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Eracity, De-Politization, De-Contemporarization, De-Intellectualization, De-Ability, De-Lawfulness, De- Independence, De-Morality/De-Civility, and De-Superiority

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Eracity, De-Politization, De-Contemporarization, De-Intellectualization, De-Ability, De-Lawfulness, De- Independence, De-Morality/De-Civility, and De-Superiority University of Alberta Competitive Discourse in an Imitational Democracy: The Multifaceted Image of the Opponents in the Online Materials of Russian Political Parties and Leaders by Artëm Andreevich Medvedev A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Slavic Linguistics Department of Modern Languages and Cultural Studies ©Artëm Andreevich Medvedev Spring 2012 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. 1 ABSTRACT In contemporary Russia, the Internet serves as the most diverse and open platform of sharing and contrasting ideas. While the most life-like imitational democracy elements do manifest themselves to a limited extent in the mainstream print and electronic media, only online do all political forces and leaders have the opportunity of reaching a wide audience and disseminating seemingly uncensored information. This thesis analyzes the discourse of Russia‟s political parties and figures through the prism of representation strategies. Particular focus is made on the ways Russian politicians represent themselves indirectly, through their opponents. Through the adaptation of Teun van Dijk‟s racist discourse studies and Buell and Sigelman‟s study of negative electoral campaigns to a wider phenomenon, it is possible to disclose such strategies as de-positivization/de- normalization, de-patriotization, de-personification, de-veracity, de-politization, de-contemporarization, de-intellectualization, de-ability, de-lawfulness, de- independence, de-morality/de-civility, and de-superiority. Data includes the materials from the websites of such diverse political forces as the self-proclaimed communists, nationalists, liberal-democrats, socialists and democrats, as well as the websites of individual political leaders. The thesis aims at disclosing an important aspect of political and inter-group discourse by means of online media within the context of post-Soviet social transformation. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This thesis was only made possible by the extraordinary patience and invaluable advice of my academic supervisor, Prof. Alla Nedashkivska, and the love and support of my family. I thank them with all my heart. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ........................ 1 1.1. Russian post-Soviet transition ................................................................... 2 1.2. Vladimir Putin and the current situation in Russia ................................... 4 1.3. Russian political parties and leaders ......................................................... 7 1.4. Elections and parliamentarism in Russia .................................................. 9 1.5. Russian political Internet and the role of media ...................................... 11 1.6. Competitive political discourse ............................................................... 12 1.7. Intended contribution of the thesis .......................................................... 15 1.8. Thesis structure ....................................................................................... 16 CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY ......................................................................... 17 2.1 Research Questions ...................................................................................... 17 2.2 Theoretical framework and general aim of the study .................................. 17 2.3 Corpus .......................................................................................................... 22 2.4 Coding and analytical process ..................................................................... 26 CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 29 3.1 DE-PERSONIFICATION ............................................................................ 30 3.1.1 Opponents as animals and inanimate objects ........................................ 30 3.1.2 De-personification summary ................................................................. 35 3.2 DE-ABILITY ............................................................................................... 35 3.2.1 Opponents as weak and losing .............................................................. 36 3.2.2 Opponents as tired and asleep ............................................................... 39 3.2.3 Opponents as mentally ill ...................................................................... 40 3.2.4 Opponents as dead ................................................................................ 47 3.2.5 De-ability summary .............................................................................. 48 3.3 DE-MORALITY/DE-CIVILITY ................................................................. 48 3.3.1 Opponents as envious and cowardly ..................................................... 49 4 3.3.2 Opponents as impudent and rude .......................................................... 52 3.3.3 Opponents as intolerant to dissent ........................................................ 54 3.3.4 Opponents as uncaring and selfish ........................................................ 57 3.3.5 Opponents as cynical, hypocritical, and immoral ................................. 60 3.3.7 Summary of de-morality/de-civility ..................................................... 67 3.4 DE-VERACITY ........................................................................................... 68 3.4.1 Opponents as liars ................................................................................. 68 3.4.2 Opponents as spreading rumours, myths and propaganda .................... 70 3.4.3 Opponents as populists engaging in rhetoric only ................................ 75 3.4.4 De-veracity summary ............................................................................ 79 3.5 DE-LAWFULNESS .................................................................................... 80 3.5.1 Opponents as violating the law ............................................................. 80 3.5.2 Opponents as corrupt ............................................................................ 82 3.5.3 Opponents as violent and dangerous criminals ..................................... 86 3.5.4 Opponents as violators of the political process ..................................... 89 3.5.5 De-lawfulness summary ........................................................................ 92 3.6 DE-INTELLECTUALIZATION ................................................................. 92 3.6.1 Opponents as stupid and not intelligent ................................................ 93 3.6.2 Opponents as lacking education and skill ............................................. 95 3.6.3 Opponents as against common sense and out of touch with reality...... 97 3.6.4 Opponents as mistaken and not learning from mistakes ..................... 100 3.6.5 De-intellectualization summary .......................................................... 102 3.7 DE-CONTEMPORARIZATION .............................................................. 103 3.7.1 Opponents as prehistoric, medieval and archaic ................................. 103 3.7.2 Opponents as relics of the Soviet era .................................................. 106 3.7.3 De-contemporarization summary ........................................................ 109 3.8 DE-POLITIZATION ................................................................................. 109 5 3.8.1 Opponents as non-political or imitating politics ................................. 110 3.8.2 Opponents as unstable in their views .................................................. 114 3.8.3 Opponents identified through prefixes and words like „so-called‟ ..... 117 3.8.4 Opponents as comical elements .......................................................... 119 3.8.5 Opponents as PR-oriented ................................................................... 122 3.8.6 Opponents as engaged in business instead of politics......................... 124 3.8.7 De-politization summary..................................................................... 125 3.9 DE-INDEPENDENCE .............................................................................. 125 3.9.1 Opponents as puppets and minions ..................................................... 126 3.9.2 Opponents as parts of the establishment ............................................. 130 3.9.3 Opponents as all the same ................................................................... 139 3.9.4 De-independence summary ................................................................. 141 3.10 DE-SUPERIORITY ................................................................................. 142 3.10.1 Opponents as shrinking in popularity ............................................... 142 3.10.2
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