Denis Volkov. Protest Movement in Russia Through the Eyes of Its Leaders and Activists

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Denis Volkov. Protest Movement in Russia Through the Eyes of Its Leaders and Activists Denis Volkov. Protest Movement in Russia through the Eyes of its Leaders and Activists Results of previous research. ....................................................................................................................... 2 Infrastructure of protest movement. ........................................................................................................... 4 Observing during the elections. ............................................................................................................... 4 “Citizen Observer”: .............................................................................................................................. 5 “The League of Voters”: ....................................................................................................................... 6 Navalny’s “RussElections”: ................................................................................................................... 7 Political protests. ..................................................................................................................................... 9 “Ethical and “stylistic” incompatibility with the authorities, abuse of power: .................................. 10 Complaints of the people in power: ................................................................................................... 11 Inefficiency of authorities: ................................................................................................................. 11 Organizing political protest. ................................................................................................................... 12 Organization Committee .................................................................................................................... 12 Workshop of Protest Actions ............................................................................................................. 15 On the role of “Solidarity” Movement. .............................................................................................. 17 Civil protest. ........................................................................................................................................... 19 From the March of Millions to the Walks on May 7th and Moscow’s “Occupy”. ............................... 20 Writers’ walk on May 13th. ................................................................................................................. 23 Municipal Elections in Moscow. ......................................................................................................... 24 “Parallel economy”. ........................................................................................................................... 26 Protest results ............................................................................................................................................ 29 Influence of protest movement on political system. ............................................................................. 29 Activization of various interest groups: opponents and supporters of the regime. .............................. 29 Tightening the screws. ........................................................................................................................... 30 Unreformability of Putin regime “from above”. .................................................................................... 31 Discussing Putin’s fate. .......................................................................................................................... 32 Vague feeling of a dead-end. ................................................................................................................. 34 Limits of the protest movement. ........................................................................................................... 36 Consolidation and civil solidarity. .......................................................................................................... 39 The problem of civil control over authorities. ....................................................................................... 42 Issue of leadership. ................................................................................................................................ 45 New generation of leaders. .................................................................................................................... 49 Program of Action. ................................................................................................................................. 50 Conclusion. ................................................................................................................................................. 52 Results of previous research. The Levada-Center experts have analyzed protest activity in several ways. The corpus of quantitative research comprises polls at the opposition rallies in Moscow (in December 2011, February 2012 and September 2012), regular Russian public-opinion polls about the attitudes towards the protests, as well as several qualitative polls conducted in Moscow. This article represents the results of qualitative research conducted in April-June 2012 with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy1. The aim of the present work is to describe the ‘infrastructure’ of the protest movement, i.e. major organizations and citizen associations involved in the events of the end of 2011 and the first half of 2012. The objective is to understand why the spirit of protest emerged and how it evolved. This is all the more important to do in order to contest the opinion that “the absence of institutional structures of mobilization is a characteristic feature of current Russian protest (with occasional exceptions uncharacteristic of the general trend).”2 The first part of the article addresses this task. The second part includes the description of the motives of leaders and activists, their inspirations and concerns, and what their protest has helped them to achieve. The work quotes extensively from interviews. In these events, we may distinguish several stages of public mobilization: a) protest voting during the elections to the Duma on December 4, 2011, which the public resolved to do 1-2 weeks before the elections; b) monitoring the polling stations, the attention to which was heightened due to the events of the preceding weeks (i.e. a scandalous election campaign) and the publication of the facts of violations on the election day; c) mass rallies (starting from the first protest on December 5 in Chistie Prudy and finishing with mass rallies).3Therefore, we could talk about the fact that the wave of protests had started to grow already in November, well before the election day. The results of voting as well as the falsifications only added fuel to the flames already kindled. Several factors contributed to the atmosphere of uncertainty and the development of significant tension in all strata of Russian society: economic recession, accumulated system tensions, conflicts of interest among the community groups aspiring to power, and the corrupt state – and, consequently, the instability of the state system in general, the rapid decline of government authority. As an outcome of a series of pre-election scandals, to which mostly the educated, financially and informationally independent big city inhabitants reacted, tensions gave way to agitation. Given these conditions, people enthusiastically reacted to the calls of the protest organizers to march into the streets. People responded to the messages on the radio and in social networks as well as to flyers that were distributed. Mass mobilization started from the grass- roots, with protest voting during the elections to the State Duma, which, apparently, enlarged the scope of the events to the whole of Russia.4 This is why these events were outside the sphere of influence of major players, who only managed to react and to adapt to the flow of events with varying degrees of success. Time flew by: mass mobilization, which outlined the framework of 1 The topic of the causes of emergence and dynamics of Russian protest movement, which unfolded in December 2011, was considered before. Ref. Volkov D. “Protest rallies in Russian in the end of the 2011-beginning of 2012: demands for democratization of political institutes”. Vestnik Obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2012. Vol.2. pp. 73-86. 2 Bigbov A. “Research methodology of the “grassroots” street activism (Russian rallies and street camps, December 2011-June 2012)/Laboratorium .2012, № 2. P. 139 3 For the chronology of protest events in 2011-2012, please refer to: “Protest behavior”/Kommersant-Online http://kommersant.ru/doc/2012447 4 About the convergent synchronizing of the role of the “single” election day ref. Kynev A. “Preterm trap”/Gazeta.ru, November 20, 2012 issue, http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2012/11/20_x_4860077.shtml the political landscape for months to come, boiled down to two weeks (from the day of voting to the first mass rallies on December 10 and December 24, respectively). At that time, the key players were identified, and the relationships among them were established, which later formed the basis for new organizations. Although the minority of the people (not only in the entire country but even in the capital) became the driving force of the protest, the protests were sympathized with and understood by almost half of the people in the country. This provided a conducive background
Recommended publications
  • Russia Chechnya
    Russia Chechnya Population: 1,200,000 (Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Russian Federation, 2007, Inter-Agency Transitional Workplan for the North Caucasus. The population of Chechnya according to the 2002 Russian census was approximately 1,100,000.) Political Rights: 7 Civil Liberties: 7 Status: Not Free Overview: Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov was promoted to the Chechen premiership in March 2006 and continued to strengthen his hold on power in the republic. Critics like investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was murdered in October, have claimed that Kadyrov and his security forces torture suspected rebels, many of whom disappear without a trace. Rebel violence declined as Kadyrov consolidated his position, and two important rebel leaders were killed during the year, but the larger region remained unstable. Chechnya, a small, partly mountainous North Caucasus republic, has a history of armed resistance to Russian rule dating to the czarist period. In February 1944, the Chechens were deported en masse to Kazakhstan after Soviet leader Joseph Stalin accused them of collaborating with Nazi German forces. Officially rehabilitated in 1957 and allowed to return to their homeland, they remained politically suspect and were excluded from the region’s administration. After winning election as Chechnya’s president in October 1991, former Soviet air force Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev proclaimed Chechnya’s independence. Moscow responded with an economic blockade. In 1994, Russia began assisting Chechens opposed to Dudayev, whose rule was marked by growing corruption and the rise of powerful clans and criminal gangs. Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent 40,000 troops into Chechnya by mid-December of that year and attacked the capital, Grozny.
    [Show full text]
  • A Call to Join in the International Days of Solidarity Against Political Repression in Russia
    A Call to Join in the International Days of Solidarity Against Political Repression in Russia An appeal from the Russian leftists to their comrades in the struggle: Today we, the representatives of Russian leftist organizations, turn to our comrades all over the world with an appeal for solidarity. This call and your response to it are very important to us. Right now we are facing not just another instance of dubious sentencing by the Russian “justice” system or another case of a human life broken by the encounter with the state’s repressive apparatus. Today the authorities have launched against us a repressive campaign without precedent in the recent history of Russia, a campaign whose goal it is to extinguish the left as an organized political force. The recent arrests, threats, beatings, aggressive media attacks and moves towards declaring leftist groups illegal all point to the new general strategy on the part of the authorities, much more cruel and much less predictable than that of recent years. The massive protest movement that began in December 2011 radically changed the atmosphere of political and social passivity established during the Putin years. Tens of thousands of young and middle-aged people, office workers and state employees, began to appear on the streets and to demand change. On December 10th and 24th 2011, and then on February 4th 2012, Moscow, Petersburg and other large cities became the sites of massive rallies, demonstrating a new level of politicization of a significant part of society. The “managed democracy” model crafted by the ruling elite over many years went bankrupt in a matter of days.
    [Show full text]
  • Erik S. Herron
    Erik S. Herron Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 1541 Lilac Lane, Blake Hall Lawrence, KS 66045-3129 Phone: (785) 864-9027, E-mail: eherron@ku.edu URLs: http://people.ku.edu/~eherron, http://vse-na-vybory.blogspot.com, http://web.ku.edu/~herron Positions Faculty Positions 2012-Present Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2005-2012 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2001-2005 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2000-2001 Visiting Assistant Professor, James Madison College, Michigan State University Concurrent Administrative Positions 2012-Present Associate Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2011-Present Program Director, Political Science, National Science Foundation 2011 Academic Advisor, Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas 2010-2011 Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas 2004-2007 Director, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, University of Kansas Education Degree Granting Programs Ph.D., Political Science, Michigan State University, 2000 M.A., Political Science, Michigan State University, 1997 M.A., Russian and East European Studies, Indiana University, 1992 B.A., Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan, 1990 Non-Degree Granting Programs Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, 1997 Intensive Uzbek Language Program, Indiana University, 1991 Intensive
    [Show full text]
  • Observation of the Presidential Election in the Russian Federation (4 March 2012)
    Parliamentary Assembly Assemblée parlementaire http://assembly.coe.int Doc. 12903 23 April 2012 Observation of the presidential election in the Russian Federation (4 March 2012) Election observation report Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau Rapporteur: Mr Tiny KOX, Netherlands, Group of the Unified European Left Contents Page 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 2. Political and legal context ....................................................................................................................... 2 3. Election administration and voter and candidate registration .................................................................3 4. The campaign period and the media environment.................................................................................. 4 5. Complaints and appeals ......................................................................................................................... 5 6. Election day ............................................................................................................................................ 5 7. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee.................................................................................... 8 Appendix 2 – Programme of the pre-electoral mission (Moscow,
    [Show full text]
  • Elections in Russia in 2011-2012: Will the Wind of Change Keep Blowing?
    In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 77-94. Elena Kropatcheva Elections in Russia in 2011-2012: Will the Wind of Change Keep Blowing? Introduction Russians have long had the reputation of being passive about, uninterested in, and disengaged from politics, and Western observers, in particular, have been puzzled by this passivity. Protests that started in December 2011 as a re- sponse to election fraud during the Russian parliamentary elections, labelled in the mass media as the “new Decembrists” movement, “the Russian winter/ spring”, the “mink-coat” or “white revolution” and described using other col- ourful epithets, too, took many observers abroad and in Russia by surprise. These were the biggest protests since the 1990s. These events raised many questions: Who are these people who have started to protest? What are the reasons for these protests and why did they begin at that specific moment? How stable is Vladimir Putin’s system over- all? Will some liberalization of the system as a result of these protests be pos- sible? And many others. Even now, at the time of writing – August 2012 – it is difficult to give clear and definite answers to these questions, and some of them still have to be studied more closely by sociologists.1 This contribution starts with an overview of the parliamentary and presidential elections (election campaigns, their results and aftermath) that took place in Russia on 4 December 2011 and 4 March 2012, respectively. It then focuses on the protest movement and tries to give some answers to the aforementioned questions. Finally, it presents a survey of developments in Russian domestic policy after the elections in order to find indicators as to whether this wind of change will keep blowing.
    [Show full text]
  • Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05
    CO VERIN G CO N FLICT Reporting on Conflicts in the N orth Caucasus in the Russian M edia N M AY 2008 ARTICLE 19, 6-8 Am w ell Street, London EC1R 1U Q , U nited Kingdom Tel +44 20 7278 9292 · Fax +44 20 7278 7660 · info@ article19.org · http://w w w .article19.org ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05 i ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION Covering Conflict Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media May 2008 © ARTICLE 19 ISBN 978-1-906586-01-0 Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05 i i ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05 ii i ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION A CKN O W LED G EM EN TS This report was researched and written by the Europe Programme of ARTICLE 19. Chapter 6, on ‘International Standards of Freedom of Expression and Conflict Reporting’ was written by Toby Mendel, Director of ARTICLE 19’s Law Programme. Chapter 5, ‘Reporting Conflict: Media Monitoring Results’ was compiled by Natalia Mirimanova, independent conflict resolution and media consultant. The analysis of media monitoring data was carried out by Natalia Mirimanova and Luitgard Hammerer, (formerly) ARTICLE 19 Regional Representative - Europe, CIS.
    [Show full text]
  • Pride & Prejudice
    » AUTUMN 2005 VOL 5 ISSUE 3 NEWSLETTER ISSN 1378-577X www.ilga-europe.org PRIDEPRIDE && PREJUDICEPREJUDICE » Amnesty International on freedom of expression » Chisinau,( Bucharest, Warsaw, Riga… is Moscow next? » free speech versus religious belief The European Region of the International Lesbian and Gay Association avenue de Tervueren 94 Bank account # 310-1844088-10 1040 Brussels, Belgium ING Belgique Phone +32 2 609 54 10 ETT-CINQUANTENAIRE Fax +32 2 609 54 19 avenue de Tervueren 10 info@ilga-europe.org 1040 ETTERBEEK www.ilga-europe.org IBAN BE41 3101 8440 8810 BIC (SWIFT): BBRUBEBB Table of Contents 3 Staff news Message from Patricia 4 ILGA European Conference 5 Revising ILGA-Europe Constitution A very warm welcome to the autumn edition of our 6 News from ILGA-Europe Newsletter! 7 Queer Solidarity Hope you all had a nice summer. For some of us, summer was a 8 Amnesty International on freedom of expression 12 Moldova: court overruled a ban on LGBT demonstration relaxing and carefree period; for others, it was a frantically busy 12 Poland: law and justice for all? time, organising pride events. For many in Europe, the summer 14 Latvia: homophobia tales to the streets ended up being very hot! While in many places the Pride events 16 Romania: victory for LGBT community were as colourful and celebratory as usual, in some parts of 17 Russia: passions around pride event Europe they resulted in bitter battles against discrimination and 18 Netherlands: freedom of speech v religious belief homophobia. LGBT people in some corners of Europe have had 19 News clips to challenge not only ultra nationalists and Christian fundamental- ists, but also Prime Ministers (Latvia) and city mayors (Chisinau,( Warsaw, Bucharest) for their right to peaceful demonstration and The ILGA-Europe Newsletter is Anmeghichean, Stephen Barris, the quarterly newsletter of Anders Dahlbeck, Diane Fisher, expression.
    [Show full text]
  • The Noncommunist Left, Social Constituencies, and Political Strategies in Russia
    The Noncommunist Left, Social Constituencies, and Political Strategies in Russia PAUL T. CHRISTENSEN efining and identifying the noncommunist Left in Russia is in many ways an Dexercise in frustration. Whereas the organizations of the noncommunist Left in Russia are somewhat more permanent than that analogy suggests, the sugges- tion that we are dealing with tenuous political formations, with few exceptions, very much to the point. There are many such organizations in Russia; some are relatively stable and have a history, many are not; and all of them are relatively small and have problematic constituencies. There are three central questions to address if we are to understand the potential political import of these groups for Russia’s political future. First, what are the organizations and parties of the non- communist Left that have any stature and political salience? Second, what are their actual or potential social constituencies? Third, what are the political strate- gies of the noncommunist Left, and why does it seem to have such a problem in carving out a political space in contemporary Russia? Before discussing the specific questions raised above, it is important to situ- ate the noncommunist Left in Russia, and indeed the entire Russian political spec- trum, on the conceptual map of political ideologies used in Western social science. Left—historically centered around socialist and communist movements—puts a high value on democracy in the economic as well as in the political realm, on eco- nomic egalitarianism, and traditionally views an expansive role for the state and organized social interests in the operation of society as necessary and positive.
    [Show full text]
  • War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: a Case for Distinction
    The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for Distinction SVANTE E. CORNELL More than any other conflict, Chechnya epitomizes the old saying that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Since the first Chechen war began in 1994, the Russian government has portrayed the war as one against ban- dits and Islamic fundamentalists. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the label changed-now Chechens are referred to simply as "terrorists." Western states have for the most part thus far refrained from accepting the Russian position at face value, seeing the conflict primarily as an ethnic war. While recognizing Russia's territorial integrity, Western and Islamic states see the Chechen rebels as more or less legitimate representatives of the Chechen people, considering that the current Chechen president, Asian Maskhadov, was elected in elections deemed free and fair by international observers in 1997. Moreover, the international commu- nity has condemned the Russian military's massive human rights violations in the prosecution of the war. That said, during the course of the second war, which began in October 1999 and rages to this day, there has been an increasing concern with regard to the radicalization of parts of the Chechen resistance movement and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East. The attacks of September 11 introduced a new paradigm into world politics, and Chechnya has since been one of the regions most affected by the increased focus on terrorism. Indeed, it did not take long after 9/11 for the Russian government to draw comparisons between the terrorist attacks on the United States and the situa- tion in Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Sergei Udaltsov and Levyi Front: a Plethora of Potential
    Sergei Udaltsov and Levyi Front: a Plethora of Potential BA Thesis Julie Jojo Nielen June 30, 2014 1169785 BA Russian Studies Da Costastraat 101 1053 ZJ, Amsterdam julienielen@gmail.com word count: 9319 Contents 3 Introduction 5 The Poltical Arena 8 Levyi Front, an organization 8 Establishment and hard-line radicalism 9 The refounding and coming of age 13 I. Staying in, or coming into, existence 17 II. Resisting integration into the regime 19 III. Guarding zones of autonomy against the regime 21 IV. Disputing the legitimacy of the regime 23 V. Raising the cost of authoritarian rule 26 VI. Creating a credible democratic alternative 28 Conclusion 31 Bibliography 2 Introduction The Russian political left is often, and not unjustly, seen as a heavily fragmented tangle of niche parties and micro organizations, adept at occasionally making (international) headlines, but not so much at implementing the change they so fiercely propagate. This is mostly due to the fact that they are forced to function in a proverbial minefield of restricting, authoritarian legislation and are often subject to arbitrary prosecution and slander. Additionally, they seem to be greatly divided amongst themselves, and thus unable to create the union between parties, civil society movements and civilians that is so crucial when trying to overthrow an authoritarian regime. However, there is one organization currently active in Russia that seems to be transcending from the trenches of impotent opposition towards a position of greater power and possibilities of effectuating actual change. This organization is Levyi Front (Left Front), under leadership of the illustrious Sergei Udaltsov.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy
    Journal of Strategic Studies ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case Martin Kragh & Sebastian Åsberg To cite this article: Martin Kragh & Sebastian Åsberg (2017): Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 Published online: 05 Jan 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 32914 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20 Download by: [Anna Lindh-biblioteket] Date: 21 April 2017, At: 02:48 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case Martin Kragha,b and Sebastian Åsbergc aHead of Russia and Eurasia Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm; bUppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden; cRussia and Eurasia Studies, Swedish Institute of International Affairs ABSTRACT Russia, as many contemporary states, takes public diplomacy seriously. Since the inception of its English language TV network Russia Today in 2005 (now ‘RT’), the Russian government has broadened its operations to include Sputnik news websites in several languages and social media activities. Moscow, however, has also been accused of engaging in covert influence activities – behaviour historically referred to as ‘active measures’ in the Soviet KGB lexicon on political warfare.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kremlin's Proxy War on Independent Journalism
    Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper University of Oxford WEEDING OUT THE UPSTARTS: THE KREMLIN’S PROXY WAR ON INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM by Alexey Eremenko Trinity Term 2015 Sponsor: The Wincott Foundation 1 Table of Contents: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 3 INTRODUCTION 4 1. INTERNET & FREEDOM 7 1.1 STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 7 1.2 MEDIA REGULATIONS 8 1.3 SITES USED 9 2. ‘LINKS OF THE GODDAMN CHAIN’ 12 2.1 EDITORIAL TAKEOVER 12 2.2 DIRECT HIT 17 2.3 FINDINGS 22 3. THE MISSING LINKS 24 3.1 THE UNAFFECTED 24 3.2 WHAT’S NOT DONE 26 4. MORE PUTIN! A CASE STUDY IN COVERAGE CHANGE 30 4.1 CATEGORIES 30 4.2 KEYWORDS 31 4.3 STORY SUBJECTS 32 4.4 SENTIMENT ANALYSIS 32 5. CONCLUSIONS 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 38 2 Acknowledgments I am immensely grateful, first and foremost, to the fellows at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, whose expertise and good spirits made for a Platonic ideal of a research environment. James Painter and John Lloyd provided invaluable academic insight, and my past and present employers at the Moscow Times and NBC News, respectively, have my undying gratitude for agreeing to spare me for three whole eventful months, an eternity in the news gathering business. Finally, my sponsor, the Wincott Foundation, and the Reuters Institute itself, believed in me and my topic enough to make this paper possible and deserve the ultimate credit for whatever meager contribution it makes to the academia and, hopefully, upholding the freedom of speech in the world. 3 Introduction “Freedom of speech was and remains a sacrosanct value of the Russian democracy,” Russian leader Vladimir Putin said in his first state of the nation in 2000.
    [Show full text]