Katanga: the Congo’S Forgotten Crisis
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KATANGA: THE CONGO’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS Africa Report N°103 – 9 January 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. SECURITY...................................................................................................................... 2 A. THE MAI-MAI OF NORTHERN KATANGA...............................................................................2 1. Losing control............................................................................................................2 2. Buying peace with bicycles .......................................................................................3 3. The hunt for Gédéon..................................................................................................4 B. THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY ...................................................................................................4 1. The conflict between “Originaires” and “Non-Originaires”.....................................4 2. The division between north and south .......................................................................5 3. Urban unrest and electoral competition .....................................................................6 C. KINSHASA IN KATANGA: JOCKEYING FOR POWER BEFORE ELECTIONS .................................8 1. The politics of mining................................................................................................8 2. The Kilwa incident...................................................................................................10 3. The April 2005 secession attempt............................................................................11 III. KEEPING THE PEACE.............................................................................................. 12 1. Integration of armed groups and demobilisation of combatants..............................12 2. MONUC’s deployment and mandate ......................................................................14 3. Good governance and abuse of power.....................................................................14 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 16 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ................................................................17 B. MAP OF KATANGA ..............................................................................................................18 C. GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................................................19 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................21 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA...........................................................22 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................24 Africa Report N°103 9 January 2006 KATANGA: THE CONGO’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Katanga province is one of the most violent yet neglected The election campaign has reignited conflict between regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most native Katangans and immigrants from Kasai province. of its problems are the same as those that are systemic in Under Belgian rule, many Luba from Kasai came to run the rest of the country but it needs urgent attention the mining companies and state administration, creating because it is both the heartland of national politics and the tensions manipulated by politicians, who in 1992-1993 nation’s most mineral-rich province, a potential economic organised militias to ethnically cleanse the province. dynamo whose mines once produced 50 per cent to 80 More than 5,000 Luba were killed. The Union of per cent of the national budget. If the March 2006 Congolese Nationalists and Federalists party (UNAFEC), elections are to be peaceful and have a chance to produce which is run by some of the same figures who led the a stable, legitimate government, both foreign and violence in the early 1990s, is using its youth gangs to domestic actors need to pay particular heed to the key intimidate its opposition, who are often Luba. Leaders of province while doing more and doing it immediately to the party’s youth wing have called for “necklacing” integrate the army, eliminate parallel chains of command opponents with burning tyres. and eradicate corruption. Waiting for the elections to put a new government in place before moving on those issues, The violence in the remote areas of northern Katanga as present international strategy implies, has it the wrong is tightly linked to actors in Kinshasa. During the war, way around. Laurent Kabila created Mai-Mai militias in the region to stem the advance of Rwandan-backed rebels. These The home province of President Joseph Kabila and many militias, bolstered by arms from officials in Kinshasa other senior Kinshasa politicians is divided by three as recently as 2004, have not been integrated into the conflicts: tensions between southerners and northerners, national army and are fighting each other and the between outsiders and natives, and between Mai-Mai army over poaching and taxation rights. militias and the national army. It is past time to address these problems. The government The north-south competition has become pronounced has primary responsibility for security in the province. It since Laurent Kabila, a northerner and father of the must take steps to integrate the Mai-Mai militias into the current president, Joseph Kabila, seized power by national army and arrest commanders guilty of war overthrowing the Mobutu dictatorship in 1997. The south crimes. After exhausting all peaceful means, it should is one of the most mineral-rich areas of the continent, deploy integrated army brigades to Katanga to dismantle whose copper and cobalt deposits have prompted recalcitrant armed groups. The UN mission (MONUC) Katangan politicians – mainly northerners – to cultivate should play an important role in these operations. It has personal networks in the local security forces to protect been efficient in dealing with similar militia in the Ituri their interests and threaten their rivals. These officials are district, where 14,000 combatants have been demobilised, resented by southerners, who feel excluded from the and the Katanga militias are not as well armed or wealth of the province. This rivalry has triggered organised. However, the minimal reinforcement – an 800- violence. In October 2004, for example, the army killed strong battalion – authorised in late 2005 by the Security over 70 civilians while suppressing a rebellion by a Council for the province is insufficient. The 2,590-strong ramshackle militia in the mining town of Kilwa. In May brigade asked for by the Secretary-General is needed. 2005, officials alleged a secession plot in Lubumbashi and arrested south Katangan politicians and military In Katanga, as elsewhere in the country, bad governance officers. Both operations appear to have been prompted and impunity are closely linked to violence. Officials use by Kinshasa politicians eager to protect their mining parallel chains of command in the army and interests and to squash opposition. administration to protect their interests and embezzle state funds. The justice sector is too weak and politicised to curb these excesses. Current levels of corruption and Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis Crisis Group Africa Report N°103, 9 January 2006 Page ii abuse of power are themselves sources of instability that include provisions in the electoral law to outlaw threaten the transition and could compromise elections, and punish hate speech, especially hate speech while discontented politicians are likely to take advantage directed toward ethnic groups. of the weak state to stir up trouble and contest election 7. Reaffirm that the National Demobilisation and results. Donors should take a firmer stance now on Reintegration Commission (CONADER) has corruption and impunity. Their aid – over half the present responsibility for demobilising armed groups in national budget – gives leverage to impose stricter Katanga and prevent other groups, such as the supervision of funds, like what is being attempted in Church Program for Peace and Conflict Liberia. They should also give more support to Congolese Transformation and Reconciliation (PAREC), institutions charged with good governance that are trying from undertaking competing programs. to curb corruption, such as courts and parliamentary commissions. To the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General and MONUC: RECOMMENDATIONS 8. Raise MONUC’s troop ceiling by 2,590, as requested by the Secretrary-General in order to To the Transitional Government of the Democratic deploy a full brigade of peacekeepers to northern Republic of the Congo: Katanga and equip this brigade with a clear concept of operations that authorises robust 1. Arrest the military commanders in the Mai-Mai cordon and search and demilitarisation operations and other armed Katangan groups who are like those used in Ituri. suspected of human rights abuses, paying special attention to those believed responsible for the 9. Instruct MONUC to carry out its mandate to events in Ankoro in 2002, Kilwa in October 2004, monitor the arms embargo, especially at the and