Concerns Over Socio-Economic Concerns . 181 Agricultural Policy Zaire: A Form of Political Settlement 184 VI. A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF STATE, AGRICULTURAL POLICY, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ZAIRE 190 The State in Developing Countries 190 The Case of Post-1965 Zaire 193 The State 193 Rural and Agricultural Development: An Entropic Language 195 Beyond the Liberal and Neo-Marxist Perspectives of Rural Development in Developing Countries, with Reference to Zaire 202 Influence of Metaphysics in Policy Design in Post-1965 Zaire 206 About the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Post-1965 Zaire 212 VII. GENERAL CONCLUSION , . . . . 218 BIBLIOGRAPHY 227 xv LIST OF TABLES Share of the European and African Sectors in the Assets, Employment, Output and Incomes (1958) in percent 20 The Zairean State's Expenditures on Agriculture Between 1967 and 1980 (in millions of Zaires and in %) 93 Government expenditures (in thousands of Zaires), 1968-72 94 Share of Agriculture in the government budget, 1970-81 95 Budget to the Department of Agriculture in Zaires, 1981-1987 96 Investment Budget and Expenditures for 1981, by Ministry, in million Zaires 97 Public Investment Program in millions of zaires . . 98 Participation of Agriculture in the Zairean External Debt in US dollars and in % on January 1st, 1980 99 Evolution of external technical assistance and number of people working in the Department of agricultural sector (in 1000's) 122 Agricultural production (in thousands of metric tons), 1960-84 129 Production: agricultural outputdn 1970) 130 Livestock and fisheries production in metric tons, 1981-87 131 Volume of exports of agricultural produce in thousands of tons 1963-1985 132 Percentage of agriculture's share in total exports, 1970-79 133 xvi Imports format -Quantity of wheat and flour (1,000 MT) 1966-1986 134 Consumer prices in Kinshasa, 1981-1987 135 Cost of living indices in Kinshasa, 1977-1981. . . 135 Percent of population engaged in agriculture in Zaire, 1970-86 136 The state's expenditures on health care (1976-82) 140 IBRD and IDA Lending by Sector, 1970-1986 ($ millions and % of Total Lending) 214 xv i i CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In Zaire, the state has repeatedly declared its commitment to promoting national development in general and rural development in particular. Similarly, the state has repeatedly stressed that rural development is impossible without its intervention. In order to further this declared commitment, the state established a Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, which has designed and implemented an agricultural policy. After roughly two decades, i.e., the years 1965-1988, a close look at the indicators of agricultural and rural development, including living conditions in Zaire, reveal that a serious deterioration in standards, rather than an improvement, has occurred. There is therefore a disturbing discrepancy between the state's declared commitment to promoting socio-economic development and reality. This study proposes to answer critically and systematically the following central question: What is the nature of the linkage between the state, agricultural policy, and rural development in post-1965 Zaire? In doing so, the study will examine the following subquestions: 1 2 1) What have been the Zairean state's agricultural policy and its actual implementation in terms of finance, expenditures for agriculture, credits, transportation, markets, prices, and personnel? 2) Has the agricultural sector actually been the highest priority among the efforts to promote rural socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire? 3) What have been the overall results of the agricultural policy in Zaire? 4) What rural parts of the country have received government attention, and why? 5) What has been the hidden agenda of the agricultural policy in Zaire? 6) How can the state in post-1965 Zaire be a solution to rural socio-economic problems while it is a major cause of these problems? 7) What lessons does the post-1965 Zaire teach us about the theory of state, agricultural policy, and rural development in developing countries? This study is a contribution to the analysis and understanding of the functioning of a peripheral capitalistic mode of production with reference to post-1965 Zaire. The study reaches beyond a simple economic determinism and draws attention to the State in peripheral countries as a prime object of investigation, by discussing what this state is, what it does, and how it functions. It shows how different characteristcs and roles of the state imply different politics of social change, in both their means and ends. 3 The study aims at explaining that, in the current historical conjuncture in Zaire, the state plays the central role in the process of rural and national socioeconomic change. As a result, any serious attempt at a qualitative rural or national transformation involves the state as the principal contradiction that is to be critically understood, mastered and resolved. This study is also a contribution to rural and agricultural sociology, as well as to the field of rural development. It aims at demonstrating that a positive and qualitative design and implementation of an agricultural development policy is of critical importance if a developing country, such as Zaire, is to achieve increasing agricultural productivity on a continuous basis and help improve living conditions in rural areas. Furthermore, this study offers an explanation of the chronic inability of this resource-rich country to generate and sustain genuine grassroots economic growth and development. The study thus aims to correct the official and partisan viewpoint that agriculture has been the priority sector by which post-1965 Zaire, and especially its rural areas, will develop. It argues that the hidden and real agenda of the state has not been rural development by the means of its agricultural policy. Rather it has been the masses' political mobilization and manipulation, and propaganda to 4 ensure security, stability and control, primarily with the interests of the ruling class in mind. This has happened in a social formation which has been, since the 1960's, characterized by the ethnic groups' political oppositions and the masses' revolutionary movements, due, among other factors, to the worsening of their standard of life. By studying Zaire with a dynamic perspective, one is likely to gain a deeper understanding of both the general aspects of peripheral capitalism, which its shares with other African and developing countries, and those characteristics which are specific to Zaire. This study calls, overall, for a fundamental change in the nature of the state as a sine qua non for national development, hence a true rural socio-economic development in Zaire. Geographically, this study does not deal with a specific rural area in Zaire. Rather, it considers the Zairean rural area as a totality on behalf of which the agricultural development policy has been designed and implemented to seemingly help improve the standard of living of the rural people. Furthermore, the basic activities and socio-economic and politico-ideological problems which the rural people from different regions (provinces) encounter are, in the last analysis, the same, and have all of the state as the major cause. 5 This reality has even been acknowledged by President Mobutu who, in his "prospects and balance" speech, stated that "everywhere in Zaire, all categories of the population do face the same following issues: housing, health, employment, how to ship the agricultural products, energy, drinkable water, education of children, etc." All these are, as he pointed out, socio-political issues, which he promised to resolve during his third seven-year term.1 The background of the state, agricultural policy and rural development in Zaire, which is rooted in the Belgian colonial regime, is not an isolated issue. It has both history and structure. However, before turning to them, a socio-geographical overview of Zaire is in order. Socio-Geographical Overview of Zaire With an area of 2,344,885 sq km (905,365 sq miles), the Republic of Zaire is one of the largest countries of Subsaharan Africa. It is three times bigger than the state of Texas in the United States of America, and 80 times bigger than the Kingdom of Belgium, which owned it for about a century. Zaire is often called the "heart" of Africa because of its strategic location in the center of the African continent. xMobutu Sese Seko, Prospects and Balance, (Kinshasa: Office of the President, December 5, 1984), 34-35. 6 Lying across the Equator, Zaire has an equatorial climate in the central region. Average temperatures range from 26 degrees C in the coastal and the basin areas to 18 degrees in the mountainous regions of the East. It rains all year long in Zaire. The country comprises, first and foremost, the basin of the River Congo, now renamed the Zaire. The climate is favorable for agriculture. Although favorable because of its warmth and rainfall, the climate has indirect effects which are not all good. There are vast stretches of Zaire where the soil is leached of its soluble elements by the heavy, warm rainfall. Unpublished results of the 1984 census give population figures around 34.6 million people. The population growth rate is estimated at between 2.5 and 3.5%, but population distribution is found to be unequal throughout the country, with about 70 to 75% of the population living in the rural areas.2 Zaire's population is made up of approximately 265 tribes, grouped in numerous ethnic groups. These tribes and ethnic groups are heterogeneous, and they were put together, regardless of the tribesmen's will, during the colonial regime to constitute this country. The country was and has 2 Zaire Economic Memorandum, Recent Economic and Sectoral developments and current issues, Volume I: Main Report no. 4077-ZR, (Washington, D.C.,: World Bank, Dec. 30, 1982), 1-5. 7 been, on several occasions, subdivided in regions, i.e., provinces, and these politico-administrative subdivisions have been determined without prior consultation with the local people. These subdivisions and boundaries have aimed at, among other features, breaking up people's ties and setting them up in ways which have been politically motivated. The majority of the Zairean people speak diverse Bantu languages. The extreme linguistic variety of Zaire is characterized by the ability of its people to speak several languages, by the existence of the four national languages (Kikongo, Lingala, Tshiluba, and Swahili), and by the use of French as the language of both education and administration. The natural resources of Zaire are potentially immense. Zaire possesses a great stretch of land which opens up enormous areas to human activity. The climate is favorable to profitable agriculture; the network of waterways is naturally navigable. Also, there is mineral wealth, such as copper, tin, silver, uranium, cobalt, manganese, malachite, tungsten, diamonds, iron, bauxite, and gold. Copper is the most important and accounts for about 6 percent of the world's production. Forty percent of the state's revenue comes from copper exports. The river Zaire carries the second largest volume of water in the world. 8 Farming Systems There are two types of production units in the agricultural sector in Zaire: the traditional small family farms, which account for almost 60 percent of total agricultural production; and the large-scale agro- industrial plantations, which contribute about 40 percent. About 30 to 40% of the total area of Zaire is said to be agricultural land; however, only 3 to 5% is used for cultivation and breeding, corresponding to 7 to 10 million hectares planted of food corps and perennial plants. With the urban population growing fast, demand for food products and other agricultural products is also increasing rapidly. Modern and traditional sectors co-exist closely in Zaire. As for the traditional sector, which is mainly concerned with food production, 3 to 4 million farming units are exploiting 4.5 to 6 million hectares.3 Traditional agriculture is handled by peasant farmers who rely mostly on household labor, which is the main determinant of production. This type of agriculture used to supply about 70 per cent of the population with a living, but today it accounts for only half or less of agriculture's contribution to GNP. While farmers involved in this sector have for many years also produced food for local consumption, their output has actually fallen, with the result that rural areas can no longer meet the demands Zaire Economic Memorandum, Op.Cit., 2-3. 9 of the urban centers, and costly imports had to be resorted to. 4 The capital available to the traditional sector of agriculture is almost negligible, and is composed largely of hand tools and seeds from previous crops. The limited amount of labor allocation among household activities seems to be the chief constraint to an increase in cultivated areas in the peasant sector. Technological change occurs slowly in peasant agriculture, and shifting cultivation continues to be the most prevalent method of production. An exception are the areas in the eastern and western parts of the country where population growth has increased pressures and led to more intense use of arable land. Plantations are owned mainly by the large foreign- owned corporations, as well as by some Zairean government high-rank officials. Output depends on both paid labor and capital. Because of use of machinery, processing plants, and intermediate producer goods, and more importantly, the search for the maximization of profits, the share of capital in plantation agriculture is much higher than in peasant farming. Plantation agriculture produces entirely for markets, whereas peasant agriculture produces both for household consumption and market. 'Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., (London: James's Place, 1979), 12. 10 Zairean main crops are cassava, corn, rice, peanut, cotton, coffee, vegetables, and tropical fruits -especially bananas. Nearly all these commodities are produced on peasant farms. In some areas of the country, such as Bolomba, peasant farmers also produce some coffee, palm oil, etc., which are sold in the domestic markets at very low prices. The bulk of export crops such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, rubber, tea, and palm oil is produced on plantations. There also exist bovines constituting about 60% of the livestock. There are sheeps and goats in many regions as well. Fish is one of the main sources of animal protein, followed by animals hunted for food. Land Tenure All land is government-owned but, even today, is still managed by traditional communities at the "collectivite" level. Small farmers cultivate farms allocated to them by the "collectivite" authorities who also allocate communal grazing lands. Traditional land tenure practice entails individual usufruct rights to continuously cultivated land. Medium-scale farmers receive their lands by applying directly to the government authorities. They are required to support their applications by submitting a development plan for the land in question. According to the law, Government officials should ensure that lands are 11 unoccupied and make the necessary arrangements with the "collectivite" which, in turn, bases its decisions on local customs. However, this is very seldom the case; the collectivites' authorities, for sake of their personal financial interests, do not always base their decisions on local customs.5 Crop Transportation and Storage Transportation The transportation situation presents one of the most serious impediments to agricultural development in Zaire. It is very difficult, and in some areas impossible, to collect and evacuate marketable surpluses because of the bad conditions of the transport network and the acute shortage of transport equipment. Zaire's vast size, topography and the uneven pattern of population distribution, with population concentrations at the far extremities of the country, render internal communications intrinsically difficult. The existing transportation infrastructure has been poorly maintained, services have been poorly managed, and private transport agents have faced inadequate equipment and shortages of fuel, gas and spare parts. This has limited competition because transport of goods has been slow and unreliable, and the costs have been very high.6 5 Zaire Economic Memorandum, Op.cit., 2-3. 12 Zaire's transportation system is dominated by the Zaire River system and its tributaries, and road and rail systems in general complement it, with numerous transshipment points on major routes. Domestic air transport is limited to high value goods and passenger service. Road Transportation System in Zaire Zaire's total road network is about 145,000 km, of which about 46,000 km are considered "national interest" road, intended to be maintained by the national parastatal agency, Office des Routes. This parastatal is also called "Office des Trous" because of its ability to maintain holes rather than roads. In recent years, Janet MacGaffey points out, the Office des Routes "maintained" only 25,000 km because of shortages of funds. Private companies, which used to play an important role in road maintenance, rarely do so now because of the lack of incentives.7 The remaining 120,000 km are maintained, in theory, by local authorities. Some collectivities devote a portion of their budget to hire roadworkers. These lower-level 6ZaireEconomic Memorandum, Op.Cit. 17-18. 7Janet MacGaffey, "Fending-for Yourself: The Organization of the Second Economy in Zaire," in The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities, edited by Nzongola_Ntalaja, (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc., 1986), 141-154. 13 employees are paid poorly and irregularly, and this lessens their devotion to duty. Moreover, should road conditions worsen to the point where a chief's superiors are likely to lean on him, the local citizenry is pressed into involuntary service called 'salongo' in order to remedy the situation. Villagers are thus forced to do the job which road-workers should be doing for pay. However, they are forced to volunteer their services without being paid. The state of roads is a very lamentable problem to consider. One of the main reasons of such difficulties in evacuating harvested crops is that many local arteries are impassable at best, and nonexistent at worst. Many villages in rural Zaire are accessible generally by land rovers, and only during the dry season. It is very difficult for large trucks to come into villages to buy and pick up harvested crops. Most of them get stuck in these muddy roads and spend days there. Villagers are the ones who (and sometimes are forced to) help them out of the mud. Areas like Bolomba and Basankusu in Equateur, Katakokombe, Sankuru and Kabinda in Kasai, Maniema in Kivu, Ituri in Haut-Zaire, and Kapanga in Shaba (see map #C), are almost cut off from the rest of the country because of the state of the roads. In general, the road system is in poor condition and is still deteriorating. The transportation system suffers from the lack of maintenance of existing infrastructure and 14 equipment. Fuel and gas are scarce and expensive, and they are available basically in the black market. River, Railway and Air Transportation System in Zaire The Office national de transport fluvial (ONATRA), the parastatal river transport agency, is in serious difficulties as well. It has been cutting back boat services up the rivers from Kinshasa, and since then the services have continued to decline and to suffer increasingly from theft. Air Zaire, the national airline, has been referred to as "Air Peut-etre," for good reason: flights are often cancelled with no notice, or delayed for hours or days. In this situation of deterioration of the economic infrastructure, some people have organized their own transportation or participated in the organization of others. Big businessmen and plantation companies repair the roads they use themselves. Large scale organizations, such as the religious missions and multinational companies, run their own transportation systems, owning small aircraft, river barges and fleets of trucks. Small enterprises and individuals use kin and ethnicity to form networks of mutual assistance for transportation problems or to provide the necessary connections to ship goods or to travel. The big companies forbid their truck drivers to take on passengers or freight, 15 but such rules are routinely broken because drivers need to make extra money. Some enterprises, such as SICOMAC, which grows coffee and rubber, and SESEP, which deals with palm oil, have their own radio telephone communication networks, others send messages either by letter or word of mouth with those whom they know, rather than by the post office because of its extreme slowness and loss of mail, which is due to clerks who open the mails to seek money or whatever they can find inside. Overall, Zaire's transportation system lacks better organization, decentralization of maintenance responsibility, more adequate budgetary allocations, and importation and careful allocation of fuel, spare parts and transport equipment. At present, it is an important disincentive to production. This transportation system has been and remains, as Philomene Makolo indicates, one of the poorest in Africa. The roads built by the colonial administration have fallen into a state of disrepair and many, therefore,have become nonfunctional. The waterways, which used to be the best and the cheapest means of public transportation during the colonial era, have been functionning at less than 50 percent capacity in the past 20 years or so due to the lack of spare parts and regular maintenance of boats.8 Philomene Makolo, "Public Service Delivery in 16 Crops Storage The storage system is also an important factor for agricultural and rural development of a country. In Zaire, storage and processing facilities are inadequate. This implies that crops cannot be stored on the farms or in depots, and that high losses occur when produce cannot be transported immediately to the market. Primary storage at the producer level takes place in traditional storage bins or in farmers' houses. The system of central village storage for seed, as it existed prior to "independence," has largely collapsed. Losses and damage are consequently high. In years of crop shortages, traders have little interest in rejecting poor crops, but they undoubtedly either refuse very poor quality shipments or buy at considerable discounts during years of more abundant production. No quality criteria or grading legislation exist, nor could they be enforced. In the traditional marketing system, there little appreciation of quality diffrences. Quality aspects, including losses in commodities as they move toward the market, are not considered in price comparisons and price formation at the producer level. Zaire: The Need for Differentiation and Integration," edited by Nzongola-Ntalaja, Op.Cit., 210-211. 17 The Linkage Between the State, Agricultural Policy and Rural Development in Post-1965 Zaire The Colonial Period The roots of the linkage between the state, agricultural policy and rural development in post-1965 Zaire reach back to the colonial Belgian regime. Zaire became a Belgian colony at the Berlin, Germany, Conference (November 15, 1884 through February 23, 1885), at which European powers divided the African continent among themselves, and established what was called the "Congo Free State." King Leopold of Belgium was personally recognized as the monarch of the new state. However, the Congo had to remain open to trade to all European nations. The representatives of King Leopold II in the Congo Free State committed many abuses against African populations such as using unpaid forced labor and restricting to the government the trade of ivory and rubber, the only trade items of that time. The government trade monopoly raised, especially in England, a vigorous international campaign against the Congo Free State's monarch. That campaign started questioning the Berlin Treaties as well as the heavy financial burden the Congo Free State had. Under those pressures, King Leopold II ceded, in 1907, the Congo Free State to Belgium which, in turn, made it her colony in 1908. 18 The Congo Free State then became the Belgian Congo. It recovered its political "independence" on June 30, 1960. Before the Congo Free State took the name of Zaire in 1971, it was known as Republic of the Congo, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo-Leopoldville, and Congo-Kinshasa. Europeans in general, and Belgians in particular, have greatly influenced Zaire's economic, political and cultural life. Belgium's colonial policy approximated a mixture of both direct and indirect rule, without fully applying either. The Belgians concentrated power in Brussels, as did the French in Paris, but they did not follow France in associating Africans with them in the imperial center, nor did they follow Britain in drawing the Congolese into the local administration and governing councils. Belgian colonial political institutions were based on that unspecified policy.' In practice, Congolese people were denied political rights. As a result, they were excluded from the exercise of political power and were denied access to high bureaucratic positions. The denial of political rights to Congolese people and their elimination from participating in management of colonial administration constituted the Belgian colonial policy in Congo. The Belgians in Congo 9 Kalambayi-Mwamba-Ntombolo, Authoritarian Rule and National Development: A Case Study of the Dilemma of Development in Zaire, Doctoral Dissertation, (Albany: University State of New York, Spring 1980), 72. 19 failed to instruct and train Congolese people for self- rule. x ° The Belgian colonial system was a specific variant of the colonial model of accumulation, a model which introduced a systematic political bias in the distribution of the economic surplus in favor of the Belgian colonizers. In 1958, that social majority represented only 1 percent of the population, but had the control of 95 percent of the capital stock, 82 percent of the enterprises in the production sector, and 70 percent of the material output. This hegemonic control of the conditions of production enabled the colonial bourgeoisie to maintain its dominant position in the accumulation process. The African population represented, as indicated in the table 1, 89 percent of the active population, but had control of only 5 percent of the capital stock and contributed 30 percent of the measurable material output. The colonial model of accumulation consisted of a highly complex interplay of economic, social and political aspects in which the policies followed by the colonial administration had an active role. Those policies, highlighted by the logic of primitive accumulation of the colonial regime, played a peculiar role in breaking up the rationality of simple 1"Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Crisis In Zaire: Myths and Realities, (Trenton, New Jersey: Africana World Press, Inc., 1986), 8-9. 20 TABLE 1 SHARE OF THE EUROPEAN AMD AFRICAN SECTORS IN THE ASSETS, EMPLOYMENT, OUTPUT AND INCOMES (19 58) IN PERCENT Europeans Africans Total population 1 99 Capital assets 95 5 Enterprises 82 18 Material output 70 30 Land under cultivation 15 85 Marketed agricultural output 58 42 Wage earners 2 98 Wage earnings 45 55 SOURCE: J. Ph. Peemans, Diffusion du progres economique et convergence des prix. Le cas Congo-Belgique, 1900-1960, (Louvain: Naauwelaerts, 1968), 386. reproduction and use value which was at the core of the African precolonial societies, and replacing it with the external logic of accumulation. From the beginning state power played a crucial role in tracing the profile of the primitive accumulation process.11 Thus, unlike Leopold II, the Belgian colonial administration left the economic exploitation of the colony to the private modern sector which flourished during the period between the World Wars. The development of this sector necessitated huge reserves of cheap indigenous labor. The role of the colonial administration was to make sure ^Paul-Albert Emoungu, "School and Economic Development Revisited: The Case of Zaire", in The Journal of Negro Education, Volume 56, no.3, (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, Summer 1987), 282-298. 21 that that end was satisfied. It aimed to support the Belgian economy, which was affected by the World Wars, as well as to master and control the villagers in rural areas. To satisfy labor needs, two conditions were necessary. First, subsistence agriculture could not be allowed to develop; peasants were not to produce for profit. Second, a level of production able to meet export demands had to be secured. To do this, peasants, who were stripped of economic incentives had to be coerced to produce. That led to the compulsory cultivation of export crops and the establishment of planned agricultural settlements. Compulsory cultivation implied forced labor, which aimed at the enrichment of colonial companies and cheap food crops designed to keep down the costs of mining. That type of cultivation was not only a mechanism of drafting the labor force for colonial companies and the colonial army, but it also facilitated the control of the country.12 The initial effect of the system of imposed cultivation was to discourage significant interests in agriculture as a profitable enterprise, and to stifle farmers' initiatives for adopting improved methods of production. A primary reason for the outcome was that the element of compulsory cultivation opened the system to 12 Jean-Philippe Peemans, "Accumulation and Underdevelopment in Zaire: General Aspects in Relation to the Evolution of the Agrarian Crisis," edited by Nzongola- Ntalaja, Op.Cit. 70, 125. 22 abuses, and there were no real guarantees that farmers would receive fair prices for their produce. The only incentive to produce was the need to meet taxation requirements. Another way to satisfy agricultural export demand was to allow foreign settlers, colons, to develop intensive agriculture and rural agro-industry. These policies combined to keep prices offered to peasants below market values, but high enough to be taxable. That released younger and more able peasants for cheap labor in the modern sector. The world depression of the 1930s reinforced colonial economic policies against the emergence of an indigenous capitalism. The mining industries cut back their production, causing massive layoffs of labor. This labor was forced into rural areas to increase peasants' production to take up the slack from the industrial sector in order to maintain an adequate balance of payment and allow the colonial administration to finance its operations. During that period, agricultural surplus was realized by means of increased cultivated land which necessitated the expansion of an important transport infrastructure. The World War II effort intensified colonial economic policies of agricultural surplus through forced peasant cultivation, cheap labor for the modern sector, and the discouragement of an indigenous capitalism. The salaried labor which had declined during the 1930s recovered 23 its pre-depression levels and doubled during the war years, while the peasants' forced-cultivated land more than quadrupled. The intensification of these economic policies caused serious social tensions which resulted in unprecedented rebellions and strikes during 1944-1945. This social strife forced a new ideology on the colonial administration. The government sought better working and living conditions for the indigenous rural population. It took measures to allow the development of small-scale agrarian indigenous capital, revolutionize the technology of peasant agriculture, and develop an indigenous commercial and civil servant class. These measures called for greater involvement of the colonial administration in education, social welfare, and agriculture in the post-war years. Gradually, in areas where transportation, marketing, and distribution facilities were relatively improved, or in periods of high market prices, production by economic incentives replaced compulsory cultivation. Farmers began to depend on and to appreciate the cash received from their crops, but they continued to use traditional methods of cultivation, incorporating the imposed crops into their customary crop cycle, and resenting the compulsive aspect of the system. During that period, there was an opportunity to develop an indigenous agrarian capitalism through rural 24 agricultural schemes known as paysannats, a Belgian colonial design of rural development. The National Institute for Agronomic Research in the Belgian Congo (Institut National pour 1'Etude Agronomique au Congo-Belge--INEAC), established in 1933, played a central role in the evolution of Congolese rural development, especially in commercial agriculture. One of INEAC's principal functions was to develop improved varieties of a wide range of food and cash crops. The organizational and operational requirements for the introduction of settled, mechanized cash crop agriculture were the main focus of INEAC's research and experimental work. To this end INEAC devised the "paysannat indigene" or planned native rural and agricultural settlement, based on a refinement of the traditional method of working the land. This system had the advantage of conserving soil fertility while permitting the introduction of improved agricultural methods; its ultimate goal was intensive cultivation of cash crops. In contrast to compulsory cultivation, the paysannats succeeded in modifying traditional methods of production, but the program disintegrated after independence because the skills and procedures upon which it depended were not systematically taught to the Congolese. Agricultural development, in the Belgian view, was more than a question of providing technical services and a 25 promising device like the paysannat system. Rather, it was, at least theoretically, intended to urge the Congolese to adopt new agricultural methods and practices with encouragement and guidance from the state. Continual close supervision was considered imperative.13 The colonial state, however, was still prisoner of its fears of allowing the development of free enterprise and market forces in rural areas. Since the salaried labor received wages that were relatively higher than prices offered to paysannat farmers, these agricultural schemes bore no fruit. The authoritarian way of mobilizing the agricultural surplus and rural work force had both economic and political goals. In a period of rapid expansion of export opportunities, it allowed the large enterprises to have privileged access to the resources of the colony, and it reinforced, therefore, the close ties between the financial groups operating in the Congo and the "colonial state power." In a similar vein, that policy also had a political purpose. The colonial administration had a strong preference for an authoritarian economic policy, because it made easier its control of the country.14 13Gordon C. McDonald et al, Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa), (Washington, D.C: American University, 1971), 299-306. 14Winsome J. Leslie, The World Bank and Structural Transformation in Developing Countries: The case of Zaire. (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), 6-12. 26 The net consequence of colonial rural and agricultural policy was to relegate peasants to a subsistence economy and to continue Leopold II's system of primitive accumulation through the development of a modern sector industrialization under the control of expatriates. Thus, on the eve of independence, the Belgian colonial economy was one of the most dualistic of colonial economies. Much more than any other sector, the agricultural sector relied on a repressive apparatus, and this was one of the reasons why it was to be more affected by the collapse of the colonial state.15 Overall, we are now able to perceive the linkage between the colonial state and the rural area by means of the colonial agricultural policy. The colonial agricultural policy was highly authoritarian in its methods, directing rural people in general and small farmers in particular when, where and how to cultivate. That policy was used to support the Belgian colonial economic base, as well as to control and master the rural area. In consequence, peasants were coerced to produce, but not for their own profit. It also meant that farmers had few skills to draw on following abrupt departure of the Belgian administration and during the crisis which followed 15Jacques Depelchin, "Transformations of the Petty Bourgeiosie and the State in Post-Colonial Zaire", in Review of African Political Economy,volume 22, no. 41, (October/December 1981), 38-40. 27 independence.xi The 1960-1965 Post-Colonial Period The Congo, today Zaire, came to independence under most inauspicious circumstances. The Belgians, never really anticipating the end of their colonial rule, had done nothing to prepare the country for a successful transition. In 1960 there were only sixteen Congolese college graduates. The Belgians and other Europeans who lived there disdained and feared the local people. Tribal rivalries and hostilities had been encouraged, and the Belgians were shocked when they discovered almost universal support among the Congolese for independence, as evidenced by riots early in 1959. A year later they convened a conference in Brussels, and within six months the country was cut loose, although many of the colonial institutions and personnel were still in place. A few days later, Congolese soldiers "rebelled" against their Belgian superiors, with the tacit encouragement of their new prime minister, Patrice Lumumba.x 7 16 Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi, Economic Intelligence Unit, (London: The Economist Publications Ltd, No.2, 1985), 14. 17Sanford J. Ungar, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 62-3. 28 After winning a major step of the political revolution on June 30, 1960, the new bureaucratic elites in power neglected, among other things, an economic revolution. They inherited the colonial structures, including socio economic policies and maintained them. The major socio-economic development of the post- colonial period was the attempt by small bureaucratic elites to build themselves an economic base and to transform themselves into an economic bourgeoisie. To this end, they sought to share with foreign capital the economic surpluses of the modern sector. Under those circumstances, agricultural production suffered. That caused the realignment of distribution outlets and intensified speculative activities, which increased the value of commerce in the GDP (gross domestic product). The share of agriculture in the GDP decreased from 23 percent to 16 percent, while commerce increased from 10 percent to 28 percent. Thus, between 1960 and 1965 commerce became, and has remained, the dominant economic activity among Zaireans.18 The weakened state was equally incapable of collecting tax revenues, which decreased by 10 percent in two years. However, the low tax base was accompanied by increased state expenditure. State coffers were the sole financial sources for the new ruling elites. The salaries Paul-Albert Emungu, Op.Cit. 291. 29 index in the private sector increased from 100 to 194 while that of the public sector rose from 100 to 476, or from 18 percent of GDP in 1960 to 23 percent in 1965. These shifts indicated a serious maldistribution of wealth between labor and peasants on the one hand, and the ruling elites with their commercial elites on the other. The Situation in Post-1965 Zaire After independence in 1960, the transfer of formal political power from the Belgian colonizers to the newly independent republic induced a general and thorough weakening in the strength of the state. The cumulated political events, notably military mutiny, Belgian military interventions, political secessions and successions, constitutional crises, creation of new provinces, widespread armed rebellions and peasant revolts in the countryside which occurred in the Congo during its first five years of statehood (1960-1965), led to the seizure of power in November 24, 1965, by citizen Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Waza-Banga, the commander-in-chief of the army.1' That seizure of power was made easier by the Western powers, interested in the Congo's natural resources, especially the ones in the Katanga province. The West 1'Michael G. Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 2-3. 30 fended off a Lumumba communist design, as well as a perceived communist takeover in Congo because of, among other things, food shipments which the Soviet Union was sending to the Congo under Nikita Khrushchev. The reaction in Washington was extreme. Based on the information reaching him from the Congo, President Eisenhower of the United States of America took the matter personally. He perceived the United States as being forced out of the strategic Congo by Lumumba, whom he thought a Soviet-supported madman.20 He decided that "Lumumba was a threat to world peace," while the Prime Minister had done nothing more aggressive than trying to quiet the uproar in his own country. Allen Dulles, the CIA director, ordered Lumumba killed and the agency soon proceeded with assassination efforts.21 Yet, until his assassination in January 1961, Lumumba never expressed such a communistic design even though he was very bitter about the way Africans were treated by Europeans in their own country.22 Zaire's political system since independence moved from a federal structure, which gave considerable power to the provinces, to a unitary system with an overcentralized 20Sanford J. Ungar, Op.Cit., 63-64. 21Helen Winternitz, East Along The Equateur. A Journey up the Congo and into Zaire" (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 123. 22Dereck Wilson, A History of South and Central Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982), 281. 31 government. As a result of constitutional changes, especially those of 1974, the president of the one party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), became automatically President of Zaire. Post-1965 Zaire's Agricultural Development Policy Several attempts have been made by the state in post-1965 Zaire to formulate a socio-economic development policy and to plan the country's development. The Zairean state, with substantial assistance and encouragement from external agencies, has embarked on a series of exercises aimed at promoting the rehabilitation and development of the rural and agricultural sector. The basic objectives of the state's agricultural policy and rural development in post-1965 Zaire have been to reattain self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and to reach the preindependence level of industrial crop production and export, hence to promote socio-economic development. The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development has been in charge of establishing general agricultural production policy regarding the pricing, marketing and storage of agricultural crops, assisting organizations under its control and supporting the operation of an adequate extension service, and carrying out agricultural research on all crops.2 3 2 3 Situation Actuelle de 1'Agriculture Zairoise, 32 The official rationale behind the priority which the state has accorded to the agricultural sector is as follows: the majority of the population lives in rjjral areas, it deals with agriculture and associated activities; as a result, agriculture will provide people with jobs and improve the living conditions of those who are already involved in it. Moreover, agriculture provides the state with foreign currencies and a principal tax base from which to draw government revenues. The agricultural sector offers the major source of saving for non-agricultural investment, and because of agriculture, Zaire will be able to rely on itself for food.24 President Mobutu made several subsequent public statements to show the state's commitment to develop the country, and especially rural areas by means of agriculture. The following statements and slogans were issued in the indicated years: -1965: The "Retroussons les Manches" operation, which invited the Zairean people to roll up their sleeves and work the land by getting involved in agriculture and associated activities; Projet 660-070, (Virginia: The Pragma Corporation, January 1987), 1-24. 24Situation Actuelle de 1'Agriculture au Zaire, Op.Cit. 1-24. 33 -1967: the year of increase in agricultural and industrial production proclaimed by the Manifeste de la N'Sele, which is the ideologico-political manifesto in Zaire; -1968 was proclaimed the year of agriculture, announced by the President of Zaire in his speech of January 1, 1968 to the Zairean nation; -1969: the year of "Salongo Alinga Mosala", meaning again the year of agricultural work and productivity; -1970: in that year agriculture was proclaimed the priority of priorities, and the President set 1980 as the target-year for having the development of Zaire realized. Indeed, he hurled defiance at the other African countries in the following terms in Lingala, which is one of the four main national languages: "...Soki premier te, deuxieme; Soki deuxieme te, troisieme; Kasi quatrieme place? Te; Tokondima yango te." This means that the Republic of Zaire could not, under his rule, accept occupying the fourth position in the competition of the African developing countries for development. Zaire, in the President's words, was to be either at the first position or the second one, and perhaps the third position, but not the fourth one. Since this declaration, the state has elaborated the 1982-1984 plan and 1985-1990 plan, also called the quinquennial plan. 34 In order to realize its declared commitment, the state has undertaken a series of political decisions to design and implement large-scale rural and agricultural development projects and programs. Some of them are: Maize National Program, Seed National Program, Rice National Program, Cassava National Program, Minimum National Program, Mobutu Plan, Presidential Agro-Industrial Domain of the N'Sele, North Shaba Rural Development Project, etc.25 Most of these projects and programs have been implemented in regions, such as Shaba, which have been politically active and very hard to control, as well as in the native villages of the most influential political leaders. Funding for the financial execution of these large scale projects and programs basically relied as the president asserted once in an interview, on the assistance of international organizations and bilateral aid.26 Achievement of these overall production goals has been hampered and the goals have remained unreached. Zaire's rural population has grown more and more poor. It includes many of the poorest people in Africa while Africa is known as the poorest of the continents. It is clear that 25Mondonga M. Mokoli & Mulowayi Dibaya, "Agriculture: Une Priorite? Analyse Sociologique de la Politique Zairoise de Developpement." in Cahiers Zairois d'Etudes Sociales Et Politiques,, no. 5, (Lubumbashi, Zaire, Universite de Lubumbashi, 1985), 227-45. 2'"Interview du President Mobutu," in Le courrier Afrique-Caraibes-Pacifiques-Communaute Europeenne, no. 78, Mars-Avril 1983, 33. 35 by virtually any measure the standard of living and income levels of the rural population in Zaire has drastically declined in recent years. Rural services have deteriorated rapidly in the two past decades, and most rural areas in general, and the villages in particular, lack road access, medical facilities, clean drinking water, consumer goods, etc. Farmers have little or no say about the agricultural and rural development policy.27 The state agricultural policy has provided few or no benefits for the peasantry, the only class that can play a central role in the resolution of the rural and agrarian crisis. The neglect of peasant agriculture is a key factor of the agrarian crisis, which is a major component of the structural crisis of Zairian society. It is also one of the main reasons why ordinary people have sought their own strategies of survival to cope with the existing living conditions.2 8 Definitions of Terms In light of what has been discussed so far, key concepts that will recur throughout this study must be carefully defined so that it is clear precisely what is being discussed. 2 7 Zaire Economic Memorandum, Recent Economic and Sectoral developments and current issues,, Volumell: Main Report no. 4077-ZR, (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, Dec. 30, 1982), 5-6. 28Winsome J. Leslie Op.cit. 64, 93. 36 Because concepts are only valid in the social sciences to the extent that they are based on a scientific understanding of society, the concepts "state," "agricultural policy," "rural development" and "developing country" must be defined in the light of a specific socio- historical and structural context. This will avoid the reduction of these concepts to a general ahistorical structure without any material content and hence without any scientific validity for the study of the society under consideration. Prior to defining these key concepts, it should be noted that this study will use the term linkage to mean any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to by another, and vice-versa. It encompasses how the state behaves and acts vis-a-vis the rural area through its agricultural policy, how this later affects the rural area in Zaire, and how, in turn, the rural area reacts to this overall situation. The term state is used here, as Michael G. Schatzberg views it, to mean a "congeries of organized repositories of administrative, coercive, and ideological power subject to, and engaged in an ongoing process of power accumulation characterized by uneven ascension and uneven decline, coupled with its local-level and micropolitical perspective. It also means a fluid and contextual entity 37 whose shape and configurations of power are changeable."2' The term agricultural policy is defined in this study as an articulated body of strategies and interventions undertaken by the state, aiming basically to mobilize and control the rural people politically and ideologically. Rural socio-economic development is not its main concern. The term rural development is used, in light of the Zairean experience, more as an ideology rather than as a socio-economic activity, by which the state, including financial international institutions, act to expand their influence in the entire country. It is a top-down activity which does not consider the rural people as the main agents of their socio-economic change. It does not, as a result, have enough room for their viewpoints. The term developing country has been used in this study to describe recent post-colonial societies. It is a country in which the economic power of the ruling class is consolidated after political power and the state machinery are seized, and people occupying the positions of power in the state's apparatus use them to promote their economic interests, including those of their families, tribes, friends and political buddies.30 It is, in addition, characterized, as Michael P. Todaro points out, by a low 2'Michael G. Schatzberg, Op. Cit., 142. 30Clive Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies. (New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1984), xiii-xxii. 38 level of living conditions, such as low income, inadequate housing, poor health, limited or no education, unemployment, overpopulation, reliance on few export items, generally raw materials, high infant mortality, low life expectancy, and in many cases, a general sense of malaise and hopelessness.3 1 Most of the developing countries are geographically located in Asia, Latin-America and Africa, and their economies are predominantly agricultural. These are countries in which rulers continue to enrich themselves in the face of popular misery, and are, as Andre G. Frank asserts, an essential instrument for the administration of the dependent role of their economies in the international division of labor and capitalist world process of accumulation and expansion.32 This study broadly falls into seven chapters. Chapter one has introduced the study by presenting a statement of the research question. It has discussed the background of the study by spelling out, in a dynamic perspective, the agricultural policy in post-1965 Zaire. It has defined the basic terms of the study. 3 Michael T. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, 3d. edition, (New York: Longman, cl985), 3-17. 32Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 4-18. 39 Chapter two will present and discuss the theoretical and methodological framework, techniques of data collection and a review of the relevant literature of this study. Chapter three will discuss the state's agricultural policy in post-1965 Zaire by analyzing the state's expenditures on the agricultural sector, provision of agricultural credits, personnel policies, crop transportation, marketing, and pricing policies. Chapter four will evaluate the results of this policy and its importance to rural development in Zaire. Chapter five will identify and discuss the fundamental cause for lacking socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire as well as the hidden and actual agenda of the agricultural and rural development policy, which, overall, is a derivative and integral part of the nature and role of the present state in Zaire. Chapter six will be devoted to the lessons which the case of post-1965 Zaire tells us about the theory of state, agricultural policy and rural development in developing countries. Finally, Chapter seven will conclude this study by giving its summary, the results of the analysis and suggestions to be considered for future studies of rural socio-economic development in Zaire as well as in other developing countries in a similar situation. CHAPTER II THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK Theoretical Framework In order to explain the linkage between the state and agricultural policy, as well as the importance of this linkage to rural socio-economic development in Zaire, this study makes use of a theoretical framework of the state as discussed by Martin Carnoy, Clive Y. Thomas and Thomas Callaghy, who have written on the authoritarian state in peripheral societies. This theoretical framework for the study of the state in developing countries in general and the case of Zaire in particular has been articulated also by the planned change approach to rural development as discussed by Norman Long. This study argues that in Zaire it is the state rather than production which has become the main focus of class struggle and social change. The state appears to hold the key to socio-economic and political development. It is the state which initiates, formulates, implements, manages, and/or sanctions policy changes. To understand the state in the context of Zaire is to understand this social formations' dynamic, hence its socio-economic development 40 41 problems.33 In a complementary way, Clive Y. Thomas' theory on the authoritarian state in peripheral countries,34 as well as the one by Callaghy on the state in Zaire,35 have enabled me to consider the colonial roots of the Zairean state, including its authoritarian character, and its rural and agricultural policy in terms of an all-important reversal of the classical relationship between economic and political power. This theoretical framework shows how in Zaire consolidation of an economic base comes after the seizing of political power and the development of state machinery at different levels. The absence of constitutional constraints in Zaire has led to abuses such as the oppression, extortion and institutionalization of corruption which, overall, play a key role in enlarging the property held by the ruling class and in consolidating its economic base. In a similar vein, this framework has also helped to explain the expansion of the state into the rural areas in Zaire under the guise of rural development, continued 33Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984), 1-12. 34Clive Y. Thomas, Op.cit, 27-64. 35Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle. Zaire in Comparative Studies, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 3-79. 42 agricultural diversification, and self-sufficiency in food production as a state strategy attempting to re-structure the rural area in conformity with its ideologico-political goals.3 6 There are three further theoretical advantages to this theoretical framework. One is that the use of post-1965 Zaire as a concrete example of the state'-s structure and behavior in developing countries allows one to study simultaneously the similarities and differences in the form that the state takes in peripheral capitalistic countries. One can then avoid two pitfalls: overspecificity, that is, an approach that is premised on the view that since each country is different, there can be no general theories. The other is overgeneralization, which results from a preoccupation with similarities. The latter is very common and leads to the incorrect thesis that since all these states have broadly common class characteristics, there is no real variety among them. Methodological Framework and Techniques of Data Collection The methodology underlying this study is fundamentally sociological, utilizing secondary data and field observation in Zaire. It focuses on internal factors in Zaire as the most critical contradictions that permit one 3'Norman Long, An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1977), 144-184. 43 to understand the developmental problems in this country. This methodology critically evaluates the premises of a legalistic approach in order to discover the sociological reality behind official declarations and appearances. Secondary sources have enabled me to draw data from work of professionals and social researchers who conducted field studies in Zaire, and from other literature. This study uses both a quantitative and qualitative approach to secondary analysis. The quantitative approach allows one to deal with numerical representations and manipulation of data for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomenon under study. It enables me to examine, for example, the share of state expenditures allocated to agriculture or the increase in state expenditures going to agriculture, and compare them with data on other sectors of socio-economic life in Zaire. Although many figures do not stem from the same base, they will at least give us a relatively concrete picture of the agricultural reality in Zaire. The qualitative approach consists, in turn, of exploring and explaining the underlying meanings and the linkages among the phenomena under study. It enables one to point out, for example, that the agricultural policy geared to promoting rural and national development in Zaire has been a top-down ideologico-political mechanism to control rural areas rather than a means for improving the living standards of the rural people. 44 Secondary data, of course, have presented problems to social researchers who use them as a research technique. The existing information, collected for different purposes, may not exactly suit the researcher's needs.37 The researcher who uses them has relatively little control over them, their form having been shaped by their initial authors, in contrast with other social research techniques, such as field research, survey research, and experiment, in which the researcher can focus exactly on those socio economic aspects which he needs to capture. If he uses questionnaires, for example, he can choose or design the instrument to fit his etiological concerns; while in interviewing, the interviewee can, when necessary, be guided by the interviewer, and if important aspects of the questions are unprecise or confusing, the interviewer can probe. The researcher may face the problem of credibility, i.e., he must determine the scope of his study by this means, the representativeness and adequacy of his secondary sources, and the reliability and validity of other researchers' interpretations and findings. Regardless of such limitations, of which I have been aware while collecting and analyzing data, secondary analysis is no less adequate than other research techniques. It provides 37John M. Shepard, Sociology, (New York, San Francisco: West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, 1987), 41-43. 45 relatively inexpensive and, by means of comparison, information of fair quality for this study. One of the most important aspects of concern to me has been to analyze other researcher's findings and use them to validate propositions on socio-economic development in Zaire. This viewpoint frees the researcher from undue reverence for any particular method. It enables him to make maximal use of his knowledge of the particular research situation facing him and to develop and rely on his own ideas, which are closest to a materialist understanding of the socio-political and economic phenomena under consideration. Unstructured interviews, i.e., in-depth conversations, have contributed to my understanding of other people's attitudes and opinions concerning the subject under study. They were conducted with Zairean state officials coming to Washington to "negotiate" funds with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They include other social groups of Zairean people based in the District of Columbia, such as students, professionals, diplomats, and visitors. I have also had, on several occasions, in-depth conversations on the same subject with the IMF and the World Bank's employees who deal with Zaire, and foreigners who used to work in Zaire in different sectors, including agriculture. The field observation which I conducted in Zaire has been crucial for this study. It offers qualitative evidence 46 of various aspects of agricultural policy and rural development in post-1965 Zaire in terms of crops production, their commercialization and transportation, credit to a> farmers, rural services, living conditions, and standards of small farmers. I have utilized these field research data to write numerous papers and published articles in preparation for this doctoral dissertation. My own life-long experience as a Zairean and as a professional researcher and instructor has enabled me to have a more balanced view and understanding of Zaire's complex political, economic and socio-cultural reality. It is worth noting that the State in Zaire presents a hardship environment for social research. A researcher is always suspected and viewed as someone who is there just to "intoxicate" the population and "destabilize" those who are in power and make their living from it. Suspicion of other people, especially of those who do not belong to their respective ethnic group and of outsiders, is a rule of life in the Zairean socio-professional environment. Many documents and official decrees are not left for public use. A researcher has to count on his personal acquaintances, which are basically triballly or ethnically oriented, in order to get such documents. Corruption of ill-paid bureaucrats is another efficient way of getting these documents. 47 This study is, overall, guided by a dialectical- materialist approach. It analyzes the phenomenon under study by putting it into its context, which is Zaire's underdevelopment, and it foresees underdevelopment in its qualitative change that is, as a social negation to be worked out and transformed into a social affirmation. This transformation is autocentric and autodynamic; it can be materialized primarily by the individual people who are underdeveloped, with the support of external factors such as international organizations and communities interested in their cause, and can provide them with the appropriate environment to carry out social change. This complementary theoretical and methodological framework, highlighted by a praxeological evaluation of facts has enabled me to collect data, screen them, analyze them and make some recommendations for both the 'take-off and the occurrence of a qualitative socio-economic development process in Zaire. 48 Literature Review The State in Developing Countries with Reference to Africa and Zaire Overview of the State in Developing Countries From what has been said up to this point, it appears that one of the most significant dimensions of agricultural and rural development in developing countries, especially African countries, has been a growing recognition of the central role of the state. With colonialism, strong central states have developed, and national and international markets have expanded. This process of state formation has had far-reaching implications for these societies as a whole. Nevertheless, theorists do not always agree on what the state in these post-colonial societies is all about and what role it should play in these countries. The problem is not simply a question of difference between Marxists and Non-Marxists, because even within a single school divergence of approaches exists. Is the Marxist approach the answer? While Marxists have always had much to say about the state, it has only been fairly recently that the creation of a theory of the state has been considered an explicit task. Recent attempts 49 at theorizing have drawn heavily on conceptualizations that were largely implicit in earlier work. Three such implicit perspectives, which may be characterized as the instrumentalist, the structuralist, and the Hegelian-Marxist traditions, have been especially important in guiding current Marxist works on the state.38 Much of the work has been concerned primarily with explicating these traditions, formulating them into more coherent and systematic theories of the state, and using them to study various specific empirical problems. A number of attempts are being made, however, to go beyond the boundaries defined by these traditional approaches. Some of these are explicit attempts to reconcile, synthesize, and extend the traditional elements; others are beginning to develop new theoretical tools. David A. Gold et al discuss and summarize these approaches as follows: An "instrumentalist theory" of the state is one in which the ties between the ruling class and the state are systematically examined, while the structural context within which those ties occur remains theoretically largely theoretically unorganized. It provides a fairly straightforward answer to the question, 'Why does the state serve the interests of the capitalist class?' The functioning of the state is thus still understood 38George Ritzer, Contemporary Sociological Theory, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 115-156. 50 fundamentally in terms of the instrumental exercise of power by people in strategic positions, either directly through the manipulation of state policies or indirectly through the exercise of pressure on the state. A "structuralist theory" of the state, in a complementary way, systematically elaborates on how state policy is determined by the contradictions and constraints of the capitalist system, while instrumental manipulation remains a secondary consideration. In other words, the structuralist analysis of the state rejects the notion that the state can be understood as a simple "instrument" in the hands of a ruling class. The fundamental thesis of the structuralist perspective is that the functions of the state are broadly determined by the structures of the society rather than the people who occupy the positions of state power. Therefore, the starting point of the structuralist analysis is generally an examination of structure in the society, particularly the contradictions rooted in political economy. Structuralist theorists of the state thus attempt to unravel the functions the state must perform in order to reproduce capitalist society as a whole. These functions determine the specific policies and organization of the state. According to structuralist theorists, the concrete ways in which the state meets the functions vary with such factors as the level of capitalist development and the forms of class struggle. 51 Hegelian-Marxist theories of the state focus on consciousness and ideology, and leave the link to accumulation and manipulation in the background. The key question they are concerned with is, 'What is the state ?' Their answer roughly is that the state is a mystification, a concrete institution which serves the interests of the dominant class, but which seeks to portray itself as serving the nation as a whole, thereby obscuring the basic lines of class antagonism. Thus, the state represents a universality, but a false one, an "illusory community." Regardless of which of these traditions is drawn upon most heavily, virtually all Marxist treatments of the state begin with the fundamental observation that the state in capitalist society broadly serves the interests of the capitalist class.3' But, although many social researchers inspired by the Marxist tradition have made considerable contributions to the analysis of the nature of the state in colonial and post-colonial Africa, they remain far from providing an accurate and satisfactory explanation of the role of the state and its importance to development. Among the shortcomings of current Marxist explanations of the state is the fact that they rest upon a mechanistic examination of "economic" forces. In this sense, the state is often viewed by Marxists as nothing but 3'David A. Gold et al, "Recent Development in Marxist Theories of Capitalist State," in Monthly Review, no. 586, (October and November 1975), 4-12. 52 a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. The present research transcends this viewpoint by pointing out and discussing, in reference to post-1965 Zaire, the fundamental cause of state behavior. In his discussion of the development of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, Albert Szymanski argues that through the 1960s and 1970s states of the less-developed countries have been becoming increasingly authoritarian and repressive of popular movements. At the same time they have been expanding their bureaucracies and for the most part increasingly taken on economic functions. The emergent regimes have been characterized as "bureaucratic authoritarian" states. Three principal characteristics of the bureaucratic authoritarian capitalist states, Szymanski notes, are currently.predominant in the major less-developed capitalist societies. First, a comprehensive state administrative apparatus exists that penetrates most of society, utilizing a "technocratic" ideology of efficiency and growth to justify its role. Second, systematic repression of trade union and peasant movements, roll back of social welfare, widespread terror and anti-leftist opposition, and attempts to depoliticize the lower classes, are all prevalent. This implies the decision to largely ignorethe state's legitimation function, substituting overt repression as the means of dealing with popular demands from the lower 53 classes. Third, there is an emphasis on facilitating and accelerating the capital accumulation process, especially in "deepening" industrialization through encouraging transnational movements, direct state participation in the economy, often in joint enterprises with private or foreign capital, especially in those areas in which local private capital is unwilling or unable to invest, the freezing of wages and the decline of working class living standards, and the consequent expansion of funds available for accumulation.4 ° For his part, Martin Carnoy discusses the state in developing countries from a dependency viewpoint and argues that the State in the Third World economies is an essential instrument for the administration of the dependent role of these economies in international division of labor and the capitalist world process of capital accumulation. "The exigencies of the process of capital accumulation and international division of labor, world-wide and in the underdeveloped countries themselves, thus become the principal determinants of the role and the form of the state in the Third World.41 4"Albert Szymanski, The Logic of Imperialism, (New York: Praeger, 1981), 444-446. 41Martin Carnoy, Op.Cit. 184-207. 54 Carnoy underscores that there are three points that define the post-colonial state. First, in colonizing the Third World, the metropolitan bourgeoisie had to create a state apparatus that .could control all the indigenous social classes in the colony; in that sense, the "superstructure" in the colony is overdeveloped relative to tha, "infrastructure." The post-colonial society -inherits that overdeveloped state apparatus and its institutionalized practices. Second, the post-colonial state also assumes an economic role in the name of promoting socio-economic development. Third, in post-colonial societies, capitalist hegemony must often be created by the state itself within territorial boundaries that are artificial once direct colonial rule is removed.42 Similar to Alavi,43 Carnoy argues that the state in postcolonial societies is "overdeveloped," and this constitutes another basis for its relative independence. However, like Colin Leys, one would wonder, in relation to post-1965 Zaire, "why such a state should be called overdeveloped while it is unable to fulfill its basic role of promoting national socio-economic development?44 42Martin Carnoy, Op. cit., 188-192. 43Hamza Alavi, "The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," in New Left Review, no. 74 (July- August 1912), 59-82. 44Colin Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State: A Re-Evaluation," in Review of Radical Political Economy, (January-April 19767^ 3-15. 55 John Saul has modified and adapted Alavi's general argument by adding the fact that the postcolonial state takes on general ideological function with great vigor. He claims that this fact, combined with the points made by Alavi, means that the post-colonial state requires a high degree of "centrality" in the social system, and that this explains its relative autonomy. In other words, autonomy is rooted in the central role the state plays in peripheral capitalist societies.45 State autonomy, Thomas points out, derives from the fact that the separation of state and society has, historically, led to the formation and growth of bureaucracy. The state, because it represents the institutionalization of authority, promotes the rapid growth of bureaucracy within it. One aspect of this is the dominance of the excecutive within the state structure. As this development has proceeded, the executive has come to display a high degree of autonomy within the state structure with respect to the other parts of the state. Another source of state autonomy, he notes, one whose importance has grown as capitalism has developed, derives from the manner in which the state is inserted into the system of material production and reproduction, and the resulting requirement that it perform an economic function. 45John S. Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania," in Socialist Register. (London,1974), 249- 272. 56 This is more than economic activity as measured by such variables as the state's share of gross national product, employment, national investment, consumption, or generation of savings, but extends to those functions that are essential to the economic process in all societies and cannot adequately be attended to by individuals or groups: determining and upholding the legal and statutory forms necessary for commodity exchange; stabilizing the growth of the national product and ironing out fluctuations in accumulation caused by national and international circumstances; protecting the national interests of the economy in the world market; and, more generally, determining the choice of the development model pursued by the state. Since class interests, as well as the interests of groups within each class, clash in the economic sphere, the state, as regulator of social conflict, takes on an economic function as it tries to resolve these conflicts -- for it is in pursuing this function that the state realizes its social objective of ensuring the reproduction of the basic social and class relations of the society. The class character of the state's intervention is therefore evident in the way it is involved in the socio-economic process and the way it tries to resolve socio-economic problems.46 4'Clive Y. Thomas, Op.cit., 49-64. 57 In a similar vein, Kofi Buenor elaborates on the origin and functioning of the modern state in Africa as well as on its role in promoting national socio-economic development, and asserts that this origin lies in the colonial period. The colonial regime established a bureaucracy, military, and police force to enforce its interests. The colonial administration was an alien implantation designed to defend foreign interests in Africa. The state apparatus was organized in line with the requirements of the colonial power, and was not responsive to local needs. The state was accountable to none other than the foreign powers it served. The main feature of the colonial state was that it made no pretense of representing African people; its sole role was to administer the "natives" and utilize them for its economic purposes. This was the state apparatus that the African nationalist leaders took over after the end of the colonial era. In all its essentials the state apparatus survived the transfer of government power. Unlike the old colonial masters, the nationalist leaders had strong direct links with the African population. However, the state machine that they use to implement new policies has remained the same. The state machine that the African leaders took over was organized to run on principles which were fundamentally different from the dreams and objectives of the nationalist 58 movement. The newly independent African countries were left with economies that barely sustained the existing level of living standards. There is little scope for economic and social development. Industry and agriculture are relatively weak and show little potential for the generation of wealth. Only one institution has stood out as stable and powerful, and that is the state. In socio-economic terms, the state emerged as the dominant force in African societies. It became the largest single employer of labor. It has access to domestic resources and investment funds from abroad. The state is not only an institution of administration, but also the most powerful economic force in society. Since the middle classes - traders and businessmen- have been relatively weak, economic success has been contingent on access to the resources of the state. Soon everyone realizes that the only road to prosperity runs through the state machine. The emergence of the state as the engine of socio economic development has had important implications for African politics and administration. Civil servants and bureaucrats soon realized that employment in the public sector bestowed important privileges on them. Nationalist leaders understood that political influence was synonymous with economic power; without the backing of the state none could pursue a successful career in business. That is why, Buenor notes, every ambitious person fights desperately to 59 carve out a place for himself inside the state apparatus. With so much at stake, none can afford to give up one's influence with the state machine. The loss of influence over the state means the loss of everything. The ruling class in Africa cannot maintain its power and prestige without directly running the state. It is because the state is so important for sustaining the economic base and social prestige and influence that it has become such a battleground. The state is not only an apparatus of administration, but the arena where the competition between sections of the ruling class and the struggle between the ruling class and the masses take place. Since even the resources of the state are insufficient for filling the capacious appetite of everybody, the conflict within this institution is always intense. One can now better understand why there are one- party states and frequent military coups. Parliamentary democracy, or indeed any kind of democracy, is a luxury that the African ruling class cannot afford. No African government can countenance the loss of office. Losing an election or a state office, for instance, means not only the end of political influence, but also the termination of the only access to economic resources. The unique role of the African state as the main source of economic and political power explains virtually 60 everything about political life in recent decades. At the first opportunity every political leader declares a fervent commitment to a one-party state. The justifications are many -- the purpose is clear. A one-party system eliminates rivals for influence and consolidates the hold of the governing party over the state. The political instability and socioeconomic crisis that characterize African societies is the inevitable consequence. The military are in a unique position to enter the political free-for-all. The concentrated power of the state machine is focused in the force of arms. The military's access to weapons of coercion provides them with a strong claim to power and influence. Inept governments are all too aware of the military option waiting at the sidelines.47 On his part, George Ayittey underscores that even the allegedly 'backward and illiterate' peasants of Africa are calling on the Western re-colonization of the continent given what is going on. Earlier this decade, he notes, some Ghanaian peasants, for instance, called on Britain to recolonize the country. For, he points out, although the European ruler sought to control economic activities, for the most part, native economic activities remained free. Europeans never monopolized any economic activity, agriculture, fishing or commerce. A few European firms 47Kofi Buenor, On Transforming Africa. Discourse with Africa's Leaders, (London: Africa World Press, Inc. , 1987), 69-73. 61 dominated various sectors of the economy, but many native businessmen, despite their lack of capital and managerial skills, competed successfully with European firms. With regard to the African traditional society often referred to by the current African leaders to justify their irrational behaviour, Ayittey asserts that Africa's traditional rulers did little to interfere with economic activities. In fact, one of the customary roles of the chiefs was to provide a peaceful atmosphere and environment for their subjects to engage in trade and commerce. The chiefs seldom monopolized commerce, fixed prices or operated tribal government enterprises. Profits from commerce were basically for peasants to keep, although chiefs did get some share. At the same time most African leaders continue to blame colonialism, American "imperialism," international lending institutions and a hostile global economic system as a way to hand over their responsibilities to other people.48 The State in Post-1965 Zaire The state in post-1965 Zaire, is primarily a structure of a single party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), and its power is backed by force. The Office of the President manages the state's departments, state industries, public services and other key sectors of 4"George Ayittey, "Africa's Market Heritage, "in The Washington Post, (Washington, D.C, October 26, 1988), A4. 62 socio-economic and political life in Zaire.49 The MPR was created on May 20, 1967, as the sole political party and it has become an integral and inclusive part of the state; they have become interchangeable. The integration of the structures of the MPR with those of the state led to their actual unity. In 1974, the Legislative Council passed a law stating that the MPR was not only the supreme institution of the Republic as it used to be since its creation on May 20, 1967, but it also became the sole official institution. The former other institutions became only its parts. This constitutional revision, which brought the fusion of the structures of state and party resulted in the disappearance of the state in the classical and ordinary sense as it exists in Western countries. It was replaced by the MPR as a "state-party." MPR's territorial organization has followed the administrative structure of regional government, and Government administrators fill dual roles in the state and in the party.50 Thus, it is the MPR which carries out the functions which were traditionally reserved to the state. 4'Janet Macgaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire. (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 49-52. 5"George Thomas Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World., Volume II, (United States of America: Facts on File, Inc., 1978), 1605. 63 Within such a context, the main organs of the MPR have clearly been the Comite Central and the Bureau Politique, which nominate the sole candidate for president of the MPR and thus, automatically, the president of the republic. The Comite Central and the Bureau Politique adopt state decisions which are binding upon legislature (now called the national legislative council) and government (now called the national executive council). The Comite Central and the Bureau Politique are said to have the power to dismiss anyone unfaithful to the ideal of Mobutisme, the official doctrine of the State-Party. However, the only person not considered an organ of the MPR is the president. As it was unambiguously stated in the constitution, until its revision in 1978, the president incarnates the MPR and is the embodiment of the nation in its political organizations. He stands above the organs of the MPR, such as the congress, the political bureau, the legislative, executive and judicial councils power and, as the founding president, he makes decisions outside the scope of the various articles of the constitution that may limit, to a certain degree, the powers of the president. As a result, the founding president is free to change and remove at will from membership any person who serves in any of the councils mentioned above. He is also immune from possible investigations and accusations of deviationism by anybody. He thus completely controls 64 everything.5 x By imposing a monolithic state structure on the whole country and centralizing all power, President Mobutu intended primarily to suppress the political opposition and lay down the foundations of national integration. Integration would be made possible by grouping all Zairean ethnic groups into MPR, the adoption of a national ideology, and the establishment, for the whole country, of common state-party institutions fairly composed of representatives from all Zairean regions. President Mobutu has systematically suppressed all independent associations and interest groups, and the MPR has become the only social organization through which political, economic, and social development of Zaire can be attained. He reduced the number of provinces to eight in 1966, dissolved parliament, abolished the independent judiciary, and provincial forces became purely administrative. To destroy and prevent the build-up of local and personal power bases, officials have since then been appointed, and sent to regions other than their own and have directly been accountable to the president. Administrative reforms in 1972 and 1973 further centralized authority and diminished 51Jacques Vanderlinden, "Recent History," in Africa South of Sahara,, (London: Europa Publications Limited, Eighteenth Edition, 1988), 1089-1090. 65 local and regional autonomy.52 Objectives of MPR, the "Party-State" The objectives of MPR can be divided into two broad categories: domestic objectives and those concerning Zaire's foreign policy. Its domestic objectives can be subdivided into political, economic and socio-cultural objectives. Politically, the MPR lists, among other things, nationalism as its doctrine, the search for and assertion of a real 'national independence' and defense through the modernization of the army, restoration of state authority, creation of a participative and democratic human community, and respect for human rights and freedoms. At the socio economic level, economic independence and state control of the economy are presented as its main objectives. The MPR contends that its ultimate goal is also to improve the material and moral conditions of the population, and assure social justice, protect the family, promote the liberation of women, and assure the education of youth, as well as carry out the development of science and technology. Apart from these broad and long-term objectives, the immediate and short-term objectives include, among others, the increase of agricultural and industrial production, the 52Michael G.Schatzberg, Politics And Class In Zaire: Bureacraucy, Business, and Beer in Lisala, (New York: African Publishing Co., 1980), 100-101. 66 establishment of an economic infrastructure, the adoption of a policy of expanded public works, and the improvement of individual socio-material and intellectual well-being. At the international level, the MPR has been expected to restore the state's international prestige, and committed to the liberation of African territories still under colonial rule, the promotion of economic cooperation and cultural exchange in Africa, the support of international organizations, and positive neutralism in the west-east confrontation for world hegemony. It is a one-party-state system, which the manifesto of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution presents as being compatible with African socialism.53 African Socialism is a syncretic attempt to reconcile African values and communal humanism (i.e. social cohesion and respect for each individual and his existence), Christianity, modern economic theories, and Marxism-Leninism. Thomas M. Callaghy argues that the state in post-1965 Zaire shows a mixture of doctrines which include notions from liberal democracy, revolutionary populism, even socialism. Above all, he notes, it is organic-statist in orientation, drawing on traditional African notions of community, equity, authority, and power, particularly precolonial concepts of kingship and chiefship. 5 3 Le Manifeste du Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution., (Kinshasa: Institut Makanda Kabobi, 1967), 14-15. 67 The process of establishing and consolidating this absolutist state has been facilated by an international system that supports the primary existence of states, even the notion of keeping particular regimes in power, but without necessarily being able to dictate their nature and structure in any systematic way.54 Like Callaghy, Kalambayi underscores that President Mobutu conceived and set up in Zaire a political system patterned after the "traditional" political organization, based on unity of command and democratic centralism. The traditional political organization based on the unity of command focuses on the exercise of state power, authority and structural arrangement of the social system in Zaire. This includes having the MPR as a monolithic social organization, each Zairean by birth being a member of MPR, a single center of power in the person o£ the president of MPR, the suppression of independent associations, a single leader embodying the whole national community and exercising full power on its behalf, suppression of organized opposition and any attempts to create a second political party, faith and fidelity to the leader, and total obedience to his orders and directives; the veneration of the leader; the subordination of the individual to the State-Party and permanent availability of individuals to be used any time by the party; the total control of all mass media; a pervasive 54Thomas M. Callaghy, Op.Cit., 6-7. 68 police network, etc;55 Neil Mclnnes discusses the notion of democratic centralism and argues that it is a principle of organization of communist parties that requires absolute centralization and rigorous discipline from their members, leading to the critical subservience of the members to leadership. This doctrine does not tolerate any dissent or organized opposition because party leaders are elected by rank-and- file members and act in conformity with the party goals and objectives already accepted by them.56 By its very nature, ideology, and structure, the MPR is not only an authoritarian state-party, but it is also the condensation of what Arthur Lewis called a "totalitarian" party because of its claim to be the supreme instrument of society.57 The state in Zaire is, as Callaghy underscores, an authoritarian system which emphasizes the centralization of power, the flow of decisions from the top down rather than of demands from the bottom up, deference to authority, limited pluralism, and the use of violent repression when other methods of cooptation and control fail.58 55Kalambayi-Mwamba-Ntombolo, Op.cit. , 220-222. 56Neil Mclnnes, Euro-Communism, (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications") 1976), 43. 5'Arthur Lewis, "Beyond African Dictatorship," in Encounter,, XXV, 1988), 3-18. 5"Thomas. M. Callaghy, Op.cit., 8. 69 The following organigramme gives an idea of the way party-state is structured in the post-1965 Zaire. MPR = State I v Founder-President of the MPR and President of the Republic V Central Committee I V Political Bureau I V Congress I v Legislative Council I v Regions I v Subregions I v Zones I v Collectivites I v Localites (Villages) Source: Histoire du Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, Bureau Politique du MPR, 1975, 68 Fig. 1. The Structure of the Party-State in Zaire One will notice that the structure of the State- Party is essentially top-down, and it weighs heavily on villages, which overall constitute the rural area in Zaire. 70 The imposition of a single political party and the centralization of political power have been accompanied by an increase in the role of the state in the economy. The dominant class in the post-1965 Zaire initially lacked an economic base; it derived power from position in the state and alliance with the representatives of Western capitalism who retained ownership of the principal means of production. But members of this class soon acted to establish an economic base. They used their position in the state to gain access to economic resources. The use of the state to acquire an economic base for the new dominant class was an evident objective of the state from 1966 on. In 1973 the Zaireanization decrees were passed: the state took over big agro-industrial and commercial enterprises and about 2,000 small- and medium-sized wholesale and retail businesses, small factories, plantations and farms belonging to foreigners were handed over to Zaireans. The majority of new owners were the politicians and administrators "faithful" to the "party-state" or their friends and relatives, the most powerful acquiring the most extensive holdings.s' The consequences of such political decisions were disastrous: few of the new owners, called "acquereurs" (acquirers) or "acquis par erreurs" in Zaire, i.e., those 5'Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairean State, (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 326-50. 71 who have acquired properties by mistake, had no serious business intentions, aptitude, managerial skills or experience. Thus, they spent revenue on personal consumption, most of them increased the number of wives and children, many of them sold stock they had and, in many cases, they went bankrupt. The state in post-1965 Zaire has been hardly more than a superstructure of privilege, a place where political mechanisms concentrated on natural resources. It did not change the structures of unequal development and peripheral capitalism established in the colonial period; indeed, it worsened them. In this light, several social researchers whose area of study is Zaire have attempted to investigate this situation for a better understanding. Winsome J. Leslie, for example, examines the World Bank's efforts to promote socio-economic development in Zaire and asserts that the Bank's success for development is affected by the nature of the Zairean state and its relationship to Western bilateral donors. The state is little concerned with social welfare or with economic development. Savings, investment, and production are not seen as the necessary link to growth, there is no thought of Zaire's long-term economic future, he asserts. When policy is made, it is ad hoc and incoherent, with a lack of attention to policy implementation. 72 The situation is further compounded by political realities. The nature of the state, with its systematic efforts to appropriate the resources of the country, and the "rational" policy of disorganization which accompanies this process, present a formidable obstacle to reform efforts and socio-economic development. As one can see, Leslie's book is very informative in describing the specifics of the state in Zaire; it shows how the state in Zaire serves the process of accumulation of wealth for those who control it and takes no interest in the genuine process of socio-economic development of the country nor in the fate of the majority of its population.60 On the other hand, Crawford Young explains the development of the modern idea of the state in developing countries, and he specifies that in these countries, nationalism has elevated economic development to its present place as a central purpose of the state. The state is expected to mobilize resources and plan their rational allocation. However, he underlines that none of these features can be identified as increasing in Zaire, quite the contrary in fact.61 Some commentators on Zaire, such as Guy Gran, have adopted the perspective of dependency theory. They have described Zaire's problems in terms of unequal exchange, in 60Winsome Leslie, op. cit, 70-72. 61Crawford Young, op.cit, 67-75. 73 which a political-administrative bourgeoisie assists the multinationals to transfer wealth to industrialized countries and hold the view that underdevelopment and dependency are self-perpetuating.62 Others, for instance Verhaegen, see Zaire's dependency as primarily technological. In this view, the state-based class controls the economic activity of the country; foreign technical aid, military cooperation, and intervention give this class the means to maintain its power. Technological imperialism with the multinationals as its agents has replaced the direct exploitation of workers and resources of the colonial period, and local development is stifled.s 3 These assertions of significance of foreign domination are necessary but not sufficient by themselves, and can be challenged on the grounds that they lack concrete documentation. They ignore the fact that in Zaire it is basically the state as an arena of class struggle, rather than foreign influence, which is, at this historical conjuncture, critical to the course of the country's underdevelopment. 62Guy Gran, Zaire, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. (New York: Praeger, 1979), 2-7. s3Benoit Verhaegen, "Imperialisme Technologique et Bourgeoisie Nationale au Zaire," in Catherine Coquery- Vidrovitch, ed. Connaissance du Tiers-Monde,(Paris: Union General d'Edition, 1978), 347-379. 74 Some detractors and activists, such as Nguza Karl-i- Bond, argue that Zaire has a dictatorship, an autocratic system of government. The leadership in the country is such that crisis and corruption have been institutionalized, and there is no way of getting another solution unless there is a change in the leadership.64 Ngunza, who has been among the high-ranked leaders of post-1965 Zaire and a decision-maker for years, ignores that, although change in the leadership of Zaire is a necessary condition, it is not, however, a sufficient one to carry out a qualitative national development. He fails to understand, as Clive Y. Thomas points out, that the state in developing countries cannot necessarily be reduced only to the existence of a dictator or to authoritarian forms of rule, although these accompany it. The state in these countries, especially in Zaire, is also, and basically, a historical, materialist entity. One must understand its social and material basis before calling for any social actions.65 How should one make sense of these alternatively insightful views? How resolve their latent and manifest contradictions? Must we regard Zaire as de-developing 6 4 Political and Economic Situation in Zaire. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. Ninety-Seventh Congress, (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, September 15, 1981), 15. 65Clive Y. Thomas, Op. cit., xx. 75 politically, hence, socio-economically? The ultimate answers to this question are presented later. For now, I can assert only that the state, i.e., the politico-ideological superstructure, corresponds to the economic infrastructure on which it rests, and they both interact dialectically and influence one another. The state is, in general, an impersonal structure, has a reliable administrative apparatus, participates extensively and rationally in socio-economic activities and designs, in collaboration with the people, policies which are conducive to rural as well as national socio-economic development. Agricultural Policy and Rural Development in Developing Countries: An Overview The literatures on agricultural policy and on rural development have been often discussed as a whole since agricultural policy has been considered, designed and implemented as a means by which to reach rural development. But James R. Kocher underscores that rural development is not agricultural development, nor is it agricultural policy. Agricultural development differs from rural development basically in that it is concerned specifically with rapid growth in agricultural production per se as well as fairly equal distribution of the benefits of development among the agricultural population. Since in most low-income countries nearly all rural people deal with agriculture, there is 76 usually very little difference between the two.6' Nonetheless, Julian Blackwood notes that rural development differs from agricultural development in two distinct ways. First, it aims to initiate rural change in a more explicit and comprehensive way, with a broad package of components providing new inputs and services at the farm level. Second, the assistance is directed explicitly to the poor. Rural development operations are defined as those agricultural sector projects in which at least half of the direct benefits go to the poor.67 A recent study presented by the United Nations indicates that the term "rural development" has different meanings in different institutions. It tends to evoke involuntary responses that vary widely from institution to institution and even among individuals within the same institution. The World Bank has popularized the problem of rural poverty and the concept of rural development, and encouraged its introduction into the official development planning documents and agendas of almost all developing countries which are its members. Other international agencies like 66James E. Kocher, Rural Development. Income Distribution, and Fertility Decline,, (New York: Key Book Services , Inc. , 1973), 51. 67Julian Blackwood, "World Bank Experience with Rural Development. A Comprehensive review by the Bank's independent Operations Evaluation Department," in Economic Development, pp.445- 448. Edited by Gary Weaver. Washington D.C: The American University, 1989. 77 the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labour Office of the United Nations, and various aid agencies have also highlighted the need for rural development. The emphasis on rural development became clear in the sixties for the following main recurrent reasons. First, about two-thirds of the population of developing countries live in rural areas, and there is a higher proportion of rural dwellers in the poorer countries. Second, accelerated population growth has helped create serious social and economic problems. Perhaps the most important of these has been a somewhat unexpected and pronounced increase in unemployment and underemployment. Third, the focus has been put on agricultural and food production and output;6" and fourth, not only can agriculture provide the needed inputs for industry, but high income will stimulate demand for industrial products. Approaches to Rural Development There are broadly speaking two different approaches to rural development in developing countries: the 'improvement approach' and the 'transformation approach.' The 'improvement approach' aims to encourage agricultural development within existing peasant production systems. It concentrates upon involving the productivity 68 Co-operation,, (New-York: Nations Development Programme, June 1979), 11. 78 and organization of production of peasant farmers without any radical changes in traditional social and legal systems. This approach, which originated in the British colonial government in Africa, India, and elsewhere, allows for the continuity of existing social institutions and land tenure arrangements. It aims to take the agrarian structure and land ownership from the local people and transfer them to the state. Development is to be initiated through improved extension work methods which, it is hoped, will encourage farmers to apply new crop varieties and new methods of production. This is said to produce more for market, which, in turn, will probably require the development of new marketing organizations. It is envisaged that the development of better extension services, and the stationing of agricultural experts to tour farms and villages to give advice and to provide other services such as arranging loans, will establish new incentives that lead to increased commercial production and help improve the living conditions in the rural area. The 'transformation approach' on the other hand attempts to establish new forms of agricultural and social organization, and makes a radical break with existing peasant systems in terms of operation, production techniques, and socio-legal structure. It involves the implementation of new land tenure systems or the 79 establishment of new types of settlements or farms, which necessitate very substantial capital outlay. Distinguishing between these two different approaches, does not suggest that the two cannot co-exist within a common national or regional framework. Indeed, in practice, most policies are based on a compromise of mixed strategies involving both types of approaches.69 The term rural development as often referred to in developing countries includes all efforts and activities undertaken by a developing country's state in collaboration with developed countries' aid agencies in order to improve the living conditions of rural people. These activities may be subsectoral or specialized. Given the nature of the state and economy in developing countries, attempts at rural development are essentially attempts at providing the "missing" or "crucial" links in the development of agriculture and agro-based village industries in rural areas. This has had considerable effect on growth of output and productivity, but the degree of success has been uneven. The approach undermining rural development plans is now being termed "top-down" since it is rooted in a centralized planning body which formulates development plans for a hierarchical and authoritarian administration.70 6'Norman Long, Op.cit., 144-184. 7"David A. M. Lea and D. P. Chaudhri, Contradictions 80 Rural development in general, especially the improvement of agricultural extension has frequently formed part of a more general program of community development. Absiekong defines the latter as an integrated approach to the question of rural development aiming to initiate improvements not only in agriculture, but in health, sanitation, craft industries, and improvement of the level of literacy. Such programs require a number of trained personnel, technically qualified in agriculture or some such skills, who are placed at the local level to provide assistance.7 l The strategies of infrastructure provision followed by state support for rural development depend upon thier objectives. A colonial state's planning and provision of infrastructure, for example, was to create and extract surplus which invariably gave rise to a colonial pattern of development. On the other hand, a state dominated by a particular group, class or social stratum would provide infrastructure giving maximum economic opportunities for that group, class or social stratum. and Dilemmas in Developing Countries. Rural Development and the State. (London and New York: Methuen, 1986), 87 7XM. Abasiekong, Integrated Rural Development in the Third World. Its Concepts, Problems, and Prospects. (New York, Smithtown: Exposition Press, 1982), 6-10. 81 A well-designed agricultural and rural development policy should reach large numbers of low-income producers; should be able to raise the incomes of this group; and should be replicable, especially with regard to the costs involved. It should be comprehensive in scope, making clear that the nonagricultural components are to be consistent with rural, regional and national guidelines. Grindle S. Merillee discusses what rural development and agricultural policies are all about in developing countries and asserts that the state reproduces, through its development policy, the conditions for capitalist accumulation, including control of subordinate classes. The dominant class intervenes directly in the policy process to achieve its ends. The state's agricultural policy is thus derivative of class relationships. Power to shape issues and to determine outcomes is located in social relationships of domination and control, and in the concrete alliances among and conflicts within hegemonic groups. Policy making in a patrimonial state is the exclusive prerogative of a small elite and is characterized by limited informational inputs, behind-the-scenes bargaining and accomodation, and low levels of public discussion and debate. Not only does the government claim responsibility for a wide range of activities, it also tends to reserve important policy making roles for the public 82 admini stration.72 James R. Bingen argues that State leaders use agricultural policy to secure advantages for particular interests, to oppose the power ofother political forces and to enhance the power capacity of political regimes. He underscores that Africa's regimes pursue elitist agricultural and rural policies because entrenched and powerful interests have a stake in perpetuating such policies.7 3 Among the cumulative lessons of more than three decades of experience with agricultural and rural socioeconomic development in developing countries has been the recognition that effective institutions are critical to the development process. Institutions provide the organizing framework for a country's capacity to solve its socioeconomic development problems. This framework conditions the incentives and opportunities a country's people have to engage in development efforts. Weak institutions offer limited incentives and few opportunities, thus diminishing local people's problem-solving capacity and increasing dependence 72Grindle S. Merillee, State and Countryside. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 11-24. 73James R. Bingen, Food Production and Rural Development in the Sahel. Lessons From Mali's Operation Riz-Segou, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 8-11. 83 on external resources and assistance. Strong institutions enhance people's ability to solve problems and undertake effective development actions, and reduce over time dependence on externally provided aid. Developing institutional capacity is one of the keys to ultimately self-sustaining agricultural and rural socio-economic development.74 Uma J. Lele documents the interaction between agricultural policy and rural development in Africa by pointing out that the success of agricultural and rural development depends upon some level of "fit" with the institutional context. Effective institutions are universally regarded as playing a strategic role in the development of a country. Effective public sector institutions allow governments to perform two important functions: to elaborate appropriate development policies and goals, and to implement them so that the goals are achieved.75 In rural development practice, many strategies fail because the planning process does not fully consider implementation requirements. First, there is a failure to anticipate potential implementation constraints, and second, 74Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Politics, Projects and People. Institutional Development In Haiti, (New-York: Praeger, 1985), 3, 11, 63. 75Uma J. Lele, The Design of Rural Development. Lessons From Africa. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins university Press, 1975), 8, 12. 84 there is a failure to act, even when constraints are identified and strategies are formulated. The cost of these failures is high. Implementers face unexpected difficulties they are ill-equipped to address; they are locked into designs that are fundamentally unsound; and they are given inadequate leeway and time to redirect strategies found to be inappropriate. Alleviating the problem is a design issue, and many policy failures stem from treating design as a discrete activity, divorced from implementation. Indicators of Agricultural and Rural Development Policy Today, a comprehension of agricultural policy and rural development in developing countries turns on issues such as the state's expenditures on agriculture, access to credit, market and price policies, transportation, research, and other indicators of policy. These indicators of critical importance have been selected as a cluefor for specifying government policy and its impacts on the farmers' ability to improve their living standards as well as promote rural socio-economic development. State's Financial Expenditures for Agriculture This indicator measures the proportion of recurrent expenditures that government devotes to agriculture and 85 agricultural development. An examination of resources allocated to agriculture, as compared with other areas of national concern, such as education, health, defense, energy, ideology, etc., enables an observer to determine how agriculture is viewed within the context of national goals and priority. Furthermore, the proportion of resources allocated to agriculture over time is a reasonable indicator of current trends about the relative importance of agriculture and its standing in the overall development policy of the country under analysis. Availability and Use of Agricultural Credit The availability and use of agricultural credit is particularly important in developing countries if farmers are to have access to improved technology in the form of purchased inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, or chemicals. Medium term credit may also be important for farmers to gain access to improved livestock, farm machinery or for land development. For this indicator, primary attention is given to the percentage of farmers using production credit and the average size of loans per farmer. Availability and Efficiency of Farm Markets Farmers are likely to increase their productivity if there are incentives to do so and if there is a reliable market system where they can sell, at encouraging prices, 86 surplus above household consumption. Farm marketing might be conducted by private traders or by a government parastatal, but the external factor measured by this indicator is the frequency by which farmers sell their produce, as well as the distance they have to take their produce and the length of time until payment. Farmers may be expected to transport their surplus at least 5 miles or 8 kilometers, but beyond this distance they tend increasingly to rely on middlemen, which in turn will increase marketing costs and reduce net income. Therefore, the first part of this indicator is percentage of farmers who live within 5 miles or 8 km of a market for primary farm products. The second dimension of this indicator is the efficiency of farm markets. Efficiency is measured by the normal time required for the farmer to be paid for his or her crop. Therefore, under this indicator, a market is considered very efficient if the farmer is paid immediately or within one week, efficient if paid before the beginning of the next growing season, so the farmer has cash available to purchase new inputs, and inefficient if a longer period is typical. Price Policy Government price policy sends important signals to farmers which directly influence their ability and 87 motivation to keep on farming. Farmers are unlikely to keep on producing cash crops unless there are clear incentives such as increased profitability. If a government pursues a "cheap food" policy to maintain the political support of urban consumers, it is unlikely that farmers can afford to adopt new technology and keep on producing more, unless purchased inputs are highly subsidized. The situation is even worse when government marketing boards for export crops are used to extract the surplus from rural producers. Therefore, the indicator used to measure government price policy attempts to compare the farms' gate prices for the major staple food crop, the major protein crop and the major cash/export crop (grown by small holders), with either regional and/or world market prices over time to determine the presence or absence of price incentives that would encourage farmers to assume the risk associated with farming activities and exigencies. Farmer Participation in Policy Formulation Increased farmer participation and involvement in government policy formulation is considered important in influencing the priorities and programs of agricultural and rural socio-economic development. The presence of farm organizations, the level of participation (percentage of farmers holding membership), the method by which leaders are selected (appointed by government or elected by the farm 88 membership) and the levels of organization (local, district, province and/or national) are all important in measuring farmer participation in policy formulation. Agricultural Research Investment Agricultural research must be viewed as a long term national investment that will directly impact agricultural productivity and rural socio-economic development. This indicator measures both private, and more important, public recurrent expenditures on agricultural research over time and relates this investment directly to agricultural gross domestic product (AGDP). A useful rule of thumb is that a nation should invest about 1% of AGDP in agricultural research annually, with developing nations needing to invest somewhat more than developed nations. For example, in Africa as a whole it is estimated that only about 0.15-0.20% of AGDP is invested in agricultural research, or about one- fifth of the suggested amount. Personnel Another indicator of the state commitment to agricultural and rural development is the extent to which the state assigns sufficient and capable officials to work on rural development and gives them adequate support in the form of attractive terms of service.76 76Puchala J. Donald, "The Politics of Agricultural Modernization," in Food, Politics, and Agricultural Development; Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural 89 In addition, one of the most significant factors influencing the general environment for agricultural and rural development is political commitment to a policy of making the rural sector more productive and, especially, of involving small farmers in development. Political support for agricultural and rural development policy at the various levels of government is necessary for the continuation of benefits. In the absence of this support, agricultural and rural development can be undermined by changing objectives or diversion of resources to other activities. When broad political support does not exist, the intended results will not be reached and rural development can become a matter of theoretical and politico-ideological exercises offering little or no guidance in real practical problem solving.77 Possible Agricultural Policy Effects An agricultural and rural development policy which cannot meet the above requirements is likely to face the following profound effects. First, it discourages production, reduces new private savings and investment, and channels whatever investment that takes place into areas which are relatively unproductive. Second, it shifts income Modernization, ed. by Hopkins F. Raymondet al,, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 4-16. 77Theodor Dams & Kenneth E. Hunt, Decision-Making and Agriculture, Papers and Reports, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), 221,451. 90 from low income groups, mostly small farmers, to upper income groups notably politicians, government employees and other workers in the formal industrial and service sector. Third, it can lead to persistent unemployment, as well as waste of capital and higher levels of capital intensity, and thus much lower levels of employment generation than should have occurred. Fourth, it engenders corruption and moral decay. Under these circumstances, the more control government has on economic life, the more it uses administrative means to ration resources rather than the market, the greater opportunity for extortion and bribery and corruption of all kinds. The greatest cost of these policy effects is not only rural underdevelopment, but also cynicism and loss of faith in government. Above all, the literature just presented is characterized by an increasing recognition of the central role of the state as a dual institution of administration and control, as well as an arena for sharing out economic resources with the interest of the ruling class in mind. Agricultural policy and rural development are characterized by the lack of "fit" with the institutional context. This, in addition to the specifics of the state in post-1965 Zaire, accounts for the unresponsiveness of state policy to the needs of the people both in the rural and urban areas. What has been the agricultural policy and its actual implementation in post-1965 Zaire in relation to the 91 agricultural policy indicators discussed above? Chapter three of this study will be devoted to this question. CHAPTER III STATE'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN POST-1965 ZAIRE This chapter will assess the agricultural policy in post-1965 Zaire by presenting and discussing statistical data related to the conventional indicators of an agricultural policy. These indicators are, among others, the state's agricultural expenditures, availability and use of credits by farmers, marketing and pricing policies, personnel policies, agricultural research, and institutional arrangements. Agricultural Expenditures This section, like others which follow, presents data that help determine the actual place of the agricultural sector in Zaire. These tables and figures will also permit one to make the comparison between the expenditures of the agricultural sector and those of other sectors of socio-economic life in Zaire. Although figures may not all stem from the same base, they will at least shed light on the relative the priority which the state in post-1965-Zaire has accorded to agriculture. 92 93 The share of agriculture has fluctuated considerably with the vicissitudes of Zaire's political economy. For instance, in 1959, before independence, agriculture's share of GDP was estimated at about 26%, but it went down to about 16% in 1970 and 17% in 1975.78 TABLE 2 THE ZAIREAN STATE'S EXPENDITURES ON AGRICULTURE BETWEEN 1967 AND 1980 (IN MILLIONS OF ZAIRES AND IN %) Years Agricultural % of global expenditures expenditures 1967 1968 1.801 7.03 1969 3.628 6.91 1970 1.725 2.76 1971 2.032 2.47 1972 1.941 1.01 1973 4.166 2.17 1974 7.437 2.2 1975 4.300 3.42 1976 40.428 4.12 1977 10.310 3.74 1978 31.837 12.02 1979 23.330 4.82 1980 Source: Reports of the Bank of Zaire. Notes: These figures on agricultural expenditures also include equipment transfer. 7"Kazadi-Tshamala," La Formation du Capital dans 1'Agriculture du Zaire Post-Colonial: Situation et Perspectives," in Les Cahiers du CEDAF, no. 6-7, (Bruxelles, 1983), 49. 94 According to the reports of the Bank of Zaire the share of the budget which the agricultural sector received between 1967 and 1979 ranged between 1.01 and 12.02 %. Furthermore, one would not expect to see such low percentages over time allocated to a sector which has been proclaimed to be the highest priority for socio-economic development. The following table presents the government expenditures in thousands of Zaire between 1968 and 1972. TABLE 3 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (IN THOUSANDS OF ZAIRES), 1968-72 Current Budget Years 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Ministry of Agriculture 2,291 2,179 1,670 1,640 5,400 Total Budget 113,772 159,690 190,481 217,850 257,100 Percentage for Agriculture 2.0 1.4 0.9 0.7 2.09 Investment Budget Years 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Ministry of Agriculture 700 2,416 2,219 2,074 3,500 Total 18,179 40,000 56,955 66,897 72,600 Budget Percentage for Agriculture 3.8 6.5 3.9 3.1 4.82 Source: Ministry of Finances 95 The low esteem in which agriculture appears to be held has been matched by the low priority which the state has accorded to it in budgeting plans. Continuously low expenditures and investments have flowed into agriculture.7 Tables 4 and 5, in addition to the ones presented above, illustrate this reality. TABLE 4 SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET, 1970-81 Year Current Investment Total Expenditure Expenditure (percent) (percent) 1970 5.7 3.3 9.0 1971 8.8 3.0 11.8 1972 1.3 3.8 5.1 1973 1.6 1.9 3.5 1974 1.8 3.4 5.2 1975 8.9 3.4 12.3 1976 3.1 7.5 10.6 1977 2.8 2.3 5.1 1978 2.9 15.5 18.4 1979 1.7 9.2 10.9 1980 1.4 13.1 14.5 1981 1.8 3.6 5.4 Source: Unpublished data provided by the Zairean Department of Agriculture, Direction of Studies, Kinshasa. 7' Agricultural Sector Survey. Republic of Zaire, Restricted General report no.PA-118a , Agriculture Projects Department, Volume I (WAshington, D.C: World Bank, June 19, 1972), 9. 96 TABLE 5 BUDGET TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IN ZAIRES, 1981-1987 Years Dept. of Agriculture Total Budget Percentage (Budget) 1981 198,053,519 5,383,108,074 3.7 1982 230,221,089 7,830,108,074 2.9 1983 235,160,217 8,167,678,464 2.9 1984 175,985,000 24,389,000,000 0.7 1985 265,904,698 33,413,452,157 0.8 1986 555,610,975 70,578,659,077 0.8 1987 -- 82,354,338,946 - Source: Zaire, Agricultural Situation, (Washington, D.C: United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Services, Washington, D.C, March, 1987). Note: This budget includes what is known as ordinary budget and investment budget. The table below allows a comparative assessment in 1981, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development received only Z 11,000,000 or 3.3 % of the total national budget. At the same time the Departments of Energy, Presidency, Public Works (which include maintainance of roads), Finance and Budget, Primary and Secondary Education, Transport and Portfolio, to cite only those, received respectively 52.0%, 8.9%, 6.0%, 5.9%, 5.5%, 5.2%, and 4.2 %. The share of agriculture occupies only the eighth position in terms of priority. 97 TABLE 6 INVESTMENT BUDGET AND EXPENDITURES FOR 1981, BY MINISTRY, IN MILLION ZAIRES Approp riations Expeniditure s Amount (%) Amount (%) Presidency 48.3 (14.1) 52.9 (8.9) Agriculture 11.4 (3.3) 19.6 (3.3) Transport 31.0 (9.1) 31.2 (5.2) Energy 87.3 (25.5) 309.9 (52.0) Primary & secondary education 27.8 (8.1) 35.1 (5.9) Information, culture & arts (Ideology) 22.5 (6.6) 8.3 (1.4) Finance & Budget 23.0 (6.7) 33.1 (5.5) Portfolio 15.3 (4.5) 25.1 (4.2) Planning 17.7 (5.2) 18.5 (3.1) Defense 8.8 (2.6) 4.6 (0.8) Public Works 20.1 (5.9) 35.5 (6.0) Health 9.8 (2.9) 2.0 (0.3) Others 19.4 (5.7) 20.0 (3.4) Total 342.4 100.0 595.8 100.0 Source: Republique du Zaire, Departement de l'Economie nationale et de l'industrie, Conjuncture Economique, 1972-1981 The above table presents the public investment plan for of different sectors of socio-economic life in Zaire between 1981-1983. A examination of expenditures in that period reveals that the agricultural sector received 13.7% of the total investment while mining, transport, and energy, for example, received respectively 34.4%, 20.0%, and 16.0%. 98 TABLE 7 PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM IN MILLIONS OF ZAIRES Sector 1981 1982 1983 Total Agriculture T 388.4 284.5 278.7 951.6 Z 79.4 73.6 62.5 215.5 13.7 F.E 308.0 210.0 216.2 736.1 Mining T 718.3 846.0 801.4 2365.7 Z 152.4 182.6 161.3 496.1 34.4 F.E 565.9 663.4 640.1 1869.6 Transport T 521.2 509.6 351.2 1382.0 Z 176.5 190.2 131.5 498.0 20.0 F.E 344.9 319.4 219.7 884.0 Energy T 467.1 431.3 195.5 1093.9 Z 97.8 144.2 64.4 306.4 16.0 F.E 369.3 287.1 131.1 787.5 Education T 54.8 63.8 221.5 221.5 Z 33.2 74.0 42.2 149.4 3.2 F.E 21.6 28.9 21.6 72.1 Health T 14.8 28.6 40.4 83.8 Z 14.8 19.6 19.7 54.1 1.4 F.E -- 9.0 20.7 20.7 Others T 265.0 229.1 201.1 695.2 Z 210.1 100.4 81.1 391.6 10.1 F.E 59.9 128.7 120.0 303.6 Subtotal T 2432.6 2432.0 1932,1 6793.7 Z 764.0 784.4 562.7 2111.1 F.E 1665.6 1647.6 1369.4 4682.6 Unexpected T -- 50.5 23.4 73.9 Z -- 50.5 73.9 73.9 1.07 F.E — — — — Total T 2429.6 2482.5 1955.5 6867.6 100 Z 764.0 384.9 586.1 2185.0 32 F.E 1667.6 1647.6 1369.4 4682.6 68 Source: The Presidency of the Republic, Mobutu Plan, The 1981-1983 Program of Economic Increase, Vol.1, March 1981, 13. Notes: T: Total; Z: Zaires; F.E: Foreign Exchange. The table below presents post-1965 Zaire's external debt in 1980, and it indicates that the agricultural sector and even agro-industry received only 1.2% and 1.5% of the 99 TABLE 8 PARTICIPATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ZAIREAN EXTERNAL DEBT IN US DOLLARS AND IN % ON JANUARY 1ST, 1980 Sectors Amounts % Agriculture, Fishing & Silviculture 57,063,742.28 1.2 Food Agro- Industry 73,089,188.69 1.5 Energy 1,252,270,857.10 26.6 Mineral industry 412,677,665.74 8.8 Chemical industry Textile, clothing, etc, 22,111,120.33 0.7 Buildings & public works 608,346,541.34 12.3 Transportation & communication 1,146,971,918.29 24.4 Manufacturing industry 13,315,116.28 0.-9 Other services 788,214,022.28 16.8 Public services 310,980,598.52 6.6 Commerce 8,551,954.13 0.2 Source: Republique du Zaire, Departement de l'Economie Nationale et de l'Industrie, Op.Cit., 190. external loans, while energy, unspecified services, public works, mineral industry, and public services, for example, received respectively 26.6%, 16.8%, 12.3%, 8.8%, and 6.6%. While the state has been presenting the agricultural and rural sector to international financial institutions as at needy sector to be funded and the key to development, it has, once funds are disbursed, given it one of the lowest shares. 100 Contribution of Agriculture to Total Exports Given the background conditions just outlined, it will not surprise that the contribution of agriculture to total exports has also decreased significantly in the past two decades. In 1959, the share of agricultural products in the total value of exports was about 39%, amounting to US $183 million. Palm oil products, coffee, cotton, and rubber were the dominant exports, and they respectively provided 30%, 25%, 14%, and 12% of total agricultural exports. By 1966, the total volume and value of agricultural exports had declined dramatically, representing only 16.5% of the total exports, valued at US $77 million. This is about the level it remained at until the present. The total volume of agricultural exports has declined in absolute terms; one estimate puts the total volume at 443,000 tons in 1968, dropping to 251,000 tons in 1978. The dramatic decline in palm product exports, from an estimated 141,000 tons in 1976 to less than 10,000 tons in 1978, is an important factor in this change. Winsome J. Leslie asserts in a complementary way that income from agricultural exports such as coffee and palm oil has generally been falling because of the declining levels of production as well as the low world prices. The price of coffee, however, has appreciated about 27 percent between 1984 and 1986, largely because of the elimination of 101 global export quotas by international coffee organizations and significantly lower exports from Brazil. In the face of favorable prices, she writes, coffee smuggling has continued unabated, hence Zaire has been unable to reap significant gains from increased exports."" It should be emphasized that export figures in general are subject to considerable inaccuracy since many products, notably coffee, have been exported fraudulently in recent years and no reliable data are available. Share of Agricultural Imports The share of agricultural products in imports has increased dramatically in recent years, although available data are insufficient and even more unreliable than for exports, given the high degree of fraud. Relevant imports comprise food, such as maize, wheat and meat, textile and leather goods, and other inputs for agricultural industries, other consumer goods, and agricultural inputs. For the 1973-1975 period, for example, Zaire imported 150,000 to to 200,000 metric tons of corn per year."1 In 1978, food imports were estimated to comprise 20% of the total value of imports, up from 16% in 1977. Textiles for further manufacturing represented 3%, rubber ""Winsome J. Leslie, Op.Cit., 141. 81See U.S. AID/Zaire Mission in Kinshasa for the Review of Development Loan Committee, U.S. Department of State, AID, Washington, D.C, September 1976, 16. 102 and leather 5%, and agricultural inputs 2% of the estimated total value of imports in 1978."2 While the share of agriculture of the recurrent Government budget has been very low, at present, salaries of established staff consume almost all of the Department's allocation. In addition to the problems of chronic misallocation and shortages of funds in this sector, budgetary procedures do not work well. High priority activities are frequently omitted from the budget and no clear mechanisms exist for obtaining release of budgeted funds, even when they are available. Capital budget funds are seldom transferred to operating agencies on time. In many areas local officials or managers sell their basic infrastructure ,i.e., equipment, vehicles and other movables in order to meet their immediate financial needs and survive. These problems are widespread in Zaire, but they seem to be particularly serious for the agricultural and rural sector. Moreover, a critical problem for the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development as well as for the parastatal agencies is the absence of effective financial control. Audit requirements are not clearly established and serious financial mismanagement is widely recognized as a critical problem. 2Zaire Economic Memorandum, op.cit., 31-32. 103 Overall, one can notice that agricultural expenditures both from the national budget and external donations do not at all reflect the priority which the state in post-1965 Zaire has accorded to the agricultural and rural sector. Availability and Use of Agricultural Credits and New Techniques Agricultural Credits Access to credits is a decisive factor in agricultural and rural socio-economic development. They allow, as Janet Macgaffey points out, the transition from petty commodity to small capitalist production. In Zaire, restrictions on credit to farmers imposed, timidly by the state and big financial institutions, operate to block this transition. Starting during the colonial period, credit restrictions formed a barrier to socio economic mobility of the local people. After independence banks continued to give credits far more readily to foreign businessmen than to Zaireans. The monetary reforms of 1967 resulted in a tightening of credit: branches of banks in the interior had to issue loans by going through the head office in Kinshasa, a slow and laborious process. By the end of 1970, total bank loans to nationals amounted to only 16% of total loans. In 1974, for example, Z20O,0OO (64%) of the Z310,658 lent out by the Societe de 104 Credit aux Classes Moyennes, went to foreigners.83 Today agricultural credit is expected to be provided by six commercial banks and by the Societe Financiere de Developpement (SOFIDE), a development finance company established in 1970. The role of these institutions is to provide loans to medium and large-scale enterprises, but a major constraint is lack of foreign exchange resources for lending. Difficulty in obtaining credit has been a critical obstacle for the expansion of Zairean-owned business and the transition larger-scale to production. Zairean farmers generally lack sufficient credit to increase their productivity and to take up the many abandoned foreign plantations. Credit for smallholder agriculture is virtually non existent in Zaire. Small farmers remain in a state of chronic mediocrity because they do not have access to credits. The only source of such credit is lending within the context of a few area-specific development programs, including the FAO fertilizer program, on which the experience with the smallholder Maize Project is largely based. Although the real demand for credit by small farmers is difficult to assess accurately, there is certainly a need "3:Janet Macgaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites. The Struggle for indigenous capitalism in Zaire, (Cambridge: University Press, 1987), 193. 105 for credit.8 4 A regional report expresses this reality as follows: The politics of bank credit remain generally restrictive... The Zairean planters of our province complain that they do not receive credit from the financial institutions. They thus find great difficulty in developing their plantations and farms adequately.85 No such difficulty exists for the politically powerful, and their relatives, who actually may not even have farms or plantations. Most of them live in cities, and are rather involved in politics and some types of smuggling activities. They are the ones, who are known as farmers and get credits easily. For many of them, an influential position in the state made the acquisition of plantations easy in the process of Zairianization and through other means. Janet MacGaffey illustrates this situation in light of what she saw in the Haut-Zaire (Upper Zaire) region, which is a frequent reality in other regions as well. She writes that in November 1979, a group of top politicians toured Upper Zaire, ostensibly on a tour of inspection. The purpose of their "official mission" was, according to a source in the Land Title office, to register title to a number of abandoned plantations. The real reason was to 84 Zaire, Agriculture and Rural Development,, Sector Memorandum, (Washington, D.C: World Bank: May 26, 1986), 32. 85 Rapport Economic Annuel. (Region du Haut- Zaire.1971), 9. 106 legally sanction their coffee, ivory, mineral and other exporting activities by acquiring ownership of plantations; whether those would be properly maintained, managed and used to capacity was made irrelevant by virtue of power, connections, and influence."6 In Zaire, banks are state-owned entities. These financial institutions block the development of the agricultural and rural sector by requesting collateral from small farmers and by refusing to recognize small grassroots financial organizations. Cooperatives Centrales D'Epargne et de Credit (COCEC), a credit union, was started in 1970 in Basankusu, Bukavu and Kinshasa, some of the main cities in Zaire. Their initial goal was to combat credit acquisition difficulties. In 1979 their membership totalled 32,000 and their funds 5 million Zaires. The Basankusu cooperative, for example, had given 47 per cent of loans for commercial ventures, 30.2% for construction. However, the Bank of Zaire refused them recognition as official financial institutions and in the demonetization of 1979 they were unable to change most of their funds into the new denominat ion.8 7 8'Janet MacGaffey, Op.cit., 38. 87 Pierre Korse," Les Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit de Basankusu," in Janet MacGaffey, Op.cit., 193-194. 107 While credits are said to be lacking and unavailable" to small farmers in Zaire, the agricultural credit bank is still operating, requesting money on their behalf, and seemingly conducting business in the name of agricultural and rural development. The following is a cover letter by the president of the bank of credit to the representative of the World Bank in Kinshasa, Zaire, for this purpose. BANQUE DE CREDIT AGRICOLE DIRECTION GENERALE Kinshasa, le 13 Mars 1987 V.Ref.: N.Ref.: PDG /0725/87 A Monsieur LANG BUI Object: Transmission Plan Representant Resident Quinquennal du de la Banque Mondiale Developpement de la au Zaire B.C.A.- KINSHASA/GOMBE Monsieur le Representant Resident, Nous avons le plaisir de vous transmettre en annexe de la presente, un exemplaire du plan Quinquenal du Developpement de la Banque de Credit Agricole (B.C.A.) 1987-1991. Tout en vous en souhaitant bonne reception, nous tenons a attirer votre attention sur le caractere indicatif du contenu de ce document. Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Representant Resident, l'expression de notre consideration distinguee. LE PRESIDENT-DELEGUE GENERAL MAMBU ma KHUNZU MAKUALA Source: Banque de credit Agricole, (Kinshasa: Direction Generale, 13 Mars 1987), 1 108 This cover letter indicates that there exists a bank of agricultural credit, the goal of which is to support the agricultural sector in general and small farmers in particular. This bank was created by presidential ordinance (decree) no. 82-162 of October 21, 1982. It is, as stipulated in chapter one, page one of this document, a public, a commercial and financial institution. It is related to decree (ordonnance-loi) no. 72-004 of January 1972, concerning the protection of savings and the financial control of middlemen in Zaire."" Nevertheless, this bank is hardly known, especially by small farmers in Zaire. In terms of loan allowances, only a few people who are either state officials or their relatives have access to them. Other categories of the population who seek credit and who are neither state high-rank state officials nor their relatives generally get the following three answers. The first response is that there are no funds, they have not yet arrived from Kinshasa. Another is that funds will arrive probably by the end of the month or next month. Yet another one is that funds have arrived, but that they are no longer here, they are already utilized. Lenders seldom will tell that credits are available and serve those who fulfill the requirements. Banque de Credit Agricole. Op.cit., 1.5. 109 Another way one may try to get credit is by accepting the "operation-retour." That is, the person who wants to get credit must accept a big amount of money, and should agree to give an important percentage of that loan to the official who is in charge of credit. Otherwise, one cannot get anything. Unless one accepts these unconstitutional behaviors, or one is a relative of the lender, or one is a high-ranked official, who can have an influence on the lender's career, one will not be served. Since the state is unable to provide small farmers with credit to promote the agricultural and rural sector, it has instead developed mass mobilization and coercion as a substitute for credits. Instead of using the Capital ^Commodity >Capital economistic model,89 successfully applied in many countries, the state in post-1965 Zaire rather has implemented coercion and repression as an "incentive" to farmers. Mulambu Mvuluya states that the system of obligatory cultivation has never really been modified in Zaire.'" "'Robert Eric Mintz, Peasants Wars of the Twentieth century, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 33. '"Mulambu Mvuluya, Le Regime des Cultures Obligatoires et le Radicalisme Rural au Zaire, These de Doctorat en Sciences Politiques et Administratives, (Universite Libre de Bruxelle: Faculte des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Economiques, 1974), 45. 110 Agricultural Techniques Not only do farmers in gneral and small farmers in particular lack credit, but they also lack fertilizer and appropriate and sufficient technical assistance. The small farming system in Zaire is still based on traditional, labor-intensive practices; fertilizer is unavailable, mechanization is not used at all. Agricultural "planning" has neglected these farmers. An effective system for delivering better technologies has not been put into place, nor is there encouragement to stimulate them.'1 Market and Pricing Policies Market Policies Several serious, immediate constraints for agricultural and rural development result directly from inappropriate or unclear government policies designed to foster and/or control the agricultural and rural sector. Policies affecting small farmers, private investment, the role of private companies, pricing of agricultural commodities, and marketing are other serious and immediate problems.92 These problems arise from the nature of the policies themselves and from the confusion surrounding their precise content, design and implementation. 51 Zaire Economic Memorandum, Op.Cit. 11. '2Zaire Economic Memorandum, Op.cit, 26. Ill The first agricultural agency in charge of marketing and pricing policy of agricultural produce was created in 1967 and was called "Economat du Peuple". Its initial and official goal was to put "order" in the process of commercialization of agricultural products from rural farmers to the urban population at relatively fair prices. Several abuses were observed within that agency and they prompted critiques. Instead of being an agricultural agency supplying agricultural products from rural areas to cities, that agency became a personal and familial property of those state officials who were in charge of it, and it was used as a transportation company to carry family members, passengers, cases of beer, and some other unnecessary commodities not needed in rural areas. Other specialized agencies, each for a particular main crop, were also created between 1973 and 1974, during the "Zaireanization" and "radicalization" measures, when the ruling class shared public properties and means of production as well as properties abandoned by foreigners. The most important of these agencies have been: ONACER, also called ONPV, for cereals; ONAFITEX, for textiles; ONO, particularly for palm oil; ONDE, for husbandry; ONCN, for rubber; ONDS, for sugar; and OZACAF, for coffee. Each of these agencies has had its own structure and personnel, and has been intended to supervise production and 112 commercialization of these crops.'3 With the creation of numerous agencies, the state in post-1965 Zaire has done no more than the Belgian colonial state, that is, established too many and unnecessary mechanisms to "control" local agricultural surplus and spread its influence in the rural area. While these agencies needed expertise and money to perform properly and fulfill their respective tasks, their costs were far above the state's financial capacity. In addition, the presidents and managers of those agencies started serving themselves, utilizing the funds allocated to agencies for their personal pockets. This situation, which is still worsening, has led to the bankruptcy and closure of many of these agencies. Pricing Policies Pricing policies have been complex, unclear, and unevenly applied. Efforts to control prices of widely traded goods, notably food crops and livestock, have been entirely ineffective, and the confusion about government policies and regulatory authority has detracted from efforts to promote increased production. These policies have in effect penalized publicly sponsored efforts at production insofar as price "ceilings" have been applied.94 '3Kazadi Tshamala, op. cit., 58-59. 94Zaire Economic Memorandum, op.cit, 26-30. 113 Livestock and meat marketing has been handled through public and private channels; private traders have experienced serious problems in marketing because of the inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure, such as slaughter houses, and cold stores, and transport, i.e., lack of refrigerated airplanes, rail cars, and boats. Problems are exacerbated by the long distances separating the centers of livestock production, for example,the regions east of Kinshasa and other marketplaces. The Office National de Developpement de l'Elevage (ONDE), created in 1973, has begun to play a role in cattle and meat and marketing processing in recent years, but because of limited managerial and technical capacity, its impact has been restricted. Fish marketing faces similar problems. Private traders dominate marketing channels, but the underlying constraint of the long distances separating production centers such as Bolangba, Bukama, and Kalemie and marketplaces have been seriously worsened by current acute shortages of transport equipment and the inefficient transportation network. A fishery parastatal institution, the Office National de Peches (ONP) has responsibility for fish marketing, but it plays a very limited role in this sub-sector. Marketing arrangements and problems for most industrial and export commodities also suffer from severe 114 impediments posed by transport inefficiencies. Marketing for cotton, coffee, sugar and palm oil, for example, have resulted in intense speculation, a dramatic example of retail market activity for products in scarce supply. Marketing problems reportedly represent an increasingly serious impediment for coffee producers in Zaire in general and in the eastern and northwestern regions in particular, largely for logistic reasons. The "unofficial" marketing arrangements, destined for illegal exports, have worked well from time to time, with farmers receiving inputs and consumer goods from abroad in return for coffee sales. Government regulations stipulate that farm-gate prices of food crops, notably maize and cattle, are subject to a government-decreed minimum price. The official declared objective of these provisions, first introduced in 1967 for cattle, was to guarantee an adequate return to farmers, and it was assumed that the policy would be supported by a national marketing agency which would act as a "buyer of last resort."'5 In practice, however, the state has been unable to provide any mechanism to enforce the minimum price established or to guarantee that farmers' crops will be purchased. Furthermore, minimum prices have not been '5 Zaire Agricultural Situation, Economic and Research Sevices, (Washington, D.C: United States Department of Agriculture, March, 1987), 2-39. 115 changed for long periods of time, and actual farm-gate prices have far exceeded the official minimum price. Thus the official minimum price has had no direct positive impact on production for any commodity concerned. While it was argued that the price policies were to curb inflatory trends and, at the same time, to protect producers and consumers, these goals have not been achieved. A World Bank report indicates that that situation was due to the lack of flexibility in government policy on producer and wholesale prices; traders and government officials on occasion taking minimum prices to be fixed prices; lack of any framework to enforce the legislation; lack of any control over the retail trade as well as much of the wholesale trade; and contradictory objectives within the control promulgated.'6 Incentives to producers have been inadequate and unclear. For the private sector, there has been little incentive to invest in long-term development, and the state's confusing regulations, including the difficult general environment, have provided significant disincentives to efficient agricultural and rural management and development. '6 Agricultural Sector Survey, Republic of Zaire, Restricted Report no. PA-118a, Volume II, Annexes 1 through 6, (Washington, D.C: Agricultural Department, June 19, 1972) 32-33. 116 For small farmers, the incentives have been more limited, prices have often been inadequate, and more important, goods have often been unmarketed and no goods have been available for purchase. Confidence of farmers in government policies and assistance has thus been low and has been decreased by the prolonged period of lawlessneess and unending inflation, which keeps on stripping many farmers of their meager savings.'7 Needless to say, farmers are very sensitive to prices, and they adjust their efforts and production to the revenues they get. Peemans illustrates this reality by pointing out the case of the region of Bas-Zaire, which quadrupled its food crop production between 1960 and 1965. He also gives an idea about the gap between the price to farmers and the price to urban people by noting, for instance, that in 1961, the price for food cropspaid to farmers represented 42% of the same food crops brought and sold to the urban population, the difference of purchase was 32%. In the beginning of 1970, the price to the farmer represented only 24%, while the margin of sale in cities reached 53%.'" The Washington Post indicates that the state in Zaire has recently ordered that farmers be paid prices that are high enough to motivate them to grow food. Where 'Agricultural Sector Survey, Republic of Zaire. Op.cit. , 8. " J.Ph. Bezy, and J.M. Peemans, J.M. Wautelet, 117 farmers have been relatively well paid, there has been an impressive increase in food production. And yet many middlemen across rural Zaire refuse to cut their exorbitant profits and pay fair-market prices to farmers. Consequently, farmers refuse to grow more food than they need for their self-subsistence. Zaire remains a food importer in spite of its enormous agricultural potential. And yet the head of the state recently saw fit to dispatch a government-owned DC airliner to Venezuela 32 times to pick up 5,000 sheep for his private farm.99 Similarly, the confiscation of agricultural surplus by state officials, traders, middlemen, and brokers prevents small farmers from increasing their incomes, hence their living standards. Concerning agrobusiness involved in cash crops, the state's pricing policy has been a cause of fraud and smuggling of such crops as coffee or palm oil. The official prices of these crops have remained far removed from the ones prevailing in the World Market, which has implied speculation at the national level. President Mobutu, aware of this situation, argued once: La speculation qui resulte de cette difference de prix provoque un gonflement exagere des besoins du marche interieur finalement insatisfait, une partie importante de son approvsionnement normal etant revendue par des 99 The Washington Post, (Washington, D.C, Friday, November 20 1987), A25. 118 intermediares sur le marche parallele ou sur les marches exterieurs.J"" It should be noted that on the few occasions that crops are purchased in rural Zaire, one observes three realities unknown in conventional transaction systems. First, middlemen buyers fix the prices of crops as if these crops belonged to them. Second, these middlemen, seeking personal profits, require a "matabiche," which is another version of bribery, from the small farmers. Should a farmer refuse this consideration, middlemen will not buy his produce. Since they are the only ones who hold a complete monopoly on crop buying, small farmers have little choice but to obey. Third, and not the least, businessmen, who are mostly state officials, have set up stores in some of these villages so that villagers can buy items in cash or for credit. The tactic behind these stores is basically to have villagers become indebted so that they can keep on growing crops and exchange them at a very low price for items which they have received on credit. The 1971-72 agricultural sector survey concluded that Zaire's marketing system, consisting largely of private traders, wholesalers and retailers, had so far managed to maintain supplies to urban centers, but at high cost.101 1°"Republique du Zaire, Ministere de l'Economie Nationale, Conjuncture Economique, no.12, 1972, 42. 1 °x Agricultural Sector Survey; Republic of Zaire, Restricted Report no. PA-118a, Agricultural Projects Department, Volume II, Annexes 1 Through 6, (Washington, 119 Rural producers not only get low prices for their products and almost no return in government services or local development, but they must also pay high prices for manufactured goods they need. One reason for such prices is government intervention for protection of domestic industry. Price control means that farmers receive lower prices for their products, whereas, sheltering of domestic industry means they must pay more for goods. A wage, price and tax structure thus operates to extract the maximum from petty producers and wage workers, and credit restrictions and marketing organization restrict their upward mobility should they find any independent means of acquiring wealth. However, the ineffectiveness of the state apparatus for this end and the alternative wage labor production under non-capitalist relations of production, sometimes permit possible resistance to, and evasion of, these restrictive measures.102 In his discussion on the political economy of Zaire, Guy Gran underscores this reality by writing that farmers lose initially in the basic act of exchange. The amount of labor going into their products is far more than is represented in the goods their money can buy. In this unequal exchange, he asserts, they lose again as one of many D.C: The World Bank, June 19, 1972), 31. 1°Agricultural Sector Survey: Republic of Zaire, Op.cit., 26-196. 120 and comparatively poor sellers in a market situation dominated by a few middlemen. For crops marketed through the agricultural agencies, the situation is even worse as officials demand bribes and commissions, although they cannot perform their duties completely.103 Personnel Many of the implementation problems that arise in the agricultural and rural development sector problems of performance and utilization of personnel. Among the most serious obstacles are shortages of trained personnel, lack of motivation, failure to make effective use of available personnel, and mediocre results from the use of foreign advisers.l° 4 It is worth noting that Zaire has a sufficient number of personnel trained locally and abroad. But this personnel is not motivated, nor is it rewarded as it should be by the Zairean state. Personnel motivation is extremely low. Salaries of virtually all government officers do not allow them to pay their bills throughout the month. Salaries coming from Kinshasa are paid either on the "40's" or the "50's" (every forty or fifty days), and sometimes they are not paid at all. 103Guy Gran, Op.cit, 4. 10"Mors, R. Elliot and Gow, D. David, Implementation of Rural Development Projects: Lessons From AID and World Bank Experiences, (United States: Westview Replica Edition, 1985), 65-79. 121 Given increasing erosion by inflation, salaries offer virtually no incentives for sustained and dedicated performance. The level of wages compared to the cost of goods necessary for the production and reproduction of workers allows neither a laborer nor a high ranked official to support his family on his salary. These problems are exacerbated by the lack of means to carry out the agricultural tasks. Staff are inefficiently utilized, and largely ineffective. The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development lacks an appropriate organization to oversee and monitor progress of on-going agricultural activities, and provides little support in resolving problems. Policy formation capability are very limited and, because of poor links with planning institutions; preparation work is generally unrealistic and ill-adapted to practical realities, notably budget constraints. Table 9 will give an idea of the evolution of external technical assistance working in the agricultural sector in Zaire between 1970-1981. 122 TABLE 9 EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND NUMBER OF PEOPLE WORKING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (IN 1000'S) Years Number of Number of expatriates Zairean working in personnel Agriculture in Agriculture 1970 126 1971 190 1972 210 1973 149 1974 149 1975 101 1976 132 17,967 1977 86 18,347 1978 72 21,447 1979 136 20,988 1980 123 20.708 1981 -- Source: Data compiled from annual reports of the Bank of Zaire The above table shows that agriculture received a very limited number of the external technical assistance personnel between 1970 and 1980; while the number of the Zairean personnel involved in agriculture between 1976 and 1980 increased, that number has decreased because of low and irregular payment.105 1"5Kazadi-Tshamala, Op.cit., 1983, 46-8, 123 Agricultural Research A report by the United States Agency for International Development highlights the following points about the necessity of research in the agricultural and rural development process. It argues that the history of successful agricultural and rural development throughout the world reveals that a nation must develop: (1) the capacity to conduct, freely, without political constraints of any kinds, a vital and relevant program of agricultural research; (2) a system to communicate the results of this research and to assist farmers through education and demonstration to apply these results; and (3) a system of higher education that will provide for the preparation of highly trained individuals who will conduct the nation's research, education and extension programs. A highly developed, adequately funded, appropriately staffed and equipped agricultural research system is fundamental to agricultural and rural development.106 The point here is that research plays an important role since it serves to increase knowledge of new inputs as well as knowledge of possibilities for raising the productivity of old inputs.107 1"6 Report of the United States Presidential Agricultural Task Force to Zaire. (Washington, D.C: Agency for International Development, February, 1985), 5-6, 26. 107George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty. Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World, (Morant Bay, Jamaica: Maroon Publishing House, 1983), 124 Zaire's agricultural research system now has a critical shortage of trained scientific staff because of lack of incentives. It is unable to address socio-political problems of either food, export crops, or agricultural and rural development in general. The country's facilities for research and education have deteriorated badly, and funding and logistical support for these activities has been inadequate. Lack of coordination also appears to be a significant problem. Authority for conducting research is divided among several government departments, none of which is adequately organized and financed to carry out its responsibilities. The Institut National pour 1'Etude et la Recherche Agronomique (INERA), headquartered at Yangambi, in Haut- Zaire region, has largely abandoned its research program as it saw its role taken over by the presidential services. Although the state and numerous bilateral and multilateral cooperation agencies have encouraged the development of Yangambi as a site for major scientific agricultural research, various constraints have led to minimal coordination and support for this center. The state has been unable to meet the material needs of the scientific community; morale is low and donor assistance has declined. Without a coordinated framework 193-4. 125 for agricultural research, extension, and education, Zaire has no way to institutionalize an applied research system responsive to the country's needs. There is no suitable mechanism for establishing national research priorities, for allocating resources, or for evaluating and altering programs. Separate technical, administrative, and financial management makes coordination and control of research programs difficult and results in wasted effort and resources. The state even discourages research which handles the fundamental problems which Zaire is facing for its socio-economic development. Publication of the results of research is not only very irregular, but it also follows an intimidating censorship process to make sure that the research falls within the guidelines of the Movement Populaire de la Revolution, guidelines which conflict with those of scientific inquiry. Organizational and Institutional Issues Virtually all institutions charged with responsibilities for agricultural and rural socio-economic development are weak and poorly organized in relation to other institutions in Zaire. There is no clear allocation of responsibility among a multitude of agencies involved in agriculture, institutions are poorly organized, and do not provide proper rewards. 126 In Zaire, agricultural training institutions do not have appropriate facilities, and programs are ill-adapted to practical and local needs. Planning systems for agriculture do not function effectively despite many efforts to develop them. Principal problems are poor management of basic information and inadequate links between planning and decision making on broad policy issues and on resource allocation, notably budget preparation. These weaknesses represent an immediate and critical problem because they result in ineffective services and confusion of policies and programs, and because they impede efforts to provide effective leadership for development of better services, clearer policies and new investment programs. Regional extension networks exist on paper but they provide few or no services to farmers. In some areas they are counterproductive, notably in enforcing inappropriate price levels and "imposed cultivation" provisions requiring cultivation of a particular crop. Links between research activities and extension are virtually non-existent, and extension services have hardly been involved in any workable system to provide essential inputs, including seeds, fertilizers, tools, or credit, to farmers. Basic systems for collection and processing of agricultural statistical data are weak and statistics that are assembled are not made available to those who need them. 127 An essential tool for effective planning and sector management is thus lacking. The few statistics data which are available must be treated as circumspect; they are highly unreliable and can only indicate a trend rather than the precise state of affairs. Zaire's formerly outstanding agricultural institutions no longer function effectively and links with farmers, through private companies and extension services, are practically non-existent. CHAPTER IV RESULTS OF THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO RURAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ZAIRE Recapitulation of State Agricultural Policy in Zaire Data in chapter three have shown, for instance, that between 1960 and 1981, the share of agriculture in the national budget ranged only from 0.36 to 3.30 per cent. That share never reached the average share of 6.25 per cent, which the agricultural sector received before independence in 1960. In addition, between 1982 and 1984 the share of agriculture in the national budget in percentage was only 2.7 in 1982, 1.3 in 1983 and 1.6 in 1984.108 In the programme of public investment between 1981 and 1983, for example, the total share of the agricultural sector was 13.7 per cent; whereas, the mining sector had 34 per cent, transport 20.1 per cent, energy 16.0 per cent, education 3.2 per cent, health 1.4 per cent, and others had 10.1 per cent.10' 108Situation Actuelle de 1'Agriculture au Zaire, Op.Cit., 11. 10'Kazadi-Tshamala, Op.Cit., 9-24. 128 129 Table 10 will indicate trends of the agricultural production of some important crops between 1960-1985. TABLE 10 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (IN THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS), 1960-84 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Maize 120 50 Rice 164 74 66 Manioc 1,500 900 Cotton 143 15 16 20 Palm oil 234 213 147 157 206 201 98 Coffee 66 60 57 37 46 56 Tea 6 3 4 5 5 5 5 Rubber 38 21 25 32 41 37 16 Cocoa 6 4 4 6 5 4 3 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Maize t • • 245 Rice Manioc Cotton 18 16 20 17 9 12 9 Palm oil 202 148 140 125 165 178 175 Coffee 65 60 68 57 69 Tea 8 5 8 8 6 6 7 Rubber 41 34 45 31 29 27 27 Cocoa 5 6 6 5 5 4 5 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Maize 186 171 169 130 112 Rice Manioc Cotton 6 7 9 8 6 6 7 Palm oil 175 97 93 92 88 79 86 Coffee 69 57 72 64 65 61 72 Tea 7 5 3 5 4 Rubber 41 25 21 20 17 15 15 Cocao 5 4 4 5 4 Source: Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Ruanda, Burundi The Economist Intelligence Unit, (London: The Economist Publications Ltd, No.l, 1966-No.l, 1987). 130 In a complementary way, the following tables, although from a different source, will show the trends of the agricultural production between 1974 and 1988. TABLE 11 PRODUCTION: AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT(IN 1970) Production 1974-75 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 (metric tons) Palm oil 203,000 176,000 Coffee 67,500 74,000 Cocao 4,460 4,360 Tea 8,500 7,000 8,00 0 Cotton fiber 17,250 16,114 Sugar cane 451,401 420,690 420,960 Bananas n.a 70,321 Plantains 1,005,000 Fish 80,000 Rice 227,000 Maize Production 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 (metric tons) Palm oil 176,000 170,000 170,000 87,000 Coffee 61,000 87,000 87,000 87,000 Cacoa 14,360 14,360 5,000 5,000 Tea 8,000 5,000 5,000 4,600 Cotton n.a n .a n. a n.a Sugar cane 451,960 700,000 700,000 700,000 Bananas 70,321 310,000 310,000 310,000 Plantains 1,005,000 1,440,000 1,400,000 1,450,000 Fish 80,000 80,000 130,000 130,000 Rice 227,000 230,000 227,000 227,000 Maize 131 TABLE 11 - Continued Production: 1984-85 1985-1986 1986-87 1987-88 (metric tons) Palm oil 75,000 155,000 n.a 150,000 Coffee 87,000 75,000 n.a 90,000 Cocao n.a n.a Tea n.a n.a Cotton fiber n .a n .a n.a Sugar cane 700,000 n .a n.a 970,000 Bananas 317,000 Plantains 1 ,450,000 1,490,000 Fish 150,000 290,000 Rice 225,000 Maize 520,000 750,000 Source: The Stateman's Year-Book, Statistical and Historical Annual of States of the World, edited by John Paxton, (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1974-1988) Note: n.a= not available The following table will present the trends in production of livestock and fish between 1981 and 1988 in Zaire. TABLE 12 LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES PRODUCTION IN METRIC TONS, 1981-87 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-1985 1987-88 Cattle 1,200,000 1,100,000 Sheep 761,000 753,000 749,000 740,000 Goats 2,780,000 2,700,000 2,700,000 2,000,000 2,100,000 Pigs 753,000 737,000 764,000 750,000 770,009 Fish 106,500 100,000 115,000 100,700 Source: The Stateman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of States of the World, Op. Cit., 1980-88 132 The following table, from another source, will present the volume of exports of agricultural produce between 1963 and 1987. TABLE 13 VOLUME OF EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE IN THOUSANDS OF TONS 1963-1985 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Coffee 47.27 24.1 3.5 Palm Oil 175.5 65.7 10.2 Rubber 37.6 21.1 29.7 7.2 Cotton F 9.1 3.1 - • • • 4.4 Bananas 21.0 7.1 6.7 Coffee 42.5 27.9 17.4 Tea 5.6 3.7 5.6 1.5 Cocoa 5.8 4.1 4.1 1.5 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Coffee 44.5 61.5 56.3 68.7 50.9 42.4 8 .2 Palm oil 87 69.7 62.4 53.2 25.5 21 .5 Rubber 37.7 30.2 26.6 24.2 8.7 Cotton F 19.9 4 6.1 1.6 1.0 • • • i # • Bananas Tea 6.9 4.8 6.4 6.7 5.9 5.4 4.2 Cocoa 6.0 6.0 4.9 4.7 5.3 1.6 3.8 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Coffee 6.6 6.2 1.9 2.3 5.3 6.0 6.0 Palm oil 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.2 • • • Rubber 1.5 1.2 1.9 2.3 1.6 Cotton F 9.7 8.0 8.3 8.5 8.6 Tea 3.7 2.7 1.5 2.1 3.0 Cocoa 4.1 Source: The Stateman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of States of World, Op.Cit., 1978-1982 133 The following table will subsequently summarize and present the evolution of agriculture's share in total exports in percentage. TABLE 14 PERCENTAGE OF AGRICULTURE'S SHARE IN TOTAL EXPORTS, 1970-79 Tear: 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 % 16 19 18 15 14 18 21 28 21 13.4 Source: Zaire Economic Memorandum, Op. Cit. 7 Data in the above table show that the trends of agriculture's share in total exports between 1970-79 ranged from 13.4% to 28%. That share never reached 30 %. Such a decline of agricultural exports gives an idea about the dependency of Zaire on food import to feed its people. 134 The following table is an illustration of post-1965 Zaire dependency on food import in order to feed its people. TABLE 15 IMPORTS FORMAT -QUANTITY OF WHEAT AND FLOUR (1,000 MT) 1966-1986 Year U.S. European Canada Argentina Other FAO Commun. 1966 59.7 2.2 2.3 0.0 15.9 80.1 1967 66.7 5.7 1.3 0.0 12.4 86.1 1968 67.3 2.9 2.9 1.8 0.0 69.6 1969 38.0 50.7 2.0 4.2 0.0 89.0 1970 22.1 65.9 3.4 3.3 18.3 116.0 1971 27.5 44.9 2.5 7.8 52.5 136.4 1972 43.2 31.1 1.1 21.7 5.8 103.0 1973 37.8 94.1 0.6 14.6 0.1 145.1 1974 45.6 56.4 0.3 19.8 27.4 149.5 1975 89.9 1.3 0.6 6.6 8.2 106.6 1976 120.3 1.5 0.5 0.0 8.1 130.3 1977 116.2 6.6 1.4 0.0 103.6 124.2 1978 102.6 6.1 7.7 0.0 0.0 66.5 1979 157.8 10.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 165.5 1980 159.4 9.3 0.0 0.0 8.6 176.6 1981 158.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 7.0 173.1 1982 129.7 8.3 2.6 8.4 17.2 166.2 1983 97.4 77.0 3.0 8.4 9.8 189.1 1984 83.6 68.8 4.9 0.0 0.6 158.0 1985 113.8 80.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 195.7 1986 191.6 41.0 5.9 11.1 0.0 249.6 Source: United States Economic Research Services, (Washington, D.C: Department of Agriculture, 1988) The following table will present the trends of consumer price in Kinshasa and growth rate in Zaire between 1981 and 1987. 135 TABLE 16 CONSUMER PRICES IN KINSHASA, 1981-1987 End of year Consumer Price in Kinshasa (1980=100) 1982 214 1983 451 1984 521 1985 701 1986 996 1987 1,139 Source: Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Ruanda, Burundi, Op.Cit., 28. The table below presents food, clothing and rent indices as indicators of the increase cost of living in Zaire between 1977 and 1981. TABLE 17 COST OF LIVING INDICES IN KINSHASA, 1977-1981. 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Food 26.7 49.9 82.5 100 139.2 Clothing 18.1 27.3 60.5 100 145.0 Rent 13.7 15.2 39.2 100 120.5 Source: Book of Labour Statistics, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1987), 878. The following table shows the percentage of the population involved in agriculture as estimated by the Food and Agricultural Organization for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1986 (in thousand). 136 TABLE 18 PERCENT OF POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE IN ZAIRE, 1970-86 Year Total Agriculture % in agriculture 1970 19481 15407 79.1 1975 22399 16881 74.4 1980 25847 18480 71.5 1985 29938 20562 68.7 1986 30862 21013 68.1 Source: FAO Production Yearbook, FAO Statistics Series, No, 76, 40, Italy, 1987, 22. Overall, the above tables indicate the stagnation, and in many cases the decline, of agricultural production in Zaire, a shrinkage of the percentage of the active population involved in agriculture as well as the dependency of the Zairean state on imports of food. The decline in the absolute magnitude of appropriations for the ministry of Agriculture is puzzling, since wages and salaries constitute no less than 60% of expenditures. Expenditures related to agriculture are incurred by agencies other than the ministry of Agriculture. The Office of the Presidency itself maintains a number of agricultural advisors, and also carries out important projects which are selected and budgeted through the Office rather than the Ministry of Agriculture. The magnitudes involved are not known -- overall, however, total public sector expenditures for agriculture are unlikely to exceed 4-6% of aggregate expenditures. 137 There has been considerable damage to plantations and agro-industrial enterprises. The principal cash crops, such as palm oil products, coffee, wood products, cotton, tea, and sugarcane have been most severely affected. However, foodcrop production has also declined to the point that Zaire depends today on outside sources to feed its increasing population. Major import products include fresh or frozen fish, dried or salted fish, and meat. Dried, salted or smoked fish, for example, went from 23,000 tons in 1985 to 26,800 tons in 1986. Meat imports were more and more considerable: about 28,000 tons in 1986, with South Africa being the main exporter to Zaire. Imports of frozen chicken were also on the rise with 19,500 tons in 1986. Imports of wheat and rice were said to be respectively 107,000 tons and 62,000 tons. It should be noted that a lot of these commodities are imported to Zaire without being registered by customs services. In 1986, for instance, about 25 tons of rice and 10 tons of wheat were not registered. Meat, milk, and fish being in a chronically short supply, are eaten mainly in cities and towns, and rarely by poor families. The per capita food intake is 44 grams of protein per day and 2,460 calories per day, which falls below the World Health Organization recommendation of 2,600 calories.x1° 1x ° Zaire: Agricultural Situation Annual,, 138 The 1988 World Development Report indicates that the labor force in agriculture in Zaire has decreased from 82 % to 72 % between 1965 to 1980; food aid in thousands of metric tons of cereal has drastically increased from 1 to 101 between 1975 and 1986, the growth annual of production (GDP) went down from 1.4 to 1.0 between 1980 and 1986. The same report also shows that the total external debt went from 311,000,000 in 1970 to 5,430,000,000 in 1986.11X The health and nutrition situation has deteriorated. It should be recalled that at independence, Zaire inherited a relatively well-structured, comprehensive health system, based on European-type facilities and expatriate professional staff. However, the lack of a long term national health policy has led to a misallocation of limited budgetary resources and to a maldistribution of health facilities and personnel between urban and rural areas. A severe blow to the health sector was the weakening of the distribution network which had provided the links between the rural and urban areas. The deterioration of the health infrastructure, the continued exodus of medical staff from the rural areas to the urban areas due to low salaries112 and a critical (Washington, D.C: Foreign Agricultural Services, U.S.Department of Agriculture, March 27, 1987), 5. 111 World Development Report 1988,, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 224-250. 112In 1981, the base salary of a trained medical 139 depletion of pharmaceutical and medical supplies have led to the closing of many hospitals, health centers, and dispensaries, especially in the rural areas. While The World Health Organization considers a ratio of one physician per 10,000 people as tolerable in developing countries, in Zaire in general and in its rural area in particular, there is instead a ratio of one physician per 28,802 people. An analysis of the regional distribution of health personnel indicates that, with the exception of Kinshasa, which is relatively well staffed, the other eight regions of Zaire are far below the average ratio of the population per physician. In 1973 Zaire had 72,090 hospital beds, or 1 bed per 327 inhabitants. The 1980 estimates indicate an average of 349 persons per bed, taking the total number of sick beds, but 484 persons per hospital bed. Rural Zaire is worse off in terms of number of beds and distance to health facilities. Indeed the inaccessibility of hospital-type care for the population in the rural areas, as well as the overall shortage of medical equipment and supplies, has led the rural people to rely on the traditional health care system, regardless of the risks which it implies. doctor in the public sector was Z 437 per month (plus a premium of 10 percent), that is, almost $4 (four U.S. dollars, if converted in the black market). Today, this salary is Z 7,000, which is the equivalent of $35. 140 The following table presents the state's expenditures on the health care system between 1976 and 1982, and gives an indirect idea about the health of the people in Zaire. TABLE 19 THE STATE'S EXPENDITURES ON HEALTH CARE (1976-82) Current Million of Z % of Total 1976 36.1 0.7 1977 48.7 5.7 1978 56.4 4.9 1979 96.6 4.0 1980 114.1 3.0 1981 123.3 (a) 2.1 1982 (b) 142.2 2.2 Source: Ministry of Finance. Notes: (a) Salaries only; (b) Budget It must be remembered that with the deterioration in the health sector, health facilities have become grossly underequipped and the statistics tend, therefore, to underestimate the damage to the system to a large extent. The United States Agency for International Development classifies Zaire in category C, which is the last and worst category in the health system in the world; it indicates that Zaire depends for 93 % of its health care system on outside aid.113 In a similar vein, the staff of 1x 3 Development and National Interest: U.S Economic Assistance into the 21st Century. (Washington, D.C: Agency for International Development, 1989). 141 the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) points out that over the last decades the proportion of government expenditures devoted to health has fallen drastically in Zaire. The staff shows, for instance, that Zaire spent only 2.3 % and 1.8 % of its budget on health. In 1972 and 1986, respectively the UNICEF staff concludes from first-hand experience that the real cost of such cuts is being paid, disproportionately, by the poor and their children.114 Although Zaire has a very low population density of about 12 inhabitants per square kilometer and a vast agricultural potential, recent studies have shown that protein malnutrition, aggravated by the inaccessibility of potable water, the absence of an adequate sewage disposal system and soil erosion have reached lamentable proportions.l15 The level of water supply services in Zaire is one of the lowest in the world. Regideso, the state-owned water entity, supplies water to about 1.7 million urban dwellers, representing only 21 per cent of the total urban population, or 32 percent of the population in the 56 urban centers 114 James P. Grant, The State of the World's Children 1989, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 124. 11"These studies, three of which having been carried out by the National Nutrition Planning Center of the Ministry of Public Health with the assistance of experts from Tulane University, New Orleans, were highlighted in previous World Bank Economic Memoranda (Report No. 2518-ZR, pp.23-25 and Report N0.3287-ZR, p.11). 142 served by Regideso. A high proportion (85 percent) of those served is supplied through 150,000 private connections, which are used not only by families owning the connections, but often also by friends and neighbors without connections of their own. The rest of the urban population served is supplied through 550 public standpipes. 98 urban centers of more than 5,000 inhabitants each, remain without piped water. Most of the urban dwellers not supplied by Regideso rely on rains, unprotected wells or springs and polluted streams. Written data on the rural water supply are very scarce. In 1986, The World Health statistics reported that only 5 percent of the rural population had reasonable access to permanent sources of safe water.116 On the average and on the basis of the above indicators, the health situation of Zaire, especially in its rural areas, appears to be much more serious than that of other low-income countries. Contamination of water and food, absence of a sewage disposal system, insufficient protein intake in the diet,117 and ignorance of basic hygiene can be singled out among the causes ofhigh 116 World Health Statistics,, (Geneve: World Heath Organization, 1986), 5C 117 The average per capita intake of protein is estimated to be about 50 percent of FAO's recommended requirements, while that of caloric intake is over 100 percent of the requirements, mainly due to the high carbohydrate content of manioc, the staple food. 143 mortality.xx 8 Unstructured interviews with Zairean physicians and nurses reveal that infectious and parasitic diseases, as well as respiratory and digestive illness account for more than 70 percent of all deaths in Zaire. Measles and its complications are first on the list, especially among children; 30-50 percent of them suffer from malnutrition. Malaria affects 20-80 percent of the population. Intestinal (mostly parasitic) diseases affect more than 80 percent of the population. The high incidence of these diseases leads to malabsorption of nutrients, which raises the nutrient requirements of an already undernourished population, further aggravating the malnutrition problem. Guy Gran sums up the health and nutrition situation in post-1965 Zaire when he writes that some ten years ago the World Bank estimated that caloric intake was insufficient for at least one-third of Zaire's rural population, and that protein deficiencies were wide-spread in cities as well. In the same year, he asserts, a report by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare noted that some 75 percent of the population lacked access to the formal health delivery system in Zaire.119 11"Zaire Economic Memorandum: Recent Economic and Sectoral Developments and Current Issues, Op.Cit, 103. 119Guy Gran, "An Introduction to Zaire's Permanent Development Crisis," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, edited by Guy Gran, (New York: Praeger, 1979), 1-22. 144 These conditions have not improved in recent years; on the contrary, they have worsened. It should be indicated here, again, that the above figures are merely indicative of trends, and should be viewed with caution, given the manipulative character of the recording and dissemination of data by the state apparatus in Zaire. In summation, agricultural output, although an important determinant of overall economic activity, has shown a sluggish record during the past two decades. This insufficient growth of agricultural output is reflected in, among other things, the rapid increase in the domestic prices of consumer food commodities, the sharp rise in food imports, the decline of agricultural exports,120 hunger, malnutrition, and a generalized underdevelopment of the majority of the population. As one can notice it is easy enough to say, for example, that agriculture is the priority sector for rural or national socio-economic development of a country. However, if the agricultural sector is not given a sufficient share in the national budget, if farmers do not have access to credit, if they do not have access to fertilizer supplies and other inputs which increase yields, if there is no adequate transport infrastructure to carry 12"Zaire Economic Memorandum. Recent Economic and Sectoral Developments and Currents Issues, Op.Cit., 41. 145 their crops to the marketplaces, if they are not paid higher prices, and if their consumers cannot afford to buy food at higher prices, if grass roots social research cannot be performed for ideologico-political reasons, then agriculture cannot, except in the case of miracles, reach these intended goals.J 2 x In post-1965 Zaire, agriculture has been proclaimed the priority sector but it has not received a sufficient share in the national budget, and small farmers have lacked credit to increase productivity. State intervention in the market has often been carried out in ways that harm the short-run interests of most small farmers. On the one hand, by sheltering domestic industries from competition, the state has increased the prices that farmers must pay for goods from the urban areas. On the other hand, through the use of power the state has lowered the prices that farmers receive for their products; alternatively, it has been competing with them in supplying food to the urban markets, and benefits of the subsidies have been reaped by the richer few. The approach to development of the transportation sector has been based on widely inflated traffic forecasts which bear no relation to the present level of traffic or the present transport capacity. Deplorable management and 121 Africa Update Book, no. 1? (United Nations: DESI, February-April, 1987), 5-6. 146 lack of maintenance and new equipment have reduced the system to a level at which it is unable to cope, even with traffic at one-half or one-third of the pre-independent level. Traffic is now slower and more irregular in the rural part of Zaire. The deterioration of the transport system has contributed to the fall in agricultural exports, the inadequacy of regional trade surpluses and supply of food to the towns and cities, and the return to a subsistence economy in the countryside.122 In other words, there have been the segmentation of the markets, farmers' return to subsistence production, an increase of beneficiary margins recuperated by middlemen, an increase of the prices of manufactured commodities sold to rural people and/or insufficiency of these commodities, discouragement of private investment in areas far from the urban centers, and the polarization of development to the benefit of a few areas which have relatively good transportation facilities. The state in post-1965 Zaire has produced, as Michael F. Lofchie et al. assert, a harsh socio-economic environment for the producers of agricultural products, and agricultural production has drastically declined, thus stagnating and worsening the living standards of the rural 122Andre Huybrechts,"Economy," in Africa South of the Sahara 1986, Fifteenth Edition, (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1985), 1021. 147 people. Marketing and pricing policy have been manipulated in ways that adversely affect the incomes of farmers. Pricing policies have been very low. These policy choices have resulted from a variety of pressures, such as the need for state revenues and foreign exchange, as well as pressures brought to bear by influential interests.123 Zaire has become a net food importer while it was an exporter of food until independence on June 30, 1960. Zaire spent more than one-third of its foreign exchange holdings on food imports in 1979. A Department of Agriculture and Rural Development report asserts that there was in Zaire, in 1975, a ratio of two farmers for each urban consumer. In 1980 however, there were only 1.3 farmers for one urban consumer, and this proportion has continued to decrease.124 Zaire continues to depend on imports of corn, rice, vegetables, meat, and other agricultural products which could be domestically produced. The country is currently facing external difficulties, exemplified by a serious debt burden. It continues to have difficulties financing imports regardless of several debt rescheduling agreements.125 12"Stephen K. Commis, Michael F. Lofchie, and Rhys Payne, Africa's Agrarian Crisis: The Roots of Famine, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1986), 52. 124Republique du Zaire, Departement de 1'Agriculture. Agriculture, Priorite des Priorites. Unpublished paper presented to the 'Foire de Kinshasa." 125 Global Food Assessment, Foreign Agricultural Economics Report, no.159, (United States Department of 148 Thus, in light of secondary data, field observations, and unstructured conversations presented and discussed so far, what have been the overall results of the state agricultural policy and rural development in post-1965 Zaire? Chapter four of this study will present and discuss the overall results of this policy and its importance to rural and national socio-economic development in Zaire. The Overall Results Since November 24, 1965, the birthdate of post-1965 Zaire, and since 1970, the year agriculture was proclaimed the priority sector to promote socio-economic development in Zaire, we have passed through roughly two decades of development. What are the results, and who benefited from them? A close look at the results of agricultural and rural development, including the living standards in rural Zaire, reveals that the results have been positive for some social categories and negative for others. For the whole country, the results have not been satisfactory. Who are those for whom the results have been positive, and who are those for whom they have been negative? Those for whom results have been positive are individuals who occupy key positions in the state. Those individuals have utilized the state's apparatus to establish Agriculture: Economic Report Washington, D.C, 1980), 60. 149 their socio-economic basis. They are the ones who have benefited from the priority accorded to the agricultural sector, including the related political decisions. Most of them are urban-area-based people, involved in politics and activities other than agriculture. They are the ones who are known as farmers at the national and international levels, and get agricultural credit which they use for purposes other than agricultural and rural development. The other, for whom results have been negative, are small farmers and other social categories based in the rural area and cities as well. Their position within the state has not allowed them to work and enjoy the results of their labor. Their situation has been characterized, as Michael P. Todaro points out, by low levels of living conditions, such as famine, malnutrition, low or no income, inadequate housing, poor health, limited or no education, severe unemployment, overpopulation, prostitution, robbery, harassment, other kinds of crimes, repression, drug addiction, high infant mortality, low life expectancy, proliferation of religious sects, and in many cases, a general sense of malaise and hopelessness.126 The domestic situation has been increasingly repressive, individuals have been intimidated and beaten. Those who have tried to speak up have been jailed and some 126Michael P. Todaro, Op.cit., 3-17. 150 deported to their respective rural areas (villages) since prisons are not only full, but lack also the necessary infrastructure to feed and "rehabilitate" people. Thus, while the benefit for some has been expropriation-appropriation of surplus-value, capital and the realization of enormous profits, the gain for others has been repression, alienation, anger, diseases, illiteracy, lack of the products of the first necessity, etc. Were I asked to express these overall results in arithmetic form, I would say, without any risk of error, that (+) + (-) = -i127 This means that the overall equation of socio economic development (+) of a social minority plus the socio-economic underdevelopment (-) of a social majority, all in the same social formation, does not prompt national socio-economic development (+) but rather national socio economic underdevelopment (-). This situation implies that Zaire's socio-economic development potentializes; whereas, its socio-economic underdevelopment actualizes. Consequently, Zaire, as a whole, remains underdeveloped because of the huge number of its underdeveloped people compared with the very few, whose relative development depends on their positions in the state. 127Read: Positive plus negative equals negative. 151 Guy Gran ably paints this reality when he writes that the overall results of development in Zaire have been a disaster. Peasants face a very effective system of exploitation, oppression, and violence. In a general climate of scarcity and insecurity, any surplus is siphoned away by the system. The Zairean ruling class controls consumer and producer rights, exports taxes, exchange rates, movement of products, credits, and land tenure to their own advantage. Position in the state and control of prices have been the mechanisms in transferring wealth from the rural areas and, at the same time in causing stagnating agricultural production.12" Prior to independence, commercial GNP at constant prices registered an annual growth of about 6 percent per year. By contrast, between 1960 and 1967, GNP fell to 2.5 percent per year.129 A World Bank report indicates that, while data have been very sketchy particularly in early years, the economy has shown no signs of improvement. GDP at constant prices in 1964 was approximately 6 percent below the 1958 level. Cash crop agriculture declined by about 40 percent between 1959 and 1967 while agricultural exports 128Guy Gran, op. cit., 307. 129J. Vanderlinden, Du Congo au Zaire,, (Bruxelles: Centre de Recherche de d'Information Socio-Politiques-CRIPS, 1980), 182-83. 152 fell 50 percent.130 The consumer price index, for example, climbed to 935.8 from 229.7 in 1974, while real wages were more than 50 percent below 1974 levels.131 Nzongola-Ntalaja assesses the socio-economic and political situation in Zaire and points out that Zaire is a country in crisis. After 25 years of independence, mostly under the authoritarian rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko, there is virtually no improvement in the quality of life of ordinary men, women and children. At the same time, Zaire's rulers continue to enrich themselves in the face of popular misery and to enjoy the support of major world powers and financial institutions. The purchasing power of an average Zairean is approximately 10 per cent of what it was in 1960. The situation is worse when one looks at the real wages of unskilled workers and peasants, who constitute the majority of the population. By 1980, Nzongola underscores, their purchasing power was estimated to be only 4 to 6 per cent of its value in 1960. The full measure of the suffering of ordinary citizens, he continues, can be gauged by adding to this dismal picture the repressive character of the state and its various agencies. The absolute decline in their standard of 130 World Bank, The Economy of Zaire. (Washington, D.C: IBRD, July 1975), 23. 131World Bank, Zaire: Current Economic Situation and Constraints, (Washington D.C, 1979), 19-20. 153 living as well as the corresponding deterioration of all social and economic services has made citizens highly vulnerable to malnutrition, cholera, AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) and other epidemics. Ordinary citizens, especially rural people, live in a state of permanent insecurity caused by soldiers, the youth of the party, tax collectors and other state officials. For them, to reside in contemporary Zaire is to live in crisis.132 Winsome J. Leslie discusses the World Bank efforts to promote socio-economic development in Zaire and argues that after more than twenty years of Mobutu's rule, the development picture is dismal. The country is classified by the World Bank as the fifth poorest country in the world, with a per capita GNP of $170, in spite of the fact that it is potentially one of the richest countries in sub-Saharan Africa.13 3 In his study of the history and political economy of Africa, Sanford J. Ungar points out that the effect on the people of the form of rule and policies of the state in Zaire has been devastating. The economy has been declared bankrupt so many times that the term has lost its meaning. More than once the International Monetary Fund has sent representatives to Kinshasa to take over the country's treasury and ministry of finance and try to make some order 132Nzongola-Ntalaja, op.cit.:ehpl, 20-25. 133Winsome J. Leslie, op.cit., 62. 154 out of chaos; most have left out of frustration. The country ought to be rich and productive agriculturally. Indeed, in 1958, before independence, 41 percent of its exports were agricultural products, and Zaire had no trouble at all feeding itself. By 1974, after a relatively stable time in recent Zairean history, only 11 percent exports were agricultural, and within a few years millions of dollars worth of food was being imported (much of it from South Africa). Most of food that comes in, whether commercially or through aid programs, is unevenly distributed. At the same time, Ungar concludes, government officials and private businessmen live without apparent concern for the circumstances aroud them.134 Ngunza Karl-I-Bond, after resigning as Prime- Minister and fleeing to Europe, confirmed the worsening of the socio-economic situation in Zaire by stating that "the vital Western economic and geopolitical interests could be jeopardized by the continued Western backing of President Mobutu's regime." In various foreign press interviews, Nguza made a number of allegations concerning "massive theft of United States and other Western aid, widespread abuses of human rights, and increased prospects for violent change in Zaire." Ngunza*s charges are particularly noteworthy since he has been a major figure of the Zairean state for 134Sanford Ungar, Op.Cit., 360-361. 155 years.x 35 For his part, Jean-Claude Willame states that for several years now, all the indicators seem to suggest that, from a formal and macro-economic point of view, Zaire has ceased to exist.x 3 6 Willame's viewpoint, which is drawn from the classical macro-economic indicators, is essentially correct. However, one must take a sociological viewpoint and argue that, regardless of this hard situation, Zaire is still a living society, and the important matter is to identify the cause of the problem, and to show how it can be resolved. This can help avoid the blame given to philosophers of just interpreting the world instead of coming up with solutions for transforming what is wrong with it. Rural People's Reaction There has been of course, from time to time, resistance from rural people, especially that of peasants to the state's imperatives, in order to express their sufferings and unhappiness. However, the answer has been either soldiers' armed interventions and killings, a jail sentence, a fine, or all three. Under such circumstances 135Political and Economic Situation in Zaire: Hearing before the Subcommitte of Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Op. cit. , 1. 13'Jean-Claude Willame, "Political Succession In Zaire or Back to Machiavelli",in Journal of Modern African Studies,, Volume 26 no. 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 37-50. 156 there have been several options open to rural villagers. Several times, villagers have fled to the deep forest in order to avoid forced work on roads and the financial burdens of the collectivity. These withdrawals, which might be called tax flight, are usually temporary and end when the immediate danger has passed. Just as often, the consequence of rural oppression brings a more permanent exodus to urban areas. The situation in rural Zaire has become so desperate that many believe, mistakenly, that the only solution is to leave for the large cities. Another option rural people in Zaire have been choosing from time to time is revolt. There have been occasional instances of revolt against the extortions of collectivity administration. Rural people in Zaire have, on several occasions, welcomed and rallied to rebellions against the state for finding themselves poorer. In 1963, 1964, between 1965 and 1967, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1985 and 1988 rural people revolted against the state and aimed at replacing it by another one which, in their view, could be responsive to their socio-economic problems. Students and teachers, another social force for change in Zaire, urban workers and the masses of unemployed people, demonstrated intermittently in Zaire for the same purpose. Mass' revolts against the state have been repeatedly reported in the rural area of almost all regions of Zaire; however, they have been more frequent in Shaba region. 157 Michael G. Schatzberg summarizes the vicious circle in which rural people, especially small farmers, are stuck as follows: 1. Small farmers need money for first-necessity items and to pay their taxes. 2. A major way by which they can obtain this money is by cultivating and selling cash crops. 3. Small farmers are forced to sell their produce to the state or to inefficient agricultural offices and middlemen. 4. If produce is sold, the prices received are extremely low and do not permit any accumulation of capital. 5. Crops are often left unsold because of the poor state of the road infrastructure, inefficiencies of buyers and corruption in the state's agricultural offices. Farmers then have no money to pay their taxes, and an accumulation of capital is not possible. 6. Because of the low prices and unmarketed harvests, small farmers have no incentive to produce, and agricultural output declines. 7. Unmarketed crops mean there will be no money to pay the taxes. 8. Collectivities depend on taxes for more than about one-half of their monetary intake. 9. Chiefs and associates appropriate funds for their own use. 158 10. Anarchical bureaucracy results in a shortage of money for other collectivity employees. Police, 'J.M.P.R.' and tax collectors are never paid on time. 11. These employees will then extract what they can from the people in their juridictions, often resorting to violence. 12. Unsold crops mean that there will not be enough food to feed the cities or to export for foreign exchange. 13. National authority pressure the territorial and collectivity officials to increase production and to repair the roads. 14. Agronomists and local officials force villagers to cultivate cash crops and to work without pay on the roads. 15. Villagers comply unwillingly, serve time in prison or are fined for refusing, escape to the forest, migrate to the cities or revolt.137 Thus this system of rural exploitation, domination and alienation does not permit rural people to accumulate significant economic resources since the state in general, and especially the collectivity administrative apparatus siphons off what it can. The entire extractive system acts in such a way as to close off opportunities for those rural people, who would like to move up either socio-economically or politically because such mobility is virtually impossible 137 Michael G. Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire, (New York, London: African Publishing Company, 1980), 81. 159 without money and access to education. Small farmers in Zaire are, in effect, placed on a treadmill from which they cannot easily escape. Since these farmers cannot accumulate much money, they are often unable to pay school fees for their children. The real tragedy, then, is reserved for the Zairean rural children, and their counterparts living in urban areas. There is a disproportionately small percentage of children in rural Zaire in primary and secondary schools. One main reason is that these children are expelled from schools when their parents cannot pay the fees, or their teachers have resigned because they have never received their salaries. The long range result is that these sons and daughters are unable to escape the fate of their fathers and mothers. The rewards and opportunities provided by rural development in post-1965 Zaire, highlighted by the slogan 'Agriculture Priorite des Priorites', continues to be systematically denied to the majority of the population. It should be underscored that regardless of this situation of political repression and economic exploitation, and a generalized underdevelopment, rural people in general, especially small farmers, still get involved in agricultural activities. This is basically due to psycho-cultural reasons. These people have been involved growing crops for years, indeed, many of them have inherited farms from their dead parents and relatives and have put mythical values and 160 social prestige on these farms to the point that they cannot get rid of them easily. Another alternative, in the midst of a political and economic environment reinforced by state "decentralization" efforts, where the regions and local administrative units have been told to generate their own income, as the central government can no longer afford to fund their activities,138 most rural people, as well as other social categories in the urban area, live without state support. Consequently, they have developed and adopted survival strategies which constitute a "second" or "parallel economy," as a way to cope with their hard socio-economic and political situation.1 3 ' Newbury defines these survival strategies as activities engaged in by inhabitants of a given society as a part of their day-to-day struggle to obtain basic human needs. As the term "survival" implies, these strategies constitute a response to difficult economic and/or political conditions; resort to such activities is often associated with a belief among the population that, since the state is unwilling or unable to act, it is necessary to "fend-for- 13"Catherine Newbury, "Dead and Buried or Just Underground?--The Privatization of the State in Zaire", in Canadian Journal of African Studies,, volume 18, no.l, 1984, 81. 13'Crawford Young, "Zaire: Is there a State?", in Canadian Journal of African Studies,, Volume 18, no.l, 1984, 81. 161 yourself", as the phrase is commonly heard in Zaire: "debrouillez-vous."J 4" Some of the analytically distinct uses of the second economy are, for example, exploitation of state positions for fraud, extortion, access to scarce goods, and other means of pillaging the economy; and coping with the strategies for survival for those with inadequate, rarely paid, or no wages. These strategies aim at accumulating considerable wealth with both the possibility of investment in the formal economy and socioeconomic mobility.141 Small farmers who have access to land have been participating in growing food or export crops, hunting and digging minerals. Those who grow foodcrops send them, if they can, to their relatives in towns for consumption and sale. In return they receive soaps, clothes, cigarettes, matches, and other manufactured commodities which are rare in the rural area; sometimes they receive cash. However, some relatives in towns keep everything for themselves, with no return to people in the rural area. Small farmers who grow coffee, tea, palm oil, cotton, papaine, etc., may export them through illicit channels. Hunters sell meat and rare skins, but most 140Catherine Newbury, "Survival Strategies in Rural Zaire: Realities of Coping with Crisis," edited by Nzongola- Ntalaja, Op.Cit., 99-101. 14 Manet MacGaffey, "Fending-for-Yourself: The Organization of the Second Economy in Zaire, edited by Nzongola-Ntalaja, Op.Cit., 141-156. 162 profitably ivory to dealers or middlemen for the powerful. Diggers of minerals do the same. They dig gold or diamonds which they sell through illicit channels. Some individuals of these three social categories spend money they earn in consumption, while others invest it in small stores.142 Seen in this light, survival strategies are sometimes tolerated by the state, because they are viewed as a "safety-valve" and as a demobilizing process, keeping of the masses from political discussions, organizations and actions. In reference to I. Arnon's study on modernization of agriculture in developing countries, it should be recalled that an inadequate agricultural policy design raises serious problems on the grounds of policy implementation in terms of state expenditures allocated to agriculture, credits to farmers, markets and price policies, transportation of crops and agricultural research. This, in turn, leads to low productivity, underemployment, low income, low or no savings, low or no investment in farms, low yields, abandonment of unpaid crops, subsistence type production and development, and involvement in survival strategies by some rural people and resignation by others.143 Nevertheless, 142Vwakyanakazi Mukohya, African Traders in Butembo, Eastern Zaire (1960-1980): The Case Study of Informal Entrepreneurship in a Cultural Context of Central Africa. Ph.D. disseration, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1982), 332-335. 143I. Arnon, Modernization of Agriculture in 163 inadequate design of agricultural policy by itself, though a necessary factor, is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the failure of rural and national socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire. In summation, data do not show sufficient evidence that agriculture, although proclaimed the priority sector to promote rural socio-economic development in Zaire, has received necessary and sufficient support in its design and implementation. Financial expenditures have been very low, credits have been unavailable to small farmers, marketing and pricing policies have been unfair to farmers, the transportation system has been poor and inefficient, fertilizers have been practically nonexistent for the majority of farmers, the ill-paid and ill-equipped personnel has been inefficient, state agricultural agencies have existed in name only, and agricultural research has been discouraged for political reasons. The implications of this situation have been serious. Decline and stagnation of output over time demonstrate the inability of the producers to generate incomes. Small-farmers in Zaire have manifested the lack of confidence in the state; overt and latent resistance toward the state have been observed. Developing Countries. Resources, Potentials and Problems., (Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 4-5. 164 Thus, secondary data, highlighted by field observations, unstructured interviews, as well as the theoretical and methodological framework used in this research reject the state' s allegations. They call for a further in-depth investigation of the state's motivations for designing and implementing such an agricultural and rural development policy. Chapter five is conveyed to identify and discuss the major cause of the failure of socio-economic development, as well as the hidden and real agenda of the state agricultural policy in post-1965 Zaire. CHAPTER V CAUSE OF FAILURE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF THE STATE'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN POST-1965 ZAIRE Cause of the Failure of Rural Development in Post-1965 Zaire Several viewpoints have been presented and discussed to explain the failure of national and rural socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire. Some of these viewpoints espouse the modernization theory tenets, focusing on dualistic economic and cultural aspects, and fix the blame for the lack of socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire on the principal victims of the historical process of development, the Zairean peasants. Such a view, which is today held by Goran Hyden among others,144 is not by itself complete in the face of reality in Zaire. Andre Huybrechts identifies the lack of a real development plan as the major cause of underdevelopment in post-1965 Zaire. He asserts that Zaire has never had a real development plan and all attempts at planning have failed. In addition to this failure in planning, which is common to 144Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 3-15. 165 166 all peripheral developing countries, he points out, there are in Zaire, specific deficiencies at the highest echelons of the political and administrative structure. In his view, the state has neither the will nor the means to plan consistently, still less to carry out a plan and, least of all, to get the private sector to follow one. The main deficiency, he continues, is the absence of any political will to undertake planning, and design and implement an adequate development policy, which must reflect the absence of a national will to develop. Moreover, he notes, one would be inclined to think that by not having a clearly stated development program, the authorities are avoiding any constraints that might inhibit freedom of decision, which is eminently in their interest. He also mentions that there is, in Zaire, a particularly strong obsession with institutions. Those in charge, at all levels, think that all problems can be solved by changing names of institutions and by shifting people from one institution to another. Similarly, he points out the emphasis on large-scale projects as another cause of failure of socio-economic development in Zaire. He argues that Zaire's investment policy is likewise characterized by the predominance of large-scale projects. There are, in his view, two main reasons for this: one being the political significance, internal and external, of such schemes, which express the state's desire to present a dynamic, go-ahead image. 167 The second reason is of an economic nature. Decisions on investment are taken at the top, without reference to a comprehensive master-plan or to any concept of financial responsibility since the capital, the Zairean public funds or foreign aid, is not subject to the requirement to show a return. The small group which makes the decisions is composed of people whose income derives from their high positions in the state and from profits proportional to the size of the projects, earned as middlemen between the Zairean state and multinational corporations, notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These large-scale projects have occurred mainly in energy, telecommunications, services and manufacturing. They include the Inga Dam, the 1,820-km Inga-Shaba power line, the port of Banana, the Banana-Matadi rail project, the Matadi bridge, the electrification of the Matadi- Kinshasa railway, the Kinshasa-Ilebo-Shaba rail link, a clutch of airports, the 'Voix du Zaire' radio complex and the world Trade Center in Kinshasa, the Maluku steel works, Kaniama-Kasese maize projects, the Gemena agro-industrial complex, Agro-Industrial Domain of the N'sele, etc. These projects, whether or not they have been carried out, mostly stand idle; most do not function even at reduced capacity. They are too big, especially in view of the supply of inputs and in relation to actual market 168 demand, their scale reflecting considerations of prestige and interests of foreign backers. Their locations are politically motivated, basically in terms of an ethnic group's opposition the regime, as well as in relation to the native villages of those at the top of political hierachy. In addition, these projects are not integrated into any wider well-articulated development program, particularly with regard to the country's basic needs and infrastructure. Their operations are not properly phased, particularly with regards to the financial aspects. These projects lead to a higher degree of dependence on outside sources in every respect, notably supplies, technology, management, and markets. Their capital costs are high, hence they consume foreign currency both during the investment phase and when in operation. All along, the terms of contracts tend to exploit the situation. Some of these projects are technically too complex, and cost/benefit criteria have not been sufficiently balanced in terms of either profitability or of national socioeconomic development priorities. The overall unbalanced choice of priorities, emphasized by the neglect of micro-development projects, Huybrechts concludes, constitutes a major blunder in economic and social policy in Zaire.x 45 145Andre Huybrechts, Op. cit,, 1019-1021. 169 A World Bank report presents the following as explanatory factors which have significantly contributed to the decline of Zaire's agricultural and rural sector: a lack of consistency and full consideration of the rural sector in policy formulation; excessive agricultural price policies; lack of priorities for agriculture in budgetary and investment allocations; misallocation of existing resources and credit, and lack of knowledge of modern cultivation practices by small farmers; lack of structural adaptation of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and other state organisms serving the rural sector; the decline of all services in the rural sector, including those for health, road maintainance, education and extension; destruction and insecurity caused by wars, rebellions and state agents, especially soldiers and JMPR; and the 1973-1974 Zaireanization and radicalization measures. At the macro-economic level, the report mentions the situation in Zaire as due to rising import costs, declining or stagnating prices for its exports, especially copper, and lack of external credit.146 It has been argued that these are causes of failed national and rural socio-economic development, and the state has attempted from time to time to resolve them, in a punctual manner. However, this has not helped at all. Does 14"Zaire Economic Memorandum, Op. cit, , 22-26. 170 this mean that the diagnosis was teleological and inappropriate by taking the effects for the real cause of the problem? An in-depth and meticulous sociological examination of the lack of national and rural development in post-1965 Zaire indicates that its fundamental cause lies in the structure and the functioning of the State-Party in this country. The state in post-1965 Zaire is, by its very structure and functioning, a socialistic ideologico- political superstructure, which reposes on a capitalistic economic infrastructure. This juxtaposition of the two different systemic components, coexisting with the traditional modes of production in the same social formation, is the fundamental cause of the blockage of rural development and national development in post-1965 Zaire. This juxtaposition has engendered the actualization of development for the social minority and the potentialization of development for the social majority in Zaire. The capitalistic economic infrastructure was introduced to the area today called Zaire by the Belgian colonists, during the expansion of the capitalistic system at the world scale, and its has been maintained since then. On the other hand, the socialistic ideologico- political superstructure, embodied in the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), was initiated by President 171 Mobutu Sese-Seko, and designed and implemented by the "cadres" of the MPR. The non capitalistic modes of production are those ways of socio-economic and intellectual production proper to peoples who happened to be called by colonists "indigenous", and "Belgian Congolese", as opposed to "French Congolese", and are today called Zaireans by the post-1965 state. Agricultural and rural development policy could have been successful only if the socialistic superstructure, ruling in Zaire, had corresponded to a socialistic infrastructure of development. That is, a superstructure corresponding to public-owned properties, means of production, social facilities and a welfare system. The type of policy appropriate to this end would have been the revolutionary policy of development, which at least theoretically, promotes the strategic interests of the masses. In this case, the priority would not have been given to agriculture, to begin with, but rather to the mastery and control of the state apparatus by all social categories, basically the ones which are oppressed politically, exploited economically and alienated socio- culturally. Their participation in the decision-making process and in the elaboration of development plans and programs, including the sharing of benefits by all with regard to their contributions and merits would have been an indispensable necessity. 172 Also important in this grassroots socio-economic development process is the use, by the whole population, of the advantages and opportunities offered by the industrial and scientific revolution. This has failed to materialize in Zaire, where peasants, low-wage-workers and organic intellectuals, who together constitute the largest majority of the population, have been proletarianized, made insecure and excluded from power, from the decision-making process, from social control of the means of production and from social advantages related to them. Another path for development would have been to preserve both the capitalistic superstructure and infrastructure inherited from the Belgian colonization, by shaping them and adapting them to local needs for the interests of the whole Zairean population. For this capitalism not only coexisted with the traditional modes of production in Zaire, but it also started articulating with them to result in a product which would have been conceptualized and defined at the time of its structuralization. However, neither one of these two paths was systematically adopted and applied. That was made explicit by President Mobutu, when he stated once in a public gathering that the Zairean ideologico-political line was neither linked to the right, nor to the left, nor to the 173 center. The right referred to the West, the left to the East, and the centre to other emerging powers in the world. Zaire's socio-political mainstream lay in what he called authenticity, i.e., a return or reference to ancestral modes of production and values. Hyden Goran points out this problem by arguing that in most African countries the political leaders have been either uninterested in pursuing the same policies or have failed to implement policies that support a consistent agricultural and rural development. The main reason for this, he underscores, seems to be that African leaders, despite their bourgeois status, have rejected a close association with the interests of their former masters. Thus, instead of using the state to implement capitalist policies, they have developed alternative strategies, often nominally socialistic but, in actual fact, expressions of their roots in the peasants, that is traditional economy.147 It is in this confusion, due to the nostalgy of a pre-colonial invaded past and the complex emerging reality of the eve of the twenty-first century, that lies the blockage of any grassroots development initiatives and efforts. The leaders, with the benediction of their acolytes, regard the country as a tribe of which they are 147Hyden Goran, "The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania," in Agricultural Development In Africa. Issues of Public Policy, ed. by Robert H. Bates and Michael F. Lofchie, ("New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 224. 174 the sole chiefs, the national property as their personal property, with the words of their mouths replacing the constitution. As one can see, solving this situation, which is known as "le mal Zairois" is not a question of increasing the state's expenditures in agriculture, provision and use of agricultural credits, increasing the personnel and technical assistance, transportation facilities, improving, punctually, markets and price policies; nor is it a question of increasing the IMF, the World Bank, and some other Western development agencies' financial assistance. These punctual technical solutions have been tried and applied, but they have been neither curative nor have they been preventive. On the contrary, they have strengthened the ruling class economically and politically, while weakening more and more the masses, hampering their local social organizations. :pThus, the question is one of correcting socio-political structures and institutions in Zaire, and shaping them in such a way that they can be responsive to the people's needs. George H. Honaldle et al underscore in the same vein that many failures in development are not failures of production or technology. Instead, they are institutional failures. When development policies emphasize production at the expense of strengthening institutions, the result is an inability to sustain those production gains over the long 175 run: the agricultural policy is designed, but badly implemented, roads are built, but not maintained, new technologies are implanted and implemented, but not supported; people are trained in new techniques, but are unable to apply them within their organizations. To have a long-term effect, development policy design should be equipped to strengthen weak organizations. To rectify this situation, development policy designers must give institutional development objectives an increased priority. This reorientation requires basic changes in structures and changes in policy design. Primary emphasis must be switched from production increases to performance improvements; potential side effects on local institutional capacity must be carefully scrutinized, and designs must reflect a deeper understanding of the existing institutional landscape.148 Derick W. Brinkerhoff discusses the role of institutions in development and he asserts that among the cumulative lessons of more than two decades of experience in socioeconomic development in developing countries must be the recognition that effective institutions are critical to the development process. 148George H. Honaldle, "Dealing with Institutional And Organizational Realities," edited by Morss and Gow, Op.cit., 33, 43. 176 Institutions, especially if they all are of the homogeneous type, provide the organizing framework for a country's capacity to solve its development problems. This framework conditions the incentives and opportunities a country's people have to engage in development efforts. Weak institutions, he asserts, offer limited incentives and few opportunities, thus diminishing recipients problem- solving capacity and increasing their dependence on external resources and assistance. Strong institutions enhance people's ability to solve problems and undertake effective development action and reduce over time their dependence on externally provided aid. The non correspondence of socio-economic developmental structures is the major obstacle to the design and implementation of an adequate development policy, conducive to the improvement of standards of living.149 Uma Lele documents the interaction between agricultural policy and rural development in Africa by pointing out that the success of agricultural policy depends upon some level of "fit" with the structural and institutional context. Effective institutions are universally regarded as playing a strategic role in the development of a country. Effective institutions allow governments to perform two important functions: to elaborate appropriate development 149Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Op.cit., 11. 177 policies and goals, and to implement them such that these goals are achieved.150 With the fundamental cause of the blockage of rural and national development in post-1965 Zaire having been identified, what has been the hidden agenda of the state agricultural policy in this country? The Hidden Agenda of State Agricultural Policy in Post-1965 Zaire In order to answer this question, a recapitulation of Zaire's rural socio-political history is in order. Brooke Grundfest Schoepf explains that the rural area in Zaire has been in crisis for at least two decades, since the peasantry of several regions, finding themselves poorer than before 1960, has embarked upon armed struggle for a 'second independence.'151 Apart from the peasant resistance to the Belgian colonial power, the Zairean rural area has been, since independence, an arena of revolutionary and violent upheavals. First of all, the Mulelist rebellion of the 1964-65 period covered more than half of the country and caused many thousands of deaths. The subsequent troubles in Zaire —the two "Front National de Liberation Congolaise" (F.N.L.C.) invasions in Shaba in 1977 and 1978; the uprising 15"Uma Lele, Op. Cit., 3-9. 15 Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, "Food Crisis and Class Formation in Shaba," in Review of Africa Political Economy, no. 33, (August 1985), 33-43. 178 and the massacres in Idiofa, Bandundu, after the Kasongo affair in 1978; the massacres at Katekelayi and Luamuela, Kasai Oriental, in 1979; recent attacks on Moba and Kalemie in Shaba region in 1984 and 1985, and many other unreported intermittant uprisings, strikes and demonstrations, the three most recent of which occurred January 17, and October 1988, and February 1989, costing killings, woundings and arrests of hundreds of participants, including opposition leader Tshisekedi-wa-Mulumba as well as many university students,152 altogether, have aimed at overthrowing the central government because of its inability to realize its repeated commitments to carry out socio-economic development. Thus, the government so concerned with the survival of the regime and the expropriation of the country's resources for private use, came up with the idea of agricultural and rural development. The initial and unstated political concern of that development policy, which is still in application, has been to reach the rural area in the name of rural development in order to mobilize the rural people and indoctrinate them with the ideology of the Mouvement Populaire de Revolution, and put an end to their organizations and political actions. 1 52Jean-Claude Willame, "Political Succession in Zaire, or Back to Machiavelli, in Modern African Studies, Volume 26, numero 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 37-50. 179 As one can perceive, the agricultural and rural development policy has been, since its design and implementation, a political mechanism contributing to the centralization of power and authority in order to restore the central government authority over the regional, i.e., provincial and traditional authority, as well as the respect of that authority by all inhabitants. It has contributed to rendering the presidency of the republic the only seat and center of political power and authority, to have all state powers centralized and concetranted in the sole hands of the President. This viewpoint has been made explicit by Kalambayi, when he argues that the implementation of the presidential system set up in Zaire has been an attempt to control every aspect of life in that country, directly in the case of political stability, as well as major decisions, which cover not only politics, but social and economic affairs, culture and religion, or through delegated power in all the important organizations at the service of the regime.153 The agricultural and rural policy has been, overall, relatively sucessful for that political purpose. Everywhere in rural Zaire, people, at the political, economic and socio-cultural levels feel the presence of the MPR and its ideology, and they have been, regardless of their will, internalizing them. The coopted traditional chiefs, 1s3Kalambayi-Mwaba-Ntombolo, Op. cit,, 185-442. 180 schools, army, media, and state officials, especially those who are sent to the rural area have been required, in one way or the other, to work for that purpose. But instead of letting the rural people devote their time to productive activity, which could provide them with income, there have been, as Callaghy points out, marches, mass indoctrinating rallies and gatherings, and tracting of "suspects." Similarly, there has been communal labor called "salongo," which is, in essence, a direct continuation of the colonial policy of forced and unpaid labor put in a thick cloud of "revolutionary language."154 Tasks organized under salongo have included practicing slogans, songs and dances of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, constructing and maintaining 'state-buildings, cleaning the houses of officials and sometimes schools and hospitals, streets, public areas and drainage canals. These unpaid tasks are accomplished only by the masses. The lack of enthusiasm for these tasks reflects the population's perception that they consolidate the power of an increasing unpopular regime.155 Those who do not show up in these activities either pay a fine in nature or money, which goes into mouths or pockets of those in charge of these activities, or they are sent to jail. 154Callaghy, Op. cit,, 4. 155Callaghy, Op. cit,, 8, 299-301. 181 The following subsection on the North Shaba Rural Development Project is chosen to illustrate the domination of state political concerns over socio-economic concerns. North Shaba Rural Development Project: A Concrete Case of State Political Concerns Over Socio-Economic Concerns A clear-cut illustration of the domination of political concerns of the state in post-1965 Zaire over socio-economic concerns in the name of rural development is the North Shaba Rural Development Project (Project North Shaba). This project has been controversial from its inception. The project zone, North Shaba, in which the United States has been involved, is in an isolated southeastern portion of the country, not far away from Angola. It is one thousand miles beyond the effective control of the central Government in Kinshasa. Its population consists of numerous ethnic groups, mainly the Hemba and the Bemba. The majority of these ethnic groups have been harboring hostility toward the central government. The experts of the United States Agency for International Development (AID), who were given the design and managerial tasks of this project, anticipated that the project's isolated location in a corner of the country would present a challenge to good management, and suggested that it be designed and implemented in another 182 part of rural Zaire. Nevertheless, the Government of Zaire, primarily for political reasons, insisted that the maize production project be in the Shaba area.156 The bottom line of that political choice has been to extend post-1965 state influence into that region which has showed hostility to the central government in order to prevent other invasions of Zaire by the "Ex-Gendarmes Katangais," based in Angola since the 1960's. The Zairean state has succeeded in convincing the United States that it should place Americans in that area to play a watchdog role and to produce psychologically frightening effects on ethnic groups in Shaba, on "Ex- gendarmes Katangais", and on Cubans based in Angola. In exchange for this service, the Zairean state has been assigned an instrumentalist role in the process of capitalistic conquest of other African areas which are under socialistic influence. Thus, post-1965 Zaire became a channel by which the United States of America has been sending arms and other strategic supports to UNlTA's fighters so that they could overthrow the Communist government in Angola and prevent the so-called Soviet-Cuban takeover of the central African region. 156Irving Rosenthal et al, Development Management In Africa. The Case of the North Shaba Rural Development Project In Zaire, AID Evaluation Special Study, no.32, (Washington, D.C.: AID, December, 1985), viii. 183 Recently, the United States embassy in Kinshasa, Zaire, in collaboration with the Zairean government has decided to reinforce security in the same area, given the new discussion on the Cuban departure. It has again designed, through the United States Agency for International Development, a new "rural development project" called the Central Shaba Agricultural Development Project, and the Shaba Refugee Roads Project.157 As one can see, this project is primarily concerned with establishing roads for military and security reasons. The question arises: If all these "projects" are aimed at helping the rural people improve their living conditions, "why such focus on rural Shaba, while there are other regions in Zaire where the rural living conditions are also very bad and deserve urgent attention?" Blaine Harden underscores this reality by writing that the state in post-1965 Zaire has, in compensation for its security and survival, allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to use its territory where and when it wishes. He asserts, for example, that the southern Zairean air base of Kamina, in the Shaba region, which is not far away from the location of these projects, has been used to airlift arms to rebels fighting the Marxist government in Angola. 157United States Department of State, 3E D102 52-1 3GV31 311 08/13/88 12: 25., 1. 184 In reference to Thomas M. Callaghy's study on politics in Zaire, Harden argues that the ruling class in Zaire has adroitly used United States' strategic interests in southern Africa to keep open the spigots of Western money. At the same time, he writes, it blocks substantive reforms that would cut into corrupt practices and mismanagement of the country. Corruption, mismanagement and the politics of "disorganization," associated with the state ruling class, are the very elements which keep it in power.J 5" Agricultural Policy Zaire: A Form of Political Settlement I would not close this chapter without noting that agricultural policy in Post-1965 Zaire appears to represent a form of political settlement, one designed to bring peaceful relations between the state and its urban constituents. The settlement character of that policy can be described by the fact that the state has been unable to mobilize the country for agricultural and rural socio economic development, while at the same time mobilizing and manipulating different social categories, including international communities, without in the last analysis satisfying either. The severe costs of such settlements and 15"Blaine Harden, "Seeds of Reform Grow Slowly in Zaire. Corruption Pervades Economy Despite Steps to Please Creditors," in The Washington Post, (Washington, D.C: Friday, November 20, 1987), A21. 185 manipulations have been borne, as discussed in chapter four, by the small farmers. Hiromitsu Kaneda and Bruce F. Johnson asserts that urban consumers in Africa constitute a vigilant and a potent pressure group demanding low priced food. Because they are poor, they spend much of their income on food. Most studies suggest that urban consumers in Africa spend between 65 and 75 percent of their income on food.159 Changes in the price of food therefore have a major impact on well-being of urban dwellers in Africa, and they pay close attention to the issue of food prices. Urban constituents are politically potent because they are geographically concentrated and strategically located. Their geographic concentration facilitates quick organization, and the cost and availability of food supplies are significant factors promoting urban unrest. Low food prices are in the interest of the state, which is the main employer. As an employer, the state cares about food prices because with higher food prices, wages must rise and, all else being equal, profits fall. Furthermore, the state cares about food prices not only as employer in its own right, but also because it seeks to protect industrial profits. 15"Hiromitsu Kaneda and Bruce F. Johnston, "Urban Food Expenditure Patterns in Tropical Africa," in Food Research Institute, Studies 2, (Washington. D.C, 1961) , 229- 275. 186 When urban unrest begins among consumers, discontent may rapidly spread to upper echelons of the polity: those whose incomes come from profits, not wages, and those in charge of major bureaucracies. Political regimes unable to supply low-cost food are seen as dangerously incompetent and as failing to protect the interests of key elements of the social order. It was those shortages and rising prices that formed a critical prelude to the coup that unseated Busia in Ghana and led to the period of political maneuvers and flux that threatened to overthrow the government of Arap Moi in Kenya.16° The preference for low-cost foods is understandable, given the rising number of urban area consumers. Low food prices are supported by the state for reasons of political necessity and ideological preference. Food is a major staple, and higher prices for such staples threaten the real value of wages and profits; hence, they impair the stability of the state. There are of course real limitations of the state's ability to lower food costs. One such limitation is political: insofar as big farmers themselves are powerful, they are likely to resist efforts of the state to lower agricultural prices. However, most farms are in actuality 16 ° Data from USAID, Food Problems and Prospects, (Washington, D.C: USDA, 1980). 187 owned by the peasantry, not the state's bureaucrats. They are small-scale and the farmers are politically weak and most often they are heavily taxed. Another common influence on state behavior is the limitation of financial resources. When lower price levels are imposed on farmers, consumers may face shortages. Indeed, because food production tends to be exceedingly price-elastic, the state must take into account the very real possibilty that its pricing policies could lead to shortages in the delivery of foodstuffs from the rural areas to the city, as has often been the case in Zaire. The most obvious strategy of compensating for such shortages has been to boost imports. However, the state always runs out of money and foreign exchange. It therefore lacks the resources by which to make up the shortfalls resulting from its pricing policies, and this places a major limitation on the degree to which it can continue to lower agricultural prices. Within these constraints, the state in Zaire hasoverall created an adverse economic environment for agricultural production and rural development. The state employs market controls and trade policies that drive down the prices to farmers, resulting in lower production and consumption. State agricultural policy in Zaire has produced a harsh socio-economic environment for small farmers, and 188 agricultural production and standards of living in that country have drastically declined. The state controls agricultural markets and sets prices within them. Marketing and pricing policies are manipulated in ways that adversely affect the income of farmers. These policy choices result, as Michael F. Lofchie underscores, from a variety of pressures brought to bear by influential interests.161 Overall, while the post-1965 state has been helpful in reestablishing presidential authority throughout the whole country, this state has tragically failed to promote socio-economic development, be it in the rural or the urban areas. The standard of living of the masses of population have remained dismally low in a country whose economic potential is considered one of the best in Africa. State agricultural and rural policy in post-1965 Zaire has been a mechanism of political control, part of the replacement of the colonial and the 1960-1965 regimes and their respective ideologies by the ideology of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, which, above all, provides political orientation and gives to the leader an instrument of control of the whole country. It has enabled him to obtain the assent of a relatively small entourage — the higher echelons of a ruling class whose considerable material interests must be safeguarded -- and to take 16xMichael F. Lofchie, Africa's Agrarian Crisis. The Roots of Famine, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986), 49-52. 189 account of sporadic outbursts of protest in the rural area as well as among the urban masses over deep-seated grievances or major problems. At least such protest may prompt subtle changes of political course. As we have demonstrated the fundamental cause of the failure of rural development in post-1965 Zaire and the hidden agenda of the state agricultural policy, what lessons would one learn from this case? The answer to this question will be elucidated in the following chapter. CHAPTER VI A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF STATE, AGRICULTURAL POLICY, AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ZAIRE This chapter is devoted to a critique of theories of state, agricultural policy, and rural development in developing countries, with a special reference to Zaire. By understanding the generalities and particulars of the Zairean case one can make inference to other African and developing countries and gain a picture of agricultural and rural development realities in these countries. The State in Developing Countries It is a widespread notion today that the state in developing countries is and ought to be the major source of agricultural and rural development. This focus on the state has been based on the expectation by the masses that the new political elites of developing countries, especially in Africa, would transform the political, economic, and social life of these states in the very near future. These views were not just functions of romanticism of the sixties, but expectations grounded in beliefs about self-government, 190 191 freedom, participation, self determination, and socio economic development. Political leaders were seen as the key to mobilization of the masses, the driving force for socio economic development, the architects of institution building, and the focus of national integration. They were to provide a new moral leadership, a short-cut to political and economic development, and the drive and charisma to move the postcolonial states from their period of suspended animation into the twentieth century.162 This argument was justified by social inequalities created during the colonial regime and by the rising poverty in these countries. These states designed and implemented development policies as a means to resolve these socio economic problems. Thus they came to control production and distribition of almost all the basic resources essential to socio-economic development as well as the resources needed to satisfy the needs of rural people for income, habitat, nutrition, health, education and employment. Such circumstances have made the local people dependent on the central government for their socio-economic development, and rural farmers dependent on the state's assistance on such items as credit, transportation, fertilizer, seeds, technology, technical assistance, education, health, and the 162David Apter, Ghana In Transition, (New York: Antheuneum, 1963), 12-20. 192 type of crops to grow as well. However, looking back at the record of political leadership and socio-economic development some two decades later, we find the results disappointing and the discrepancies between expectations and reality bitter. The question of who has gotten what, when, and how continues to come up, and constitutes both a critical aspect of national politics and a challenge to theories of the state and rural and agricultural development in developing countries. The general pattern has been one of the state's inability to act effectively in order to materialize its commitment to helping the people develop. The intended role of these states as a source of development has remained a confusing illusion, and rural development only a myth in the minds of those who talk about it and base their hope on it. Mobilizations have been largely for political reasons, or for punctual development efforts which have failed at the national level, but benefited the few. Institutions' names have changed, yet often not for the general good. The expected socio-economic and political miracles have never materialized. Moral leadership and revolutionary ideology appear to have failed to produce substantial change in both socio-economic development and nation-building. While there have been a few exceptions, the general pattern remains clear, and post-1965 Zaire is an illustrative case. 193 The Case of Post-1965 Zaire The State In post-1965 Zaire, the state has been much more concerned with the spread of the ruling class' ideology, the elimination of political opponents, and the accumulation of wealth by the acquisition of political offices. This particular state has been characterized, as Schatzberg notes, by attempts to occupy all available political space within the social system. It has dealt with any attempt at organization at lower levels of society by either co- optation into the state-party or suppression, and it has deemed "subversive" any organizational initiatives which it cannot control and which might subsequently become foci of potential opposition.163 Thus, national socio-economic development has not been its major concern. Meanwhile, the country has been run in a paternalistic manner, i.e., by relying mainly on tribal and ethnic members at different levels, and by an arbitrary exercise of power through a state bureaucratic apparatus. The leading officials, whose activities have not been rationally and continuously controlled by the rulers, have become rich quickly. The source of accumulation of wealth has not been acquisition by hard work and exchange, but rather by the exploitation of the working classes and rural people, and the latter's necessity to "buy" all 163Michael G. Schatzberg, Op.Cit., 141. 194 official actions of state bureaucrats, given the wide latitude for granting favor and arbitrariness. Rationality and hard work have not been the major criteria and concern of the state in Zaire. Tribalism, ethnicity and regionalism have been implicitly used as the main criteria in the socioeconomic and political life of Zaire. People who are tribally related to the leaders or their leading officials are more likely to obtain jobs and make fortunes, regardless of their level of education, expertise, competence and merit. Young and Turner's analysis of the state in post-1965 Zaire confirms this reality when it argues that upward mobility through schools is no longer real for most people, although the myth of mobility through education endures.16 4 Militancy, which is different from patriotism, has been another important criterion. In the sense given to it by the Zairean ruling class, militancy means submission, indeed absolute submission to the leaders. If fulfills this subjective criterion, one is more likely to join the team. However, it should be noted that Zaire has about two hundred fifty-five tribes, and it is inconceivable to deny one's tribal origin and identity and be adopted by another individual's tribe just for the sake of a job. 164Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, Op. Cit., 153-37, 160. 195 This situation amounts to what Thomas M. Callaghy calls patrimonial and personal rule, where patron-client politics prevail and decisions are made according to a leader's personal discretion, based on political rather than economic rationality. The arbitrariness of the decision making process permeates the administrative structure and leads to state irrationality and softness. This puts the country in a situation where it can neither participate effectively in the process of national development and provide basic services to its citizens, nor participate' effectively in the international economic system.165 Rural and Agricultural Development: An Entropic Language Agricultural and rural development has been emptied of its initial and intrinsic socio-economic content of characterizing a grassroots participatory process of social change intended to bring about social, material, intellectual and moral advancement, including greater equality, freedom, and prosperity for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control. The concept happened to be filled out by another content, which is semantically and praxeologically inappropriate to socio-economic development: a mechanism of political control and mobilization of rural people, with the 165Thomas M. Callaghy, The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa, (London, New York: Zaki Ergas, 1987), 3-9. 196 interest of the ruling class and their international allies in mind. Rural development in post-1965 Zaire has not, as Norman Long underscores, given sufficient attention to the ways in which local groups and processes can contribute, and indeed modify, the patterns of rural and national development. It has taken a deterministic view of socio economic change and has not allowed sufficiently for the interplay of local and national forces. As such it has been a top-down rather than a-two-way developmental process relating local-level processes and decisions to national structures. It has not treated farmers and local entrepreneurs as active socio-historical subjects in the process by which rural transformation can influence the direction and outcomes of national and rural policy.166 Having lost its socio-economic substance, agricultural and rural development is no longer conducive to create growth of human productivity, nor can it be beneficial to historical actors involved in this process. Other such entropic terms which are often used by the superstructure in post-1965 Zaire to confuse the masses are, for instance, (1) agriculture: the priority of priorities, instead of agriculture the last of priorities; (2) revolution instead of reaction; (3) equality instead of inequality; (4) "peace, justice and work," which is the 16"Norman Long, op.cit., 187. 197 motto in post-1965 Zaire, instead of insecurity, injustice and apathy; (5) order instead of disorder; (6) cooperation instead of neocolonization; (7) information instead of disinformation and intoxication; (8) progress instead of regression; development instead of underdevelopment; and (10) condemnation of tribalism, ethnicity and regionalism while tactically using them for personal purposes. As entropic language, agricultural and rural development as well as many other terms of this nature are indicators of the degree of evolution and social disorder which characterize post-1965 Zaire, and many other peripheral capitalistic countries.167 Rural development has not meant what it intended to be and what the rural people have expected to receive from it. Development or rural development has become a political slogan used to mobilize the poor for political ends and private aggrandizement. Poor people have been given unmaterialized promises, and agricultural and rural development has often been used contrary to what it means to the poor, with leaders pretending to accept it without giving it any substance. At the international level, rural development has become both a mechanism of mobilization and mastering freedom fighters, and a growing industry raising millions of 167Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature., (Toronto, New York, London, Sydney: Bantam Books, 1984), 117-122. 198 dollars to create more,jobs and more institutions for the international communities rather than for the poor. This has, as a result, forced the rural poor to become increasingly more dependent on their respective states and the international donor agencies to break their vicious circles of poverty, hunger and powerlessness in which they find themselves. This path has not been beneficial to the rural poor in Zaire at all. Nzongola-Ntalaja discusses this point and asserts that, contrary to their expectations, the Zairean masses in general, especially the rural masses, have not experienced a substantial improvement in their quality of life since independence. In spite of decolonization, the state continues to serve principally the interests of the ruling class as well as its externally-based dominant classes and agents. The lack of national socio-economic development is thus a function of the social or class character of the state in post-1965 Zaire. The class character of the state reflects the nature of its leadership group, its objective interests, values, and relative strength in the national and international class struggle. In Zaire, this group traces its origin to the African petty bourgeoisie, the most politically conscious class of colonized society and one that assumed the leadership of the independence struggle.16" Nzongola-Ntalaja, Class Struggles and National 199 The question which one can raise is, "where does the money go?" Here again, Harden documents the issue by writing that the ruling class in Zaire mouths the free-market "lingo" that the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Reagan administration and some other Western financial institutions like to hear, while continuing to fill foreign bank accounts with money. No government project is begun without payoffs. Payoffs are ubiquitous and so exorbitant that many projects are never completed.16' Similarly, Mr. Ruding, the Dutch Finance Minister, thinks that the problems of middle and poor-income countries, such as Zaire, will still have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. He underscores that it will be hard to raise more money for many of these countries because capital owned by their leaders has flowed out faster than new capital could come in. "What puzzles me, "Mr. Ruding points out," is why insufficient attention is being paid to capital flight. If we are unable to stop that flight, legal or illegal, I do not see how we can achieve a stable solution."170 Liberation in Africa, (Roxbury, Massachusetts: Omenana, 1982), 37-8. 16"Blaine Harden, Op.cit., A21. New York Times, (March 14, 1987), 12-13. 200 Thus, the answer is that the money goes into the pockets of those who receive it in the name of development for the poor. Nevertheless, the case of rural and agricultural development in post-1965 Zaire should not be overgeneralized and simplified to the point of denying altogether the role rural and agricultural development policy has played in the socio-economic development process in other social formations. Historical experience confirms the critical role that a dynamic agricultural sector plays in supporting overall growth. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century in England and Japan, Anandararup Ray points out, considerable increases in farm productivity and output freed domestic resources and provided an important market for industrial goods. In Japan, substantial voluntary transfers of capital and labor from agriculture to the rest of the economy were a major contributor to industrial and socio economic development. The complementarity is also evident from recent studies at the macro and micro level in some developing countries. In India, Malaysia, and the Philippines more rapid agricultural growth has had strong positive effects on the rest of the economy by raising demand for consumer goods and by increasing household savings and government 201 revenue.x 7 x In a similar vein, anthropological and sociological evidence indicates that the standard of living has improved for rural people in most Asian countries, particularly in China. This was basically due to particular kinds of political structures and organizations which have set special incentives for the society as a whole, and ultimately explain aspects of development and the direction of change in these countries. As a part of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese State has been able to carry out fundamental transformations in the rural and agricultural sector through a series of structural and institutional reforms, and the adoption of a labor-intensive rural development program. Bernstein asserts that rural development in China has not eliminated the attractions of city life; however, at least the material conditions have been created that permit rural people, especially farmers, to remain in the countryside to grow crops and receive an adequate income.172 17xAnandararup Ray: "Inappropriate macro-economic policies and Their effects on Agriculture", World Bank Report, (Washington, D.C: World Bank, March 1987). 172Thomas P. Bernstein, Up to the Mountain and Down to the Villages — The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), 293. 202 The point here is not to argue whether or not the Chinese case, for instance, has been perfect, but rather to point out that China has shown important structural and organizational capacities which defy the allegations often made against agriculture and rural development in developing countries. The Rural and agricultural sector has played its initial and intended role of being a chief source of food and factor supplies for other sectors as well as an important earner of foreign exchange, basically because adequate structures and organization were established. Beyond the Liberal and Neo-Marxist Perspectives of Rural Development in Developing Countries, with Reference to Zaire Studies have been conducted to determine the causes of the failure of rural development, indeed national socio economic development, particularly in African countries. These studies range from a liberal to a Neo-Marxist perspective. According to the liberal perspective, the explanations of Africa's development problems and its agricultural crisis are to be found in 1. the lack of skill and entrepreneurship; 2. the lack of resources for productive investment; 3. the lack of technical and scientific improvements; 4. the lack of multi-displinary research relevant to local conditions; 203 5. the lack of sufficient agricultural extension services as well as marketing and credit facilities; 6. market failure (price controls and other imperfections in price setting mechanisms); 7. the inapropriateness of development loans and failure to scrupulously implement set plans and policies; 8. the existence of some archaic social structures such as inequalities in land tenure patterns; 9. the environmental deterioration, droughts and massive soil erosion; 10. the lack of transportation systems, and 11. the demographic problems, i.e., lack of control of population growth that neutralizes growth in agricultural production.x 7 3 The above list shows that the liberal diagnosis essentially relates the problem to the scarcity of certain factors of production. However, most of the factors listed above are producible. Thus, accordingly, a successful production system would shift resources and effort to the production of scarce products and the development of necessary institutions. An unsuccessful system of production would fail to do so over time. However, the scarcity of capital, skill and entrepreneurship do not take us very far in explaining the failure of a qualitative 173Kidane Mengistead, "Food Shortages in Africa: A Critique of Existing Agricultural strategies," in, Africa Today, no. 32, 1985: 39-53. 204 production system. * They do not tell us why a country like Zaire fails to generate these producible goods and services. Furthermore, addressing such factors by themselves does not always alleviate the problem; this has been attempted by the state in post-1965 Zaire, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and some European financial and development agencies. The results are, as we have seen, the actualization of development for a social minority, and the potentialization, at the national level, of development of a social majority. The Neo-Marxian perspective, like the liberal perspective, recognizes the scarcity of certain products such as capital, technology and skill in many developing countries. It also realizes that such scarcities impose productivity as well as market constraints on the producers. However, unlike the liberal perspective, it regards the scarcities as outcomes of the problem rather than the causes. The neo-Marxist diagnosis goes at least one step further than the liberal diagnosis. This has very important policy implications. The neo-Marxian analysis considers that changes in the production relations and in the division of labor are prerequisites for dealing systematically with the scarcity of all producible factors of production by coordinating the use of available resources with social needs. It is implied that without structural changes the 205 appropriation that generates scarcity, hence the actualization of underdevelopment, would persist. Overall, while the liberal paradigm provides us with little explanation beyond the scarcity of resources, the neo-Marxist paradigm relates this deprivation to the existing production relations. This last view leads us another step further to find the fundamental cause of failure of rural development in post-1965 Zaire primarily in the juxtaposition of its socialistic ideologico-political superstructure with the capitalistic economic infrastructure, further highlighted by their coexistence with the traditional modes of production. Capitalistic penetration and development have, of course, been incomplete and hampered, and it has taken a form which John Illiffe aptly names "parasitic capitalism."174 The development process in Zaire hinges primarily on a solution to the people's self-determination problem, characterized by their political choice of homogeneous socio-economic, and politico-ideological structures responsive to their needs and aspirations. It cannot lie in an imposition of the results of a speculative imagination of one single individual, or a small group of individuals, who are, overall, cut off from the masses and refuse to understand their basic problems, needs and aspirations. 174John Illiffe, The Emergence of African Capitalism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 80. 206 Influence of Metaphysics in Policy Design in Post-1965 Zaire The lack of materialization of development in general and agricultural and rural development in post-1965 Zaire in particular is rooted in a philosophical conception to which the ruling class refers either for tactical reasons or by ignorance. This philosophical conception is metaphysics, especially its principles of identity in non- differentiation, isolation of social phenomena, and the principle of opposition of contrary phenomena.175 The principle of identity in non differentiation implies that those, who design and encourage agricultural and rural development in developing countries i.e., state, development agencies, such as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, ignore or neglect that, while agriculture is a factor for socio-political stability and economic development of the ruling class, it is at the same time, for rural people and small farmers, a mechanism of political control, ideological alienation and economic exploitation. This principle denies, particularly, the existence of social classes. This reality has been well expressed by professor Mwabila Malela, when he writes that ... la negation du phenomene des classes sociales associees au principe de l'identite dans la non differenciation repose sur la double confusion 175George Politzer, Principes Elementaires de Philosophie,, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975) , 1-277. 207 consistant a ne pouvoir discossier la realite de classes et.celle de leur lutte, et a reduire la lutte des classes a une simple opposition au pouvoir.176 This means that in Zaire the ruling class denies the existence of social classes, because "everybody belongs to the same family, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution. Everybody is equal." As a result, any class struggle is reduced to a simple opposition to the established power. The principle of isolation of phenomena is often referred to by policy designers and development experts and contains a fundamental pitfall of analyzing social phenomena by dissociating them. It does not take into account relations which exist among these phenomena. Thus, to think that the agricultural sector by itself can develop a country like Zaire socio-economically as well as politically, and isolating agriculture from other sectors of socio-economic life and from the contradictions which exist at the national level, and opposing the rural area to the urban area is an oversimplication of the underdevelopment reality, an explicative monism. The same principle supports the view that individuals who are originally from the same region as their leaders are also leaders, that they have the same class interests and advantages, and that they all are developed. 176Mwabila Malela, "Propos sur les classes Sociales avec Reference a l'Afrique et au Zaire," in Cahiers Zairois d'Etudes Politiques et Sociales, No.5, (Kinshasa: Presse Universitaire du Zaire, Juin 1984), 3. 208 Accordingly, they need not be consulted and considered in the struggle for a qualitative social change. Michael G. Schatzberg writes that in Zaire most ordinary folk, even many educated individuals, believe that an inner circle of rulers from the Equateur region dominates the state. Popular expressions such as "Nazareth," "Bethlehem," and "Holy Land" designate the President's heartland in daily conversation. Although this perception of a regime of, by and for the Equatorian people is far too simplistic, people nevertheless think their lives are miserable and they have nothing because the state pours its resources into this one region. To be sure, this image of a flourishing, economically vibrant Equateur is, with the exception of Gbadolite, the native village of the President, incorrect. However, Zaireans living in Kasai, Shaba, and itivu, for example, who depend on their imagination and whatever rumor, need to know that villagers in Equateur, the region I am originally from, live in the same, even more lamentable existential conditions in which they live --conditions induced by a politico-economic structure inherited from colonialism whose rulers consciously manipulate to produce the desired result: wealth for the few at the expense of the many. In light of this widespread but confusing image, opposition to the state assumes an ethnic and, given Zaire's 209 culturally plural composition, necessarily fragmented form. This discourages transtribal, transethnic, transregional and social class alliances, and aids the ruling class, which in actuality includes members of all regions, to keep on maintaining its political quiescence.177 This argument also indicates that ethnicity tends to result from the politicization of demands in the interests of the new men of power-or aspirant bourgeoisies; it notes shrewd rulers will seek to ally the class interest of these potential ethnic mobilizers to their own by granting access to the state, thus decapitating and demobilizing potential ethnic "trouble" spots. Goran Hyden discusses the same situation for Africa in general, and argues that political leaders have confined themselves to communal action. They use their respective tribal groups as the basis for social action in order to maximize their own power. Stratification has been subsumed under these forms of social actions, and rarely have political leaders in Africa engaged in naked class action at the expense of their community. Where this pattern has been allowed to develop, he asserts, it has also been common for the political leaders to use the state, not as an institution to ensure higher productivity and a greater surplus, but as an instrument to secure benefits for their respective communities. A genuine class structure has 177Michael G. Schatzberg, Op.Cit., 23, 141. 210 failed to develop because 'it has remained contained in the vertically organized social factions that form the principal social formations in societies, where the peasant mode coexists with other modes of production.17" The principle of opposition of contrary phenomena states that there cannot be a common ground between different phenomena. In reference to this study, there are in Zaire areas which were assigned either the agricultural role or the industrial role. Regions, such as Equateur, and Kivu have been presented as 'essentially' agricultural, therefore, there is no need to establish and develop industries there because regions cannot be both agricultural and industrial at the same time. However, the ambiguity occurs when the state in the name of the same principle gears up to design and implement agricultural and rural development projects, for instance, in the Shaba region, which was initially designed as an industrial pole of development in Zaire. Structural ambiguity, confusion and inefficiency in a country can be used for political purposes to promote particular class interests. Janet MacGaffey argues that regulations that are unenforceable in Zaire have purposes other than their overt one: they provide officials with 17"Goran Hyden, "The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania,"in Agricultural Development In Africa. Issues of Public Policy, ed. by Robert H.Bates and Michel F. Lofchie, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 224-225. 211 additional opportunities for harassment and extortion. She points out the example of commerce in the region of Haut- Zaire and asserts that, although ostensibly intended to restrict the excessive number of retailers and speculators, licences for petty commerce operate to this effect.1'9 Huybrechts and Van Der Steen express this situation when they write that it is the system of regulation and control itself which sustains fraud and corruption, two sources of easy and enormous profit which the political- administrative beneficiaries are not ready to give up. One could ask if regulation is not set up more to permit illicit profit than to clean up the situation.180 David Gould notes, in the same vein, that viewing mismanagement in the state apparatus in post-1965 Zaire as an obstacle to development misrepresents reality. Mismanagement may be part of a conscious self-enrichment strategy on the part of those in control of the public bureaucracy.x 8 x Although this situation, influenced by the metaphysical principles, created problems for aspiring enterpreneurs, it has, by the same token, created potential opportunities for those of the masses with initiative, enterprise and a measure of good fortune. The political 17 Manet MacGaffey, Op. cit,, 200-201. 18"Huybrechts A. and Van Der Steen, op.cit. , 285. 181David Gould, Op. cit., 89. 212 aristocracy uses the state to extend its control over the rural area and the economy; however, this process has sometimes furthered the interests of other social categories because of administrative ineffectiveness. The political aristocracy controls the system politically and pillages it, but it leaves openings which the people use to evade the state's attempts to harness commodity production and wage labour for exploitatively low returns. About the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Post-1965 Zaire The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have been criticized for the lack of "fit" and adequacy of their development policies in developing countries.182 In Zaire, the International Monetary Fund, for example, has been providing balance of payments support by insisting that the Zairean state undertake several major economic stabilization measures. These include devaluation of the Zaire, reduced budget deficits, no increases in real wages and strict import controls.183 182Mondonga M. Mokoli, "The International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Loans: A Debatable Development Strategy in Developing Countries," Unpublished study written and submitted to the Sociology Department at the American University, and the African Development Foundation, Washington, D.C, October, 1987, 1-19. 183Albert H. Barclay et al., Internal Evaluation of Project North Shaba., (Washington, D.C: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1980), 15-16. 213 Such policies, which the financial institutions designed and had implemented in developing countries through the respective states, have not been successful in terms of improving the living conditions of the poor. This is due to, on the one hand, the nature of these institutions and, on the other hand the kind of environments in which they have been involved. Nevertheless, blame on these institutions should not be excessive, for these institutions could not have entered developing countries and worked in them without their indebted leaders' prior deliberate agreements. Furthermore, it is also known that foreign finance can promote growth through higher investment and technology transfers. It can, if carefully and wisely utilized, allow countries to adjust gradually to new circumstances in the world economy. However, it can also be misused, so that countries end up with more debt, but no corresponding increase in their ability to service it.184 The following table shows some evidence of World Bank and IDA financial assistance in Zaire. It indicates that the agricultural and rural development sector was allocated a relatively important amount of money by the World Bank and other international development agencies. However, there is no significant relation between 184 Statistical Office of the United Nations,, (New York: United Nations, 1968), 6. 214 TABLE 20 IBRD AND IDA LENDING BY SECTOR, 197 0-1986 ($ MILLIONS AND % OF TOTAL LENDING) Sector 1970 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 Agric. 426 3,458 3 ,078 3,473 3,749 4,777 20 30 23 22 26 29 Dev.Finance 216 818 1 ,128 918 565 1,449 20 7 9 6 4 9 Education 80 440 526 694 928 829 4 4 4 4 6 5 Energy 556 2,849 2 ,898 3,513 3,582 3,018 25 25 22 23 25 18 Industry 76 423 929 591 644 821 4 5 7 4 4 5 Nonproject 75 523 1 ,241 1,378 629 1,321 3 5 10 9 4 8 Population, health, nutr. 2 143 36 243 191 420 0 .1 1 0.3 2 1 3 Small-scale enterprises 3 260 286 672 561 275 0 .1 2 2 4 4 2 Techn. Ass. 0 .0 13 73 135 135 110 0.1 1 1 1 1 Telecommun. 85 131 396 167 122 50 11 3 3 1 1 1 Transport. 6 35 1445 1 ,614 2,597 2,139 1,498 29 13 12 17 15 9 Urbanizat. 0 .0 49 375 500 385 1,118 3 3 3 3 7 Water sup.& sewerage 33 631 441 641 781 Source: The World Bank Annual Reports (Washington, D.C. , September 1981), 1980-86. the amount of money allocated to that sector and the quality of rural and national development realized. This is due basically to the nature of the contradictions within the state as well as its defective policies. The World Bank, the International Nonetary Fund and other Western financial 215 institutions should find out mechanisms to constrain those who received their funds, misused them, and refuse to pay them back, instead of harming the poor. These financial institutions need to make sure to whom they lend funds because among the developing countries' leaders, there are those who can, if they want, fund the development initiatives and projects in their own countries without begging for money from the outside. On the other hand, should the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund wish to save their credibility and continue working in developing countries in general, and in Zaire in particular, they need basically to review and correct the oversimplicity, overgeneralization, and inflexibility of their short-term economistic models and approaches. They should correct and convert their macro- development orientation to one of the micro-level. Adjustment policies, for instance, cannot be successful without both understanding and commitment at the grassroots level. Knowledge of, and sensitivity to the developing countries' grassroots concerns are critical to appropriate adjustment programs. No development effort can carry out growth and qualitative improvement of the living conditions in a true sense if it does not involve the people as participants in its activities. The World Bank, especially the International Monetary Fund, should acknowledge that the 216 fact that the rural poor continue to survive under the most unfavorable of circumstances is a testimony to the fact that they possess a good deal of technical and social knowledge relevant to their conditions— knowledge of which many university-trained technicians may be unaware. So the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should try to learn from the experience of the masses and make use of their knowledge. This will encourage grassroots participation and will benefit the development experts in gaining insight into the problems they have been unable to solve. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund need to render their respective heavy administrative and decision-making systems more democratic and people-oriented. They should base their decision-making and planning systems on a "bottom-up" approach and should adhere more to 'self- help' strategies in the implementation of their projects. They should go directly to the people instead of attempting to reach them through the machinations of heavy-handed bureaucratic governments. Finally, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's development strategies would be less indictable and debatable had they allowed the people and their respective governments to resolve their internal socio-political contradictions, make their decisions, and learn from their mistakes. This may cause some problems, but it can 217 ultimately contribute to a greater degree of local initiative and thus the ability to improve the quality of life. From this overall critique of the state as an arena of class struggle for the accumulation of wealth and social prestige, agricultural policy as a mechanism of political control of the masses, and rural development as as an ideology and entropic technique, one can learn about post-1965 Zaire, and make some careful inferences to other African and developing countries. What general conclusion should one draw from the present study, and what recommendations should be prescribed for future research on the linkage between the state, agricultural policy and rural development in developing countries? CHAPTER VII GENERAL CONCLUSION Is a conclusion necessary in this study? Would it not be appropriate, in the spirit of this research, to let the reader draw the one which is relevant according to observations and analyses performed in the course of this study? In this research on the linkage between state, agricultural policy and rural development in post-1965 Zaire, my main concern has been to x-ray the state in order to determine the fundamental cause of failure of national socio-economic development,„especially rural development, by means of the agricultural sector. In doing so, I have proceeded to examine the following subquestions: 1) What has been the Zairean state's agricultural policy and its actual implementation in terms of financial expenditures for agriculture, credits, personnel, transportation and storage systems, markets and prices, research, and institutional building? 2) Has the agricultural sector actually been the highest priority, chosen to promote rural socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire? 3) What have been the overall results of the agricultural policy in Zaire? 4) What rural parts of 218 219 the country have received government attention, and why? 5) What has been the hidden agenda of the agricultural policy in Zaire? 6) How can the state in post-1965 Zaire be a solution to rural socio-economic problems, while it is a major cause of these problems? What lessons does post-1965 Zaire tell us about the theory of state, agricultural policy and rural development in developing countries? My major concern has been with the rural people and the impacts of state-initiated policies on them. Are their basic needs being met? Do they feel they are going through a correct development process? Where is development taking place and where is it failing to take place? What forces lead to social inequalities and enclaves of development? How do all these things relate to the nature and role of the state in post-1965 Zaire ? The answer to this body of questions has been threefold. First, I have demonstrated that the failure of the agricultural policy to carry out rural and national socio-economic development in post-1965 Zaire is dialectically linked to the nature and the role of the state in this — in terms of —resources richly-endowed country. The state in post-1965 Zaire is a socialistic superstructure which uses repression as a method of rule. It stands on a capitalistic economic infrastructure set up by the Belgian colonial administration during the expansion of capitalism on a world scale. This incompatible 220 juxtaposition of a socialistic superstructure with a capitalistic infrastructure, in the same social formation has engendered the structural conflicts and blockages of the Zairean system. These structural conflicts and blockages of different systems in the same social formation have been detrimental to rural people, wage workers, and other social categories. In the meantime, they have enabled the ruling class and its historical allies to use the state apparatus and power to establish their economic bases and expand their ideological and political influence. We find in post-1965 Zaire the actualization of underdevelopment of the social majority along with actualization of development of the few who hold the key state offices. This reality has been expressed arithmetically by underscoring that the equation of socio-economic development (+) of the few, plus socio-economic underdevelopment (-) of the majority, in the same social formation, does not result in national or rural socio-economic development, but rather in national socioeconomic underdevelopment. The socio economic development of the few becomes less visible in the face of the striking socio-economic underdevelopment of the majority, and this development potentializes. However, underdevelopment (-) should be viewed not only as a socio-historical negativity, but also as a positivity, which can be transformed qualitatively into 221 development in the future by the social categories which are underdeveloped. Second, this study has evaluated the overt and underlying relevancy of the priority which the state in post-1965 Zaire has accorded to the agricultural and rural sector by examining the indicators provided by the conventional rural development theories. These indicators have, as discussed in chapter three, shown over time that although agriculture has been proclaimed the priority of priorities, it has not received the necessary and sufficient financial support, and lacked political will and commitment, to materialize its assigned and intended goals. Data have indicated that the claims made by the state in post-1965 Zaire are not significant. This has led me to go further and question the rural area's political records in Zaire in order to find out the hidden agenda of the state's agricultural and rural development policy. These records indicate that the rural area in Zaire has been an uncontrolled and unmastered socio political arena, characterized by revolutionary movements such as peasant uprisings, 'rebellions', political oppositions and state invasions, all, due to the state's inability to carry out national socio-economic development. It has been for the survival of the state, the maintainance and promotion of the strategic interests of the ruling class that an agricultural and rural development 222 policy was designed and has been implemented. Its objectives have been basically political, not socio economic. It has been a political mechanism of mobilization and control of the rural people to stop them from taking any political initiatives and actions conducive to social change. Even though the agricultural and rural sector received sufficient financial support, its probability of socio-economic development remains very limited, given the incompatibility of the socialistic socio-political superstructure and the capitalistic economic infrastructure. The research has equally demonstrated the relationship between development policy in post-1965 Zaire and some principles of metaphysics, notably the principle of identity in the non differentiation of phenomena, the principle of isolation of social phenomena, and the principle of opposition of contrary phenomena (see Chapter Six). The use of these principles brings more confusion to the underdevelopment issues in post-1965 Zaire. It hides the social class dimension which characterizes agricultural policy and rural development in favor of the ruling class in post-1965 Zaire. A critique has been made about the functions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and more important, their collaboration with the state in Zaire in the name of the development of the poor. Since this 223 collaboration has severe implications for the poor, these financial institutions should go directly to them and assist them in what they have been doing, instead of trying to reach them through the debatable state apparatus. This is critical if these financial institutions wish to save their credibility in developing countries in general and in Zaire in particular. Concerning therapeutic suggestions and recommendations, I would rather leave them open. Nevertheless, I urge, knowing the state as the major cause of the failure of development in Zaire, that it be handled by all Zaireans, without distinction of tribes, ethnic groups, regions or gender, as well as by international communities which are interested in the improvement of the living conditions in Zaire. This task of alliance and united front therefore goes further than bringing about a change in government, as proposed by Ngunza Karl-i-Bond, with the superstructure remaining intact as it is. What is most important at this juncture is a fundamental transformation of state and political relations in favor of popular forces composed of peasants, wage workers and organic intellectuals, in such a way as has never been the case before. This is the number one priority, and a minimum achievement without which there is considerable doubt as to whether post-1965 Zaire can proceed beyond its present stage of national and rural socio-economic underdevelopment. 224 However, if the objective of the alliance and united front is other than this, then the outcome will be, as correctly pointed out by Clive Y. Thomas, a coup, military or otherwise, as has been frequently the case in Africa, with no changes of substance.185 The mastery of the state and the resolution of the internal contradictions within it is the sine qua non for a grass roots socio-economic development in Zaire. The next fundamental priority should be the determination, in a democratic manner, of the appropriate socio-economic sector most conducive to national socio economic development. This sector may be agriculture, mining, or others, depending on the needs, interests and aspirations of the people, as well as the socio-political conjuncture in place. Continuing the present treatment by asking for the increase of agricultural expenditures, availability and use of credits to and by farmers, crops' transportation, improving markets and price policies, as well as the number and quality of personnel, is perpetuating a "dialogue of deafs".1"6 This has been tried on several occasions and has failed because previous diagnoses, even if correct, were 18"Clive Y. Thomas, Op. cit., 130. 186"A dialogue of deafs" is a type of conversation, in which interlocutors do not understand one another. It is an unproductive conversation, in which two or more people are involved and leave, each, with his own ideas. 225 incomplete. The rural area in Zaire cannot develop in an independent and isolated manner from the national context in which it is an integral part. There is the necessity of the mastery of the state as the general and first step in the development process. Given the delicate situation in which rural people find themselves in Zaire, as well as the macro-micro focus of this study, there is a necessity to encourage the development of microstrategies, which have been productive and have been providing them with some income. At the same time, one must be very cautious with whatever development initiatives and policies which the state would undertake on their behalf. The Zairean masses, especially rural people, should remember, in light of the dialectic of the relation between the master and his slaves, that if they are treated in the eve of the twenty-first century like slaves, this is because they accept the system and structures which generate this type of social relations. They are the ones who can decide the continuation or the end of this type of relations. In summation, this study on post-1965 Zaire has shed new light on the theories of the state and agricultural and rural development in developing countries. 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