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Erik S. Herron

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Erik S. Herron Erik S. Herron Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 1541 Lilac Lane, Blake Hall Lawrence, KS 66045-3129 Phone: (785) 864-9027, E-mail: [email protected] URLs: http://people.ku.edu/~eherron, http://vse-na-vybory.blogspot.com, http://web.ku.edu/~herron Positions Faculty Positions 2012-Present Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2005-2012 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2001-2005 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2000-2001 Visiting Assistant Professor, James Madison College, Michigan State University Concurrent Administrative Positions 2012-Present Associate Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2011-Present Program Director, Political Science, National Science Foundation 2011 Academic Advisor, Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas 2010-2011 Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2004-2007 Director, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, University of Kansas Education Degree Granting Programs Ph.D., Political Science, Michigan State University, 2000 M.A., Political Science, Michigan State University, 1997 M.A., Russian and East European Studies, Indiana University, 1992 B.A., Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan, 1990 Non-Degree Granting Programs Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, 1997 Intensive Uzbek Language Program, Indiana University, 1991 Intensive Russian Language Programs: Pushkin Institute, Moscow, Russia, 1989; Norwich University Russian School, Summer 1986, 1987 Main Research and Teaching Interests Comparative Political Institutions and Behavior (electoral systems, political parties, democratization) Research Methods (undergraduate and graduate methods of political research) Honors, Fellowships, and Grants George and Eleanor Woodyard International Educator Award, University of Kansas, 2012 University of Kansas General Research Fund Grant, 2010 ($5,200) National Science Foundation Advisory Committee Member (SES – 0921830, PIs: Brett Ashley Leeds, Micaela Mattes), 2009-2011 National Science Foundation Grant Subcontractor (SES – 0751662, PIs: Ellis Krauss, Robert Pekkanen, and Matthew Shugart), 2008-2011 (~$35,000) Research Travel Grant, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2008 ($3,000) Fulbright Fellowship, Teaching/Research in L'viv, Ukraine, 2007 (~$26,000) International Political Science Association Website Award, Top 300 Websites in Political Science, 2007 Title VI Foreign Language and Area Studies Grant, US Department of Education, 2006-2010 ($994,000) 1 Title VI National Resource Center Grant, US Department of Education, 2006-2010 ($888,136) New Faculty General Research Fund Grant, University of Kansas, 2002-2005 ($10,000) Virtual Classroom Program, U.S. State Department, 2004 (~$15,000) Westview Press Award for Best Paper by a Graduate Student at the 1999 Midwest Political Science Association Conference, 2000 (with Misa Nishikawa) Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Michigan State University, 2000 Regional Scholar Exchange Program (ACIE/USIA), 1999-2000 Graduate Office Fellowship, Michigan State University, Summer 1997, 1997-1998 SSRC Grant for Uzbek Language Study, 1991 Publications Books 1. Erik S. Herron. 2009. Elections and Democracy after Communism? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2. Federico Ferrara, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa. 2005. Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Journal Articles 1. Erik S. Herron. Forthcoming. "The Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine, October 2012." Electoral Studies. 2. Erik S. Herron and Nazar Boyko. Forthcoming. "Horizontal Accountability during Political Transition: The Use of Deputy Requests in Ukraine, 2002-2006." Party Politics. 3. Erik S. Herron and Nazar Boyko. 2012. "Reversing Democratic Revolutions: The Implications of Ukraine's 2010 Local Elections." Journal of East European and Asian Studies. 3(1):79-100. 4. Erik S. Herron. 2011. "Measuring Dissent in Electoral Authoritarian Societies: Lessons from Azerbaijan's 2008 Presidential Election and 2009 Referendum." Comparative Political Studies. 44 (November): 1557-1583. 5. Erik S. Herron. 2011. "How Viktor Yanukovych Won: Reassessing the Dominant Narratives of Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election." East European Politics and Societies. 25 (February): 47-67. 6. Erik S. Herron. 2010. "The Presidential Election in Ukraine, January-February 2010." Electoral Studies. 29 (December): 761-765. 7. Erik S. Herron. 2010. "The Effect of Passive Observation Methods on Azerbaijan's 2008 Presidential Election and 2009 Referendum." Electoral Studies. 29 (September): 417-424. 8. Erik S. Herron. 2008. "The Parliamentary Election in Ukraine, September 2007." Electoral Studies. 27 (September): 551-555. 9. Lauren Prather and Erik S. Herron. 2007. "Enfranchising Displaced Voters: The Case of Bosnia- Herzegovina." Election Law Journal. 6 (October):354-371. 10. Erik S. Herron. 2007. "State Institutions, Political Context, and Parliamentary Election Legislation in Ukraine, 2000-2006." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 23 (March): 57-76. Reprinted in Taras Kuzio (ed.). 2009. Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution. New York: Routledge. 11. Federico Ferrara and Erik S. Herron. 2005. "Going it Alone? Strategic Entry Under Mixed Electoral Rules." American Journal of Political Science. 49 (January):16-31. 12. Misa Nishikawa and Erik S. Herron. 2004. "Mixed Electoral Rules' Impact on Party Systems." Electoral Studies. 23 (December):753-768. 13. Erik S. Herron. 2004. "Political Actors, Preferences and Election Rule Re-Design in Russia and Ukraine." Democratization. 11 (April):41-59. 14. Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron. 2004. "One Ukraine or Many?: Regionalism in Ukraine and its Political Consequences" Nationalities Papers. 32 (March):53-86. 2 15. Erik S. Herron. 2003 [Published in 2007]. "Election Fraud and Manipulation: Central Asia in Comparative Perspective." Journal of Central Asian Studies. Vol. 8, (Fall/Winter): 2-16. 16. Erik S. Herron and Kirk A. Randazzo. 2003. "The Relationship Between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts." Journal of Politics. 65 (May):422-438. 17. Lowell W. Barrington, Erik S. Herron and Brian D. Silver. 2003. "The Motherland is Calling: Views of Homeland Among Russians in the Near Abroad." World Politics. 55 (January):290-313. 18. Erik S. Herron. 2002. "Mixed Electoral Rules and Party Strategies: Responses to Incentives by Ukraine’s Rukh and Russia’s Yabloko." Party Politics. 8 (November):719-733. 19. Erik S. Herron. 2002. "Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed-Member Systems: Evidence from Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 27 (August):361-382. 20. Erik S. Herron. 2002. "Causes and Consequences of Fluid Faction Membership in Ukraine." Europe- Asia Studies. 54 (June):625-639. 21. Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron. 2001. "Understanding Public Opinion in Post-Communist States: The Effect of Statistical Assumptions on Substantive Results." 2001. Europe-Asia Studies. 53 (June):573-594. 22. Erik S. Herron and Misa Nishikawa. 2001. "Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems." Electoral Studies. 20 (March):63-86. 23. Erik S. Herron. 1999. "Democratization and the Development of Information Regimes: The Internet in Eurasia and the Baltics." Problems of Post-Communism. 46 (July-August):56-68. Book Chapters 1. Erik S. Herron with Paul E. Johnson. 2008. "Fraud Before the 'Revolution': Special Precincts in Ukraine's 2002 Parliamentary Election." In Ingmar Bredies, Valentin Yakushik, and Andreas Umland (eds.), Aspects of the Orange Revolution III: The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections. (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag). 2. Erik S. Herron. 2006. "Too Many or Too Few Parties? The Implications of Electoral Engineering in Post-Communist States." In Norman A. Graham and Folke Lindahl (eds.), The Political Economy of Transition in Eurasia. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 3. Erik S. Herron and Irakli Mirzashvili. 2005. "'Georgians Cannot Help Being Original': The Evolution of Election Rules in the Republic of Georgia." In Christopher Waters (ed.), The State of Law in the South Caucasus. London: Palgrave. 4. Erik S. Herron, Ronald A. Francisco and O. Fiona Yap. 2002. "The Implications for Stability" (with Ronald A. Francisco and O. Fiona Yap). In Paul Schumaker and Burdett Loomis (eds.), Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond. New York: Chatham House. Book Reviews 1. "Between Utopia and Disillusionment. A Narrative of the Political Transformation in Eastern Europe? by Henri Vogt." Democratization, February 2006. 2. "Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior by Pippa Norris." Perspectives on Politics, March 2005. 3. "Beyond Post-Communist Studies: Political Science and the New Democracies of Europe by Terry D. Clark." Perspectives on Politics. December 2003. 4. "Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work by George Tsebelis." Comparative Political Studies. December 2003. 5. "Elections Without Order: Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin by Richard Rose and Neil Munro." Russian Review. October 2003. 6. "Launching Into Cyberspace: Internet Development and Politics in Five World Regions by Marcus Franda." Political Science Quarterly.
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