Ukraine and the EU After the Elections: More of the Same?
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Policy Brief December 2007 The King Baudouin Foundation and Compagnia di San Paolo are strategic partners of the European Policy Centre Ukraine and the EU after the elections: more of the same? By Amanda Akçakoca and Richard Whitman Background Relations between Ukraine and much-needed reforms that would, In 2004, the Orange Coalition the EU have made unspectacular in turn, allow it to put greater was a heterogeneous collection of progress since the 2004 Orange pressure on the EU to start thinking disparate groups united primarily Revolution, despite the expectations about Ukraine as a potential by opposition to former President raised by the democratic uprising in candidate for accession, albeit in Leonard Kuchma’s increasingly Kiev and the Union’s enlargement to the long term. repressive regime. It lacked a Central and Eastern Europe. common, clearly-defined political For the EU, the signing of the Lisbon agenda – a problem subsequently Since 2004, Ukraine has been Treaty and optimism about its exacerbated by President Viktor confronted with recurrent internal successful ratification should Yushchenko’s weak and unstable political turmoil and parliamentary enable it to devote more energy leadership, and Yulia Tymoshenko’s gridlock which have tarnished its and effort to policies towards its ‘populist’ approach and apparent image as a reforming country and wider neighbourhood – and towards inability to act as team player. the prospects of deepening relations Ukraine, as a key neighbour, with the enlarged Union. Meanwhile, in particular. Controversial constitutional the EU has been distracted by the reforms in early 2005, which trauma of the failure to ratify the So what are the key stumbling blocks significantly enhanced the Constitutional Treaty and the ensuing to fostering a closer relationship powers of the government at the ‘enlargement fatigue’ reinforced by between the two sides and what President’s expense, also resulted the experience of Bulgarian and can be done to speed up progress? in widespread gridlock in the Romanian accession. decision-making process. This was The three-year crisis compounded by arguments over The newly-elected government of speedy re-privatisation deals, Our Ukraine (OU) and the Yulia The 2004 Orange Revolution corruption allegations and a Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) offers a failed to deliver domestically. The lack of transparency in the second chance for the Orange three years since then have been policy-making process, sparking forces to deliver on the promises marked by political infighting, deep divisions within the they made in 2004 and failed to personal rivalries among its political “revolutionary” forces. meet. If it is able to bring about elite and government incompetence. greater political stability in Ukraine, As a result, Ukraine has stumbled After only eight months in office, this would allow it to introduce the from crisis to crisis. Tymoshenko was dismissed as prime minister by Yushchenko and the change in voting patterns. Most within the OU to Tymoshenko government collapsed shortly parties lost support in their becoming prime minister. afterwards, prompting fresh traditional strongholds and elections which returned the gained votes in other parts of She was narrowly elected as prime President’s rival Viktor Yanukovych the country, making them more minister more than three weeks to power. Their relationship proved national in character and later, presiding over a government disastrous, with clashes over policy weakening Ukraine’s previously which has 228 seats – just two more priorities and attempts by the strong regional cleavages. than the majority required to pass government to erode the President’s most legislation. remaining powers. Tymoshenko was unquestionably the biggest winner. Many The new cabinet is predominantly President Yushchenko took dramatic voters, tired of weak leadership, pro-Western, with a mix of old action by dissolving parliament switched to the BYuT because and new blood and an awareness again in April 2007, sparking a of Tymoshenko’s slick style, of the need for good relations with general election on 30 September. promising populist goals, a neutral Moscow. Volodymyr Ohryzko, a Although Yanukovych’s Party position on NATO membership, close ally of Yushchenko and strong of the Regions won the largest anti-corruption and poverty- supporter of NATO membership, share of the vote (34.3%), the reduction measures, and thus becomes foreign minister, with an unexpected gains made by the making inroads into Yanukovych’s ex-Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov BYuT (with 30.7%) opened the traditional constituency in (a critic of Tymoshenko) taking way for it to form a coalition Russophone eastern Ukraine. over the defence portfolio. government with the OU Reform-oriented Viktor Pinzenyk, (with 14.1%). However, after the vote, differences Finance Minister in the 2005 Orange between the camps once again government, returns to this post, The election results also resulted in weeks of delay because with BYuT also taking the economy demonstrated a significant of strong opposition from some and energy dossiers. State of play Despite their profound domestic ‘European choice’, support among they half-heartedly opted to work political differences, Ukraine’s the Union’s 27 Member States for through the ENP (which the Union political elites have gradually giving the country a clear member- regards as ‘enlargement neutral’) converged towards a consensus on ship perspective was limited to as a first step towards an ever-closer the need to improve relations with neighbouring Eastern European relationship. the EU – a striking and important countries (particularly Poland, development since the days of the Lithuania and Hungary) and the In February 2005, Ukraine signed a Orange Revolution. European Parliament, which backed three-year Action Plan with the EU this approach, at least in principle, which set out the main areas where In February 2007, the Ukrainian by an overwhelming majority. the country needed to introduce parliament adopted a Resolution, reforms to meet Union standards. supported by all the major However, the European Full implementation of this plan is political parties, on the country’s Commission and Council almost the equivalent, in the ENP commitment to European remained non-committal on this context, of meeting the ‘Copenhagen integration. However, there is issue; instead, they urged Ukraine criteria’ for EU membership. no such consensus on the issue to keep its accession ambitions on However, Ukraine’s progress to of NATO membership, with ice and focus first on political and date has been somewhat patchy President Yushchenko continuing economic reforms within the and the plan is unlikely to be fully to insist that moving closer to the framework of the new European implemented on schedule. alliance through a Membership Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Action Plan should be a priority designed to bring the country The most recent Commission report even though public opinion still closer to EU standards and values. stated that Ukraine had made seems strongly opposed to this. This reserved approach also reflects headway in consolidating respect a lack of agreement within the EU for human rights, the rule of law, Meanwhile, Ukraine and the EU over what to do about Ukraine. minority rights and freedom of have only deepened their relation- expression, and congratulated Kiev ship marginally over the past three Although the revolutionary forces on holding free and fair elections. years. Although the Union welcomed were disappointed by the Union’s The EU has also recognised Ukraine the Orange Revolution and Ukraine’s initial response to the events of 2004, as a market economy, and pledged to support its accession to the World There is a consensus among political border’ – closer to the Union and to Trade Organization. Furthermore, elites in Ukraine that a policy promote people-to-people contacts. cooperation on Common Foreign framework which includes countries To this end, a visa facilitation and and Security Policy (CFSP) issues has such as Morocco and Israel and readmission agreement was signed deepened, with Ukraine aligning offers no membership perspective in June 2007 which allows certain itself with EU positions on questions is not an adequate framework categories of people (businessmen, of regional and international for relations, despite the ENP’s students, scholars, scientists) to relevance, and cooperating on issues enhancement since December 2006. obtain visas more rapidly and helps of common interest such as the put an end to overly-complex situation in Belarus and the Kiev insists that such an ‘ENP-Plus’ procedures and groundless visa settlement of the Transnistria issue. does not bring any new added- denials. It is due to come into force value and cannot deliver anything by the end of 2007. However, endemic corruption tangible to Ukrainians. Given the remains a serious concern and falling support for the EU in the However, the enlargement of the efforts to combat it have proved country, Kiev believes it needs Schengen border-free area in ineffective, with the culture of something more solid to ‘sell’ back January 2008 will make it more corruption exacerbated by a rise home to justify continuing with difficult for ordinary Ukrainians in international organised crime. often painful domestic reforms. to travel to their Western This remains the main challenge to neighbourhood. Until recently, Ukraine’s economic growth and This has prompted increasingly visas from Ukraine’s immediate overall development, with a recent strong signals of Ukraine’s growing neighbours – Poland, Slovakia, report by the Council of Europe’s dissatisfaction with its current Hungary, the Czech Republic and Group of Countries Against situation. Viewed from Kiev, whether the Baltic States – were free of charge Corruption (GRECO) warning or not the existing Action Plan is and easily accessible. But now that Ukraine suffers from systemic prolonged beyond February 2008 Ukrainians will have to pay €60 for a corruption which constitutes a now appears to depend on whether visa and the issuing of multiple-entry direct threat to the principles of the EU can offer it more tangible permits will be greatly reduced.