KONDA BAROMETER

Political and Social Survey Series SAMPLE REPORT

10th year SAMPLE REPORT

This report is a sample copy to foster a better understanding of the contents of the political and social research series, begun 10 years ago. Due to the privacy agreements between KONDA and its subscribers, no report or any part of it can be shared with a third party until after a year after its preparation.

KONDA February’18 Barometer Report is offered as the sample copy of our monthly work in this document.

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KONDA BAROMETER 2019 WHAT IS KONDA BAROMETER?

Konda Barometer is the only tool you can use to observe and make sense of the society in Turkey as a whole.

KONDA Barometer was launched in 2010 and as of January 2019, we will conduct a survey, representative of the adult population in Turkey, for the 94th time and publish its 94th report. KONDA Barometer is political and social survey series going on to its 10th year. Each month, around 3 thousand people are interviewed face to face at locations determined through a sample representative of the population in Turkey. The survey includes questions on demographic characteristics and political preferences, and on how current events are perceived, as well as thematic questions on how social issues are shaped. In short, KONDA Barometer reports monitor what society thinks and how it reacts in the face of social or political events and developments.

Above all, this survey series is second to none in Turkey in terms of its longevity, standardization and high-quality.

KONDA BAROMETER 2019 Selected themes

• The economic crisis and expectations • Justice in society • Political identities in society • Evaluation of companies and brands • Headcover and turban • Nationalism and national pride • Use of the Internet and social media • Alcohol and tobacco consumption • Women in social life • Life satisfaction • The new constitution • Family structure in Turkey • Economic ideology in daily life • Environmental awareness • Shame, sin and crime In the past 9 years, KONDA Barometer • Perception of human rights subscribers were able to follow 4 • The other in society • Trust in society general elections, 1 local election, 2 • How do we live sadness? presidential election and 2 • How do we live happiness? referendums, thanks to the reports that • Scientific thought and unscientific beliefs they received on the last day of every • Avoiding uncertainty month. • Definition of a leader and evaluation of political leaders • Gezi Park events Subscribers also gained a full grasp on • Future orientation society’s view on any development that • Reputation in society • Problem-solving skills either influenced social life or was • Demands for urban management publicly debated. Moreover, they • Legitimacy learned through thematic Barometer • Effect of mass communication media reports how people in the country • Investment preferences of society perceived or even influenced countless • Authoritarianism • Corruption and economic situation issues shaping the structure of society, • Living together such as housing, economic classes, the • Economic concerns and risk • Competition relationship of shame, sin and crime, • Violence towards women football fandom, perspective on the • Patience in society and politics judicial system or the health system. • Post-election evaluation • Trust and the Kurdish issue • Turkey’s well-being • The average person in Turkey • Perception on Syrian asylum- seekers • Public security • Perception of justice and law • Nationalism in Turkey • Economic concerns • July 15th coup attempt • Well-being of society • Perception of health • Foreign policy • Problem solving • Violence and trauma in social life • Power distance • Perception of economic class • Consumer expectations • The referendum and political expectations As they manage and direct their businesses • The emotional meaning of “home” and make decisions, Konda Barometer • Changes in media preferences • Ramadan practices subscribers have, for the past 9 years, • Time use known the dynamics of society in Turkey. • Football and fandom • Structure of the educational system and expectations

KONDA BAROMETER 2019 Barometer reports present the collected social data to its subscribers as comprehensible pieces of information, data visualizations and commentary. Therefore, the reports consist of data-driven commentary and predictions presented through a technical lens, instead of raw data, complicated statistics and unintelligable information. Decisions regarding society should be made with every possibility in plain sight and reports are written with this goal in mind. The person to make such a decision could be a politician, an investment expert or a major taxpayer…

KONDA BAROMETER 2019 KONDA Barometer not only manages to follow the dizzying pace of current events in the country through a social framework, but also monitors social undercurrents over time. How some issues are perceived is worth monitoring even when they seem to drop out of the public agenda. Changes in public opinion on issues such as economic sentiments, outlook on the Kurdish issue or constitutional amendment can be monitored thanks to the Barometer surveys. Other issues are monitored every few years. Key issues such as life satisfaction or the effect of social media, however, are tracked and analyzed annually.

KONDA BAROMETER 2019 Barometer reports do not consist merely of statistical analyses and visual representations. Social data based on surveys are transformed into analyses; analyses into commentary; commentary into scenarios. The commentary and predictions available throughout the reports are solely based on the accumulated knowledge of its authors, not their own views. Each finding in the Barometer reports is a reflection of the truth and each commentary of unbiased views. We work closely with academics and other experts, both for the conception of a theme and the in-depth analysis of the collected data. A literature review is provided with any issue or theme analyzed in Barometer reports. Any information shedding light on the issue is analyzed and included in the report. Also, the highlights of the news agenda are presented every month as a chronological selection under the heading of “current agenda.”

All in all, KONDA Barometer is the only tool for monitoring the situation in Turkey and making sense of society’s behavior in the face of events right now.

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KONDA BAROMETER 2019

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER

Political and Social Survey Series

Political Preferences Daily Politics Economic Ideology in Daily Life Barometer of the Agenda

In accordance with the confidentiality provisions of the KONDA Barometer subscription agreement, this report shall not be distributed or circulated other than corporate use.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 2 / 94 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 5

2. POLITICAL PREFERENCES ...... 11

If There Was An Election Today...... 11 Who Should Rule Turkey? ...... 14 Analysis of the Political Party Electoral Bases and Electoral Clusters ...... 19 Electoral Clusters on the Right-Left Spectrum ...... 26 The Ak Parti Electoral Base ...... 30

3. DAILY POLITICS ...... 33

Opinions on the Afrin Operation ...... 33 What are the Targets in the Afrin Operation? ...... 34 Successful Performances of the Ak Parti ...... 34

4. ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY IN DAILY LIFE ...... 37

Conceptual Framework ...... 37 Economic Satisfaction: Overview ...... 42 Political Party Preferences and Economic Satisfaction ...... 45 Information, Media and Perception on Economy ...... 46 Economic Satisfaction and Presidency ...... 52 Priorities in Economic Policy ...... 55 Economic Preferences and Leftist-Rightist Ideologies ...... 61 Economic Development and Environment ...... 67 Conclusion ...... 70

5. BAROMETER OF THE AGENDA ...... 73

6. RESEARCH ID ...... 79

Overall Description of the Survey ...... 79 6.1 Sampling ...... 79

7 FREQUENCY TABLES ...... 81

7.1 Profile of Subjects ...... 81 7.2 Daily Politics ...... 85 7.3 Economic Ideology in Daily Life ...... 87

8. GLOSSARY of TERMS ...... 93

8.1 Questions and Response Options ...... 94

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 3 / 94

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 4 / 94 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis of this report was conducted on 3-4 February 2018 by face-to- face interviews with 2687 people in their homes in 154 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts of 30 provinces including the central districts.

POLITICAL FINDINGS Increase in direct political preferences, decrease in swing voters When we asked the interviewees this month “if there was an election today, who would you vote for?” we have observed that the society has further politicized due to daily dynamics such as the Afrin operation and tension with the U.S. as a result of which the direct preferences have started to rise after a long interval with a 4-point increase in the Ak Parti voting rate and a 2-point increase in the CHP voting rate whereas the rate of the swing voters and non- voters have decreased by about 6 points.

The difference in political preferences in January'18 and February'18 Barometer findings 1 November election 60 January’18 February’18 42.9 40 36.2 32.3 25.9 22.2 20.5 20 16.7 14.8 13.0 10.5 9.2 6.97.0 7.48.2 7.36.9 4.73.7 2.20.70.9 0 Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti Other Swing voters Non-voters

Forty-three percent of the electorate consist of those voters who are not loyal to any political party A calculation according to the KONDA Electorate profiling model reveals that 22 out of every 100 people are the core electorate of the Ak Parti and 10 are the sympathazing electorate of the Ak Parti. A very significant difference in size is observed in terms of the electorate profiles of the Ak Parti and the other parties. However, there are 43 in every 100 people who would not be considered as a loyal electorate of any political

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 5 / 94

party. An analysis of the profile of this electorate that remains in the gray area reveals that this group consists of people who rather act on economic motives, are not on the extremes about daily and political issues and have demographic characteristics at the national average.

The findings and the analysis on political party electorate profiles confirm that although the direct preference rates of the four parties vary, the general portrait remains the same in the sense that the parties are stuck within certain demographic, economic, sociological and cultural clusters, somewhat within identities, as we have been observing in every survey we have conducted in the past five years.

Within the general electorate, 20.5 percent consider themselves on the right and 18.7 percent on the right of the center. 12 percent consider themselves on the left and 12.1 percent on the left of the center. On the other hand, there is a group of electorates at a rate of 36.7 percent who consider themselves in the middle / in the center on the left-right political spectrum. Distribution of the electorate on the left-right political spectrum

Left of center; 12.1 Right of Center; 36.7 Right; 20.5 Left; 12.0 center; 18.7

0% 50% 100%

When the electoral bases of the political parties are analyzed through this positioning, it is observed that the Ak Parti and MHP electorates define themselves as the right of the center and the CHP and HDP electorates as the left of the center.

Although the candidates in the presidential election are not yet clear, Erdoğan dominates for the time being. The rate of those who indicate that R. T. Erdoğan should rule Turkey is 41.4 percent, K. Kılıçdaroğlu 11 percent and M. Akşener 8.2 percent. In response to the question as to who they wish that should rule Turkey irrespective of their candidacy in the presidential election, more than one fourth of the electorate indicate that none of the current leaders should rule Turkey. Still, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is ahead of the other leaders by far.

Another significant finding is that the rate of those who indicate Meral Akşener has been continuously twice as high as the Iyi Parti voting rate.

The society supports the Afrin operation Seven tenth of the society approve of the Afrin operations. Namely, 72 percent approve of it whereas 28 percent disapprove of it.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 6 / 94 Do you approve of Turkey's military operation to Syria ?

72 28

0% 50% 100% Yes, I approve of it. No, I disapprove of it.

Within the Ak Parti electorate, 94 percent approve of the operation whereas the approval rate is 90 percent within the MHP electorate and 49 percent within the CHP electorate. 94 percent of the HDP electorate disapprove of the operation. 62 percent think that the Afrin operation targets terrorist organizations.

THEME OF THE MONTH: ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY IN DAILY LIFE By handling this theme, we aimed to analyze as to whether the electorate is pleased with the economic course which is a particular concern for daily politics, the distribution of the state of satisfaction with economy among the political party electorates and its influence on the voting behavior and what the most important economic problems for the society are.

Starting from the fact that the average education level of the Ak Parti electorate is lower than the general, there is a common criticism that the electorate is unable to accurately evaluate the economy or does not sufficiently care about it and instead favours the Ak Parti for feeling closer about religiousness, cultural values and lifestyle.

In academic literature, this discussion is known as “economic voting hypothesis” according to which those who are positively affected by economy and are pleased with the economic course reward the ruling party in the elections whereas the others turn to other parties in pursuit of an alternative. When expressed in this terminology, the question as to whether economic voting (still) exists in Turkey in 2018 is very important for both managing economy and sustaining the culture of democratic coexistence.

There is a tendency to reflect on the past economic course negatively and remain hopeful about the future In response to question ‘In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect your family budget?’ a majority of the respondents at a rate of 56 percent answered as “negatively” or “very negatively.”

When a similar question was asked about “national economy” instead of one’s family budget, the comments were slightly more positive, but still, the majority at 54 percent answered as “negatively” or “very negatively.” The total rate of those who have optimistic expectations about the future of economy rises up to 21 percent.

When assessments on economy are directed from the past to the future, they become more positive. In response to question “How will the policies of the government affect your family budget next year?” 44 percent answered negatively whereas in response to question “How

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 7 / 94

will the policies of the government affect national economy next year?” 45 percent gave a negative answer.

It is understood that the electorate tends to be more pessimistic when evaluating the past but tries to remain hopeful about the future.

Evaluations on economy also reflect profound polarization Among the Ak Parti electorate, 71 percent perceive the fluctuating foreing currency exchange rates as the plot of foreign powers. This rate is below 50 percent even among the MHP supporters whereas all other groups primarily blame the government for the fluctuating foreign currency exchange rates.

Polarization is also observed in the perception of official statistics. 75 percent of the Ak Parti electorate believe in the officially declared growth figures whereas the rest believe them at a rate of mere 22 percent. When it comes to inflation, polarization slightly diminishes, namely 65 percent of the Ak Parti electorate vs. 33 percent of the rest find the officially declared inflation rate realistic.

The strong correlation between the perception of economic progress and the political party preferences as well as the extreme difference of perception among the political parties may be partly due to the fact that the electorates of each political party follow different media outlets. The Ak Parti supporters watch the news at TRT, ATV and A Haber whereas the others prefer FOX TV and Kanal D for getting the news.

Another finding that verifies the extensive existence of political polarization in perceptions on economy is the answers to question ‘If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would the economy be affected?’ that was asked in view of the significance of the presidential position in the new system. Namely, 43 percent of the electorate stated that it would worsen.

Primary economic issues are employment and the fight against unemployment The question “What should the 2 most important priorities be in national economy?” was posed with five answer choices among which the fight against unemployment led by far as it was the first choice of 53 percent of the respondents and second choice of 20 percent of the respondents making a total of 73 percent that considered unemployment as the most important problem.

Unemployment was followed by inequality, inflation and tax reduction, respectively. Only 22 percent considered the maintenance of the value of Turkish Lira against dollar among the priorities. Therefore, this answer choice remained rather behind.

In the light of this data, it is observed that with respect to the unemployment / inflation dilemma, the majority of the electorate clearly prioritize unemployment. Namely, our sampling serves as the social projection of the government’s efforts in the past year on growth and creating employment through an inflationist financial policy.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 8 / 94 Likewise, the government’s distance towards the call for interest rate hikes may be explained by a desire to feed employment through an expansionary monetary policy at the cost of an increase in foreign exchange currency rates in an environment where the devaluation of Turkish lira is not a concern for the electorate (44 percent state that the increase in foreign currency exchange rates is a plot of foreign powers and 16 percent state that foreign currency exchange rates do not concern their life).

The society regards economy with higher humanistic awareness We posed the question ‘Which one of the following is more important for the country?’ and provided the answer choices of ‘economic development,’ ‘a powerful state’ and ‘a society that values humans.’ The answer choice ‘a society that values humans’ came first by 42 percent whereas ‘a powerful state’ came second by 33 percent followed by ‘economic development’ by 25 percent.

Contrary to the society in general, the first priority of the Ak Parti supporters is a powerful state. The answers of the MHP electorate are also similar. On the other hand, it is understood that economy is a significant matter that differentiates the MHP supporters from the Iyi Parti supporters: the MHP electorate has the lowest rate of preferring the answer choice ‘economic development’ whereas the highest rate for this answer choice is observed among the Iyi Parti electorate.

9 In response to the statement ‘It is the employers’ right to discharge striking workers’ 72 percent reacted negatively by choosing either “I absolutely disagree” or “I disagree.” 9 In response to the statement “The state should provide support for people in need so that no one lives in poverty” 74 percent supported this opinion. 9 “In order to reduce inequality, the state should impose high taxes on high-income earners” was supported by 77 percent.

Environmental awareness on the rise among the electorate Within the electorate, 65 percent are against the destruction of forests for building dams or highways. Again, 65 percent are negative about the construction of a nuclear power plant.

“It is well known that nuclear power technology entails environmental risks. Yet, a nuclear power plant to be developed and built (by a TURKISH company) will enable reduced energy costs for Turkey. Should the establishment of such a power plant be allowed?” A random half of the interviewees were asked this question by emphasizing the involvement of a Turkish company whereas the other half were asked the question in relation to a foreign company. The difference between the two groups reveals that with respect to a risky technology, there are different reactions towards domestic and foreign companies. 58 percent of those who thought that a Turkish company would build the power plant opposed to this idea whereas among those who presumed that a foreign company would build the power plant, 65 percent objected to the idea.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 9 / 94

Reflection of the view about economy on politics 9 According to the answers to the survey, the majority of the electorate are not pleased with the economic course, nevertheless the majority of the electorate believe that the economy would worsen if somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power.

9 Among those who stated that they would vote for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election, the rate of those who are pleased with economy is lower than it is within those who would vote for the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections. From another perspective, it may be concluded that certain voters who are not pleased with economy wish to punish the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections based on proportional representation, but they are ready to open a new political credit for Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election taking into consideration that more than 50 percent of the votes are needed for victory.

9 National economy is more positively assessed than family economy. Future economic expectations are more positive than the reflections on the past. However, this differentiation between family economy and national economy has grown quite a lot from 2015 to 2018. Within this period, the rate of those who are satisfied with the government’s performance on economy has significantly decreased when one’s own family is in question whereas there is no such decrease in terms of the perception on the economy in general. In this regard, it may be interpreted that the government’s ability to persuade the electorate has improved.

9 It is understood that economy is a significant matter that differentiates the MHP supporters from the Iyi Parti supporters. The assessment of the MHP supporters about economy is closer to the average in Turkey whereas it is significantly lower within the Iyi Parti electorate.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 10 / 94 2. POLITICAL PREFERENCES

If There Was An Election Today...

The answers to question “If there was an election today, who would you vote for?” posed in the survey conducted on February 3-4, 2018 have revealed the political preferences as follows:

1 November Party preference February’18 January’18 election Ak Parti 36.2 32.3 42.9 CHP 16.7 14.8 22.2 MHP 7.0 6.9 10.5 HDP 8.2 7.4 9.2 Iyi Parti 3.7 4.7 Others 0.9 0.7 2.2 Swing voters 20.5 25.9 Non-voters 6.9 7.3 13.0* Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 * The rate of those who did not cast votes in the 1 November elections.

Among the interviewees, 36.2 percent indicated that they would vote for the Ak Parti, 16.7 percent for the CHP, 7.0 percent for the MHP, 8.2 percent for the HDP and 3.7 percent for the Iyi Parti whereas 20.5 stated that they were undecided about their political preferences and 6.9 stated that they did not consider to cast votes.

Ak Parti MHP 36,2 7,0

İyi Parti 3,7 CHP HDP Other Swing Non voter 16,7 8,2 ,9 voters… 6,9

It is observed that the Afrin operation and the upsurge in the social psychology created by the behavior and emotions about it seem to have generated a clarification of political preferences. The rate of the swing voters and non- voters has decreased by about 6 points this month while the rate of those who expressed a direct political preference has increased by 6 points.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 11 / 94

In view of this social psychology, the Ak Parti has enjoyed an increase of 4 points in the direct preferences reaching 36 percent and the CHP has also received an increase of 2 points.

Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the total rate of the swing voters and non- voters constitutes the second biggest cluster after the Ak Parti electorate.

Change in direct preferences (With moving average curve) 50 42,9 40 36,2 32,3

30

22,2 20 14,8

10

0

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti

In view of the tendencies in the directly expressed political preferences, certain mobility patterns are remarkable:

9 International-scale developments such as the Afrin operation and the diplomatic tension with the U.S. as well as the tone of the internal political discussions about the Afrin operation, harshness in political style and major developments in daily politics such as the CHP General Assembly have created an increase in politization and upsurge in political preferences.

9 The decrease observed in the Ak Parti voting rates throughout the year has ended and the rate of those who indicated the Ak Parti in direct preferences has increased by 4 points under the influence of internal and external dynamics.

9 The CHP votes had also been in decline compared to the 1 November elections, but the CHP preference has also increased by 2 points again under the influence of the abovementioned political dynamics.

9 The progress of the HDP has been steady around the level of its traditional voting rate with slight fluctuations back and forth.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 12 / 94 9 The regression observed in the MHP voting rate at the time when the Iyi Parti was founded has stopped at a certain point, and the MHP has been steady around the electoral threshold.

9 The interest the Iyi Parti has created at a certain cluster of the public has not yet transformed into votes, and a regression back to the starting point has been observed with the effect of the social politization of last month.

In the graph below, the striking aspect of the comparison of today’s political preferences with the 1 November 2015 General Election results is that the Ak Parti and CHP have maintained 90 percent of the votes they had obtained on 1 November. To repeat, the internal and external dynamics of February have stopped the shift from the electoral bases of both parties in 1 November towards the undecided state due to unsatisfaction and brought it back to these parties. Still, it is to be noted that one third of today’s swing voters had been Ak Parti voters on 1 November.

Where were today's voters in 1 November?

Ak Parti 90 3 3 1 CHP 2 90 1 3 1 MHP 74 1 12 3 1 HDP 2 85 8 3 Iyi Parti 9 39 38 5 1 Other parties 17 9 9 52 13 Swing voters 34 14 1 8 16 12 Non-voters 14 11 8 2 11 34 12

0% 50% 100% Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Other parties I voted for an independent candidate I wasn't eligible to vote then I didn't cast a vote Blank voted

Among the Iyi Parti voters, 9 percent had voted for the Ak Parti on 1 November, 39 percent for the CHP and 38 percent for the MHP. Our determination that the Iyi Parti has been receiving votes from the electoral base of the MHP and CHP but not from that of the Ak Parti at a significant rate has been valid for the past few months including this month. This finding shows that the Iyi Parti has not yet created an interest and reached a potential that might produce radical changes in the political environment and has even regressed further below its starting position.

On the other hand, the MHP has been maintaining its traditional position by gaining what it has lost to the Iyi Parti from the first-time voters of the next elections.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 13 / 94

The graph below shows the current preferences of the electorate compared to the voting preferences of 1 November. The most important finding is that one fifth of the Ak Parti electorate has shifted towards an undecided position as understood in the direct political preference rates and shown in the graph below. Similarly, the CHP has lost one fourth of its voting rate in the 1 November elections a significant part of which has shifted towards an undecided position but another significant part of which seems to have been lost to the Iyi Parti. Where are the 1 November votes today?

Voted for the Ak Parti 79 1 15 2

Voted for the CHP 75 13 4

Voted for the MHP 6 56 15 14 5

Voted for the HDP 1 8 3

Other parties 4 4 48 24 16

I voted for an independent candidate 19 5 3 3 54 16

I wasn't eligible to vote then 22 8 15 11 3 2 25 13

I didn't cast a vote 16 3 3 39 31

Blank voted 11 22 1 59 23

0% 50% 100%

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti Other parties Swing voters Non-voters

Another remarkable aspect is that the new voters who had not been eligible to vote or had not preferred to vote in the 1 November elections are now predominantly swing voters or non- voters.

The HDP is notable as the political party that has maintained its electorate at the highest rate by 86 percent. On the other hand, the MHP has become the political party that has lost the highest rate of voters since the 1 November elections, namely the MHP seems to have lost one third of its electorate to the Iyi Parti and swing voters at equal rates.

Who Should Rule Turkey?

Since the November’17 Barometer survey, we have been asking the interviewees as to who should rule Turkey showing the card below. Although it has not yet been declared as to who among the current leaders will be candidates to presidency, this question nevertheless generates important findings for monitoring Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s voting rate and providing clues as to possible preferences in a probable presidential election.

The rate of those who indicate that R. T. Erdoğan should rule Turkey is 41.4 percent, K. Kılıçdaroğlu 11 percent and M. Akşener 8.2 percent. In response to the question as to who the interviewees want to rule Turkey irrespective of their candidacy in the presidential election,

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 14 / 94 more than one fourth of the electorate indicated that none of the current leaders should rule Turkey. Still, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is ahead of the other leaders by far.

Another significant finding is that the rate of those who indicate Meral Akşener has been continuously twice as high as the Iyi Parti voting rate.

Who should rule Turkey?

Feb.'18 41 11 8 8 4 27

Jan.'18 39 12 9 7 5 28

Dec.'17 41 13 9 8 5 25

Nov.'17 41 10 14 7 4 24

0% 50% 100%

R.T. Erdoğan K. Kılıçdaroğlu M. Akşener S. Demirtaş D. Bahçeli None

In a total of 100 people, there are 41 people who think that Erdoğan should rule Turkey 33 of whom are Ak Parti voters, 2 MHP voters, 5 swing voters and 1 non-voter. It is understood that a significant part of those voters who have dissolved from the Ak Parti and assumed an undecided position remain to take position in favor of Erdoğan among the current leaders.

Who should rule Turkey?

R.T. Erdoğan 33 2 5 1 41 K. Kılıçdaroğlu 10 1 11 M. Akşener 2 1 3 2 8 S. Demirtaş 7 1 8

D. Bahçeli 4 4

Another person 1 2 1 5 2

None 2 2 1 7 3 27

0% 25% 50% Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti Other parties Swing voters Non-voters

It is noteworthy that Akşener receives the votes of not only her own party but also MHP and CHP voters and swing voters/non-voters.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 15 / 94

Another striking finding is that although S. Demirtaş has been in jail pending trial and has resigned from his post as the co-chair of his party, the HDP electorate, almost in its entirety, still takes position in favor of him. 1

Within the voters who have stated that they would vote for the Ak Parti, 91 percent indicated that Erdoğan should rule Turkey, whereas 60 percent of the CHP electorate and 52 percent of the MHP electorate chose their respective leaders while 84 percent of the HDP electorate chose Demirtaş.

We have asked two separate questions in this matter due to the fact that the candidates have not yet been declared and with an aim to verify ourselves as this will be the first election of its kind. In the first question, we have used a card showing the photographs and names of the political party leaders and asked “Who do you wish that rules Turkey?” Then, without showing any cards, we have asked the second open-ended question “If there was a presidential election today, who would you vote for?”

The analyses above have been made on the findings obtained by question ”Who do you wish that rules Turkey?” (by showing the card) whereas the table below demonstrates the findings of both questions posed in different manners.

(With the card) (Without the card) If there was a presidential election to- Leader Who do you wish that rules Turkey? day, who would you vote for? Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 41.4 40.6 Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu 11.0 10.8 Meral Akşener 8.2 5.6 Selahattin Demirtaş 8.0 7.5 Devlet Bahçeli 4.3 3.3 None 12.0 - No answer 15.0 - Others - 2.1 Swing voters - 24.8 Non-voters - 5.3 Total 100 100

The rates and the differences between the patterns of the findings reveal the following facts:

9 As might be expected, compared to the open-ended question, the question posed by showing a card, i.e. by reminding the alternatives, forces 5 percent of the voters to make a choice and utter the name of a particular leader.

9 There is no specific differentiation in the rates of Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu, Demirtaş and Bahçeli. However, when asked with a card by reminding the alternatives, Akşener gains 2.5 extra points.

1 The field survey of this research had been conducted before the HDP Congress.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 16 / 94 9 In both questions, Erdoğan tops the list by far and dominates the picture.

9 In both questions, the total rate of those who said “none” or “no answer” and those who said that they were undecided or non-voters makes about one fourth of the electorate.

The graph below shows the progress of the 1 November voting rates towards the current political preferences and the current political preferences towards the answers to question “who should rule Turkey” in a way reflecting the source of the preferences.

An overall look at the answers to these three questions confirms a fundamental finding once again. Although the Ak Parti has lost about one fifth of its voters in the 1 November elections to an undecided position, the very same voters support Erdoğan in the presidential elections. In a way, Erdoğan is still the leader of those in the Ak Parti electoral base who are resentful or critical towards their party.

The second important point is that today’s swing voters and non-voters are not inclined towards a leader other than Erdoğan and that they find “none” of the political leaders fit to rule Turkey for the presidential elections.

Another interesting finding is shown in the graph below. A combined analysis of the findings of question “who should rule Turkey?” and the findings about the TV channels preferred for obtaining the news reveals that firstly, there is a considerable rate of those who do not watch the news on TV. This tendency has been on the rise compared to the findings of the past two-three years. Secondly, those who watch Fox TV for obtaining the news prefer the opposition leaders whereas almost all of those who watch TRT, ATV and A Haber prefer Erdoğan as the leader.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 17 / 94

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 18 / 94 Analysis of the Political Party Electoral Bases and Electoral Clusters

In the February’18 Barometer, we have produced a model by using the findings of multiple political questions.

We have made a modelling by using the findings of political questions such as the party for which one will under no circumstances give up voting for, the party for which one will never/under no circumstances vote for, the party which can solve the most urgent and important problems of Turkey, the party voted for in the 1 November elections, the party to vote for if there was a general parliamentary election today and the leader to vote for if there was a presidential election today.

Those who indicated the same political party/leader in response to all the questions above were defined as the “core electorate” of that party whereas those who indicated the name of that party in response to a certain number of the questions but responded the other questions as “undecided”, “these problems will persist” and “there is no party that I will never abandon” were defined as the “sympathizing electorate” of that party. Finally, we have also defined “the electorate on the gray area”, i.e. those voters who would not be considered as the electoral base of any party including those who showed no signs of commitment to any political party directly in response to any of the abovementioned questions.

The graph below shows the distribution of the overall electorate in view of this model. The Ak Parti has a core electorate of 21.8 percent and a symphatizing electorate of 10.5 percent whereas 6.2 percent of the electorate is the CHP core electorate and 6.4 percent is the CHP symphatizing electorate. There is a cluster of 43 percent that would not be considered as the electoral base of any political party.

When the electoral clusters and political party electoral base profiles are viewed on the basis of this modelling, it is clearly observed as to how political preferences are formed in terms of electoral behaviour.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 19 / 94

e

c c c c

i i i i

h t t t t a i i t

t t

e e e e

e

r r e r h h h h n P P e e e P P P P r i a a t t t t r r r a

H H

o D D H H a a a a P P s o o o

y c r p p p p C C c c c H H M M k k e ç e r t A A m m m m g y y y y o s s s s V

r Female 54 48 26 22 49 53 48 39 39 e d

n Male 46 52 74 78 51 47 52 62 62 e

G Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Between 18 - 32 26 28 43 47 34 25 26 50 54 Between 33 - 48 36 38 35 38 36 30 39 24 27 e g

A 49+ 39 34 22 15 30 45 35 26 19 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Under hgh school 68 67 39 30 47 46 46 57 46 n o i

t High school 25 23 48 45 32 32 27 22 37 a c

u University 8 10 13 25 21 23 27 21 17 d E Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Modern 7 11 22 31 32 55 54 27 39

e l r y e

t Traditional Cons. 46 47 59 56 49 39 39 34 40 t s s

u e l

f Religious Cons. 48 43 19 14 20 6 6 39 21 i c L Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Turkish 87 81 92 95 81 91 78 8 6 Kurdish 8 12 5 0 13 3 4 87 94 y t i

c Zaza 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 i n h

t Arab 3 1 2 0 3 5 14 1 0 E Other 2 6 2 5 4 1 2 1 0 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Atheist 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 12 Non believer 0 0 2 0 2 8 7 9 4 y t i

s Believer 10 17 37 38 29 43 38 30 29 o i g i l Religious 72 66 56 52 55 43 48 43 46 e R Pious 17 17 6 10 10 5 5 17 10 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Lower income class 22 22 9 15 17 18 13 46 47

c i

s Lower middle class 34 37 37 46 35 31 31 33 28 e m s o

s Upper midle class 30 28 32 17 23 23 20 13 16 n a o l c c High income class 14 14 23 22 25 29 37 7 9 E Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 20 / 94 Ak Parti electoral profile

Ak Parti core Ak Parti symphatizers

Turkey 22 11

Women 25 10 er

Gend Men 19 11

Ages 18 - 32 17 9 Ages 33 - 48 22 11 Ages 49+ 26 11

Below high school 28 13

nAge High school 18 8 University 10 6 Educatio

Senior 15 9 Worker, small retailer, farmer 20 11 Retired 26 9 Housewife 30 13 status Student 12 7 Employment Unemployed 14 9

Modern 5 4 Traditional conservative 22 11 Religious conservative 38 16

Lower income 24 12 Lower middle class 22 11 New middle class 28 12 classes Lifestyle

Economic Upper income 14 7

Turkish 24 11 city

Ethni Kurdish 11 8

Sunni Muslim 24 11 ect on/S

Religi Alevi Muslim 1

Atheist 2 Non-believer Believer 9 7 Religious 27 12

Religiousness Devout 32 15 03060

9 The Ak Parti core is stronger among women and increases as the age groups get older. The Ak Parti is relatively weaker among young people. 9 The support for the Ak parti decreases as the educational level increases and the rate of support considerably increases as the educational level decreases. 9 The Ak Parti is stronger among housewives and retired people whereas the students show the weakest support for the Ak Parti. 9 In terms of lifestyle, the Ak Parti electoral base is the strongest within the religious conservative cluster. 9 Support for the Ak Parti is more intense in the new middle class and lower class. 9 Support for the Ak Parti increases as the religiousness level intensifies.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 21 / 94

CHP electoral profile

CHP core CHP symphatizers

Turkey 6 6

Women 7 6 er

Gend Men 6 6

Ages 18 - 32 5 5 Ages 33 - 48 5 7 Ages 49+ 9 7

Below high school 5 5

nAge High school 7 6 University 8 10 Educatio

Senior 7 10 Worker, small retailer, farmer 5 7 Retired 11 9 Housewife 5 4 status Student 5 2 Employment Unemployed 3 4

Modern 13 13 Traditional conservative 5 5 Religious conservative 1 1

Lower income 5 4 Lower middle class 6 6 New middle class 6 5 classes Lifestyle

Economic Upper income 8 11

Turkish 7 6 city

Ethni Kurdish 12

Sunni Muslim 5 5 ect on/S

Religi Alevi Muslim 25 32

Atheist 2 8 Non-believer 21 16 Believer 11 9 Religious 5 5

Religiousness Devout 3 3 03060

9 The CHP is stronger in the oldest age cluster while it loses support as the age groups get younger. The CHP is relatively weaker among young people. 9 Support for the CHP increases in parallel to the increase in educational level and considerably decreases as the educational level drops. 9 The CHP is stronger among white collar workers and retired people whereas it is weak among the students. 9 Modern lifestyle is the cluster in which the CHP electoral base is the strongest. 9 Support for the CHP is quite higher in the upper class. 9 Support for the CHP increases as the religiousness level lowers. 9 The CHP is nearly the sole political party for the Alevis.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 22 / 94 MHP electoral profile

MHP core MHP symphatizers

Turkey 2 2

Women 1 1 er

Gend Men 4 4

Ages 18 - 32 3 3 Ages 33 - 48 2 3 Ages 49+ 2 1

Below high school 2 1

nAge High school 4 4 University 2 4 Educatio

Senior 2 4 Worker, small retailer, farmer 4 4 Retired 2 1 Housewife 1 1 status Student 5 3 Employment Unemployed 2 2

Modern 2 3 Traditional conservative 3 3 Religious conservative 2 1

Lower income 1 2 Lower middle class 3 3 New middle class 3 2 classes Lifestyle

Economic Upper income 3 3

Turkish 3 3 city

Ethni Kurdish 1

Sunni Muslim 3 3 ect on/S

Religi Alevi Muslim 1

Atheist Non-believer 1 Believer 4 4 Religious 2 2

Religiousness Devout 1 2 01020

9 The MHP enjoys the support of men, young people and students at higher rates. 9 The MHP is relatively stronger among the educational level of high school and traditional lifestyle. 9 The MHP is the political party of the Turks and Sunni Muslims but loses support as religiousness intensifies.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 23 / 94

HDP electoral profile

HDP core HDP symphatizers

Turkey 4 3

Women 3 2 er

Gend Men 5 3

Ages 18 - 32 7 5 Ages 33 - 48 3 2 Ages 49+ 3 2

Below high school 5 2

nAge High school 3 4 University 5 3 Educatio

Senior 3 2 Worker, small retailer, farmer 4 3 Retired 2 2 Housewife 4 2 status Student 6 6 Employment Unemployed 12 7

Modern 4 4 Traditional conservative 3 2 Religious conservative 6 2

Lower income 10 6 Lower middle class 4 2 New middle class 2 2 classes Lifestyle

Economic Upper income 1 1

Turkish city

Ethni Kurdish 24 17

Sunni Muslim 4 3 ect on/S

Religi Alevi Muslim 2 2

Atheist 2 18 Non-believer 15 4 Believer 5 3 Religious 3 2

Religiousness Devout 6 2 02550

9 The HDP receives the support of men, young people and students at higher rates. 9 The HDP is relatively stronger among poor people, lower income groups, students and unemployed people. 9 The HDP is the political party of the Kurds. 9 The support for the HDP decreases as the religiousness level intensifies.

The findings and the analysis on political party electorate profiles confirm that although the direct preference rates of the four parties vary, the general portrait remains the same in the sense that the parties are stuck within certain demographic, economic, sociological and cultural

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 24 / 94 clusters, somewhat within identities, as we have been observing in every survey we have conducted in the past five years.

This model reveals that naturally each political party may lose votes in the symphatizing electorate cluster. However, the real critical point is the electoral profile in the gray area which does not belong to any political party, because if the daily and especially economic developments trigger changes in the preferences of this cluster, this group will leave its mark on the political picture of the coming term.

Profile of the electorate in the gray area

Those in the gray area

Turkey 43

Women 44 er

Gend Men 42

Ages 18 - 32 46 Ages 33 - 48 44 Ages 49+ 39

Below high school 38

nAge High school 47

Educatio University 53

Senior 49 Worker, small retailer, farmer 42 Retired 38 Housewife 40 Student 54 Unemployed 46

Modern 51 Traditional conservative 45 Religious conservative 32

Lower income 36 Lower middle class 43 New middle class 40 classes Lifestyle Employment status

Economic Upper income 51

Turkish 44 ity Kurdish 37 Ethnic

Sunni Muslim 42 ct

Religi Alevi Muslim 36 on/Se

Atheist 69 Non-believer 42 Believer 49 Religious 41

Religiousness Devout 37

04080

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 25 / 94

9 Young people, students, and those with university level education have quite low commitment to any political party, hence they intensify in the gray area. 9 Modern lifestyle and upper income groups are stronger in the gray area. 9 The gray area grows as the religiousness level decreases.

Electoral Clusters on the Right-Left Spectrum

Although it is occassionally indicated that the right-left discrimination is no longer valid in Turkey, in the theme of this month we have asked a question about right-left positioning in order to understand the view on economy of those who position themselves in such political spectrum. Indeed, it was observed that this is a quite significant differentiation when analyzed in view of political party preferences.

We used question “Regarding political matters, where would you position yourself in the left-right political spectrum? (1 farthest left, 10 farthest right)” and grouped the answers to define the left / left of the center / center / right of the center / right. 20.5 percent of the overall electorate consider themselves on the right and 18.7 percent on the right of the center. 12 percent consider themselves on the left and 12.1 percent on the left of the center. On the other hand, there is a group of voters at a rate of 36.7 percent who consider themselves in the middle / at the center of the left-right political spectrum.

Distribution of the electorate in the left-right spectrum

Left of center; 12,1 Right of Center; 36,7 Right; 20,5 Left; 12,0 center; 18,7

0% 50% 100%

When the electoral bases of the political parties are analyzed through this positioning, it is observed that the Ak Parti and MHP electorates define themselves as the right of the center and the CHP and HDP electorates as the left of the center.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 26 / 94 Where do you position yourself in the left-right spectrum?

Turkey 3,29

Ak Parti 3,98

CHP 2,03

MHP 3,78

HDP 2,23

Iyi Parti 3,38

Other parties 3,11

Swing voters 3,27

Non-voters 2,86

12345 Left Left of center Center Right of center Right

The graph above about the political party electoral bases has been calculated on the electorate average, but this finding is to be noted: About one third of the electorates of almost all political parties position themselves at the center whereas the rate is two third for swing voters and non-voters.

It is observed that over the years, the positioning on the left-right spectrum has changed shape according to the daily politics. Before the 2011 Elections when all political parties had been promising for constitutional amedments and the demand for change had been on the rise, those positioned on the right and left decreased and were mostly placed at the center whereas at the beginning of the three-election rally in 2014, the center weakened and the right increased under the influence of the elevated political tension.

These days, the political dynamics that have enhanced an undecided position and the state of unsatisfaction with the existing political actors have caused a part of the electorate to place themselves at the center, somewhat decreasing the positioning on the right. It is observed that in the process of change through the years, the main mobility has been the movement back and forth between the center and the right whereas the left positioning has scarcely changed.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 27 / 94

Distribution of the society in the left-right spectrum over the years

Feb.'18 12 12 37 19 21

June'14 12 13 30 23 22

June'11 18 4 48 4 26

%0 %50 %100

Left Left of center Center Right of center Right

The graph below shows how the mobility reflects on the political party electoral bases. The large dots / loops on the graph show the February’18 findings whereas the others show the Barometer findings of various months and years in a time series. For instance, it is observed that the average electorate in general are directed towards the centre. Another fundamental finding is that the electoral bases of all political parties have been moving towards the center in general.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 28 / 94 Where do you position yourself in the left-right spectrum (average value)

March'14 Turkey February'18

February'18 March'14 Ak Parti 3,98

June'11 February'18 CHP 2,03

February'18 3,78 October'14 MHP

March'14 February'18 HDP 2,23

February'18 Iyi Parti 3,38

February'18 Other parties 3,11 June'11

February'18 3,27 Swing voters October'14 March'14

February'18 2,86 Non-voters 12345 <-- LEFT CENTER RIGHT -->

The graph below shows the correlation between the positioning of the electorate on the left-right spectrum and the political preferences. It is observed that the left-wing electorate mostly prefer the CHP and HDP whereas the right-wing electorate are more inclined towards the Ak Parti and MHP. What is noteworthy is that the electorate placing themselves at the center usually prefer the Ak Parti or are swing voters.

This finding confirms and repeats a fundamental characteristic of the politics in Turkey as previously noted in many Barometer reports:

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 29 / 94

9 The Ak Parti dominates the politics in Turkey;

9 There is a mobility back and forth between the Ak Parti and the cluster that cannot be readily labelled and addressed such as “those who are positioned at the center of the left-right spectrum”, “those with traditional lifestyle”, “those who adopt a view based on economic and daily dynamics among the political preference identities”, “swing voters” or “the electora l cluster in the gray area”. Such mobility determines the final outcome of political preferences or elections .

The Ak Parti Electoral Base

Let us repeat an analysis we have been conducting for the past few months in order to understand the Ak Parti electoral base through another perspective. Firstly, we have separated those who indicated the Ak Parti in direct political preferences into three: “The Ak Parti White Collar” (those belonging to the upper income group and new middle class), “The Ak Parti Folk” (those in the traditional middle class and lower income group) and “The Ak Parti Kurds”. Then, we have created an analysis by looking at the mobility in the size of these three sub-clusters that form the Ak Parti electorate in a time series. The related graph is shown below.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 30 / 94 50 Progress of those who indicated the Ak Parti in direct preferences in three clusters

3 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 17 3 2 20 22 21 20 19 18 17 17 19 17 18 16 17 25 17 16 16 16 18 16 16 15 15

22 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 17 18 17 18 18 17 18 17 17 17 15 14 14 15

0

Ak Parti White Collars Ak Parti folk Ak Parti Kurds

We have already indicated that in the February’18 Barometer findings, the Ak Parti voting rate in the direct preferences has increased by 4 points the 2 points of which come from the Ak Parti White Collar cluster and the other 2 points from the Ak Parti Folk cluster. That is, the Ak Parti has stopped the regression in two of the 3 clusters in its traditional electoral base and has been on the rise again with the effect of this month’s daily dynamics.

On the other hand, it is observed that the loss among the Kurds which constitute the third cluster of the Ak Parti electoral base has become permanent or the increase this month has not been reflected on the Kurds. Especially the Afrin operation which has been the issue with the highest influential capacity this month, did not affect the Kurds, which is quite expectable.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 31 / 94

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 32 / 94 3. DAILY POLITICS

Opinions on the Afrin Operation

In the February’18 Barometer, we have questioned the interviewees’ opinions on the Operation Olive Branch against Afrin which has been generating important consequences and discussions within both the politics and daily life. Seven in every ten voters approve of the Afrin operation.

Do you approve of Turkey's military operation to Syria? Yes I do. No I don't.

Turkey 72 28

Ak Parti 94 6 CHP 49 51 MHP 90 10 HDP 8 92 Iyi Parti 79 21 Other parties 63 38 Swing voters 74 26 Non-voters 60 40

Ak Parti core 96 4 Ak Parti symphatizers 92 8 MHP core 92 8 MHP symphatizers 87 13 Electorate in the gray area 73 27 CHP core 43 57 CHP symphatizers 49 51 HDP core 3 97 HDP symphatizers 8 92

Turks 81 19 Kurds 33 67

Ak Parti-supporting Kurds 84 16 HDP-supporting Kurds 7 93

0% 50% 100%

The rate of those who approve of the operation is 94 percent within the Ak Parti electorate, 90 percent within the MHP electorate and 49 percent within the CHP electorate whereas 94

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 33 / 94

percent of the HDP electorate disapprove of the operation. As for the swing voters and non- voters, half of them are approving.

The Turks approve of the operation at a rate of 81 percent whereas 67 percent of the Kurds disapprove of it. When the Kurds are differentiated in terms of their being the Ak Parti or HDP voters, it is observed that 84 percent of the Ak Parti-supporting Kurds approve of the operation whereas 93 percent of the HDP-supporting Kurds disapprove of it.

What are the Targets in the Afrin Operation?

The opinion as to whom the operation targets was asked as an open-ended question and the answers were subsequently classified.

According to 62 percent of the electorate, the target is the PKK, i.e. terrorists organizations. 13 percent think that foreign powers are the target including, particularly, the U.S. 7 percent think that the Kurds are the target. On the other hand, 6 percent indicate border security as the aim and 2 percent think that there are internal aims involved such as an investment for the elections or display of power.

The electoral bases of the political parties seem to be in consensus about the fact that the operation targets terrorist organizations. The HDP differs from this basic pattern in that 61 percent of the HDP electorate think that the Kurds are targeted.

What is the real target of Turkey's military operation to Syria?

62 13 7 6 3 2 7

0% 50% 100% PYD / PKK / Terrorist groups Foreign powers / USA Kurds Border security Syria / Bashar al-Assad Election investment - Power display Other

Successful Performances of the Ak Parti

Within the framework of this month’s KONDA Barometer, we have also asked the interviewees the question “In which field do you find the performance of the Ak Parti government more successful?” The interviewees were allowed to give multiple answers. The electorate considered that the Ak Parti was the most successful in the fields of health and anti- terrorism and security whereas the Ak Parti was found to be the least successful at agriculture, commerce/finance and anti-corruption.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 34 / 94 In which field do you find the performance of the Ak Parti government more successful? Health 53 Anti-terrorism and security 47 Social aid to those in need 33 Housing 32 Education 25 None 21 Anti-corruption 14 Commerce, money, finance 14 Agriculture / food 13

0 50 100 An analysis based on voting preferences reveals that about 8 in every ten Ak Parti voters find the Ak Parti more successful at health and anti-terrorism. They consider the Ak Parti the least successful at agriculture, commerce/finance and anti-corruption.

Even though the rate of the political party to vote for and the performances found more successful vary, the field which individual political party electorate clusters find “more successful” is health. In other words, even those who do not vote for the Ak Parti rank the Ak Parti’s performance at health on the top, albeit at much lower rates than the Ak Parti electorate.

More than half of the HDP and CHP electorates answered this question as “none”. According to the CHP electorate, the most successful fields are health and anti-terrorism but this makes only about one fourth of the answers.

The answers given by the MHP electorate and the Iyi Parti electorate are similar, but they differ considerably in terms of finding the Ak Parti successful about anti-terrorism. Of couse, another point they differ is the rate of those who answer this question as “none” since only one tenth of the MHP electorate answer this question as “none” while the rate is four tenth among the Iyi Parti electorate.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 35 / 94

Social Anti-ter- Com- Agricul- Educa- Aid to rorism merce, Anti-cor- Housing Health ture/Foo None tion Those in and Se- money, ruption d Need curity finance Ak Parti 46 56 50 77 25 76 28 27 2 CHP 5 10 14 27 3 23 3 5 51 MHP 13 27 28 55 10 54 13 9 10 HDP 9 11 15 20 2 5 1 1 59 Iyi Parti 8 18 23 33 3 15 2 3 42

Other par- 0 17 21 31 10 28 3 0 34 ties Swing vot- 17 27 24 47 5 37 4 6 19 ers Non-vot- 14 18 18 41 5 27 7 5 35 ers

According to the answers to question “If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would the economy be affected?” the data obtained is striking in that those who think that the economy would be negatively affected if somebody other than Erdoğan came into power find the Ak Parti successful at health and anti-terrorism similar to the average in Turkey and find the Ak Parti less successful at agriculture, anti-corruption and commerce/finance.

In which field do you find the performance of the Ak Parti government more successful? 80 72 69

52 51 49 46 42 39 40 28 26 27 26 25 22 19 22 21 14 12 9 7 7 8 6 3 3 5 0

Economy would improve Nothing would change Economy would worsen

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 36 / 94 4. ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY IN DAILY LIFE

Conceptual Framework Asst. Prof. Alper H. Yağcı2

In this report, our aim was to illuminate certain questions related to daily economic policy:

x Is the electorate satisfied with economic progress? x What is the distribution of level of satisfaction with economy among the political party electorates and what is the effect this on voting behavior? x What are the issues prioritized in terms of economic policy? x What is understood by left-wing and right-wing economic positions in Turkey?

Ever since the Ak Parti came into power in 2002, the role of economic policy in the Ak Parti’s political success has been in debate. On the one hand, there is the argument that the Ak Parti has been rewarded by the electorate in the elections because it has managed to create a significant transformation in economy and that the opposition has no chance of replacing the Ak Parti as it is unable to put forward a more convincing alternative in economic vision. On the other hand, there is the criticism that starting from the fact that the average educational level of the Ak Parti electorate is lower than the society in general, the Ak Parti supporters have been unable to evaluate economy in a correct way or do not adequately care about it and instead, base their preference for the Ak Parti on a feeling of affinity with the Ak Parti staff in terms of religiousness, cultural values and lifestyle.

In the academic literature, such debate is know as the “economic voting hypothesis” according to which those who are positively affected by economy and are satisfied with economic progress reward the ruling party in the elections whereas the rest are directed towards other political parties in search for an alternative. When defined in these terms, the question as to whether there has (still) been economic voting behavior in Turkey is a significant question in terms of the management of economy and sustaining a democratic culture of coexistence.

In an environment where the electorate cares about economy and a democratic accountability mechanism is at work, a rational government will try to improve economic indicators such as national economic growth and employment to win the elections. Then, economic voting may (at least in the short term) provide that the governments prefer those economic policies that positively affect a larger group of people. The existence of economic voting behavior is also important for a democratic culture of coexistence, because it means that the inter-party competition is not merely based on a fight between “us” and “them” in an environment of sociocultural polarization similar to the case of supporting football teams. A person who votes for political party A today may as well vote for political party B tomorrow because of a more favorable economic policy and vice versa. The transitivity among political parties will reinforce the desire and habit of coexistence among poeple with different lifestyles and ethnicities. Thus, it is a vital issue as to whether there still exists

2 Department of International Relations, Özyeğin University

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 37 / 94

economic voting behavior in Turkey today since a discourse of social polarization has been on the rise.

Since the beginning of the 2000’s, various academic studies have generally agreed on the finding that so long as factors such as religiousness, sect, ethnicity and educational level are kept constant, those voters who are satisfied with economic progress will tend to vote for (or more precisely, declare that they will vote for) the ruling party at higher rates (for a summary, see Başlevent and Kirmanoğlu 2015). Namely, the likelihood is higher between two people with identical education and religiousness levels that the one with higher satisfaction with economy will vote for the ruling party. The analyses we have conducted based on the findings of the February’18 Barometer survey essentially confirm this outcome. On the other hand, this finding may be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, those voters who develop their perceptions on economy in an objective way make a political party preference based on such perceptions, i.e. the economic voting hypothesis is verified. Another possibility is that a voter who has developed an affinity towards a particular political party due to more complex psycho-social reasons may persuade himself/herself that the economy has been progressing well under the rule of that party. That is, according to the second interpretation, the preference for a political party comes first and the perception on economy comes second (Erdoğan 2013). To our opinion, although this interpretation holds true to a certain extent, it is not realistic to assume that it may fully explain the strong relationship between political party preferences and economic perceptions (which continues to exist independently from religiousness level, etc.). It is most probable that the perception on economy influences the preference for a political party but the mechanism also works the other way round. It is impossible to explain this issue only through survey data, yet we recommend our readers to keep this bilateral causality in mind in order to make an accurate evaluation of the findings of our report.

Some readers may be surprised at the existence of economic voting behavior in Turkey. It is true that there are many citizens in Turkey who are uninterested in economic developments and have extremely limited knowledge on economy with unshaped opinions, but the opinions of this uninterested lot are typically distributed randomly, i.e. neutralize each other, so the behavior of those citizens who are closely interested in economy are determinative in this regard thereby creating the economic voting relation we have observed. There is one exception to this rule: Although unsatisfaction about economy is high among the swing voters, we know from electoral figures that many individuals who declare an undecided status in the survey eventually vote for the Ak Parti. This means that the economic voting mechanism is not as strong as it manifests itself in this survey and in other similar surveys. Yet, a study which examined the entirety of the national elections held in Turkey since the 1950’s in terms of official election results and actualized macroeconomic data found that throughout a given year preceding the elections, the voting rate of the ruling party (or the senior partner of a coalition government) tends to be positively affected by the increase in national income and decrease in inflation (Akarca and Tansel 2006). In this regard, it may be concluded that in any case the perception of the electorate in Turkey on growth and inflation is not really unrealistic. This does not mean that the ruling parties implement an ideal economic policy: If there are no political parties around that can implement a good economic policy, then there will be no good economic

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 38 / 94 policy. However, it is observed that as long as the economic progress is positive, the likelihood for the ruling party to remain in power will increase.

9 Economic voting mechanism is observed in the politics of Turkey in general, however it may change character contextually. For example, according to our findings, the rate of those who are satisfied with economy among those who indicate that they will vote for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election is lower than it is among those who will vote for the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections. This may be interpreted by the fact that the factors which attract the electorate to Erdoğan are more diversified. From another perspective, it may be concluded that certain voters who are not pleased with economy wish to punish the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections based on proportional representation, but they are ready to open a new political credit for Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election taking into consideration that more than 50 percent of the votes are needed for victory. Economic voting behavior may become indistinct based on the political discussions on the agenda. For example, a study that compares the two elections held in 2015 shows that in the election held in June, the most important concern for the electorate was economy whereas in the elections held in November, the issue of terror and security became the top priority failing the relation betwen economy and voting (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). Thus, a political party or a leader with strong skills of influencing the agenda may manipulate the economic voting mechanism to its own benefit: The issue of economy may be kept on the agenda when the economy progresses well but when economic problems emerge, other political matters may be brought into the heart of the agenda.

When evaluating the economy for voting preference, the electorate will not only consider the question as to whether the country is administered well but also, through hypothetical reasoning, consider as to what the other alternatives are. We have obtained findings which show that such reasoning indeed exists. According to the answers to the survey, the majority of the electorate are not satisfied with economc progress, but still the majority believe that if somebody other than Erdoğan comes into power, the economy will worsen. This may mean two different things: First, although the present administration is not satisfactory, the opposition leaders fail to provide hope for an alternative to the electorate. Second, irrespective of the policies promised by any of the leaders about economy, the idea that political instability may emerge in case Erdoğan loses power affects even those voters who are not pleased with current economic performance.

In this regard, it is very clear as to how important independent and free media is in order for economic voting mechanism to work effectively. The media has the power to shape both the role of economy on the agenda and the perception on economic progress as well as the appeal of political leaders to voters. Thus, in this study, we have also analyzed the difference in the economic perceptions of people who prefer different TV channels as the news source. In short, we have found that among those who follow those TV channels that may be identified as the pro-goverment media, the probability of finding official economic data convincing and the level of satisfaction with economy as well as the rate of finding Erdoğan indispensible for economic stability are all higher. The differences are sharper especially among the non-Ak Parti electorate. This is a very important matter: These people most of whom appear to be undecided for the time being, develop a higher possibility of

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 39 / 94

voting for the Ak Parti as they watch certain TV channels. This probability may turn into actual votes on the election day by exceeding a certain decisive threshold. In order to correctly interpret the meaning of this difference created by media outlets, it must be emphasized that although there exists the likelihood that the pro-government media presents a more optimistic look about the economy, it is also probable that the opposing media presents the economy in an overly bad form. Thus, a judgment as to who is right may not be made only through survey data. However, the fact that the viewers of different TV channels are extremely divided about the reliability of official data reveals a very alarming situation about the existence of a healthy social discussion platform. In other words, the economic voting behavior which we have defined above as a mechanism to inhibit social polarization turns into yet another front for polarization in this environment of sharp social and political polarization.

In addition to general satisfaction about economy, we have also handled as to which economic issues are prioritized by the society. In economic theory, when the unemployment / inflation dilemma called the “Phillips curve” is in question, the majority of the electorate clearly prioritize unemployment. Thus, the social reflection of the government’s attempts for inflationist financial policies for the past one year to create growth and employment is observed in our sampling. Namely, the maintenance of the value of Turkish Lira against foreign currency which is very important for financial circles is not a priority for most of the society. Among the answer choices, unemployment is followed by inequality. The priorities of individuals vary in an unsurprising way on the basis of professional groups. Workers and public officers care about inequality, businesspeople care about taxes and foreign currency exchange rates, housewives care about inflation and unemployed people care about unemployment at higher rates. To summarize, the economic voting behavior and expectations from economy of people in Turkey are not really different from the electoral behavior observed across the world.

A sociologically more complex matter is as to what extent the economic ideology preferences overlap with the distinction between right and left. It is recognized in academic literature that the right-left distinction as understood by the public in Turkey reflects a conceptual duality called “center-periphery” by sociologist Şerif Mardin (1973). Accordingly, military and civil bureaucracy as well as intellectuals and those who adopt secularity constitute the center and position themselves at the left of the spectrum whereas the rest of the society making the “periphery” identify with right-wing political parties. The basic axis of conflict between the two groups is not economic but cultural. Namely, rightists and leftists differentiate more sharply in terms of cultural values rather than economic ideologies.

This point has seldom been subject to quantitative research (for an exception, see Çarkoğlu 2007), therefore, in order to dig into this matter, we have asked the interviewees their attitute on economic ideology. The findings point to the existence of two different economic ideology axes. Firstly, when asked about labor rights, inequality and social aid through questions reflecting a kind of “socialism-conservatism” distinction, the tendency of those who position themselves at the left to choose the socialist alternative is as high as or higher than that of the rightists with one exception in that although the CHP voters support labor rights, they object to social aid at a rate higher than the average as might be expected due

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 40 / 94 to their relatively higher income levels. Secondly, the questions that reflect a kind of “statism-liberalism” distinction on globalization and the role of the state in economy, a different situation is observed in that those who position themselves at the right are more statist whereas those on the left are more liberal. It is understood that the majority of the participants in the survey consider these matters within the context of the role of the state in social life in general rather than specifically economy. For example, rightists rather than leftists, women rather than men and those who identify their ethnicity as Kurds rather than Turks agree that the state should not intervene in economy. In other words, those who are more distant from the power of the state prefer the more liberal answer choice.

It is probable that the timing of this survey might have influenced certain answers about economy, since, currently, there has been an escalating tension with the Western countries, the Turkish army is involved in a cross-border military operation and the political polarization has been deepening between the two left-wing parties vs. the two right-wing parties. Therefore, this issue requires longer term and more extensive studies. Still, in the light of the present findings, it may be concluded that there is no simple correlation between the way our participants position themselves in the right-left spectrum and their economic ideology preferences or their classes. On the other hand, there is a strong linear correlation between the right-left positioning and education and religiousness levels. As a result, left- wing ideology is more widespread in higher income groups in Turkey. This shows that the conceptual repertoire developed by authors such as Şerif Mardin and Idris Küçükömer (1967) in the 1960’s are still worthy of serious discussion.

In addition, we have also determined that there is a new axis on environmentalism that consistently differentiates those who consider themselves at the left from those who consider themselves at the right. The leftists tend to object to the construction of a nuclear power plant or sacrificing forests for building highways or dams at much higher rates. Furthermore, the attitudes in these matters differentiate sharply on the basis of political parties. Therefore, it may be concluded that the political split created around the Gezi protests in 2013 triggered by environmentalist sensitivities is still effective.

References Akarca, Ali T., and Aysit Tansel. “Economic performance and political outcomes: An analysis of the Turkish parliamentary and local election results between 1950 and 2004.” Public Choice 129.1-2 (2006): 77-105. Başlevent, Cem and Hasan Kirmanoğlu (2015): Economic Voting in Turkey: Perceptions, Expectations, and the Party Choice, Research and Policy on Turkey, Çarkoğlu, Ali. "The Nature of Left–Right Ideological SelfǦplacement in the Turkish Context." Turkish Studies 8.2 (2007): 253-271. Erdoğan, Emre, 2013. Revising the equation: Partisan bias and economic voting hypothesis in the Turkish context. Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, 28 (325), pp.27-60. Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (2017): Two elections and a political regime in crisis: Turkish politics at the crossroads, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Küçükömer, İdris [1969]. Batılılaşma: Düzenin yabancılaşması. Profil Yayıncılık, 2010. Mardin, Şerif [1973]. "Türk Siyasasını Açıklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Çevre İlişkileri." Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset (2000): 30-66.

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Economic Satisfaction: Overview

The interviewees were asked several questions about their perception on the economic progress and the performance of the government in this matter.

In response to the first question ‘In the past one year, how did the policies of the government affect your family budget?’ the majority of the respondents at a rate of 56 percent said either ‘negatively’ or ‘very negatively’ whereas 30 percent said ‘neither positively nor negatively’ while the answers ‘positively’ and ‘very positively’ remained below 14 percent in total.

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect your family budget? Feb.'18 16 40 30 13 1

Oct.'15 21 37 25 16 1

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

A similar question was posed by replacing ‘family’ with ‘national economy’ in which case the assessment was slightly more positive but still, a majority of 54 percent said either ‘negatively’ or ‘very negatively’. The total rate of those who have optimistic expectations about the future of economy rose up to 21 percent.

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect national economy?

Feb.'18 17 37 25 19 2

Oct.'15 23 40 18 18 2

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

When economic assessment is directed to the future instead of the past, people tend to evaluate it more positively. In response to question ‘How will the policies of the government affect your family budget next year?’ 44 percent gave negative answers whereas 36 percent thought that it will be neither positive nor negative and 19 percent thought that the change will be positive.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 42 / 94 How will the policies of the government affect your family budget next year?

Feb.'18 14 31 36 17 2

Oct.'15 16 26 35 22 2

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

Finally, the question ‘How will the policies of the government affect the national economy next year?’ received the most positive evaluations. The rate of negative answers was 45 percent whereas 25 percent indicated that the national economy will be positively affected by the policies of the government.

How will the policies of the government affect national economy next year?

Feb.'18 15 29 32 20 3

Oct.'15 17 25 32 23 3

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

The same questions had previously been asked in October 2015. The comparison of the answers of October 2015 and February 2018 reveals an interesting picture. x First of all, in both data, expectations from the future are more positive than the assessments of the past. x Again, in both periods, the assessments on national economy are more positive than those about family economy. x However, this differentiation between the family economy and national economy has expanded considerably from 2015 to 2018. The rate of those who are pleased with the government’s performance on economy has considerably decreased from 2015 to 2018 when one’s family is concerned whereas there is no such decrease in terms of the perception on economy in general. In this regard, it may be concluded that the government’s ability to persuade the electorate has improved.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 43 / 94

The rate of those who stated that the policies of the government affected the economy "positively" or "very positively"

24 Turkey/next year 26

19 Family/next year 24

21 Turkey/last year 19

14 Family/last year 18

02550 Feb.'18 Oct.'15

With respect to the distribution of economic satisfaction among income groups, it is observed that the uppermost class in terms of household income per capita is the cluster that is the least satisfied with economic progress with a positive assessment rate of 16 percent. On the other hand, the satisfaction rate gradually increases upwards among the three classes other than the upper class.

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect national economy?

Turkey 17 37 25 19 2

Upper income 21 40 23 15 2

New middle 10 36 26 25 2

Lower middle 17 35 26 20 2

Lower income 18 38 25 16 2

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

When the same question is evaluated in terms of place of residence, it is observed that those who live in metropolises are the most concerned group about the course of economy.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 44 / 94 In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect national economy?

Turkey 17 37 25 19 2

Metropolitan 20 37 24 17 2

Urban 14 38 25 21 2

Rural 9 37 29 22 3

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

Political Party Preferences and Economic Satisfaction

It is recognized in the literature of political science that what affects the voting behavior is the perception on the economic performance of the country rather than the perception pertaining to one’s own/family. When we separated the electorate into the political parties on the basis of the answers to question ‘If there was a general parliamentary election today, which political party would you vote for?’ we came up with the table below about the distribution of economic perceptions.

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect national economy? Turkey 17 37 25 19 2

Ak Parti 4 20 32 39 4 CHP 32 57 9 20 MHP 10 48 24 15 2 HDP 41 41 14 3 1 Iyi Parti 33 54 9 12 Swing voters 15 43 33 9 1 Non-voters 27 38 25 10 0 0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Middle Positively Very positively

x As might be expected, the rate of satisfaction with economy is higher within the Ak Parti electorate (43.5 percent) than the rest. This difference remains to be statistically

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 45 / 94

significant even when factors such as religiousness, sect, ethnicity, income and educational level are kept constant. x The economic assessments of those voters who position themselves at the right of the political spectrum are more positive. The electorates with the most negative assessments are those who say that they would vote for the CHP and HDP. x It is understood that economy is a significant matter that differentiates the MHP from the Iyi Parti which are the two political parties representing the nationalist right. The assessment of the MHP supporters about economy is closer to the average in Turkey whereas it is significantly lower within the Iyi Parti electorate. x Finally, the rate of those who are satisfied with economy is lower than the average among the swing voters and non-voters. A considerable portion of the swing voters may be considered as those voters who are symphatizers of the Ak parti, but have not yet made their minds about it due to their unsatisfaction about economic performance.

In order to analyze this situation about the swing voters, it is useful to compare the electorate who had voted for the Ak Parti in 2015 in terms of their current voting preferences. As seen below, those who indicate that they would vote for other parties despite the fact that they had voted for the Ak Parti in 2015 differ from today’s Ak Parti electorate in terms of not only economic satisfaction but also social factors such as religiousness and educational level. On the other hand, those who had voted for the Ak Parti in 2015 but are currently swing voters socially resemble the Ak Parti electorate rather than the electorates of the other parties, yet are closer to the electorates of the other parties about economic satisfaction. The difference in terms of economic satisfaction between today’s swing voters and the Ak Parti voters is rather large (0.7 points at the range of 4 points from 1 to 5). In other words, many people who would normally be expected to belong to the Ak Parti social base are undecided due to their unsatisfaction about economy.

Ak Parti voters in 2015 Ak Parti again Swing voters Another party Economic satisfaction (1-5) 3.2 2.5 2.3 Religiousness (1-5) 4.0 3.9 3.7 Educational level (1-7) 3.9 4 4.3

To summarize, it is necessary to highlight the fact that the majority of the electorate are not satisfied with economic progress. The average of the answers to question “In the past one year, how did the policies of the government affect the national economy?” is below the midpoint for the entire sample (2.53 in the rage from 1 to 5, placed between ‘negative’ and ‘neither positive nor negative’).

Information, Media and Perception on Economy

The question about foreign currency exchange rates which we have been regularly posing for a while now, was also repeated this month for the aim of following up the progress and also for understanding its correlation with economic ideology and as to whom the interviewees blame for the devaluation of Turkish Lira.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 46 / 94 Firstly, we have observed a significant change in the two months that passed since December last year. Those who linked the fluctuation of the exchange rate of dollar to foreign powers had been on gradual decline since the beginning of last year and finally in December, the rate of those who linked this situation to the failed economic policies of the government had peaked at 38 percent.

What do you think about the recent increase in the exchange rate of dollar? Dec.'16 48 32 19

Feb.'17 51 34 15

March'17 44 32 24

Apr.'17 42 30 28

Dec.'17 36 38 26

Feb.'18 44 40 16

0% 50% 100% This is a plot of foreign powers against Turkey. It is the result of the government’s failed economic policies. The increase in the exchange rate of dollar does not concern my life.

This month, we have observed an increase in both answers: the rate of those who link the situation to foreign powers has increased by 8 points whereas the rate of those who link the situation to government policies has increased by 2 points. Yet, the rate of those who indicated that the increase in the exchange rate of dollar does not concern their lives has decreased by 10 points. To sum up, it may be concluded that the society has reverted back to the stance it had taken at the beginning of last year.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 47 / 94

What do you think about the recent increase in the exchange rate of dollar?

Turkey 44 40 16

Ak Parti 71 11 18

CHP 14 74 12

MHP 49 40 11

HDP 17 79 4

Iyi Parti 19 75 5

Swing voters 35 42 23

Non-voters 27 55 18

0% 50% 100% This is a plot of foreign powers against Turkey. It is the result of the government’s failed economic policies. The increase in the exchange rate of dollar does not concern my life.

An analysis of this month’s findings in terms of political party preferences reveals a profound polarization. 71 percent of the Ak Parti supporters blame foreign powers whereas this rate is below 50 percent even among the MHP supporters. All other groups primarily hold the government responsible.

In addition, we asked the interviewees whether they found the current official statistics on economy convincing or not with the following statement: “I will now read you some official figures about the economic situation. Please tell me whether you find each of them convincing or not”. In the past 7 years, the size of the economy in Turkey has expanded from 100 to 155 with a growth rate of 55%. Turkey 44 56

Ak Parti 76 24 CHP 12 88 MHP 32 68 HDP 8 92 Iyi Parti 14 86 Swing voters 35 65 Non-voters 28 72

0% 50% 100% Convincing Not convincing

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 48 / 94 The average annual inflation rate for 2017 is around 11%.

Turkey 46 54

Ak Parti 65 35

CHP 21 79

MHP 44 56

HDP 33 67

Iyi Parti 24 76

Swing voters 41 59

Non-voters 36 64

0% 50% 100% Convincing Not convincing

Polarization is observed in perceptions on official statistics as well. 75 percent of the Ak Parti supporters believe in the growth figure whereas the rate is only 22 percent among the rest of the electorate. With respect to inflation, the polarization somewhat decreases as 65 percent of the Ak Parti supporters vs. 33 percent of the rest of the electorate find the official inflation figure realistic.

The strong correlation between the perception on economic progress and the political party preferences as well as the extreme difference of perception among the political parties may be partly due to the fact that the electorates of each political party follow different media outlets. It is likely that beyond personal observations, the economic perception of the individuals are shaped by the information outlets at their reach, especially the media. Indeed, the TV channels the interviewees refer to as news sources considerably vary in terms of political parties.

Which TV channel do you prefer for watching the news? (Top three answers of each political party electorate)

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti Swing voters I don’t follow ATV (27%) Fox TV (48%) TRT (14%) Fox (38%) Fox (50%) the news on TV I don’t follow I don’t follow I don’t follow the TRT (19%) the news on Fox TV (13%) the news on news on TV Fox TV (16%) TV (30%) (11%) A haber Kanal D I don’t follow Kanal D (9%) Kanal D (7%) ATV (17%) (10%) the news on TV

It is quite clear that A Haber, ATV and TRT which the Ak Parti electorate prefer at extremely high rates are pro-government media outlets. Thus, it may be illuminating to compare the

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 49 / 94

economic perceptions of those who watch pro-government media and those who don’t on the basis of political parties. For this aim, we asked the interviewees “Is there any political party which you would never, under no circumstances give up voting for? If so, which party?” Those who name a particular party in response to this question are labelled as “partisans” and those who don’t as “rationals”. The table below shows the distribution of partisan and non-partisan voters among the Ak Parti supporters, swing voters and the supporters of other parties and compares economic perceptions of each in terms of the preferred media outlet.

Differences in perception between Rational Partisan Partisan Ak Rational Ak those who watch pro-government media Swing vot- supporters supporters Parti sup- Parti sup- (ATV, A Haber, TRT) for obtaining the ers3 of other of other porters porters news and those who don’t parties parties Increase in the ex- Those who don’t 67.8 59 29.9 19.1 20.3 change rate of dollar Those who do 74.9 74.7 49.5 52.7 46.7 is a plot of foreign powers (%) Difference 7.1 15.7 19.6 33.7 26.4 Those who don’t 76 57 28 20 12.2 Official growth figure Those who do 81 75 59 24 30 is convincing (%) Difference 4 18 31 22 17.8 Those who don’t 64.7 50.3 37.6 33.5 24.9 Official inflation figure Those who do 71 60.7 54.5 34 36.2 is convincing (%) Difference 6.3 10.4 16.9 0.5 11.3 National economy Those who don’t 3.1 2.9 2.3 2 1.9 has improved in the Those who do 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.4 past one year (1-5) Difference 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5

3 A limited number of people who both named a political party which they would under any circumstances vote for and also declared undecided status have been excluded for the purpose of consistency.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 50 / 94

Partisan Ak Parti Supporters Rational Ak Parti Supporters Those who do 75 75 Those who don't 59 (%) 68 plot of rate of foreign powers change

Increase Difference in the ex- 16

dollar is a 7

Those who do 81 75 Those who don't 76 57 g (%) growth Official figure is Difference 18 convincin 4

Those who do 71 61 Those who don't 65 50 g (%) Official figure is inflation Difference 10

convincin 6

Those who do 3 3

5) Those who don't 3 3 has in the year (1-

National 0 past one

economy Difference improved 0 050100 0 50 100 Swing voters Those who do 50 Those who don't

(%) 30 plot of rate of foreign powers change Increase

in the ex- Difference dollar is a 20

Those who do 59 Those who don't 28 g (%) growth Official figure is Difference convincin 31

Those who do 55 Those who don't 38 g (%) Official figure is inflation Difference convincin 17

Those who do 3 Those who don't 2 has in the National past one economy

improved Difference

year (1-5) 1 050100

Rational voters of other parties Partisan voters of other parties Those who do 53 47 Those who don't 19 20 plot of the ex- foreign Difference Increase in

powers (%) powers 34 26 change rate of dollar is a of dollar

Those who do 24 30 Those who don't

(%) 20 12 growth Official figure is

convincing Difference 22 18

Those who do 34 36 Those who don't

(%) 34 25 Official figure is inflation

convincing Difference 1 11

Those who do 3 2 Those who don't 2 2 has (1-5) the past National one year economy Difference 1 1 improved in 050100 050100

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 51 / 94

x As seen above, in all groups analyzed, the groups indicating pro-government media as the news source link the increase in the exchange rate of dollar to the plot of foreign powers and find official statistics convincing at higher rates. Further, these people have higher rates of believing in the idea that the policies of the government have affected national economy positively in the past one year. x The perception difference created by media outlets, as may be expected, is the lowest among “partisan” AK Parti supporters who are ready to support the Ak Parti under any circumstances. The highest difference is observed among the swing voters and the electorates of the other parties who have no emotional reasons to believe that things have been improving. As a striking example, there is a difference of 31 points out of 100 in the rate of believing in the official growth figures between those swing voters who watch pro- government media and those who don’t. x There are two important aspects to consider in order to correctly interpret this data. Firstly, although it may be alleged that the difference of perception in those who watch different media results from the media watched, this issue is open to more detailed analysis. Secondly, even if the media is indeed the reason behind the difference, this does not provide data as to which media is objectively more truthful. It is probable that the pro- government media may present a more optimistic look about the economy, yet it is also probable that the opposing media presents the economy in an overly bad form.

Economic Satisfaction and Presidency

Economic satisfaction analyzed on the basis of political parties above is now compared on the basis of presidential preferences.

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect national economy?

Turkey 17 37 25 19 2

Recep Tay 4 22 32 37 4

Kemal Kıl 34 54 10 20

Meral Akş 34 60 4 11

Selahatti 45 36 15 3 1

Devlet Ba 15 37 30 17 1

Other 43 43 11 4 0

Swing voters 16 49 27 8 0

Non-voters 30 43 21 6 0

0% 50% 100% Very negatively Negatively Neither positively nor negatively Positively Very positively

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 52 / 94 x Among the voters who state that they will vote for Erdoğan in the presidential election, the rate of those who are satisfied with economy (41 percent) is lower than the rate prevailing among those who will vote for the Ak Parti (43 percent). Thus, it may be interpreted that voting for the Ak Parti is mostly based on economic factors whereas the factors that attract the electorate to Erdoğan are more diverse. x In an alternative point of view, based on the fact that Erdoğan’s individual voting rate is higher than the voting rate of the Ak Parti, it may be assumed that certain voters who are not pleased with economy wish to punish the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections based on proportional representation, but they are ready to open a new political credit for Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election taking into consideration that more than 50 percent of the votes are needed for victory.

While making voting decisions, in addition to question ‘are we administered well?’ the electorate will also consider question ‘what are the other options?’ in other words ‘if someone else came into power, would he/she administer better?’ In order to understand the tendencies in this regard, in consideration of the significance of presidential position in the new system, we asked the interviewees ‘If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would the economy be affected?’ in response to which 43 percent chose ‘The economy would worsen’ among the three answer choices provided.

If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would the economy be affected?

25 33 43

0% 50% 100%

The economy would improve Nothing would change The economy would worsen

In the first section above, we have indicated that the perception on the government’s performance on economy is negative for the majority of the electorate. Now, on the other hand, the perception on the significance of the Tayyip Erdoğan rule for national economy is above the midpoint (2.18 within the range from 1 to 3), i.e. more positive. This difference may be interpreted in multiple ways: x A considerable part of the electorate may not be holding President Erdoğan responsible for the economic performance of the government led by Binali Yıldırım as the Prime Minister. x The electorate may be holding Tayyip Erdoğan responsible for the negative economic performance but may not be hopeful about the alternative opposition leaders. x Irrespective of the policies promised by any of the leaders about economy, the idea that the political instability that may emerge in case Erdoğan loses power may affect even those voters who are not pleased with current economic performance.

When the perception on the significance of Erdoğan for economy is analyzed on the basis of the political party preference, the following table is obtained.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 53 / 94

If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would the economy be affected?

Turkey 25 33 43

Ak Parti 6 19 76

CHP 60 29 11

MHP 25 42 32

HDP 58 32 10

Iyi Parti 53 39 9

Swing voters 17 52 31

Non-voters 21 53 27

0% 50% 100%

The economy would improve Nothing would change The economy would worsen

x In response to question ‘If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would the economy be affected?’ 75 percent of the Ak Parti electorate answered that it would worsen. This rate increases up to 80 percent in partisan Ak Parti supporters who indicate the Ak Parti as the party which they will never, under no circumstances give up voting for. x Among the electorates of the other political parties, the MHP electorate is the only group that prefers the answer “the economy would worsen” (32 percent) at higher rates than the answer choice “the economy would improve” (25 percent). x At this point, the significant differentiation between the MHP and the Iyi Parti comes up again. Only 9 percent of the Iyi Parti supporters believe that the economy would worsen if Erdoğan lost power which is even lower than the rates observed within the CHP and HDP electorates.

Then, who are more inclined to consider Erdoğan important for economic stability? Since the Erdoğan factor is very strong among the Ak Parti supporters, it is necessary to make an internal comparison within the Ak Parti electorate. Comprehensive statistical analyses extending beyond the tables presented here were conducted according to which the following was found: x The most important characteristics that differentiate the group within the Ak Parti electorate which considers that economic stability depends upon the Erdoğan rule from the rest of the Ak Parti electorate are that they position themselves in further right in the political spectrum, they follow the pro-government media as the news source and are more satisfied with the economic performance of the past one year. x There are no significant differences between this cluster and the rest of the Ak Parti electorate in terms of religiousness, educational level or income level.

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On the other hand, when we analyzed the minority within the group that does not believe in Erdoğan’s significance for economic stability that is loyal to the Ak Parti in a partisan way, interesting findings came up. x Within this group, there is higher probability for more religious people and those who follow the pro-government media as the news source to indicate that they would vote for the Ak Parti under any circumstances. Namely, these people hold on to the Ak Parti as the defender of pious values. x At the same time, the probability also increases among those who are more hopeful about future economic performance. Namely, these people already believe that the economy will improve irrespective of Erdoğan’s position. x Finally, it is a very interesting finding that not a single Alevi citizen has been encountered within this part of the sampling. In other words, it is almost obligatory for an Alevi to vote for the Ak Parti in a partisan way (“under any circumstances”) that he/she considers economic stability to be dependent upon Erdoğan’s rule.

In more general terms, the rate of those who do not identify themselves as Sunni Muslims in terms of religion/sect to vote for the Ak Parti is around 9 percent whereas this rate climbs up to 19 percent among those who consider economic stability dependent upon Erdoğan’s rule. All this data highlights the importance of the Erdoğan factor in the electoral perception.

Priorities in Economic Policy

The findings we have handled above show that the electorate incline towards the Ak Parti and R. T. Erdoğan to the extent they are satisfied with economy. On the other hand, it is also necessary to analyze as to what is understood by a healthy economy. In this regard, we have posed the question ‘What should be the top 2 priorities of the national economy?’ Among the five answer choices provided, reducing unemployment topped the list by far. Among those who answered this question, 53 percent chose unemployment as the most important problem and 20 percent chose it as the second most important problem making a total of 73 percent.

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What do you think should the 2 most important priorities be in national economy? 73 Reducing unemployment 20 53

Reducing inequality in income 40 20 distribution 20

Preventing price increases 38 23 (inflation) 15

38 Tax cuts 24 First or second 14 priority Second Priority Maintaining the value of Turkish 22 12 Lira against dollar 9

04080

Unemployment is followed by inequality, inflation and tax cut, respectively. Only 22 percent considered the maintenance of the value of Turkish Lira against dollar among the priorities. Therefore, this answer choice remained rather behind.

x In view of this data, it must be noted that in economic theory, when the unemployment / inflation dilemma called the “Phillips curve” is in question, the majority of the electorate clearly prioritize unemployment. Thus, the social reflection of the government’s attempts for inflationist financial policies for the past one year to create growth and employment is observed in our sampling. x Likewise, the government’s distance towards the call for interest rate hikes may be explained by a desire to feed employment through an expansionary monetary policy at the cost of an increase in foreign exchange currency rates in an environment where the devaluation of Turkish lira is not a concern for the electorate.

An analysis of the answers to this question on the basis of the political parties reveals the following situation.

Economic problem prioritized (as the first or second) by each political party electorate

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 56 / 94 Reducing unemployment Reducing inequality in income distribution Turkey 73 Turkey 40

Ak Parti 72 Ak Parti 34

CHP 72 CHP 44

MHP 66 MHP 42

HDP 82 HDP 45

Iyi Parti 69 Iyi Parti 42

Swing voters 76 Swing voters 40

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100% Preventing inflation Tax cuts Turkey 38 Turkey 38

Ak Parti 43 Ak Parti 39 CHP 36 CHP 40 MHP 30 MHP 38 HDP 39 HDP 26 Iyi Parti 38 Iyi Parti 31 Swing voters 33 Swing voters 43

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%

Maintaining the value of Turkish Lira against dollar Turkey 22

Ak Parti 24

CHP 16

MHP 29

HDP 15

Iyi Parti 22

Swing voters 24

0% 50% 100%

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x The highest rate of prioritizing unemployment is observed within the HDP electorate, inequality within the CHP electorate and inflation within the Ak Parti electorate. x The MHP electorate cares about the maintenance of the value of Turkish Lira against foreign currency at the highest rate whereas the HDP electorate cares about this issue at the lowest rate. It is understood that this matter is considered as a sort of national power indicator and hence assessed in parallel to nationalistic views. On the other hand, the Iyi Parti electorate do not care about the exchange rate of dollar more than the general average. x It is another interesting finding that the HDP supporters prioritize taxes at the lowest rate.

An analysis of the same question in terms of the type of residential area brings about significant differences.

Economic problem prioritized (as the first or second) in terms of residential areas

Reducing unemployment Reducing inequality in income distribution Turkey 73 Turkey 40

Rural 76 Rural 33

Urban 80 Urban 34

Metropolitan 66 Metropolitan 45

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%

Preventing inflation Tax cuts

Turkey 38 Turkey 38

Rural 42 Rural 41

Urban 36 Urban 40

Metropolitan 38 Metropolitan 36

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%

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Turkey 22

Rural 23

Urban 18

Metropolitan 24

0% 50% 100%

x Unemployment is considered an issue mostly in small towns outside of metropolises. Such prioritization is understandable for small towns which are subject to emigration to metropolises given that metropolises are the flagship in employment while rural areas are stable in terms of employment. x In metropolises where affluence and poverty exist side by side, inequality is prioritized at much higher rates than it is in rural areas. x It is an interesting finding that taxing is prioritized in rural areas at the highest rate and in metropolises at the lowest rate. When this issue is analyzed on the basis of professional groups, it is observed that farmers in rural areas lift up the average. It is possible that this answer has been shaped by taxing on energy and transport prices that affect the profitability of farming. Merchants/businessmen and private sector employees are also concerned about taxes at rates above average. x The distribution of other economic priorities among professional groups shows that inequality is prioritized by public officers and workers the most, inflation by merchants/businessmen and housewives the most, foreign currency exchange rates by merchants/businessmen, small retailers and students the most and unemployment by unemployed people and housewives the most. x Another interesting finding in this matter is that when voting preferences, profession and other demographic characteristics are kept constant, those who follow the pro-government media care about inequality less. According to the same analysis, as the income per capita in the household decreases, the likelihood of unemployment and inequality to be mentioned among the priorities increases. Those who are ideologically closer to the left care about unemployment more than anyone else.

In more general terms, the subject of economic priorities can be considered as the priority the economic policy has in terms of the administration of the country. In this regard, we asked the interviewees ‘Which of the following is more important for Turkey?’ with answer choices of ‘economic development,’ ‘powerful state’ and ‘a society that values humans’. As shown above, the third choice was preferred the most at a rate of 42 percent.

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Which of the following is more important for Turkey?

Turkey 25 33 42

Ak Parti 24 45 30

CHP 30 15 55

MHP 19 47 34

HDP 22 15 63

Iyi Parti 33 28 39

Other parties 26 22 52

Swing voters 22 30 48

Non-voters 29 18 53

0% 50% 100%

Economic development Powerful state A society that values humans

x The Ak Parti supporters have become the electorate that chooses the most popular alternative ‘a society that values humans’ at the lowest rate. Basically, it may be considered that the individuals care about this answer choice to the extent they feel distant from the government. Unlike the overall society, the Ak Parti supporters prioritize a powerful state. x The MHP electorate also choose answers similar to the Ak Parti electorate. Yet, it is again observed that the most important issue that distinguishes the MHP electorate from the Iyi Parti electorate is economy in that the MHP has become the group that chose the alternative ‘economic development’ at the lowest rate whereas the Iyi Parti electorate has become the group that chose this alternative at the highest rate.

We have also conducted detailed statistical analyses about the answer choices the demographic groups preferred the most by keeping political party preferences constant. Accordingly:

x The groups that chose the answer ‘a society that values humans’ at higher rates make a list of those who think that they do not receive the respect they deserve in the society. The Alevis, women, Kurds, young people and the leftists have the most distinct desire for ‘a society that values humans’. x The answer choice of powerful state is at its most common among religious people, rightists, men and public officers. x Economic development is a priority for Sunni Muslims and men. The state of being a public officer reduces the probability of caring about economic development. This probability is at its highest among those who indicate their profession as ‘self-employed’ or ‘private sector’ and unemployed people.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 60 / 94 Economic Preferences and Leftist-Rightist Ideologies

We asked the interviewees ‘Regarding political matters, where would you position yourself in the left-right political spectrum? (1 farthest left, 10 farthest right)’. The average answer value was 6, i.e. slightly on the right of the center point (5,5). When the answers are divided according to the political party which the individuals consider to vote for, the following graph is obtained.

Regarding political matters, where would you position yourself in the left-right political spectrum?

Ak Parti 7,5 MHP 7,1 Iyi Parti 6,1 Turkey 6,0 Swing voters 5,9 Other 5,6 Non-voters 5,0 HDP 3,8 CHP 3,4

12345678910 << Left Right >>

On the other hand, in Turkey, governments established by right-wing parties are predominantly preferred but the fact that the most popular answer is 5 makes us think that the interviewees might have assumed that 5 was the midpoint between 1 and 10. If so, the majority of the public is actually positioned at further right than the table above shows. Still, the answers provided reveal the comparative positioning of the political parties in the eye of the electorate which may be visualized as follows in terms of the ideological distance of the parties from each other. Swing Non voters voters

LEFT RIGHT

Other Turkey parties We asked several questions on economic ideology in order to understand how the concepts of left and right are understood by the public.

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The classic left as it emerged in Europe is known as a political stance that defends laborers in the conflict of labor vs. capital. In order to handle this conflict, we gave the interviewees the statement ‘It is the employers’ right to discharge striking workers’. 73 percent of the answers were negative covering the answer choices of “I absolutely disagree” or “I disagree.” Only 13 percent reacted positively to this statement and the rate of positive answers is higher among the Ak Parti electorate and swing voters.

It is the employers’ right to discharge striking workers.

Turkey 35 38 14 10 3

Ak Parti 29 37 17 13 4

CHP 50 39 4 6 2

MHP 33 40 17 8 2

HDP 45 21 12 15 8

Iyi Parti 34 39 16 9 1

Swing voters 30 45 15 8 14

0% 50% 100% I absolutely disagree I disagree I neither agree nor disagree I agree I absolutely agree

x As might be expected, it is a higher probability among those who position themselves at the left of the abovementioned left-right spectrum (1-10) to object to this statement. x This relationship is created by the fact that especially the Ak Parti electorate is pro- employer above average whereas the CHP electorate is pro-laborer above average. However, the same situation is not valid for the other left-wing party HDP. Religious HDP voters support this view above average while the others vehemently object to it, i.e. the HDP electorate is internally polarized in this matter. x Religiousness and being a Sunni increases the likelihood of being pro-employer. x In the answers to this question, the income or education levels of the individuals do not create a significant difference. However, when the households of the interviewees are divided into three classes as 1) ‘capitalists’ who live on profits, interests or rent, 2) ‘fixed income holders’ who live on wages or pension, 3) ‘the poor’ who have no regular income as of last month and live on aid and loans, we observe that capitalists are more inclined to take the side of the employer. This differentiation is shown below.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 62 / 94 It is the employers’ right to discharge striking workers.

Turkey 2,1

The poor living on aid 2,1

Fixed income holder 2,1

Capitalist 2,4

135 <-- I absolutely agree I absolutely agree->

Another matter that may reflect the right-left separation economically may be the social aid the state provides to the poor. This matter was handled within the framework of the question below the results of which show that almost three fourth of the respondents support social aid.

Which of the following two statements do you agree with the most?

Turkey 26 74

Ak Parti 25 75 CHP 28 72 MHP 35 66 HDP 12 88 Iyi Parti & Others 31 69 Swing voters & Non-… 26 74

0% 50% 100% Social aid provided by the state causes people to develop laziness, so it is harmful for economy.

The state should provide support for people in need so that no one lives in poverty.

x The most striking finding of the table above is that the HDP electorate is more in favor of social aid than all the other groups. The MHP and Iyi Parti electorates object to the state’s providing social aid to the poor at the highest rates. It may be assumed that the attitude in this regard is shaped by the perception that social aid mostly go to the Kurds. x Indeed, according to the findings of the survey, among the people with identical education and income levels, it is a higher probability for those who identify their ethnicity as Kurdish or Zaza to have received social aid from the state last month in order to make a living. x According to our detailed statistical analysis, as the individuals’ income and education levels rise, the opinion that social aid will harm economy increases. This answer is

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significantly lower among women, young people and those who had to receive social aid from the state last month in order to make a living. x Another finding in this matter is that the rate of those who object to social aid is higher among the “left-wing” CHP electorate compared to the “right-wing” Ak Parti electorate. However, this difference loses statistical significance when factors such as income and education level are taken into consideration. Namely, the CHP electorate is against social aid at an extent expected from relatively higher income levels. x As might be expected, “the poor” who live on aid come up as the group who support social aid at the highest rate.

Inequality and taxes are other dimensions to the left-right separation. In this regard, we asked the interviewees the statement ‘In order to reduce inequality, the state should impose high taxes on high-income earners.’ Only 11 percent of the respondents are against taxes that would be imposed for the aim of overcoming inequality.

In order to reduce inequality, the state should impose high taxes on high-income earners . Turkey 3 8 12 44 33

Ak Parti 3 8 13 46 30 CHP 2 8 10 41 38 MHP 3 9 6 44 38 HDP 6 5 9 38 42 Iyi Parti 1 6 8 47 37 Swing voters 3 9 14 46 28

Non-voters 3 7 20 38 31

0% 50% 100% I absolutely disagree I disagree I neither agree nor disagree I agree I absolutely agree

x On the condition that demographic factors other than political party preference are controlled, the rate of supporting this view is the highest among the Iyi Parti, HDP and CHP electorates. Those who are against taxing high-income earners at the highest rate are the Ak Parti electorate and the swing voters. x The most striking finding revealed by the analyses in this regard is that among the Alevis, support for this matter is significantly higher. Namely, a CHP supporter who identifies his/her sect as Alevi has a higher possibility to favor taxing the affluent more than a Sunni CHP voter with similar education, income level, etc. does.

To sum up, it may be concluded that the electorates of the CHP and HPD which are perceived as left-wing parties take the expected “leftist” position or at least remain at the center. The difference between them is that the CHP electorate is more supportive of labor rights whereas the HDP electorate is more interested in inequality and poverty.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 64 / 94 The three questions analyzed above have revealed the left-right separation in the axis of economic conservatism / socialism. Yet, questions on globalization and the role of the state in economy bring about a quite different situation.

Firstly, only a minority of the society at one third support the fact that the state should not intervene in economy. The clusters that support state intervention in economy at the highest rates are the Ak Parti and MHP electorates whereas the HDP electorate is against it at the highest rate.

The state and the government should not intervene in the economy.

Turkey 20 41 20 13 6

Ak Parti 25 44 15 12 5 CHP 20 37 20 17 7 MHP 19 47 19 9 6 HDP 13 30 25 18 13 Iyi Parti 19 42 19 15 6 Swing voters 16 43 26 11 3

Non-voters 17 30 28 17 7

0% 50% 100% I absolutely disagree I disagree I neither agree nor disagree I agree I absolutely agree

x It is understood that the majority of the interviewees have considered this question in terms of the role of the state in overall social life rather than the operation of the free market. Rightists rather than leftists, women rather than men and those who identify their ethnicity as Kurdish or Zaza rather than Turkish agree that the state and the government should not intervene in the economy. As might be recalled, in response to question ‘What should the priority for Turkey be’ these groups had the highest probability to choose the answer choice ‘a society that values humans’ instead of ‘economic development’ and ‘a powerful state.’ x It is an interesting finding that as the interviewees’ education and income level increase, they become more inclined to support the state’s intervention in economy.

The following question handled the perception on free trade which has recently returned to the agenda due to the upgrading of the Customs Union agreement. Only one third of the society support that imports should be free so that prices do not rise whereas the remaining majority favor the protection of domestic goods. The HDP electorate favor free import the most whereas the most opposing electorates are those of the Ak Parti and Iyi Parti.

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Which of the following two statements do you agree with the most?

Turkey 30 70

Ak Parti 27 73 CHP 31 69 MHP 25 75 HDP 48 52 Iyi Parti 21 79 Swing voters 35 65 Non-voters 35 65

% 0 % 50 % 100 Entry of foreign products into Turkey should be free so that prices do not rise.

The state should restrict the entry of foreign products into Turkey in order to protect domestic products.

x Kurds and those who receive social aid from the state prioritize that the prices do not increase whereas more religious people favor the restriction of imports with the concern of protecting domestic products. x Provided that these variables are kept constant, there is no correlation between income or education level and the answers to this question.

It is understood that these two questions about the role of the state in economy and imports have revealed a different separation than that shown through the attitude on labor rights, inequality and poverty which may be summarized as statism vs. liberalism according to which those who consider themselves at the right favor statism. Which of the following two statements do you agree with the most?

Turkey 47 53

Ak Parti 45 55

CHP 42 58

MHP 42 58

HDP 59 41

Iyi Parti 35 65

Swing voters 52 48

Non-voters 55 45

0% 50% 100% Foreign investment is beneficial for creating employment. Foreign capital exploits our country.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 66 / 94 We also asked questions about foreign capital. Objection in this regard is at the rate of 53 percent. The fact that the objection against imports is not at the same level with foreign capital is consistent with the fact that unemployment is prioritized more than inflation as handled above.

x The Iyi Parti electorate objects to foreign capital at the highest rate whereas the HDP electorate favors it at the highest rate. x The swing voters and non-voters regard foreign capital more positively than the average. In view of the position of these groups, it is revealed that as the position of an individual gets closer to the right, the probability of being against foreign capital decreases. x The Alevis are observed to be a group that is against foreign capital at significant rates.

It is probable that the timing of this survey might have influenced certain answers about this issue, since, currently, there has been an escalating tension with the Western countries and the Turkish army is involved in a cross-border military operation. For example, the timing might have caused an increase in objection against foreign capital among the Ak Parti and MHP electorates. Thus, in the overall sampling, the rightists are more in favor of foreign capital wheras the Ak Parti and MHP supporters are against it at rates above the average.

Economic Development and Environment

We asked two questions about the relationship between economic development and environment. Firstly, the sampling in general is against sacrificing forests for building highways or dams.

Forests may partly be sacrificed if necessary for building highways or dams.

Turkey 37 28 15 16 4

Ak Parti 25 29 17 23 7

CHP 58 24 8 9 1

MHP 32 35 15 15 3

HDP 59 13 12 12 5

Iyi Parti 46 29 18 8 0

Swing voters 34 35 17 12 2

Non-voters 41 25 16 13 4

0% 50% 100%

I absolutely agree I agree I neither agree nor disagree I disagree I absolutely disagree

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x In this regard, there is a distinct polarization between the Ak Parti electorate and the rest of the society in that the only electoral group that answered this question positively at rates above average (2.23 within the range of 1 to 5) is the Ak Parti electorate (2.58). The extreme group in the other pole is the CHP electorate (1.73). x Demographic characteristics beyond political preferences show that the group that is against sacrificing forests for building highways or dams at the highest rate are women living in cities and metropolises having a modern lifestyle who are secular, work on wage and position themselves at the left of the political spectrum.

We asked the interviewees whether they were against the construction of a nuclear power plant: “It is well known that nuclear power technology entails environmental risks. Yet, a nuclear power plant to be developed and built (by a TURKISH company) will enable reduced energy costs for Turkey. Should the establishment of such a power plant be allowed?” In a method different from the rest of the survey, two different versions of this question were used on random halves of the interviewees, the only difference between the two versions being the use of “a Turkish company” or “a foreign company.” Special care was exercised to divide the group randomly. The difference between the two groups reveals that the reactions are different towards domestic and foreign companies. 58 percent of those who thought that a Turkish company would build the power plant opposed to this idea whereas among those who presumed that a foreign company would build the power plant, 65 percent objected to the idea. This finding may be interpreted in a way that an investment that entails environmental risks increase the society’s perception of risk if it is to be made by foreign capital rather than the domestic one.

The rate of those who approve of permission for constructing a nuclear power plant

39 Turkey 35 42

53 Ak Parti voters 49 58

30 All other voters 27 32

0 50 100 Average Foreign company Turkish company

x According to our statistical analysis, in both cases, the group that is against nuclear energy the most are the left-wing women living in metropolises. x When the company is foreign, political party preferences do not cause a significant difference in the objection against nuclear energy. On the other hand, when the company is Turkish, the tolerance of the Ak Parti supporters to nuclear energy increases more than anyone else.

KONDA FEBRUARY’18 BAROMETER SAMPLE REPORT 68 / 94 As we conclude this chapter, it will be useful to list some of the questions we have handled throughout the report on the basis of the lifestyle one suits to himself/herself. What we mean by lifestyle is the answers received to question ‘Which of the following three groups do you think you belong to in terms of lifestyle?’ with the answer choices of ‘Modern’, ‘Traditional Conservative’ and ‘Religious Conservative.’ As the question is posed without defining these concepts, the interviewees make their choices according to the way they understand these concepts. On the other hand, we observe that the answers are consistent in that they actually reflect an existing separation in the society. Modern lifestyle differs from the conservative ones in terms of high educational level whereas the conservatives are fundamentally separated into two as traditional and religious conservatives in terms of religiousness level. The three groups formed in this way correspond to three positions in the left-right political spectrum: Modern people are on the left, Religious Conservatives are on the right and Traditional Conservatives are relatively at the center.

Membership to these three groups entails a surprisingly high correlation with the attitudes on various ideological issues: Conservative lifestyle brings about an increase in supporting domestic goods vs. imported ones, the state’s intervention in economy and sacrificing forests for building highways whereas modern people are against social aid higher than the average but are more in favor of labor rights. Modern people watch Fox TV as the news source, are concerned about economic progress and prefer the CHP as the first political party. Religious Conservatives watch ATV, express satisfaction with economic progress and indicate that they will vote for the Ak Parti at extremely high rates. Traditional Coservatives answer all these matters in the middle of the other two groups. In short, people’s lifestyle choices which are essentially shaped on the basis of people’s education level and relationship with religion have the ability to highly estimate the right-left separation in Turkey as well as opinions in many other issues.

Traditional Religious Con- Modern Conservative servative Education level (1-7) 4.98 4.16 3.53 Religiousness (1-5) 3.26 3.82 4.18 Left-right (1-10) 4.69 6.06 7.29 Laborer vs. employer (1-5) 1.89 2.12 2.28 Effort vs. social aid (0-1) 29% 27% 21% State vs. private (1-5) 2.56 2.42 2.34 Imported vs. domestic goods 66% 70% 72% Forests vs. highways and dams (1-5) 1.81 2.27 2.56 Will vote for the Ak Parti 13% 40% 62% Will vote for the CHP 35% 13% 3% Fox TV viewing rate 34% 20% 12% ATV viewing rate 6% 15% 22% National economy well in the past 2.1 2.57 2.88 one year (1-5)

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Conclusion x According to the answers to the survey, the majority of the electorate are not satisfied with economic progress, but still the majority believe that if somebody other than Erdoğan comes into power, the economy will worsen. This may mean two different things: First, although the present administration is not satisfactory, the opposition leaders fail to provide hope for an alternative to the electorate. Second, irrespective of the policies promised by any of the leaders about economy, the idea that political instability may emerge in case Erdoğan loses power affects even those voters who are not pleased with current economic performance.

x The rate of those who are satisfied with economy among those who indicate that they will vote for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election is lower than it is among those who will vote for the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections. This may be interpreted by the fact that the factors which attract the electorate to Erdoğan are more diversified. From another perspective, it may be concluded that certain voters who are not pleased with economy wish to punish the Ak Parti in the parliamentary elections based on proportional representation, but they are ready to open a new political credit for Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential election taking into consideration that more than 50 percent of the votes are needed for victory.

x National economy is more positively assessed than family economy. Future economic expectations are more positive than the reflections on the past. However, this differentiation between family economy and national economy has grown quite a lot from 2015 to 2018. Within this period, the rate of those who are satisfied with the government’s performance on economy has significantly decreased when one’s own family is in question whereas there is no such decrease in terms of the perception on the economy in general. In this regard, it may be interpreted that the government’s ability to persuade the electorate has improved.

x Those who had voted for the Ak Parti in 2015 but are currently swing voters demographically resemble the Ak Parti electorate rather than the electorates of the other parties, yet are closer to the electorates of the other parties about economic satisfaction. In other words, many people who would normally be expected to belong to the Ak Parti social base are undecided due to their unsatisfaction about economy.

x Among those who follow those TV channels that may be identified as the pro-goverment media, the probability of finding official economic data convincing and the level of satisfaction with economy as well as the rate of finding Erdoğan indispensible for economic stability are all higher. The differences are sharper especially among the non-Ak Parti electorate. This is a very important matter: These people most of whom appear to be undecided for the time being, develop a higher possibility of voting for the Ak Parti as they watch certain TV channels. This probability may turn into actual votes on the election day by exceeding a certain decisive threshold.

x It is understood that economy is a significant matter that differentiates the MHP from the Iyi Parti which are the two political parties representing the nationalist right. The assessment of the MHP supporters about economy is closer to the average in Turkey whereas it is significantly lower within the Iyi Parti electorate. The MHP electorate has the lowest rate of preferring the answer choice ‘economic development’ (the first choice of the MHP electorate

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is ‘powerful state’) in answer to question ‘Which of the following is more important for Turkey?’ whereas the highest rate for this answer choice in the overall sampling is observed among the Iyi Parti electorate.

x In economic theory, when the unemployment / inflation dilemma is in question, the majority of the electorate clearly prioritize unemployment. Thus, the social reflection of the government’s attempts for inflationist financial policies for the past one year to create growth and employment is observed in our sampling. Namely, the maintenance of the value of Turkish Lira against foreign currency which is very important for financial circles is not a priority for most of the society.

x We have attempted to understand people’s economic ideology preferences through questions on labor rights, inequality, social aid, the role of the state in economy, imports and foreign capital. There is no simple correlation between the way our participants position themselves in the right-left spectrum and their economic ideology preferences or their classes. On the other hand, there is a strong linear correlation between the right-left positioning and education and religiousness levels. As a result, left-wing ideology is more widespread in higher income groups in Turkey. We have also determined that there is a new axis on environmentalism that consistently differentiates those who consider themselves at the left from those who consider themselves at the right.

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It is difficult to change how people think “without manipulation”!

In fact, when we look at dual correlations, it seems that there is a strong relationship between the TV channels watched and people’s political preferences. While pro-government groups watch certain TV channels, opponents to the government watch others.

However, we know that all these people also access the news through digital means and make assessments and verifications accordingly. Obviously, they use the “one of us-not one of us” filter also in the digital world but at least they encounter other opinions in their newsfeeds or comments.

It is true that many communication studies have proven that people prefer those TV channels or the media or even the tweets that support their views. Yet, it is also true that it is difficult to change “hhow” people think. You can’t turn a rightist into a leftist and vice versa. Besides, as shown in the KONDA results, the majority avoids to be persuaded.

Currently, in the media system of Turkey, the parties have been constantly feeding a polarized system in which the sides do not understand nor listen to each other as they have been influenced as to “what” they think through agenda setting. However, such a partisan media understanding may make its own electorate happy but cannot influence the swing voters, because they would not rely on a media that “partisanly defends certain causes”.

On the other hand, if people do not need to understand and listen to each other and if people follow the media only “tto be informed of dangers”, then how could we blame the media! In this case, we must refer to how people are raised, namely to the family as the primary source.

For changing “how” people think, it is necessary to design the news as a “means of persuasion”. This is indeed called propaganda or manipulation. The general population in Turkey has failed to get united over a common “existence” narrative for 80 years, therefore it has become standard journalism to “mmanipulate different narratives in a way to defame the narrative and characters of the other”. The solution for all these lies in universal-level journalism and media ownership.

In order to achieve this, we should not wait until the country reaches a universal level of law and democracy, because, currently, countries are ruled by four different types of agenda: the agenda of the government, the agenda of the parliament, the agenda of the opposition and the agenda of traditional media and social media (Twitter). The multiplier effect of the agenda of the media is quite high in the formation of public opinion. In an environment where the electorate can have access to the ideas of all sides in a transparent, unbiased and manipulation-free way, the public may be able to make its final decision through multi-sided thinking.

A final remark: The latest communication studies have proven that the pluralist media does not serve democracy by polarizing people.

Prof. Dr. Ali Atıf Bir

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5. BAROMETER OF THE AGENDA

1 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- launched from Afrin to Turkey in 12 ces declared that 811 terrorists have days killing 5 people. been neutralized so far in the Afrin operation. 3 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 899 terrorists have 1 February 2018: In a precedent deci- been neutralized so far in the Afrin sion, the Constitutional Court ruled operation. that sharing opinions on social media is a precedent. The decision was pub- 3 February 2018: President Recep Tayyip lished in the official gazette. Erdoğan said, “The Free Syrian Army have the Turkish flag and the PYD have 1 February 2018: Pentagon declared the U.S. flag on their arms.” that the weapons sent to the YPG shall be taken back once the fight against 3 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ISIS is over. ces announced that an attack that tar- geted a Turkish tank killed 5 soldiers 1 February 2018: Foreign Ministry of the in the Afrin operation. Republic of Turkey notified the UN that it shall not accept the participation of 3 February 2018: In Istanbul, operations the PYD in the Syria Peace Talks to be were conducted against ISIS as a part held in Geneva. of which 82 people including 77 fore- igners were detained. 1 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 2 soldiers died and 4 February 2018: Prime Minister Binali 2 were injured in North Iraq. Yıldırım declared that so far 94 rockets have been launched and 7 civilians 1 February 2018: Two soldiers died in died in the attacks to Hatay and Kilis the attack against the base center at at the Syrian border. Şemdinli, Hakkari. 4 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- 2 February 2018: Foreign Minister Mev- ces declared that 936 terrorists have lüt Çavuşoğlu said in an interview in been neutralized so far in the Afrin Canada, “We observe that some circ- operation. les are concerned about our relations with Russia. These concerns are unfo- 4 February 2018: Deputy Prime Minister unded.” Fikri Işık said, “If we hadn’t been sern- sitive about the civilians, the Afrin ope- 2 February 2018: The Ankara Governor’s ration would have progressed more Office declared that a bomb set-up swiftly.” was found in the blast occurred at the Ankara Tax Office Directorate. 4 February 2018: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke with Italian press be- 2 February 2018: Prime Minister Binali fore his visit to Vatican and said that Yıldırım declared that 82 rockets were

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thanks to the Afrin operation, Turkey will contribute to the integrity of Syria. 7 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 2 soldiers died in the 4 February 2018: Government Spokes- Afrin operation. person Bekir Bozdağ said, “Everyone with a YPG uniform even those of US- 7 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- origin are our targets.” ces declared that 999 terrorists have been neutralized so far in the Afrin 5 February 2018: After the CHP General operation. Assembly, Muharrem Ince stated that the delegates were deceived through 8 February 2018: United States Secre- an operation of perception. tary of Defense James Mattis stated that he will meet with Turkey’s Natio- 5 February 2018: President Recep Tayyip nal Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli Erdoğan had a meeting with the Pope and that Turkey has been pressuring in Vatican for one hour. about the Manbij issue.

5 February 2018: The Ministry of Interior 8 February 2018: The European Parlia- declared that 449 people were detai- ment passed a resolution titled “The ned due to terrorist propaganda in so- Current Human Rights Situation in Tur- cial media about the Afrin operation. key” stating that “the state of emer- gency is currently being used to si- 5 February 2008: The Turkish Armed For- lence dissent and goes far beyond any ces declared that 947 terrorists have legitimate measures to combat thre- been neutralized so far in the Afrin ats to national security.” operation. 8 February 2018: In the court case on 6 February 2018: The coalition draft former Istanbul governor Hüseyin Avni expected to be formed between the Mutlu’s and former police chief Hüse- Christian Union Party and the Social yin Çapkın’s links to FETÖ, prison sen- Democrat Party in Germany included a tence up to 15 years was requested for request for halting Turkey’s accession both. process to the EU. 10 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- 6 February 2018: Iranian President Has- ces declared that in the Afrin opera- san Rouhani said about Turkey’s Afrin tion, 11 soldiers died 2 of whom were operation, “The operation is futile and killed in a helicopter crash. must be ended immediately.” 10 February 2018: Director of Religious Af- 6 February 2018: HDP Şırnak MP Ferhat fairs Ali Erbaş stated that the soldiers Encü’s deputy status was lifted upon a serving in Operation Olive Branch have finalized court order. been progressing slowly in order not to harm innocent civilians. 6 February 2018: A missile attack aga- inst a refugee camp in Hatay killed 3 10 February 2018: In the 3rd Ordinary people and wounded 15 others. Congress of the HDP, Pervin Buldan

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and Sezai Temelli were elected as Co- 13 February 2018: Foreign Minister Mev- Chairs. lüt Çavuşoğlu stated that there has been a loss of trust against the United 11 February 2018: Deputy Prime Minister States due to the transfer of weapons Bekir Bozdağ reacted against the Uni- to the YPG and sheltering of FETO ted States: “Stop testing Turkey’s pa- which has caused a trust crisis in the tience. Don’t come here to convince U.S.-Turkey relations, but they will us.” make attempts to improve the relati- ons. 11 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 1266 terrorists have 13 February 2018: In the court case aga- been neutralized so far in the Afrin inst the HDP Adana MP Meral Danış operation. Beştaş who had been on trial without arrest, the prosecutor requested Beş- 12 February 2018: President Recep Tayyip taş’s imprisonment up to 25 years for Erdoğan stated the following about the membership to a terrorist organiza- Afrin operation: “This nation is ready tion, provocation for crime and provo- as soon as we say Afrin.” cation of the public for illegal meetings and protest marches. 12 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 31 soldiers have 13 February 2018: U.S. Lt. Gen. Paul E. been killed and 143 soldiers wounded Funk said that they would remain at so far in the Afrin operation. Manbij despite Turkey’s objections and added, “we will respond aggressi- 12 February 2018: Prime Minister Yıldırım vely if you hit us” in response to which stated that Turkey has been ensuring President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said: the security of the EU and the Balkans “It is clear that they have never expe- in the region and added: “If Turkey rienced an Ottoman slap.” does not protect this region, the whole Europe will pay a dear price because of 14 February 2018: Greek Defense Minis- both the refugee crisis and the wave of ter Panos Kammenos issued a comp- terror.” laint to the defense ministers of the NATO states against Turkey over 12 February 2018: The Greek media clai- the tension about the crash of Turkish med that a Turkish coast guard vessel and Greek coast guard vessels. had collided with a Greek Coast Guard boat off Kardak islets in the Aegean 14 February 2018: German Foreign Minis- Sea. ter Sigmar Gabriel stated that he has recently been engaged in many discus- 13 February 2018: Prime Minister Binali sions with his Turkish counterpart Yıldırım had a telephone conversation Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu about the impriso- with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsip- ned journalist Deniz Yücel. ras during which both sides expressed their disturbance about the tension in 14 February 2018: President of the Euro- the Aegean Sea. pean Commission Jean-Claude Junc-

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ker said about the crisis between Tur- 17 February 2018: Prime Minister Binali key and Cyprus in East Mediterranean: Yıldırım and Iraqi Prime Minister Hai- “I am entirely against Turkey’s stance”. der al-Abadi had a meeting in which the importance of close cooperation 15 February 2018: It was announced that with Iraq in the fight against the PKK, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ac- ISIS and FETO was stressed. cepted U.S. Secretary of State Tiller- son’s visit and expressed Turkey’s 17 February 2018: President and Ak Parti expectations in Syria. Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in the Eskişehir Provincial Congress of his 15 February 2015: Greek Defense Minis- party, “I will go to Afrin when I decide ter Panos Kammenos stated that they to, like I did on 15 July.” will no longer tolerate Turkey’s “new provocations” and questioning 18 February 2018: Foreign Minister Mev- Greek’s sovereignty on Kardak islets. lüt Çavuşoğlu said, “Our ties with the United States are at a critical phase. 15 February 2015: After his visit to Bela- The two sides are going to either cor- rus, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım visi- rect this or it is going to take a turn for ted Germany and said about Turkey- the worse." Germany relations, “It is time to return to normalcy with Germany.” 18 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 1614 terrorists have 16 February 2018: Die Welt reporter Deniz been neutralized so far in the Afrin Yücel was released after one year in operation. jail. 19 February 2018: After the cabinet mee- 16 February 2018: Turkey and Germany ting, government spokesperson Bekir held a meeting on anti-terrorism. Bozdağ claimed that it was out of question for the Syrian army to enter 16 February 2018: Prime Minister Binali Afrin: “It will cause a disaster if the re- Yıldırım said about Turkey-Germany re- gime enters Afrin to protect the YPG.” lations, “It appears our problems with Germany have been solved, and our 19 February 2018: Based on the informa- relations will improve.” tion obtained from a reporter in the re- gion, the Syrian State Television anno- 16 February 2018: In the court action on unced that pro-government militia the FETO structuring, six defendants, would enter Afrin in a few hours. including Nazlı Ilıcak, Ahmet Altan and Mehmet Altan were given aggravated 20 February 2018: President Recep Tayyip life sentences. Erdoğan said about Syrian government forces entering Afrin: “That issue is clo- 17 February 2018: German Minister of In- sed for now. They had to withdraw terior Thomas de Maiziere stated that upon artillery fire.” Turkey is a key partner in the fight aga- inst terrorism.

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20 February 2018: YPG Afrin Spokesper- jailed without charges for a year did son Brusk Haseke stated that the Sy- not change the concerns about the rian government forces came to Afrin problems in Turkey regarding the state to help the Afrin public. of law.

20 February 2018: As a result of the dis- 23 February 2018: The court handed cussions between the Ak Parti and down 53 aggravated life sentences to MHP in the past few months, the two the perpetrator of the deadly bomb at- parties submitted a bill to the parlia- tack in Reyhanlı, Hatay, which left 53 ment to allow electoral alliances in the people dead in May 11, 2013. elections. 23 February 2018: German Foreign Mi- 21 February 2018: In Germany, Jürgen nistry announced the release of anot- Hardt, the foreign policy spokesperson her German citizen who had been jai- for the Christian Democratic Union led in Turkey on political reasons. Party chaired by Prime Minister Angela Merkel, called Turkey for ending the 24 February 2018: It was announced that military operation in Afrin against the the members of the United Nations Se- YPG and withdrawing from the region. curity Council voted unanimously in fa- vor of a 30-day cease-fire in Syria, fol- 21 February 2018: Two soldiers were kil- lowing several postponements to the led in PKK’s rocket launcher attack voting. from the Kanireş district in North Iraq to Şemdinli, Hakkari. 24 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- ces declared that 32 soldiers have 21 February 2018: The Turkish Armed For- been killed and 183 others wounded ces declared that 1780 terrorists have so far in the Afrin operation. been neutralized so far in the Afrin operation that has been continuing 24 February 2018: President and Ak Parti since January 20. Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke at his party’s Kahramanmaraş 6th Ordi- 22 February 2018: The Dutch parliament nary Provincial Congress: "For now, we passed a motion recognizing as geno- are sending our trained staff. Those cide the massacre of Armenians in who have active mobilisation orders, Anatolia in 1915. be ready. Not that we need them right now. When the decision is made, we 22 February 2018: The Parliamentary Pre- will set off." sidency condemned the Dutch Parlia- ment’s resolution and considered it 24 February 2018: The U.S. Department of null and void. State and Pentagon hosted press members who were told that Turkey's 23 February 2018: The EU Commissio- acquisition of Russian S-400 air de- ner for European Neighbourhood Po- fence systems might expose Turkey to licy and Enlargement Negotiations Jo- sanctions and offered to work together hannes Hahn said that the release of to find an alternative to S-400. journalist Deniz Yücel who had been

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24 February 2018: The former co-leader of the PYD/PKK, Salih Muslim who had been sought with a red notice, was ca- ught in the Czech capital Prague.

26 February 2018: Saudi Arabian King Sal- man published a decree to replace top military commanders including the chief of staff.

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6. RESEARCH ID

Overall Description of the Survey The survey on which this report is founded was conducted by KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık A.Ş. for KONDA Barometer subscribers.

The field survey was conducted on February 3-4, 2018. This report reflects the current political tendencies, preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey on the days the field study was conducted.

The survey was designed and applied for the aim of determining and monitoring the tendencies and changes in the preferences of the subjects that represent the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey. The error margin of the findings in the survey is +/- 1.7 in the confidence interval of 95 percent and +/- 2.3 in the confidence interval of 99 percent.

6.1 Sampling The sample was prepared by stratification of the data on population and educational level of neighborhoods and villages based on Address-Based Population Registration System with the neighborhood and village results of the general elections dated November 1, 2015. Residential areas were first graded as rural/urban/metropolitan and then the sample was determined based on 12 regions. Within the scope of the survey, face-to-face interviews were carried out with 2687 individuals in 154 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts -including central districts- of 30 provinces. Age and gender quotas were applied for 18 questionnaries conducted in each neighborhood.

Provinces visited 30 Districts visited 101 Age groups Women Men Neighborhoods/villages Ages 18-32 3 subjects 3 subjects 154 visited Ages 33-48 3 subjects 3 subjects Subjects interviewed 2687 Ages 49 and above 3 subjects 3 subjects

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Level 1 (12 regions) Provinces visited 1 İstanbul İstanbul 2 Batı Marmara Balıkesir, Tekirdağ 3 Ege Denizli, İzmir, Kütahya 4 Doğu Marmara Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli 5 Batı Anadolu Ankara, Konya 6 Akdeniz Adana, Antalya, Hatay, Mersin 7 Orta Anadolu Kayseri, Sivas 8 Batı Karadeniz Samsun, Tokat 9 Doğu Karadeniz Trabzon 10 Kuzeydoğu Anadolu Erzurum, Kars 11 Ortadoğu Anadolu Elazığ, Malatya, Van 12 Güneydoğu Anadolu Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Mardin

Region of survey Rural Urban Metropolitan Total

1 Istanbul 21.5% 21.5% 2 West Marmara 0.6% 3.3% .7% 4.7% 3 Aegean 2.0% 6.5% 5.2% 13.7% 4 East Marmara 1.3% 2.7% 6.1% 10.0% 5 West Anatolia .5% 1.3% 6.6% 8.5% 6 Mediterranean 1.8% 5.3% 5.3% 12.4% 7 Central Anatolia .6% 2.6% 1.3% 4.5% 8 West Black Sea 2.0% 3.3% .7% 6.0%

9 East Black Sea 0.7% 2.0% 2.7%

10 Northeast Anatolia 1.3% 0.6% 2.0% 11 Middle East Anatolia 1.3% 3.1% .7% 5.1% 12 Southeast Anatolia 2.0% 3.1% 3.8% 8.9% Total 14.3% 33.8% 52.0% 100.0%

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7 FREQUENCY TABLES

7.1 Profile of Subjects

Gender Percentage Female 48.6 Male 51.4 Total 100.0

Age Percentage Ages 18 - 32 31.9 Ages 33 - 48 35.4 Ages 49+ 32.8 Total 100.0

Educational status Percentage Illiterate 5.8 Literate without degree 2.6 Primary school graduate 22.3 Primary education /Middle school graduate 22.9 High school graduate 29.6 University graduate 15.2 Postgraduate / Doctorate 1.8 Total 100.0

Educational status (grouped) Percentage Below high school 53.5 High school 29.6 University 16.9 Total 100.0

Household population Percentage 1 - 2 persons 19.6 3 - 5 persons 65.8 6 - 8 persons 12.6 9 persons or more 1.9 Total 100.0

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Lifestyle cluster Percentage Modern 26.0 Traditional conservative 46.5 Religious conservative 27.5 Total 100.0

Employment status Percentage Public officer 5.4 Private sector 6.4 Worker 10.3 Small retailed 6.7 Merchant / Businessman 1.0 Self-employed 1.3 Farmer, agriculturalist, stock breeder 3.3 Emloyed, other 5.1 Retired 14.2 Housewife 30.1 Student 9.8 Unemployed 5.3 Unemployable 1.2 Total 100.0

Social media Percentage Facebook 45.6 Twitter 19.1 Whatsapp 56.2 Youtube 30.1 Instagram 36.7 Others .7 I use the internet but not social media 6.7 I never use the internet 27.1

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TV channel preferred for obtaining the news Percentage I don’t watch the news .6 I don’t follow the news on TV 15.1 A Haber 8.0 ATV 14.7 CNN Türk 2.5 Fox TV 21.4 Haber Türk 1.2 Halk TV 1.7 Kanal 7 1.4 Kanal D 7.4 NTV 2.2 Show TV 4.1 Star TV 3.7 TRT 11.1 Ulusal Kanal .4 Other channels 4.5 Total 100.0

Do you have an automobile owned by this household? Percentage Yes 48.4 No 51.6 Total 100.0

Head covering status Percentage No head cover 27.8 Head scarf 46.3 Hijab 9.1 Chador, purdah .5 Subject single male 16.4 Total 100.0

Ethnicity Percentage Turkish 79.5 Kurdish 13.7 Zaza .6 Arab 3.1 Other 3.1 Total 100.0

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Religion/sect Percentage Sunni Muslim 92.2 Alevi Muslim 5.5 Other 2.3 Total 100.0

Dindarlık Percentage Ateist 1,8 İnançsız 2,3 İnançlı 25,2 Dindar 58,6 Sofu 12,0 Total 100,0

Monthly household income (new grouping) Percentage TRY 700 TL or less 3.5 TRY 701 - 1200 6.5 TRY 1201 - 2000 35.0 TRY 2001 - 3000 24.6 TRY 3001 - 5000 22.7 TRY 5001 TL or more 7.7 Total 100.0

Economic classes Percentage Lower income 19.7 Lower middle class 34.5 New middle class 24.6 Upper income 21.2 Total 100.0

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7.2 Daily Politics

The political party one would under no circumstances give up voting for Percentage Ak Parti 27.2 CHP 10.5 MHP 4.6 HDP 4.4 Iyi Parti 1.1 Other parties .7 No such party 51.5 Total 100.0

The political party one would never/under no circumstances vote for Percentage Ak Parti 17.0 CHP 14.8 MHP 3.3 HDP 30.2 Iyi Parti .4 Other parties .8 No such party 33.6 Total 100.0

If there was a presidential election today, who would you vote for? Percentage (grouped) Meral Akşener 6.1 Devlet Bahçeli 3.1 Selahattin Demirtaş 5.4 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 43.2 Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu 10.2 Others 2.1 Swing voters 24.6 Non-voters 5.3 Total 100.0

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Who can solve the most urgent and important problems of Turkey? Percentage Ak Parti 38.1 CHP 9.0 MHP 3.5 HDP 4.3 Iyi Parti 2.9 Other parties .8 None can, a new party is needed 19.2 These problems will persist 22.1 Total 100.0

Who should rule Turkey? Percentage Meral Akşener 8.7 Devlet Bahçeli 4.1 Selahattin Demirtaş 5.8 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 43.4 Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu 10.4 None 12.1 No answer 15.6 Total 100.0

Do you approve of Turkey’s military operation against Syria? Percentage Yes, I do. 74.5 No, I don’t. 25.5 Total 100.0

What is/are the real target(s) of Turkey’s military operation against Syria? Percentage (grouped) PYD / PKK / Terrorist groups 64.1 Foreign powers / USA 13.1 Border security 6.1 Kurds 5.5 Syria / Bashar al-Assad 2.7 Election investment – Power display 2.1 Other 6.5 Total 100.0

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Regarding political matters, where would you position yourself in the left- Percentage right political spectrum? (1 farthest left, 10 farthest right) 1 – Farthest left 6.9 2 3.7 3 5.9 4 5.7 5 27.7 6 9.6 7 9.5 8 9.8 9 6.1 10 – Farthest right 15.1 Total 100.0

7.3 Economic Ideology in Daily Life If somebody other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came into power, how would Percentage the economy be affected? The economy would improve 24.7 Nothing would change 32.7 The economy would worsen 42.6 Total 100.0

Which one is more important for Turkey? Percentage Economic development 25.1 A powerful state 32.8 A society that values humans 42.2 Total 100.0

Reducing unemployment (What do you think should the 2 most important Percentage priorities be in national economy?) First priority 52.0 Second priority 19.1

Preventing price increases (inflation) (What do you think should the 2 most Percentage important priorities be in national economy?) First priority 15.1 Second priority 22.4

Tax cuts (What do you think should the 2 most important priorities be in Percentage national economy?) First priority 14.1 Second priority 23.3

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Maintaining the value of Turkish Lira against dollar (What do you think Percentage should the 2 most important priorities be in national economy?) First priority 9.2 Second priority 12.1

Reducing inequality in income distribution (What do you think should the 2 Percentage most important priorities be in national economy?) First priority 19.5 Second priority 19.4

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect your family Percentage budget? Very negatively 16.0 Negatively 40.3 Neither positively nor negatively 30.2 Positively 12.6 Very positively .9 Total 100.0

In the past year, how did the policies of the government affect national Percentage economy? Very negatively 16.7 Negatively 37.0 Neither positively nor negatively 25.1 Positively 19.2 Very positively 2.1 Total 100.0

How will the policies of the government affect your family budget next year? Percentage Very negatively 13.8 Negatively 31.0 Neither positively nor negatively 35.9 Positively 17.4 Very positively 1.9 Total 100.0

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How will the policies of the government affect national economy next year? Percentage Very negatively 15.4 Negatively 29.1 Neither positively nor negatively 32.0 Positively 20.4 Very positively 3.1 Total 100.0

Which of the following two statements do you agree with the most? Percentage The state should provide support for people in need so that no one lives in 74.0 poverty. Social aid provided by the state causes people to develop laziness, so it is 26.0 harmful for economy. Total 100.0

Which of the following two statements do you agree with the most? Percentage The state should restrict the entry of foreign products into Turkey in order to 69.4 protect domestic products. Entry of foreign products into Turkey should be free so that prices do not 30.6 rise. Total 100.0

Which of the following two statements do you agree with the most? Percentage Foreign capital exploits our country. 53.1 Foreign investment is beneficial for creating employment. 46.9 Total 100.0

In order to reduce inequality, the state should impose high taxes on high- Percentage income earners I absolutely agree 32.8 I agree 44.2 I neither agree nor disagree 12.2 I disagree 7.9 I absolutely disagree 2.8 Total 100.0

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The state and the government should not intervene in the economy. Percentage I absolutely agree 5.7 I agree 13.3 I neither agree nor disagree 19.9 I disagree 40.6 I absolutely disagree 20.5 Total 100.0

It is the employers’ right to discharge striking workers. Percentage I absolutely agree 3.4 I agree 9.9 I neither agree nor disagree 14.4 I disagree 37.7 I absolutely disagree 34.6 Total 100.0

Forests may partly be sacrificed if necessary for building highways or dams. Percentage I absolutely agree 4.1 I agree 15.9 I neither agree nor disagree 15.1 I disagree 28.5 I absolutely disagree 36.4 Total 100.0

What do you think about the recent increase in the exchange rate of dollar? Percentage This is a plot of foreign powers against Turkey. 44.2 It is the result of the government’s failed economic policies. 39.7 The increase in the exchange rate of dollar does not concern my life. 16.1 Total 100.0

The average annual inflation rate for 2017 is around 11%. Percentage I find it convincing. 45.7 I DON’T find it convincing. 54.3 Total 100.0

In the past 7 years, the size of the economy in Turkey has expanded from Percentage 100 to 155 with a growth rate of 55%. I find it convincing. 43.5 I DON’T find it convincing. 56.5 Total 100.0

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In which fields do you find the performance of the Ak Parti government more Percentage successful? Education 25.2 Social aid to those in need 33.4 Housing 31.6 Health 53.1 Agriculture / food 12.6 Anti-terrorism and security 47.3 Commerce, money, finance 13.5 Anti-corruption 13.9 None 21.4

“It is well known that nuclear power technology entails environmental risks. Yet, a nuclear power plant to be developed and built by a Percentage TURKISH/FOREIGN company will enable reduced energy costs for Turkey. Should the establishment of such a power plant be allowed?" Yes 38.5 No 61.5 Total 100.0

How do you cover your household expenses? Percentage The wages/fees received by those household members who are employed 75.2 Retirement pension 22.0 Profit from companies, stores, taxis, etc. owned by household members 6.9 Rent, interest, stock exchange earnings 2.6 Aid from relatives 2.2 Loans 3.0 Aid from philantropists .8 Social aid from state institutions (unemployment pay, disability pay, etc.) 3.6

If you receive social aid, which type? Percentage Child / education support 4.7 Conditioned medical benefits .7 Maternity benefits .3 Survivors’ benefits 1.0 Disability or veterans’ pay 1.3 Unemployment pay .6 Food or fuel allowance 3.5

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If so, from which institutions? Percentage The state 8.2 Municipalities 2.5 NGO’s (Foundations, associations) 1.0 Family 2.0 Philantropists .2

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8. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer, but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report. This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response options which establish the basis for these terms..

DEFINITION Alevi muslim: A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim Lower middle class: Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment but which do not own a car Lower class: Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent segment Arab: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab Headscarf: A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf Chador: A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a cha- dor Religious: A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion Religious conservative: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative Traditional conservative: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative Believer: A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but does not fulfill them completely Non-believer: A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion Urban area: Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the official definition) Rural area: Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the official definition) Kurdish: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish Metropolitan: Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition) Modern: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern No cover: A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse does not cover her head Pious: A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely Sunni muslim: A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim Turban: A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a tur- ban Turkish: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish Upper class: Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent segment

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New middle class: Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent seg- ment and which own a car Zaza: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza Multiple correspondence It is a data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used analysis to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets with more than two variables.

8.1 Questions and Response Options

Which religion or sect do you feel you belong Which of the three lifestyle clusters below to? do you feel yourself belonging to? Sunni Muslim Modern Alevi Muslim Traditional Conservative Other Religious Conservative Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample) We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic, Rural but we may have different ethnic origins; which identity do you know/feel that you Urban belong to? Metropolitan Turkish Do you cover your head or does your spouse Kurdish cover her head when going out of your Zaza home? How do you cover your head? Arab No head cover Other Headscarf Turban Chador Which of the below describes you in terms Bachelor male of piety? A person who does not believe in the re- Economic classes (determined by using quirements of the religion household size, household income and car A person who believes in the requirements ownership) of the religion, but does not fulfill them com- Lower class pletely A person who tries to fulfill the requirements Lower middle class of the religion New middle class A person who fulfills the requirements of the Upper class religion completely

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