Populism in Ukraine in a Comparative European Context Taras Kuzio Discussions of populism usually HE term “populist” has been applied to a heteroge- Tneous group of political groups ranging from the focus on Latin America, Western anti-globalization left and greens to the nationalist right. These include parties opposed to immigration, those that Europe, and Central-Eastern see globalization as “Americanization,” and those that Europe, but the leading political believe taxes are too high or oppose excessive government interference in the private lives of citizens and business. parties in Ukraine all exhibit Politicians advocating a “third way” between capitalism and socialism are often labeled as “populists.” Populism elements of populism, such has deep roots in Latin America, where it is usually found as economic protectionism, on the left of the political spectrum, virulently nationalist and anti-American. Parties labeled “populist” have grown ideological swings, and, in some in popular support throughout the 1990s in Western and Central-Eastern Europe and have won electoral victories cases, xenophobia. in Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Slovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria. Western studies of populism have focused on Western and Central-Eastern Europe, not on Eurasia, and this ar- ticle is the first to analyze the phenomenon of populism in Ukraine. The term “populist” was not used to describe Ukrainian politics during Leonid Kuchma’s decade-long presidency (1994–2004) and only began to be used af- ter Viktor Yushchenko, Kuchma’s prime minister from December 1999 to May 2001, won the January 2005 presidential election. The term primarily was used when criticizing Yulia Tymoshenko and her eponymous bloc (Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, or BYuT). The discussion in this article analyzes the phenomenon of populism in Ukraine, comparing its development with the growth of populism in Western and Central-Eastern Europe. It uses the list of ten attributes of populism as defined by TARAS KUZIO is the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation visiting fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Ivan Krastev, director of the Center for Liberal Studies Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. in Sofia, Bulgaria, and asks whether the attributes found Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 57, no. 6, November/December 2010, pp. 3–18. © 2010 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2010 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216570601 Kuzio Populism in Ukraine 3 Table 1 Ten Attributes of European Populism in a Ukrainian Context 1. Charismatic leader Tymoshenko/BYuT, Tyahnybok/Svoboda 2. Socioeconomic discontent, “transition losers” BYuT, Yushchenko (2004), Our Ukraine, Party of Regions, Tyahnybok/Svoboda 3. Anti-elite and anti-establishment Tymoshenko/BYuT, Svoboda 4. Anti-corruption Tymoshenko/BYuT, Yushchenko/Our Ukraine, Svoboda 5. Anti-American Yanukovych, Svoboda 6. Opposition to NATO membership Party of Regions, Svoboda 7. Defense of sovereignty; opposition to IMF and European Union Party of Regions, Svoboda 8. Xenophobia Svoboda 9. Anti-immigration Svoboda 10. Anti-multiculturalism, support for assimilation Yushchenko/Our Ukraine, Svoboda in Western and Central-Eastern Europe are also present parties, shows that the Party of Regions, Yushchenko/ in Ukrainian politics. Krastev’s set of ten elements of Our Ukraine, and BYuT fit three to four, with the highest populism includes authentic anger, unrestrained hatred number found in Svoboda (Freedom), whose populist- for elites, policy vagueness, economic egalitarianism, nationalist profile matches all ten factors. Populism can be cultural conservatism, compassionate radicalism, mea- found across the Ukrainian political landscape, with three sured euroskepticism, declared nationalism, undeclared mainstream parties matching an average of between four xenophobia, and anti-corruption.1 and six of the ten attributes commonly found in European Taking the election platforms and rhetoric of populist populist parties. The populist-nationalist Svoboda party party leaders in Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, Krastev most closely resembles European populist parties. Ukrai- believes that these ten issues can be synthesized into four nian political parties and governments (see Table 2) are key areas for populism: anti-corruption rhetoric, hostil- all to some degree populist, but less than their European ity to privatization, anti-elite sentiments, and efforts to populist counterparts. reverse the social inequalities arising from the transition from a communist economic system to a market economy. Populism in Western and Central- In Ukraine, populism has evolved around criteria similar Eastern Europe to Krastev’s factors. The ten attributes of populism developed in this article Populist parties on both the left and right have come include: to power in Western and Central-Eastern Europe. The populist agenda is at the center of national politics in • Charismatic leader many countries, and it is encroaching upon establishment • Socioeconomic discontent among “losers” in economic parties. Populists in Western Europe have scored electoral transitions • Anti-elite (anti-oligarch) and anti-establishment victories in the Netherlands (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), Belgium sentiments (Vlaams Blok), Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Swit- • Strong emphasis on battling corruption zerland (Swiss People’s Party), and Italy (Lega Nord). • Anti-Americanism The most electorally successful populist-nationalist party • Hostility regarding NATO membership in the EU is Austria’s Freedom Party (FPA). The Free- • Opposition to joining, and delegating sovereignty to, dom Party and its offshoot, the Alliance for the Future of international and supranational structures, such as the Austria (BZA), were closely associated with the charis- International Monetary Fund and European Union matic politician Jörg Haider until his death in 2008. The • Xenophobia FPA and BZA exhibit ideological tenets similar to other • Anti-immigration European populists, such as anti-elitism and opposition • Criticism of multiculturalism and support for policies of to immigration. assimilation.2 The nature of populism in Ukraine is analyzed more Austria, Italy, and Xenophobia. Immigration does not thoroughly by comparing the election platforms of the dominate public sentiment in post-communist societies, country’s political parties and the rhetoric of its party because few immigrants desire to stay in Central-Eastern leaders. Table 1, which compares Krastev’s ten factors Europe merely using the region as a transit route to the defining European populism with Ukrainian political West. In Western Europe, by contrast, populist parties are 4 Problems of Post-Communism November/December 2010 hostile to immigration, and the issue has entered the elec- Table 2 tion platforms even of establishment center-right parties, such as the British Conservative Party. Anti-Roma policies Ukrainian Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1991–2010 have been introduced in established democracies such as Year President Prime minister France and Italy. In the Netherlands, populists defended 1991 Leonid Kravchuk Vitold Fokin 1992 the country’s traditions of tolerance and multiculturalism 1993 Leonid Kuchma against what they perceived to be intolerant Islamic immi- 1994 Leonid Kuchma Vitaly Masol grants. The growing support for West European populist 1995 parties has partly arisen from widespread public disquiet 1996 Pavlo Lazarenko at immigration levels and particularly from the pres- 1997 Valeryi Pustovoytenko ence of Islamic immigrants. Islamophobia is on the rise 1998 throughout Western Europe in response to the perceived 1999 Viktor Yushchenko unwillingness of Muslims to integrate and a terrorist 2000 threat from homegrown Islamic extremists. In the run-up 2001 Anatoliy Kinakh to Norway’s 2009 elections, Islam became an important 2002 Viktor Yanukovych 2003 issue when the opposition Progress Party argued that the 2004 governing Labour Party was pandering to the Islamic 2005 Viktor Yushchenko Yulia Tymoshenko community.3 The issue of Islam has also turned a majority Yuryi Yekhanurov of the voters of France, Germany, Denmark, and Austria 2006 Viktor Yanukovych against Turkish membership in the European Union (EU), 2007 Yulia Tymoshenko believing that, if allowed to join, Turkey would become 2008 the largest EU member. The backlash has spread to the 2009 2010 Viktor Yanukovych Nikolai Azarov nationality policies of European governments that have shifted away from the multiculturalist policies dominant in the 1970s and 1980s toward an emphasis on integration a merger of his populist right Forza Italia, established of nontitular ethnic groups.4 in 1993 as the successor to the Christian Democratic Austria is different from other European countries Party, which had dominated Italian postwar politics but because populism has manifested through the country’s collapsed in 1991, and the post-fascist National Alliance unwillingness to deal with its past; unlike, for example, (formerly the Italian Social Movement). The Guardian West Germany before unification with the German Demo- newspaper described the launch of Italy’s new party of cratic Republic in 1990. Austrians see themselves as his- power as the merger of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia with, tory’s victims, and the FPA and BZA capitalize on Austria’s “the spiritual heirs of Mussolini’s fascist blackshirts.”6 competing national identities between pan-Germanism and Meanwhile, “the merger caps his fifteen-year attempt