Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.6, March 2004

TOP NEWS • Putin fires Kasyanov, taps Fradkov as PM SEE INSIDE • Putin still leads presidential race with 80% P.2: Theories on why Putin fired Kasyanov • Communist Kharitonov in second with 5% P.2: Biography of new PM Fradkov • Glaziev is new target of Kremlin media assault P.3: What do think: results from a new poll • Fradkov announces reshuffle, major cuts in Cabinet Pp.4-5: TV campaign ads of Putin’s rivals • Economic liberals get vice-PM post, key ministries P.6: Websites with election information in English • Little-known Fradkov has ties to “Siloviki” P.7: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from • Rybkin disappears, reappears, drops out of race pro- and anti-Putin camps interpret the campaign

TRACKING THE POLLS: Percentage intending to vote for each presidential candidate, January-February 2004

79 80 80

70

60

50

40

30 4 4 5 4 4 20 2 1 11 1 2 1 1 1

10

0 January February

Putin Kharitonov Glaziev Khakamada Malyshkin Mironov Rybkin Against All

Polling agency VTsIOM-A (renamed Levada-Center in March 2004) polls 1600 people in 40 regions nationwide in the middle of each month and reports the percentage of adult citizens who, given a list of names, say they would cast their ballot for a candidate if the election were held the following Sunday, counting only those who intend to vote. The latest poll was taken February 13-16, 2004. A total of 63% said that they were likely to vote. Margin of error is 3.4%.

DATES TO REMEMBER improve on this record in his second term. Finally, Kremlin strategists are March 12, 2004: Last day of campaigning carefully calibrating state-owned me- March 14, 2004: Presidential election dia coverage to ensure that Putin’s opponents divide the electoral crumbs On the Campaign Trail in the optimal way, which involves actually puffing up Communist can- FINE-TUNING A LANDSLIDE didate Nikolai Kharitonov while po- Given that incumbent (right) leads ’s litically masticating erstwhile ally Sergei Glaziev. Thus presidential contest with 80% in the polls, he and his while a table or two have turned, Putin remains seated strategists have been remarkably active. Most dramatically, firmly at the head. less than three weeks before the voting Putin fired Prime Minister and then shocked the establish- NOT-QUITE-PRIME-TIME MINISTER? ment by tapping Russia’s little-known envoy to the European Putin’s dismissal of the prime minister was both expected Union, , as his replacement. While and unexpected. Few observers thought Kasyanov would continuing his “uncampaign” — disparaging political last much beyond the presidential election. Not only did he advertising and keeping far from candidate debates — Putin oppose the high-profile arrest of “oligarch” Mikhail used public appearances to state more forcefully than ever Khodorkovsky in late 2003 that Putin clearly supported, but before what his achievements have been and how he hopes to over the previous year he had become something of a whipping boy for pro-Putin , which was Mikhail Yefimovich Fradkov obviously eyeing more government posts for its own 1950 Born in Oblast 1972 Graduated Instrument Building Institute members after the landslide it anticipated (and got) in the 1973-75 Economic counselor with the Soviet Embassy to Duma elections. Almost everyone, however, expected 1975-84 Worked at the Tiazpromexport foreign trade company Kasyanov to go only after the presidential contest was 1985-91 Positions at the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations over, especially since Russian law requires that any PM 1991-92 Senior Counselor of the Russian mission at the UN or- appointed and confirmed by the Duma prior to the elec- ganization in ; Russia’s representative at the tion be reappointed and reconfirmed after the start of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade new presidential term. 1992-93 Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations 1993-97 First Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations But on February 24, Putin nonplussed everyone by an- 1997-98 Minister of Foreign Economic Relations 1999-00 Minister of Trade nouncing Kasyanov’s dismissal. While pundits have 2000-01 First Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council offered numerous other explanations (see box below), 2001-03 Director of the Federal Tax Police Putin himself told 2003-04 Russian Presidential Envoy to the voters that the March 5, 2004 Confirmed as Prime Minister of Russian Federation move had two main goals: first, Most observers interpreted Putin’s decision as a move to to let them know establish his own personal control over the government before election since Fradkov (below), to the extent he is characterized at day what to expect all, is usually called an effective technocrat and not a man of from his second vision. The new PM wasted little time in imposing Putin’s term; second, to plans. On March 9, just four days after his confirmation, he accelerate a struc- announced a new government that included over a third tural reform of the government, which he said fewer ministries than before, shifting some major figures Kasyanov’s team had been slow to carry out. A whirl- like Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (replaced by Russia’s wind of speculation ensued over who would replace him, former UN envoy Sergei Lavrov) out of their posts, but with almost every A-level pro-Kremlin politician in Rus- retaining Western business sia making someone’s short list. favorites like German Gref in Economic Development When Putin announced his choice on March 1, even and Trade and Aleksei those predicting a surprise were taken aback by the scale Kudrin in Finance and of this one; not a single published prognosticator appears naming the reputedly pro- to have so much as named Mikhail Fradkov (above with market Aleksandr Zhukov Putin) among the set of possibilities. While Fradkov had deputy PM. Russia’s long- enjoyed a long career at the top levels of government est serving minister, the popular Sergei Shoigu, stays on as (see box above right), most recently serving as Putin’s Emergencies Minister. Fradkov and Putin even managed to trade minister in 1999-2000 and as chief of the tax police find a more potent poison chalice for former Putin nemesis in 2001-03, he was responsible for a scandal that helped Vladimir Yakovlev, the ex-governor of St. Petersburg result in the elimination of the latter agency in March whom Putin regards as having stabbed him in the back by 2003, whereupon he was appointed to distant Brussels as defeating his own and Putin’s political mentor, Anatoly Russia’s envoy to the European Union. Although he Sobchak, to gain his gubernatorial post. Yakovlev, who last retained ministerial rank, he was no longer considered a year had been given the post of deputy prime minister for key player in Russian politics. the seemingly hopeless housing and utilities sector as a way to dislodge him from St. Petersburg, was packed off to head WHY FIRE KASYANOV NOW? the Southern Federal District of Putin’s administration, Pundits and politicians have advanced a wide where he will have to cope with the problem of . range of theories. Some of the most interesting are summarized here. Analysts were quick to scrutinize not only • Oligarchs might have assassinated Putin to make their Fradkov’s actions but also his biography friend Kasyanov, who as PM was first in the line of suc- in their efforts to discern the meaning of cession, president (Argumenty i Fakty) his appointment. Many noted his close ties • Kick-start reforms stalled by Kasyanov (Nikonov, p.10) to Defense Minister and Putin friend Ser- • Show freedom from Yeltsin “Family” (Michaleva, p.8) gei Ivanov (right), for whom Fradkov • Inform voters for presidential choice (Putin) once worked in the Security Council. This • Raise interest in elections, increase turnout (Nikonov) links Fradkov to the “Siloviki” grouping • Remove unwanted government figures taken aboard in of Kremlin officials, associated with force-wielding struc- political deals, such as former St. Petersburg governor tures such as the FSB and military. The Internet publication Yakovlev (Polit.Ru) Polit.Ru, generally friendly to big business, pointed out that the “scandal” that helped bring down the tax police was • Draw attention to Putin, away from rivals (Nikonov) Fradkov’s aggressive move not only to investigate tax evad- ers but to take active measures against those considered ca-

2 pable of evasion, including pressuring them via co- workers and even relatives. The publication also noted WHAT DO RUSSIANS THINK? that he was implicated in a corruption case in the early Shortly after the Duma election in December 2003, Timothy 1990s but that the case was ultimately dismissed and the Colton, Henry Hale, and Michael McFaul organized a pub- evidence destroyed in a reportedly accidental fire. lic opinion survey asking a representative sample of Russian citizens about their political views. Here are some prelimi- Other pro-business politicians, such as noted economist nary findings as to the percentages responding that: Yevgeny Yasin and Unified Energy Systems chief Ana- - Russia’s economy is in good or great shape: 5% toly Chubais, praised Fradkov in RFE/RL Newsline as a - Own economic situation has improved in last year: 21% market-oriented liberal with a proven record of accom- - Russia’s economy has improved in last year: 36% plishment in the trade ministry. Yasin roundly denied - Own economic situation has worsened in last year: 24% that Fradkov could be considered a Silovik by disposi- - Russia’s economy has worsened in last year: 17% tion and orientation. If one views Fradkov above all as a - Russia should continue and deepen market reforms: 54% loyal technocrat, however, one would indeed expect him - Russia should return to a socialist system: 26% to effectively carry out his bosses’ policies, whether they - Democracy is more or less suitable for Russia: 58% are market-oriented foreign trade measures or tough tax- - Western democracy is the system best suited to Russia: 7% policing steps to promote law and order. full convertibility for the , and the state-led develop- PUTIN’S PUBLIC VISION ment of mortgage markets so that ordinary citizens can af- The transition from Kasyanov to Fradkov, dominating ford to buy housing. Striking a favorite chord, he called for the news in the last three weeks of the campaign, is a more “transparency” in relations between the state and firms central element of Putin’s uncampaign strategy, which is exploiting Russia’s natural resources and, notably, higher predicated above all on “being presidential” and subtly taxes on “superprofits” from sectors like the oil industry. denigrating those who stoop to the level of actual cam- He also repeatedly stressed the importance of personal lib- paigning. Bypassing all televised candidate debates and erty, asserting that only free individuals can form the basis foregoing the state-provided opportunity for each candi- of a vibrant economy. Elsewhere, he has sought to allay date to air campaign advertisements for free on certain fears that he seeks a presidency-for-life, demonstratively television and radio channels, the President’s team in- rejecting a Duma initiative in early February to extend the stead orchestrates highly positive television coverage of presidential term to seven years. his activities as a “newsmaker” (the three biggest net- works are state-controlled). Analysts debate the extent to which policies are at the root of Putin’s popularity (for one view, see Peshkov, p.11). On one With fawning media hand, there is evidence that a majority supports the kind of broadcasting seem- market-oriented reforms that Putin has pushed and that more ingly every word as people think the economy is improving than worsening. On news, Putin has be- the other hand, the same research reveals that hardly anyone gun to inventory his thinks Russia’s economy is in good shape, and most Rus- achievements and sians feel their own economic situation is either getting outline his plans worse or staying the same (see box above). Whatever the an- more vigorously swer, the President has undoubtedly cultivated an extraordi- than before. In a key narily broad base of mass support. In fact, a poll designed by speech given at Timothy Colton, Henry Hale, and Michael McFaul found Moscow State Uni- that, as of late December 2003, Putin even had the support versity on February of 40% of those who had voted Communist in the Duma 12 and broadcast live election and a solid majority of Russians who had cast bal- on television, a speech that some political analysts con- lots for each of the other major parties and blocs (the LDPR, sider one of the most important of Putin’s career (see Motherland, SPS, United Russia, and ). Nikonov, p.10), the incumbent made a clean rhetorical break with the Yeltsin era, lambasting the legacy of eco- MICROMANAGING THE ELECTION nomic instability, corruption, and state weakness he in- While one might think that an election herited from his predecessor. Apologizing to voters for team leading its nearest rival by a margin appearing to “advertise” himself but citing the need to of 80% to 5% could afford to risk a free present them with his vision, he claimed the restoration and fair one-month campaign period, the of order and stability in the country as his most impor- Kremlin is thinking long-term and taking tant achievement. This, he argued, has helped him facili- no chances (Is accelerated autocratization tate economic growth on the order of 30% since 1999, a inevitable? Read Michaleva, p.8). It has three drop in inflation by nearly two-thirds, and concomitant main concerns. First, of course, its occupants want to be improvements in pensions and wages. absolutely sure that no candidate gains a last-minute spurt of support that could force Putin into a runoff, which would be But, Putin averred, much remains to be done, including necessary if no candidate wins 50% on March 14. The only the modernization of industry and infrastructure, the candidate even remotely capable of such a surge, most ob- reduction and simplification of taxes, the introduction of servers believe, is Glaziev (above), whose Motherland bloc

3 PUTIN’S RIVALS: TV CAMPAIGN ADS contest, so the prospect of insufficient turnout is more of a nuisance for the Kremlin than an imperative.) SERGEI GLAZIEV Party: Motherland These three goals have driven Kremlin election managers to Nomination: Independent undertake what would otherwise seem to be some strikingly Slogans: “We’ll take Russia back”; inconsistent measures. For one, Kharitonov, whose Com- “There is a choice” munist Party (KPRF) was mercilessly hammered by nega- Sample Ad: Glaziev appears, declaring tive coverage in the fall 2003 campaign, now finds ample that Russia needs a president who fulfills time to expound upon Lenin’s virtues and make what are all promises, taking responsibility for his becoming trademark anti-Semitic insinuations. This is be- every word. Feel-good images of Soviet industrial pro- cause the Kremlin does not perceive the gress and oil pumping fill the screen as Glaziev promises little-known and uncharismatic Khari- to restore Russia’s economic might and even repay citi- tonov as a long- or short-term vote-getting zen-investors who lost savings during the 1990s. The clip threat. Indeed, while he is strongly backed then turns to a short series of faux news broadcasts from by KPRF leader the near future, each called “Good News.” A female (right), who regularly appears on his be- anchor leads off each “news” program with the words half in campaign ads, another of the “President Glaziev today signed a decree...” In one clip, Party’s major factions, led by Gennady the decree is on “natural resource rents,” forcing big oil Semigin, is unenthusiastic at best and has previously been and gas companies to share more of their profits with more sympathetic to Glaziev, who has long held ambitions the state, enabling President Glaziev to raise student of effectively taking over the left wing of Russian politics, stipends and double pensions. A smiling pensioner re- including the Communist Party. As a result, the Kremlin ceiving a big stack of is shown. (Aired on TV prefers to have Kharitonov in the race in order both to raise Center, March 5, 2004) turnout and weaken Glaziev. Thus after Kharitonov threat- ened to withdraw from the contest if he did not receive live coverage of one of his speeches just as Putin did for his NIKOLAI KHARITONOV address, the RTR television net- Party: Agro-Industrial Union of Russia work actually conceded the point and reported live from a Nomination: Communist Party speech he gave to supporters in Tula on March 4. Slogan: “For the native land and the popular will” Instead of the Communists, it is Gla- Sample Ad: Trumpets blare as the ziev who now finds himself squarely KPRF symbol appears on the screen in the Kremlin’s crosshairs. Firing with a decidedly low-budget feel. Cut to Kharitonov, one of the first rounds, Dmitry who declares that Gaidar and Yeltsin robbed the Rus- Rogozin (right), who was Glaziev’s sian people in January 1992, that Putin is now paying a co-leader of the Motherland bloc in debt to the West, and that millions of dollars are going the December 2003 Duma election abroad each month. Trumpets again sound, heralding but who has backed Putin for presi- the KPRF logo. Kharitonov appears again, lamenting dent, orchestrated something of a how capitalism has rendered education unaffordable coup within Motherland. First, an and vowing to provide a free education for every child. organization that he controlled and More trumpets, followed by the candidate, glancing that was only one component of the down at notes, calling for discipline and order in the Motherland bloc suddenly claimed the sole right to run un- military. The above-mentioned slogan appears, followed der the name “Motherland” in future parliamentary elec- by a few more iterations of the brass and Kharitonov. A tions, a move which was quickly confirmed by the Russian former collective farm chief, the candidate concludes by Ministry of Justice. Rogozin then set calling for the restoration of Russian agriculture. (Aired his sights on the Motherland Duma on TV Center, March 5, 2004) fraction, twisting the arms of a ma- jority of Motherland deputies to strip Glaziev of his status as fraction rocketed from near-zero to 9% in the last days of De- leader, a post Rogozin then assumed. cember’s Duma campaign. Second, the Kremlin wants to Surprisingly, another leading Moth- avoid a strong showing by someone who might then erland figure, Sergei Baburin prove a troublesome rival in future elections, most nota- (above), who just days earlier had bly Glaziev (on why this is the case, see Kolmakov, p.7). endorsed Glaziev’s bid for Russia’s Finally, Putin’s team wants to get as many people to the highest office, suddenly went along polls as possible; if turnout dips below 50% of registered with Rogozin and then took up Rogozin’s former position as voters, the elections are ruled invalid and must be held deputy speaker of the Duma. again. With Putin so far ahead, there is a real danger people will not see a need to come to the polls. (Contrary As election day approaches, television news regularly re- to some incorrect reports, all candidates on the ballot in a ports Glaziev’s woes and rarely gives him an opportunity to low-turnout election are free to run again in the repeat respond, much less to elaborate his platform. Sometimes he is completely omitted from major-network newscasts. For

4 example on March 5, the 1st Channel’s Vremya, the flagship news program of Russia’s largest television Party: SPS network, covered Putin and then each of the other presi- Nomination: Independent dential candidates except for Glaziev, who got nary a Slogan: “Irina Khakamada: Our Voice” word. When he has drawn news coverage recently, it has Sample Ad: Khakamada is shown often been highly negative. Glaziev, who acknowledged reading, by a dim light in a dark room, that the Kremlin had boosted Motherland during the letters from ordinary Russians whose 2003 Duma campaign in order to weaken the Commu- voices are heard asking for her help. nists, used much of his officially allocated advertising Facing the camera, she declares “I am running for presi- time to argue that the Kremlin had now turned on him. dent so that President Putin will listen to us.” The camera He added that provincial bosses were also persecuting cuts to a nondescript backdrop, against which the candidate him, in one case by evacuating the building during a explains that she is running for a Russia where each indi- Glaziev press conference on the pretext of a bomb threat. vidual is secure, where the police actually protect people, Rogozin returned fire with fire, however, claiming that and where bureaucrats serve the citizenry. Today Russians the Kremlin was in fact supporting Glaziev’s campaign pay, but do not get anything, such as medical care, in re- in order to raise voter turnout. turn. The candidate calls for equal access to education, without bribes. The special services, she declares, should Two other candidates received token coverage, neither answer to the citizens. Russia should not create its own ene- particularly positive nor negative, on the network news. mies but live in a civilized world. She reiterates, “I am Irina Khakamada was the more outspoken, blasting running for president not to become president right now....I what she called an unfair elec- am running for president so that President Putin will listen tion. In one instance, like to us.” (Aired on TV Center, March 5, 2004) Kharitonov, she demanded equal time in response to the major-network live broadcast SERGEI MIRONOV of Putin’s Moscow State Uni- Party: Party of Life versity appearance. While one Nomination: Independent channel did give her (also like Kharitonov) some “live” Slogan: “Justice and Responsibility” coverage in response, it still managed to omit a particu- Sample Ad: Mironov is sitting in a dark- larly Putin-critical question, citing a technical glitch, wood-paneled office, a colorful map of reported Polit.Ru. She also protested a Central Election Russia’s regions behind him. Lightly pul- Commission (CEC) get-out-the-vote ad that showed sating electronic music, graphic images, a children drawing images of their ideal president, who voiceover giving pertinent facts simultaneously summarized was without exception depicted as male — this ad was on screen — all these punctuate Mironov’s methodical list- then withdrawn. On March 9, implying she may leave ing of key problems and the solutions he proposes. A better her current party, SPS, she announced plans to form a life for the provinces: firms should pay taxes where they new party (“Free Russia”) to oppose autocratic tenden- actually work. Freedom from narcotics: life imprisonment cies in Russia. She has largely refrained, however, from for drug lords. End corruption: convicted bureaucrats the highly negative should be jailed and banned from state service. And more. attack on Putin He is for Russia’s being a “great power,” he concludes. with which she (Aired on 1st Channel, March 5, 2004) began her cam- paign. Oleg Ma- OLEG MALYSHKIN lyshkin, the Lib- Party: LDPR eral Democratic Nomination: LDPR Party of Russia Slogan: “Vote for the LDPR presidential (LDPR) nominee, candidate, Oleg Malyshkin” attempted to register party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky Sample Ad: High-energy, rave-style elec- as an official campaign representative, a status that tronic music, the kind that LDPR leader would have allowed the charismatic nationalist do most Zhirinovsky used in many of his 2003 of the talking for the gruff bodyguard, but the CEC disal- Duma campaign commercials, accompanies the camera lowed this request (the two are pictured together above, moving across the letters “LDPR” embedded in a boxy vir- Zhirinovsky at left). tual-reality landscape. The camera cuts to a pumped-up Malyshkin, looking earnest and flashing teeth with plenty of While all current candidates, including Glaziev, have metal fillings, who calls to revive collective physical exer- been receiving officially allocated television time on the cise in the workplace. The same LDPR symbolism briefly major channels, these “debates” and “advertising blocks” reappears with the throbbing music. Malyshkin, his necktie have often been assigned to odd hours, sometimes start- slightly askew, advocates free medical care. Another rave ing before 8am (the 1st Channel’s election graphic LDPR interlude. Back to Malyshkin, who growls that com- shown top left). One network, NTV, declared that it panies should not be able to cut off heat, water, or electric- would not broadcast candidate debates or even advertis- ity. In more such segments, he demands a more accessible ing blocks at all during prime time because without bureaucracy, restoration of the coal industry, and natural gas in every home. (Aired on 1st Channel, March 9, 2004)

5 Putin’s participation, its management declared, there was just not enough public interest to justify showing them. Internet Resources in English While a number of news agencies have excellent coverage, Adding a dash of tragicomedy to this story, former Secu- outstanding campaign summaries, polling data, and analy- rity Council Secretary and ex-Duma Speaker Ivan ses of events can be found at: Rybkin (pictured below with a video link to his reputed Carnegie Moscow Center: www.carnegie.ru chief sponsor, “oligarch” Boris Berezovsky) provided a RFE/RL: www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection bizarre diversion during the campaign. Having just been VTsIOM-A / Univ. Strathclyde: www.russiavotes.org registered as a candidate, he mysteriously disappeared on February 6, prompting his wife and campaign man- avoid airing his campaign ads, which were reportedly ager to file a missing persons report. When he suddenly barbed attacks on Putin. After courts rejected his various reappeared five days later, he at first claimed he had pleas, Rybkin withdrew from the race on March 5. gone to Kiev for a bit of relaxa- Some liberal, pro-democracy forces appealed to voters to tion and was protest what some called the farcical nature of the campaign shocked to read by either voting “against all” or by not casting a ballot. At a all the fuss about February 24 appearance at Harvard University, the leader of him in the one of these groups, Yabloko Party chair Grigory Yav- newspaper. A linsky, compared Russian presidential elections to a soccer few days later, game. If in 1996 and 2003 he was playing on a badly short- he gave a press handed team aiming at a smaller goal than his opponents, he conference with said, in 2004 both the ball and goal have disappeared, leav- a very different ing only a scoreboard. “,” a new movement story, saying that he had been lured to Kiev with an offer co-led by chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov, also encour- to meet with Chechen rebel leader aged liberal voters not to legitimize the election with their but that this turned out to be a trap resulting in his being participation and called for democratic forces instead to injected with drugs and rendered unconscious for four concentrate on finding a strong candidate for the 2008 presi- days. Later, he related fragments of stories that commen- dential contest. tators found hard to piece together, including being tailed by the FSB, plied with spiked sandwiches and tea, At various times, every candidate other than Putin and Ser- targeted by a blackmail scheme that hinged on a com- gei Mironov has admitted to pondering a withdrawal from promising videotape of himself, which he was shown, the race in protest. For precisely this reason, most analysts and more. During all this, he declared that he would say, Putin has assigned Mironov, his own loyalist, to run as campaign only from London, where it was safe for him a kind of insurance policy; that way, there will at least be to speak his mind and that his chief issue would be one alternative candidate to point to if all the others with- Chechnya. The CEC, however, ruled that to participate draw. Mironov, in line with this theory, continues to praise in televised debates, he had to appear in person and not Putin regularly during campaign appearances. by satellite link. Rybkin further complained that all the — Henry E. Hale, Indiana University major networks were citing technicalities in order to

Russian Election Watch can be found online at http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/publications/rew.html

Russian Election Watch is produced with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a joint publication of The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Graham T. Allison, Director The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Timothy J. Colton, Director and Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director Indiana University - Bloomington The views expressed in Russian Election Watch are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any sponsoring organization. The editors welcome feedback of all kinds. Please direct comments to

Henry E. Hale (Editor) Danielle Lussier (Associate Editor) Assistant Professor Research Associate Department of Political Science Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Russian & East European Institute John F. Kennedy School of Government Indiana University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] Special thanks to Isabelle Kaplan for translation, editing, and layout and to Mara Zepeda for logistical support. The editor is also grateful to the Carnegie Moscow Center for moral and logistical support.

SOURCES USED IN REW, Vol.3, No.6: All images from 1tv.ru and accessed on March 9, 2004, except: Putin, Putin & Fradkov (president.kremlin.ru, March 8); Kasyanov (cnews.canoe.ca); Glaziev, Zyuganov (gzt.ru, August 18, 2003); Ba- burin (rodina-nps.ru); Khakamada (hakamada.ru); Rybkin (bbc.co.uk). Much of Fradkov bio from novinite.com.

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INSIDER INFORMATION: CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS BY LEADING RUSSIAN PRACTITIONERS

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIALRACE: THE GLAZIEV PHENOMENON Sergei Kolmakov Vice-President of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia ______

SOME KEY POINTS: producers and (b) to fulfill social obli- the West’s little-valued junior partner, * Kremlin’s fierce “anti-Glaziev” gations as part of a plan to overcome useful only as a source of raw materi- campaign shows fear of this rival poverty and spark a breakthrough in als and with an excess of population. * Glaziev formulates populist innovation; Should Glaziev come in second on message more powerfully than —an end to the structural transforma- election day and get no less than 7- does Kremlin tions of the previous reform cycle, 10% of the vote, his openly populist * Glaziev presents self as alterna- including those reforms already im- plan will present an immediate politi- tive to Russia’s current “road-to- plemented (such as with Unified En- cal challenge to President Putin him- ruin” policies of market global- ergy Systems, the housing and utilities self, to the project of establishing a ization and foreign investment sector, and the pension fund); “dominant party,” and to the 2008

The smokescreen of scandals and —a fundamental review of tax re- presidential “succession” plan. related publicity surrounding the can- forms so as to revoke the flat 13% All this can explain the fierce, sys- didacies of Khakamada, Rybkin, and income tax and switch to a wage scale tematic nature of the attack by the Kharitonov notwithstanding, the real based on “contribution to national “anti-Glaziev” campaign in its effort hidden nerve of this campaign is the revenue” (practically speaking, this to defuse the Glaziev “bomb” now, in Kremlin’s struggle against “the Gla- means a progressive tax on “super- the current electoral cycle. The sub- ziev threat.” profits” that will pay for Glaziev’s sequent organizational, political, and The summer-fall 2003 assault on the plan to double the average Russian publicity moves against Glaziev are “oligarchs,” Motherland’s subsequent salary); an indicator of how seriously the phenomenal electoral success, United —an end to investment deals with the Kremlin is taking this rival. Russia’s forced embrace of the anti- West involving the acquisition of Virtually the entire arsenal has been oligarch policy at the end of the 2003 Russian raw materials, permitting engaged in this struggle, from an “un- campaign, and the current anti- only those investment deals geared expected” dip in Glaziev’s rating and Glaziev efforts all demonstrate the towards developing infrastructure in Kharitonov’s emergence in second serious forces of public opinion the production sectors; place to the sudden orchestration of Kremlin itself has aroused. —a slowdown in the process and ul- rifts in the Motherland coalition and Glaziev has turned the President’s timate rejection of membership in the the Ministry of Justice’s decision to favorite lines about doubling GDP, World Trade Organization even in the register the Russia’s Regions party, overcoming poverty, and resurrecting medium term. headed by Yuri Skokov and Dmitry Russia’s greatness into a comprehen- Philosophically and geopolitically, Rogozin, under the name “Mother- sive economic, philosophical, and we are talking about a full-fledged land”; Glaziev was soon replaced by geopolitical strategy so accessible to nativist revanchism, interpreted as a Rogozin as leader of Motherland’s the masses that the Kremlin dares not reaction to failed attempts by reform- Duma fraction. oppose it openly. Further, the Glaziev ers to follow the rules of globaliza- It is obvious that Glaziev has been program is neatly packaged into user- tion, democratization, and liberal con- deprived of financial resources and friendly points and slogans easy for ceptions of a market economy. support by both national and local the public to understand. Basically, it Glaziev and his supporters contend media. The main TV networks’ cover- boils down to the following: that the alternative to them – to con- age of Glaziev’s campaign is designed —a state takeover of so-called “natu- tinue along the old path of participat- to prevent him from outlining his po- ral rents” not only in the energy sector ing in projects like “market- sition, depicting only a “talking head,” but in raw materials as well as alcohol globalization-foreign investment in a “crazy professor” who repeats the production; the natural resources sector” – will same asserted truths over and over. lead to Russia’s ultimate historical President Putin’s visit to Krasnoyarsk, —the effective introduction of mobili- st zational economic levers to (a) redis- defeat in the 21 century, involving the birthplace of the “Glaziev phe- tribute what is taken so as to restruc- the seizure of the country’s natural nomenon,” may also serve as indirect ture the economy in favor of goods- riches by trans-national corporations evidence that the Kremlin has major and Russia’s relegation to the role of concerns about this rival. █

7

ELECTIONS WITHOUT CHOICE: THE 2004 CAMPAIGN Galina Michaleva Head of the Yabloko Party’s Analytical Center ______

SOME KEY POINTS: ruling that a television broadcast of brawler. For Zhirinovsky, Ma- * No candidate other than Putin is Putin’s meeting with his supporters is lyshkin’s candidacy meant a chance to actually trying to become president; not an infringement upon the other continue the intense Duma campaign each is a mere tool of some other po- candidates’ rights. and to shore up ratings. From the start, litical force, e.g., the Kremlin Finally, in the improbable event that however, the CEC and then the Su- * Kremlin invests surprising effort to one of the challengers gets more than preme Court deprived Zhirinovsky of control an election it has in the bag 5% or that voter turnout is less than this opportunity by not allowing him * The logic of authoritarianism inevi- 50%, no one doubts that these “mis- to participate in nationally televised tably leads to repressive excess takes” would be corrected by precinct debates. Malyshkin is an instrument of * Kremlin destroying even the illusion and district election commissions dur- the LDPR leader, and does not have of democracy it hopes to project ing vote tabulation, just as they were his own political goals. * Putin reduces political role of PM’s in the Duma elections. office and government itself Thus, the result is predetermined. , formerly a member of The majority of Russian voters will the ruling state elite as Speaker of the Since we all know what the results vote for the current president, Vladi- Duma and secretary of the Security of the presidential election will be, we mir Vladimirovich Putin. Council under Yeltsin, quickly left the know that the president will not only Only two questions remain: political arena with the advent of stay in office but that he will win in —Why are other candidates partici- Putin. As Boris Berezovsky’s chance the first round with approximately 75- pating in this game that has a prede- to remain on the Russian political 80% of the vote. termined winner? scene, Rybkin has served as a mouth- Regardless of one’s opinion of —Why, despite the obvious absence piece for the exiled millionaire’s anti- Putin, descriptions of the events to of competition, is the government Putin statements. Despite his minimal take place on March 14 range from making not less but more use of its ratings and most Russians’ aversion to farce to national referendum on confi- administrative resources than it did in Berezovsky, Rybkin was forced to dence in Putin. Unlike the Duma the Duma elections? flee to London and then drop out of elections in December, this election is First, let’s take a look at who is for- the race. He is another instrument a none-too-skillful, less-than-serious mally competing with Putin in these without his own goals. imitation of free and fair elections. elections. From the get-go, it excluded elements Nikolai Kharitonov, the Communist of the democratic process. Sergei Mironov is Speaker of the Party of the Russian Federation First of all, it lacks competition. Not Federation Council, a constitutional (KPRF) candidate, is a leader of the one of the challengers has even the organ that has basically squandered its Agrarian Party of Russia known for remotest chance of getting enough political role since Putin’s federal his drive to restore the monument to votes to bargain with the winner for reforms. In many gubernatorial races Dzerzhinsky that used to stand in front significant political position. and elections in the Asian part of the of the former KGB’s Lubyanka Second, the favorite is not hiding the former , Mironov is play- Prison. The KPRF’s nomination of fact that he is not taking the other ing the role of “doubler” in case, due this second-string figure is the result candidates seriously, leaving challeng- to the vagaries of different candida- of conflict within the party. Because ing statements unanswered and not cies, a leading candidate should find of his dwindled influence, Zyuganov participating in debates. himself running unopposed. His task was unable to unite the party behind Third, the President is putting na- is to lend a semblance of legitimacy to his push for non-participation in the tionwide television networks to an undemocratic election. He himself elections. But the KPRF leadership maximum use, a strategy perfected “fully supports the President’s poli- has not rejected non-participation for during the Duma campaign. With cies” and will vote for him. Without good: Kharitonov may drop out of the Putin’s domination of the media, cri- an agenda of his own, Mironov is but race yet. His candidacy has been tiques of his activities are by and large an instrument of the Kremlin. something of a boon to his popularity, absent. but a significant showing on Election Fourth, the other candidates have no Oleg Malyshkin is a Duma deputy, a day is not expected. A personal vic- hope of defending their rights. Neither member of the Liberal Democratic tory in the election is not a goal for the courts nor the Central Election Party of Russia (LDPR), and a fitting this candidate. Commission (CEC) have rendered a response by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, single verdict favorable to the chal- who, not wanting to participate in this Irina Khakamada, one of the leaders lengers, whether it is the refusal to game, nominated his chief bodyguard, of the (SPS) allow Zhirinovsky to represent Ma- who acquired a reputation during the until its party congress last December, lyshkin in the debates, or the CEC’s Duma campaign as a dim-witted was not even supported by her own

8 party. She cites the need for a liberal sources (that is, a party) is running in All the TV networks broadcast opposition candidate in this race as the these elections. Putin’s meeting with his supporters, basis for her run. She began her cam- The Russian democratic party and the CEC rejects Khakamada’s and paign with a pointed statement about Yabloko at first refused to nominate a Kharitonov’s complaints about un- Putin’s responsibility for the lives lost candidate and later virtually called for equal air time. during his response to a terrorist sei- a boycott of the presidential elections. Finally, Putin fires his government zure of a crowded Moscow theater in An official statement released by the and names Mikhail Fradkov, a man no October 2002. However, this state- party in February says, “We operate one knows with a less-than-spotless ment, which echoes arguments made on the assumption that people are see- reputation, as the next prime minister. by Berezovsky, has been the only sub- ing a growing limitation of freedom in These steps seem illogical only in stantive one made by Khakamada, this country, inequality among the the context of the elections. Some who now talks most often about the candidates in these pseudo-democratic have no bearing on the election, others numerous threats to her safety. Her elections, and candidacies that lack are explained not by the irrational campaign is financed by Boris substance and are even comic. We actions of the actual political players Nevzlin, a former chief who is propose that under these circum- but by the inertial logic of bureau- the target of an international investi- stances the natural form of protest for cratic decision-making. gation by Russian authorities and cur- people with democratic convictions is The former category includes rently resides in Israel. For all intents non-participation in the elections for Putin’s speech to his supporters, in and purposes, Khakamada, who is president of the Russian Federation.” which for the first time since he came using the campaign to bolster her own to power he publicly and unambigu- ratings, is another instrument of the ously blamed Yeltsin for corruption anti-Putin forces outside Russia, Permission from and poverty, the impotence of state Yukos representatives and Bere- above is no longer machinery, and the oligarchs. zovsky. Willingly or not, Khakamada The firing of the government and is also an instrument of the Kremlin, needed to use adminis- the appointment of a technocrat as its legitimizing the elections through the new head is a practical and political participation of a representative of trative resources; step toward freedom from obligation democratic forces. Therefore, her un- their use is becoming to the Yeltsin “Family” and a state- answered appeals to Glaziev and ment of Putin’s intention to follow his Kharitonov to drop out of the race the M.O. for authori- own political course. with her are hardly coincidental. ties, anticipating their By not selecting a political figure – whether United Russia poster boy Sergei Glaziev is an administration bosses’ will. , Silovik , economist who joined the opposition or “liberal reformer” Aleksei Kudrin –

Congress of Russian Communities, Putin has reduced the political weight Then why, in this utterly predictable was later in the KPRF, and then co- of the prime minister’s office and of situation, is the Kremlin using the founded Motherland, a project aimed the government as a constitutional same tactics it used in the Duma elec- at eroding the KPRF’s support in the organ, the sole mission of which will tions, in which it had a completely last Duma elections. He was not now become the technical implemen- different objective – to raise United nominated by his own bloc, which has tation of the president’s policies. Russia’s percentage and weaken the endorsed Putin. At the start of the As to the pressure on other candi- opposition? campaign, he looked like the Presi- dates and the limitation of their elec- By the logic of the situation, it dent’s only serious challenger al- toral rights, this is a consequence of would be more advantageous to the though his rating never exceeded 4%. the logic of an authoritarian regime. President if opposition candidates A series of scandals connected with a After the Duma election, the results received the maximum number of split in Motherland and a conflict with of which underscored a rejection of votes possible without jeopardizing a the bloc’s other leader, Dmitri the principle of division of power and Putin victory in the first round as that Rogozin, substantially hurt Glaziev, a rejection of elements of democracy, would provide a more convincing whose main task was to strengthen his actions such as the suppression of imitation of democracy. Instead, one personal popularity after Motherland’s even insignificant displays of opposi- gets the impression that the Kremlin is success in the Duma elections. As the tion are completely unavoidable. doing everything to destroy that illu- most influential of all the opposition Permission from above is no longer sion rather than strengthen it. candidates, he also serves to legiti- needed to use administrative re- The Kremlin takes systematic steps mize the elections, willingly or not. sources, and their use is becoming the to weaken Glaziev, who has already modus operandi for authorities, an- suffered blows, first Motherland’s From this list, it is evident that run- ticipating the will of bosses, at any nomination of Gerashchenko and then ning for president is not the goal for level, from federal to local, and under the bloc’s split. The minimally popu- any of the candidates, and many of any circumstance, at least as far as lar and unpersuasive Rybkin is forced them are not independent figures. Not federal elections are concerned. out of the country. There is pressure one major Russian politician with The real question lies elsewhere: on Khakamada to tone down the op- significant name-recognition and his How prepared are society and its elites positional pitch of her statements. own financial and organizational re- to accept the new rules of the game? █

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MODERNIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDST OF THE ELECTION Vyacheslav Nikonov President of the POLITY Foundation

SOME KEY POINTS: tioned by the President have been during the election campaign concerns * Putin’s dismissal of the government stuck in his governmental committees political tactics. is indication of resolve to generate for years. The introduction of a new topic into modernization breakthrough Economic growth in the past four the election campaign – particularly * Electorate is asked to vote not only years was considerable, but the degree one regarding the creation of a new for President but also for new team to which our economy was reformed government – intensifies its signifi- * Kasyanov’s oligarch-friendly cabi- falls short in comparison with our cance and makes it more interesting. net stalled Putin’s reforms for years neighbors like, for example, Kazakh- It is no secret that up to this point stan. There, GDP rates are already there has been no real intrigue or On February 12, Putin gave a tele- increasing twice as fast as in Russia. drama. Certainly, the disappearance vised speech at Moscow State Univer- Putin and his administration have re- and subsequent return of presidential sity to an audience of his supporters. peatedly criticized the cabinet of min- candidate Ivan Rybkin (together with The speech drew much attention, isters precisely for its sluggishness the three completely contradictory above all because Putin’s opponents and lack of ambition in its planning. explanations of what happened to charged that it violated campaign And this is happening while the him) could not be considered intrigu- rules. President carries an absolute majority ing. The winner is known and a por- However, it seems that this speech in the Duma and thus any reform is tion of the electorate started to experi- deserved attention for completely dif- conceivable and capable of being car- ence apathy. ferent reasons: it would not be an ex- ried out. Now the political situation has ex- aggeration to say that it was one of the When Putin unexpectedly dismissed ploded, while all of the news pro- most important speeches of Putin’s the government on February 24, for grams have started to attract more of presidency and possibly of all Russian me this was an indication of his reso- the public’s attention. The electorate presidencies as well. I am writing this lute intention to generate a moderniza- is being asked to vote not only for the with a certain degree of knowledge tion breakthrough. Moreover, he President but also for his new team; and self-criticism, for I co-authored clearly had become concerned with this can be seen as a sign of respect several speeches for two previous his place in history. for the citizens. presidents. But the question remains of why the Up until election day, March 14, all What Putin proposed was a broad President decided to discharge his eyes will carefully follow the proceed- and detailed program for a “moderni- cabinet at this time, since by law the ings of the formation of the cabinet. zation breakthrough” in Russia, which same thing has to be done again fol- This process will involve ratification is to take place in his last four years in lowing the election? in the Duma, and, finally, the personal office. The reason seems to be clear. If pro- appointment of the ministers. According to the President, Russia cedural changes in the government But the media spotlight will, of must quickly complete the creation of were to go according to schedule, the course, be on Putin. There should be a modern, competitive state that is new cabinet would not begin its work no worries about the last part of the capable of ensuring even greater eco- until the middle of summer, which campaign being saturated with news nomic growth rates and prosperity means that no work could be started coverage. So the dismissal of the gov- through the implementation of re- until that time. ernment was a very strong tactical forms in the realm of administration, Now, however, there is a chance move. pensions and taxes, as well as finan- that the delayed and problematic ad- I assume that another reason for the cial and military reforms; this is in ministrative reform (which is sup- dismissal of the government that is addition to transforming housing and posed to reduce the bureaucratic appa- directly connected with the presiden- communal services, fighting corrup- ratus, together with the number of tial election is that the government did tion in the law-enforcement structures, ministries and their regulatory func- enjoy some popularity, but it was sig- etc. tions, by one-third) will be completed nificantly less than Putin’s (the lowest Furthermore, all of these changes in the next few weeks. Thus, the new popularity rating in Russian politics is are to take place within strengthened cabinet will be formed according to enjoyed by the Duma and the various democratic institutions. the new structure and begin its work political parties). I carefully studied the speech and in April. The dismissal of the government mentally applauded the President, but To sum up, the primary reasons for could increase Putin’s rating, though it then thought to myself, “With the cur- an early dismissal of the government is not clear why he would he need this rent government, his proposal will correspond with the content of Putin’s – according to recent polls he is set to continue to be merely a proposal.” second presidential term. But of receive 70-80% of votes. The oligarch-friendly cabinet course, everything that takes place The question on everybody’s mind headed by Mikhail Kasyanov was was “Who is going to replace caution itself, as all the reforms men-

10 Kasyanov?” I avoided making any . Such a move could had responsibility as vice-governor of forecasts since nobody has been able certainly speed up the reforms. St. Petersburg. to predict any key appointments by But the President once again sur- Fradkov knows the force-wielding Putin in the past. prised everyone, nominating Mikhail structures since he worked in the Se- It seemed to me that the best candi- Fradkov for the job. Putin followed curity Council and headed the tax po- date for this position would have been his own criteria, and he mentioned lice. Putin himself. The Constitution does professionalism, honesty, and broad- And he knows the world as he is not categorically preclude this option. based experience. now moving to Moscow from Brus- This combination could unite the Fradkov is definitely experienced. sels, where he was Russia’s ambassa- power of the presidency with the re- He is a smart economist and was in dor to the EU. sponsibilities of the head of the gov- charge of the Ministry of Foreign On March 5 the Duma will approve ernment as is already done in classic Trade, an area where Putin previously his nomination. On March 14 Putin presidential republics such as the will win the election.█

A TACTICAL VICTORY FRAUGHT WITH STRATEGIC DEFEAT Viktor Peshkov Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee

SOME KEY POINTS: In reality, all this is carefully engi- country has achieved democracy: the * Gross overkill in manipulating cam- neered to achieve the opposite, as re- turnover of power to the opposition paign may be priming voters for end- cent political events show. As a result within the legal framework and as a ing elections altogether of last December’s Duma campaign, result of free and fair elections. Putin * Putin admits aim to select a succes- in which the President and his admini- does not even permit such a thought. sor for the office of president, annul- stration loomed large, a new party Thus the basic principle of democ- ling essence of democracy hierarchy has taken shape. racy, including its institutions, is dis- * Polls show Putin’s appeal unlinked It was logical to assume that Putin, credited. to policies, which are far less popular who openly endorsed United Russia The same can be said of the scan- than he is during the Duma campaign, would dalous removal of Mikhail Kasyanov * People don’t blame president for finally become a party candidate – from the post of prime minister. Putin Russia’s plight, seeing him as power- i.e., United Russia’s nominee. Instead, has explained that he wants to present less; thus they choose presidents he preferred nomination by no group the people with a new head of his based on personality in particular; he did not formally link government. * Women are attracted to Putin as a himself to any party. This left United But this is being done three weeks nice guy; men like him as a tough guy Russia in limbo despite its 300 Duma before the presidential election. Even seats. if the President’s high popularity rat- The current presidential campaign in Since absolute power in Russia is ing justifies predicting a Putin victory, Russia has effectively turned into an concentrated in the president’s hands, under no circumstances should he urgent warning that the streets of Rus- as long as this power has no direct allow himself to act as if the elections sian public politics are being rolled party affiliation, multipartism will were over and he had won. This is a up. It is clear that for the time being remain in an embryonic state. After show of disrespect for the very institu- the nation has lost the chance to make all, what is the point of a party if it a tion of elections. any kind of real political choice. priori cannot vie for real power? Here one cannot ignore the strange All the inalienable features of de- Putin’s remark during a meeting phenomenon of the redundant efforts mocracy – multipartism, free choice, a with supporters at Moscow State Uni- by Putin’s team to preserve his power. real and active opposition – have been versity attests to his perception of the With a two-thirds approval rating drained of content. Only the shell of a political process in Russia as his own guaranteeing victory, it would seem formal judiciary remains, one whose personal affair, not a party issue. He unnecessary to resort to the kind of moral and psychological status has said that he sees it as his task to select political pressure and violations of the been reduced to infinitesimal size. a successor for the office of president. democratic process that are consis- The paradox is that all this is the This comment betrays either a lack tently seen in Russia. result of ongoing conscious efforts by of understanding of the essence of Are such methods laying the psycho- President Vladimir Putin and his team, democracy or a lack of respect for it logical groundwork for Russians’ utter people who are following a consis- along with a purely monarchic, purely disillusionment with democratic insti- tently liberal economic path. The dictatorial attitude that precludes any tutions? Certainly, such disappoint- paradox is even more striking consid- chance that his successor might not ment could be insurance for Putin ering that in public appearances Presi- require his approval. Putin is trying to should he lose his current rating. Dis- dent Putin consistently appeals to lib- foreclose any possibility of the oppo- illusionment with elections opens the eral democratic values. sition coming to power in Russia. door to abolishing them altogether. Strictly speaking, this is doubtless For now there is no need for that, the main criterion for whether or not a but who knows what will happen to-

11 morrow? To be sure, the stability of actions less and less. According to the sion image and not by actual facts and Putin’s rating is in no way linked to same polls, a majority of Russians do issues. any concrete results of the job he is not believe in fast economic progress, Then again, there is a new Russian doing as head of state: in Russia no whether on a general or personal psychological trend emerging more major positive changes can be de- level. Social pessimism with an overt and more among the younger genera- tected in any sphere, be it the econ- twist of impending doom predomi- tion, especially its men. It consists of omy, social services, or public and nates: that’s how it is, they say, and one or another version of the “camp national security. Polls show that, of there’s nothing you can do about it. mentality,” based on raw strength and all the problems they face, Russians This mood explains the obvious threats of its use. consider rising prices to be the most paradox that sociologists regularly As it happens, even Putin not infre- dangerous to them – that is about the identify: the President’s very high quently expresses himself in just these essence of purported social and eco- rating, on the one hand, and low levels terms: “mochit’ v sortire” [roughly, nomic accomplishments. of satisfaction with the situation in ‘to bump someone off while his pants It is more likely the reverse – noth- various aspects of everyday life (i.e., are down’] and other pearls of prison ing is being done about the worst with the results of the actual work that lexicon. problems, especially security. Chech- the president is doing), on the other. One does not need evidence that the nya and terrorist acts in the rest of chief executive, wielding all punitive Russia, including Moscow, have be- power, definitely has the ability to come almost the norm. Nevertheless, Dissatisfaction with suppress. what is basically an obvious failure of the actual state of af- In this aspect he is subliminally per- the centerpiece of Putin’s campaign ceived as a national Cossack chieftain. commitments is not affecting Rus- fairs should translate You can dislike him, but you cannot sians’ opinion of him at all. Why is deny his power. Here too we see a that? into dissatisfaction kind of fetishism developing, but this It is logical to assume that the secret with the leadership it- kind is from another era: a Cossack of Putin’s “Teflon coating” is con- chieftain does not give anything, but nected with a change in how Russians self, but this is not he can take without being questioned. think about the office of the presi- happening: the “Tef- Therefore it does not occur to anyone dency and the person who holds it. to hold him accountable for his ac- There is a layering, interference be- lon president” effect. tions – try it, go ask a Cossack chief- tween two waves, two trends – the old tain about it. and the new. The old is an apathy, left In Russia today, it is obvious that It would seem that this dissatisfac- over from the Soviet era, towards the political and psychological tion with the actual state of affairs leadership in the spirit of classic fet- groundwork is being laid for the con- should translate into dissatisfaction ishism, when the splendor of a uni- tinuing gradual “desiccation” of de- with the leadership itself, which is form endows its wearer with dazzling mocratic institutions and processes responsible for the state of affairs. But virtues. and for their increasing profanation. this is not happening (the “Teflon Here, the full extent of the often The tactical victories of Vladimir president” effect). It is not happening, noted psycho-social characteristic of Putin in strengthening his own per- apparently, because in the eyes of the Russian political culture is manifested sonal power threaten the nation with a majority, the President himself is hos- as an inclination toward authoritarian, large strategic collapse. Certainly au- tage to circumstances, unable to make autocratic consciousness. thoritarianism, if it is effective at all, any radical changes. But a new characteristic is superim- is so only under very specific histori- In that case, expectations of him are posed on the old: less and less, Rus- cal circumstances and for a very lim- different. External appearance, behav- sians see the president as able to really ited period. And as a rule, it is fraught ior, etc., rather than views, are the influence the state of affairs in the with social unrest. I do not assert that evaluation criteria and form the popu- country. Public opinion polls entirely authoritarianism and unrest are inevi- lar impression of him. confirm this trend, indicating that table, but the preconditions are there. There is a good reason that the most Russians think real power in the In conclusion, we can note that the majority of Putin’s supporters are country belongs to big business and processes discussed above have room women. Essentially, this is probably not the head of state. to exist also because they do not re- the manifestation of an approach to VTsIOM polls from September ceive adequate attention from the op- evaluating the president as a “nice 2003 speak precisely to this issue. The position political parties, which have guy” and not as an all-mighty gov- most educated and influential social been unable to offer and attract Rus- ernment statesman in the Russian and strata – i.e., those largely responsible sian public opinion with projects to Soviet tradition. for forming public opinion – are the develop democracy. But that is a dif- Here we see the gradual transforma- ones in the forefront of this trend. ferent subject. █ tion of the old Soviet mentality into a People correlate their personal mate- new one that is fed largely by a televi- rial prosperity with the government’s

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