MASTER'S THESIS M-590
TRUMPS, Shirly Ray. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS CAUSING THE KATANGA-CONGO SPLIT.
The American University, M.A., 1964 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan AN ANALÎSIS OF THE FACTORS
CAUSING THE KATANGA-CONGO SPLIT
A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of the School of International Service
The American U niversity
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts In Area Studies
Committee' a signature r Chairman by C S h irly R^1 Trumps
Dates November 1963 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MAR 2 3 1CS4
. r WASHINGTON. P,■o TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER P'^GE
I . INTRODUCTION...... 1
Statement of the problem ...... 3
purpose of the th e sis ...... 5
I I . BACKGROUND OF THE CONGO CRISIS...... 6
I I I . THE PHYSIOGRAPHIC FACTORS...... 34
G e n e r a l...... 34
Size and Location 35
B ou nd aries ...... 36
C lim a t e ...... 37
M in era ls...... 37
A n a ly s is...... 38
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHIC " f a c t o r s ...... ^
G e n e r a l...... 40
Population figures ...... 41
Population groups ...... 42
Population trends ...... 43
A n a ly sis...... 43
V, THE HISTORICAL FACTORS...... 45
G e n e r a l...... 45
Ancient Congolese Monarchies ...... 46
Empires of the Congo ...... 48
The Congo Free State ...... , 50
11 CHAPTER PAGE
A nalysis ...... 53
V I. THE ECONOMIC FACTORS...... 56
General ...... 56
Union M inière du HautKa ta n g a...... 59
A n a ly s is...... 63
V II. THE POLITICAL FACTORS...... 66
G e n e r a l...... 66
Political parties ...... 68
A n aly sis ...... 92
V III. THE SOCIO-GULTÜRAL FACTORS...... 98
G e n e r a l...... 98
Policy of Liberalism and paternalism ...... 100
Education and Religion...... 103
Urbanization ...... 106
A nalysis ...... I l l
IX. THE MILITARY FACTORS...... 114
G e n e r a l...... 114
Force publique...... 114
A n aly sis ...... 119
X, CONCLUSIONS...... 121
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 125
111 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
P rio r to World War I I the Congo was v ir tu a lly is o la te d from the rest of Africa and appeared to be happy under the rule of the Belgians,
AS a result of World War II the isolation barrier of the Congo was bro ken. Congolese were coining into contact with other African troops who had served in Egypt, the Middle East and Burma, and were learning of the outside world. In the Congo itself the Congolese had the opportu nity to observe the American Negro soldier being treated as an equal to his white counterpart.
By the end of World War II the elites, the racial separation policy of the Belgian Government, individual European settlers, and the vast movement fo r independence which was beginning to emerge throughout co lonial Africa, threatened the colonial regime of the Congo,^
I t was a t th is time th a t voices could be heard in the Congo de manding changes and eventual independence. The f i r s t demands were fo r better economic and social conditions. Particularly, they desired as similation to European status. This desire for assimilation carried with it the desire for independence.
When the Belgians noticed that their * Paternalistic Policy* would not work in the Congo, the Government issued the Declaration of January
iRPth S lade, The Belgian Congo (London; Oxford U niversity press, 1961) p, 53, 13, 1959. This declaration was preceded by a message from King Baudouin of Belgium stating; "it was the firm intention, without undiscernable procrastination, but also without undue haste, to lead the Congolese population towards independence in prosperity and peace,
There were three widely different events which occurred outside
the Congo which can be considered as primary causes for the issuance of the Declaration of January 13, 195,9 on the part of the Belgians;
General de Gaulle's launching of the French community; the Brussels
World pair; and the first All-African people’s Conference in Accra.3
In August 1958, de Gaulle arrived in Brazzaville, on the opposite side to the Congo riv e r from L eopoldville, and gave the French Congo lese a choice between membership in the French Community as an auton omous republic, or complete independence. Two days after this speech, an influential group of Congolese forwarded a firm memorandum to the
Governor-General of the Congo firm ly s ta tin g th e ir demands fo r eventual complete independence,4
It was also during this period that prominent Congolese leaders were invited by the Belgian Government to attend the World Fair in
Belgium. It was there, for the first time, that Congolese leaders from a l l p a rts of the Congo found themselves in close and continuous association with each other, previously, they had little opportunity
^Ibid, p, 50.
^colin Legum, Congo D isaster (Baltim ore; Penguin Books, 1961) p. 54.
4lbid. of meeting and discussing ideas under the Belgian colonial regime in
the C ongo,3
finally, there was the third factor which preceded the Declaration
the A ii-A frican p e o p le 's conference in Accra on December 5, 1958. The
Belgian authorities placed no obstacles in the way of certain Congolese
leaders who had been invited to attend the conference, it was at the
Accra meeting that Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement National
Congolaise (MNC) made a full-blooded nationalist soeech committing the
MMC to full supoort for Accra's decision of immediate independence for
all African countries,
in January of 1960 representatives of the Belgian Government and
the Congolese political loaders met at Brussels at the Round T-ble
Conference to determine constitutional changes in the Congo. At this ccnierence it was announced on January 27, lOôO that independence for the Congo would begin on June 30, 1960,^
The Belgians were completely unurepared for the swiftness with which events had moved at the Round Table Cenference. The Belgians had never envisaged immediate independence. They believed that it was possible to achieve a peigian-Congolese Community. They also hoped, that their King might stiil be recognised as King of an independent
Congo, nfhy did the '’ei.^ians lose tl'e conference? The Belgians suf fered from self-deception, they could not bring themselves to believe
^ibid. p. 55.
^Ib id . D. 7 3 or to understand the extent of the Congolese op osition to their con
tinued rule, in addition, Belgium's political intelligence reported
what the Government wanted to hear. These intelligence reports tend
ed to show that the extremists demanding immediate independence were 7 in a small minority,
sovereignty was granted to the Congo on June 30, 1960 and the first few days of independence were peaceful. However, four days
later trouble started and tlie crisis of the Congo vjas launched on the
arena of world politics,
(pn July 11, I9 60 Moise Tshombe of Katanga province proclaimed the province an independent country and seceded from the Republic of the Congo.
Katanga'S secession from the Republic of the Congo and her pro clamation of independence presented the central government of the
Congo and the governments of the world with a serious problem. What is the right attitude to adopt when a small country with fewer than two million people presents a reasonable basis for independence? Are they entitled to expect automatic support from nations in the inter n a tio n al Community? when is p a rtitio n ju s tif ia b le ? When is i t de s ira b le ?
There are no set answers to these questions. However, in the three- power reso lu tio n adopted by the se cu rity co u n cil on November 24,
1961 it completely rejected the claim of Katanga as a sovereign
7Ibid. p, 74 independent nation. This resolution clearly denied the provincial
authorities of Katanga the right of self-determination. The principle
of self-determination generally refers to the right of people to de
termine their own destiny, but there are no legal criteria to determine
which people may legitim ately claim that righ t. There are no uni
versally accepted standards which mark the measure of freedom a group 8 may enjoy.
It is the purpose of this thesis to determine and analyze the
major factors underlying the secession of Katanga and to determine
where the blame lies for the c^ngo crisis,
TO place the thesis in proper prospective i have used chapter ij
to present background data on the congo during the period June 1960
to January 1963.
®Rene Temarchand, "limits of Self-Determination; Katanga," The APGrican p o litic a l science Review. (june, 1962) p. 404 CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE CONGO CRISIS
on June 17, 1960 the first elected parliament of the Congo met in Leopoldville for the purpose of electing an heir to the Belgian ruler. The heir apparent, Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement
National Congolaise (MNC) which favored a highly centralized, unified
Congo state, negotiated with patience and skill to organize a coali tion government. In the midst of these negotiations the Belgian Min ister, Walter Ganshof van Meersch, decided to offer to Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the A lliance Des Bakongo (ABAKO) the task of forming the government, Kasavubu was the only Congolese leader who had refused to negotiate with Lumumba, when Kasuvubu's efforts also failed, both
Lumumba and Kasavubu were persuaded by leaders of other African states, including Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana, to settle their differences and to form a government. After much maneuvering, Kasavubu accepted the office of
President while Lumumba became Prime Minister, The new government was shaky from the start. It was essentially nothing more than a coali tion of rivals who united together for the sole purpose of speeding up the date of independence, as they feared the country might disin te g ra te before i t became a s ta te .
Independence was finally achieved on June 30, 1960 at a ceremony in the Palace of Nations, built as the residence of the Governor-
General, before a group of Congolese Parliam entary members and pro vincial representatives, Belgian Parliamentary delegations, and dip- loraatic representatives. King Baudouin spoke first giving credit to the Belgians who since the time of Leopold II had devoted their ser vice to the development of the Congo, He spoke of the dangers arising from the administrative inexperience, tribal hostilities and foreign intervention. He cautioned against undue hate and encouraged the
Congolese to use Belgian technicians and administrative assistance.^
Kasavubu, following King Baudouin, praised the Congolese who had supported the independence movement and had fought fo r the ideals of freedom and liberty. He also commended the Belgians for their contribution to the development of the Congo and fo r the wisdom "not to oppose the course of history," and called for national unity,^
After these two addresses, Lumumba, who was apparently annoyed by the paternalistic tone in King Baudouin*s speech as well as by several last-minute clashes with Belgian officials during the pre ceding days, presented a speech in which he reminded the Congolese of the many humiliating forms of racial discrimination used against them in their long period of colonialism, and told them that, al though independence was being received in amity with Belgium, no
Congolese should ever forget that it had been won "by an indispensable
^Area Handbook f o r the Republic of the Congo (L eopoldville). Prepared by Foreign Areas studies Division, Special Operations Research office, The American University, Washington, d,C. June 1962, pp. 344-345,
2lbid, p. 345, war to put an end to the humiliating slavery imposed on us by force,"
He concluded by calling on the Congolese to work in unity, accepting the cooperation of the Belgium, towards peace and the establishment of prosperity.3
This speech of Lumumba aroused a storm of protest when published in Belgium and intensified the fear of the Belgians in the Congo who were anxious about their safety in a Congo run by the Congolese,4
In the first few days of independence the new government faced several immediate and major difficulties. Most of the Congolese throughout the country had often taken literally the political lead ers promises of material benefits to come with independence and their hopes were encouraged by the action of Parliament, who as one of their first actions voted themselves an increase in salary. Administration was disrupted as new ministers sought to understand their jobs and to work out procedures with the Belgian technicians and advisers. The
European community was becoming increasing alarmed over the number of outbreaks of anti-European feeling.^
The first incident of a serious nature came on July 4th when the Belgian officers at Camp Hardy near Leopoldville were threatened by members of the Force Publique. They broke into the armory and
3ibid.
4ibid.
^Ibid. helped themselves to arms and ammunitions. During the next few days
there were reported accounts of rapes and beating of Belgian civilians
and fighting between various tribes in the Congo,^
By July 7 the Force Publique was in mutiny and political author
ity and law quickly broke down. Alarmed at the extent and violence of the revolt thousands of Belgians began a frantic exodus from
Leopoldville to Brazzaville in the neighboring Republic of the Congo, on July 8 the Belgian Government decided to send paratroop rein forcements to the Congo and on July 10th and 11th Belgian paratroooers
landed in Luluabourg, Blisabethville and Leopoldville.? This action on the part of the Belgian Government was immediately interpreted by
the Congolese as an attempt by them to resume control of the Congo.
This resulted in even greater violence against the Belgians.&
on 11 Ju ly P resident Moise Tshombe of Katanga province, noting the deteriorating conditions in the Congo, proclaimed that province an independent country and requested additional Belgian forces to maintain order, shortly thereafter Union Minière, the great Belgian financial organization in the Congo, diverted the taxes formerly paid to the central Government to the provisional government in
^Legum, op. c it. pp. 108-109,
7Area Handbook, op. c it. p. 347.
^Legum, op. cit. p. 110. Blisabethville,^
With the secession of Katanga and the mass exodus of the Belgians, who were for the most part responsible for the maintenance of the ad ministration, technical facilities and health services, the Congo faced a complete breakdown of its social and economic organization.
Confronted with a situation beyond its control, the Congo government looked abroad for assistance, on the same day as the Katanga secession the Congolese government approached the United states ambassador with a request for troops. The ambassador replied that he was sure his government would take the position that any aid should come through the United Nations and the request was transmitted to the Secretary-
General by the United states Secretary of State.10
On 12 July, the president and the prime Minister of the Congo cabled the Secretary-General asking for the "urgent dispatch by the
United Nations of military assistance."H
Lumumba and Kasavubu in the message accused the Belgian government of conspiring with a small group of Katangese leaders in preparing the secession of the province. The Leopoldville leaders stressed that
"the essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external
^King Gordon, UN in the Congo, A quest for Peace (Carnegie Endowment fo r In te rn a tio n a l peace, 1962) p. 14 and 33,
lOlb id . p. 15.
lllbid. p. 15.
10 aggression which is a threat to international p e a c e , '*12 ^ further cable from Kasavubu and Lumumba on 13 July stated that military
assistance was needed, not to restore the internal situation but
rather to protect Congolese territory, and warned that if the United
Nations aid was not forthcoming the Congo Government would have to appeal to the Bandung Treaty powers. They also indicated to the
Soviet Union on July 14 that they might be forced to request Soviet intervention if the West did not stop its "aggression" against the
Congo,13
The Security Council resolutiono f Ju ly 14, 1960 responding to the Congolese Government's request for aid against "Belgian aggression," was the basis for united Nations action. According to the resolution, the Security Council;
1, Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;
2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the nec essary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese
Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government,
Insecurity Council official Records (SCOR): 15th Yr., Suppl, for July, Aug., and Sept. 19 60 (S/4382, I),
l^Gordon, op. cit. p, 16.
11 to meet f u lly th e ir t a s k , ^4
This resolution caused a major conflict between Lumumba and
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, Lumumba desired and requested
United Nations military assistance to force the end of the secession of Katanga but the Secretary-General refused stating that the UN Force would not be authorized to action beyond self-d e fen se . He fu rth e r stated that they may not take any action which would make them a party to internal conflicts in the c o u n t r y ,
Lumumba, faced with the United Nations resolution, the recent secession of South Kasai in addition to Katanga's secession, and his growing opposition in the government, decided in late August 1960 to
accept equipment and supplies from the SovietU n i o n . 16
The decision to accept Soviet aid in order to attack the secession i s t areas brought to a head the issue of Communist influence and led
Kasavubu, on September 5, 1960 to announce the dismissal of Lumumba and the appointment of Joseph Ileo, the leader of the rival coalition before independence as his replacement. Lumumba refused to relinquish his position and went on the radio denouncing the president's action and proclaiming the Kasavubu was no longer chief of state. He called on the people, the workers and the army to rise,17
14^rea Handbook, op_, c it. p, 352,
l ^ Ib id . 352.
^^Ibid. p. 360.
17cordon, op, cit. p. 53.
12 parliament refused to confirm the dismissal of either Lumumba
or Kasavubu and sought to effect a reconciliation between them. These
attempts were unsuccessful and on genteinber 14, 1960 Colonel Joseph
Mobutu assumed power in order to "neutralize" both Lumumba and Kasavubu,
The coup d'etat was directed principally against Lumumba, Among
Mobutu's first acts were an ultimatum demanding the departure of
Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel within 48 hours. He announced that
government departments were to be run by a College of Commissioners
made up of recent u n iv e rsity graduates, students and a few members
of Lumumba's c ab in e t, headed by J u stin Bomboko,^®
With the eclipse of Lumumba, Kasavubu remained as president.
For the Western powers, the Mobutu-Kasavubu government appeared
to be a welcome change from Lumumba, The West pressed the United
Nations to recognize the new "government" so as to build up its pres
tige both in the Congo and in the international community,!^
In the meanwhile, Lumumba who had been placed under United Nations' protection, eluded his protectors and attempted to join his supporters who had seized power in Stanleyville, where Antoine Gizenga, a vice
prem ier in Lumumba's dism issed cab in et, had declared him self Prem ier of the Congo. Lumumba was captured before he could reach Stanleyville
and was imprisoned in Thysville on 3 December 1960 by Mobutu's forces,^0
Area Handbook, op. c it, p. 362.
^^Gordon, op. cit. p. 57.
20(3ordon, op. cit, p. 86.
13 on 18 January 1961 Patrice Lumumba and two parliamentary associates were transferred from Thysville to Blisabethville under orders of
Kasavubu. it had been suggested that Lumumba's influence with the
Camp Hardy garrison was great and since the garrison has shown mutinous tendencies it was thought better to have Lumumba out of the way. He was flown by DC-4 Air Congo aircraft, accompanied by a detail of soldiers, and those who saw him at the Blisabethville airport stated that he and his companions were in pitiful state and showed signs of having been badly beaten.
on 11 February Godefroid Munongo, Tshombe's M inister of the
Interior, announced that Lumumba and his companions had escaped and three days later he reported that they had been killed by villagers of an unnamed v i l l a g e . E v i d e n c e found by a United Nations inves tigation commission indicated that the men had been killed shortly after their arrival in Blisabethville, probably in the presence of
Katangese authorities.^3
The rep o rt of Lumumba's death in February 1961 plunged the Congo once more into internal strife with the possibility of all out civil war. At this time there were four separate authorities, each with a su b sta n tia l armed fo rce , contending f o r power in the Congo. The
Kasavubu-Mobutu group consisting of approximately 7,500 troops; the
^^Ibid. p, 95.
33ibid. pp. 95-96,
^^security Council official Records (SCOR): 16th Year, supplement for Oct., Nov,, and Dec,, 1961 (S/4976).
14 Gizenga group consisting of approximately 7,000 troops; the Tshombe
group consisting of approximately 5,000 troops; and the Kalonji group
with approximately 3,000 troops.^4
In an attempt to check the trend towards anarchy the Security
Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution on February 21,
1961 that marked a new beginning for the United Nations, The resolu
tion gave the United Nations force much greater authority to prevent
civil war and stated clearly that the United Nations required the
removal of foreign personnel attached to the various Congo governments
as well as those directly responsible to Brussels,
The security council's resolution urged the following:
1. That the united Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force if necessary, in the last resort;
2. That measures be taken for the immediate with draw! and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations command, and mercenaries;
3. That Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo,
24us State Department, "The Republic of the Congo," (Washington D.C.; January ^4, 1962) p, 6 (Mimeographed),
^^Area Handbook for the Republic of the Congo, op, cit. p. 369,
15 4, That an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstance of the death of Mr, Lumumba and his colleagues and the perpetrators of these crimes be punished,
This new mandate of the United Nations had the effect of bring- 27 ing three of the rival groups together, Kasavubu, Tshombe and Kalonji,
on March 3, 1961 representatives of the three groups met in
Tananarive, Malgache Republic, All that this conference could do was merely to try to temper some of the more secessionist tendencies.
The conference confirmed the military pact between Kasavubu, Kalonji, and Tshombe but rejected as inapplicable the United Nations resolution of February 21 claiming that this was a violation of their sovereignty.
However, the conference affirmed that the Congo would continue to coop erate with the United Nations provided its sovereign rights were re spected. The delegates at the Conference also agreed to form a con federation of autonomous states organized along tribal lines, with
Kasavubu as chief of state,
The Tananarive conference was a political capitulation to
Katanga’s positions as a result of the threatening power of Stanley- 29 ville and opposition to the United Nations, Almost immediately
3Ggecurity Council official Records (SCOR): 16th Year, Suppl. for Jan, Feb, and Mar. 1961 (S/47 41).
^^Area Handbook, op^. c it, p, 370, pO Gordon, op, c i t . pp. 114-116,
Z^ibid,
16 after the agreement of Tananarive the majority of the delegates be gan to develop skepticism and the agreements failed to materialize.
Another attempt at reunification of the country was made at the
Coquilhatville (23 April - 28 May 1961), This reunification attempt also f a ile d and Tshombe was a rre ste d and held fo r two months because he refused to accept the decisions for a more centralized administra tio n of the Congo. Tshombe was released on June 22nd a f te r promising to reunite Katanga with the Congo. After his release and return to
Katanga, Tshombe declared the agreements he made were purely economic and refused to attend the parliamentary meeting in Leopoldville during
July 1961.2°
The parliamentary meeting in Leopoldville resulted in the forma tion of the Government under prime Minister Adoula, Antoine Gizenga, chief of the Soviet-bloc supported government in Stanleyville, became the First Vice Premier in the new Government, With the exception of
South Katanga, all other provinces were thus effectively represented and participated in the new government,21
on 13 September 1961 the United Nations troops in Katanga attempt ed a military coup in Katanga for the purpose of deporting all mercen aries out of the province. The coup was unsuccessful. On October 14th,
1961 a c e a se -fire was e sta b lish e d and r a tif i e d on October 24th by the united Nations Secretariat.23
^°Ibid. p. 117,
2lus State Department "The Republic of the Congo", op, c it., p.7.
32Area Handbook, op. c i t . , pp. 377-380.
17 The c e a s e -fire la ste d u n til December 5th, 1961 when the U nited
Nations troops again attacked Blisabethville, This time the United
Nations forces were successful in sacking the city and Tshombe was forced to meet with premier Adoula in Kitona, The Kitona agreement was signed and later ratified in principle by the Katanga assembly.
The K itona Agreement reads as follow s
"The President of the province of Katanga
1, Accepts the application of the loi fondamentale of May 19, 1960.
2, Recognizes the indivisible unity of the Republic of the Congo.
3, Recognizes president Kasavubu as chief of state,
4, Recognizes the authority of the central Government over all parts of the Republic.
5, Agrees to the participation of representatives of the Province of Katanga in a government commission to prepare a new c o n s titu tio n .
6, Agrees to take all measures to permit senators and depu ties of Katanga Province to exercise the national func tions (that is, to sit in the national legislature).
7.. Agrees that the gendarmerie of Katanga shall be placed under the authority of the president of the Republic.
8. Agrees to sec that the resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly are respected and to facilitate their execution."23
A fter the Kitona Agreement, Tshombe appeared to s t a l l f o r time
23gmith Herapstone, Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends (New York; Frederick a , Praeger, 1962) p. 211.
18 acting on the alleged assumption that the United Nations would run
out of funds and withdraw from the Congo before it had successfully
ended Katanga's secession.
In January 1962 the Chamber of Deputies voted to demand Gizenga's
return to Leopoldville to answer charges of secessionist activities.
Although Gizenga was named First Vice-Prime Minister in the Adoula
Government in July 1961 he had chosen to retain his control over the eastern provinces rather than assume his position in the national govern ment. After attempting in vain to avoid the charges he reported to
Leopoldville where he was detained while the government prepared its case against him.
In August 1962, Secretary-General U. Thant, who had replaced
Dag Hammarskjold on his death on September 18, 1961, submitted an
integration proposal to settle the Katanga-Congoc r i s i s , 24
The first phase of this proposal provided for a 50-50 split of a l l taxes, d u ties and mining ro y a ltie s between the c e n tra l Government and Katanga and the setting up of a Congo monetary council to control all foreign exchange. The Secretary-General also proposed the reuni fication of the Katanga and central government armies within two months.
If the first phase failed, the second phase called for a trade ban with particular emphasis on Katanga copper and cobalt.
The third phase provided the authorization of the UN Command to
24"congo" The African Digest (October 1962) pp. 39-40,
19 seek by all means necessary the reunification of the Congo,
In his proposal Secretary General U. Thant stated the alternative
choice that if progress did not come quickly, the UN Command might
withdraw from the Congo.
on August 26, 1962 the Congo Central Government announced its
approval of the proposal, on September 4, 1962, only a few hours be
fore the expiration of the UN time limit Tshombe gave his agreement
to the proposal,
on September 5, 1962 the Secretary General notified both Adoula
and Tshombe th a t the proposal had been accepted and th a t the UN ex
pected the following steps to be t a k e n ; 2 5
(1) The central government and the Katangese authorities would
cease all resort to force and halt all troop movements in Katanga
Province,
(2) All pretentions to the secession of Katanga from the Repub
lic of the Congo were to be abandoned.
(3) The parties would undertake, without delay, implementation of the UN proposal, and the UN would provide assistance.
(4) The implementation measures would be guided by the provisions
of the plan itself.
At the time of Tshombe's approval of the proposal he offered two million dollars towards making good on Secretary General U, Thant's proposal, which represented about one-third of Katanga's monthly revenue
22ibid,
20 from its fabulous copper and cobalt exports. This was the first con
crete move towards making good on the proposal; however, Tshombe made
no further step towards reconciliation, in fact, Tshombe refused to
send a representative to Leopoldville during the week of October 14th,
1962 when Premier Adoula submitted a draft of the new constitution of
the other five provinces of the Congo. In addition, Tshombe's delegates
hamstrung the Blisabethville talks on integration of the national and
Katanganese currency and armed forces. However, Tshombe agreed to a
cease fire and the reopening of the Lubilah railway bridge. With the
reopening of the bridge, Katanga's mineral deposits could now be ex ported down the Congo river to the Atlantic port of Matadi, where the
Central Government was free to collect the required taxes. While
Tshombe made these gestures, reports emanating from the Congo revealed
th at he had imported more foreign m ercenaries to b o lste r his troops and dispatched bombing missions to the northern section of Katanga province which was nhysically and politically out of his control,
The gradual build-up of armed forces in Katanga, including the stationing of three British-made Vampire jet pursuit planes with rockets at Kolwezi, gave the appearance that Tshombe was preparing to make a last desperate bid to maintain the independence of Katanga,
During the period QC-tober-November 1962, united Nations intelligence sources reported that in the Katanga area there were between 20,000
2^Varren Unna. "US Fears outbreak of New war in the Congo," The Washington Post, October 20, 19 62,
21 and 30,000 K^tanganese forces and some 500 mercenaries consisting of
Belgians, Rhodesians, south Africans, former French secret Army organi zation officers, Greeks, and Italians who were attracted by the high 37 pay offered by Tshombe*
S tra teg ists of the secessio n ist Katanga province now appeared to be debating when, rather than whether, to provoke a major clash for a showdown with the forces trying to unite the country, some advisors of Katanga'S president TShombe desired to postpone any military activity until Indian troops, who formed approximately 40 per cent of the 15,000 united Nations forces in the Cnngc, went home to fie h t in the border war against China, Tshombe's advisors argued that if the Indian troops were not replaced, the united Nations might either c a ll on troops from other major nations contributing finaneiaiiv to the ccngc ooeraticns or withdraw its military forces except for a small training detachment for the Congolese army and it is believed that either course would weaken Tshombe's chances for success,
some of Tshombe's strategists believed that it was better for
Tshombe to fight the present united Nations Congo force than fight, perhaps, a new united Naticns force consisting of troops of a major power.
^^Russell Howe, "Tshombe readies U'Sperae pffrrt to Retain crumbling c^ngo," T^e Washington post, November 16, 1962. pp, 1 8.
^^Russeli HOwe, "Katangese seen weighing tine of showdown," The Washington post, November 17, 1962. p. A-i^
22 If the UN forces were withdrawn from the Congo the probable al ternative facing TShombe would be to submit to an eventual battle with the central Congolese Army, who could be expected to get their training and military equipment from all sides - the east, the west and other African states, especially from the united Arab Republic and Algeria.
The Congolese Array, formerly a great source of disorder was be ginning to emerge as the government's main weapon and possible bul wark for the Congo,
On November 15th, 1962 the u n ited Nations announced th a t Secretary
General U. Thant was to summon his twenty nation Congo Advisory Com mittee within a few days to formulate strategy for ending Katanga's secession and reuniting the Congo under a new federal constitution, informed sources reported that the advisory committee meeting would be a 'showdown* session and that U. Thant felt that it was time to take action. The pressure for a quick settlement was partly due to the financial problems of the united Nations and the upkeep of the
15,000 UN force costing approximately 10 million dollars a month,
During the l a t t e r p a rt of November 1962, US S tate Department officials feared that premier cyriH Adoula of the central Congolese
Government, under heavy pressure from extremists in his own party was about to inform the United Nations and the United states that he could no longer wait for peaceful mediation with Tshombe, It was generally
S^News Item in the Washington Post, November 16, 1962,
23 believed that Adoula would turn to the militant powers in Africa -
A lgeria and Ghana, and perhaps the United Arab Republic, and ask them for help, if this were to occur it was believed that the moderate
nations of Africa such as Nigeria would then summon home their United
Nations troops stationed in the Congo. The Soviet Union had already
let it be known thnt they would be glad to offer help to the Adoula
Government, if Adoula were thus armed to put down Katanga, Tshombe might well then become allied with such colonial powers as Portugal,
Rhodesia and South Africa - "The Unholy Alliance." The battle lines could be drawn not ju s t between Katanga and the re st of the Congo, but between the Congo and the white supremacists in the southern part of the co n tin en t. This would then place Tshombe as the vanguard of the whites, do-or-die resistance in Africa.
AS the Katanga-Congo crisis entered into its last phases many of the myths of Katanga remained unexplained. It was known that
Tshombe had a very e ffe c tiv e propaganda machine both at home and a- broad, Tshombe’s supposedly friendly attitude towards the West had often been stressed by Katanga's propagandist, yet the record indi cated that he had consistently been against the United Nations and the
United States; that he had requested recognition from Moscow; that he had sought markets for his copper in Czechoslavakia; and that the only politician he had agreed to work with during 1961 had been Antoine
Gizenga, the Marxist former First Deputy premier of the Congo who was
^^News item in the Washington post, November 16, 1962.
24 put in prison for crimes against the states. Tshombe is reported to have protested vigorously against the arrest of Gizenga and of former
interior Minister, Christophe Gbenye, another leftist who heads the late Patrice Lumumba’s old party the MNC.'*^
United Nations officials during this period were agreed that the h a ltin g of the fig h tin g in Katanga, in December 1961 because of planned talks between premier Adoula and Tshombe was a costly mistake. Since that time the United Nations has been hesitant to use its troops and the opportunity for moral blackmail by the Congo's warring factions has become greater. It was now apparent that Tshombe used the united
Nations to preserve the independence of Katanga, Tshombe was always more than willing to take part in talks, to sign any agreement and to make any promises as long as they benefited Tshombe, In his opin ion words and signatures cost little ,^2
Adoula, as the leader of the Congo, also used his position as a shelter behind the United Nations and has refused on occasions those elements of conciliation necessary in negotiations with a leader like
Tshombe.
United Nations official Robert Gardiner, who in the past year has probably done more than anyone else towards peace in the Congo stated the following; "We in the United Nations are doing all the negotiations,
Neither Adoula nor Tshombe negotiate at all. We cannot go on like this
4lNews item in the Washington p o s t, November 18, 1962.
^%ews item in the Washington post, November 20, 1962.
25 indef initely",
By the latter part of November 1962, it became apparent that the
Congo c r is is was about to explode. This was indicated by the follow ing;
(1) The government of Congolese premier Cyrill Adoula was de feated on two key issues before the chamber of Deputies in Leopoldville on November 23, 1962.
(2) US Ambassador Edmund A. Guillon was summoned back to Wash ington on Thanksgiving week to advise the Administration of the crisis.
(3) The Central Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko hurried to Washington to ta lk with Secretary of S tate Dean Rusk.
(4) Belgian Foreign Minister paul Henri Spaak, under severe pres sure from his country’s financial interests to prevent any toughening of the UN pressures on Katanga, was closeted with Secretary General
U. Thant on November 25th. The follow ing day President Kennedy and the Belgian Foreign Minister issued a surprisingly strong joint com munique indicating that the United States was enlisting the support of its European allies for a united Nations crackdown on the Congo’s secessionist province of Katanga.
on November 29, 1962 prem ier Adoula survived an opposition attempt to bring down his government. The storm against the Adoula government arose the week before, when the lower house demanded the release of four members arrested in connection with an alleged secessionist plot;
as well as the end of a presidential state-of-emergency ordinance
43washington Post, Ibid.
26 introduced in Leopoldville to combat gangsterism. The ordinance was
resented by the AÜiance des gakongo political party which is strong in the Leopoldville area.
The opposition consisted of such people as former premier Ileo, jean golikango, Tshombe and followers of the jailed leftist former ministers Christophe Gbenye and Antoine Gizenga, Many of the speak ers who attacked Adoula stressed that they had nothing against Adoula personally but were opposed to the 'Binza Group' which they claimed was a super-government. The Binza Group consists of president Kasavubu;
Foreign M in ister j u s t in Bomboko; Army Commander, General Joseph Mobuto;
Security chief victor Nendaka; and their close political allies. The op )Osition accused the Adoula regime of turning a blind eye to what it called large scale embezzlement of public funds, failure to solve the Katanga problem, the arbitrary arrest of parliamentarians, failure to deal with the economic plight, failure to work with parliament in drawing up the text of the new draft federal constitution, departure from the avowed foreign policy of non-alignment, and failure to halt alleged widespread smuggling of gold and diamonds,
just prior to the censure vote, and just before the debate, the four members who had been previously arrested were freed, included in the four were Lumumba's party chief Christophe Gbenye and a former minister of Mines, Edmond Rudachindiva,
The motion of censure a g a in st the government received 50 v o tes
44jjews item in the Washington post, November 29, 1962,
27 in the Congolese Lower House, 16 short of the required two-thirds majority. Adoula obtained 47 votes. Although the vote left him a minority in the Lower House, he was not obliged to resign, Adoula was surprised at the vote because many of the persons who voted for him had c ritic iz e d him strongly during the debates on the censure motion,
on November 29, 1962 United Nations Secretary-G eneral U, Thant ordered his chief military adviser. Brigadier General Indar Jit Rikhye, to fly to Leopoldville with Robert Gardiner, officer in charge of the united Nations operations in the Congo,
The purpose of the dispatch of Rikhye and Gardiner was to initiate an immediate action program. The program called for implementation of the second phase of U. Thant's proposal which would impose tough econ omic sanctions against Katanga province if its leader, Moise Tshombe, did not immediately implement the reconciliation plan first outlined by the united Nations in August of 1962.
Since Tshombe bad not complied with the program as outlined the way was now open for the following actions
(1) A demand fo r a world-wide embargo on imports of Katanga copper and c o b a lt.
(2) A blockade of Katanga exports and imports,
(3) A stoppage of air traffic to Katanga as well as the termina tion of telecommunications and postal services to the province.
^^News item in the Washington Post, December 5, 1962,
28 (4) Withdrawal of Belgian technicians from Katanga,
This second phase was never implemented because many countries
refused to support the embargo. The principle miscreants were the
British, who controlled a large share of Katanga's mines and two of
the three railroads leading out of Katanga; Portugal's provinces of
Ahgola and Mozambique; and the Republic of SouthA f r i c a , 46
on December 4, 1962 fig h tin g erupted in Katanga. The C entral
Congolese Array and a 1500 man Katanga garrison were reported to be fighting inside the north Katanga town of Kongolo, Reports from both
sides reaching the United Nations Headquarters reported that Kongolo was surrounded by troops loyal to the Central Government in Leopold ville, According to the initial reports the central Army detachments penetrated the town but were having difficulty dislodging the Katangese tro o p s ,47
on December 5, 1962 the c e n tra l Congolese Government claimed the capture of Kongolo, This victory helped to bolster the Adoula-
Leopoldville regime in the face of strong parlimentary opposition.
In mid-December, 1962 president Kennedy sent a m ilitary mission of eight US officers to the Congo to make an assessment of the seriously deteriorating situation. As a result of the mission the united states began to make preparations for the dispatch of military equipment to
4&Russell Howe, "Civil War in Congo seems inevitable Despite U.N, Efforts," The Washington post, December 7, 1962,
47 News item in the New York Times, December 6, 1962,
29 the Congo for the use of the united Nations forces,^
on December 27, 1962 the UN announced that they planned to move in strength against the secession of Katanga in late January. The UN hoped that by this announcement president Tshombe would accept UN term s.
The UN had moved freely in Elisabethville since the Kitona agree ment in December 1961, however, Tshombe remained in control of Kolwezi,
Jadotville and Kipushi. Kolwezi and jadotville are key Katanga mining centers which provided the vast riches once available to the entire
Congo. Kipushi controls the Katanga supply route into Northern Rhodesia.^9
On December 28, 1962 the Katanga p o lic e , ignoring cease f i r e o r ders, attacked UN forces with machine guns and mortor fire in Elisabeth ville, The UN retaliated and on December 30, 1962 victorious UN troops drove remnants of Tshombe’s army into the bush while UN Jet fire wiped out Tshombe’s air force.
on December 31, 1962 S ecretary General U* Thant warned Tshombe to n e g o tia te in te g ra tio n in to the Congo w ithin two weeks or face further UN action. Under U, Thant’s plan, accepted tentatively by both Tshombe and Adoula in the fall of 1962, stated that Katanga would rejoin the Congo which would have a decentralized federal constitution.
^^News item in the New York Times, December 27, 1962,
^^News item in the Washington post, December 28, 1962.
^^ews itemin the Washington post, January 1, 1963.
30 in his ultimatum to Tshombe, U* Thant called for the following
(1) Opening of talks in Leopoldville between the union Minière
and the central Government on the company's payment of 'a ll tax revenues'
to the Adoula Government, with the bank of Katanga’s representatives
attending the technical side of the talks,
(2) The dispatch of Tshombe’s senior gendarmerie officers to pay
allegiance to President Joseph Kasavubu and to restore unity to the
Congolese Army,
(3) An assurance from Tshombe of f u l l lib e r ty of movement fo r all united Nations personnel,
(4) Cooperation from Tshombe with the United Nations in devising a plan for the immediate elimination of all mercenaries from Katanga,
(5) Acceptance by Tshombe of the customs and immigration of the
Central Government in the pursuance of their functions in Katanga as elsewhere in the Congo,
on receiving the ultimatium, Tshombe requested for talks as he wanted to bargain on some of the terms spelled out to him by u, Thant,
U, Thant rejected his request,52
scattered fighting continued and by January 3, 1963 rebel Katanga forces had lost Elisabethville, Kipushi and Jadotville leaving only the stronghold of Kolwezi, the rail frontier town of Dilalo on the
Angolian border, and Sakania on the Rhodesian frontier, unlike the
^%ews item in the Washington post, January 1, 1963,
^^News item in the New York Times, January 3, 1963,
31 bitter fighting for Elisabethville of December 1961, the United Nations
military mission accomplished its aims with a minimum of damage,53
By January 7, 1963 the military takeover of Katanga by the UN
forces was nearing completion with only Kolwezi in the hands of Tshombe's
forces, AS the UN forces were moving against Kolwezi the Congolese
Central Government named secretary Francois Kalala of its public Ad
ministration Ministry as the administration boss of Katanga with the
mission of securing the economic and political victory for the govern
m ent,54
on January 17, 1963 Tshombe agreed to allow the UN to take con
tr o l of Kolwezi and a l l of Katanga province. The agreement was signed
by Tshombe and two rep resen tativ es of the UN,^^ The agreement pro vided fo r:
(1) UN entry into Kolwezi to be completed by January 20, 1963,
(2) immediate removal of all explosives in hydroelectric and mining facilities in Kolwezi, where sabotage and destruction had been
threatened,
(3) Disarming of Tshombe's gendarmerie, with the exception cf
the personal guard,
on January 20, 1963, UN troops moved into Kolwezi bringing to an
53 News item in the New York Times, January 4, 1963,
54News item in the New York Times, January 8, 1963,
^%ews item in the New York Times, January 18, 1963.
^^News item in the Washington post, January 18, 1963,
32 end the secession of Katanga. The central government appointed Joseph
Ileo, former Prime Minister, as the minister for Katanga,
33 CHAPTER III
THE PHYSIOGRAPHIC FACTORS
This chapter is an attempt to show how the physiographic factors of the Congo contributed to the Congo crisis and in particular to
the Katanga secession.
General. The Congo is lik e a l l of A frica, i t creates an illu s io n of unity and simplicity, but again similar to the rest of Africa its massiveness conceals its great complexities. When people hear the word 'Congo' they immediately think of the geographic features - sultry heat, forests, rain, rivers, rapids, savannas, etc, in reality the geographic features of the Congo are much more infinite and complex than these few terms.
First, there is the complexity of the landscape, one can travel by road for miles and miles over monotonous stretches of savannas be fore reaching forest lands and from the forest lands to the savannas again, yet the Congo has mountains, valleys, and great rivers which form an ever changing landscape.
Secondly, there is the complexity of climate, one's conception of an equatorial zone bordered by two tropical zones with well defined characteristics is a fallacy because many factors in the Congo modify this to easy a classification and create a multiciplicity of local clim ates.
Thirdly, there is the complexity of geological strata. The
Republic of the Congo rests on an ancient foundation mass which has
34 come into existence in the course of some three billion years, it is
composed of rocky strata that were deposited, displaced, dislocated,
shaken and fractured during the courses of the ages, chains of moun
tains, often complex in character were uplifted at first and then level
ed down again. Today the foundation mass of the Congo represents the
essential part of the mountainous rim circling the vast depressions
formed by the c e n tr a l basin of the Congo River over an area nearly
400,000 square miles. To this foundation with its various folds can
be traced most of the mineral wealth of the country.^
size and location. The Congo is situated in the center of the
African continent and occupies an area of 905,378 square miles,
approximately equal in size to that portion of the united States east
of the Mississippi River.^
one has only to look at a map of the Congo to understand the
separateness Katanga has from the rest of the Congo, First of all
we must appreciate the vast distances involved. From Leopoldville
to Elisabethville is farther than it is from paris to Prague, if it
were to be superimposed on a map of Europe, the Congo would blanket most of the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) countries,
Katanga itself is twice as large as west Germany, The navigable
reaches of the Congo River system, the arteries which tie together
^Belgian Congo, Volume i . (B russels; Belgian Congo and Ruanda- Urundi information and public Relations office, 1959) p. 16.
^"Country by Country Guide to Africa," Africa Report (November, 1961) p, 6.
35 the remainder of the Congo, reach towards Katanga like a giant hand
but do not reach it. Katanga's natural lines of communication lie to
the south and east rather than the west,^
Boundaries, in the Congo as in many parts of Africa political
boundaries do not correspond to natural, ethnic or economic boundaries.
For over three-quarters of a century, Katanga has been part of the
Congo. Modem Katanga fell within the general area recognized by the
1885 Berlin conference as Belgian King Leopold II's private domain.
Nevertheless, the great empire-builder Cecil Rhodes dreamed of linking
the B ritish African te r r it o r ie s from "Cape to C airo," and of joining
the vast Katangese mineral lode to the copper treasury of Rhodesia.
Agents of both Rhodes and Leopold's forces actively courted the power ful chief M 'Siri, whose kingdom occupied most of what is now Katanga,
and only a f te r Leopold's forces had conquered and slain M 'S iri in 1891 was the Belgian claim to Katanga secure.4
For administrative purposes the Belgians divided the Congo into six administrative provinces. Each province was further divided into districts and territories and these divisions did not necessarily correspond to ethnic groupings, in Katanga, which is geographically a part of the South African plateau, the area of mineral wealth is s p lit in h a lf, in 1960 and 1961 suggestions were made by both p o litic a l leaders of Katanga and Northern Rhodesia to join together to form a
^Hempstone, op, cit, p. 25.
^Gordon, op, cit. p. 32,
36 State whose boundaries conformed to the natural economic zone,^
Climate* There is no one set climate for the Congo. The climate varies according to whether one is on the equator, north or south of the equator, in the central basin, the mountainous regions in the eastern Congo or on the high Katanga ta b le -la n d s.
The monotony of high temperatures and high humidity in most of the Congo make the climate uncomfortable for Europeans, but there is no part of the country where European settlement is impossible. In
Katanga and among the mountain valleys and lakes of Kivu province, temperatures are generally lower and there is more seasonal variations than in the remainder of the Congo. This favorable climate in Katanga tends to foster a more energetic and dynamic people than the rest of the Congo. This climatic condition has influenced many of the people to feel that they are not really an integral part of the low, hot, and humid areas of the remainder of the Congo.
Minerals, For many years the exploitation of mineral resources was the chief objective of the Belgian Government. Tin was first worked in the northeast in 1905; copper mining started in Katanga in
1911; and diamond mining began in Kasai in 1913, In 1958 minerals accounted for two-thirds of the Congo's exports with Katanga by far furnishing the raost,^
Copper, the largest money-maker, was exploited long before the
Europeans came to open the mines. The green surface layers of Katanga
^Area Handbook, op_, c it,, p. 54.
^Ibid, p. 59.
37 had attracted the attention of Africans, who found the mineral useful in making coins for use in barter between Katanga chieftains, their 7 neighbors and the Arabs,
The copper content of Katanga ore is at least five times greater than that found in American ore. The two major centers of production are Lubumbashi, near Elisabethville, and Shituru, near Jadotville.
The chief cobalt-copper ore lodes are located in the Lolwezi region of Katanga.B
Katanga is tropical Africa's leading silver producer, in addition
Katanga produces uranium, zinc, tungsten, iron ore, coal, lithium, lead, diamonds, beryllium, cadmium, and germanium.
Although there are other areas of the Congo with mineral deposits none can compare w ith Katanga. The Congo without Katanga would be a poor country in spite of its plantations and small industry.
Analysis of the physiographic Factors and how they affected the Katanga-Congo split. In considering the physiographic factors it is important that the vast distances and areas involved be understood.
The Congo itself contains an area of some 905,000 square miles of which
Katanga comprises approximately 191,000 square miles. The distance from Leopoldville to Elisabethville is well over a thousand miles, and the greater part of this distance is covered by tropical forests, sav annas, mountains, gorges, rivers, etc., forming a difficult barrier to rail, land and water communications, Katanga is situated in the
7lbid.
^Ib id .
38 southeastern most part of the country and is to some extent isolated from the other provinces of the Congo, Because of this lack of com munication and isolation there has always existed a common animosity
among the Katanganese and the people of the remainder of the Congo,
It is also to be noted that the navigable reaches of the Congo River
system, the arteries that bind the rest of the Congo together, do not
extend into Katanga, making the shipment of mineral ore more profit
able through the Rhodesian and Angolan rail systems, in addition to
the great distances involved, the communication difficulties, and the
isolation of Katanga we find that it is a different type of land,
Katanga is high and cool containing vast areas of grassland and enormous mineral deposits, it has a much more invigorating climate than the majority of the other provinces and thus has a more energetic population, prom a physiographic point of view Katanga appears to have much closer ties to the Cop >erbelt of Northern Rhodesia than to the Congo,
39 CHAPTER IV
THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
General. Tbe Congo's population is of an essentially transition al nature characterized by the interaction of the two elements com posing it - The Whites and the Black. Between these two groups no colored race has developed as in many of the countries of Africa,
The reason for this is because there has never been a large-scale
European immigration to the Congo and because most of the government employees of the Belgian Government were married men and were accom panied by their families.
The European group, consisting of a small minority, constituted the fundamental cadre for the administrative and economic development of the country.
The African element, the majority of whom are Bantu, outnumber the w hites by approxim ately 140 to 1.
It was not until the end of the 19th century that European pene tration extended across the Congo but European settlement were mainly confined to a few trade and administrative centers. This penetration has profoundly changed the n atu re of both the Congo and i t s people.
Many of the Africans adopted and accepted pa rts of western culture while many preferred to follow the ancient traditions of tribal life.
This clevage in the native population had its effects on the demographic structure of the Congo, originally the rural population
40 was very unevenly distributed and even today one-fifth is scattered
through the ’bush country’ averaging about three inhabitants per square
mile; the other four-fifths are concentrated in specific areas, usually
near the larger cities giving these areas an average population density
of 30 to 60 inhabitants per square mile, with the establishment of
European cities many of the natives abandoned their rural tribal life
and flocked to the cities. This migration to the cities raises the
question of the equilibrium between the two factions of the native
population, in the Congo the equilibrium has been reached and with
more and more people flocking into the cities the policy of stability
in the rural areas is in serious jeopardy.^
population figures. Prior to independence the Congo had a total 2 3 population of approximately 13,600,000 of which approximately 118,000 were non-Africans,
The approximate population breakdown by provinces at the time of
independence was as fo llo w s;^
^Belgian Congo, Volume I I , published by the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Informatïon and PuFlic Relations office, Brussels 1959, p. 42,
^"Country by Country Guide to Africa," Africa Report (Nov, 1961) p . 6.
^"The Republic of the Congo" A Memographed a r tic le prepared by the US State Department dated Jan, 24, 1962.
^Belgian Congo, Volume II, published by the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and public Relations officer, Brussels, I960* p. 12,
41 Province African Natives Non-natives
Leopoldville 3,200,000 36,000
E quator 1,800,000 7,000
E astern 2,500,000 17,200
Kivu 2,260,000 14,700
Kasai 2,159,000 9,000
Katanga 1,650,000 35,600
population Groups. The European group which is composed of some
118,000 (includes approximately 1,500 Asians and 3600 mulattoes) of whom approximately four-fifths are Belgians, form the minority group.
In addition to the Belgians there are small foreign elements consisting of Portuguese, Greeks and Italians who devote themselves especially to commerce,^
The African group consisting of approximately 13,600,000 is com posed o f many eth n ic groups ( t r i b e s ) , in a l l in sta n c e s in the Congo there are two or more tribes residing in any one province and in many cases some tribes overlap into two or more provinces. This factor has led in some instances to open warfare between certain tribes. After independence this was particularly noted in the actions of the Lulua tribe of Kasai, who, caring little for education or the white settlers, attacked the Baluba of Kasai because of their economic advantage ob tained by working for the Europeans, At the same time the Baluba,
residents of Katanga, were being slaughtered in Katanga by the dominant
^Belgian Congo, Volume I, op, c it,, p, 41,
42 Luanda tribe because of their resentment to the Baluba for favoring
a united Congo,^
Population Trends. The migration of the native Africans to the
urban centers created a problem where in the rural areas the female
population exceeded the male, and in the urban areas the women were
too few in proportion to the men. This lack of balance may in seme way have affected the birth rate. It is very difficult to determine what had been the growth of the population during the late 19th and early
20th century but it appears to have been stationary. It probably re mained in this status because of slave traffic, disease and lack of virility. It is only in the past several years that accurate figures indicate that the population is growing at a rate of 1 per cent per year, however, it is showing trends to accelerate which indicates that by 1975 the A frican population could number some 15 m illio n .
Analysis of the Demographic Factors and how they affect the Katanga-
Congo split. The population disparity throughout the provinces of the Congo and the numerical importance and the economic status of the
White settler population has been one of the major determinants of the recurrent conflict between Katanga provisional authorities and the central government on the one hand, and among the provisional leaders on the other,®
^Legum, Op. C it, , pp. 66-67. 7 Belgian Congo, Volume I , Op, C it. pp. 43-44,
®Rene Lemarchand, Op, C it,, pp. 404-416,
43 Although Katanga was th e most th in ly populated area in the Congo
it had more jgu roue ans than any other province except Leopoldville
and had about 34 per cent of the total European population of the Congo,
of the 35,600 white population only 2,310^ were permanent settlers, the
rest were Belgian civil servants, industrialists, technicians, etc.
The absence of a numerous, homogeneous and permanently settled
European population was in a large measure an attempt by the Belgian
Government to insure control over the affairs of their former colony
The White settlers of Katanga became increasingly committed to
the idea of dominion status for the province. It was the desire of many that Katanga should be a distinct political entity administered
by a Governor-General appointed by the Belgian King,^^
The desires of the white settlers of Katanga, both temporary and permanent, as well as the Katanga Africans for independence was prompted by the feeling of animosity which they harbored towards the Congo and particularly the city of Leopoldville, This hostility became more intense as the economic growth of the province increased. The public expenditures in Katanga were so little when compared with the total contributions of its tax payments to the colonial revenues,
Considering the demographic factors together with the physiographic disparities of the Congo reveals suggestions as to why some people found an incentive to support separation of the Katanga from the rest of the
Congo,
^Ib id . p, 406 lOlbid, p. 408
lllbid. p, 409 44 CHAPTER V
THE HISTORICAL FACTORS
General. The history of the Congo, not only in the ancient past
but in the recent past has been shrouded in mystery. There are no
w ritte n chronicles o r la stin g monuments which reveal p a st events,
peoples or dynasties. There are only to be found a few rocks with
primitive carvings bearing witness to the ancient tribes of the past.
Historians differ on bow the Congo developed during the first
millenium, however, it is generally agreed that in the first millenium
groups of forerunners of the Bantu-speaking peoples who later dominated
the area began to arrive from the west and northwest (probably from the
region that is now the Cameroons and eastern Nigeria) to occupy the
western and southwestern areas of the present republic. S till later
groups, in increasing numbers from the first centuries A«D* on, and
in all likelihood representing the main body of the Bantu expansion
that took place throughout all of central and southern Africa, pene
trated the central Basin of the Congo River, absorbing or pushing
before them the earlier inhabitants of the area,^
Throughout the next four or five centuries other Bantu-speaking groups moved further eastward to the upland savannas. Some of these turned southward to occupy the present - day provinces of Kivu, Katanga and K asai.
^Area Handbook, op, c it,, p, 15,
45 These Bantu migrations, successive luid intermingled, continued on through the second millenium and were s till going on when, at the close of the 19th century the Europeans arrived and began the colon ization of Africa, It can be said that the arrival of the Europeans 2 in Africa put an end to the great ethnic migrations of central Africa,
When the first Europeans arrived in the Congo in the latter part of the 15th century they found several well organized kingdoms and empires.
Ancient Congolese Monarchies,^ as early as the 15th century the
Kingdom of the Kongo, under the rule of Nzinga N tinu, was discovered by the Portuguese and soon the Kingdom entered into relations with
Portugal and made its appearance in world history.
This Kingdom of the Kongo stretched as far north as pointe Noire and to the south as far as Angola and to the east it bordered on Kwango, prom the time of the arrival of the Portuguese in the Kingdom they established a monopoly of commerce and began to evangelize the people.
The Kingdom of the Kongo reached its height in the 16th century.
The successor to Nzinga Ntinu, Don .Alfonso, encouraged the Portuguese to send tra d e rs and m issionaries to the Kingdom, i t was under his reign that the Kingdom entered into active international life.
By the end of his reign the Kingdom began to have repeated con flicts with the Portuguese, The reason for this hostility was that
2 Belgian Congo, Volume I, op. c it, , pp, 65-67,
®Ibid, pp, 69-75,
46 the Portuguese in addition to introducing commerce and Catholicism introduced extortion and slavery.
The slave trade assumed such proportions that pon ^Ifonso, although he had been one of the early s u p p lie rs, became indignant and threatened to cut off all Commerce with the Portuguese,, \ s the situation continued to deteriorate between the kingdom and Portugal the Kingdom was invaded by the barbarous Jagas who were overrunning Africa and burning every thing in th e ir path. The Kongo Kingdom was sacked and i t s c a p ita l destroyed. Don Aifonso's successor, Don Aivaro, appealed to the
Portuguese for help and in 1580 the Portuguese arrived and restored order, jt took the Portuguese overa year to subdue the ferocious jagas, in gratitude Don Aivaro recognized the sovereignty of Portugal; however, in practice the Kongo retained its independence.
For almost 150 years after the discovery of the Congo by the
Portuguese they were the only pu ropean power in the area, in the early seventeenth century, however, they began to lose tîieir position as the leading colonial power, Dutch and other European rivals appeared in the Kongo in force, speeding the political disintegration which had already begun, in 1665 at the battle of Ambuila the Kingdom of the
Kongo, allied with the Dutch, were defeated by the Portuguese and their king killed, in the ensuing anarchy, from which the Kingdom never recovered, Christianity disappeared and by the end of the 17th century the ascendancy of the Portuguese had been ended and they turned their a tte n tio n more and more to Angola,
The Kingdom of the pakuba or Rushongo, situ a te d between Kasai and
47 Sankuru, was the most ancient o f Congolese Kingdoms and is reported to have been founded in the 5th century. With the arrival of the white man in the Congo the Kingdom of the Bakuba ceased to e x is t, however, the Bushongo people of the Congo, with their tribal conservatism, have retained many of their ancient aspects down to the present day,
Bmpires of the Congo, The first great Bantu empire in the eastern p a rt of the Congo was created by the Baluba during the 15th century.
This empire was founded by Kongolo Mukulu and contained an area larger than Belgium, Holland and Luzembourg combined. It stretched from the present s ite of A lb e rtv ille on Lake Tanganyika to Bushroaie River w ithin the borders of modern day Kasai and south to about 10 degrees latitude.
Although this is still considered to be the heartland of the Baluba, today they find themselves a hated minority trisected among northern
Katanga, southern Kasai and southern Kivu.^
In the 16th century, with the rise of the Lunda empire, the Balubas ceased to be the dominant force in the eastern Congo, The Lundas, under th e ir c h ief Mwata yamo, ruled over an empire g re a te r than th a t of the
Baluba, The Lunda domain extended from Angola in the west, including much of Kasai and the southern half of Balubaland, and arched both through Katanga and present-day Northern Rhodesia, Like those of their archenemies, the Balubas, the Lundas successes were based primarily on military skill and the capability of their political organization. The
^Smith Hempstone, op. c it., p, 9,
48 Lunda empire began to disintegrate at the end of the 17th century as
the empire became heavily involved in the slave trade. To speed along
the decline of the Lundas, the Chokwe tribe, which was formerly allied
with the Lunda, rebelled and overthrew the Lunda, The Lundas are only
now, since the 1950’ on their way to becoming the dominant force in
Katanga province,^
By the 19th century, at the height of the chaos of the slave trade
in the Congo, a third tribal force, the Bayeke, interjected itself in
the midst of the Baluba-Lunda rivalry. The Bayeke leader M’Siri rapidly
began to expand his empire and his lands soon stretched from Lake Moero
and the Luapula River on the east, to the Lulua River on the north,
Lualaba on the west, and the mid-Zambesi Basin on the south,^
In the center of his empire, M’Siri established his capital at
Bunkeya, on the shores of the Lufra River, where he established a center of international trading.
It was during the reign of M’Siri that Leopold II of Belgium summoned representatives from Europe and America to Brussels to debate various plans by which Central Africa might be opened to exploitation.
This meeting led to the formation of the international African Associ a tio n ,
At the Berlin Conference in 1885 it was agreed that the so-called
Congo Free S ta te would become Leopold's personal property. However, no one bothered to establish the boundaries of the Free state. This
^Ibid, pp, 9-10,
^Belgian Congo, Vol, i . , op, cit,, pp. 75-76,
49 meant that Leopold had to obtain M 'Siri's signature on a treaty if he
was to include the Bayeke empire as part of the Congo Free State,
Cecil Rhodes, the great British empire builder, was opposed to
the decisions of the Berlin Conference which granted Leopold the Congo.
Rhodes had hoped to create a north-south British-African railway
stretching from Egypt to the Cape of Good Hope, To do so Rhodes needed
the eastern part of the Congo, His efforts however, were unsuccessful,
Leopold, w ith the assistan ce of the concessionary company ' Compagnie
du Katanga' and the assassination of M'Siri by one of his agents, signed
a treaty with M 'Siri's successor, Mukanda, who accepted membership in
the Congo Free State at the price of being allowed to be king of the 7 Bayeke tr ib e .
The Congo Free State, With the formation of the international
African Association by Leopold ii the Congo became open for exploration,
in 1879 Leopold hired Henry Morton Stanley, who had just returned from the Congo, with the mission of returning to the Congo to open it up for trade and to make treaties with the various Congo tribes so 8 that the Association could build stations and depots,
Stanley spent the next four years mapping and making treaties with the Various trib e s of the Congo, The re su lts of S tan ley 's work was the basis fo r Leopold's claim to the Congo Free S ta te which was recognized
Tphillipa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo, (New York; The Devin Adair Company, 1962), pp. 206-207,
^A. Conan Doyle, The crim e of the Congo, (New York; Doubleday, page and Company, 1909) p, 3,
50 at the Berlin Conference as the private domain of Leopold.
When Leopold embarked on his 'civilizing mission' in the Congo
the people were destitute. The Congo had suffered greatly from the slave trade and it has been estimated that during its height there were some 50,000 men, women and children taken annually from the Congo.
Vast areas of the Congo had become depopulated and throughout there was a feeling of insecurity, fear, and suspicion,^
Leopold, having received his mandate to the Congo Free State, be
gan to consolidate his gains. He first changed the name of the inter national African Association to that of the international Congo Associ ation, a device which conveniently separated the Belgian interests and
Leopold from the old international African Association,^®
By 1886 the in te rn a tio n a l Congo A ssociation and the Congo Free
State were Leopold's private possessions, entirely separated from the
Belgian Government, Leopold, however, was short of finances and since a great deal of money was required to develop the Congo he decided to raise the capital by granting attractive monopoly concessions. This led to the active penetration, pacification and economic development of the Congo,
The A fricans in the Congo were not w illin g to work fo r Leopold or the concessionary companies, therefore the Europeans believed it
^Legum, op^, c i t , , p , 27,
^®Donald W, Wiedner, A H istory of A frica , South of the Sahara, (New York; Random House, 1962) p, 218,
51 was their duty to teach the African the importance of work. Native
labor was drafted to work for nominal wages, in addition taxes were
established to force the natives to work and earn money or perform
services in lieu of taxes.
In the political and judicial administration of the Congo Free
State, Leopold and the concessionary companies refused to recognize
the tribal chiefs. They appointed instead 'capitas*. These were na
tives, outside the traditional leadership heritage, who promised to
be loyal to the Europeans, The ’capitas' usually relied on physical
terror to show their authority. The policy of the 'capita' destroyed
tribal and social authority and the only effective means of enforcement
was physical punishment. Murder, torture, cutting off of hands, arms
and legs were every day occurrences,^^
Leopold tried his best to isolate the Congo Free state and to
discourage foreign travel but criticism and suspicion soon developed
throughout the world. Many outsiders were incensed at the cruel and
inhumane treatment rendered to the natives.
In 1904 the historic report of Roger Caseraen, a British consul,
confirmed, and in many instances amplified, the cruel and sadistic punishment raeeted out to the natives of the Congo Free State,
The p u b lic a tio n of the Casemen Report re su lted in demands by the
Belgians and English for an official inquiry, Leopold, under much
l^Wïedner, op. c it,, pp. 222-223,
^^Doyle, op, cit,, pp, 56-57,
52 pressure from the Belgian Government, appointed a committee but he curtailed its powers so much that it virtually lost all of its utility*
The report, however, failed to whitewash Leopold,
It was not until October 18, 1908, that the Belgian Parliament passed a law seizing the Congo Free State and transferring it to the
Belgian Government, From 1908 to 1959, the year p rio r to Congo in dependence, the Belgians ruled the Congo as a colonial empire.
Analysis of the Historical Factors and how they affected the
Katanga-Congo Split, proponents of Katanga separatism say that the
Congo has never been a single political entity, in a sense this is true, but similar statements could be said of the early Apierican col onies and other areas of the world which have been brought under a unified or federalized political structure,
opponents of Katanga separation claimed that the Congo could be considered a political entity, because for over half a century it has been administered by a single colonial administration with several districts or provinces for more efficient consideration of local needs.
The Congo prior to Belgian colonialism was a huge geographic area sprawling from the Atlantic ocean over the vast Congo basin, in this area resided hundreds of tribes, subdivided into thousands of clans. Few of the powerful tribes of earlier times had survived the deprivations of slavery. The once great Kingdom of the Kongo, the only remarkable nation-state known to have existed in that part of the world, had long since fallen and decayed. The attempt to reestab
53 lish the past greatness of the Kongo Kingdom is one of the factors
that many years later was to contribute to the downfall of the Belgian
empire,
prom the start of the negotiations for Congo independence there
existed a struggle for power in Katanga between the Lunda, under the
leadership of Moise Tshombe, and the Balubas, headed by Jason sendwe.
The Bayeke, headed by Godefroid Munongo, a gremdson of M 'Siri became united with the l^inda in their opposition to the Baluba, The Munongo-
Tshombe entente favored an independent Katanga as an attempt to recon
struct the old Bayeke-Lunda empire while the Baluba were in favor of
Katanga remaining as a province in a united Congo, in the negotiations
the Belgians refused to listen to the demands of the innda and Bayeke, insisting that the Congo remain as they had established it. The Bel gians failed to recognize, or purposely overlooked, the fact that an independent Congo with a weak government and administration could not possibly maintain the Congo as a strong centralized unit. The Belgians were able to keep the Congo centralized because they had experienced government and business trained administrative personnel who could keep things moving, it must also be remembered that the Belgian
Army's control of the porce publique provided the clinching element 14 for maintaining centralization.
l^Legume, op_, c it. , op, 26-27,
14gchuyler, op, cit,, pp, 82, 177-179,
54 The desire of the Lunda and the Bayeke for an independent Katanga was given im petus by some f a r more pow erful fo rces than ju s t a d e sire to recreate the Bayeke-Lunda empire. These forces were international investors; white settlers in Katanga; and British and APierican industrial i s t who saw in Tshombe a chance f o r n eo-colonialism ,^^
1^"Katanga" Africa Today (February 1962) pp. 4-6.
55 CHAPTER VI
THE ECONOMIC FACTORS
if we were to consider any one factor as the most important one contributing to the congo-Katanga Split it would in all probability be in the field of economics, for here in the Congo it is the extreme wealth of Katanga province which is at the heart of the problem.
General. The dynamic development and wealth of the Congo prior to world War ll was due to the discovery and the exploitation of the vast mineral deposits found in the Congo.
The whole economy of the country was f o r many years based on the export of these raw materials and the import of equipment and material required to extract the raw materials from the ground. Concurrently with the development of the raw materials agriculture was developed and farmers were encouraged to raise cash crops.
Economic development made enormous strides during World War II owing to the Congo’s location outside the theaters of operation, and the vast requirements of the war machines of the Western powers which the Congo was able to supply.
The Belgians in their post war development program had commenced the establishment of an excellent system of transportation and commun ication in the Congo, in addition, the Belgians, through their ed ucational system and their vocational training program had produced a la rg e pool of s k ille d lab o r to meet the demands of in d u stry . Urban-
56 ized Africans in the Congo, who number approximately 3 million have
indicated over the past years an increased level of diversified con
sumption of goods and services.^
With the achieving of independence on June 30, I960 the Congo's
economic structure was relatively intact and sound. The transport
system was adequate, power installations, utilities and other com
munications facilities were in order. However, the sudden post
independence departure of the Belgian technicians and supervisory
personnel and the decision of union Minière, the Belgian firm domin
ating the economic life of Katanga, to divert the taxes formerly paid
to the central Government to the provincial government in Elisabeth-
ville, brought turmoil to the scene in the Congo,
Turning to the Katanga, with its diversity and abundance of sub
soil resources, we note that it underwent a rapid and spectacular
development in the post war years. Katanga has been the scene of heavy foreign investments in the form of mines, metallurgical plants, second
ary industry, communications and ancillary social service. Katanga, as
a result of her mining interests, had at the time of independence a
large white population (approximately 35,000 or 29 per cent of the
Congo's white population); a large and relatively advanced African wage-earning class, and a considerable population of "foreign" (non-
Katangan) Africans who were attracted by the economic and social
i"Basic Congo Economy Healthy", Foreign Commerce weekly (Wash ington; The Government printing office, August 2i, 1961) p. 1,
57 2 opportunities available there.
Between the period 1950-1957 the total value of the mineral out
put increased some 57 per cent, jumping from 5,569,3 to 8,764,5 million
Belgian francs. This has been estimated to be approximately 80 per cent
of the total minerals extracted from the Congo in 1957, Its main source
of revenue comes from i t s fabulous copper d e p o sits, so v a st and easy
of access that they have been called a "geological scandal". More
over, some 60 per cent of the world's cobalt and an appreciable share
of uranium come from Katanga. It also has a virtual monopoly in the 3 Congo's production of silver, platinum, lead, palladium and zinc.
In 1959 th is m in eral-rich province accounted f o r some 48 per cen t
of the value of the Congo's total global imports and some 79 per cent
of the total global exports,^
After the secession of Katanga mining continued without any major
interruptions and the transportation routes via the Benguela Railroad
to Lobito in Angola and connections with the Rhodesian rail system
permitted Katanga to continue export to the world markets, Katanga's
annual exports run between $18 to $20 million, while imports run at
a level of $7 to $8 million.^
The wealth of Katanga as previously mentioned is identified with
one to the Congo's largest operating companies, the Union Minière du
2 Herapstone, op, c it. pp. 25-26.
^Lemarchand, op. c it., p, 405,
^"Basic Congo Economy H ealthy," Foreign Commerce Weekly, op. cit, pp. 1-2.
^Ib id .
58 Haut Katanga founded in 1906 to prospect the mineral resources of an area of some 20,000 square kilometers in extent,^
Although Katanga holds only approximately 12 per cent of the total population of the Congo, it produces 50 per cent of the Congo's wealth, in 1960 Katanga's contribution to the revenue of the Central Government in taxes and export duties would have amounted to about $60,000,000» without Katanga, the Congo would be as miserably poor as its neighbors.
The modern economic and so c ia l development of the Congo is based on an elaborate complex of industrial and financial interest of which Katanga
7 mines are the core.
The Union Minière du Haut Katanga. The union Miniere's stock value stood as high as F700 million before the troubles came to the
Congo. It contributed almost half of all the country's taxes. Yet, the union Minière is not entirely its own master. It forms part of the gigantic complex of financial companies erected by the Belgians in the Congo.®
The Belgian financial empire formed a State within a State, both within Belgium and within the Congo, in this empire, the biggest is the Société Generale de Belgique, its interests can be found in many profitable enterprises such as banks, industry, cotton, sugar, oharmacy, motor-cars, beer, railroads, etc, it controls the Compagnie Congolese
^Lemarchand, op. c it. , p. 405,
King Gordon, op. c it. , pp. 32-33.
®Legume, op, c i t , , p, 42.
59 du Commerce et de l'Industrie which in its turn controls the Comite
special du Katanga (C.S.K.). Strange as it may seem the C.S.K. was
charged with granting all mining concessions until the Congo was granted
her independence - this is a function which in every other country in
the world is the perogative of a Government Department. Two-thirds of
the shares of C .S.K . are owned by the Belgian Government, and C.S.K.
itself owned 25 per cent of the fabulous Union Minière; the rest was
owned by Belgian, British, and American shareholders. C .S.K . has now
been done away with and its quarter holdings in union Minière is being
distributed in proportions of 19 per cent to the British and American
in te r e s ts and 22.5 per cent to the Congo Government.^
The other four monopolies having interests in the Congo are the
Société de Bruxelles pour la Finance et l'industrie, which controls
the Banque de Bruxelles; the Société Commerciale et Minière du Congo;
H u ilev er, a su b sid iary of U nilever; and the Banque .Bmpain,
Ever since the start of the Congo crisis suspicion was built a-
gainst the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga as the main instigator of the
Katanga secessio n . Large, w hite, and prosperous the company dominates
the economy of Katanga province. In the United Nations, during the
time of the Congo c r i s i s , propaganda ag ain st the company had reached
enormous proportions, and many of the officials believed that Union
Minière was the arch villian of the Congo crisis. During the entire period o f the Congo c r i s i s the company's in s ta lla tio n s operated amid
Sibid.
60 strife and violence and on numerous occasions were threatened by Min
isters in president Moise Tshombe's cabinet with the destruction of
company property i f the province were invaded by the U nited Nations or
the Congolese Central troops,it can be assumed that the action of
these ministers was taken to force ynion Minière and their Belgian
controllers to exert their efforts in influencing the United Nations
and the Congolese central troops from attacking the province.
In reaction to the hostile information eminating from the United
Nations Union M inière p resid en t Herman R p b iliart in November of 1960
issued a statement in New York categorically denying charges that the
company had been fomenting discord in the Congo. However, this had
little affect on the deliberate smear campaign initiated by the Africans
and other in the United Nations, in the Security Council, neutralist
delegates with pro-west leanings blame the union Minière of paying
mercenaries to fight for secessionist Katanga, in a report by the
General Assembly commission, the company was im plicated - by unnamed witnesses - in the slaying of premier Patrice Lumumba.
At the annual General Meeting of the union Minière in 1961, Mr.
Paul G illet, Chairman, made the following comments;
"Haut-Katanga is entirely under the control of the Katangese Government, Since the declaration of the au tonomy of Katanga in July 1960 the Katangenese author ities have made a series of orders or laws imposing upon companies who exercise an activity in the region to pay
^®"Doing business amid Congo C r is is " , Business Week, (December 9, 1961) pp. 61-69.
l^Ibid. pp. 61-69
61 these authorities their duties, taxes, export duties, and royalties as well as dividends...The question of knowing if the Kantangese is justified in view of the particular circumstances must not be confused with the fact that the regime exists 'de facto' and that it has, moreover, shown on numerous occasions its capacity for imposing its de cisions. union Minière cannot therefore do other than comply with the instruction of the Katangenese author ities. .Union Minière deplores the persistence of the political deadlock in the relations between the central government and that of Katanga. At every possible occa sion we have expressed the wish for an agreement between the interested parties, agreement upon which the future of a considerable number of Africans and European nation als depend. But in the meantime we must comply with the decisions of the authority which has, moreover, the means of imposing them,"^
AS the largest single taxpayer in Katanga, the union Minière paid about $45 million a year to the Katanga government. This allowed p resid en t Tshombe to m aintain a m ilit ia of some 12,000 men and run an efficient administration,^®
Besides paying taxes and dividends, union Minière has made heavy contributions to the Katanga economy by employing over 20,000 Africans, who with their 80,000 dependents, enjoy one of the highest standard of living for Africans anywhere in Central Africa.
The Union Minière has never taken an official stand in Congolese politics, privately, however, union Minière officials have let it be known that they supported fully the secession of Moise Tshombe from
^^"Congo" Africa Digest, Vol X, No, I (January 24, 1962).
l®"Doing business amid Congo c r is is '; Business Week, op. c i t . , pp, 61-69,
l^Ibid.
62 the central government in Leopoldville under Patrice Lumumba. They
figured that a stable Katanga in secession was better for mining oper
ations than an unstable Congo. Today, however, since Lumumba is no
longer on the scene many of the officials of union Minière look more
favorably towards a united Congo,
Analysis of the economic factors and how they affected the Katanga-
Congo Split, With a population of some 1,700,000, approximately 12
per cent of the total population of the Congo, Katanga was at the time
of independence the greatest contributor to the revenues of the Con
golese Central Government. Katanga was in this position because of its diversity and sheer abundance of subsoil resources which underwent a
spectacular development in the post war period.
The position of Katanga in relations to the other provinces has always been a source of economic grievances on the part of the resident population. The Katanganese were disenchanted in seeing the taxes and
revenues earned in Katanga being sent to the central government in
Leopoldville, These people have always felt that Katanga should re ta in most of the revenues to build up Katanga and improve the standard of living of the Katanganese,
In 1960 Katanga's contribution to the revenues of the Central
Government in taxes and export duties would have amounted to some
$60,000,000 but when Katanga seceded Union Minere diverted the reven ues from the central government to the provincial government of Katanga.
From this action it appears that Union Minière desired to see the
Lumumba Government fa ll as they were for the most part afraid of
63 Lumumba'S pro-Soviet attitudes and feared that he might nationalize
union Minière and bring in soviet technicians to run the company's
property, union Minière realized that by the diversion of fund from
the central government it would create a hardship for them to meet the
monthly pay of the government employees and the m ilitary,
in considering the policies followed by union Minière we must not
lose sight of the fact that union Minière and its corporate ancestors have always felt that they were responsible for the creation of Katanga, union Minière has not only been involved in Katanga politics but has created them, union Minière is a dynasty; grandfathers, fathers, sons
and their sons. The actions of union Minière during the Congo crisis were only an extension of the dynasty's past activities.
Although Katanga'S whites could hardly be described as liberals, they have over the years established a tradition of tolerance, mutual respect, and easy race relations with the Africans, it is worth noting th a t in 1958, a year and a half prior to independence, Elisabethville was the only one of the major cities of the Congo to have an African majority on its city council. This tradition of racial cooperation, which existed nowhere else in the Congo, has also contributed to the
Katangan feeling of separateness.
The overwhelming concentration of economic resources within the boundaries of Katanga, and of the capital in the hands of union Minière has definitely created political implications. The political imp lications, brought about by the economic status of Katanga province, pres ents a rather unique position when compared with other states of Africa.
64 These states in gaining their independence has to strive first for political power to gain economic power, while in Katanga the state used economic power to develop political power with which to break from the Congo,
65 CHAPTER VII
THE POLITICAL FACTORS
General, The growth of Congolese political parties, reflected by tribal and provincial divisions, have played a key part in bring ing about the Katanga-Congo Split, Congolese political parties began to develop in the latter part of 1958 and early 1959 and presented a very confusing picture because of the weakness of leadership, fluidity of the parties, ethnic diversity and the rural-urban split,^
The most serious lack in Belgian preparation of the Congo for independence was the failure to train a group of educated Congolese to be political leaders capable of running the government and to give the country mature and able leadership. Although the Belgians had an in te n siv e educational program in the Congo i t was lim ited to primary education. The average level of education of the Congolese politicians participating at the Round Table Conference in Brussels in I960 was le ss than high school. The dearth of education was more te llin g in that the purpose of this meeting was to establish a date for complete independen ce and to reach an agreement on the functions and power of 2 the new central and provincial governments.
^Alan p, Merriam, Congo, Background of Conflict (Northwestern University press, 1961) pp. 114-115,
^Ib id ,
66 Many of the original parties that were organized disappeared from the scene or were absorbed into another party, which in turn may have fused with still a third. This fluidity in the organization of the
Congo's political parties can be traced to the fact that the Congolese leaders had virtually no political experience and, once having formed a party, they found that after a few months it no longer represented their own desires, or that their own ideas had changed and the party refused to change with them, in some instances the political leaders would find other parties in the Congo with principles and aims similar to their own so they would unite and form a political fusion for politic 3 cal preservation.
Another problem facing the political parties of the Congo is the fact that they are the product of what is sometimes called a 'tribal renaissance'. But the term 'tribe' is not really appropriate to de scribe the varied and different communities among the various political movements in the Congo. The political parties can best be described as
'people' having certain common ties of culture, language, social in stitutions, and history - who unite politically for common goals,
'tribal renaissance' is an effort to reconstruct the pre-colonial com munity as a reaction to the disintegrating or the "balkanization" effects of colonialism,4 in the 'tribal renaissance' type of party we find that local interests which were paramount in early political
^Ibid,
Thomas Hodgkin. African political parties (Baltimore, penguin Books, 1961) p, 119,
67 formations have tended to remain a powerful factor in Congo politics.
Finally, there is the question in Congo politics as to how much popular support any leader can command at any specific time. To a large extent this is due to the lack of adequate communications and to the vast difference between the urban and rural areas. The great majority of Congolese parties were formed in the urban area by rela tively educated Congolese, while other parties were organized speci fically to protect the interest of rural areas they were not always successful because the urban leaders often failed to get in touch with his constituencies. The urban-city split is a real problem in the
Congo, and the transitory nature of the popularity of almost any lead er, plus the urban problem of collecting rural votes, has contributed heavily to the shifts, movements, fusions and disbanding of political p a rtie s ,^
Because of these numerous problems there is a question of doubt whether the Congolese parties can be called bonifide political parties at all. in Congo politics, for the most part, the oarty platforms have been generally in broad statements of principles rather than in specific terras.
Political parties of the Congo. The principal parties of the
Congo; their organization, their platform and their principal lead ers are as follows;
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), This party had its origin
^Ibid,
68 in a memorandum forwarded to the Governor General of the Congo demand
ing eventual independence and rejecting federalism and separatism in favor of a strong, unified central government, on October 10, 1958,
all of the signers of the memorandum formed a ‘provisional ccanmittee’ under the name of the Mouvement National Congolais with Patrice Lumumba as the President,^
P a trice Lumumba was bom Ju ly 2, 1925 a t Katako-Kombe in the
Sankuru District of Kasai province; his ethnic origin is the Batetela,
and h is education was of primary school only, in 1954 he became a postal clerk in Stanleyville and a year later was made President of the
A ssociation du Personnel indigene du Congo Beige e t du Ruanda-Urundi
(APIC). on July 1, 1956, he was arrested in Stanleyville, and charged with embezzlement of a substantial sum of money in connection with his work w ith p o stal money orders. Most authors place the sum at about
$2,520, He was arraigned, judged g u ilty , and condemned to two years in prison, but the sentence was later reduced on appeal of June 13,
1957, to 18 months, and still later to 12 months. It is both inter esting and significant to note that while he was in prison many of the prominent 'évolués* of Stanleyville gathered together the money to pay back the sum embezzled and to care for his family, on his release from prison his endeavors turned more towards politics and led eventu- 7 ally to the creation of the MNC,
^Ronald segal, political Africa (New York; Frederick A* praeger, 1961, p. 319,
^Merriam, op, cit, 154-155,
69 Colin Legum in his book Congo Disaster gives the following char acter sketch of Lumumba;
"...He is a rake of a man, with a tiny, narrow head and a chin ful of beard. His smile is light and quick and frequent; when he is angry or frustrated it disappears behind a hard, hostile, impregnable s h ie ld . His movements are sharp and wary, like those of a praying mantis. His tongue is silver and seldom still. He thinks nothing of talking for four hours at a time. But his pleasant, easy manner is deceptive; he is earnest and tough, and can be ruthless, as occasion has shown. His hero is Dr, Kwame Nkrumah, and the model fo r his s ta te is Ghana He is a republican and a reformer..,We must separate the Church from the State, We must take away all power from the traditional chiefs, and remove all privileges. We must adapt socialism to African realities,. .Lumumba is neutral, indifferent, or inde cisive, rather than rebellious. It is only when he suspects paternalism that he rebels without thought of consequences; time and again in the gravest days of crisis this emotion flared up with a terrifying passion, paternalism acts on him lik e an allergy."®
The MNC had as its principal aim the inclusion of Congolese ideas and personnel in the Belgian Study Group which was due to arrive in the Congo in the l a t t e r p a rt of October 1958. The purpose of the Group was to form ulate a new policy fo r Congo independence. The policy was to include the take over of public affairs by the Congolese; democrat ization within the Congo; and a freeing of the Congo from colonialism by peaceful negotiations.
It is important to note two other factors pertaining to the forma tion of the MNC, First is that, apparently under the persuation of
Lumumba, many personalities from highly diversed political parties joined in the formation of the 'provisional committee*. Some of these
^ Le gum, op, c it, pp, 94-95,
70 personalities were Mr. Diomi, one of the lieutenants of Kasavubu and
the A lliance des Bakongo (A8AK0); M essrs, Nguvulu and Adoula, p resid en t
and vice president respectively of the Socialist Action party; Mr,
Joseph ile o , e d ito r of the Conscience A fricain e; Mr, Antoine Ngwenza,
Secretary General of the Bengala, The second point is that the committee
was considered to be only temporary, and that as soon as the immediate
problem of liaison with the B elgian study Group was so lv e d i t wns to
be d issolved with i t s members retu rn in g to th e ir separate p o litic a l
p a rtie s . 9
The party, however, was never dissolved and soon after the Belgian
Study Group Conference the party began to gain strength. The Bangala
people of Equator province followed their political leaders, Joseph
Ileo and Joseph Ngalula, into the MNC* The MNC thereby acquired a
stro n g foo th o ld in tr a d itio n a l Bakongo t e r r i t o r y , Kasavubu*s ABAKO, weakened and greatly alarmed by this intrusion into its baliwick,
changed its policy immediately. Separatism was still latent among the
Bakongo, but their party now sought either an alliance with other
regionalists or a guarantee that all other parties would refrain from
activity in the Lower Congo, At this point Kasavubu fell out of favor w ith the Belgian a u th o ritie s who openly p referred Lumumba's n atio n wide MNC.^®
In December 1958, Lumumba, together with two other MNC leaders
^Merriam, op, cit, p, 139.
l®Donald L. Wiedner, op, cit. pp, 441-445,
71 attended the F ir s t A ll A frican peoples Conference at Accra, Kasavubu» leader of ABAKO, was prevented from leaving the Congo presumably be cause his medical papers were not in order. Thus uumumba beczune the undisputed leader of the Congolese contingent, of all the major lead ers of the Congo he was the only one to present the Congo's case for national independence. Other African leaders, particularly those from
Ghana and Guinea, were convinced th a t Lumumba was the only tru e Congo lese nationalist. At Accra, Lumumba and the MNC were themselves con verted to the idea that independence must come, not in 1986 as recom mended by professor A, A. J. Van Bilsen, a scholar at the University of Antwerp, in his thirty year plan for African independence, but by
1961.11
on Lumumba's retu rn from the Accra Conference in early January
1959 he laid down the following program for the MNC:
"The Mouvement N ational C ongolais, of completely A frican origin, has for its fundamental aim the liberation of the Congolese people from the colonial regime and the accession of the Congolese to independence. We base our action on the Universal Declaration of the fdghts of Man - rights guaranteed to all the citizens of the world by the charter of the United Nations - and consider that the Congo, as a human society, has the right to accede to the ranks of free people. We wish to bid farewell to the old regime, this subjugating regime which deprives our nationals of the enjoyment of political rights granted to all humans and to all free citizens. We want our country, our fine country, to reflect another face, the face of happy people released from anxiety, fear, and all colonial domination. I t would be a great shame fo r the in h ab itan ts of th is country - and above all for the Belgian administration - i f , in th is time when the u n iv ersal conscience condemns
^^Ibid,
72 the domination of one people by another, the Congo we ire to remain under the regime of a colonial empire. The work of c o lo n ia liz a tio n undertaken by Belgium in the Congo must be limited in time and space, in our view, these limits have been largely realized We do not exclude the possibility that after having obtained our independence, a confident, fruitful and durable collaboration can be established between the Congo and Belgium and between the black and white inhabitants of this country. The Belgiems like all other foreign inhabitants, will continue to reside in the Congo.,
on January 3, 1959 Lumumba addressed a mass meeting in Leopold ville and announced his objective of immediate independence, in his speech he repudiated the Van Bilsen thirty year plan for gradual ad vance to independence, supported by the Belgian Government and imny of the parties in the Congo itself. The following day riots broke cut in Leopoldville when some 30,000 unemployed marched into the city and attacked Europeans, The riots were blamed on ABAKO =»ud its leader, Joseph Kasavubu, was arrested. This marked the end of the
Belgian era of paternalism in the Congo,
In April 1959 the MNC held a conference at Luluabourg and de manded self-government by 1961. In July however, disputes occurred within the party, principally over Lumumba’s leadership, ,\s a conse quence of the disputes the moderates, including Joseph Ileo, resigned and formed a new group under the leadership of Albert Kalonji of Kasai province, which called itself th e Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC
Kalonji),13
^^Merriam, op, c it,, p. 140.
l^gegal, op, cit, p, 319,
73 the domination of one people by another, the Congo were to remain under the regime of a colonial empire. The work o f c o lo n ia liz a tio n undertaken by Belgium in the Congo must be limited in time and space, in our view, these limits have been largely realized We do not exclude the possibility that after having obtained our independence, a confident, fruitful and durable collaboration can be established between the Congo and Belgium and between the black and white inhabitants of this country. The Belgians like all other foreign inhabitants, will continue to reside in the Congo..
on January 3, 1959 Lumumba addressed a mass meeting in Leopold ville and announced his objective of immediate independence, in his speech he repudiated the Van Bilsen thirty year plan for gradual ad vance to independence, supported by the Belgian Government and many of the parties in the Congo itself. The following day riots broke out in Leopoldville when some 30,000 unemployed marched into the c it y and attacked Europeans, The r io t s were blamed on ABAKO and i t s leader, Joseph Kasavubu, was arrested. This marked the end of the
Belgian era of paternalism in the Congo,
In April 1959 the MNC held a conference at Luluabourg and de manded self-government by 1961. in July however, disputes occurred within the party, principally over Lumumba's leadership, as a conse quence of the disputes the moderates, including Joseph Ileo, resigned and formed a new group under the leadership of Albert Kalonji of Kasai province, which called itself the Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC
Kalonji),13
l% erriam , op^, c i t , , p. 140,
l^ S e g a l, op^, cit, p, 319.
73 on October 30, 1959 riots broke out in Stanleyville as an after- math of an MNC Congress. A® a result Lumumba was arrested and im prisoned until January of the following year.
It would appear from the arrests of Kasavubu and Lumumba that the Belgians were using imprisonment as a technique to discourage further demands for independence. However, imprisonment of the lead ers only built up their prestige in the eyes of their followers, in other words the mark of prison became a badge of heroism,
on his release in January, Lumumba attended the Round Table Con ference held by representatives of the Belgian Government and Congol ese leaders in Brussels to determine constitutional changes in the
Congo, At this conference Lnmumba emerged as the most dominant Congo lese politician. The Belgian Government backed his proposal fo r a unitary state against the demands of federation advanced by ABAKO and by Moise Tshombe of Katanga, The Conference decided th at e lectio n s should be held in May 1960 and th a t the Congo would become independent on June 30, 1960,
During the election campaign many parties contested the chamber seats. Some candidates played on anti-European feelings and some ex ploited tribal rivalries. The two strongest parties to emerge were
P a trice Lumumba's MNC and Kasavubu's AB.AKC, Lumumba and h is a llie s won the largest number of seats but Kasavubu also emerged in a strong position. After much maneuvering Kasavubu accepted the office of
P resident while Lumumba became Prime M in ister,
on September 5, president Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba because of
74 his dealings with the Soviets. Luraumba refused to resign and a mili tary coup d'etat soon followed, as a resu lt Lumumba and Ile o , who had been named by Kasavubu as Lumumba's replacement, were both removed from the position.
The report of Lumumba's escape from imprisonment and of his death, under mysterious circumstances, in February, 1961, plunged the
Congo once more into internal strife with the possibility of all-out civil war. Rioting outside Belgian embassies and widespread protests testified to the degree to which the political policy of Lumumba him self and the MNC had spread.
The MNC is republican, believing in the democratization of all institutions, the separation of Church and State, and the removal of power from the tribal chiefs. It believes in adapting socialism to
A frica, u n til the c r i s i s , i t was the larg est and most m ilita n t party in the whole country, and was active in all areas except Katanga, The
MNC opposed nationalization of European property at the time of the elections, but promised to introduce controls to reduce exploitation,^^
The MNC leader after the death of Luraumba was Christophe Gbenye,
Mouvement N ational Congolais (MNCKalonji),in July 1959, the
MNC led by Patrice Lumumba sp lit, and the moderate wing under Joseph
Ileo withdrew in protest against Lumumba's centralized control of the party. This group was later joined by Albert Kalonji, the leader of the
l^ ib id , p. 321,
l^ibid, pp, 324-325,
75 MNC (Lumumba) in Rasai, in Kasai the MNC Kalonji immediately became associated with the Baluba tribe in opposition to the Lulua who backed
Lumumba,
on August 4, 1959 K alonji was a rre sted on charges of arousing ra c ia l hatred but was later released, in October serious warfare erupted be tween the Baluba and the Lulua,
At the Round Table Conference in Brussels, The MNC Kalonji joined the ABAKO Cartel, favoring federalism, in the May elections of I960, the party won 8 seats out of 137 in the Congo's National Assembly and
21 of the 70 seats in the Kasai provincial Assembly,
The MNC Kalonji was the only major party that was not included in the coalition government of pat rice Lumumba at the time of independence.
During the crisis after independence and the secession of Katanga,
Kalonji attempted to declare Kasai an independent state. Tribal war fare erupted once more, however, between the Baluba and the Lulua,
The Congolese central Government with the aid of United Nations troops was able to reunite Kasai with the Republic of the Congo,
Kalonji attended the conference of Congolese political leaders in the Malgache Republic in March, 1961 where it was decided to establish a Congo Confederation organized along tribal line with Kasavubu as Chief of State, This fell through because Antoine Qizenga, of the Stanleyville regime refused to participate and those who did meet failed to carry it through.
Another attempt at reunification was made on April 24, 1961 at
Coquilhatville by Kasavubu, Tshombe, Ileo, and Kalonji, This time.it
76 was proposed that the number of federated states be increased, with greater powers to be given to the central government. Two days after the Coquilhatville Conference, Moise Tshombe of CONAKAT, representing
Katanga, was arrested. After Tshombe's release and return to Katanga he reaffirmed his independence policy.
The failure of the Coquilhatville conference prompted all factions to seek a solution by reconvening Parliament under UN protection so that a new central government could be chosen that would include representa tives from the entire Congo, All factions attended except Tshombe who chose to boycott the parliamentary gathering altogether, and Qizenga, who deferred his own appearance although the Stanleyville parliamen tarians appeared in strength.
This parliamentary meeting resulted in the formation of the pre sent Congolese government under prime Minister Adoula in 1961,
A lliance des Bakongo (ABAKO).S i n c e the turn of the century, the Bangala people from the Upper Congo region had gained a numerical superiority in Leopoldville and were quicker to adapt to European ways than the Bakongo, who were distributed across the Lower Congo, Leopold ville, the north of Angola and the east of the (Brazzaville) Republic of the Congo, As the Bangala people gained superiority in Leopoldville they began to work c lo se ly with the B elgians, while the Bakongo remain ed relatively hostile to the Belgian Administration, Eventually, the
Bakongo began to fe e l the need to form an organization to counteract
l^Merriam, op, c i t , pp, 121-126.
77 the Bangala influence, in 1950 a group of Bakongo ’évolués* headed by Edmond Nzeza-Lanu formed an A ssociation of the Bakongo fo r U n ifica^ tion. Conservation and Expansion of the Kikongo Language, fABAKO).
In 1955, Joseph Kasavubu was elected ABAKO*s president. Kasavubu's expressed aims were the reunification of the Bakongo and the formation of a separatist state, originally gradualist in its political approach
AB.1K0 accepted the thirty year plan for Congolese Independence recom mended by professor Van pilsen in 1954, on the condition that the
Congolese were to be affiliated with the detailed planning.
After the riots of Leopoldville on January 4, 1959, for which the members of ABAKO were blamed, the Belgians proscribed the ABAKO and arrested its leaders. Kasavubu himself was not tried but was flown to Belgium, where he remained until May, 1959, on his return to
Leopoldville, he reformed the organization of ABAKO into a political party under the name of Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO)» The new politi cal party began to collide increasingly with the Belgian Administration,
AS a political party, ABAKO, began to publish three widely read newspapers in Leopoldville and the Lower Congo - the Kongo pia Ngunga,
Notre Kongo and Kongo pieto, all dailies. These papers were very important to the ABAKO movement, and their existence was made feasible by the high literacy ratio in this area of the C^ngo, estimated at about
37 per cent in the Lower Congo and 54 per cent in Leopoldville itself.
The contents of the ABAKO dailies varied but followed in general an anti-Belgian line; they served also, of course, as a news organ for the p arty .
78 The political platform on which the ABAKO stood is rather diffi cult to follow, although at its core it had the aim of separatism for the Lower Congo region. It seems that Kasavubu had tended to waver between separatism on the one hand and federalism on the other, but in e ith e r case he d esired the Lower Congo to be independent.
on June 24, 1959, the three leaders of ABAKO - Kasavubu, Daniel
Kanza and gimon Mzeza - presented to the Belgian M inister fo r the
Colonies a detailed scheme for a separate 'Republic of Central Congo',
ABAKO informed the m inister that;
"AS of the month of January, 1960, the province of Leopoldville will become an autonomous state which will be called the 'Republic of Central Congo', It will be a democratic and social republic, and its capital will be Leopoldville. The republic will be headed by a pres ident elected by the people. The government of the republic w ill be composed of three d is tin c t powers; (1) Legislative; (2) executive; (3) judiciary. Legislative power w ill be represented in a Senate and a Chamber, senators and Deputies will be elected through universal suffrage. Executive power will be vested in a cabinet of 15 ministers and a secretary of State, It will be supported by a provincial government, and a territorial and communal ad m in istratio n . The Cabinet w ill include Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Health, Defense, Commerce and industry. Youth and Sports, Educa tio n and Social A ffa irs, Economic A ffa irs, Transport and Communications, Agriculture, Water and Forests, Finance, public Works, inform ation and Press and Work, The ju d ic i ary will include a supreme court, a court of appeals, a T ribunal...... The provincial government w ill administer the five provinces of the Republic of the Central Congo, as follows* (1) the province of Kinshasha, capital Kinatambo; (2) the Cataract province, capital Thysville; (3) Lower-River province, capital Bomba; (4) Kwango province, capital Kikwit; (5) Kwilu province, capital Kenge...The Republic of the Central Congo will elect its president the 12th or 13 December, 1959, in order to be considered eligible for the election as president, the candidate must be; (1) 40 years old; (2) from the Republic of the C entral Congo; (3) a person whose
79 conduct towards the people has been irreproachable, in order to participate in the presidental election, the electors must be from the Republic of the Central Congo and be 20 years of age. The right to vote is given to women as well as to men,.,The geographic limits of the Republic of the central Congo are* to the west, the Atlantic ocean, Angola and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); to the east, the Kasai River; to the south Angola; and to the north the Kasai River, the River Congo and the Republic of the Congo,
The response of the Minister to this ultimatum was to refuse
it, however, the declaration represents clearly the basic position
of Kasavubu and ABAKO.
In November, 1959, Kasavubu was instrumental in forming the
ABAKO Cartel - an alliance of ABAKO; the Parti Solidaire Africain
(PSA); the Mouvement N ational Congolais (K a lo n ji); and the p a rti du peuple (PP), This cartel included all the major parties which had separatist-federalist tendencies, except the CONAKAT of Katanga,
The position of AB.AKO with respect to separatism or federalism was becoming quite complicated. In December, 1959, the Cartel called
a Congress at Kinsantu where i t demanded immediate independence and a federal constitution for the Congo, At this Congress ABAKO*s position turned more toward federalism as opposed to separatism.
However, it has never been too clear where ABAKO, as a party, stood on the question of separatism or federalism. It is almost certain
that Kasavubu himself, has always stood for senaratism, and that he has always had the backing of the Bakongo population on this question.
Because of political implications he has often altered his position
l^Ibid. pp, 124-125,
80 towards federalism, but at the same time he has used separatism as a weapon to wield against the Belgian Administration, in any case, in the Congo, separatism and federalism do not by any means indicate different things, and those who have supported federalism have often been striving for separatist states.
At the January, 1960, Round Table Conference in Brussels,
Kasavubu led the ABAKO Cartel and pressed for a federal constitution; but several days after the conference started he withdrew in protest after being unable to persuade the Belgian Government to support federalism or to set up a provisional constitutent assembly immedi ately. The Cartel itself split with the rival faction under the leadership of Daniel Kanza. This left Lumumba, leader of the MNC, to emerge as the dominant figure at the Conference,
The main opponent of ABAKO in the May 1960 e le c tio n s was the
MNC. ABAKO won impressive electorial successes in Leopoldville province, winning 33 seats in the provincial Assembly. Nationally, however, it did not do so well, winning only 17 seats out of 137 in the Congolese National Assembly. Kasavubu accepted the office of president in the first elected parliament of the Congo in June
1960.
During the early period of Katanga’s secession, Kasavubu made no move ag ain st Lnmumba's e ffo rts to consolidate the C en tral Govern ment; but when Lumumba summoned Soviet aid and openly criticized the united Nations forces, Kasavubu, on September 5, 1960 dismissed him as prime Minister* Kasavubu appointed Joseph ileo in his place but
81 Lumumba refused to resign.
A military coup d’etat followed and Colonel Joseph Mobutu re moved both Lnmumba and Ile o ,
with the eclipse of Lnmumba, Kasavubu was able to obtain the necessary support to be recognized as the leg itim ate Congo Cheif of State by the United Nations General Assembly,
In early December Kasavubu signed a warrant for Lumumba’s a r r e s t,
ABAKO has maintained close relations with the government of the
Republic of Congo in Brazzaville. Abbe pulbert Youlou, president of the Republic, gave open support to Kasavubu in his struggle for power against Lnmiunba, allowing Kasavubu to use the airport and radio station in Brazzaville when the United Nations closed similar facilities in Leopoldville, Kasavubu had consulted with many of the former French African states. The heads of these states met in
B razzaville la te in 1960 and were reported to have seeked a compro mise government that would have federated the disunited Congo,
in March 1961, rep resen tativ es of the p o litic a l fa c tio n s met in the Malgache Republic and announced plans for a Congo Confedera tion and as Antoine Gizenga had refused to attend the meeting failed to carry its plans through.
Another attempt at reunification of the country was made in April at Coquilhatville by Kasavubu, Tshorabe, Ileo and Kalohji. It failed however, and Tshombe was arrested and held for a period of two months.
He was released after he promised to unite Katanga with the Congo,
82 After his release and his return to Katanga, Tshombe declared the agreements he made were purely economic and refused to attend the parliament in Leopoldville in July,
At the parliam ent in Ju ly 1961 a new cabinet was formed w ith
Cyrill Adoula, a Kasavubu supported, as prime Minister, and Gizenga of Stanleyville regime as the First Deputy premier.
Parti du peuple (PP)l^ The PP under the leadership of Alphonse
Nguvulu has expressed strong support for ABAKO. The pp was offici ally formed on April 26, 1959. Its basic approach was socialistic - at least in its economic proposals - although it has followed the federalist line. The PP was one of the few parties which advanced specific economic measures before independence. Its chief economic aims were that; (1) the means of production, land and riches in general are the common property of all; ( 2 ) the right to the enjoy ment and exploitation of such property is subordinated to the social utility and to the maximum well being of all; (3) the ownership of riches and of means of production cannot be reserved to any individ ual who will use them for his own profit.
The PP called for the socialization of large holdings under collective leadership.
The program of the pp was socialistic. It bad difficulty in getting widespread support because it was considered to be strongly influenced by the Belgians, However, it did gain status by supporting
l^ibid, pp. 129-130,
83 AB.AKO in a Cartel which took a strong position at the Round Table
Conference in Brussels,
Alphonse Nguvulu attended the communist party Congress at Liege,
Belgium in April 1960»
Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA).^^ This party was founded in
April 1959, by Cleophas Kamitatu and Antoine Qizenga, It is mainly
a party of rural workers and peasants spread over some twenty-five
tribes in the Lower Congo, At first it supported the idea of a cen
tral and unified state, however it soon changed its policy, supported
federalism , and formed an a llia n ce with AB.AKO*
m the May 19 60, elections the PSA did not back ABAKO as origin
ally planned. As a result pSA won 35 of 90 seats in the Leopoldville
P rovincial Assembly, The PSA joined the c o a litio n C entral Government
of P atrice Lumumba, Gizenga became a Deputy premier and Kamitatu was elected president of the Leopoldville Provincial Government,
During the crisis which followed independence the party became divided with Gizenga giving increased support to Lumumba, while Kamitatu maintained contact with both the Lumumba and Kasavubu camps. After
Lumumba was dismissed from his job as prime Minister and was arrested,
Gizenga escaped to S ta n le y v ille , and on December 13, 1960 announced
that the Stanleyville Government was the rightful government of the
Congo,
19gegal, op, cit, p, 325.
^^Area Handbook, op. cit. p, 366,
84 In general the PSA seems to follow socialist tendencies and can be considered a left-wing party. It opposes all forms of neo-colon ia lism .
Confederation des Association du Katanga (CONAKAT)?^ The party was founded in July 1959, as the Rassemblement Katangais, based mainly on the Lunda tribe in Katanga, CONAKAT elected Moise Tshombe as its leader in December 1959, The political platform of CONAKAT at the time Moise Tshombe took charge of the party was stated as follows;
"The total decentralization of powers in order to prepare the future ’federated states' before the proclamation of independence.
The independence of the Congo in order and calm as soon as p o ssib le,
A federal system uniting the large Congolese provinces and Belgium in the framework of a Belgo-Congolese community, each constituent part retaining its internal autonomy.
Growth of the productivity of the rural regions by the adop tion of a well-studied plan of action aiming to obtain the modernization of equipment at the disposition of the farmers.
Development of access roads in order to allow outlying re gions to better participate in the economic life.
Development of education in all possible ways in the in terior, and above all agricultural and secondary education.
Extension of the system of governmental credit to the middle classes of the centers and in the interior.
Expansion of the formula; equal pay for equal work.
Prank and sincere collaboration between Blacks and Whites in order to pursue together the value of this country for the b en efit of i t s two c o lle c tiv i tie s .
^^Merriam, op,, cit, pp. 133-136,
85 m general the PSA seems to follow socialist tendencies and can be considered a left-wing party. It opposes all forms of neo-colon ia lis m .
Confederation des Association du Katanga (CONAKAT), The party was founded in July 1959, as the Rassemblement Katangais, based mainly on the Lunda tribe in Katanga. CONAKAT elected Moise Tshombe as its lea d er in December 1959, The p o litic a l platform ofCONAKAT at the time Moise Tshombe took charge of the party was stated as follows*
"The total decentralization of powers in order to prepare the future 'federated states' before the proclamation of independence.
The independence o f the Congo in order and calm as soon as p o ssib le ,
A federal system uniting the large Congolese provinces and Belgium in the framework of a Belgo-Congolese community, each constituent part retaining its internal autonomy.
Growth of the p ro d u c tiv ity of the ru ra l regions by the adop tion of a well-studied plan of action aiming to obtain the modernization of equipment at the disposition of the farmers.
Development of access roads in order to allow outlying re gions to better participate in the economic life.
Development of education in all possible ways in the in terior, and above all agricultural and secondary education.
Extension of the system of governmental credit to the middle classes of the centers and in the interior.
Expansion of the formula; equal pay for equal work,
Frank and sincere collaboration between Blacks and Whites in order to pursue together the value of this country for the b e n e fit of i t s two c o lle c tiv i tie s .
21Merriam, op..cit, pp. 133-136.
85 Respect for law established by traditional authorities,"^^
CONAKAT had as its principal aim the creation of a federal
state, within the framework of which Katanga province would be direct
ed and administered by authentic Katangan citizens to the exclusion
of a l l members of other races or tr ib e s . I t fu rth e r held f o r the
right to separate itself from the rest of the Congo if the defense
of Katangan interests made such secession necessary,23
CONAKAT was vigorously supported by Union Minière and by the
Belgian settlers, who encouraged the Katanganese in their secessionist
program of Belgo-Congolese,^^
in December 1959, ju s t p rio r to the Round Table Conference in
Brussels to discuss the independence of the Congo, CONAKAT made an
alliance with ABAKO on the basis of a federalist state for the Congo.
During the Conference Tshombe was virtually ignored by the Africans
and the Belgian Government delegates. Tshombe's name remained virtu
a lly unknown u n til the electio n s of May 1960, when CONAKAT won 38 of
the 60 seats in the Katanga Provincial Assembly and 8 out of 137 in
the Congo's National Assembly,
When Lumumba of the mNC formed his coalition government Tshombe
refused to participate, on July 11, 1960 several days after inde pendence Tshombe seceded Katanga from the Congo. At the time of
secession Tshombe called a conference of all the Luanda chiefs who
Z^lbid. p, 135.
23lb id .
24ibid.
86 unanimously agreed to defend the new 'state' by force if necessary.
In February, 1961, the united Nations was given a new mandate
to use force to prevent civil war in the Congo, This mandate had the effect of bringing three of the rival factions together, Kasavubu,
Tshombe and K alonji agreed on a common fro n t against Gizenga, who 25 was backed by the S oviets,
on March 8, 1961 rep resen tativ es of the three fa c tio n s met in the Malgache Republic and announced plans for a Congo Confederation but this failed because Gizenga refused to participate.
Another attempt at reunification of the country was made in
April at Coquilhatville by Kasavubu, Tshombe, ileo and Kalonji, it f a ile d , however, and Tshombe was a rre sted and held fo r two months.
He was released after he promised to reunite Katanga with the Congo,
After his release and return to Katanga, Tshombe declared the agree ments he made were purely economic and refused to attend the Parli ament in Leopoldville in Ju ly , 2 6 Association des Baluba du Katanga (RALÜBAKAT). This party under the direction of Jason gendwe has been the opposition party to
CONAKAT in ip.tanga. As is usual in Congo p olitics, the BALUBAKAT follows an ethnic line, receiving its main support from the Baluba people of Katanga, BALLIBAKAT sp lit off from CONAKAT in the la tte r part of 1959 because it regarded CONAKAT as too pro-Belgium, This
^^Area Handbook, op, cit. p. 370,
^^erriam, op. cit, pp. 136-137,
87 split was perpetuated when the BALUBAKAT established the Lualaba
state in northern Katanga.
The program of BALUBAKAT has never been made clear and detailed
but Jason gendwe has la id down the main points of th e ir aim;
"Separatism must be fought against, because it will bring the Congo to suicide...This is why we wish a united Congo with a strong c e n tra l government, composed of six federated provinces each of which has a large degree of autonomy." 7
In December 1959, the BALUB.AKAT formed a C artel with FBDBKA
(groupings of immigrant tribes from Kasai) and ATCAR (the organiza tion of the Tshokwe tribe), in the elections of May 1960 - in a
loose alliance with Lumumba's MNC - the BALUBAKAT Cartelwon six seats to CON.AKAT’s eight in the Congo’s National Assembly, in the provincial
Assembly the BALUBAKAT C artel won 22 seats to CON.AKAT's 38, The
BALUBAKAT Cartel refused to participate in the government so CONAKAT set up its exclusive government.
The party strongly opposed the secession of Katanga and has ad vocated a unitary form of government for the whole Congo. BALUB,AKAT has embraced the federal idea but with emphasis upon a central govern ment to hold the six federated provinces together, CONAKAT on the other hand has leaned more strongly towards federalism and towards separatism and autonomy,
DALUB.AKAT has been bitterly hostile to the Tshombe regime and it controled areas in the province where no writ issued in Blisabethville
2?lbid.
88 could apply. With Katanga's secession there had been widespread fighting in Katanga between the Baluba, who supported the BALUBAKAT
Cartel, and the Luanda who supported CONAKAT, 28 parti de L'Unite Congolaise (interfederale - PUC). In early
1958 Mr, jean fiolikango organized the interfederale. Its membership contained almost all of the associations of the Upper Congo, Which existed at that time in Leopoldville; the Bangala Federation; the
Sassonge Federation; the Kwango-Kwilu Federation; the Kasai pedera- tion; the Batetela Federation; the Kivu-Maniema Federation; and sev eral other similar groups, interfederale represented approximately
50 per cent of the Congolese population of Leopoldville, but it was divided due to ethnic diversity.
Since interfederale was a party of moderation it was plagued by rumors that it was merely a front for the Belgians and that it was being entirely financed by the Belgians, To do away with the stigma of this reported relationship, interfederale launched a new political party called the parti de I'Unite Congolaise (PUC) in
January 1959, It was announced by Bolikango that the new party would be a v ast p o litic a l movement which would defend the ideas of to le r ance, equality, justice and cooperation among the peoples of the different races, interfederale and pUC remained two distinct entities, the former to study cultural and social problems and the latter to pursue political aims.
ZGlbid. pp. 158-162.
89 The division of responsibilities between interfederale and the
PUC soon led to friction, interfederale presented a detailed program
to the Belgian Government in April 1959, which discussed political, economic, and social problems at some length. More trouble emerged from the lack of a strong president. Although Mr, Bolikango appeared
to be an outstanding leader, Mr, Jacques Mbilo was president of Inter federale at the time, Mr. Mbilo in August 1959, changed the moderate policy of interfederale, abandoning the Belgian Governmental Declar ation of January 13, 1959, and demanded; (1) A Congolese Government;
(2) the creation of the Congolese nation; (3) no racial discrimina
tion; (4) an increase in salaries; (5) etc.
Approximately one month later interfederale-PUC was absorbed
into a new political party called the Union pour les interests du peuple congolais (UNICo). 29 Union pour les interest du peuple Congolais (UNICO). UNICO was formed on September 12, 1959, The origin of this party is rather obscure. It is believed to have been organized by Mr, Jean-pierre
Dericoyard, the founder of the parti Travailliste Congolaise (PTC),
UNICO absorbed Interfederale-pUC, PTC, and several other minor parties.
The result of fusion of these parties in the Leopoldville area is that
it liquidated almost all of the individual parties except AB.AKO and
its satellites - the PSA, the MNC (Kalonji) and the PP. Thus practi cally all of the ethnic groups of Leopoldville, with the exception of
^^ibid. p. 62.
90 the Bakongo, were united and allied in a political movement which
stood for a united Congo, thereby posing a real threat to the MNC
(Lumumba).
Parti National du progrès (PNP).^^ in November 1959, all the parties under UNICO, plus approximately 20 others, formed themselves
into a new party called the pNP under the leadership of Paul Bolya»
The PNP was the p arty the Belgians hoped would form the f i r s t Congo
lese Government, All the groups of this new party were of moderate
tendencies. The PNP called for independence emphasizing a strong desirability for a unified Congo and set itself firmly against an federalist or separatist tendencies, in the May I960 elections the
PNP won 22 out of the 137 seats in the Congo's National Assembly,
They reluctantly joined the coalition government of Lumumba at the time of independence, Bolya became Minister of State and another leader Albert Delvaits, became Minister-Resident in Belgium, The leaders of PNP appear to have not taken a great part in the crisis which developed after independence.
Parti de L'Unite Nationale (PUNA),^^ Mr, Bolikango, organizer of Interfederale mentioned previously, established on January 20,
1960 a new p o litic a l p arty designated pront de L'U nite Bangala (PUB).
In March, 1960 FUB changed its status and united with five smaller parties and became known as pUNA, PUNA is primarily a party of two
30 Segal, op. cit. p. 32 6,
31ibid,
91 ethnie groups - the Bangala and the Mongo, Its program includes the
following* A united Congo in opposition to the Federalism of ABAKO
and CONAKAT; a considerable provincial decentralization, and the
maintenance of collaboration with the Belgians,
Union Congolaise (UC)»^^ This represents one of the p arties
whose policies changed during the course of its existence. The UC
was founded in B lisa b e th v ille in December 1957, under the leadership
of Mr, Antoine Rubbens. From its beginning the UC stressed the con
cept of a united Congo, However, its attitude towards Belgium and
its policies were constantly changing, in October 1959, the president
of UC at the time, Gabriel Kitenge, issued a statement calling for
the cooperation of all people, and stressing cooperation with the
whites. By 1959, however, Mr, Kitenge denounced all whites, ".,,who
under the pretext of guarantees, sabotaged the work of the Belgians
i n the C o n g o , "^3
The UC aligned itself for a while with the MNC (Lumumba), but
it soon returned to a relatively moderate policy. The UC, on the
whole, joined the Parti National du progrès (PNP) although part of
it remained independent, particularly in Stanleyville,
Analysis of the political Factors and how they affected the
Katanga-Congo Split, in analyzing the political parties of the Congo we note five major tendencies which developed in a short period of
^^Merriam, op, cit, p, 167-168,
33lbid,
92 time prior to independence. The first of these was separatism,
best exemplified by ABAKO rooted in the 800,000 Bakongo tribesmen
living in the Lower Congo. By separatism is meant the expressed aim
of dividing the Congo in order to create new completely independent
states from the Congo's six provinces, separatism in Congo politics
shades almost imperceptibly into federalism and it is often difficult
to determine which system the party is following, in the federal
system, the governor of a province is the representative of that
province, while in a unitary system he represents the central govern
ment, The degree to which powers are divided between the central
and provincial governments in a federated state depends upon the
terms and distribution of power established by the constitution,^^
In the Congo a number of political parties espoused federalism,
but in the case of CONAKAT, federalism often seemed to mean a form
of to ta l independence, while on the other hand ABAKO' s demands fo r
separatism could often be seen to shade into federalism, which again
came close to independence with virtually no responsibility to the
central government,35
A third tendency in Congo politics was exemplified primarily by
the p o lic ie s of the {^iNC (Lumumba), The MNC (Lumumba) was fo r the estab
lishment of a united Congo with a strong central government which would administer the entire territory and make little or no concessions
34ibid. pp, 115-117.
^^Ibid,
93 to federalist tendencies.^6
The fourth tendency was dictated by following a system of moder atio n . The demands of these p a rtie s fo r independence were in general agreement with the Belgian Government's Declaration of January 13,
1959, This declaration stressed the Belgo-Congolese community and outlined no specific timetable for independence. The interfederale and the PNP exem plified th is tendency.3?
A fifth tendency was dictated by espousing a combination of some of the tendencies noted above, combining moderation and support of
Belgian policy with a call for federalism. This is best exemplified by the Union Congolaise (UC).
Looking further into the political factors related to the Katanga-
Congo split we find that in December 1957, when elections were held in
Blisabethville there was no political parties in Katanga province, and the elections were won primarily by outsiders from Kasai province.
To prevent this from happening again CONAKAT was formed. Following the Belgian Government’s Declaration of January 13, 1959 CONAKAT came out in favor of total and loyal collaboration with the Belgians,
Both the Belgians residing in Katanga and CONAKAT fe lt that Katanga should form an independent government. However, the idea of feder alism and collaboration with the Belgians has remained the major aim
^^Ibid.
3?Ib id ,
38 Ibid,
94 of CONMOVT.^^
The ABAKOi under the leadership of Kasavubu, and CONAKAT, under
Tshombe, have often been discussed together, but there are two major differences separating them, CONAKAT, prior to independence, was strongly in favor of a federalist system, although there was some talk of separatism. Here the difference is one of emphasis, A much sharper difference is found in CONAKAT's support of a Belgo-Congolese com munity and close cooperation with the Belgians, both in Katanga and
Belgium, The ABAKO has never taken such a position.
The following quote represents the position held by CONAKAT up to independence;
"CONAKAT.. .demands the creation of a federal state within the framework of which the province of Katanga would be directed and administered by authentic Katangan citizens to the exclusion of all members of other races or tribes and would have the right to separate itself from the rest of the Congo if the defense of Katanga interests made such secessions necessary. The establishment of a Belgo- Katangaise community would also be envisaged," ^
Katanga produced a unique type of African leader in the person of Moise Tshombe, During the period of the Katanga-Congo Split he was probably the least popular leader in all of Africa* Most African leaders regarded him as a t r a i t o r and an im p e ria list stooge, Tshombe was never part of the A frican n a tio n a lis t movement in the Congo and
39Ibid, pp, 133-134,
40lb id ,
41lbid, p. 135.
95 in the days of colonialism he stuck pretty close to the B elgians.4^
Tshombe is in r e a lity a product of K atanga's conservatism . The combination of royal, tribal and business elements in his birth and background set him off on a conservative path, as in other parts of
Africa, chiefs and tribes in Katanga regarded as essentially non progressive and far to the right of typically nationalist, liberal le a d e rs, CONAKAT, Tshombe's party, has a tribal foundation and en joyed the support of a settled and prosperous African middle class, white settlers, and Belgian raining interests,
Conservative, business-oriented Katanga quite naturally became suspicious of the strange workings of the massive bureaucratic machine centered in Leopoldville and of the noisy, nationalist maneuvering^ of the pioneer Congolese political leaders in that city. This atti tude helped to further the concept that Katanga formed a geographic, economic and ethnic unity from the remainder of the Congo, These same Katanganese dreamed of shaking off the distant control of the politicians of Leopoldville, The prospect of Congolese independence gave a renewed inspiration to go it alone,
with the breakdown of the central government in July 1960
4^Interview with Mr, D. Hoffacer, political Officer, US Embassy, Leopoldville, June 28, 1963,
43ib id ,
44ibid,
96 Tshombe saw his chance to create an independent Katanga, if it had not been for the support of Belgian mining interests, Belgian ad visors and Belgian settlers it is quite probable that Tshombe would never have considered such a daring coup,^^
97 CHAPTER VIII
THE SCCIO-CULTÜRAL FACTORS
General.^ Before the arrival of the Europeans the basic and essential unit of the Congolese people was the clan, it was a living unit which had common religious, social and economic beliefs. The clan included all the descendants of a common ancestor, clan units with common ancestral ties tended to group themselves into larger units such as the tribe, in certain places in the Congo, federations were constituted such as those of the Kingdoms of the Kongo and pakuba or military empires were created like those of the Lundas and payeke, in both cases a centralized power appeared and was the basis for the establishment of a feudal organization, within these political systems numerous associations were created such as brotherhoods, age groups, etc. All of which played an important oart in the social life of the community. The traditional community included various social classes, essentially free men and serfs.
There was no individual ownership of land. Generally the land was considered to be the c o lle c tiv e property of the c lan . The economy was of a subsistence level consisting of food growing, hunting, fishing, and handicrafts.
Religion consisted of private worship of God and public worship of ancestors, but it was covered up with numerous superstitious
^Belgian Congo, Vol I . po, cit, pp. 37-39,
98 beliefs which had come to debase its original source.
The isolation and hostility in which the tribes lived had fav ored the multiplication of dialects.
The Congolese population, sparce and sc a tte re d over an immense and hostile area of forest lands and savannas, changed the face of the country. The Congolese people were continually pulling up stakes and establishing temporary villages elsewhere, and were constantly seeking fresh ground for planting crops. These Congolese tribes, moving as they did century after century in search of richer lands scarred the soil with fires and exhausted its fertility.
The arrival of the Europeans was destined to stop the migratory movements of the tribes and to bring a new way of life to the Congo,
They systematic penetration of the Congo by Europeans commenced in the latter part of the 19th century. This penetration made a profound change on the nature of the Congo and its people, and the transform ation process is still continuing at an ever accelerating pace. The evolution of the Congolese people gravitates between two poles* one is a new ’elite* element representative of the western world; the other, based on the ancient traditional way of life, EVen though many of the 'elites’ have rejected the ancient traditions and customs, they still determine certain reflexes, attitudes, concepts and ideas about life.
To create this profound change in the Africans of the Congo the
Belgians developed a policy of paternalism which molded the education, religion and urbanization of the Congo*
99 policy of Liberalism and paternalism* This policy concentrated
on the well-being of the African with the hope that this policy would
create a contented population,
Belgian law in the Congo guaranteed equality between the races;
however, there was no social equality and discrimination was practiced
throughout the country, paternalism established a policy of superiors
and inferiors. To make the system more palatable to the native Africans
the Belgians established a merit system for rising to a status of a
European, in other words, an inferior who achieved certain distinc
tions such as religion, education, employment, western culture, etc.,
could qualify for the status of a superior. This African was called
an ’évolué’ and he was entitled to all the privileges of the Europeans,
in the Congo th is system never did make much headway because the
Europeans in the area refused to absorb the ’évolué’ and the ’évolué’
had no desire to be absorbed by the Europeans,
p rio r to World War II Congo paternalism had paid o ff in great
dividends. When the great concessionary companies such as Union
Minière found it necessary to move and concentrate thousands of men
around the mines, they took the natives away from their tribal back
ground and moved them into what could be considered western civ ili
zation, They were furnished with houses, food, clothing, medical
care, social welfare, and Christianity, Such activity on the part of the large companies produced impressive material results, what
everyone had overlooked, however, was that nothing was left to the
initiative of the African, in other words this provided an indication
100 2 to the African that he was being treated less than a human being.
After the war, a few warning voices began to be raised in the
Congo which is w ell exem plified in the follow ing quote by G, Malen- greau, in La Revue Nouvelle, dated February 1947;
"The social question, in the Congo as in Belgiuip, is something other than the multiplication of clinics and of swimming pools or a distribution of alms, if tomorrow all the squalid huts that remain in the workers’ quarters could be removed, water and electricity laid on, family allowances and social insurance extended, and wages and their living standards raised, the European companies would have done their duty, but the industrialized native would be very little happier. The object of paternalist policy is to make him someone who is a ss is te d , insured and pensioned, instead of making him a free man; the per son is sacrificed to the individual. Each native is provided with his standarized house, mass-produced furni ture, pre-determined scale of food, his free time regulated to the last detail and without a trace of imagination; on top of which, to stop him making an unwise use of his money, a part of his wages is replaced by payment in kind, Man is turned into a sort of vegetable, in an anticipation of the mechanical earthly paradise of Bernanos, But at all times, men have found freedom in misery preferable to a comfortable slavery, a certain paternalism vis-a-vis the A frican in the Congo w ill doubtless be in e v ita b le f o r a considerable time to come, but we must remember that liberty which has once been taken away is difficult to bring back, we must begin at once with the task of deproletarianizing the native worker and giving him his freedom by progressively causing him to participate him self in the improvements of his conditions of life and in the administration of work camps, in preparation for the day, inevitably still long distant, when he will be able to take part in the direction of the concern itself. The function of the camp leader is not, as most people still imagine, to be the brain of the native worker, but rather to teach the latter to be able to do without him. The object which we seek, after all, is the native’s own happiness, and a man can only receive his true happiness
2 Rpth S lade, op, c i t . , p, 4,
101 at his own hands,
The material well being of the African, comprehensive social legislation, and a primary educational system were all beneficial to the Congolese; however, on the other hand, there were certain gaps. The Congolese had no political responsibility. Neither they or the Europeans residing in the Congo could vote. There was no
’elite’ capable of taking over the leadership. There was a strict censorship of the press preventing free expression, in addition, racial discrimination was prevalent, particularly in the field of education, medical service, housing and government employment.
The turning point in the Congo’s relations with Belgium came during the period 1946-1959 when the ’évolués* began to voice demands for social, economic and political reforms,
Belgian paternalism perished on January 4, 1959 when the riots in Leopoldville erupted because the Belgian Government banned a meeting of ABAKO* The riots had a profound effect on Belgian think ing and the consequence was an abrupt about-face in policy by the
Belgians, on January 13, 1959 the Belgian King and Government announced that the Congo could now accede to independence ’without undue delay',4
prior to the Congo’s independence., and a short time thereafter, some of the ’évolués' - especially those of Katanga - were for com plete independence but with close cooperation with the Belgians, on
^Ibid, pp, 4-5,
State Department, "The Republic of the Congo',' op, cit. p, 5,
102 the other hand there were the followers of Lumumba who were in charge
of the central Government at the time, desiring independence without
the cooperation of the Belgians,
Education and Religion, in the post war years one of the most
frequent demands of the A fricans was f o r higher education. Their
main desire was for educational privileges equal to the whites. Dur
ing these years virtually all of the education in the Congo had been
under the direct supervision of the Roman Catholic Church, The
Government Administration, Big Business and the Church were all in
agreement on the educational policy. It consisted of a primary
education for the masses of the Congolese with higher education
limited to some few who were studying for the priesthood.
After World War II the Catholic monopoly on education was broken
and in 1946 Protestant missions were allowed in the Congo, However,
it was not until the 1950’s that racial discrimination in education
began to break down and Congolese children were permitted to attend
schools formerly reserved for Europeans, Many of the Europeans were
opposed to this arrangement but the Belgian Government decided to
proceed with the inter-racial education program in the Congo, To make the inter-racial education more palatable to the Europeans, the
natives of the Congo were obliged to appear before a special com mission who examined their educational qualification, their general
standards of living, and their personal hygiene. The ’évolués’ did
not take kindly to this on the grounds that it represented racial
discrimination.
103 The election in Belgium of the Liberal-Socialist Government, in
1954, led to an open clash between the Government and the Catholic
Church in the Congo over the educational policy to be followed in
the Congo, in Rome, a t about the same time the church showed an increasing desire to have the church in Africa mostly African, and for the Catholic Church in the Congo to dissociate evangelization from the colonial system. These two factors caused the Church in the Congo to break its close link with the State,^
AS a result of this break the Congo Administration began to accuse the church of siding with the extremists in their desire for independence.
In the eyes of many .\fricans the Church was closely linked with the colonial authorities and the domination of the church was just as irksome as the state, Africans, especially the 'évolués* were inclined to think that the Church was something associated with their childhood which was no longer important. The Africans in the
Congo regarded Christianity as a foreign importation - something which was s t r i c t l y European,^
The protestants, on the other hand, suffered less than the Cath olics from racial division in their churches, and since they were mainly non-Belgian in nationality, they were less identified with the
Belgian colonial administration.
^Slade, op, cit, p. 33,
^Ibid. p. 33,
104 Although in the latter part of 1954 the Congolese were admitted
to JBuropean primary and secondary schools, it really did not satisfy
the Congolese. There became an ever increasing demand f o r u n iv ersity
education. The policy of the Belgians had been to discourage Congo
lese students from studying abroad, in 1954, pressured by the de mands of the Africans, the Belgians began to allow a few Congolese
to study at Belgian universities, and in 1956 the Belgians opened up the Congo's f i r s t u n iv e rs ity , the C atholic u n iv e rsity of Louvanium at Leopoldville, Two years later a state university was established in Elisabethville, Both universities were inter-racial.
By the time of the Congo’s independence in June of 1960 there were less than twelve Congolese graduates with a college degree.
The education of Congolese women had lagged behind that of men.
The Belgians as well as the African men, failed to realize the im portance of educated women, it was not realized until the 'évolués* who desired to receive Europeans in their homes, were embarrassed because their wives could not speak French and properly welcome the g u ests. As a re s u lt a c e rta in number of boarding schools were estab lished and the women of the Congo began acquiring an advanced educa tion, The social services which developed in the Congo after the war also provided an increased educational opportunity for the Congolese women, in conjunction with the social services, the Belgians con ducted a campaign of mass education, one medium adopted was an enormous film program which was the best in all Africa, This was organized by the Catholic missionaries and became known as the Congo's
105 Catholic Cinema center, it acted as a religious-social supplement to government propaganda and produced well over a hundred original 7 films for mass education.
Education in Katanga province has been considered to be better than that of the other provinces of the Congo because of the activities of union Minière which has operated over 70 schools in that area.
Urbanization, This is particularly characteristic of the Congo where the cities, though largely created by Europeans are nevertheless predominantly African in population and orientation,^
The growth of urbanization was unusually rapid in the Congo dur ing and after the Second World War, It represents, however, a move ment of older standing since it is one of the outcomes of the policy directed to the stabilization of labor which was originally adopted for the mines in Katanga and has since been followed by other European 9 undertakings.
The growth in certain cities during the years prior to independence was spectacular, in 1946 Leopoldville had a population of about 110,000
Africans; by 19 60 the population of the city had increased to some
400,000,^^ Leopoldville owes its initial growth to its strategic posi-
^Maurice N. Hennessy, The Congo (New York; Frederick a , Praeger, 1961) p, 70.
^The United States and Africa", The American Assembly, (New York; Columbia University, June 1958) p7~112^
^Lord Hailey, An /Vfrican survey Revised 1956 (London; Oxford Univ. Press, 1957) p, 583,
-^Philippe Schuyler, op, c it,, pp, 65-85,
106 tion as the terminus of the navigable Congo River and the point of outward shipment from which palm oil and other tropical products from the Upper Congo are sent by r a il to M atadi.
Elisabethville h^d increased in population from a total of approximately 27,000 in 1946 to some 150,000 by 1 9 6 0 . Elisabeth ville' s growth is attributed to the large scale exploitation of m inerals.
Stanleyville, during the same period, increased from just over 12 17,000 to approximately 46,000.
It has been estimated that approximately 47 per cent of the work ing population in Katanga and Leopoldville provinces come from distant regions outside the provincial borders - the Kasai, orientale and
Equator provinces, a certain amount of this urbanized population is admittedly only temporary, depending on the changing economic situa tion, However, at the time of independence there appeared to be an increase in the resident African population of Leopoldville and Elisa b e th v ille ,
The city patterns in the Congo in the period prior to independence were created by legal procedures rather than private practice. The
Belgian Governments policy prevented Africans from owning land in the urban areas and as a result established 'neutral zones' to isolate the
l l lb id ,
^^Lord Hailey, op, cit, p. 583,
13philippe Schuyler, op. cit, pp, 65-85,
107 native sections from the w h i t e s , ^4
AS previously mentioned the Belgians desired to form a middle class of Congolese, to encourage this stratification the Belgians encouraged a policy of self-employment in the urban areas. In pursuit of this program the Belgians issued in 1954 some 7,080 licenses to native entrepreneurs (approximately 7,3 per cent of the labor force) as against some 2,800 in 1944, The only problem with this increase was that more than one third of the licenses were issued to Portuguese Africans en tering the Congo from Angola,
m the native sections of the urban areas of the Congo, both the
Catholic church and the State carried on a determined melting pot pol icy, Tribal consciousness, nevertheless, continued to play a great part in preventing integration of the tribes. An inquiry by the Belgian
Government into some 1,100 marital unions in the urban areas of the
Congo revealed that 983 were tribal, 84 intertribal and 33 interracial.
The intertribal union usually involved the educated men of the 'evolue* class and foreigners,
in the urbanized areas of the Congo extended family ties remain significant in social life. They are maintained primarily through the practice of 'Matanga*, or urban family rites, and through the
^4j, Comhaire, "some Aspects of Urbanization in the Belgian Congo", Ajaerican Journal of Sociology (July 1956) pp, 8-9,
^^Ibid, p. 10.
^^Ibid, p, 11,
108 organizations founded in the cities on a territorial or professional
basis which reflect no disposition towards accepting western culture,
when considering urbanization in the Congo it is necessary to
look at the functions of union Minière in this field.
The union Minière of uaut Katanga has done much in the field of
uruanization for the ^frleans in Katanga, The 'stabilization of labor'
policy established in 1927 by the Belgian Government attempted to form
ulate the proportion of laborers which could be taken from their hab
itual environment and employed in European enterprises. This policy
brought about a definite policy of stabilization in the mines and other
industries of Katanga. Although the type of accommodations provided
its employees is that of a typical African villa^'e it has something of
an urban c h a r a c te ris tic . The huts are of good p a tte rn and w ell b u ilt;
social services are provided on a generous scale and medical treatment
is well organized. The recruiting conditions established in Katanga
by union Minière provide tor lubnrers to be accompanied, if possible,
by their families, and for family allowances to be paid to married
employees, in 1U50 about 46 per cent of all workers in Katanga copper mines had more than 10 years of continuous service and only 24 per cent had worked for less than three years,
The union Minicre has tended over the years to recruit a sub stantial part of its labor force from the ponulaticns of the Kasai
^^Ibid. p. 12
^^Lord Hailey, op. c it , pp. 280-286
109 province, in 1956, for example, it was estimated that 35 per cent
of the population of Elisabethville, and 53 per cent of the workers
employed by union Minière originated from the Kasai,The presence
of this alien element whose language, customs and traditions differed
considerably from those of the resident tribes made them all the more
conscious of their mutual differences. The flaluba of the Kasai, for
example, who make up the bulk of the workers employed by Union Minière,
although ethnically related to the Baluba of Katanga, nevertheless,
form a distinct cultural group, important cultural, linguistic and
historical factors have also marked them off from the Lunda, the
Bayeke the Tshokwe and o th e r trib e s of Katanga, Moreover, the f a c t
that they were physically removed from their original tribal areas and permanently exposed to an industrial environment probably accounts for their nationalistic spirit.20
The ethnic particularisms of Kat&nga are further noted by the heavy concentration of industry in the southern part of the province -
in the LUalaba and Haut Katanga districts, particularly, where the
three major mining centers of Elisabethville, Jadotvilie and Kolwezi
are located. This unequal distribution of industrial development means
a difference in social welfare, commercial centers, communication facilities, schools and hospitals. This has meant that the Baluba of
^^Rene Lemarchand, "The Limits of Self-D eterm ination; Katanga", The American Pol i t i c a l Science Review (June 1962) p, 406,
^°Ibid,
110 the northern region of Katanga have remained largely insulated from the unsettling influences generated by the spread of urbanization,'^^
Analysis of the gocio-cultural factors and how they affected the
Katanga-Qi ngo S p lit, BY estab lish in g a policv of liberalism and paternalism in the Qengc the Belgians created the force which was to put an end to goj.gian rule in the country.
The B'^lgi^ns created a cadre of 'évolués' to serve as a middle class between the Europeans' and the remainder of the Congolese. These
'évolués' were to be as‘-iini In tod into the nuci'pean C"'i'iiuity ?.nd would render a steadying influence on the other Congolese and support the
Belgians in the exploitation of their country, ^yhat the Belgians failed to realize was that a middle class gave the Congolese people the element with Wiich to strive for complete independence.
The 'évolués* became united in one aim - independence - but when independence was granted an internal struggle for power and orestige be g an, Katanga, led by Moise Tshombe and qodefroid Nginongo, respective leaders of the Lunda -^nd rayeke tribes, demanded independence and decided to secede from the Republic of the ccngo.
in t o socio-cultural factors we also noted that many of the large trib es of the Ccngo do not liv e in one homogenecus land u nit.
An example of this is the naluba tribe concentrated in northern Kelt- anga and the eastern Kasai. The naluba are a large, vigorous, and intell igent tribe which had the misfortune of being a minority in both
^ \ b i d .
I l l provinces. Their tribal-based party in Katanga and in Kasai the
BALUBAKAT i n i t i a l l y a llie d themselves w ith Lumumba's MNC* They re a l
ized that by supporting Lhmiimba they were doing the only thing to
avoid an isolation of their tribe and of escaping the domination of
Kasai and Katanga, When Kalonji broke with Lumumba and raised the banner of independence over the Baluba area of Kasai, he realized that he had placed the Kasai section of the Baluba in danger of this isolation they had sought to avoid. To reduce the danger of this isolation they embraced a loose federalist movement. This brought them into closer contact with Tshombe and Kasavubu, and into further conflict with the dominant tribal group in Kasai, the Lulua which were allied with Lumumba, The Katanga Baluba had refused to follow
Kalonji when he broke away from Lumumba, In Katanga the Baluba were fighting a defensive action against an attempt by the majority tribes, who were united in CONAKAT, to dominate the province. This division placed the Baluba tribe under fire in both provinces. They were massacred in Katanga by Tshombe*s fo rces and in the Kasai by Lumumba's nationalist,^^
The fact that the Baluba were killed in large numbers by opposite armies was not caused by an animosity towards them as a race and there was no policy to kill them off as a tribe. The tragedy of the Baluba is that the wheels of fortune was against them. The action of Kalonji
p O C olin Legume, op, c i t , pp, 123-124,
112 in trying to set up a separate state without a large enough army to 2*2 defend it proved to be the downfall of the Baluba.
Tribalism plays a large part in the sccio-cultural arena of the
Congo. AS a direct result of tribalism we found the provincial govern ment of Katanga, at the time of secession claiming that since Katanga had no social, cultural or linguistic patterns similar to the rest of the Congo she should be a separate and independent country, or at least a closely federated state within the Republic of the Congo,
^^Ibid, p, 124.
113 CHAPTER IX
THE MILITARY FACTORS
General* The Force publique, a creation of the Belgians for
the defense and internal security of the Congo, turned on its former
master and in ten critical days the Belgians had lost the greater
part of their 75 years in the Congo,
with the mutiny of the Force publique during the first week
of independence, everything changed; it destroyed what looked like
a peaceful transition to independence; it killed cooperation between
the Belgian and the Congolese; it splintered the alliances of the
coalition government; it opened the way for foreign intervention; it wrecked internal security and it presented Tshombe with the chance
of declaring the secession of Katanga,'^
Force publique. The Congolese Army was created by the order of Leopold II in 1886, The first troops, consisting chiefly of vol
unteers from all of Africa soon gave way to Congolese enlisted men who were either volunteers or levies furnished by tribal chiefs.
The officers at first came from all over Europe but this was changed at the turn of the century and became almost entirely Belgian- o ffic e re d ,
under the Belgians the Congolese Army had a twofold mission;
to defend the Congo from enemy attack and to provide internal security,
Icolin Le gum, op, cit, p. 110.
114 TO accomplish this mission the porce publique consisted of a general headquarters, three groups to which were added an independent brigade, a defense u n it fo r the region of the Lower Congo, a company of Congolese commandoes, air units, and various other units such as transport and supply. Each of the three groups was detailed to serve two provinces and is divided into 'encamped troops’ and 'troops as signed to territorial duty', The latter were placed permanently at the disposal of the civil authorities while the 'encamped troops' could be requisitioned by the civil authorities to restore order in case of public disturbances.
Discipline within the Force publique under the Belgians was by
African army standards, excellent. Life on and off duty was care fully regulated. The Congolese soldier accepted the harsh discipline well and felt that his new way of life was superior to tribal ways.
He was loyal to the Force publique as an institution and a way of life, but not to the state or nation, which to him was merely a foreign power represented by Belgian officers. He readily fired upon his own countrymen provided they did not belong to his own tribe, as a result, troops employed in punitive operations against the Congolese were regularly drawn from distant parts of the country. The civilian population regarded the Force publique with respect born of fear; the presence of troops not normally in an area generally meant that trouble 3 had occurred or could be expected.
^Belgian Congo, Vol I,, op, cit, p, 195,
^Area Handbook, op, c it,, pp, 622-623,
115 All officers of the Force publique were as previously mentioned
Europeans, mainly Belgians, who volunteered for service in the Congo,
They were under contract to serve for 3 years, at the end of which they could contract fo r 3 more years or retu rn home. The pay scale of officers serving in Africa was in no way related to the pay of the same grades in Belgium, The incentive of increased pay and allow ances and the automatic promotion of one grade upon arrival made colon ial service attractive,4
All enlisted grades from the lowest to the highest received the same base and longevity pay, increases depending on time in grade.
The highest enlisted rank, first sergeant major with 18 years of service and 10 years in grade, drew 600 francs in base pay and 2,610 francs for monthly pay increase for time in grade. The Non-commissioned o ffic e r with 21 years of service and 21 years of time in grade drew
600 francs in base pay and 3,072 francs monthly increase, or a total of 3,672 francs per month, the equivalent of $73,44,^
since i t s creatio n in 1886 and p rio r to the mutiny of June 1960 there have been several incidents of mutiny in the Force publique, in 1895 the Batetela elements of the Force mutinied when their chief,
Gongo Lutete, was executed and as a result of this mutiny several
Belgian officers were killed. Two years later the Batetela element again mutinied while on a mission towards the Nile to head off the
4ibid, p, 625,
^Ib id ,
116 Dervishes, in 1944 another mutiny occurred in Luluabourg and result ed also in the killing of several Belgian officers,^
In early I960 the Force publique was considered the best trained and disciplined fighting force in central Africa, however the events immediately following the independence day celebrations failed to justify its reputation, soldier mutinied against their white officers, demanding officer rank for their own people, increased pay and a fair share of the spoils which in their minds should have accompanied inde pendence.
The Congo's hope for a peaceful transition to independence lasted less than one week, on July 4, at Camp Hardy (near Thysville, between
Leopoldville and the sea ), members of the Force publique, armed with knives, threatened the Belgian officers and broke into the armory and helped themselves to arms and ammunition, on July 5, trouble started in the Leopold II Camp, where the soldiers of the Force publique had assembled to discuss independence and their grievances. The men ex pressed strong resentment against Lnmumba's decision to appoint Bel gians to the national defense posts and on July 6, they sent a dele gation to Lumumba. Lumumba told them that he intended to stand firm by his appointment of Belgian officers, on July 7, the Force reacted more strongly and attacked a ministerial car. The Cabinet of the
Republic of the Congo realizing that they were losing control de cided to comply with the request of the soldiers and agreed to remove
^Legum, op, cit, pp, 111-113,
117 Lieutenant General Emile Jansen, Commander of the Force publique and his staff. It was also agreed that all Congolese non-commissioned officers should be promoted one rank, gut their proposals were too
late and failed to achieve their purpose,^
on July 8 the rebel element in the Force had secured the promises of the government to replace all white officers with Congolese, Bel gians were invited to remain only as technical advisers to the Army, not in p o sitio n s of command,^
on July 9, president Kasavubu, as Commander in chief of the Army, and prime Minister Lumumba, as Minister of Defense, promoted former sergeant Major Victor Lundula to Major General and Commander of the
Congolese Army,^
The best of the new officers was a young political journalist who had left the Congolese Army in 1956 after only seven years service.
His name was Joseph Desire Mobuto, At the time of independence he was a s ta te secretary in P a trice Lumumba's Government, Eight days a f te r independence Mobuto found himself a colonel and Chief of Staff of the
Array, within two months General Lundula fell out with president
Kasavubu and Mobutu succeeded him,
on July 11, Belgian paratroopers flown from Belgium occupied
Leopoldville and in the next few days deployed to all parts of the
^Ib id , 109-110,
^Area Handbook, op^. c it, p. 629,
^Ib id .
118 country. Their arrival was the signal for the rebellion of the Force
publique to flare up everywhere. This was also the day that Moise
Tshombe chose to proclaim the secession of Katanga.
Analysis of the M ilitary Factors and how they affected the Katanga-
Congo S p li t. The Force publique su ffered from two basic weaknesses;
the bulk of the men were illiterate , often drawn from the most back
ward p a rt of the country and there was no opportunity fo r the Congo
lese to become o ffic e rs
prior to independence several attempts were made to persuade the
Commander of the Force publique to announce plans for Africanizing
the Army but nothing was done. At the time of independence the color
lin e in the army was rig id ly enforced.
The training of the Congolese soldier was directed towards pro ducing a tough and rough army. The Congolese soldier suffered from
it and learned to fear it. The men knew how to shoot and fight but did not know why or whom to shoot or fight,
The Belgian officers failed miserably in their assessment of the reliability of the Force publique. They considered it to be the best disciplined and most loyal Army in central Africa, What they failed to consider was that the Force publique, although an excellent
lOlbid, p, 113,
^^Ib id ,
12 Edwin s, Munger, African Field Reports, 1952-1961 (Cape Town; G, Struik, 1961) p, 179,
119 fighting unit, had a history of mutinies under the Belgians,
The Congolese so ld ie rs had been led to believe by demagogue
Congolese politicians that freedom meant Utopia, Yet at independence the Force publique was informed that they could continue to serve under Belgian officers. This infuriated them and as a result they revolted, not only against the Belgian officers an I white civilians 13 but against Congolese officials and Congolese civilians,
Wben Moise Tshombe of Katanga noticed that the central Govern ment had lost control of the Force publique he seized the opportunity to declare Katanga independence and called for the Belgian Government to furnish him with troops to safeguard his Katanga,
with the removal of the European officer cadre and the appoint ment of officers from the ranks, all semblance of discipline and control in the Anay disappeared, within two months of the Army's mutiny it had splintered more or less along tribal lines; what had been one central command became four regional commands under local political leaders (Kasavubu-Mobuto representing the central govern ment; Kalonji; Gizenga; and Tshombe), Their strength and their con trol over their troops more often than not depended upon their ability to pay them,14
l^ Ib id ,
l^Area Handbook, op, cit. p, 630.
120 CHAPTBR X
CONCISIONS
in the analysis at the end of each chapter this writer has at- teaqited to show how each factor of power played a part in bringing about the gatsnga-congo Split.
Where does the blame lie for the Congo crisis? With the Bel gians? with the Congolese? or was it just an instance of the cold war?
The Belgians definitely bear a share of the blame, we need only look at the era of Leopold H and the subsequent era of Belgian paternalism to see how the ground work was laid for the crisis.
Leopold II with various concessionary companies ran a regime as cruel and mercilëss as any in history. Murder, torture and forced labor were everyday occurrences and the Congolese were the victims.
under the era of paternalism, Belgian policy did little to en hance the educational level of the Congolese or to prepare them for eventual self-government, paternalism was a policy of superiors and inferiors with little chance for an inferior to become a superior, paternalism presented to the Congolese one of his greatest grievances
'failure to be treated as a human being*.
Hand in hand with paternalism were the catholic Church and Belgian financial houses. The Catholic Church was more than willing to go along with the policy of paternalism as long as they had the say-so on religious matters in the cnngo. The Belgian financial houses were
1 2 1 among the first to encourage and support Katanga's secession because of the fear of nationalization by the central government.
The Belgians were also responsible for creating an illiterate army and over a period of some 75 years failed to permit even a token
Africanization of the officer corps. A* a result, during the first week of independence they mutinied against their Belgian officer and became the rogue elephant of the Congo.
what about the Congolese? They must also take a share of the blame. Their history prior to independence was one of disunity; by disunity this writer is referring to the animosity which existed be tween the various tribes. Some people tend to believe that tribal ism is a thing of the past in Africa and that urbanization has created a new type of individual - the independent thinker. T^e African may well be an independent thinker but as in the Congo hid thinkings are still influenced by his tribal culture, individuals the world over do not live alonp - they must belong to a group because the group provides them with security; be he a tribal African from the bush or an urbanized African, he will in time of danger or crisis desire that security furnished by the tribe.
in the Congo, political parties strongly reflected tribal and provincial divisions. T^is placed into the political arena of the
Congo some ten or twelve prominent parties making it virtually im possible for any one party to gain control. The government at inde pendence was a coalition government with various party leaders jockey ing for positions of power.
122 Tribalism, the biggest thorn to African nationalism, was paramount in the Congo crisis.
What about the cold war? it must also share part of the blame because if it were not for the cold war the united states and other countries of the western Bloc would not have placed pressure on the
Belgian which forced them to grant independence to the Congolese be fore they had the opportunity to prepare the congolesé for take over.
T^e Congolese were not qualified to take over the government, they lacked the leaders, the administrative personnel and the know-how to manage a country of the complexity of the Congo.
In spite of the fact that the Congolese lacked the capabilities for self-government it must be remembered that the spirit of Congolese nationalism was so great that the Congolese leaders were willing to make an attempt at self-government immediately, rather than undergoing a period of training under Belgian Tutelage.
Katanga is today reunited with the Congo as a direct result of
UN military operations. However, the problem of unification of the
Congo is far from being settled. The factors which created the Congo crisis are still prevalent and hang as an ominous cloud over the
Congo.
1 23 AHdVHOonaia BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Bascora, William R. and Herskovits, Melville j. Continuity and change in African Cultures* Chicago: University of Chicago press, n62%
Calder, Richard. Agony of the Congo, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1961.
De Meyer, Roger, introducing the Belgian Congo and the Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels; office de publicité, 1958,
Doyle, Conan a . The Crime of the Congo. New York. Doubleday, Page and C o ., 1909.
Gordon, King. UN in the Congo. Carnegie Endowment for International peace, 1962^
Hailey, Lord. An African survey Revised 195 6. New York; Oxford University press, 1957.
Hatch, John, Africa Today and Tomorrow. New York; Frederick a* p raeg er, 1962,
Hempstone, smith. Rebels, Mercenaries and Dividends. New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1962,
Hennessy, Maurice N* The Congo, New York; Frederick a . praeg er, 1961.
Hodgkin, Thomas, African political Parties, Baltimore; penguin Books, 1961.
Kimble, George H. T. Tropical Africa, New York; Doubleday and Co, 1962,
Legum, C o lin , Congo D is a s te r, B altim ore; penguin Books, 1961,
Malinowski, Bronslaw, The Dynamics of cultural Change. New Haven; Yale University Press, 1961.
Merriam, Alan p. Congo, Background of Conflict. Northwestern university press, 1961,
Murdock, George peter. Africa, Its peoples and Their culture History, New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959, " "
125 O'Brien, cruise c* To Katanga and Back, a UN Case H istory. New York; Simon and S chuster, 1963,
Ottenberg, Simon and peter. Cultures and Societies of Africa, New York; Random House, 1960,
Schuyler, p h illip p a . Who K illed the Congo, New York; The Devin - Adair Company, 1962,
Segal, Ronald, political Africa. New York, Frederick A. praeger, 1961,
Slade, Rpth, The Belgian Congo, London; university of oxford press, 1961.
Weidner, Donald L. A History of Africa south of the Sahara, New York- Random House, 1962.
Woddis, jack. Africa, the Roots of Revolt, New York; The Citadel press, 1962,
PUBLICATIONS OP THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER LEARNED SOCIETIES
Ball, George W* The Elements in our Congo policy, united states Department of state, Washington; Government printing office, December, 1961.
Belgian Congo, Volume i, Brussels; Belgium’s Government public Relations office, 1959,
Belgian Congo, Volume i i . Brussels; Belgium's Government public Relations office, 1960,
Eighth National Conference of the United States National Commission for Unesco, Africa and the united States, images and Realities, October 22-26, 1961,
Foreign Commerce weekly, Basic Congo Economy Healthy, Department of Commerce, Washington- August à l, 1961,
Hagg, Van Den. The War in Katanga. New York; American committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom pighters, 1962,
The American Assembly. The united States and Africa. New York; Columbia University, June 1958,
126 U. s* Department of Commerce, Economic Report, "Establishing a Business in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda U rundi," Washington; Government Printing office, (undated),
U, S# Department of S ta te , The Republic of the Congo (Mimeographed article) January 24, 1962%
Foreign Areas Studies Division, Special operations Research office. Area Handbook f o r the Republic of the Congo (L eo p o ld v ille), Washington;The American Univefsity, June 1962,
Security Council official Records (SCOR); 15th Year, Supplemental for July, August and September 1960 (S/4382, I)
Security Council official Records (SCOR): 16th Year, Supplemental for January, February and March 1961, (S/4741)
Security Council official Records (SCOR): 16th year. Supplemental fo r O ctober, November and December 1961 (S/4976)
PERIODICALS
Comhairq, J. "Some Asnects of Urbanization in the Belgian Congo," The American Journal of sociology, (July 1956),
"Congo," Africa pigest (June, 1962) pp, 173-174.
"Congo," Africa pigest (August, 1962),
"Congo," Africa Digest (October, 1962) pp. 39-40,
"Congo, Basis for Reconciliation," Africa Digest (April, 1962) p, 137,
"Developments in the Congo," United Nations Review (February, 1962), pp. 33-38.
"Developments in the Congo," united Nations Review (March, 1962) p. 18,
"Doing Business amid Congo C risis," Business Week (December 9, 1961),
Duehnelt-Leddihn, E,V. "What about Katanga," N ational Review (October 21, 1961),
"Katanga," The Reporter (March 30, 1961),
Lemarchand, Rene. "The Limits of Self-Determination - Katanga," The American political Science Review. (June, 1962).
127 "Moving 50,000 Congo Refugees from Camp Squalor to & New Life," United Nations Review (Ju ly , 1962) pp. 36-39.
Munger, Edwin S. A frican Field Reports, 1952-1961, Cape Town; G. Struk, 1961%
"Report by the officer in Charge of UN Operations in the Congo," United Nations Review (March, 1962) pp, 53-60.
"Security council Insists on finding of secessionist Activities in the Congo," United Nations Review (December, 1961) pp, 6-10,
"The Congo, A Move Towards Reconciliation," United Nations Review (January, 1962) pp. 6-7 and 44.
"United Nations Actions Relating to the Congo," United Nations Review (May, 1962) page 36-39. '
"United Nations Actions Relating to the Congo," United Nations Review (December 30, 1961) pp, 39-41,
"United Nations Actions Relating to the Congo," United Nations Review (October, 1962) pp, 36-38,
NEWSPAPERS
The New York Times, December 1, 1962 - January 31, 1963,
The Washington R ost, November 1, 1962 - January 31, 1963,
128