No. 238 Strategic Forum February 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? by Jeffrey Simon
candidate for membership in either the Euro- Ukraine has consistently tried to have it both Key Points pean Union or NATO. ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian political Under these circumstances, the chal- leaders’ aspirations for membership in Euro- Since independence, Ukrainians have lenge is to provide Ukraine sufficient time to Atlantic institutions have been driven, in part, been evenly split between those who desire consolidate successful democratic gover- to be part of the Euro-Atlantic (European nance and develop domestic consensus on by the desire to solidify independence from Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) this critical strategic choice. Rather than Russia. This impulse has roots that go back to community and those who gravitate toward pressing Ukraine toward early accession, the the earliest days of its independence, when the Eurasia (Russia and the Commonwealth of new U.S. administration should keep open fate of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on Independent States). During the 1990s, when the possibility of NATO membership, but for Ukrainian territory was being decided and Kyiv the European Union and NATO were focused the time being encourage Ukraine to follow appealed to the United States and its NATO on Central Europe and Russia was politically the model of Finland, another nonaligned Allies for security guarantees against the spec- down and economically weak, Ukraine was Partner for Peace, as it attempts to reconcile able to have it both ways. the competing popular factions in the country ter of Russian resurgence. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has and to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and Yet at the same time, Ukraine’s history, made significant progress developing a Euro- Eurasian neighbors. By nurturing its politi- culture, and economy are closely entwined Atlantic–style democratic political system, cal stability, the United States will enhance with Russia’s. Ethnic Russians and others demonstrated a vibrant open media and civil Ukraine’s value to the Alliance over the living in eastern Ukraine are more nega- society, and successfully advanced civilian longer term. oversight of its Euro-Atlantic–oriented military, tive about NATO and the EU than those in the western part of the country because they which has built strong ties with NATO. The Dilemma Despite this progress, Ukrainian opinion see such integration with the West as jeop- remains sharply divided on integration Ever since Ukraine declared independence ardizing a good relationship with Russia. into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Attempts by in August 1991, its main security preoccupa- Since about half of Ukraine’s population Ukrainian leaders and some current members tion and challenge has been its search for iden- is Russian-speaking, and about 17 percent of NATO to promote a Membership Action Plan, in the hope that public opinion would tity. Nostalgic to maintain its long and close are ethnic Russians, the country’s prospec- follow, have backfired. Not only has Russia, association with Russia, which has become tive membership in NATO and the EU has now more autocratic, responded with missile increasingly competitive with the North been met with apprehension by roughly 60 threats, cutting gas supplies, and meddling in Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the percent and 45 percent of Ukraine’s citi- Ukraine’s domestic politics, but the cross- European Union (EU), and at the same time zenry, respectively. In fact, roughly 45 per- cutting internal and external pressures are eager to become a more cooperative and close cent of the population would rather partici- aggravating profound political instability, partner with the Euro-Atlantic community, pate in Russia’s Common Economic Space actually making Ukraine a less appealing
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 1 than the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Hence, ■ ■In the March 2002 election, of the While an Orange (Yushchenko and Ukraine’s progress toward its government’s seven Rada parties, only Yushchenko’s Our Tymoshenko) coalition attempted to form stated goals of NATO and EU member- Ukraine (NU), which received 23.6 percent of a government in coalition with Oleksandr ship has been anything but easy, stumbling the vote and 112 seats, sought membership Moroz’s Socialist Party, Moroz instead opted over these domestic obstacles, which even in NATO and the EU. Prime Minister Viktor to enter a Yanukovych-led “anti-crisis” gov- 4 years after the Orange Revolution remain Yanukovych was interested in a “single eco- ernment, along with Petro Symonenko’s the most important barrier to the country’s nomic space” to bind Ukraine with Russia, Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), that Euro-Atlantic progress. Kazakhstan, and Belarus. would lead Ukraine in a Eurasian direc- tion. Problems immediately arose over the Internal Symptoms of ■ ■In the March 2006 election, five par- president’s prerogative in foreign and secu- Crisis ties won seats. Again, only Yushchenko’s rity policy and the Rada’s control of the purse This Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian NU bloc (81 seats) supported NATO inte- and power to dismiss ministers. When Prime dichotomy and tension have been reflected gration, while former Prime Minister Minister Yanukovych went to Brussels on in Ukraine’s often tumultuous domestic Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYT (Bloc of Yulia September 14, 2006, to withdraw Ukraine’s bid politics and had an impact upon its con- Tymoshenko) (129 seats) was noncommit- stitutional development. Indeed, since tal, and the other three parties command- Ukraine’s efforts to the Orange Revolution brought Viktor ing a total of 240 seats—a clear majority— define itself as either Yushchenko to the presidency in January were opposed.1 2005 with an agenda to bring Ukraine closer Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian to the Euro-Atlantic community and after In other words, despite the remarkable continue to be plagued four governments marked by political tur- consolidation of democratic governance in by its lack of public and moil, Ukraine’s efforts to define itself as Ukraine and the clear erosion of support for political elite support and either Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian continue to the Communist Party over the past 17 years, absence of strategic focus be plagued by its lack of public and political this has not translated into popular support elite support and absence of strategic focus. for membership in NATO. Indeed, the policy With popular support for NATO and EU differences rapidly metastasized into a strug- for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), integration consistently at only 20 percent gle over constitutional prerogatives between Yushchenko cried betrayal. Conversely, when and 45 percent, respectively, Ukraine’s centrist the president, the prime minister, and the Yanukovych visited the European Union to political parties have not even developed a Rada. When the new government convened request Ukraine’s accession, EU external rela- consensus on the issue in the decade or more in 2006, it was under a constitution that had tions commissioner Benita Ferrer-Waldner that it has been on the national agenda: been amended in December 2004 during the informed him that the EU had no plans to heavily contested presidential elections of offer membership, but instead proposed closer ■ ■Of the eight parties with seats in the the Orange Revolution. No longer could the economic and political ties. This rejection Rada following the March 1998 parliamen- president appoint or fire the prime minis- undermined Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic support- tary elections, only the People’s Movement of ter, who is now selected by a majority of the ers, who took up the argument that NATO Ukraine (with 9.4 percent of the vote and 46 Rada members, changing the power relation- was a first step toward the more popular (but of the Rada’s 450 seats) supported NATO inte- ship between the two. President Yushchenko’s unwelcoming) EU. gration, while the others opposed it, with plat- challenge would now be how to stitch together The foreign policy rift between the pres- forms either to remain allied with Russia in a governing coalition that could put aside ident and prime minister was magnified by the Commonwealth of Independent States past personal and political differences, build confusion over authority and led to a major (CIS) or to be neutral. a consensus on NATO–EU integration, and constitutional crisis. The situation deteriorated convince society of its worthiness to rule. further after the cabinet returned a number of Unfortunately, he failed. presidential decrees unapproved. Yanukovych bypassed the president and foreign minis- ter by conducting negotiations with Russia Dr. Jeffrey Simon is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense Univeristy. Comments may be addressed to Dr. Simon at [email protected]. on Ukrainian membership in the Common
2 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009 Economic Space and providing Russia a stake to reach an uncertain peace on December $72.5 million for UN operations from 1992– in the Ukrainian gas transport system. In 10, 2008, by reforging their Orange coali- 1999, far more than they had expended.5 response, President Yushchenko dissolved the tion. Only time will tell how stable this new In marked contrast, Ukraine’s defense Rada on the grounds that Yanukovych was arrangement will be. ministry had to pay for NATO operations from usurping the president’s powers and subvert- its cash-starved budget, which also meant ing the will of the people. Political Schizophrenia that in order to save money, Ukrainians Political destabilization worsened when While the Ukrainian political leadership deployed for 12 months, while their Polish the government accelerated its efforts to strip has been slower than its neighbors to pub- partners rotated every 6 months. But the away the president’s powers. Yushchenko licly promote the virtues of NATO integration, lengthier deployments paid benefits by rais- reacted by firing Prosecutor General its military outreach toward NATO and other ing their professional expertise, which the Svyatoslav Piskun on May 24, 2007; Interior European countries has been fairly impres- military recognized and appreciated.6 As has Minister Vasyl Tsushko retaliated by deploying sive. Even though Ukraine’s first Military been the experience in many other post-com- troops to prevent the newly appointed min- Doctrine in October 1993 specifically rejected munist transition countries,7 it is plausible ister from taking office. When Yushchenko membership in military blocs, it was the first (though no public data are available) that for announced that he was taking control of CIS state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace professional reasons a higher percentage of the interior ministry and ordered its troops (PFP) in February 1994. In December 1995, Ukrainian servicemen support NATO integra- to Kyiv, Tsushko countermanded the order. Ukraine deployed 400 mechanized troops to tion than is found in the wider population. Fortunately, violence was avoided during a NATO’s Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) At the July 1997 Madrid Summit, tense 2-month standoff, which resulted in an and increased the number to 550 in the fol- Ukraine signed a “Charter on a Distinctive agreement to hold new parliamentary elec- Partnership”8 that elaborated new areas for tions. The entire episode, however, strongly consultation and cooperation with NATO, indicated the need for constitutional reform. Ukraine was the to include creating Joint Working Groups The September 2007 parliamentary elec- first country in the on Defense Reform and Civil Emergency tion resulted in a fragile Tymoshenko and Commonwealth of Planning and establishing a NATO Liaison Yushchenko (BYT–NU) coalition government Independent States to Office in Ukraine’s defense ministry. In addi- with 30.7 and 14.2 percent of the vote, respec- join NATO’s Partnership tion to the 2,800 troops to NATO IFOR/ tively, and only 227 seats of the Rada’s 450. for Peace in February SFOR, Ukraine deployed 250 troops to Yanukovych’s Party of Regions (PRU) won 34 1994 Kosovo (KFOR) in September 1999, increas- percent of the popular vote and 175 seats, and ing the force to more than 330 in 2001, the Communist Party acquired 27 seats. As as part of a joint Ukrainian-Polish battal- had been the case during Tymoshenko’s pre- low-on Stabilization Force (SFOR). From 1995 ion.9 Ukraine ratified a PFP Status of Forces vious tenure as prime minister in 2005, she through December 1999, when they withdrew, Agreement (SOFA) in May 2000, condemned and the president found it difficult to work more than 2,800 Ukrainian servicemen took on September 14, 2001, the acts of terror- together, and their political infighting con- part in this NATO mission.2 ism committed against the United States, and tinued. Even after the Russian invasion of What is particularly important, though, signed an Exchange of Classified Information Georgia in August 2008, when Yushchenko is not just the troop numbers. NATO provided Agreement with NATO in 2002.10 criticized Russia and visited Tbilisi (with fel- much-desired operational experience.3 On Ukraine first officially stated its inten- low presidents from Poland, Lithuania, the other hand, the missions were extremely tion to join the Alliance at the Reykjavik Latvia, and Estonia) to render moral sup- costly. While Ukraine had been active in NATO-Ukraine Foreign Ministers session in port to Georgia, Prime Minister Tymoshenko United Nations (UN) peacekeeping opera- May 2002.11 Despite NATO concerns about refused to support him, and her government tions in Angola and in the Former Republic Ukraine’s transfer of air defense equipment collapsed. After months of continued political of Yugoslavia,4 the UN had always reimbursed to Iraq (for example, Kolchuga radars12), turmoil and once again facing the prospect of Ukraine for these operations. Indeed, UN the NATO-Ukraine Commission adopted an new elections, which would most likely result peacekeeping was actually a money-maker for Action Plan at the November 2002 Prague in yet another unstable coalition govern- the Ukrainian armed forces, which received Summit that provides a framework for ment, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko appeared intensified consultations and cooperation.13
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 3 Ukrainian supporters portray this Action 2006 for the retraining and resettlement of port from Washington, President Yushchenko Plan as preparation for its ultimate acces- decommissioned military officers. The third, announced in April 2008 that Ukraine will sion to the MAP. for which the agreement was signed in June also send 15 peacekeepers to Iraq.23 While Ukraine did not participate in 2006, is the largest, allocating €25 million Despite this extensive record of mil- direct military operations in Afghanistan, it over 10 years to destroy 1,000 man-portable itary cooperation, it became abundantly provided overflight rights for NATO military air defense missiles, 1.5 million small arms, clear in the 4 months of “Orange” fac- transports on their way there. Later, in 2003, and 133,000 tons of munitions.19 Surplus tions’ squabbling after the March 2006 par- Ukraine did send 1,650 troops to Operation weapons and ammunition are a serious secu- liamentary election that integration into Iraqi Freedom with the joint Ukrainian- rity issue. Ukraine maintains roughly 16,000 the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and specifi- Polish battalion as part of the Polish-led tons of liquid propellants and nearly 760,000 cally into NATO, was not a high priority for Multinational Division Central-South. After tons of surplus ammunition, of which most Ukrainians, but was instead becom- 30 months and loss of 18 lives, Ukraine with- 480,000 tons have expired their storage terms ing an increasingly divisive issue for the drew from Iraq in December 2005.14 and must be disposed of.20 In 2004, 92,000 country. Yushchenko, who supported Euro- In June 2004, President Leonid Kuchma tons of ammunition exploded at a depot in Atlantic integration, emerged greatly weak- replaced Ukraine’s 1993 Military Doctrine the southern Zaporizhia region, spraying ened, while the Yanukovych-led PRU- with a new one that portrays NATO as the Socialist-Communist governing coalition basis for the European security system and had little interest in convincing society of pledges to pursue Euro-Atlantic integra- in early 2007, public the importance of NATO membership. Some tion.15 At NATO’s June 2004 Istanbul Summit, opinion polls indicated European members of the Alliance were dis- Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk pre- that most Ukrainians turbed by anti-NATO demonstrations that sented the new doctrine as well as Ukraine’s believed NATO was erupted against Sea Breeze military exercises Strategic Defence Bulletin, which stresses fomenting insecurity in Crimea, the hardening of Russia’s posi- that “future membership in NATO and and showed opposition tion on Ukraine-NATO ties, and Yanukovych’s the EU continued to be the main priori- to joining the Alliance September 14, 2006, announcement to the 16 ties of Ukraine’s foreign policy.” After increasing to nearly two- Ukrainian-NATO Commission that Ukraine NATO expressed concerns about the sta- would suspend negotiations on membership, thirds of the electorate tus of Ukraine’s democratic development even though it would enhance cooperation in light of the so-called Gongadze affair,17 with NATO.24 Days later, the Rada adopted President Kuchma issued yet another decree debris and shells and destroying buildings in a resolution supporting Yanukovych, stat- in July 2004 that removed preparations nearby villages.21 To deal with such crises, the ing that NATO membership would be decided for NATO membership from the doctrine.18 NATO-Ukraine 2006 Action Plan established a only via national referendum. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, President special National System of Coordination and In early 2007, public opinion polls indi- Yushchenko once again altered Ukraine’s pol- Cooperation with NATO. cated that most Ukrainians believed NATO icy, reaffirming interest in joining the MAP In 2008, Ukraine maintained about 600 was fomenting insecurity and showed opposi- and NATO and reinstating the provisions service personnel in peacekeeping opera- tion to joining the Alliance actually increas- in favor of joining the EU and NATO in the tions; it had 185 service personnel in KFOR ing to nearly two-thirds of the electorate.25 country’s Military Doctrine. On that basis, and 2 liaison officers (and 150 policemen) in At about the same time, the United States NATO and Ukraine launched an “intensified the UN Mission in Kosovo, and provided 43 began promoting its missile defense system dialogue” on membership in April 2005, and personnel to support NATO’s training mis- in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the military activities proliferated. sion in Iraq.22 In December 2006, President U.S. Senate formally endorsed NATO enlarge- To date, three major projects have been Yushchenko authorized the Ukrainian navy ment by five members, to include Ukraine.26 carried out in Ukraine using NATO/PFP to participate in Operation Active Endeavor These actions, too, were divisive, even within trust funds. The first, completed in 2003 in in the Mediterranean Sea, and in early the Ukrainian cabinet. At a March 16, 2007, Donetsk, destroyed 400,000 anti-personnel 2008 sent 10 Ukrainian peacekeepers to news conference, Defense Minister Anatoliy landmines. Another, led by the Netherlands, serve with the Canadians in Afghanistan. Grytsenko described U.S. missile defense as a was established in Khmelnitsky in January In an apparent effort to win further sup- “benefit . . . [that] could become an impor-
4 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009 tant element of the pan-European secu- scale invasion and Russian President Dmitry nuity is precisely what Ukraine has lacked. rity system,” adding that “Ukrainian and Medvedev’s issuance of a doctrine claiming The country has had nine defense minis- Russian officers, if they want, can famil- the existence of Russian “privileged inter- ters since independence, an average of one iarize themselves with the characteristics ests”29 in the former Soviet space. every 22 months (see table). As has already of these facilities and carry out verifica- President Yushchenko (along with been seen, the deep cleavages over the coun- tion.”27 But Prime Minister Yanukovych, who the three Baltic presidents and Poland’s try’s security orientation have been a major had put NATO on hold, openly warned that Lech Kachynski) went to Tbilisi to ren- contributor to this instability. It should come deployment near Ukraine could harm rela- der moral support and sought a Rada con- as no surprise that the constant leadership tions with Russia. demnation of the Russian invasion, but changes have tended to retard defense reform Since the September 2007 parlia- Tymoshenko instead criticized Yushchenko and to contribute to politicization of the mentary elections, the new government and broke from the coalition. Opposition armed forces, turmoil in the ministry, and has exerted little effort to build a national leaders Yanukovych (PRU) and Symonenko operational disasters. consensus on NATO. After Tymoshenko (KPU) supported Russia and called for offi- The impact of this instability on took over as prime minister once more in cial Ukrainian recognition of Abkhazia and defense reform is visible on a number of December, the new leadership—Yushchenko, South Ossetia. After the government col- fronts, including the stop-and-go history of Tymoshenko, and Rada Speaker Arseniy lapsed, Yushchenko again called for new “Ukrainization” (replacing the Russian lan- Yatsenyuk—again reversed Ukraine’s course elections, which will result in Ukraine’s fifth guage and traditions of the military with on NATO membership, sending a letter (on government since January 2005. January 16, 2008) to NATO requesting a In sum, Ukraine remains schizophrenic MAP at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. and gridlocked. Some internal political forces, Ukraine’s political Predictably, the Russians responded with supported by external forces, want to pull leadership skids back threats and another energy crisis, and when Ukraine in a Euro-Atlantic direction, while and forth, contributing the Alliance convened in Bucharest, the others, also supported by external forces, want to internal instability and Allies were divided and rejected MAPs for closer association with Russia and the CIS. to the Ukrainian public’s Ukraine (as well as Georgia). However, they Hence, Ukraine’s political leadership skids confusion about NATO “agreed that these countries will become back and forth, contributing to internal insta- members of NATO” at some point, adding bility and to the Ukrainian public’s confusion that it was necessary to engage in “intensive about NATO, in the process confirming legit- Ukrainian ones), removal of corrupt offi- engagement . . . at a high political level”28 to imate questions in the minds of some NATO cers,30 and decisions on defense production assess progress on their MAP applications. Allies about the depth of Ukraine’s commit- and procurement. Yet if internal and exter- In the aftermath of Bucharest, confu- ment to Euro-Atlantic integration. nal pressures to move toward NATO mem- sion reigned in Kyiv, Moscow, and among bership have often been divisive and destabi- some NATO Allies as to what the Alliance NATO Influence lizing, close military contact with the NATO really meant by the Bucharest Summit state- At the outset of its existence as an inde- countries through PFP and other mecha- ment, particularly looking forward to NATO’s pendent nation, Ukraine faced daunting, nisms has nevertheless yielded a number of April 2009 60th anniversary summit. Some in even unique, defense reform challenges. With important defense reform benefits. Kyiv hyped the offer of eventual membership 47 million people, it was by far the largest of Depoliticization. Not the least impor- to mask their disappointment in not get- the former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states not tant of these is the progressive depoliticization ting a MAP, while those in Moscow, who were to have inherited its own armed forces from of the armed forces. In the early years, politi- opposed to further NATO enlargement, were the communist predecessor regime—it had cal leaders of all factions tried to use the mili- energized to prevent Ukraine’s accession to build a national security establishment tary for partisan political advantage, as when by dividing the Allies. Disunity in Ukraine from scratch. Lessons from transitions in Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky issued a was exacerbated by the events of August states confronting less severe challenges sug- memorandum urging members of the armed 2008 when Russia responded to Georgian gest that continuity in leadership is neces- forces to vote for President Leonid Kravchuk in President Mikheil Saakashvili’s assertion of sary to stabilize and deepen defense reforms the 1994 presidential election. sovereignty over South Ossetia with a full- so they can take root. Yet this kind of conti-
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 5 A decade later, the norm had changed tinued to hold the armed forces above poli- tled instead into a pattern of civilian defense completely. When President Kuchma directed tics, assuring demonstrators that the armed leadership. After Kuchma defeated Kravchuk Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk to order forces would not be used against the people,31 for the presidency in 1994, he replaced troops to support Kuchma’s chosen successor, while his predecessor, Marchuk, also called Radetsky33 (the minister who had ordered Yanukovych, in the 2004 election, Marchuk on President Kuchma and Prime Minister military personnel to vote for Kravchuk) refused. Kuchma fired Marchuk and rein- Yanukovych to exercise good sense and ensure with Ukraine’s first civilian defense minister, stated Colonel General Oleksander Kuzmuk that there would be no bloodshed in Ukraine.32 Valerii Shmarov, in an attempt to gain con- as minister, but to no avail, as Kuzmuk also Civilianization. Simultaneously, after trol of the armed forces.34 But many military refused to get the military involved in politics. a series of fits and starts, Ukraine seems to personnel lacked confidence in the civilian Indeed, during the Orange Revolution at the have broken with the Soviet model of having a Shmarov, and the poor condition of the armed end of 2004, Defense Minister Kuzmuk con- serving officer as minister of defense and set- forces further contributed to his unpopular-
Ukrainian Defense Ministers and Armed Forces
Defense Minister Appointment Comments Size of Armed Forces* January 1, 1992: Colonel General Oversees creation of Ukrainian armed forces; n 900,000 total August 1991 Kostyantyn Morozov resigns over increasing Communist criticism n 720,000 military n 180,000 civilian
Colonel General Vitaliy Slows “Ukrainization” and discourages political December 1993 Radetsky activities in armed forces
First civilian; Kuchma appointment; continued Valerii Shmarov September 1994 military decline
Colonel General Forced to resign; lies about downing civilian June 1996 Oleksander Kuzmuk airliner over Black Sea
January 1, 2001: Colonel General Forced to resign; air show disaster and continued n 415,850 total November 2001 Volodymyr Shkidchenko degradation of armed forces n 314,395 military (−57%) n 101,455 civilian (−43%) January 1, 2003: Second civilian; fired; refuses to order armed n 390,015 total Yevhen Marchuk June 2003 forces to vote for Yanukovych n 295,495 military (−6%) n 94,525 civilian (−7%)
Return signals failed effort to politicize armed Colonel General September 2004 forces; calls for military neutrality in presidential Oleksander Kuzmuk election
January 1, 2005: Third civilian; stabilizes ministry; armed forces n 285,000 total Anatoliy Grytsenko January 2005 atrophy n 210,000 military (−29%) n 75,000 civilian (−21%) January 1, 2008: Fourth civilian; needs to develop an all-volunteer n 200,000 total Yuriy Yekhanurov December 2007 force by 2010 of 143,000 total n 152,000 military (−28%) n 48,000 civilian (−36%)
*Statistics from Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin Until 2015 (Defence White Paper) (Kyiv: Ministry of National Defence, 2004), 13, 21, 58; White Book 2005: Defence Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, 2006), 13; White Book 2006, 90; and White Book 2007, 15.
6 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009 ity. It was not until 2003 that another civilian Improvement of the planning process at Iraq found itself under enemy fire and was was named to the position, the same Yevhen the strategic level was carried forward after unable to communicate in English with for- Marchuk who would be dismissed—and the Orange Revolution, when, with NATO ward air controllers to request F–16 sup- replaced by a general—for refusing to get the assistance, Deputy Minister Polyakov cre- port.40 These shortfalls were recognized in military involved in the 2004 election. ated a Defence Policy and Strategic Planning the defense ministry’s 2006 and 2007 Target After the Orange Revolution, Department in the ministry that, for the Plans for the armed forces, prepared in sup- Yushchenko appointed Anatoliy Grytsenko first time, linked defense policy to plans.36 port of President Yushchenko’s February as defense minister and Leonid Polyakov The influence of exposure to NATO was also 2007 National Security Strategy of as first deputy minister. As former military evident in a series of organizational steps Ukraine, which stressed the need to improve officers with professional military educa- undertaken by Grytsenko and Polyakov. interoperability under the ministry’s so- tional experience in the United States and Based on lessons learned from participating called NATO Action Plan. substantial exposure to Western models of in NATO expeditionary operations, Ukraine’s The ministry’s main priorities were to defense management, both Grytsenko and defense leaders reorganized the General reduce and reorganize the troops to better Polyakov understood better than any of their Staff to fit assigned missions and to align suit the threats faced by Ukraine. The most predecessors what defense reforms and mod- the military command to NATO standards.37 daunting challenges, however, would involve ernization tasks were necessary to enhance To rationalize the budget, Grytsenko subor- switching to an all-volunteer force by 2010 as Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO. Under dinated the Department of Finance and the mandated by the president, destroying surplus their mandate, the defense ministry exhib- Department of Surplus Funds and Lands to ited signs of institutional improvement and himself. To retain and promote capable per- Ukrainian leaders are friction with the General Staff moderated sonnel, the Personnel Policy Directorate cognizant of how far somewhat, although the armed forces con- developed a personnel policy concept and they have to go before tinued to atrophy for want of resources. built a database system to track English lan- the country can function Grytsenko was succeeded as minister in guage–trained personnel38—clearly some- December 2007 by Yuriy Yekhanurov, an thing driven by recognition of the need to militarily on anything economist with a background in industrial be able to work effectively with NATO forces. resembling a NATO level management, further solidifying the trend Finally, the General Staff formed a Joint toward civilianization of the ministry. Operational Command with responsibility to weapons and military equipment, updating Planning and Organization. employ all combined armed task forces in and modernizing essential equipment, and For the first decade, Ukraine’s force “plan- Ukraine and overseas.39 harnessing technology to support Ukraine’s ning” was nonexistent; underfunded defense defense industry. Although Grytsenko placed budgets caused continuous “freefall” of the Challenges Remain a high priority on these issues, combat read- armed forces. It was only in November 2001 Notwithstanding the commendable and iness continued to deteriorate because of that Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko intro- even remarkable advances that have been chronic underfunding. In March 2007, duced serious planning to the defense minis- made, particularly considering the point Grytsenko noted that Ukraine’s first-line try. Shkidchenko had been the key author of from which the Ukrainian forces began in Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) “would Ukraine’s first real strategic document, State 1991, Ukrainian leaders are cognizant of not be combat ready in one to two years Program on Armed Forces Development how far they have to go before the country when about 50 percent of the equipment and Reform, 2001–2005, calling for the can function militarily on anything resem- will stop working.”41 His options to solve the transformation of Ukraine’s 310,000-man bling a NATO level. The need for vastly resources problem were limited by lack of armed forces into a smaller force designed improved operational capacity has repeat- funds.42 Although the law “On Defence of for limiting local conflicts and resolving edly been highlighted by Ukrainian forces’ Ukraine” calls for the allocation of 3 percent emergencies on Ukraine’s territory.35 The experience in operations with U.S. and other of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, country’s first comprehensive defense pol- NATO forces. Ukraine needs to create more the defense ministry was consistently receiv- icy review, the Ukrainian Strategic Defence standing units, modernize equipment, and ing only about half this amount or less Review to 2015, was published in June 2003 improve language skills, a point that was between 2000 and 2005.43 As a result of these on Yevhen Marchuk’s watch. highlighted when a Ukrainian contingent in shortfalls, the ministry was not only unable
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 7 to provide adequate resources for weapons east, it remains to be seen if these plans will the EU and Russia, both of whom have repair and modernization for the JRRF, but actually materialize. an interest in safe transit of gas through declining operating funds also led to inad- Ukraine. When Prime Minister Yuriy equate training for the force.44 Though the External Environment Yekhanurov agreed to pay Russia nearly defense ministry had abandoned the prac- Transformed double the price it had previously paid for tice of using outdated munitions for training Domestic tensions between those gas ($130 per thousand cubic meters, still after two major missile disasters in 2000 and Ukrainians who support closer ties to Russia less than half the European market price of 2001—including the downing of a Russian and the rest of the CIS and those who favor $315), the Rada flexed its new constitutional Tu-154 passenger aircraft over the Black Sea integration with the EU and NATO have powers, dismissed the government, and with a defective S–200 surface-to-air missile, often resulted in Ukraine’s schizophrenic renewed political instability ensued. killing all 78 aboard—Grytsenko was forced policies pulling in opposite directions. These problems resurfaced in December to resume this practice even for the most These internal pressures are aggravated and 2007 when Tymoshenko took over as prime elite JRRF units in October 2006.45 made more difficult to resolve by the pro- minister for the second time and moved to President Yushchenko’s mandate to found transformation that has taken place raise the pipeline transit fees charged to move Ukraine to an all-volunteer force by Gazprom. Gazprom responded by demand- 2010 also ran up against budget realities, ing repayment of $1.5 billion in debt and ultimately becoming a political issue during how Ukraine ultimately threatening to cut Ukraine’s domestic nat- the September 2007 parliamentary campaign, resolves its internal ural gas supply by 25 percent. At the same as Tymoshenko actually advocated accelerat- debate over its strategic time, Russia sought to drive a wedge between ing the schedule to 2008. Grytsenko argued alignment is further Ukraine and the EU countries by reassuring that this was impossible on the grounds that complicated by the fact Europeans that they would not suffer short- selecting appropriate personnel required a that the Euro-Atlantic ages as a result of Russian action against well-developed human resource policy, which community is itself Ukraine. In March, Gazprom claimed that it simply did not exist.46 Despite the significant had not received its money and cut supplies divided over what it improvements in civilian oversight and man- of Russian gas by 25 percent, and then by wants for Ukraine agement and in accountability and transpar- another 25 percent a day later. After Ukraine ency during Grytsenko’s tenure, the constant threatened to reduce gas deliveries to Europe, need to accommodate ambitious plans to in Ukraine’s external environment over the Russia and Gazprom, not wanting to further insufficient resources led to a steady decline last decade. harm relations with the West, restored deliv- in both the size and capabilities of the force A key element in this transformation eries and signed an agreement holding prices during his tenure.47 is Ukraine’s increased strategic importance steady at $179 per thousand cubic meters Grytsenko’s successor, Yuriy Yekhanurov, as an energy bridge. The country’s vulner- through 2008. This agreement, however, only continues to face the same challenges that ability to energy-related pressure, and the deferred the issue. At the end of 2008, with stymied his predecessors—to create an all- degree to which this vulnerability could Ukrainian elections looming, Prime Minister volunteer force, modernize its equipment, exacerbate political instability, became evi- Tymoshenko was again in Moscow to negoti- enhance its readiness, redress sociopolitical dent in January 2006, when Gazprom, ate the size of its debt (which Russia claims problems (such as inadequate housing), and the world’s largest natural gas producer to be $2.4 billion in arrears) and 2009 price prepare for NATO membership, all on a shoe- (half-owned by the Russian government), of gas (which Russia threatens to raise to string budget. Yekhanurov’s efforts to aug- cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and then more than $400 per thousand cubic meters). ment the 2008 defense budget, which was restored them subject to a doubling of the How Ukraine ultimately resolves its only 1 percent of GDP,48 unfortunately proved price. Since roughly 75 percent of Russian internal debate over its strategic alignment unsuccessful. Although the Russian invasion gas exports to Europe flows through is further complicated by the fact that the of Georgia has prompted plans for the addi- Ukrainian pipelines, the cutoff affected Euro-Atlantic community is itself divided tion of 2 billion hryvnyas (approximately not only Ukraine but its EU neighbors as over what it wants for Ukraine. When the EU $375 million) in 2009 to upgrade existing well. Ukraine, which needs to meet its own rebuffed Yanukovych in September 2006, and form new army units in the south and domestic requirements, was caught between it had the effect of undermining pro-NATO
8 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009 Ukrainians, who had argued that joining and Eurasianists in the Ukrainian politi- forced by periodic flexing of its military and the relatively unpopular NATO would pro- cal elite. While the current government has economic muscle—and the Euro-Atlantic vide a pathway to membership in the much responded by seeking to strengthen defense community’s own failure to clarify its objec- more popular EU. The same message of divi- capabilities, including the deployment of air tives for Ukraine. sions among the Euro-Atlantic countries was defense units in the Crimea and along the So where does Ukraine stand? On the further driven home in April 2008, when eastern border with Russia,50 others feel the positive side, in marked contrast to the autoc- President George W. Bush failed to get the need to placate Russia. racies that continue to rule most of the other Bucharest NATO Summit to support Ukraine’s Ukraine’s transformed external environ- former Soviet states, Ukraine has resound- bid for a Membership Action Plan. The EU’s ment has aggravated its internal problems, ingly shown that it prefers Euro-Atlantic–style recent Stabilization and Accession Agreement which in turn have further complicated its democracy, as evidenced by repeated free and (SAA) with Ukraine, in marked contrast to its external problems. Not only has the dichotomy fair elections followed by orderly transfer of SAAs with the Balkan states, offers no pros- between eastern autocratic and western dem- power between rival parties, a thriving open pect for future membership. At the December ocratic neighbors increased, so too has their media, and vibrant institutions of civil soci- 2–3, 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers session, willingness to meddle in Ukraine’s politics. ety. On the negative side, Ukraine’s external NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Summit deci- environment has been transformed. During sion, made note of Ukraine’s progress, but not only has the the 1990s, Russia was weak and more coop- added that significant work remained; hence, dichotomy between erative; now it is more competitive. The more it did not grant Ukraine a MAP. The foreign eastern autocratic and the United States and some Allies promote ministers, though, did amend the NATO- NATO accession, the more Russia interferes, western democratic Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, and the more the Ukrainian government is and agreed to provide further assistance to neighbors increased, so destabilized, further undermining its Euro- Ukraine, develop Annual National Programs too has their willingness Atlantic options. to advance reforms, and augment the NATO to meddle in Ukraine’s The challenge for the United States is liaison office in Kyiv.49 politics to nurture Ukraine’s political stability and Last, but far from least, the strategic keep its Euro-Atlantic options open. This is position of Ukraine’s powerful Russian neigh- Ukraine’s increased strategic importance as a difficult because the EU, which enjoys sig- bor to the north and east has undergone a natural gas bridge for both the Euro-Atlantic nificantly greater Ukrainian domestic sup- transformation of its own. Given the funda- and Eurasian communities combined with port, has clearly indicated that it is not yet mental sympathy for Russia felt by much of Russia’s renewed assertiveness in other for- ready for Ukraine. While Allies disagree Ukraine’s population, Moscow’s renewed cred- mer Soviet republics has resulted in increas- over the timing of Ukraine’s MAP acces- ibility as a major power would in itself tend ing equivocation within NATO and the EU and sion, due in part to the low popular support to tug Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. In exacerbated internal problems for Ukraine. the Alliance enjoys within Ukraine, the April addition, however, Russia has become much 2008 Bucharest Summit did provide a long- more assertive and intrusive, thanks in part The Challenge Ahead term membership horizon reiterated at the to the consolidation of autocratic power The prospects for Ukrainian member- December 2008 foreign ministerial. But gov- under Vladimir Putin as well as the strong ship in Euro-Atlantic structures thus remain ernment stability is needed in Kyiv to reassure Russian reaction to NATO enlargement, mis- uncertain, in part because of Russia’s oppo- many skeptical European Allies and to build sile defense, and other perceived manifesta- sition, in part because of ambivalence confidence among Ukrainian society. tions of Western aggrandizement. among NATO and EU members, and in part Ukraine needs time to make a strategic The dilemma of how to deal with because of divisions within Ukraine itself. choice that can muster a popular consensus a resurgent Russia was crystallized by Given the cross-cutting pressures, it is under- within the country. At this point, assertive U.S. Moscow’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia. standable that Ukraine’s political leaders promotion of Ukrainian accession to NATO is The invasion forced Ukrainian politicians to and society have yet to make a clear strategic counterproductive: it engenders divisiveness focus on the defense sector and reassess the choice. Ukraine cannot at this point make a with some Allies, encourages Russian interfer- country’s Military Doctrine, but did little to firm decision in favor of Euro-Atlantic inte- ence, and, most importantly, shifts Ukraine’s resolve the tension between Euro-Atlanticists gration given Russia’s opposition—rein- internal politics in an undesirable direction,
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 9 6 Ibid. Lieutenant Colonel Krivchenko noted that NATO strengthening the hand of the Eurasianists at ther weakens the confidence in many NATO/ operations in the former Yugoslavia provided Ukraine the oppor- the expense of Euro-Atlanticists. The United EU capitals that Ukraine is a suitable candi- tunity “to raise the expertise of veterans and new recruits. . . . [adding] a helicopter squad gets a month of training in two-to- States needs to foster a Euro-Atlantic ori- date for membership. three days in Kosovo.” entation in Ukraine, but should exercise Third, Kyiv needs to coordinate its out- 7 For example, according to former Romanian Defense restraint in doing so. Thus, the United States reach to its western EU neighbors—Poland, Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu, an internal poll of the Romanian military in January-February 2001 indicated military support should stress the language of the Bucharest Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania—to pro- for NATO at 83.6 percent compared to 75.5 percent for the gen- Summit and promote NATO cooperation with mote a more effective, open EU policy eral population. See Ioan Mircea Pascu, The Battle for NATO: Personal Report (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2008), 310, fn. 104. Ukraine’s military independent of the issue of toward Ukraine. 8 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North For its part, the Obama administra- Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, Madrid, July 9, 1997, available at
10 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009 23 “Ukraine’s president orders to send 15 peacekeepers to Iraq. Personal interview with senior defense official, Kyiv, April 46 Total force strength declined to 221,000 (165,000 mil- Iraq,” Kyiv Post, April 14, 2008, available at
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 11 Other titles from For on-line access to NDU Press publications, NDU Press go to: ndupress.ndu.edu From Sputnik to Minerva: Education Defense Transformation à la française and American National Security and U.S. Interests Sean Kay Leo G. Michel (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 65, (Strategic Forum No. 233, October 2008) January 2009) Energy Security in South Asia: Can Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: Interdependence Breed Stability? How Should the United States Respond? Joseph McMillan Judith S. Yaphe (Strategic Forum No. 232, September 2008) (Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008) The Role of Medical Diplomacy in Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding Stabilizing Afghanistan and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Donald F. Thompson Military Operations (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 63, Paul T. Bartone May 2008) (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 64, November 2008) International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction NATO’s Uncertain Future: Is Paul I. Bernstein Demography Destiny? (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 6, Jeffrey Simon May 2008) (Strategic Forum No. 236, October 2008) Choosing War: The Decision to Invade The Absence of Europe: Implications Iraq and Its Aftermath for International Security? Joseph J. Collins Steven Philip Kramer (Institute for National Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 5, April 2008) (Strategic Forum No. 235, October 2008)
Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations Patrick M. Cronin (Strategic Forum No. 234, October 2008)
12 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009