Policy Brief

December 2007

The King Baudouin Foundation and Compagnia di San Paolo are strategic partners of the European Policy Centre

Ukraine and the EU after the elections: more of the same?

By Amanda Akçakoca and Richard Whitman

Background

Relations between and much-needed reforms that would, In 2004, the Orange Coalition the EU have made unspectacular in turn, allow it to put greater was a heterogeneous collection of progress since the 2004 Orange pressure on the EU to start thinking disparate groups united primarily Revolution, despite the expectations about Ukraine as a potential by opposition to former President raised by the democratic uprising in candidate for accession, albeit in Leonard Kuchma’s increasingly Kiev and the Union’s enlargement to the long term. repressive regime. It lacked a Central and Eastern Europe. common, clearly-defined political For the EU, the signing of the Lisbon agenda – a problem subsequently Since 2004, Ukraine has been Treaty and optimism about its exacerbated by President Viktor confronted with recurrent internal successful ratification should Yushchenko’s weak and unstable political turmoil and parliamentary enable it to devote more energy leadership, and ’s gridlock which have tarnished its and effort to policies towards its ‘populist’ approach and apparent image as a reforming country and wider neighbourhood – and towards inability to act as team player. the prospects of deepening relations Ukraine, as a key neighbour, with the enlarged Union. Meanwhile, in particular. Controversial constitutional the EU has been distracted by the reforms in early 2005, which trauma of the failure to ratify the So what are the key stumbling blocks significantly enhanced the Constitutional Treaty and the ensuing to fostering a closer relationship powers of the government at the ‘enlargement fatigue’ reinforced by between the two sides and what President’s expense, also resulted the experience of Bulgarian and can be done to speed up progress? in widespread gridlock in the Romanian accession. decision-making process. This was The three-year crisis compounded by arguments over The newly-elected government of speedy re-privatisation deals, Our Ukraine (OU) and the Yulia The 2004 corruption allegations and a Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) offers a failed to deliver domestically. The lack of transparency in the second chance for the Orange three years since then have been policy-making process, sparking forces to deliver on the promises marked by political infighting, deep divisions within the they made in 2004 and failed to personal rivalries among its political “revolutionary” forces. meet. If it is able to bring about elite and government incompetence. greater political stability in Ukraine, As a result, Ukraine has stumbled After only eight months in office, this would allow it to introduce the from crisis to crisis. Tymoshenko was dismissed as prime minister by Yushchenko and the change in voting patterns. Most within the OU to Tymoshenko government collapsed shortly parties lost support in their becoming prime minister. afterwards, prompting fresh traditional strongholds and elections which returned the gained votes in other parts of She was narrowly elected as prime President’s rival the country, making them more minister more than three weeks to power. Their relationship proved national in character and later, presiding over a government disastrous, with clashes over policy weakening Ukraine’s previously which has 228 seats – just two more priorities and attempts by the strong regional cleavages. than the majority required to pass government to erode the President’s most legislation. remaining powers. Tymoshenko was unquestionably the biggest winner. Many The new cabinet is predominantly President Yushchenko took dramatic voters, tired of weak leadership, pro-Western, with a mix of old action by dissolving parliament switched to the BYuT because and new blood and an awareness again in April 2007, sparking a of Tymoshenko’s slick style, of the need for good relations with general election on 30 September. promising populist goals, a neutral Moscow. Volodymyr Ohryzko, a Although Yanukovych’s Party position on NATO membership, close ally of Yushchenko and strong of the Regions won the largest anti-corruption and poverty- supporter of NATO membership, share of the vote (34.3%), the reduction measures, and thus becomes foreign minister, with an unexpected gains made by the making inroads into Yanukovych’s ex-Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov BYuT (with 30.7%) opened the traditional constituency in (a critic of Tymoshenko) taking way for it to form a coalition Russophone eastern Ukraine. over the defence portfolio. government with the OU Reform-oriented Viktor Pinzenyk, (with 14.1%). However, after the vote, differences Finance Minister in the 2005 Orange between the camps once again government, returns to this post, The election results also resulted in weeks of delay because with BYuT also taking the economy demonstrated a significant of strong opposition from some and energy dossiers.

State of play

Despite their profound domestic ‘European choice’, support among they half-heartedly opted to work political differences, Ukraine’s the Union’s 27 Member States for through the ENP (which the Union political elites have gradually giving the country a clear member- regards as ‘enlargement neutral’) converged towards a consensus on ship perspective was limited to as a first step towards an ever-closer the need to improve relations with neighbouring Eastern European relationship. the EU – a striking and important countries (particularly Poland, development since the days of the Lithuania and Hungary) and the In February 2005, Ukraine signed a Orange Revolution. European Parliament, which backed three-year Action Plan with the EU this approach, at least in principle, which set out the main areas where In February 2007, the Ukrainian by an overwhelming majority. the country needed to introduce parliament adopted a Resolution, reforms to meet Union standards. supported by all the major However, the European Full implementation of this plan is political parties, on the country’s Commission and Council almost the equivalent, in the ENP commitment to European remained non-committal on this context, of meeting the ‘Copenhagen integration. However, there is issue; instead, they urged Ukraine criteria’ for EU membership. no such consensus on the issue to keep its accession ambitions on However, Ukraine’s progress to of NATO membership, with ice and focus first on political and date has been somewhat patchy President Yushchenko continuing economic reforms within the and the plan is unlikely to be fully to insist that moving closer to the framework of the new European implemented on schedule. alliance through a Membership Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Action Plan should be a priority designed to bring the country The most recent Commission report even though public opinion still closer to EU standards and values. stated that Ukraine had made seems strongly opposed to this. This reserved approach also reflects headway in consolidating respect a lack of agreement within the EU for human rights, the rule of law, Meanwhile, Ukraine and the EU over what to do about Ukraine. minority rights and freedom of have only deepened their relation- expression, and congratulated Kiev ship marginally over the past three Although the revolutionary forces on holding free and fair elections. years. Although the Union welcomed were disappointed by the Union’s The EU has also recognised Ukraine the Orange Revolution and Ukraine’s initial response to the events of 2004, as a market economy, and pledged to support its accession to the World There is a consensus among political border’ – closer to the Union and to Trade Organization. Furthermore, elites in Ukraine that a policy promote people-to-people contacts. cooperation on Common Foreign framework which includes countries To this end, a visa facilitation and and Security Policy (CFSP) issues has such as Morocco and Israel and readmission agreement was signed deepened, with Ukraine aligning offers no membership perspective in June 2007 which allows certain itself with EU positions on questions is not an adequate framework categories of people (businessmen, of regional and international for relations, despite the ENP’s students, scholars, scientists) to relevance, and cooperating on issues enhancement since December 2006. obtain visas more rapidly and helps of common interest such as the put an end to overly-complex situation in Belarus and the Kiev insists that such an ‘ENP-Plus’ procedures and groundless visa settlement of the Transnistria issue. does not bring any new added- denials. It is due to come into force value and cannot deliver anything by the end of 2007. However, endemic corruption tangible to Ukrainians. Given the remains a serious concern and falling support for the EU in the However, the enlargement of the efforts to combat it have proved country, Kiev believes it needs Schengen border-free area in ineffective, with the culture of something more solid to ‘sell’ back January 2008 will make it more corruption exacerbated by a rise home to justify continuing with difficult for ordinary Ukrainians in international organised crime. often painful domestic reforms. to travel to their Western This remains the main challenge to neighbourhood. Until recently, Ukraine’s economic growth and This has prompted increasingly visas from Ukraine’s immediate overall development, with a recent strong signals of Ukraine’s growing neighbours – Poland, Slovakia, report by the Council of Europe’s dissatisfaction with its current Hungary, the Czech Republic and Group of Countries Against situation. Viewed from Kiev, whether the Baltic States – were free of charge Corruption (GRECO) warning or not the existing Action Plan is and easily accessible. But now that Ukraine suffers from systemic prolonged beyond February 2008 Ukrainians will have to pay €60 for a corruption which constitutes a now appears to depend on whether visa and the issuing of multiple-entry direct threat to the principles of the EU can offer it more tangible permits will be greatly reduced. democracy and the rule of law. incentives – and ones which are not available to non-European ENP Since last September, when the The judiciary’s independence is countries, to signal an important testing of Schengen control systems also in question: the country has difference in the way it is treated. began, Ukrainians have encountered an imperfect, deregulated system growing problems at the border, with overly complicated procedures An important test of this will be from checks on vehicles (including and increasing interference in the the new ‘Enhanced Agreement’ fuel levels and speedometer data) courts’ activities by administrative being negotiated to replace the to restrictions on the number of and political institutions. old Partnership and Cooperation crossings per day and, more Agreement (PCA). Ukraine is generally, slow and irregular border Progress in implementing reforms pressing for something similar to and customs services. As a result, has also been hindered significantly a Stabilisation and Association Kiev feels the EU has replaced the by conflicts between authorities, Agreement – like those offered to iron curtain with a paper curtain. a lack of funding and human the Western Balkan countries, It is possible, however, that border resources, the absence of a body to which give them a more or less guards are simply being extra coordinate the drive for European explicit membership perspective. vigilant until they receive the integration, the private and business final green light for Schengen interests of political leaders, and The EU is currently unwilling to go membership on 21 December. long pre- and post-election periods that far, although many of the areas of political instability when parlia- of collaboration envisaged in the Also crucial is the development ment has not functioned, making Enhanced Agreement are crucial of a ‘deep’ Free Trade Area (FTA) it impossible to pass legislation. for the Union, starting with energy to further strengthen bilateral security and market access. Ukraine’s economic integration. Ukrainian Just a neighbour? leaders must also prove that they can membership of the WTO is a provide some political stability and pre-condition for starting negotiations One key sticking point in the continuity in the reform process. on this. Ukraine has been bidding EU-Ukraine relationship has been for a seat at the WTO table for the country’s EU membership Stuck on the border 14 years and, with the signing of a ambitions, and the question bilateral deal with Kyrgyzstan to of whether participation and Making it easier for Ukrainian settle an old dispute, the last hurdle engagement in the ENP are citizens to travel to the EU is now appears to have been overcome. reconcilable with (and conducive crucial to bring the country – whose WTO membership would not only to) possible future EU accession. name literally means ‘land on the pave the way for the FTA with the EU, but also promote efficiency and significant progress was standards, and foster progress and foreign investment. reported on implementation at the towards integrating electricity September EU-Ukraine Summit. and gas markets. Ukraine needs Finally, Ukraine is a key energy EU assistance to diversify its energy partner for the Union. The two The new Enhanced Agreement supplies, mitigate its current heavy sides signed a Memorandum of would promote energy security, dependence on Russian energy and Understanding in December 2005 improve safety and environmental develop alternative energy sources.

Prospects

The Enhanced Agreement stick to its reform programme, while The new parliament’s first task negotiations offer Ukraine and the simultaneously communicating to should be to introduce the EU an opportunity to re-calibrate the public that the process is both constitutional changes needed their relationship. In particular, a lengthy and arduous, albeit with to ensure more effective and new accord could establish a revised significant rewards. accountable government. set of concrete objectives and its subsequent implementation in The relationship with Kiev is a key To bring an end to the three-year 2011 could provide an opportunity barometer of the ENP at large. The crisis and consolidate democracy, to deliver tangible benefits for ENP still needs to demonstrate the parliamentary majority for both sides. that it has sufficient flexibility to such changes must be broader than successfully accommodate the government coalition alone. Furthermore, however much countries like Ukraine alongside Ukraine complains about the states that do not share a Key institutional and political ENP Action Plan, this has clearly membership vocation. players must cooperate beyond stimulated the reform process their narrow contingent interests and helped concentrate minds on Ukraine is too important a neighbour and contribute to forging a what needs to be done. Its effective for the EU to engage with through sustainable political system and implementation would strengthen anything other than a clearly-defined law-making machinery. Abuses Ukraine’s position in the Enhanced and properly-implemented set of of parliamentary immunity Agreement negotiations, so it has policies – and success in Ukraine also need to end, and the nothing to lose by allowing the is crucial to bringing prosperity and independence of the judiciary plan’s implementation to be stability to the whole region. and constitutional court must extended until the end of 2008. be strengthened. Above all, however, Ukraine must At the same time, new incentives get its own house in order if it is to In other words, Ukrainian leaders are needed to keep Ukraine gain the maximum possible from must prove that they are willing motivated, such as a road map its relations with the EU. and able to carry out the required for a visa-free regime similar to reforms and generate the necessary that with the Former Yugoslav The main challenge in this respect momentum, regardless of what the Republic of Macedonia (which is for the new Orange government EU can or cannot promise at this is officially a “candidate” for to put differences aside and work stage in terms of future membership. EU membership). constructively towards shared goals without allowing personal If this does not happen, the country The EU also needs to pay much ambitions and sectoral interest could well find itself back at the greater attention to public groups to derail the process. polls within a few months, with diplomacy: it has to clarify its political turmoil persisting until message and ensure this reaches However, the tortuous talks on the 2009 Presidential elections. ordinary Ukrainians. This means forming the new government and squaring a difficult circle: sending its slim majority in parliament do Amanda Akçakoca is a Policy Analyst positive signals to Ukraine that the not bode well for the prospects of at the European Policy Centre and door is open for closer integration political reform, and the forthcoming Richard Whitman is chair of its EU as long as Kiev shows it can comply 2009 Presidential elections could Neighbourhood Forum and Professor with the ‘rules of the game’ and also hamper progress. of Politics at the University of Bath.

European Policy Centre I Résidence Palace, 155 rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 (0)2 231 03 40 I Fax: +32 (0)2 231 07 04 I Email: [email protected] I Website: www.epc.eu

With the support of the European Commission