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Public Opinion in Ukraine 1999

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Public Opinion in Ukraine 1999 Public Opinion In Ukraine 1999 A Publication in the VOICES OF THE ELECTORATE Series Gary A. Ferguson October 1999 SAMPLE: 1,200 OVERSAMPLES IN KYIV (100) & CRIMEA (300) FIELDWORK: JUNE 16 – JUNE 23, 1999 DUCTED BY: SOCIS-GALLUP, KYIV Prepared for International Foundation for Election Systems 1101 15th Street, NW, Third Floor Washington, DC 20005 phone: (202) 828-8507 fax: (202) 452-0804 Public Opinion In Ukraine 1999 Opinion Research at IFES is a global program seeking to develop reliable and accurate opinion indicators. Results from IFES-sponsored surveys and focus group discussions are published in the IFES Voices of the Electorate series. For more information on opinion research at IFES, please call the IFES Development and New Initiatives Office. Use of information from this publication is permitted, provided the following statement is attached in 10- point type: "Source: International Foundation for Election Systems." As a courtesy only, we request that you advise us when using any data from this report This Publication was made possible through support provided by the Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), under the terms of Cooperative Agreement No. EE-A-00-97-00034-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or IFES. International Foundation for Election Systems, Washington, DC 20005 Public Opinion in Ukraine: 1999 Published October 1999 Printed in the United States of America ISBN 1-879720-60-4 Contents Introduction..................................................................................................................1 Background and Overview .........................................................................................2 Political Environment..................................................................................................3 Interest in Politics and Government...............................................................................3 Dissatisfaction with Conditions Remains Ubiquitous .....................................................4 Reasons for Dissatisfaction and Steps needed to Improve Situation.............................5 Generations Divided over Market Economy ..................................................................6 Pace of the Transition to a Market Economy .................................................................7 Further Measure of Desired Extent of Market Reform ...................................................8 The Meaning of a Market Economy..............................................................................8 Economic Reforms Occurring Too Slowly .....................................................................9 Economic Outlook Remains Pessimistic......................................................................10 Executive Branch Most Likely to Resolve Economic Problems....................................11 A Plurality Says the President is most Responsible for Impeding Economic Reform ...12 Corruption and Flawed Legislation Seen As Reform Impediments ..............................13 Black Market Activities ................................................................................................14 Black Market Goods....................................................................................................14 Black Market Services.................................................................................................14 Ukrainians Divided on the Importance of Foreign Investments....................................15 Political Reforms Occurring Too Slowly.......................................................................16 Citizens Say Ukraine is Not a Democracy ...................................................................16 Meaning of Democracy ...............................................................................................17 Perception of Vote Efficacy Improving.........................................................................18 Other Measures of Efficacy .........................................................................................19 1998 Voting.................................................................................................................19 No Party Best Represents Ukrainians’ Views and Interests.........................................20 High Voter Turnout Expected in 1999..........................................................................21 1999 Presidential Election ........................................................................................22 Kuchma’s Bid for Reelection .......................................................................................22 The Presidential Election Environment........................................................................23 Party Affiliation ............................................................................................................23 Distinctions between Candidates ................................................................................24 Confidence in Presidential Candidates........................................................................25 Candidate Support Profiles .........................................................................................26 Run-off Scenarios .......................................................................................................29 Voting Issues ..............................................................................................................30 Perceptions about the Election Process ......................................................................31 i Views on Political Parties .........................................................................................36 Necessity of Political Parties .......................................................................................36 The Importance of Having at Least Two Parties Competing in an Election..................37 Differences between Parties........................................................................................38 Voters’ Interests Not Represented by Parties..............................................................39 The Political Composition of the Supreme Rada .........................................................40 Communist Party Seen As Most Effective in Rada......................................................41 Plurality Says Military Personnel Compelled to Vote ...................................................43 Foreign Models for Ukraine’s Development............................................................44 Germany Seen as the Best Economic Model ..............................................................44 United States Seen as the Best Political Model...........................................................44 Land Issues................................................................................................................45 Attitudes toward Land Ownership by Ukrainians and Foreigners.................................45 Laws Regarding Treating of Land as Private Property.................................................45 Ownership versus Leasing ..........................................................................................45 Nongovernmental Organizations .............................................................................48 NGOs Free from Government Participation are Possible ............................................48 NGOs Not Seen as Necessary....................................................................................49 Importance of Certain Rights ...................................................................................50 Confidence in Institutions and Individuals..............................................................51 Few Understand the Purpose and Function of the Constitutional Court.......................52 Ethics and Corruption...............................................................................................53 Corruption is Widespread and Serious ........................................................................54 Ukrainian Citizens Accept Corruption as a Fact of Life................................................54 Corruption is Believed to be Common in Ukrainian Institutions....................................55 Public Information .....................................................................................................56 Information about Rights under the Constitution..........................................................56 Information about Political and Economic Developments ............................................56 Main Sources of Information........................................................................................57 Assessment of the Media..........................................................................................59 Objectivity ...................................................................................................................59 Role of Media..............................................................................................................59 Conclusion.................................................................................................................60 Appendix: Topline Data............................................................................................63 ii Public Opinion in Ukraine - 1999 Gary Ferguson 1 Introduction
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