Turkey-Ukraine Relations: High Potential, Low Voltage

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Turkey-Ukraine Relations: High Potential, Low Voltage TURKEY-UKRAINE RELATIONS: HIGH POTENTIAL, LOW VOLTAGE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Habibe Özdal Center for Eurasian Studies Viktoriia Demydova USAK Policy Brief No: 03 December 2011 TURKEY-UKRAINE RELATIONS: HIGH POTENTIAL, LOW VOLTAGE Center for Eurasian Studies Habibe Özdal Viktoriia Demydova USAK Policy Brief No: 03 December 2011 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu CENTER FOR EURASIAN STUDIES Eurasia covers a wide area ranging from the Baltic to the Pacific. The region, with its natural resources and sources of energy, has seen waves of dramatic political change over the centuries. The changing political structure of the region, the presence of never-ending conflicts, and international actors’ interest in the region are aspects of Eurasia’s complexity and dynamism. The Center for Eurasian Studies contributes to area studies conducted within USAK under the assumption that social reality is a very complex phenomenon and can only be dealt with through the use of different methods and disciplines. The main goal of the Center is to carry out a vigorous analysis of Eurasia and offer policy recommendations. To this end, the Center prepares reports and studies on the region as well as risk analyses. By organizing roundtable meetings and conferences, the Center also functions as a platform where different ideas and opinions can be expressed. The Center contributes to academic literature in the field by carrying out studies and publishing the refereedJournal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies (JCACS) twice a year. The Center’s wide-ranging research benefits from sources written not only in English but also in regional languages. The Center comprises the following desks: • Russian and East European Studies Desk • Caucasus and the Caspian Studies Desk • Central Asian Studies Desk Habibe Özdal ?? Viktoriia Demydova ??? CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................1 1. POLITICAL SYSTEM OF UKRAINE .....................................................................................3 Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ ...................................................................................................5 Political Parties in Ukraine .........................................................................................................7 Current Power Composition ......................................................................................................9 Current Political Crisis in Ukraine: Tymoshenko’s Trial............................................................10 2. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF UKRAINE ........................................................................13 GDP by sectors in 2010 ...........................................................................................................13 Relations with Foreign Economic Institutions .........................................................................17 3. MAIN ASPECTS OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY .....................................................19 Ukraine-EU Relations..............................................................................................................19 Russian-Ukrainian Relations ....................................................................................................23 4. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND UKRAINE ..........................................................31 Political Relations ....................................................................................................................31 Membership in Regional Organizations ...................................................................................33 Turkey-Ukraine Economic Relations .......................................................................................36 Turkey and Crimean Tatars in Ukraine ....................................................................................36 Cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine in the Sphere of Culture.........................................37 Cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine in the Sphere of Education ....................................38 5. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................41 INTRODUCTION With its strategic location of the existing power lines and economic potential, Ukraine, as one of the most important countries of Eastern Europe, is one of the pilot countries with which Turkey aims to develop its relations in an ‘exemplary manner’. Besides, since Ankara and Kiev, share common values and priorities within the framework of preserving stability in the region, the Black Sea neigh- borhood adds another dimension to bilateral relations. With the High-Level Strategic Council founded in May 2010, it is aimed to improve political and economic relations. Moreover with visa exemption agree- ment, which is going to be signed in December 2011, will not only increase to- urism activities but also expected to intensify the mutual inter-communal relati- 1 ons. Even though there is a consensus on accelerating existing relations in which high level visits frequently occur, the effective potential is not available yet due to differences in political agendas. This has both structural and cyclical reasons. In this study, before proceeding to the analysis of Turkey-Ukraine relations, Ukraine’s economic structure and political process is going to be evaluated in a comprehensive way, for better understanding of the Ukraine politics as well as bilateral relations. TURKEY-UKRAINE RELATIONS: HIGH POTENTIAL, LOW VOLTAGE POLITICAL SYSTEM I OF UKRAINE Having declared independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991, Uk- raine administratively consists of 24 regions (oblasts), the two cities of Kiev and Sevastopol with special status, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The population of Ukraine is about 45.8 million. Ethnic Ukrainians compose 77.3% of the total while ethnic Russians number about 17.3%. 0,5 0,6 0,5 3 17,3 Ukrainians Russians Belarusians Moldovans Crimean Tatars 77,8 *The ethnic composition of the country in accordance with the 2001 census1 Ukraine has a presidential-parliamentary system of government with separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. The president is described as the head of the state and head of the executive power in Ukraine; president is granted the power to appoint the prime minister with the consent of more than one-half of the parliament. Moreover, the president also appoints the first deputy prime minister, three other deputy prime ministers and cabinet ministers based on a submission by the prime minister. TURKEY-UKRAINE RELATIONS: HIGH POTENTIAL, LOW VOLTAGE As a result of the first free elections held on December 1, 1999, Leonid M. 1,4 0,5 0,4 Kravchuk, who was former chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, was elected as Ukraine’s first president for a five-year term. Following independence, the 1996 12 constitution was prepared by a commission which adopted a multi-party system Russians and also adopted legislative guarantees of civil and political rights for national Ukrainians minorities.2 Crimean Tatars 24,3 Belarusians The 1996 constitution declared Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, “a 58,3 Tatars sole body of legislative power.” The constitutional composition is 450 deputies Armenians who are elected for five-year terms on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot. Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada cannot combine their work in parliament with other activities. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine works Ethnic composition of the region:4 in sessions. Amendments to the 1996 constitution shifting significant powers from the pre- sident to the prime minister and the Verkhovna Rada took effect in January Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ 2006. However in 2010, the Constitutional Court announced that the amend- During the 2004 presidential elections that preceded the Orange Revolution, ments were unconstitutional since procedures used to adopt them violated the 4 there were two main candidates: the incumbent (at the moment of elections) 5 constitution. As a result, this granted great powers to the president reinstated by the court. prime minister Viktor Yanukovych and the leader of the opposition Viktor Yush- chenko. The elections were held through three rounds. The Crimean peninsula is home to a significant number of ethnic Russians and pro-Russian political organizations. Crimea was ceded by the Russian Soviet Fe- Twenty four candidates ran in the first round. Viktor Yushchenko ran as an derated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, in independent candidate and won 39.87 percent of the vote. Yanukovych, the recognition of historic links and for economic convenience, to mark the 300th leader of the Party of Regions, won 39.32 percent of the vote.5 In the second anniversary of Ukraine’s union with Russia. Moreover in July 1992, both the round, Yanukovych got 49.42 percent of vote, while Yushchenko received 46.69 Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments decided Crimea would remain under Uk- percent.6 Geographically, the votes were divided into eastern and western trends. rainian jurisdiction with significant political, economic and cultural autonomy. In the political sphere, Ukraine’s 1996 constitution confirmed the president’s The eastern and southern regions of Ukraine supported Yanukovych while cent- special
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