Ukraine Against Herself: to Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, Or Neutral? by Jeffrey Simon
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No. 238 Strategic Forum February 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? by Jeffrey Simon candidate for membership in either the Euro- Ukraine has consistently tried to have it both Key Points pean Union or NATO. ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian political Under these circumstances, the chal- leaders’ aspirations for membership in Euro- Since independence, Ukrainians have lenge is to provide Ukraine sufficient time to Atlantic institutions have been driven, in part, been evenly split between those who desire consolidate successful democratic gover- to be part of the Euro-Atlantic (European nance and develop domestic consensus on by the desire to solidify independence from Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) this critical strategic choice. Rather than Russia. This impulse has roots that go back to community and those who gravitate toward pressing Ukraine toward early accession, the the earliest days of its independence, when the Eurasia (Russia and the Commonwealth of new U.S. administration should keep open fate of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on Independent States). During the 1990s, when the possibility of NATO membership, but for Ukrainian territory was being decided and Kyiv the European Union and NATO were focused the time being encourage Ukraine to follow appealed to the United States and its NATO on Central Europe and Russia was politically the model of Finland, another nonaligned Allies for security guarantees against the spec- down and economically weak, Ukraine was Partner for Peace, as it attempts to reconcile able to have it both ways. the competing popular factions in the country ter of Russian resurgence. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has and to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and Yet at the same time, Ukraine’s history, made significant progress developing a Euro- Eurasian neighbors. By nurturing its politi- culture, and economy are closely entwined Atlantic–style democratic political system, cal stability, the United States will enhance with Russia’s. Ethnic Russians and others demonstrated a vibrant open media and civil Ukraine’s value to the Alliance over the living in eastern Ukraine are more nega- society, and successfully advanced civilian longer term. oversight of its Euro-Atlantic–oriented military, tive about NATO and the EU than those in the western part of the country because they which has built strong ties with NATO. The Dilemma Despite this progress, Ukrainian opinion see such integration with the West as jeop- remains sharply divided on integration Ever since Ukraine declared independence ardizing a good relationship with Russia. into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Attempts by in August 1991, its main security preoccupa- Since about half of Ukraine’s population Ukrainian leaders and some current members tion and challenge has been its search for iden- is Russian-speaking, and about 17 percent of NATO to promote a Membership Action Plan, in the hope that public opinion would tity. Nostalgic to maintain its long and close are ethnic Russians, the country’s prospec- follow, have backfired. Not only has Russia, association with Russia, which has become tive membership in NATO and the EU has now more autocratic, responded with missile increasingly competitive with the North been met with apprehension by roughly 60 threats, cutting gas supplies, and meddling in Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the percent and 45 percent of Ukraine’s citi- Ukraine’s domestic politics, but the cross- European Union (EU), and at the same time zenry, respectively. In fact, roughly 45 per- cutting internal and external pressures are eager to become a more cooperative and close cent of the population would rather partici- aggravating profound political instability, partner with the Euro-Atlantic community, pate in Russia’s Common Economic Space actually making Ukraine a less appealing No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 1 than the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Hence, ■ ■In the March 2002 election, of the While an Orange (Yushchenko and Ukraine’s progress toward its government’s seven Rada parties, only Yushchenko’s Our Tymoshenko) coalition attempted to form stated goals of NATO and EU member- Ukraine (NU), which received 23.6 percent of a government in coalition with Oleksandr ship has been anything but easy, stumbling the vote and 112 seats, sought membership Moroz’s Socialist Party, Moroz instead opted over these domestic obstacles, which even in NATO and the EU. Prime Minister Viktor to enter a Yanukovych-led “anti-crisis” gov- 4 years after the Orange Revolution remain Yanukovych was interested in a “single eco- ernment, along with Petro Symonenko’s the most important barrier to the country’s nomic space” to bind Ukraine with Russia, Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), that Euro-Atlantic progress. Kazakhstan, and Belarus. would lead Ukraine in a Eurasian direc- tion. Problems immediately arose over the Internal Symptoms of ■ ■In the March 2006 election, five par- president’s prerogative in foreign and secu- Crisis ties won seats. Again, only Yushchenko’s rity policy and the Rada’s control of the purse This Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian NU bloc (81 seats) supported NATO inte- and power to dismiss ministers. When Prime dichotomy and tension have been reflected gration, while former Prime Minister Minister Yanukovych went to Brussels on in Ukraine’s often tumultuous domestic Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYT (Bloc of Yulia September 14, 2006, to withdraw Ukraine’s bid politics and had an impact upon its con- Tymoshenko) (129 seats) was noncommit- stitutional development. Indeed, since tal, and the other three parties command- Ukraine’s efforts to the Orange Revolution brought Viktor ing a total of 240 seats—a clear majority— define itself as either Yushchenko to the presidency in January were opposed.1 2005 with an agenda to bring Ukraine closer Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian to the Euro-Atlantic community and after In other words, despite the remarkable continue to be plagued four governments marked by political tur- consolidation of democratic governance in by its lack of public and moil, Ukraine’s efforts to define itself as Ukraine and the clear erosion of support for political elite support and either Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian continue to the Communist Party over the past 17 years, absence of strategic focus be plagued by its lack of public and political this has not translated into popular support elite support and absence of strategic focus. for membership in NATO. Indeed, the policy With popular support for NATO and EU differences rapidly metastasized into a strug- for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), integration consistently at only 20 percent gle over constitutional prerogatives between Yushchenko cried betrayal. Conversely, when and 45 percent, respectively, Ukraine’s centrist the president, the prime minister, and the Yanukovych visited the European Union to political parties have not even developed a Rada. When the new government convened request Ukraine’s accession, EU external rela- consensus on the issue in the decade or more in 2006, it was under a constitution that had tions commissioner Benita Ferrer-Waldner that it has been on the national agenda: been amended in December 2004 during the informed him that the EU had no plans to heavily contested presidential elections of offer membership, but instead proposed closer ■ ■Of the eight parties with seats in the the Orange Revolution. No longer could the economic and political ties. This rejection Rada following the March 1998 parliamen- president appoint or fire the prime minis- undermined Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic support- tary elections, only the People’s Movement of ter, who is now selected by a majority of the ers, who took up the argument that NATO Ukraine (with 9.4 percent of the vote and 46 Rada members, changing the power relation- was a first step toward the more popular (but of the Rada’s 450 seats) supported NATO inte- ship between the two. President Yushchenko’s unwelcoming) EU. gration, while the others opposed it, with plat- challenge would now be how to stitch together The foreign policy rift between the pres- forms either to remain allied with Russia in a governing coalition that could put aside ident and prime minister was magnified by the Commonwealth of Independent States past personal and political differences, build confusion over authority and led to a major (CIS) or to be neutral. a consensus on NATO–EU integration, and constitutional crisis. The situation deteriorated convince society of its worthiness to rule. further after the cabinet returned a number of Unfortunately, he failed. presidential decrees unapproved. Yanukovych bypassed the president and foreign minis- ter by conducting negotiations with Russia Dr. Jeffrey Simon is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense Univeristy. Comments may be addressed to Dr. Simon at [email protected]. on Ukrainian membership in the Common 2 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009 Economic Space and providing Russia a stake to reach an uncertain peace on December $72.5 million for UN operations from 1992– in the Ukrainian gas transport system. In 10, 2008, by reforging their Orange coali- 1999, far more than they had expended.5 response, President Yushchenko dissolved the tion. Only time will tell how stable this new In marked contrast, Ukraine’s defense Rada on the grounds that Yanukovych was arrangement will be. ministry had to pay for NATO operations from usurping the president’s powers and subvert- its cash-starved budget, which also meant ing the will of the people. Political Schizophrenia that in order to save money, Ukrainians Political destabilization worsened when While the Ukrainian political leadership deployed for 12 months, while their Polish the government accelerated its efforts to strip has been slower than its neighbors to pub- partners rotated every 6 months.