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Russianelection Watch Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.6, March 2004 TOP NEWS • Putin fires Kasyanov, taps Fradkov as PM SEE INSIDE • Putin still leads presidential race with 80% P.2: Theories on why Putin fired Kasyanov • Communist Kharitonov in second with 5% P.2: Biography of new PM Fradkov • Glaziev is new target of Kremlin media assault P.3: What do Russians think: results from a new poll • Fradkov announces reshuffle, major cuts in Cabinet Pp.4-5: TV campaign ads of Putin’s rivals • Economic liberals get vice-PM post, key ministries P.6: Websites with election information in English • Little-known Fradkov has ties to “Siloviki” P.7: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from • Rybkin disappears, reappears, drops out of race pro- and anti-Putin camps interpret the campaign TRACKING THE POLLS: Percentage intending to vote for each presidential candidate, January-February 2004 79 80 80 70 60 50 40 30 4 4 5 4 4 20 2 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 10 0 January February Putin Kharitonov Glaziev Khakamada Malyshkin Mironov Rybkin Against All Polling agency VTsIOM-A (renamed Levada-Center in March 2004) polls 1600 people in 40 regions nationwide in the middle of each month and reports the percentage of adult citizens who, given a list of names, say they would cast their ballot for a candidate if the election were held the following Sunday, counting only those who intend to vote. The latest poll was taken February 13-16, 2004. A total of 63% said that they were likely to vote. Margin of error is 3.4%. DATES TO REMEMBER improve on this record in his second term. Finally, Kremlin strategists are March 12, 2004: Last day of campaigning carefully calibrating state-owned me- March 14, 2004: Presidential election dia coverage to ensure that Putin’s opponents divide the electoral crumbs On the Campaign Trail in the optimal way, which involves actually puffing up Communist can- FINE-TUNING A LANDSLIDE didate Nikolai Kharitonov while po- Given that incumbent Vladimir Putin (right) leads Russia’s litically masticating erstwhile ally Sergei Glaziev. Thus presidential contest with 80% in the polls, he and his while a table or two have turned, Putin remains seated strategists have been remarkably active. Most dramatically, firmly at the head. less than three weeks before the voting Putin fired Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and then shocked the establish- NOT-QUITE-PRIME-TIME MINISTER? ment by tapping Russia’s little-known envoy to the European Putin’s dismissal of the prime minister was both expected Union, Mikhail Fradkov, as his replacement. While and unexpected. Few observers thought Kasyanov would continuing his “uncampaign” — disparaging political last much beyond the presidential election. Not only did he advertising and keeping far from candidate debates — Putin oppose the high-profile arrest of “oligarch” Mikhail used public appearances to state more forcefully than ever Khodorkovsky in late 2003 that Putin clearly supported, but before what his achievements have been and how he hopes to over the previous year he had become something of a whipping boy for pro-Putin United Russia, which was Mikhail Yefimovich Fradkov obviously eyeing more government posts for its own 1950 Born in Samara Oblast 1972 Graduated Moscow Instrument Building Institute members after the landslide it anticipated (and got) in the 1973-75 Economic counselor with the Soviet Embassy to India Duma elections. Almost everyone, however, expected 1975-84 Worked at the Tiazpromexport foreign trade company Kasyanov to go only after the presidential contest was 1985-91 Positions at the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations over, especially since Russian law requires that any PM 1991-92 Senior Counselor of the Russian mission at the UN or- appointed and confirmed by the Duma prior to the elec- ganization in Geneva; Russia’s representative at the tion be reappointed and reconfirmed after the start of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade new presidential term. 1992-93 Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations 1993-97 First Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations But on February 24, Putin nonplussed everyone by an- 1997-98 Minister of Foreign Economic Relations 1999-00 Minister of Trade nouncing Kasyanov’s dismissal. While pundits have 2000-01 First Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council offered numerous other explanations (see box below), 2001-03 Director of the Federal Tax Police Putin himself told 2003-04 Russian Presidential Envoy to the European Union voters that the March 5, 2004 Confirmed as Prime Minister of Russian Federation move had two main goals: first, Most observers interpreted Putin’s decision as a move to to let them know establish his own personal control over the government before election since Fradkov (below), to the extent he is characterized at day what to expect all, is usually called an effective technocrat and not a man of from his second vision. The new PM wasted little time in imposing Putin’s term; second, to plans. On March 9, just four days after his confirmation, he accelerate a struc- announced a new government that included over a third tural reform of the government, which he said fewer ministries than before, shifting some major figures Kasyanov’s team had been slow to carry out. A whirl- like Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (replaced by Russia’s wind of speculation ensued over who would replace him, former UN envoy Sergei Lavrov) out of their posts, but with almost every A-level pro-Kremlin politician in Rus- retaining Western business sia making someone’s short list. favorites like German Gref in Economic Development When Putin announced his choice on March 1, even and Trade and Aleksei those predicting a surprise were taken aback by the scale Kudrin in Finance and of this one; not a single published prognosticator appears naming the reputedly pro- to have so much as named Mikhail Fradkov (above with market Aleksandr Zhukov Putin) among the set of possibilities. While Fradkov had deputy PM. Russia’s long- enjoyed a long career at the top levels of government est serving minister, the popular Sergei Shoigu, stays on as (see box above right), most recently serving as Putin’s Emergencies Minister. Fradkov and Putin even managed to trade minister in 1999-2000 and as chief of the tax police find a more potent poison chalice for former Putin nemesis in 2001-03, he was responsible for a scandal that helped Vladimir Yakovlev, the ex-governor of St. Petersburg result in the elimination of the latter agency in March whom Putin regards as having stabbed him in the back by 2003, whereupon he was appointed to distant Brussels as defeating his own and Putin’s political mentor, Anatoly Russia’s envoy to the European Union. Although he Sobchak, to gain his gubernatorial post. Yakovlev, who last retained ministerial rank, he was no longer considered a year had been given the post of deputy prime minister for key player in Russian politics. the seemingly hopeless housing and utilities sector as a way to dislodge him from St. Petersburg, was packed off to head WHY FIRE KASYANOV NOW? the Southern Federal District of Putin’s administration, Pundits and politicians have advanced a wide where he will have to cope with the problem of Chechnya. range of theories. Some of the most interesting are summarized here. Analysts were quick to scrutinize not only • Oligarchs might have assassinated Putin to make their Fradkov’s actions but also his biography friend Kasyanov, who as PM was first in the line of suc- in their efforts to discern the meaning of cession, president (Argumenty i Fakty) his appointment. Many noted his close ties • Kick-start reforms stalled by Kasyanov (Nikonov, p.10) to Defense Minister and Putin friend Ser- • Show freedom from Yeltsin “Family” (Michaleva, p.8) gei Ivanov (right), for whom Fradkov • Inform voters for presidential choice (Putin) once worked in the Security Council. This • Raise interest in elections, increase turnout (Nikonov) links Fradkov to the “Siloviki” grouping • Remove unwanted government figures taken aboard in of Kremlin officials, associated with force-wielding struc- political deals, such as former St. Petersburg governor tures such as the FSB and military. The Internet publication Yakovlev (Polit.Ru) Polit.Ru, generally friendly to big business, pointed out that the “scandal” that helped bring down the tax police was • Draw attention to Putin, away from rivals (Nikonov) Fradkov’s aggressive move not only to investigate tax evad- ers but to take active measures against those considered ca- 2 pable of evasion, including pressuring them via co- workers and even relatives. The publication also noted WHAT DO RUSSIANS THINK? that he was implicated in a corruption case in the early Shortly after the Duma election in December 2003, Timothy 1990s but that the case was ultimately dismissed and the Colton, Henry Hale, and Michael McFaul organized a pub- evidence destroyed in a reportedly accidental fire. lic opinion survey asking a representative sample of Russian citizens about their political views. Here are some prelimi- Other pro-business politicians, such as noted economist nary findings as to the percentages responding that: Yevgeny Yasin and Unified Energy Systems chief Ana- - Russia’s economy is in good or great shape: 5% toly Chubais, praised Fradkov in RFE/RL Newsline as a - Own economic situation has improved in last year: 21% market-oriented liberal with a proven record of accom- - Russia’s economy has improved in last year: 36% plishment in the trade ministry. Yasin roundly denied - Own economic situation has worsened in last year: 24% that Fradkov could be considered a Silovik by disposi- - Russia’s economy has worsened in last year: 17% tion and orientation.
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