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Home , Geography of Hungary

'' and 'Democracy' in Geographical Notion of at the Beginning of 1920s: From Discussions by Pál Teleki and Oszkár Jászi TSUJIKAWA Noriko Research Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

Introduction A new political order based on nation states was established in Central Europe under the direction of the Paris Peace Conference by the beginning of the 1920s. The republican revolution, the participants of which called 'October Revolution' and the leader of which was Mihály Károlyi, broke out at the end of the October 1918 in Hungary. It was followed by the short-living communist regime in March 1919, only to be collapsed in August of the year. The counter-revolutionary regime virtually led by Admiral Miklós Horthy was established under the direction of Paris Peace Conference since the autumn of 1919. This political system had been consolidated by the first half of the 1920s. Simultaneously with the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the historical territory of Hungary was dismantled after the end of WWI. The Peace signed in June 1920 determined that Hungary should cede the two-thirds of its historical territory to the new-born surrounding states. Territorial revisionism was one of the most important principles for the during the inter-war period. This paper discusses some common characters of geographical notion expressed by two intellectuals at the beginning of 1920s: Pál Teleki's Evolution of Hungary1and Oszkár Jászi's 'Danubian cultural alliance'2. Pál Teleki (1879-1941) was prime minister of Hungary from July 1920 to April 1921 and from February 1939 to April 1941. He was also a representative expert in geography. Geography was developed as an academic field in Hungary since the end of the 19th century, and his essay History of Geographical Thought [A földrajzi gondolat története] (1917) was a comprehensive introduction to geography at that time. One of his famous works on geography was so-called 'Red Map [Vörös térkép]', the ethnographic map of

1 Teleki, Paul, The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923. 2 Jászi Oszkár, „A dunai szövetség jövője [The Future of the Danubian Confederation],” Bécsi Magyar Ujság[The Hungarian Newspaper of —hereinafter BMU], 1921. dec. 25., 1.old. 1 based on the density of population according to the 1910 census, prepared for the Pa ris Peace Conference. Oscar Jászi (1875-1957) was one of the leading political and intellectual figures in at the Turn of the Century. In January 1900, he launched a progressive periodical The Twentieth Century [Huszadik Század], and based on which, he engaged in founding The Society for Social Studies [A Társadalomtudományi Társaság] and became its director. The intellectuals joining this association had a variety of theoretical backgrounds: positivism, progressivism, syndicalism, Marxism, etc. He gradually devoted himself to political activities calling for the democratization of Hungary. He participated in the 'October' revolutionary regime. From the autumn of 1919, the political and intellectual figures who had participated in the 'October' government, engaged in political activities outside Hungary against the counter-revolutionary regime, insisting 'democratisation' of Hungary. They attempted to rally around Károlyi as the 'Emigrants' in favour of the 'October Revolution' until the middle of 1920s. As will be discussed later, both Teleki and Jászi attempted to advocated their plan to resolve problems in the Carpathian Basin peacefully, which might modify the political framework after the end of WWI. They also pointed out some connections between Hungary and 'Europe' in the viewpoint of 'democracy'. This paper will present a tentative suggestion for discussing Hungarian nationalism at the beginning of the 1920s.

1. Territory, History and Nation 1-1. Geographical Notion of a Nation Compared to Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, Thongchai Winichakul, taking the case of modern Thailand, focuses on the 'geo-body', another element of nationhood, and describes the operations of the technology of territoriality which created nationhood spatially in Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (1994)3. According to him, the 'geo-body' of a nation is 'a man-made territorial definition which creates effects--by classifying, communicating, and enforcement--on people, things, and relationships' and 'merely an effect of modern geographical

3 Thongchai, Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, 1994, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, p.16. 2 discourse whose prime technology is a map'4. He said the emergence of the 'geo-body' of Siam was not a gradual evolution from the indigenous political space to a modern one; it was a displacement of the former by the latter at various moments both by foreign powers and by the Siamese themselves 5. The discourse of the 'geo-body' is subject to alter in confronting the 'other'. Thongchai also discusses the relationship between the 'geo-body' and history. The historical maps of Thailand do not describe the loss of territories and provincial reform under the influence of European imperialism in the modern era: 'As the humble origin of the geo-body in the operation of mapping is concealed, the geo-body of nationhood becomes naturalized as having existed with the Thai since time immemorial.'6 He points out that the 'geo-body' and history have become powerful technologies of nationhood and the most powerful effect is their operation in the identification of Thainess, or We-self, as opposed to otherness 7 . The notion of nationhood is constructed, identifying the 'other' at the same time. As to identification of the 'other', the dismantling of its historical territory was one of the largest interventions from the 'other' in the context of Hungary after the WWI. It should be noted that attempts to redefine the meaning of existence and the 'nationhood' of Hungary became popular at that time.

1-2. Symbols in Miklós Zeidler points out that there were three major types in the set of symbols in Hungarian irredentism8. The first and most common, was the vulgarisation of Christ's Passion story. In the second set of symbols, parallels were drawn to the 1848 -1849 Revolution and War of Independence. The third set was based on the actualisation of the twin symbols of the Conquest and the subsequent heroic protection of the Carpathian Basin by the . According to Zeidler it can be seen that at certain points these symbols meet, complement each other and even meld into each other 9. He

4 Ibid., p.17. 5 Ibid., p.131. 6 Ibid., p.154. 7 Ibid., p.164. 8 Zeidler, Miklós (translated from Hungarian by DeKornfeld, Thomas J. and Helen), Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920-1945, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p.187. 9 Ibid. 3 says it is even more important that all three symbol systems are eminently sui table for romanticism because all of them were meeting points for extremes where the hero bleeds from the stroke of the evil of enemy but does not die and eventually rises to greater glory than ever before10. As Zeidler criticises, these symbols originated in a view of history which arbitrarily took the actual situation and the positive elements of the historical traditions and created false analogies. These three motives of self-sacrifice, struggles for national independence and the Carpathian Basin as integrated living space also could be seen in some discussions on Hungary both by Teleki and Jászi.

2. From Pál Teleki's Work 2-1. Evolution of Hungary Teleki resigned from prime minister in April 1921. He made a lecture trip to the in summer 1921 and spoke on history and geography of Hungary at the summer session of Williamstown University in Massachusetts. The eight-times serial lecture was published in 1923 entitled The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History with an introduction by a geographer Lawrence Martin, one of his old acquaintances in USA. Teleki introduced the geographical outlines of the Carpathian Basin at the first lecture, then illustrated his interpretation of history of Hungary in the next three chapters: the first from the settlement up to the 'Tartar invasion' (from the tenth century to 1244), the second to the 'Turkish invasion' (1244-1526), and the third from 1526 to his time. According to him, in the first of these periods a great variety of people came to Hungary, but they were amalgamated, just as was the case in the other European countries; in the second period Hungary received still more western settlers, but the process of amalgamation was able to keep up with that of immigration, and at the end of the period Hungary was more united nationally than ever; in the third period the process of natural amalgamation by the leading race could not keep pace with the speed and amount of the colonization, and Hungary became a racially mixed country11.

10 Ibid. 11 Teleki, Paul, The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1923, pp.147-148. 4

He continued to describe the political situations in Hungary from the Compromise to 1919 at the fifth lecture, and the economic situations in East Central Europe after the First World War at the seventh lecture. Having introduced the backgrounds, he explained the nationality policies in pre-war Hungary as a response to some expectations from the audiences in the sixth chapter. He summarised the reason the nationality policies before 1918 had failed as follows: First, a decadence of political sense, reducing it to the level of political

quarreling. Second, a disregard of our own conditions, the imitation of western European ideas of nationalism. Third, a lack of sufficient social feeling in the local administration. Fourth, a lack of true and sound direction of the administration, insufficient control by the state.[...] Fifth, we made grave mistakes and created enemies by our inconsistency in not carrying out laws which we had passed, as well as by passing laws which could not be or were not carried out. Sixth, the governments neglected to control and check propaganda going on freely among the non-Magyar races, under the direction of strong cultural societies and of political banks and savings banks of anti-Magyar tendency, subsidized from abroad. Seventh, this propaganda itself, which, construed unfavorable political, social or economic conditions, affecting certain classes of the population, without distinction of race, as aggressive measures directed against a given non-Magyar race, and therefore blamed Hungary as a nation and not merely the government which really was responsible for the said conditions12. He then presented his views on the way to resolve those questions at the final chapter entitled "The Racial or Nationality Problem Seen by a Geographer" 13. Illustrating some

12 Ibid., pp.173-174. 13 According to him, he used the term 'racial' in the way in which it was used 'in the modern, popular, political literature' with the meaning 'nationality,' or 'linguistic group', which was the 5 cases such as the , Eastern Transylvania, Eastern , the Ruthenian territory and Western Hungary, he concluded that 'you cannot solve the racial question of politics in practice according to a unique system, or scheme '14. According to him, there are different and conflicting interests in all more or less mixed language areas, and only the mutual compensation of interest can bring a solution and peace in such territories15. He suggested that each solution to a specific region should be considered individually, because every region had its local tradition which would form its own characteristics16.

2-2. Historical Connection to 'Democracy' and 'Europe' Teleki explained the historical backgrounds and the post-war economic situations of Hungary to the audience in the US at the lectures, while he admitted that the nationality problems of pre-war Hungary had many problems. He presented some possible solutions for them, but it should be noted here that although he did not profess it, he presupposed the integration of the Carpathian Basin and attempted to modify the political situations after WWI. The motif of the Carpathian Basin as living space of the Hungarian citizens can be found here. He also appealed that Hungary had been an independent state and had some connections to 'Europe', an 'advanced' region with 'civilisation' and 'democracy'. As mentioned above, he pointed out that one of the reasons the nationalities policies of Hungary had failed was the imitation of Western European ideas of nationalism. It should be noted that he considered the influences on ideas from . The historical scope of his discussion can be retraced to the mediaeval area, the first stage of the kingdom. He mentioned István I., the first king of Hungary, and his father Géza as the introducers of 'Western civilisation'; 'St. Stephen was not the first to introduce Western civilization and Christianity into Hungary; his father had done this before him.'17 In regards to the kingdom in the mediaeval times, he discovered a 'democratic' advantage of Hungary with the Golden Bull of 1356 and indicated some continuous criterion of the Paris Peace Conference. He denied the view that 'nationality' and 'linguistic group' were equal to 'race' in a scientific meaning. Ibid., p.211. 14 Ibid., p.229. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p.236. 17 Ibid., p.33. 6 characters until his period; ' If we can speak of democracy in those remote times, and we surely find there the origins of the most inspiring ideals of our own times, it is worthy of note that the great charter of Hungarian liberties, in some respects, went even beyond the Magna Charta.'18 He also maintained the counter-revolutionary actions after the collapse of the short-living communist regime in August 1919, which had some connections with the government; 'When bolshevism was broken down, the reaction came, of course. [...] It has an undemocratic sound. But I do not know of anything more undemocratic and anti-democratic than bolshevism. We who have seen terrorism by a few bolshevists know that there is no rule more autocratic than bolshevik [sic.] rule. Reaction against bolshevism is democracy.'19 Here it can be pointed out that Teleki represented Hungary as a state with long history of 'democracy' as a member of 'Europe' to the audiences.

3. From Oscar Jászi's Work 3-1. Danubian Cultural Alliance20 Since the editorial meeting of the Hungarian Newspaper of Vienna [Bécsi Magyar Ujság] on June 15 1921, Jászi took charge of its management. The editorial policy was changed. Soon after the meeting, he published two articles with which he insisted that the principles of the October Revolution of 1918, land reform and republicanism, should be maintained, that the politics and should be 'democratized', and that a new morality should be established. According to him, only through this reformation process would Hungary attain a position in 'Europe'—the author of this paper presumes that this term meant the 'advanced' area, especially Western Europe21. He also insisted that the ethnic Magyars detached from Hungary after the WWI should accept 'democracy', should never be misled by revisionism, and

18 Ibid., p.35. 19 Ibid., pp.140-141. 20 The term 'Danubia' or 'Danubian Basin' is one of the essential words of Jászi’s geographical recognition. Although he did not make the precise definition of 'Danubia ', it is possible to affirm from many of his works that he mentioned this term as a synonym of the Carpathian Basin, or at least as the countries whose territories were included the area of the former Habs burg Monarchy—especially Hungary, , , and Yugoslavia. 21 Jászi, Oszkár, „A magyar emigráció feladatairól [About the Magyar Exiles’ Tasks],” BMU, 1921 jún. 19. This article is included in Litván, György, és Varga F. János (Válogatta, szerkezette és a jegyzeteket készítette,) Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája [Oscar Jászi’s Publication—hereinafter JOP], Budapest, Magvető, 1981, 371-378. old. 7 should never conflict with the government of the country they were living in. He identified himself and his colleagues in exile as the main driving force for realizing these conditions22. This viewpoint led to the 'Danubian cultural alliance' plan. On December 25 1921, Jászi wrote an article in BMU, "The Future of the Danubian Confederation", in which he propounded 'the Danubian cultural alliance'23. First, he pointed out that in the Danubian Basin the basis of a more universal spirit was in danger. It was not only the material conditions, such as the result of severe inflation, rising unemployment, rapid worsening of living standards, disintegration of the former middle class, and the shameless intervention of unproductive capitalists, but also, in his view, this 'crisis of spirit' which was widely seen not only in Europe but also all over the world, that imposed a heavy burden on the Danubian peoples. The crisis, which the war [WWI] brought to Western Europe, continued in Central Europe [középeurópa], and the cause and harm of the crisis lay in the Danubian Basin. He then criticized the new order which formed in this area after the war. According to him, a large problem of the Danubian peoples would be whether their states and nations existed in harmony with their complete independence and the general economic and cultural interests of 'the Danubian common destiny'. Jászi criticised that 'the new states do not aspire to economic and cultural alignments'. The project of a 'Danubian alliance' would be doomed as long as the Danubian peoples did not succeed in uniting 'the best intelligence' under 'an atmospher e of a new ideology and morality'. Therefore, he advocated 'the cultural alliance of the Danubian peoples[népek]'. The 'culture' in this context 'creates a concept which would become the backbone of the overall framework' and also never suppress or compete with the free development of other peoples’ cultures. The members of the alliance are 'the Magyar, German, Czechoslovakian, South Slavic, Romanian, and Ukrainian nations who do not think about parties and classes, who are genuinely democratic, who love culture, who respect the freedom of each nation with each other, and who are convinced that they

22 Jászi, Oszkár, „Az emigráció „hazaárulása,” [The Emigrants’ "Betrayal of Homeland"]” BMU, 1921 jún. 26. 1.old./ JOP, 379-383. old. 23 All quotations in this section: Jászi Oszkár, „A dunai szövetség jövője [The Future of the Danubian Confederation],” BMU, 1921 dec. 25. 1.old. For details about this plan, see Tsujikawa, Noriko, "Oscar Jászi's 'Danubian Cultural Alliance' Plan and Reorganization of Central Europe at the Beginning of the 1920s," Yoroppa Kenkyu [European Studies], Vol.8, pp.63-82 [in Japanese]. 8 are not concerned with other people’s freedom, independence, labour and culture as long as these values would be guaranteed to the people to some extent'. The members would enlighten public opinion in order to reach the true solution of each nation’s economic, cultural, and social problems, demonstrating their views by publications, translations, and periodical meetings, through which to introduce the fight against 'the suppressive tendency of all kinds of chauvinists, nationalists, and imperialists' and certify that 'the interests of labour and culture are allied in all states'. With this activity 'the unconscious masses [öntutadatlan [sic.] tömegek]' will recognize that 'competition of the Danubian peoples with each other' contributes only to 'soldiers, capitalists and civil servants' and that 'the interests of all working diligently' are 'peace', namely 'exchanging ideas and wealth as thoroughly and freely as possible'. In this atmosphere the ethnic Magyars living outside the border of Hungary would become 'a bridge to each nation’s productive mutual relationship'. 'A difference in language' is 'diversity in culture', neither 'burden' nor 'obstacle', and an 'advantage and improvement of development'. Finally he concluded as follows: 'Even if the actual political and economic problems were never solved […] the Danubian cultural alliance would become a new element of unification of Danubia.' Without this view, 'the young independence of the Danubian peoples would die immediately from an enthusiastic ferment of irredentism and the intervention of imperialistic divisions ordered by foreign countries'.

3-3. The meaning of existence of Hungary and 'Europe' In line with the 'The Hungarian Emigrants' Tasks' and 'Danubian cultural alliance' plan, Jászi attempted to establish an enlightening network for the Danubian peoples based on 'democracy' beyond the borders of states. He counterposed the activities of the cultural alliance against the nationalism of Hungary and its neighbouring countries. Although admitting that the political and economic problems were actually hard to solve and accepting the political framework in Central Europe after WWI, he still attempted to restructure and reunite this region 'democratically' as one of the leaders of the peoples even after his exile. However, his plan was not able to influence the real politics. He did not demand the revision of the border demarcated after WWI. He considered the 'Danubian' region 9 as an integrated living space of the peoples of Central Europe and virtually assumed the historical territory of Hungary as the area of activities of the cultural alliance. Moreover, he emphasized that the ethnic Magyars outside the border of Hungary were a key element of regional cooperation and positioned this area as the very forefront of the difficulties in Europe after the First World War. It can be pointed out that he searched for a meaning of existence of Hungary after WWI. This motif related to self-sacrifice also could be associated with one of the major symbols in Hungarian irredentism as mentioned above24. Neither the ethnic Magyars outside Hungary nor the neighbouring countries, therefore, approved of his proposal.

Conclusion Confronting the difficulties after WWI, both Teleki and Jászi searched for a role of Hungary. They accepted the premise that there remained integration in the Carpathian Basin after the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty and Hungary should be a part of 'Europe', i.e. Western Europe, the advanced 'democratic' region. In 2010, the 90th anniversary of signing Trianon Treaty, there were political debates whether the statue of Mihály Károlyi should continue to stand near at the Parliament of Hungary25. Those who approved of Hungarian radical nationalistic view criticised that Károlyi and the government of the October Revolution of 1918 triggered the dismantling of historical territory and demanded the removal of the statue, while those who supported democratic republicanism evaluated Károlyi as pioneer of democracy and republicanism in independent Hungary and were against the removal. As seen in the arguments, 'the Carpathian Basin as an integrated living space of the ethnic Magyars' and 'introduction of democracy to Hungary' are still controversial in today's Hungary.

24 Jászi often mentioned some historical revolutionary or anti-establishment actions in Hungary in order to insist the legitimacy and the significance of the October Revolution of 1918. He identified the October Revolution and the 'emigrants' themselves with the followers of the 1848 -1849 Revolution and War of Independence and the leaders especially since 1922. It can be said that this discourse was also similar to the Hungarian irredentism at that time. 25 For details, see Tsujikawa, Noriko, "Nationalism in Contemporary Hungary: From the Political Controversy over the Statue of Mihály Károlyi in 2010," Hikaku Bungaku Bunka Ronshu [Proceedings of Comparative Literature & Culture], No.29, pp.48-67 [in Japanese]. 10