Vladimir Shlapentokh is a professor of sociology at Michigan State University.

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong Vladimir Shlapentokh

As we all know, stereotypical images tend probably the chasm between a Trotskyist universally to dominate mainstream politi- pamphlet circulated in Detroit and the cal discourse. The world recently glimpsed Detroit News. opposing images of America conjured by Russian writers of the pessimistic per- Republicans and Democrats. Both view- suasion assume the universality of democ- points, however, converged in supporting racy and the market economy, and assess the major tenets of American democracy. Russian developments using democratic This is not the case today in President standards. Russian writers in the second, Vladimir Putin’s Russia. “realist” camp see their country from a per- Indeed, analysts who belong to the same spective that may be described as a version Russian mainstream—even close friends and of the Eurasian ideology. This ideology as- colleagues—offer diametrically opposed im- sumes Russia has a unique role in history, ages of their country. One viewpoint is pes- determined by its size, its geographic iden- simistic, as propagated in a few liberal peri- tity spanning Europe and Asia, its ties to odicals such as Novaia Gazeta and Moskovskie the Muslim world, its historical traditions, Novosti and the radio station Ekho Moskvy. and even by its climate, an argument that It can also be found in some less ideological- became popular in Russia after the publica- ly driven newspapers, such as Moskovskii tion in 2000 of the popular Russian author Komsomolets, and even the solidly neutral Dmitry Parshin’s book, Why Russia Is Not Izvestia. The opposing viewpoint is “realis- America.1 “Realists” insist Russia has a tic,” even positive, and it emphasizes the unique place in history and should have its stability of Putin’s regime. The “realistic” own specific political and economic order. view of the developments in Russia has been They believe Russians are not only unable advanced by the country’s main television but unwilling to adopt the Western mode of channels, as well as by such newspapers and life. By all accounts, the “realists” express weeklies as Komsomolskaia Pravda, Argumenty the views of President Putin and his inner I Fakty, and Trud. circle. To convey the highly charged differences between these major viewpoints, let us re- The Pessimists sort to an impressionistic comparison: take The pessimists paint an extremely gloomy as a point of reference the ideological dis- picture. Grigorii Yavlinskii, the leader of tance between the New York Times and the the liberal party Yabloko, regards his coun- Wall Street Journal. In the Russian context, try as geared toward “the destruction of all the ideological distance that separates Nova- state institutions,” and believes Russia ia Gazeta and Trud, or Channel One and is facing a new economic crisis. Gary Kas- Ekho Moskvy is probably 10 to 30 times parov, the world chess champion, who greater than between these two publica- is now the chairman of “Committee 2008,” tions. The closest American analogue is a sort of central headquarters for bold

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong 61 Russian liberals, said in December that “if the new year in an editorial with the sarcas- events develop at the same speed as they did tic title, “We Do Not Rebel against the Au- in the last eight months, in 2005 the politi- thorities,” that the current persecution of cal power in Russia will collapse as a result one company after another (for instance, the of internal processes, without any effort mobile telephone firm Vympelkom and the from outside.”2 Another liberal leader, the bank Russian Standards) “puts in doubt the former head of the oil giant Yukos, Mikhail survival of the country.”9 Khodorkovsky (even pro Putin media recog- Liberal authors vie with each other in nize him as “a serious political figure”3) de- their use of grim terms to describe Putin’s livered a New Year’s message from prison in Russia: “a frozen country,” “the ice period,” his article, “Prison and the World: Property “theater of the absurd,” “the civilization de- and Freedom,” which foresees a horrendous cline,” “a country sinking in the swamp,” “a future for Russia if current trends persist. self-destructive political power.”10 “The all-devouring bureaucracy will be con- The liberals deplore almost every aspect fronted by savage crowds that invade the of Russian life and condemn the domestic streets and destroy the fabric of society, de- and foreign policies of the Kremlin. They manding ‘bread and entertainment.’”4 Liber- point to the slackening of economic growth, al Russian analysts who are not directly en- suggesting that the country has made no gaged in the political struggle repeated the move toward modernization and has entered gloomy prognoses of these activists. Yurii a period of “liberal stagnation,” an allusion Levada, a prominent Russian liberal and the to “Brezhnev’s stagnation” in the second half head of a leading polling firm, declared that of the 1970s.11 They point to the miserable “the structures created in the last five years state of science, education, and culture and are in crisis,” and the authorities are “help- talk about Putin’s “alienation from all active less” and “confused.”5 His diagnosis was sec- people in the country and the elites in gen- onded by another leading liberal, the editor eral.”12 Boris Nemtsov, a well-known Rus- of Moskovskie Novosti Evgenii Kisilev, who sian liberal, and the prominent political sci- says, “The system does not work.”6 entist Lilia Shevtsova mocked Putin’s ad- “The general political climate among ministrative innovations, particularly his the Russian elites has become immensely centralization policy. They predict the disin- depressing in recent times,” according to tegration of Russia as a result of these inno- the prominent Moscow journalist Mikhail vations. In their view, Putin’s system of Rostovskii. He insists that the authorities, “vertical power,” based on the Kremlin’s di- who have “only instincts but no strategies,” rect control over the governors and the pres- are involved in ludicrous endeavors, such as idents in the national republics, is rotten the cancellation of the holiday celebrating and will collapse at the first serious test, as the October (Bolshevik) Revolution, mean- was the case with former president Leonid ingless or dangerous undertakings, such as Kuchma in Ukraine.13 the decision to abandon the election of The liberals speak of the Kremlin’s total provincial governors, or even stupid actions, failure in Chechnya, particularly in connec- such as the destruction of Yukos.7 The au- tion with the tragic terrorist siege of a thors of a report produced by Stanislav school in Beslan, and its general inability to Belkovsky’s Council on National Strategy guarantee security. (They do, however, sup- accuses the state of “lacking a strategy and port Putin’s aggressive stance toward inter- goals.” The report focuses on the Kremlin’s national terrorism.) chaotic economic policy.8 Even Expert, a pro- With a special fervor, the pessimists business weekly, which is usually friendly used the developments in Ukraine and the toward the Kremlin, declared on the eve of breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia—

62 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2005 where Moscow, despite its seemingly total luded to the Kremlin as a mafia, in which control, could not get its candidate elected “the authorities today are concerned first —to prove their thesis that the regime’s fate of all with the accumulation of financial is already “written on the wall.” While sup- streams in their own accounts.”20 Yulia porting Ukraine’s sovereignty, which sets Latynina, a prominent economic analyst, them apart from a great majority of Rus- discussing the recent and suspicious auc- sians, they mock the Kremlin’s failure to in- tioning of the oil company Yugaskneftegaz, stall its political candidates. They were par- a subsidiary of Yukos, could not help but al- ticularly harsh in regard to Putin’s awkward lude darkly to the president’s participation intervention in the recent presidential elec- and his use of KGB techniques. Victor tion in Ukraine.14 Critics faulted Moscow’s Gerashchenko, a highly respected banker overt intervention in the campaign, seem- and current chairman of the board at Yukos, ingly based on the incorrect assumption that echoed the same thought.21 Gary Kasparov Ukrainians could be as easily manipulated was even blunter. In a Russian newspaper, by money and “administrative resources” he characterized people in the Kremlin as as Russians. For the liberals, “the orange concerned “only about their personal enrich- revolution” is a real people’s movement for ment and keeping their offices.”22 In a Wall democracy, directed against corruption. Street Journal article, he ascribed the govern- To the prominent liberal deputy Vladimir ment’s recent attack on the mobile tele- Ryzkov,15 Moscow was evidently foolish to phone firm Vympelkom to the intrigues of assume the Kremlin’s candidate would win the rival company Megaphon, which is and thus jeopardize relations with the oppo- “closely connected with Mr. Putin,”23 or at sition victor.16 least, (according to Izvestia), to Minister of Politicians and journalists with access Information and Communication Leonid to liberal newspapers castigate everybody Reiman, who is close to the president.24 The in Putin’s government. The pollster Yurii fact that the Kremlin did not resort to the Levada describes the government as a col- re-nationalization of Yukos—which had lective of “helpless people” who can only been widely expected—but simply gave this “change offices.”17 The investigative journal- jewel of the Russian economy to a friendly ist Alexander Minkin derogates Putin’s ret- private company underscored in the mind of inue regularly in his serial, “Letters to the liberal critics the egotistical interests of the President.” Minister of Defense Sergei masters of the Kremlin.25 Ivanov, the head of the Federal Security Ser- This analysis of Russian life is mitigated vice, Nikolai Patrushov, the speaker of the in some degree by a belief that the people’s Duma, Boris Gryzlov, and the economics ire will soon erupt. The journalist Alexander minister German Gref have all been criti- Kolesnichenko began his article, “The De- cized for their alleged incompetence.18 spair Syndrome,” which appeared in Izvestia Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov has pro- by suggesting that “the situation in Russia voked contempt.19 Liberal critics do not is either tense or on the verge of an explo- spare even Putin himself. They worry not sion.”26 Levada believes that “the current sit- only about his KGB past, but also about his uation cannot last long since neither the interest in siphoning money (or, more ele- elites nor the mechanism of power can sus- gantly, “financial streams”). They have tain it.”27 Dmitry Oreshkin wrote that even suggested—as one journalist did at a “20–25 percent of the Russians, with their seminar abroad in October 2004—that orientation toward Western values, are get- “the maximization of his control over mon- ting nervous and are trying to consolidate ey” is Putin’s main motivation. Stanislav their forces.”28 Some predict that Putin’s Belkovsky, an analyst with liberal ties, al- high approval rating will soon collapse,

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong 63 pointing out that the favorability rating of himself in the mirror all day, instead of Tsar Nicholas in January 1917, one month gathering broad and objective information before he was deposed, was probably no less about the world.”35 Several authors on the than 80 percent.29 left describe Putin as the one who botched Even relatively sober journalists as Yev- the electoral transition in Kiev.36 genia Albats still believe in “the restiveness” Among leftists, Alexander Prokhanov, a of the Russian people and their potential rabid nationalist, is the boldest. He blurts for revolt, following the example of the out what more timid souls only say private- Ukrainians.30 Liberal politicians believe, or ly after a few glasses of vodka. After a long pretend to believe, in the efficacy of “Com- period of ostracism by the Moscow estab- mittee 2008” as well as other similar efforts lishment, Prokhanov now regularly takes that, with the support of the intelligentsia part in the mainstream liberal media. In and even the masses, will halt Russia’s slide December 2004, he appeared as a guest on into totalitarianism. They also believe that the prestigious radio station Ekho Moskvy the business community, despite its demor- three times. In an editorial in Zavtra, which alization after Khodorkovsky’s arrest, will he edits, Prokhanov characterized the situa- join in the fight against the regime.31 Devel- tion in Russia as “pre-revolutionary,” proph- opments in Ukraine have especially heart- esying that Putin’s head will be “cut off.” ened Russian liberals. Some predict that “a Prokhanov insists everyone is “against flowers riot” in Red Square will follow the Putin” in Russia, including the “humiliated “rose revolution” in Georgia and the “orange governors,” the oligarchs, the liberal intelli- revolution” in Ukraine.32 gentsia, the nationalists, and the Russian Liberals also contemplate other scenarios people as a whole. He says that Putin’s that might bring an end to Putin’s rule, regime might come to an end because of even as they assume he will do everything “terrorist acts” or “a hysterical Western possible to stay in power after his second campaign against Putin as a politician who term ends in 2008.33 Several writers archly cannot control the country” with its “mis- warned Putin about the intentions of the siles, nuclear stations, aerodromes, and “hawks in the power ministries” who want bridges.” He foresees strikes in the defense to replace him with “a harsher leader.”34 industries as well as student riots.37 However, none describe Russia’s immi- The picture limned by Russian liberals nent future as bleakly as Communists and and their incongruous allies, the nationalists nationalists who are now allied to an extent and Communists, has been accepted at face with the liberals in their critiques. Starting value by some Westerners. A recent editor- from different premises, they hate Putin, ial in Business Week was titled “The Unravel- whom they still regard as a promoter of lib- ing of Putin’s Power.”38 Zbigniew Brzezin- eral economic ideas, though they recognize ski, a former national security advisor, con- that he is also a promoter (if a passive one) curred in the Wall Street Journal, asserting of their imperial views. that “Putin’s regime is an anachronism.”39 Two thoughtful left intellectuals, Sergei Among liberal Russian analysts there is Kara-Murza and Sergei Glaziev, use the a group whose members may be termed the same language as the liberals, whom they “ultimate pessimists.” These are people who ironically dislike and blame for all Russian believe that the movement of their country disasters. Kara-Murza writes that Putin has toward “the totalitarian past” is virtually placed the country “on the verge of a deep unstoppable. A famous Russian intellectual, crisis.” Glaziev contends that the Russian Alexander Gelman, insists that the Krem- president “provokes destructive processes in lin’s strategy will bring “a steady and the country” and speculates that “he looks at planned retreat from democracy.”40 These

64 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2005 bitter realists, all Westernizers, believe no istries,” have “high contempt for public developments within Russia can undermine movements,” writes the Moscow journalist Putin’s power in the near future. They fear Alexander Budberg.46 They believe that or- Russia does not have an elite opposition that dinary people can only play a destructive can take control of the country if necessary. role when they become involved in politics. These elites, as the politican columnist They openly profess their contempt for Leonid Radzikhovsky writes, are only “a democracy and their belief that elections are pale copy of the ruling elite,” distinguished rigged in America and Western Europe. by “incompetence, irresponsibility and state These were the sentiments of Russian for- nihilism.”41 Still, few can compete with the eign minister Sergei Lavrov during his ex- pessimism of the Izvestia’s columnist Sergei change with former secretary of state Colin Leskov, who, in an article titled “Walpurgis Powell in Sophia in December 2004.47 Presi- Night,” worries that Russia is losing its dent Putin faulted the American elections, common sense and self-control and is mov- which he declared were not any better than ing toward a period of “crazy delirium.”42 “in Ukraine and Afghanistan.” In America “intimidation of voters” was the same as in “Realists” and the Kremlin’s Disposition those countries.48 In the opposite corner are the politicians Tsipko, along with Mikhail Leontiev, and journalists who serve the Kremlin and the most unabashed champion of the Krem- might be labeled “aggressive realists.” lin, unequivocally support its centralization Without denying the problems facing the of power and Putin’s cancellation of guber- country today (which they usually attribute natorial elections.49 They believe such steps to former presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and are necessary for the salvation of Russia. Boris Yeltsin) they describe Russia as a great They also support the increased state inter- nuclear power and a stable country. They vention in the economy, exemplified by the evince their nostalgia for the Soviet empire action against Yukos, and the arrest of its and an open hostility toward the West, chief executive. Some aggressive realists, particularly the United States. They con- such as Dmitry Rogozin, the leader of the sider Putin’s policies, domestic and interna- Kremlin’s party Motherland, demand even tional, as the best possible under the given harsher policies. They condemn big business circumstances.43 as anti-national, controlled mostly by non- The political scientist Alexander Tsipko, Russians who export their money to the an especially eloquent member of this West, where they are ready to flee at the group, has declared in many articles that the first sign of a problem.50 Western model of democracy has not only They believe Russia faces a mortal threat failed in Russia but inflicted immense from the West. Reverting to Stalin’s concept harm. For Tsipko, a reversion to authoritar- of Russia as a besieged fortress, they con- ian rule is the single hope for the country.44 tend that “the cold war in fact never ended,” A similar argument was implied by Putin a thesis supported by most aggressive real- himself, who in December justified “the ists.51 Writers like Tsipko and Alexei Kiva, choice made by Russia to follow its own op- describe the threat posed by the United timal road of development,” explaining that States as more serious than that of terrorism. “it is impossible today to gather in the same In fact, as their post-Beslan comments illus- place 145 million Russians,” as was done in trate, they even connect terrorism to the the ancient Russian cities Novgorod and United States.52 Pskov.45 Developments in Ukraine, which they Aggressive realists, along with the see as sponsored and controlled by the Kremlin and those in the “power min- West, particularly by Washington, are the

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong 65 strongest evidence of these hostile intentions goal. To these analysts, with their deep mis- and a powerful reason for supporting Putin’s trust of ordinary people, it is self-evident foreign policy.53 The leading political ana- that the humiliation of Russia in Kiev has lysts Viacheslav Nikonov, Sergei Markov, been implemented by American special Alexei Pushkov, and Alexander Dugin (a services, a repetition of the “rose revolution” notorious champion of the Eurasian ideol- in Georgia against former president Eduard ogy) as well as such politicians as Duma Shevardnadze.59 With few exceptions, they deputy Konstantin Zatulin, vehemently dismiss all the evidence of the enthusiastic supported Putin’s intervention in Ukrainian popular support of Viktor Yushchenko.60 As politics.54 Some bluntly declared what Putin summarized by one newspaper article, “If could not say himself: “Ukraine is our coun- we give up Ukraine this year, next year it try,” said the television journalist Mikhail will be Russia.”61 Leontiev, and thus Russia can do anything it wants, even sending tanks to Kharkov. Variation on a Theme Leontiev’s hatred of the West extends to Along with aggressive realists, a prominent Poland. He does not scruple from using eth- role in the Russian political discourse be- nic slurs against the Poles, whom he refuses longs to their allies: “critical, or liberal, re- to forgive for conquering Russia in the sev- alists,” whose views in some cases are enteenth century. He describes Poland as a similar to those of “pure liberals.” While Western “stooge” in its role as an intermedi- strongly disagreeing with liberals, whom ary in the Ukrainian crisis. Other realists they despise as political failures, and reject- emphasize Poland’s strong lobby in the U.S. ing their gloomy scenarios, the prominent Congress, with its own anti-Russian de- sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaia and two signs, including the annexation of the west- well-known Moscow journalists, Yulia ern Ukraine.55 With their imperial contempt Kalinina and Alexander Budberg, share the for former Russian satellites (even Slavic belief that democracy has no future in Rus- ones), realists do not spare their “junior sia, but they come to this conclusion bitter- brothers” from ethnic slurs. Leontiev de- ly. It is unfortunate, they contend, that Rus- scribed former Ukrainian president Leonid sia seems unable to break from its vicious Kuchma and the participants in the “orange historical circle and join “the normal coun- revolution” as sly: “typical Ukrainians.” A tries” in the world where, as one author former leading Kremlin official jokingly writes, “democracy for any administration is considered Kiev’s joining NATO as a benefit a supreme value.” They even praise “the un- to Russia because the “Ukrainians will steal believable civic maturity” of the Ukrainian everything in two weeks.”56 people, though they remain skeptical about In their worst scenario, the aggressive the positive consequences in Ukraine, par- realists imply that Ukraine is not a viable ticularly with respect to Russia.62 But they state. To save ethnic Russians from in- acknowledge the Russian reality and sup- evitable discrimination, they propose the port Putin’s regime as the best alternative. annexation of the eastern and southern parts They do not ignore the country’s problems, of Ukraine.57 These realists cite the support but unlike the liberals, they see Russia’s in opinion polls of almost half of their coun- problems as insoluble in the short term. trymen who believe that Ukraine is “our They are as nostalgic about the past as country,” while only 18 percent consider “the majority of the citizens.” Alexander Ukraine as a sovereign state. 58 Budberg is convinced that the West is at Aggressive realists put even greater best alien and at worst an enemy. Most of stress on the alleged spread of the “orange them, like Budberg, are certain that Ameri- revolution” to Moscow as the West’s major can policy in Ukraine “is directed at least

66 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2005 partially against Russia” and that “Russia liament, which he even shelled in October has full rights to intervene in Ukrainian 1993, because he was perceived as a legiti- affairs no less than America and Europe.”63 mate elected leader. Yeltsin’s perceived le- But they rebuke Putin for his mild policy gitimacy led to the country to accept his toward the United States, and for failing to chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, then an press for the restoration of a mini-Soviet obscure politician. Russians regarded the Union. In essence, they support Russia’s continuity of the Kremlin’s power as an an- special rights in Ukraine but deplore mis- tidote against possible anarchy. It was strik- takes (one articles is titled “The Ukrainian ing that during the stormy days of the “or- Schizophrenia”) the Kremlin committed in ange revolution” in Ukraine, the legitimacy pursuing legitimate national goals. Like the of Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent presi- liberals, they mock Putin’s two trips to Kiev dent, was acknowledged even by his ardent during the election campaign, his atten- opponents, and Kuchma himself played an dance at a parade of the Ukrainian army, his important role resolving the electoral crisis. two congratulatory messages to the failed As an elected two-term president, Putin, Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, like Yeltsin, is seen as a legitimate leader whom he endorsed despite the fact that and symbol of order, Russia’s problems Yanukovich has been jailed twice in the notwithstanding. By the end of 2004, Putin past. Critical realists attribute these blun- continued to be trusted by almost 70 per- ders to Putin’s determination “to rule Russia cent of the Russians polled.66 It is implausi- alone” and to his servile advisers who per- ble to imagine Putin’s overthrow by uncon- suaded Putin to become personally involved stitutional means. There are no serious signs in the Ukrainian election.64 of active hostility to Putin among power holders. Yurii Luzhkov, Moscow’s mayor, is The Persistence of Putin’s Regime probably the only leading official openly to In the author’s view, both pictures of Russia belittle the government; he did so during are right—and wrong. Liberals are assuredly the December 2004 meeting of the gover- right in their description of Russian’s eco- nors of the Central Federal District in nomic, social, and political ills. They are Moscow. He does not, however, criticize the also right that “the prestige of Russia in the president personally, and a few days before world declined with the rate of the ruble in the meeting he called Putin an “absolutely the beginning of the 1990s.”65 The realists irreplaceable leader.”67 Still, suppose a plot indeed deceive themselves—and President against Putin succeeded. The new leader- Putin—in concocting an upbeat image of ship could only survive through mass re- Russian society. The liberals, however, are pression and would have to inspire mortal mistaken when they predict the imminent fear among both the people and the elites— demise of Putin’s regime, while the realists something that the previous plotters against have grounds for their confidence in its Gorbachev and Yeltsin could not do, even survival. with the backing of the Soviet KGB and the Those foreseeing a rapid demise of the army. The day after a coup, Russia would present regime misunderstand the role of le- cease to exist; all the major regions and non- gitimacy for any political system, democrat- Russian republics would proclaim their in- ic or not. President Yeltsin prevailed over dependence and autonomy. The perpetrators Gorbachev for this reason. Yeltsin was elect- would confront gigantic economic prob- ed in 1990 by a free popular vote, while lems, including the new relations with the Gorbachev in 1989–90 preferred to be elect- West and private business, and the immedi- ed by the tame Soviet parliament. Yeltsin ate threat of hunger, as all available food- thus was able to challenge the Russian par- stuffs would disappear from the shelves.

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong 67 Second, there are no opposition leaders 2005 indicated the depth of discontent. who could inspire a mass movement. Dur- It was an unprecedented development in ing his five years in power, Putin system- the post-Soviet period, and may have atically eliminated all rivals. His recent a serious impact. The refusal of the authori- elimination of the provincial elections was ties to use force to dispel demonstrators aimed at barring even the remote possibility may encourage other aggravated Russians of a governor emerging as a popularly to go to the streets. At the same time, the elected opponent. Putin learned from Gor- humble protests by the elderly confirmed bachev’s tolerance of Yeltsin’s rise as a sec- the strength of the regime. Ultimately, the ond center of power. The Ukrainian “orange protest showed, as remarked by Leonid revolution” would not have occurred if for- Radzikhovsky on radio station Ekho mer President Kuchma had eliminated Moskvy, that the margin of the regime’s Yushchenko. No Russian opposition figure security is very wide. No national organi- even remotely compares to Yushchenko’s zation directed the anger of the retirees status before the beginning of his election against the Kremlin. Even the Communist campaign. Party did not attempt to exploit the rising In any case, the current Russian opposi- against the regime on a national scale. More tion, as Alexander Minkin has explained, is importantly, the children and grandchildren not a threat to Putin. Almost all the promi- of the elderly protesters did not join them nent members of the liberal or nonliberal in the streets; the babushkas were left to opposition soiled their reputations in the fend for themselves. A few days after the past by supporting the corrupt actions of protests began, even the liberal media lost the previous government or the oligarchs. interest. Nor, as Minkin notes, are they ascetic in Taken together the January develop- their lifestyles. They turn up at numberless ments took their toll on Putin’s prestige. In Moscow receptions, drinking champagne early 2004, 65 percent of Russians polled and eating caviar. Minkin also quite shrewd- said they would have elected him as presi- ly notes that Russia’s “false opposition” at dent, by January 15, 2005, the figure was bottom serves the interests of the Kremlin, only 43 percent. However, these data are not “keeping the field of the opposition out of terribly important to the president. In the hands of real fighters.”68 2000–03, his election potential was also be- Yet, the liberals are correct concerning low 50 percent. If an election were held to- the growing and widespread disenchant- day, Putin would garner 9 times more votes ment with Putin’s rule. Indeed, in 2004, as than the nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Levada’s data showed, the percentage of 14 times more votes than the Communist Russians who agreed that their country is Gennadii Ziuganov, and 43 times more moving in the right direction, declined votes than the most popular democratic can- from 50 percent in January to 38 percent in didate, Grigorii Yavlinsky.71 Another indica- November. The percentage of those who tor of Putin’s status—the people’s trust in found that the political situation in the him—has also declined. In January 2005, country is “good” and “calm” also declined 27 percent had “trust in him,” a sharp drop from 35 to 20 percent.69 According to an- from 41 percent in early 2004. However, other poll, the percentage of Russians who the number of respondents who said they felt that 2004 was better than the previous “distrust the president” remained practically year declined from 35 percent in December unchanged at 3 percent. 2003 to 22 percent in December 2004.70 Tellingly, Putin is still “trusted” much The massive protests by retired Russians more than any other Russian politician. Be- against reduced social benefits in January sides, the percentage of those who described

68 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2005 their mood at last year’s end as “perfect” or coffers. More recently, leaders have egre- “good” had dropped only slightly since giously sacrificed national interests to per- 2003: from 61 to 57 percent. The percent- petuate their power. This was true in both age of those who assessed the material Soviet and post-Soviet times. Yeltsin ex- standing of their family as “good” or “de- ploited his position as president to enrich cent” had also declined very little: from 63 his family, a circumstance that demoralized to 61 percent. Russians in the 1990s. If Putin perpetuates, The liberals’ predictions about “Putin’s even in more moderate ways, Yeltsin’s tradi- Waterloo,” to use the phrase of Evgenii tion of privatizing power, it is unlikely that Kisilev, who has estimated the remainder of he will enhance his standing at home or Putin’s political career at two years at best, abroad. nine months at worst, are very likely incor- With a weakened state machine and rect.72 However, their gloomy diagnoses of army, Putin’s regime will not present a seri- many developments in the country appear ous threat to the West, or to Russia’s neigh- sound. They are right to assert that Putin bors. As the Ukrainian events confirmed, has vitally weakened major democratic insti- Putin, despite his rhetoric, always retreats tutions. The Russian economy, with its fo- from any serious action that might jeopard- cus on the export of raw materials, shows no ize his relations with the West, and particu- signs of serious modernization. In his De- larly the United States. Despite his bluster- cember 2004 press conference, Putin avoid- ing response to Western critics, he managed ed the major problems facing the country; to extol Russia’s relationship with the such as the struggle against crime and cor- United States, asserting that “our relations ruption, the war in Chechnya, and major are not those of partners, but of allies.” terrorist acts, such as the tragedy in Beslan. Moreover, he praised President Bush as He focused instead on attacking the West in “a very decent and consistent man.”74 general and the United States and Poland in The West’s major problems with Russia particular. Putin’s nonchalance indicates derives not so much from the internal polit- that he is quite sure of his control over Rus- ical evolution in Russia, which the West sia.73 His dealing in January with protests cannot influence, but from the need for over social benefit reforms was superficial, Moscow’s collaboration in the fight against and in his analysis he simply shifted the re- international terrorism, and the need to sponsibility to the regions, which have no safeguard nuclear and chemical weapons on resources to satisfy the basic needs of retirees Russian territory. In coming years, Russia and others dependent on social benefits. will probably be seen by many observers as a Though it is safe from obvious chal- peculiar society that combines totalitarian- lenges, Putin’s regime remains, his critics ism with some individual freedoms and feu- credibly argue, extremely inefficient and un- dalism with an inability to enforce its own able to cope with major problems, notably laws. Russia remains an extremely heteroge- public concerns over security and the econo- neous nation, not only socially but also ter- my. Even if the accusations of some liberals ritorially, as was aptly noted by the partici- alleging personal enrichment are only par- pants of the debates about Russia’s future in tially plausible, it is wise to recall a phe- Literaturnaia Gazeta. It has a “globalistic” nomenon well known during the early Mid- zone that includes Moscow and Petersburg, dle Ages in Russia and in many developing the Russian provinces, and the non-Russian countries in the contemporary world. The North Caucasus. Each of these territories be- princes in Muscovy in the twelfth and thir- longs to a different historical epoch: the teenth centuries did not distinguish be- first, to the twenty-first century (a post- tween their private fortunes and the state’s industrial Russia); the second, to the nine-

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong 69 teenth and twentieth centuries (an industrial 11. See, for example, Liliia Shevtsova’s interview Russia); and the third, to the times of the with Nezavisiamaia Gazeta, September 27, 2004. patriarchal, pre-industrial Russia.75 It is dif- 12. Evgenii Trifomov, “Gorokhovye zerna,” ficult to predict how long this strange social Novoye vremia, September 26, 2004. organism will persist. In any case, only the 13. See Boris Nemtsov’s interview with Nezav- emergence of a new group of opposition isiamaia Gazeta, October 27, 2004; Alexei Pankin, elites could bring radical changes. Finally, it “‘Tsarstvui lezha na boku’ rossiiskii interest na is impossible to fully exclude the possibility Ukraine,” Izvestia, November 30, 2004; Lilia of a violent plot against the president by Shevtsova’s interview with Nezavisiamaia Gazeta, factions inside the army and security forces, September 27, 2004. trumpeting nationalist slogans. Such a plot 14. See Borislav Mikhailichenko, “Tak ne vyi- would be a disaster for the country and gryvaiut,” Moskovskii Novosti, December 2, 2004; would sow many troubles for the world. Lilia Shevtsova, “Kto iz nas malorossy,” Moskovskii • Novosti, December 2, 2004. Notes 15. Mikhail Leontiev’s interview with Echo The author wishes to thank Joshua Woods for his ed- Moskvy, December 10, 2004. itorial contribution to this article. 16. Vitalii Yaroshevskii, “‘Vybir’ Kremlia ili 1. See Dmitry Parshin, Pochemu Rossia ne Ameri- pochemu Rossiiskaia vlast provalialas na Ukraine,” ka, Moscow, 2000. Novaya Gazeta, December 9, 2004; Vladimir 2. Garry Kasparov’s interview with Novaia Ryzkov’s interview with Izvestia, November 23, Gazeta, December 27, 2004. 2004; Boris Nemtsov’s interview with Nezavisimaia 3. Yurii Sergeev, “Pismo na voliu,” Komsomol- Gazeta, November 30, 2004. skaia Pravda, December 29, 2004. 17. Yuri Levada’s interview with Novaia Gazeta, 4. Mikhail Khdorkovsky, “Tiurma I mor:sob- November 11, 2004. stvennost I svoboda,” Vedomosti, December 28, 18. See Glaziev’s interview with Zavtra, Decem- 2004. ber 3, 2004; Anatolii Salutskii, “Pisma v Kreml.’ 5. See Yurii Levada’s interview with Novaia Grefomania,’” Literaturnaia Gazeta, October 13, Gazeta, November 15, 2004. 2004. 6. Evgenii Kisilev, “Teatr absurda,” Moskovkie 19. Alexander Minkin, “Pismo presidentu,” Novosti, October 8, 2004. Moskovskii Komsomolets, November 19, 2004. 7. Mikhail Rostovskii, “Fradkov bez suk,” 20. See Stanislav Belkovsky’s participation in Moskovskii Komsomolets, November 16, 2004. the discussion, “The Conflict of Ideologies” (Zavtra, 8. See Olga Tropkina, “Depolitizirovav oligark- No. 40, 2004). hov, gosudarstvo ne stalo silnee,” Izvestia, October 21. Yulia Latynina, “Auktsion kak spets operat- 26, 2004. sia,” Novaia Gazeta, December 23, 2004; Victor 9. Editorial, “My protive vlastei ne buntuem,” Gerashchenko’s interview with Novaia Gazeta, De- Expert, December 20, 2004, p. 19. cember 27, 2004. 10. Evgenii Trifomov, “Gorokhovye zerna,” 22. Gary Kasparov’s interview with Novaia Novoye vremia, September 26, 2004, and his Gazeta, December 27, 2004. “Khronika lednikovogo perioda,” Novoye vremia, 23. Gary Kasparov, “Say It in Russian: ‘Caveat November 7, 2004; Evgenii Kisilev, “Teatr ab- Emptor,’” Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2004. surda,” Moskovkii Novosti, October 8, 2004; Stanis- 24. See Sergei Koliada, “‘Vympelkom’ po- lav Belokovskii, “Izbrannitza presidenta,” Zavtra, shel po sledam ‘Yukosa,’” Izvestia, December 9, No. 45, 2004; Alexander Budberg, “Bunt tsvetov,” 2004. Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 10, 2004; 25. See the debates on Ekho Moskvy, January 15, Leontii Byzov, “Nado li zhdat’ narodnogo soporo- 2005. tivlenia,” Literaturnaia gazeta, December 14, 26. Alexander Kolesnichenko, “Sindrom 2004. otchainia,” Novye Izvestia, December 6, 2004.

70 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2005 27. Yurii Levada’s interview with Novaia Gazeta, 43. See, for instance, this description of Russia November 11, 2004. in Yurii Sergeev, “Kak nam auknetsia’sosedskii’ 28. See Dmitry Oreshkin’s interview with Neza- bunt,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, November 27, 2004. visimiaia Gazeta, October 26, 2004. 44. Alexander Tsipko, “Russia may regain con- 29. Evgenii Trifonov, “Gorokhovye zerna,” trol of national development,” RIA Novosti, Decem- Novoye vremia, September 26, 2004. ber 10, 2004. 30. Yevgenia Albats, “In Putin’s Kremlin, It’s 45. See Putin’s press conference All about Control,” Washington Post, December 12, (www.kremlin.ru), December 23, 2004. 2004. 46. Alexander Budberg, “Bunt tsvetov,” 31. Boris Nemtsov’s interview with Nezavisimaia Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 10, 2004. Gazeta, October 27, 2004. 47. See Alexander Mineev, “Istoria po sosed- 32. Alexander Budberg, “Bunt tsvetov,” stvu.Istoricheskaia perepalka,” Novaia Gazeta, De- Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 10, 2004. cember 9, 2004. 33. See the reflections about Putin’s plans in 48. See Putin’s press conference Maxim Glikin and Alexandra Samarina, “Rossiu go- (www.kremlin.ru), December 23, 2004. toviat k primiero-presidentskoi rokirovke,” Nezavisi- 49. Alexander Tsipko, “Dovody. Khuzhe ne maia Gazeta, October 14, 2004; Dmitry Oreshkin’s budet,” Literaturnaia gazeta, September 29, 2004; see interview with Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 14, also Yurii Sergeev and Leonid Poliakov, “Zavtra 2004; Evgenii Trifonov, “Gorokhovye zerna,” Novoye mozhno opazdat,” Literaturnaia gazeta, September 29, vremia, September 26, 2004. 2004. 34. Evgenii Kisilev, “Teatr absurda,” Moskovkii 50. See about his view in Andrei Kolesnkiov, Novosti, October 8, 2004; Dmitry Oreshkin, “Sle- “Levyi Front,” Kommersant Daily, December 14, duiushaia ostanovka—v Rossii,” Izvestia, November 2004. 30, 2004. 51. See Alexander Tsipko’s interview with Trud, 35. See Vladimir Poliakov, “Politicheskoie December 3, 2004. opolchenie,” Literaturnaia gazeta, November 9, 2004; 52. See typical post-Beslan articles that directly and Sergei Galziev, “Kreml otkazalsia ot Rossii,” Za- or indirectly accuse the United States for the tragedy vtra, No. 49, 2004. in Alexander Kiva, “Po zaslugam i chest,” Literatur- 36. See Alexander Frolov, “Putinizm na export,” naia Gazeta, October 20, 2004; Alexander Tsipko, Sovietskaia Rossia, November 27, 2004. “Nam nado pomnit vse,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, Sep- 37. Alexander Prokhanov, “Putin provalilsia v tember 15, 2004; Leonid Ivashov, “Pod odnoi donestkuiu shakhtu,” Zavtra, December, No. 50, kryshei,” Sovietskaia Rossia, September 9, 2004; 2004. Alexander Drabkin, “President skazal...,” Pravda, 38. Editorial, “The Unraveling of Putin’s Pow- September 7, 2004. See also the comments of liberals er,” Business Week, December 14, 2004; Ian Bremmer, in Andrei Piontkovsky, “Sshibka,” Novoye vremai, Sep- “High Marks on Ratings Can’t Hide Russia’s Rising tember 12, 2004; Leonid Radzikhovsky, “Kto vrag,” Problems,” Financial Times (London), November 15, Ezhedelnyi Journal, September 13, 2004. 2004; Bronwen Maddox, “Putin Reforms Will Create 53. See Alexander Tsipko’s interview with Trud, Chechen-type Problems,” The Times (London), Sep- December 3, 2004. tember 15, 2004. 54. Viacheslav Nikonov, “Ukraina i Rossia,” 39. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Imperial Russia, Vas- Trud, November 27, 2004; Alexander Dugin, sal Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2004. “Ukraina uzhe pobedila na Ukraine, potomu chto be 40. Alexander Gelman, “Vtoroi Gosplan i piata- sdalas,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, December 1, 2004; ia kolona,” Moskovskii Novosti, December 2, 2004. Konstantin Zatulin’s interview with Izvestia, Novem- 41. Leonid Radzikhovsky, “Natsionalno-liberal- ber 23, 2004; Sergei Markov’s interview with Izvestia, naia elita,” Izvestia, November 15, 2004. November 23, 2004; Alexei Pushkov, “Ukrainu 42. Sergei Leskov, “Valpurgieva noch,” Izvestia, khotiat ne razdelit, no otorvat ot Rossii,” Trud, December 9, 2004. December 1, 2004.

Two Simplified Pictures of Putin’s Russia, Both Wrong 71 55. See Mikhail Leontiev, “Odnako,” Channel 64. See Yulia Kalinina, “Kto otvetit za Sev- One, December 2, 2004. See also the program “To astopol,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 2, 2004; the fence,” NTV, December 10, 2004; the interview Olga Kryshtanovskaia’s interview with Novaia Gaze- with Mikhail Leontiev and Sergei Parkhomenko on ta, December 9, 2004; Dmitry Furman, “Uroki radio station Ekho Moskvy, December 10, 2004; Ukrainskogo,” Novaia Gazeta, November 29, 2004; Maria Chekaleva-Demidovskaia, “Rossia - Polsha: see also Marina Barinova, “Proekt Rossia,” Profil, bitva za Ukrainu,” Sodruzhestvo, December 7, 2004 November 22, 2004; Alexander Minkin, “Pismo (www.mpa.ru:8081/analytics/issue.php?id=388). prezidentu,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, November 22, 56. See Viktor Timoshenko, “Pravitelstvo 2004. Ianukovicha palo,” Russikii kurier, December 2, 2004; 65. Mikhail Rostovskii, “Goriachie golovy Alexander Maslov, “‘Mnogoviktornaia’ strategiia Kie- kholodnoi voiny,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, December va,” Zavtra, No. 45, 2004; see also Yulia Latynina, 7, 2004. “Ukraina.Vybory,” Novaia Gazeta, November 11, 66. See Leonid Sedov, “Analiticheskii obzor 2004. issledovanii za avgust 2004,” Levada- Tsentr, Press- 57. See the interview with Mikhail Leontiev, Bulletin, September 6, 2004. Ekho Moskvy, December 10, 2004; Olga Krysh- 67. See Alexandra Samarina, “Stoiat na zadnikh tanovskaia’s interview with Novaia Gazeta, December lapkakh plokho,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, December 17, 9, 2004; Alexei Pushkov, “Ukrainu khotiat ne 2004; Yurii Luzhkov’s interview with Izvestia, De- razdelit, no otorvat ot Rossii,” Trud, December 1, cember 14, 2004. 2004. 68. Alexander Minkin, “Sosat pustyshku,” 58. The Fund of Public Opinion, December 9, Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 10, 2004. 2004 (www.fom.ru). 69. Levada-Tsentr, Press bulletin, December 2, 59. See Mikhail Leontiev’s interview with Echo 2004. Moskvy, December 10, 2004; Gleb Pavlovskii’s inter- 70. Fund of Public Opinion, Bulletin, December view with Komsomolskaia Pravda, November 27, 17, 2004. 2004. 71. See the Fund of Public Opinion, Bulletin, 60. Alexander Tsipko recognized that “almost January 20, 2005. all Ukrainian youth voted for Yushchenko” (“Ukrain- 72. Evgenii Kisilev, “Daleko li to Vaterloo,” skaia Pravda,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, November 30, Moskovskii Novosti, January 25, 2005. 2004). 73. See C. J. Chivers, “Getting Personal, Putin 61. A collective of authors, “Sleduiushchaia os- Voices Defiance of Critics Abroad,” New York Times, tanovka.v Rossii,” Izvestia, November 30, 2004; “Esli December 24, 2004. my otdadim Ukrainu, cherez god to zhe samoie 74. See Putin’s press conference budet v Rossii,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, November (www.kremlin.ru), December 23, 2004. 27, 2004. 75. See contributions to the discussion “Nado li 62. Yulia Kalinina, “Kto otvetit za Sevastopol,” zhdat ‘narodnogo soprotivlenia’” by Mikhail Malutin Moskovskii Komsomolets, December 2, 2004. and Alexander Dugin in Literaturnaia Gazeta, De- 63. Alexander Budberg, Moskovskii Komsomolets, cember 14, 2004. “Ukrainskaia shizofrenia,” December 3, 2004.

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