HOW DOES THE LEFT EITHER EXCLUDE OR INCLUDE? NATIONALISM AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY
By Cemre Aydoğan
Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations
Supervisor: Dr. Erin K. Jenne
Word Count: 15487
Budapest, Hungary 2019
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ABSTRACT
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war (2011), Turkey received huge number of the
Syrian refugees. Expectedly, the influx of refugees caused a dissonance among the political
parties of Turkey and their migration policies. In this research, I analyze why two left-wing
parties might respond in an opposite manner to a refugee influx, with different levels of
inclusion. Also, I demonstrate the dissonance between minority and majority party status. I
trace minority party politics as inclusive for refugees. This is a rational strategy for minority
parties to maximize their constituencies. On the other side, majority party politics demonstrates
that ideology is not enough to interpret the migration policies of the political parties. In other
words, there are other reasons to see different level of inclusion within the party politics. I refer
to historical nationalism as a source of exclusion of the left for their electoral considerations.
The method of analysis relies on minority party, political party, and nationalism literature.
Hence, in this research, the comparison between ideologically inclusive parties, CHP and HDP,
aims to show the failure of scholars who argue conflictual, destabilizing, and polarizer role of
minority parties by demonstrating a certain degree of inclusion in a minority party.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Erin Jenne because I discovered my passion on nationalism and ethnic politics thanks to her endless support and guidance. Also, I am grateful
to Vera Eliasova for her advice while the writing-up period.
Moreover, I want to acknowledge my dear friends Pelinsu, Cansın, Cansu, Sergen, and Yavuz because of their belief in me and their endless encouragement along my academic journey. They are amazing friends and siblings. During my days in Budapest, with Anıl and Burcu, I also
learnt to combine laughing and working hard. Thanks guys!
Lastly, I am grateful to my perfect family. My mom, my dad, my sister, my aunt, and the newbie of our family, my little Teo, are always with me. I never felt alone because of their endless support. I cannot imagine an academic career and future without them. Especially, I would like
to thank my mom and my sister. They are my wonder women.
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To the whole victims of forced migration ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………….………i ACKNOWLEDMENTS………………………………………………………………...... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………....…iii INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………1 CHAPTER 1: HOW DO POLITICAL PARTIES EITHER INCLUDE OR EXCLUDE IMMIGRANTS?...... 6 1.1. Minority party politics…………………………………………………………6 1.2. Political parties and immigrants…………………………………………...... 10 1.3. Theories of nationalism and stories of orientalism(s)………………………..13 CHAPTER 2: THE TURKISH CASE: CONSISTENCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE LEFT-WING POLITICS……………………………………………....17 2.1. A brief background…………………………………………………………...17 2.2. Research puzzle and question…....…………………………………………...19 2.3. Hypotheses of the research…………………………………………………22 2.4. Methodology: Comparative case study and process-tracing………………...23 CHAPTER 3: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHP AND HDP: VISIBLE IDEOLOGIC CLEAVAGE…………………………………………………………………………...…24 3.1. The left-wing party politics and CHP………………………………………..24 3.2. The left-wing party politics and HDP………………………………………..28 CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE IN TURKEY: DO THE LEFTISTS DIFFERENTIATE?...... 31 4.1. The Syrian refugees and CHP……………………………………………….31 4.2. The Syrian refugees and HDP……………………………………………….40 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………..49 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..51
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INTRODUCTION
Political parties aim to represent their constituencies, and their behavior is motivated by
material incentives to win. For the electoral periods, all political parties formulate their issue-
specific policies. In general, ideologically similar parties have consistent policies on similar
issues. Especially case of minorities and immigrants are formulated similarly by the
ideologically similar parties. The aim of this research is to demonstrate why two left-wing
parties might respond in an opposite manner to a refugee influx, with different levels of
inclusion.
In the existing literature of the left-wing politics, inclusion and aim to establish an
inclusive society for humanity are clear.1 Scholars argue that inclusion of the left-wing party
politics is related to its core principles such as economic equality, social rights, internationalism,
and solidarity.2 “Redistributionist message” of the left-wing politics aims to consolidate
equality not just for “the proletariat”, but also for everybody.3 Moreover, in general, the left-
wing politics accepts the national identities as constructed and weak because they see ideologies
more rigid and important.4 However, for Alonso and Da Fonseca, the left-wing parties can also
exclude some part of the societies, especially immigrants, because of economic, social, electoral
reasons or against the pressure of the right.5 However, while the American Socialist Party was
1 Holbrook, Colin. López-Rodríguez, Lucía. Fessler, Daniel M. T. Vázquez, Alexandra, and Gómez, Ángel. (2017) “Gulliver’s Politics: Conservatives Envision Potential Enemies as Readily Vanquished and Physically Small.” Social Psychology and Personality Science, Vol. 8, No. 6: 6., Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. (2011) CEU eTD Collection “Immigration, left and right.” Party Politics, Vol. 18, No. 6: 871., Loxley, Andrew. and Thomas, Gary. (2010) “Neo-conservatives, Neo-liberals, the New Left and Inclusion: Stirring the pot.” Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 31, No. 3: 293., Giddens, Anthony. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2 March, Luke. and Mudde, Cas. (2005) “What’s Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation.” Comparative European Politics, No. 3: 25. 3 Ibid 34. 4 Bauer, Otto. (2000) The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press: xxxv. 5 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. (2011) “Immigration, left and right.” Party Politics, 876. 1
against immigrants from the Eastern Europe in the USA6, social democratic and ethnically
minority party of Ireland, Sinn Féin, has an inclusionary rhetoric and strong relations with
immigrant groups for their rights and representations.7 As another example, Swedish Social
Democratic Party “implemented legislation making it possible for differential treatment of
refugees based on country of origin in 1976.”8 However, ethnically Quebecois party of Canada,
Parti Québécois9, try to include also all immigrants to the society. Thus, my answer to see the
dissonance between migration policies of the left-wing parties comes down between minority
politics incentives and majority politics incentives.
In the existing literature of minority parties, one school says that minority parties are
harmful in the democracies due to their risk to cause conflict and polarization. On the counter
that they are also analyzed beneficial for the sake of their democracies by representing the
unrepresented parts of the societies. Scholars who argue minority parties as potential sources
of conflicts10 fail to explain their inclusionary policies in democracies because minority parties
rationally come to close to include the interests of the disadvantaged groups into their agendas
for their electoral considerations.11
Differentiated migration policies of minority and majority parties with different levels
of inclusion are seen between two left-wing parties in Turkey: The Republican Peoples’ Party
6 Von Beyme, Klaus. (1985) Political Parties in Western Democracies. England: Gower Publishing House. 67. 7 Fanning, Bryan., Shaw, Jo., O’Connell, Jane-Ann. Marie Williams, Maire. (2007) “Irish Political Parties, Immigration and Integration in 2007.” the Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative, University College Dublin: 5. 8 Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. (2012) “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” Journal of European Public Policy, 19:4: 593. CEU eTD Collection 9 Koji, Junichiro. (2009) “Ideas, Policy Networks and Policy Change: Explaining Immigrant Integration Policy Evolution in Quebec, 1976-1991.” 81st Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association: 10 10 Rabushka. Alvin, and Kenneth, Shepsle. Politics in plural societies: A theory in democratic instability., Horowitz, Donald. (1985) Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press: 141-228., Gunther, Richard. and Diamond, Larry. (2001) Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press: 23-44., Linz, Juan. and Stepan, Alfred. (1978) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press., Brancati, Dawn. (2005) “Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe.” Constitutional Political Economy (Special Issue), Vol. 16, No. 2: 144.
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(CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). CHP is a majority and social democratic
party, and it has an inclusionary party agenda that is consistent with the left. However, it
extensively excludes immigrants, especially the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Despite a possible
tendency to exclude in the left, CHP excludes in a similar manner with extreme right. In other
words, CHP totally excludes the immigrants, and does not volunteer to accept&integrate them.
However, minority and social democratic party of Turkey, HDP, follows an inclusionary
politics for the immigrants. Although they exist in Turkey, and they have a common party
ideology, they differ in their migration policies. CHP has historically never aimed to include
ethnically different groups of the society in its electorate because the founding leaders of
modern Turkey (and CHP) aimed to consolidate Turkish nation state by fetishizing Turkish
identity. Especially in 2010, with the new leadership, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a reconciliation is
observed with the native minorities in a consistent manner with the left-wing politics. However,
after the Syrian civil war (2011), Turkey welcomed huge number of the Syrian refugees, and
for CHP, the Syrians are the new threat in Turkey. In its changed electorate from founding years
to now, exclusive nationalism is seen, and currently it is seen against the Syrians. However, in
HDP, there is no exclusionary nationalism when it states its migration policy. Moreover, HDP
defines itself as a party also for the immigrants and refugees in its party constitution. Why is
the historical nationalism seen in a majority party? Why do minority parties directly aim to
include immigrants? In this research, these questions are responded.
In the wide literature on minority parties, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania’s minority
parties directly aim “the representation and pursuit of minority interests”.12 In other words, CEU eTD Collection minority parties also aim to represent the interests of the population who are not represented by
the other parties. In Latin America, the political mobilization of ethnic (indigenous) groups
12 Gherghina, Sergiu. and Jiglău, George. (2016) “Playing Their Cards Right: Ethnic Parties and Government Coalitions in Postcommunist Europe.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol, 22. No. 2: 222. 3
proved the improvement of “the quality of democracy by placing new issues and values (justice,
equality, tolerance of difference) on the political agenda”.13 As a specific example, the
indigenous party of Ecuador, Pachakutik, insists on diversity by not focusing on one
ethnic/indigenous group.14 Hence, its rational inclusionary policy and ethnic tolerance are
concrete.
Most assume minority parties are “left”-wing parties. In the case of the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation, an Armenian minority party which is also member of the Socialist
International, in Lebanon, pro-Syrian refugee rhetoric and daily policies are irrefutable in
Lebanon.15 Moreover, the Republican Left of Catalonia, pro-independence left-wing party,
depicts its sensation on the issue of the refugees and their lives in Catalonia by not referring to
ethnocultural differences.16
Hence, when expected inclusionary behavior of the left-wing party politics overlaps
with minority party politics, in general, exclusion is unlikely to be visible especially for the
ethnic minorities and immigrants. Scholars who argue conflictual, destabilizing, and polarizer
role of minority parties in democracies fail to explain their political inclusion. In this research,
I present that in light of the ideological similarities of the two left-wing parties in Turkey how
there is a sharp dissonance between them against the Syrian refugees.
13 Van Cott, Donna Lee. (2005) “Building inclusive democracies: Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in
CEU eTD Collection Latin America.” Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 5: 820. 14 Andolina, Robert. (2003) “The Sovereign and its Shadow: Constituent Assembly and Indigenous Movement in Ecuador.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4: 734. 15 Hartrick, Adrian. “Beirut’s ‘Little Armenia,’ A Heaven of Diversity.” News Deeply. April 26, 2016. https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/04/26/beiruts-little-armenia-a-haven-of-diversity. Accessed April 17, 2019. 16 Solé, Jordi. “Catalonia is an inclusive country, a civic republic.” EU Observer. June 6, 2018. https://euobserver.com/opinion/142000. Accessed April 17, 201
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After a brief introduction, I show theoretical frameworks on minority parties and
political parties for immigrants in the first Chapter. Then, I demonstrate applicable nationalism
theories to associate them with political parties. In the second Chapter, I explain the research
design to see how the hypotheses of the research are proved, and which methods are applied for
the case of Turkey within the Turkish party politics. In the third Chapter, I make a comparative
analysis between selected cases, CHP and HDP, to demonstrate their similarity in terms of their
ideology. In the fourth Chapter, I discuss how CHP and HDP differ on their migration policies
in light of empirical evidences. In the final part, I conclude the research.
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CHAPTER 1: HOW DO POLITICAL PARTIES EITHER INCLUDE OR
EXCLUDE IMMIGRANTS?
1.1. Minority party politics
For Von Beyme, minority parties are just one of the nine categories of the political
parties to define them more precisely.17 Previous literature has looked at the definition of
minority parties by focusing on demands or interests of specific ethnic groups. To Horowitz,
the core of minority parties is just to serve for the interest of the ethnic group(s).18 For Van Cott,
minority party “is defined here as an organization authorized to compete in local or national
elections; the majority of its leadership and membership identify themselves as belonging to a
non-dominant ethnic group, and its electoral platform includes demands and programs of an
ethnic or cultural nature.”19 In the words of Chandra, a minority party is defined “as a party
that is the champion of the particular interests of one ethnic category or set of categories”.20
Thus, it is clear that minority party is intrinsically associated with the interests, demands or
future of the supporter ethnic group(s) in the political arena. In this paper, this emphasis is
conserved when the case selection, HDP, is analyzed in relation with the Syrian refugees.
Most early research investigated minority parties as a potential source of “ethnic
conflicts” and “ethnic outbidding”.21 Rabushka and Sheple’s Model for “ethnic outbidding”
demonstrates that competition among ethnically minority parties causes ethnically
CEU eTD Collection 17 Von Beyme, Klaus. Political Parties in Western Democracies. England: Gower Publishing House. 18 Horowitz, Donald. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 293. 19 Van Cott, Donna Lee (2003) “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America.” Latin American Politics and Society. Vol. 45, No.2: 1. 20 Chandra, Kanchan. (2011) “What is an ethnic party?” Party Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2: 155. 21 Rabushka. Alvin, and Kenneth, Shepsle. (1972) Politics in plural societies: A theory in democratic instability. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill., Horowitz, Donald. (1985) Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. – This term directly refers a sharp increase in the numbers of the ethnic parties if just one of them is allowed to be founded. Then, newly emerged ethnic parties are assumed to be harmful in their democracies. 6
“polarization” in the democracies.22 For Horowitz and his Model, “zero-sum game” is
inevitable among the interests of the ethnic groups, so when minority parties represent their
demands or interests, there will be a crush among them because of their centrifugal
competition.23 As a result, minority parties are not seen as beneficial for the democracies due
to their potential risk to polarize and lead a conflict. At this point, the hidden focus on minority
parties is about their exclusionary position at least against one group in their societies. This
analysis is similar with the argument of Gunther and Diamond. They state that “the electoral
logic of the minority party is to harden and mobilize its ethnic base with exclusive, often
polarizing appeals to ethnic group opportunity and threat ... the ethnic party’s particularistic,
exclusivist, and often polarizing political appeals make its overall contribution to society
divisive and even disintegrative.”24 Furthermore, for Linz and Stephan, in “multi-ethnic states”,
stable democracy is hard to observe because of politization of ethnic groups.25 Also, Brancati
observes that minority parties just tend to dominate the interest of their founding ethnic groups,
so a compromise in democracies cannot seen easily.26 For Fearon and Laitin, the tendency of
conflict in minority parties is explained by the elites of them because “antagonistic ethnic
identities” are constructed by prioritizing their ethnic demands to “strengthen their hold on
power”.27 So, minority parties’ position within the democracies becomes a contested issue
though lens of the sceptics against ethnic cleavage. However, these scholars fail to explain a
possible inclusionary behavior of minority parties for immigrants by not prioritizing their
founding “ethnicity”. CEU eTD Collection
22 Rabushka. Alvin, and Kenneth, Shepsle. Politics in plural societies: A theory in democratic instability. 23 Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 141-228. 24 Gunther, Richard. and Diamond, Larry. Political Parties and Democracy.: 23-44. 25 Linz, Juan. and Stepan, Alfred. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. 26 Brancati, Dawn. “Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe.”: 144. 27 Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D. (2003) “Violance and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4: 853. 7
Other research demonstrates the importance of minority parties for democracies and
representation arguing against conflictual, destabilizing and polarizer orientation of minority
parties. For Ishiyama, “ethnic parties do mobilize minority ethnic groups to engage in protest,
but there is no natural connection between the appearance of ethnic parties and the extent to
which the minority group engages in communal conflict.”28 Moreover, he shows that in the
post-communist world, “ethnic parties have served to assist in bringing into the political process
those who would have been otherwise alienated by the emerging democratic systems in the
region.”29 For Stroschein, “ethnic parties do not cause ethnic conflict but emerge as the result
of it.”30 Hence, ethnically minority parties are not drivers of ethnic violence but protections
against it. The argument against “ethnic outbidding” comes from the remarkable research of
Chandra on minority parties. She states that “ethnic parties can help sustain democracy if these
parties are institutionally encouraged to compete on multiple dimensions rather than on just the
unidimensional axis of ethnicity.”31 In line with her argument, for Birnir and Waguespack, the
rate of the representation of populations will increase when minority parties participate in
democracies, hence political stability and an inevitable leverage vis-à-vis diverse policies
emerge within the societies.32 The existing literature holds that minority parties have the impact
of increasing political inclusion..
For Chandra, a minority party “may champion the interests of more than one ethnic
category, but only by identifying the common ethnic enemy to be excluded”33, hence inclusion
can be more concrete than exclusion which is inevitable part of the party politics. As a concrete
CEU eTD Collection 28 Ishiyama, John. (2009) “Do Ethnic Parties Promote Minority Ethnic Conflict.” Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 1: 56. 29 Ibid 59. 30 Stroschein, Sherril. (2001) “Measuring Ethnic Party Success in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 4, No. 1: 59. 31 Chandra, Kanchan. (2005) “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3: 236. 32 Birnir, Johanna K., and Waguespack, David M. (2011) “Ethnic Inclusion and Economic Growth.” Party Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2: 244. 33 Chandra, Kanchan. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” 236. 8
example, Plaid Cymru, a social democratic and pro-Welsh party in the UK, demonstrates in its
party agenda how citizenship is accessible for immigrants without any discriminatory policy.34
Hence, despite the literature on the conflictual, destabilizing and polarizer role of minority
parties, the literature mostly sees minority parties as mechanisms of political inclusion which
is consistent with inclusionary behavior of HDP. These researches are necessary but insufficient
to see political inclusion of minority parties for immigrants.
In the context of inclusion and minority parties, for Bloemraad and Schönwälder,
minority parties can also serve “important mediating structures between new-comers and host
country”.35 This is a key argument to see politically inclusionary position of minority parties in
their democracies. Moreover, for Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst, minority parties have tendency to
address different the problems of different ethnic groups “during legislative debates”.36 It also
bases on vote competition among the political parties, and also minority parties have more
capacity and visibility to address the problems of immigrants because of their multi-
dimensional party formation. For Al-Haj, in practice, the main reason of the closeness between
minority parties and immigrants is about material interest of immigrants in the host states.37 He
refers to voting behavior of the former Soviet immigrants in Israel, and he associates it what
minority parties provide for immigrants such as jobs and other benefits.38 Hence, minority
parties have a capacity to include immigrants in their societies using multi-dimensional party
structure. This is a result of rational inclusive politics of minority parties.
CEU eTD Collection 34 Giudici, Marco. (2014) “Immigrant narratives and nation-building in a stateless nation: the case of Italians in post-devolution Wales.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 37, No. 8: 1418. 35 Bloemraad, Irene. and Schönwälder, Karen. (2013) “Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Representation in Europe: Conceptual Challenges and Theoretical Approaches.” West European Politics, Vol. 36. No. 3: 569. 36 Bird, Karen., Saalfeld. Thomas. and Wüst, Andreas M. (2011) The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, parties, and parliaments in liberal democracies. Oxon: Routledge: 224. 37 Al-Haj, Majid. “Ethnic mobilization in an ethno-national state: the case of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2: 245. 38 Ibid. 9
1.2. Political parties and immigrants
Social democratic or socialist, i.e. the leftist, parties are also one of the sub-categories of
the “Familles Spirituelles”39 by Von Beyme, so ideologic cleavage becomes visible when the
political parties are defined. For Mudde, “party ideology is defined as ‘a party’s body of
normative(-related) ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and
purposes of society (italic in his writing).”40 In the previous literature on party politics, “party
ideology has been the missing factor in understanding concrete immigration policies.”41 The
aim of this part is to depict nationalism and dilemma within the leftist parties against
immigrants.
Firstly, I present the orientation to include in the left-wing parties to see why nationalism
and exclusions are dilemma in the left. Inclusive society is embedded in the definitions of the
left-wing party politics. For Haupt, left-wing parties favour redistribution of wealth for
everybody without dismissing a certain group of societies.42 Adams, Haupt, and Stoll argue that
the left-wing parties are “activist privileging and tied to social groups”.43 In other words, they
try to be voice of the excluded groups. March and Rommerskirchen state that the left-wing
parties aim to achieve “unity in diversity”.44
Moreover, to be able to understand the aim of “unity in diversity” of the left-wing, a
comparative evaluation is healthier between the right and the left in the existing literature by
referring to immigrants. In the previous researches, for Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer
CEU eTD Collection 39 Von Beyme, Klaus. Political Parties in Western Democracies. 40 Mudde, Cas. (2000) The Ideology of Extreme Right. Manchester University Press. 19. 41 Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. (2012) “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol, 19, No. 4: 585. 42 Haupt, Andrea B. “Parties’ Responses to Economic Globalization: What is Left for the Left and Right for the Right.” Party Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1: 10. 43 Adams, James. Haupt, Andrea B., and Stoll, Heater. (2009) “What Moves Parties: The Role of Public Opinion and Global Economic Conditions in Western Europe.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5: 616. 44 March, Luke. and Rommerskirchen, Charlotte. (2015) “Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties.” Party Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1: 41. 10
“where political left placed relatively more emphasis on providing aid to refugees and the
political right placed relatively more emphasis on stricter border control to protect the safety of
EU citizens.”45 Also, in the dichotomy of the extreme left and the extreme right, to
Holbrook, López-Rodríguez, Fessler, Vázquez, and Gómez, the extreme left is assumed more
positive for all refugees on the road of their asylum-seeking process, and for the extreme right,
this positive approach and humanitarian understanding are not seen in general.46 Hence, it is
clear and easy to summarize in the words of Alonso and Da Fonseca, the right-wing parties see
“the mixing of different ethnicities poses a threat to national culture; ethnicities have to be kept
separate in order to prevent cultural extinction.”47 On the other hand, expectedly, in the
ontology of the leftist parties, “they have good reason to be more inclusive regarding societal
diversity”48, and it can be explained the driving force behind the left that is “greater equality
and inclusion”.49 Furthermore, Loxley and Thomas observe that in the left-wing, “there is a
strong undercurrent of inclusion.”50 For Suny, inclusion of the left depends on obtaining the
supports of the masses for a mobilization.51 To Brooks, inclusion is directly related to equality,
and “the adaptation of integrative as opposed to a class-conflict ideology”52 is targeted by the
left.
45 Van Prooijen, Jan-Willem. Krouwel, André P. M. and Emmer, Julia. (2017) “Ideological Responses to the EU Refugee Crisis: The Left, the Right, and the Extremists.” Social Psychology and Personality Science. Vol. 9, No. 2: 1. 46 Holbrook, Colin. López-Rodríguez, Lucía. Fessler, Daniel M. T. Vázquez, Alexandra, and Gómez, Ángel. “Gulliver’s Politics: Conservatives Envision Potential Enemies as Readily Vanquished and Physically Small.”: 6. CEU eTD Collection 47 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.” 6: 871. 48 Ibid 866. 49 Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. (2012) “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” 588. 50 Loxley, Andrew. and Thomas, Gary. “Neo-conservatives, Neo-liberals, the New Left and Inclusion: Stirring the pot.” 293. 51 Suny, Ronald G. (1993) The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the USSR. Stanford University Press: 94. 52 Brooks. Joel E. (1983) “Left-Wing Mobilization and Socioeconomic Equality: A Cross-National Analysis of the Developed Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3: 399. 11
To understand inclusion and the left, especially social democracy, Giddens’s book, The
Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, is important because it clearly states the tie
between them. For Giddens, the core of social democracy is an inclusive society.53 Also, for
him, “nations are a product of relatively recent history”, and different ethnonational groups can
exist in the same society.54 This is important for the inclusive social democracy because it aims
“ethnic and cultural pluralism”.55 Hence, to Giddens, to establish an inclusive society,
successful cultivation of ethnic pluralism is must.56 In this inclusive society, social democracy
serves to include everybody. In other words, exclusions are also the result of rigid ethnonational
identities, and they do not have meaning in the social democratic parties or states.
On the other side, scholars investigated that equality, humanity, and inclusionary
policies within the leftist parties generally matter for their own people. Alonso and Da Fonseca
state that “in Austria, the Social Democrats turned more anti-immigrant before the electoral
jump of the extreme right.”57 Van der Brug and Van Spanje observe that two economically
leftist parties, the Danish Social Democrats and the Finnish Centre Party are consistent on the
idea of “helping asylum seekers and migrants return home are bundled together.”58 Moreover,
as Hinnfors, Spehar, and Gregg stated in their research, “Gordon Brown, former Labour Prime
Minister in the UK, pledged that his government would create ‘British jobs for British workers’
in 2007.”59 These are clear examples that depict relatively hidden nationalism in the leftist
parties against especially immigrants. This looks like paradoxical in the ontology of the left,
CEU eTD Collection 53Giddens, Anthony. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press: 104 54 Ibid 131-132. 55 Ibid 132. 56 Ibid 107. 57 Alonso, Sonia., and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.” 877. 58 Van der Brug, Wouter. and Van Spanje, Joost. (2009) “Immigration, Europe, and the new cultural dimension.” European Journal of Political Research, No. 48: 323. 59 Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” 600. 12
but there could be legitimate reasons to understand exclusionary rhetoric of the leftists, and by
the harshness of these reasons, the level of exclusion change.
For Hinnfors, Spehar, and Gregg, the main reasons could be about “political
institutions”, “national economic conditions”, “cultural context”, “vote-maximization
behaviour of the political parties”, and “the behaviour of right-wing and populist right
parties”.60 Under these conditions and circumstances, the leftist parties in their migration
policies “can be observed in three types of scenario: convergence with the main competitor,
congruence and divergence or polarization.”61 Thus, according to the domestic conditions, the
left-wing parties try to reframe their policies vis-à-vis the other political actors for their electoral
considerations. CHP and HDP, as ideologically left-wing parties, fit in contrast positions in
Turkey for the Syrian refugees.
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60 Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” 587. 61 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.” 877. 13
1.3. Theories of nationalism and stories of orientalism(s)
In the literature of the nationalism studies, the roadmap of exclusions and inclusions are
discussed from different aspects and dimensions. Before analyzing them, the core debate is
important to correlate nationalism within the party politics. One of the most contested issues in
the literature of the nationalism studies is whether national identities and ethnicities are either
socially constructed, flexible and not rigid or rigid-fixed from the beginning, i.e. primordial
identities. For Chandra, the supporters of the natural ties of the minority parties in relation with
a possible conflict, they assume ethnic and national identities as primordial. 62 In this research,
mainly, I will use primordial, virulent, exclusive and defensive nationalism to define the
nationalism of CHP because they have common patterns to exclude the national other.
For Geertz, primordial nationalism is about social existence, and it “stems from being
born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of
a language, and following particular social practices.”63 In the words of Bieber, virulent
nationalism “rejects the status quo and seeks to reassert the will of an imagined community
over a political or cultural space is different from.”64 Also, Wimmer states that “political project
of nationalism” is oriented to exclude others, and this directly refers to exclusionary
nationalism.65 For Öniş, defensive nationalism constitutes “a series of resistance” for the future
of a nation by preserving its national priorities.66 Therefore, all these definitions of nationalism
have common patterns to draw the boundaries of a self and to exclude the national other.
CEU eTD Collection 62 Chandra, Kanchan. (2005) “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3: 236. 63 Geertz, Clifford. (1963) Old societies and new states: the quest for modernity in Asia and Africa. London: The Free Press of Glencoe: 107. 64 Bieber, Florian. (2018) “Is Nationalism on the Rise? Assessing Global Trends.” Ethnopolitics, Vol. 17, No. 5: 520. 65 Wimmer, Andreas. (2002) Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadow of Modernity. Cambridge University Press. 66 Öniş, Ziya. (2007) “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3: 248. 14
Anderson in his classic book, Imagined Communities67, defines nationality as a socially
constructed and as a result of modernity. Also, for Gellner, nationalism is modern, top-down,
and constructed.68 As mentioned above, socially constructed nationalism is not rigid like
primordial nationalism, and its exclusionary rhetoric is less harsh than primordial one. It does
not refer to historical narratives. Hence, if minority parties and leftist parties are evaluated in
the framework of nationalism, their nationalism is closer to socially constructed one. For Bauer,
national identities will “disappear once a socialist order had been achieved.”69. Also, in
inclusionary policies of minority parties, a desire is seen for “the representation of the interests
of marginalized groups”70 by not just focusing their constructed national interests.
At this point, it is necessary to mention the literature of ethnic conflicts to see the core
of the constructed national and ethnic identities vis-à-vis the escalation of tensions. For
Kaufmann, ethnic identities are the main reasons of the conflict due to their rigid and fixed
characteristics.71 However, Kalvays refutes the explanation and argument of Kaufmann by
referring to the conflicts that have ideological dimensions, i.e. the Spanish civil war.72 Hence,
for Kalyvas, ideologies are fixed, and ethnic or national identities are socially constructed.73 To
be able to see and analyze social democratic and socialist parties, Kalyvas’s argument is highly
important because when either the inclusions or the exclusions are observed, they are consistent
with ideological explanations of the parties and their socially constructed nationalisms.
As referred in the former research on nationalism, exclusion and process of
otherification are inevitable parts of both constructed and primordial nationalisms, but the
CEU eTD Collection 67 Anderson, Benedict. (1991). Imagined Communities. London: Verso. 6 68 Gellner, Ernest. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 57 69 Bauer, Otto. The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis and London: xxxv. 70 Htun, Mala. (2016) Inclusion without representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations. Cambridge University Press. 2 71 Kaufmann, Chaim. (1996). “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4: 138. 72 Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008). “Ethnic Defection in Civil War.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 8: 1047. 73 Ibid. 15
degrees of exclusions change. For Smith, “the impact of waves of migrants and guest-workers
on the economies and societies of European states [ … ] may differentially affect their attitude
and priorities.”74 It is also stories of the ideologically cleavaged political parties where it is
possible to see the core of the inclusion and exclusion in the domestic politics vis-à-vis
immigrants. For Giddens, solidarity is also the milestone and one of the cores of the social
democratic and socialist parties.75 But, according explanation of Wimmer and Schiller Glick,
“immigrants destroy the isomorphism between people and solidarity.”76 That’s why although
nationalism is not seen rigid and exclusionary within the left-wing politics, anti-immigrant
attitude of the left is more likely to protect their own people and solidarity in their societies.
To see the paradox of exclusion in the left-wing parties how they excluded and exclude
are important to see historical continuation to preserve nationalism. Said’s book, Orientalism77,
that establishes a certain hierarchy between the Orient and the Occident and starts the process
of (re)writing of otherization in an oriental sense. After sixteen years when the Orientalism was
published by Said the first time, Bakić-Hayden discussed the issue of “nesting” orientalism(s)
that depends on the tensions of the times and geography to other people orientally.78 This is
also story of the exclusionary nationalism in the 21st century by the extreme right European
parties against the refugees and asylum seekers as called as neo-Orientalism79, but also it is seen
in the left-wing parties as a continuation of their exclusionary exergies in their pasts (and their
presents).
CEU eTD Collection 74 Smith, Anthony D. (1992) “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” International Affairs, Vol.68: 75. 75 Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 76 Wimmer, Andreas. and Schiller Glick, Nina (2002) “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences.” Global Networks, Vol. 2, No. 4: 310. 77 Said, Edward (1979). Orientalism. New York: Random House. 3. 78 Bakić-Hayden, Milica. (1995) “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia.” Slavic Review. Vol. 54, No.4: 917. 79 Amin-Khan, Tariq. (2012) “New Orientalism, Securitisation and the Western Media's Incendiary Racism.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 9: 1596. 16
Also, for Wimmer and Schiller Glick, nationalism is also about defending their own
lands.80 For anti-immigrants, refugees and asylums seekers don’t do that, and this is problematic
for the whole interpretations of nationalism in the different degrees. In the next Chapters, these
theoretical and thematic arguments and explanations are implemented into the case of the left-
wing parties of Turkey.
CEU eTD Collection
80 Wimmer, Andreas. and Schiller Glick, Nina. “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences.” 309. 17
CHAPTER 2: THE TURKISH CASE: CONSISTENCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE LEFT-WING POLITICS
2.1. A brief background
To understand the visible differentiation between the two leftist parties in terms of their
migration policies, the background of the Syrian refugee crisis and Turkey’s volunteer policy
and rhetoric for the Syrians should be demonstrated. Since 2002, Islamist AKP rose to power
in Turkey and its foreign policy in the Middle East blurred the borders between domestic policy
and foreign policy. To be an imperial power in the Middle East, AKP and Erdoğan referred to
the problems of this region in the Turkish politics.81 Catastrophic relations between Assad and
Erdoğan opened the window of an opportunity for Erdoğan to be an effective voice in the region
using the Syrian refugees. Erdoğan used ethnicity and religion on the road of acceptance of the
Syrians.82 Hence, the acceptance of the Syrian refugees is legitimized one of the columns of
Islamist AKP’s general policy either in its domestic or foreign policy.83
According to current data of the UNHCR, there are registered 3.600.000 Syrian refugees
in Turkey.84 From the beginning of the acceptance of the refugees, the failure of AKP and
Erdoğan’s Syria policy is the case by looking at the situation of the refugee camps and lives of
the Syrians.85 This catastrophic foreign policy and its direct effects in the daily lives of “the
people” of Turkey caused a polarization within the society. That’s why this polarization,
81 Hinnebusch, Raymond. and Tür, Özlem (2013). Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity. Surrey: CEU eTD Collection Ashgate: 198. 82 Korkut, Umut. (2016) “Pragmatism, moral responsibility or policy change: the Syrian refugee crisis and selective humanitarianism in the Turkish refugee regime.” Comparative Migration Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2: 1. 83 Memisoğlu, Fulya. and Ilgıt, Aslı. (2016) “Syrian refugees in Turkey: multifaceted challenges, diverse players and ambiguous policies.” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3: 12. 84 UNHCR. “UNHCR Türkiye: Kilit Veriler ve Sayılar.” Februaray 28, 2019. (In English, “UNHCR Turkey: Key Data and Numbers.”) Accessed date April 28, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/tr/unhcr-turkiye-istatistikleri. 85 Ahmadoun, Souad. (2014) “Turkey's policy toward Syrian refugees: domestic repercussions and the need for international support.” SSOAR: 3
18
different solution alternatives, and differentiation are also visible between CHP and HDP, as
discussed despite their ideological similarities.
After the official foundation of HDP in 2012, it aims to stay positive towards CHP.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s “less nationalistic more social democratic”86 party aim is crucial to see closeness
of the two left-wing parties against Islamist AKP. Before the Syrian refugee crisis, they
followed similar inclusive agendas for their electorates that are dismissed by AKP. During the
refugee crisis, they started to state different and contrast statements over time for the Syrians.
HDP started to criticize CHP’s exclusive statements against the Syrians despite their alliance
against AKP during all electoral periods.87 From the beginning of the crisis to now, HDP
developed more inclusive policies, but CHP supported exclusion of the Syrians. In the current
Turkish politics, there is still an alliance which is not clearly stated but visible between them
against AKP88, but their differentiation vis-à-vis the Syrians is concrete. In the fourth Chapter,
I present empirical evidences to show the dissonance between their migration policies.
CEU eTD Collection
86 Cingi, Aydin. (2011) “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: 1. 87 “Suriye’den ülkemize sığınan mületiclere yönelik düşmanca politikalar son verin.” (In English, “Stop to hostile policies against the Syrian refugees who asylum in our country.”) March 5, 2018. Accessed May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/basin/basin-aciklamalari/suriyeden-ulkemize-siginan-multecilere-yonelik-dusmanca- politikalara-son-verin/11690. 88 “CHP’de ‘HDP ile ittifak’ açıklaması.” (In English: “Clarification by CHP for the alliance with HDP.”) CNN Turkey. January 29, 2019. Accessed date May 25, 2019. https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/chpden-hdp-ile- ittifak-aciklamasi. 19
2.2. Research puzzle and question
With the Syrian refugee crisis, the first time, all political parties had to formulate, a
policy position on the appearance of millions of refugees, particularly on the extent to which
they would be welcomed in the Turkish polity. As I discussed in the previous Chapter, the
ideological cleavage among the political parties provides to estimate their reactions and
behaviours vis-à-vis the refugees. For Van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Emmer, “the political right
is more concerned [with] preserving cultural traditions, and therefore less tolerant of minority
groups, than the political left.”89 This is also expected and general interpretation for the party
ideologies for immigrants.
However, in a deeper analysis on social democratic and socialist parties, an inclusionary
policy for immigrants is not seen in each case. For Alonso and Da Fonseca, the “anti-immigrant
turn” of the leftist parties “can be observed in three types of scenario: convergence with the
main competitor, congruence and divergence or polarization.”90 As a social democratic majority
party, CHP fits in “divergence or polarization” against its main competitor, AKP that is the
ruling party of Turkey and accepts the refugees.91 Moreover, exclusionary policies of CHP are
closer to exclusion of extreme right against the immigrants. Hence, I trace the exclusion of the
left-wing parties.
In the case of CHP, its historical nationalism and strategies cause its severe exclusion
against the Syrians. CHP repeats its former reactions in the past against ethnically different
groups. That’s why exclusionary nationalism of CHP is harsher than a possible exclusion of the CEU eTD Collection left-wing. It is possible to say that inclusionary policies of the social democratic and socialist
89 Van Prooijen, Jan-Willem. Krouwel, André P. M. and Emmer, Julia. “Ideological Responses to the EU Refugee Crisis: The Left, the Right, and the Extremists.” 1. 90 Alonso, Sonia. and Da Fonseca, Saro Claro. “Immigration, left and right.”: 877. 91 In the section of 4.1. A brief background, AKP’s Syrian refugee policy is discussed. 20
parties are mainly about their own people.92 In the exclusionary nationalism of CHP, electoral
considerations are in the center. When CHP was founded and rose to power in Turkey (1923-
1950), its electorate was the ethnonational core group.93 In other words, CHP was the party for
the Turkish population who were not non-Muslim and Kurd, that’s why it excluded periphery
of Turkey from its electorate.94 Now, the Syrians are the new periphery of Turkey that are not
a part of “real” Turkish population, and they are excluded again.
On the other side, minority parties serve as camps to represent the people who are not
represented politically. This is similar also with the story of HDP in Turkey. Although all the
Syrian refugees are not citizens, their health conditions, integration into society, lives, and rights
integration into society matter for HDP. Rationally, HDP reflects its multi-dimensional
minority party feature for the Syrians in its migration policy. Unlike CHP, HDP does not refer
to historical patterns in its migration policy because as Chandra states, it tries to be “champion
the interests of more than one category”. So, for the case of the ethnically leftist party
“congruence” is the case for the inclusion of immigrants.
In light of the ideological polarization in Turkey, a visible alliance between the two
leftist political parties in Turkey against AKP is observed. However, in their migration policies,
specifically for the Syrian refugees, there is a sharp dissonance between them as stated above.
Exclusionary policies are clearly observed in CHP, but in HDP, inclusion is concrete for the
Syrian refugees. Then, both represent the same ideological camp, and they have relatively close
relations in the Turkish politics, so why two left-wing parties might respond in an opposite
CEU eTD Collection manner to a refugee influx, with different levels of inclusion is the puzzle of this research. My
92 Hinnfors, Jonas., Spehar, Andrea. and Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. (2012) “The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy.” Journal of European Public Policy, 19:4: 599. 93 Hale, Henry E. (2004) “Explaining Ethnicity.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4: 463. 94 Mardin, Şerif. (1973). “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics.” Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 1: 169- 190. 21
answer comes down to differences between minority politics incentives and majority politics
incentives.
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22
2.3. Hypotheses of the research
In light of the research puzzle, two hypotheses are tested for a scientific answer. The
first hypothesis is that the left-wing parties are welfare chauvinists despite the parties’
humanitarian and egalitarian core. To test welfare chauvinism of CHP, nationalism and
possible reasons to exclude immigrants are analyzed within the left-wing politics over time. In
this research, I analyze the ontology of the left and exclusionary nationalisms-orientalisms in
order to see exclusion of a left-wing party despite its internally inclusionary rhetoric for its
electoral considerations.
The second hypothesis of the research is that the left-wing minority parties are more
inclusionary than the left-wing majority parties for the immigrants. To test it I will present how
the left-wing party politics nourishes minority parties in terms of inclusionary party policies
and rhetoric is discussed over time. This is mainly correlated with multi-dimensional and
inclusive party formation of minority parties for immigrants that is not discussed in detail in the
literature.
I expect that all hypotheses are right. For the first one, I expect to see that the left-wing
majority party excludes immigrants from the society. It aims to protect the interests of the
ethnonational core because the ethnonational core is its electorate, and they are against the
refugees. For the second one, I expect to see inclusionary policies of the minority party as
concrete. Moreover, it should include the immigrants more than the majority party. Also, the
constituencies of the minority party should be inclusive for them. Thus, minority party also acts
CEU eTD Collection in a consistent manner with its electorate as rationally.
Dependent variable of this research is level of inclusion of the left-wing parties, and
independent variable is their electoral considerations. I will measure over time with CHP and
HDP, looking at policies, statements, and political positions.
23
2.4. Methodology: Comparative case study and process-tracing
In this research, mainly, comparative case study and the method of process-tracing will
be applied to see the differentiation between the two left-wing political parties and to locate
them into theoretical frameworks that are discussed in the first Chapter.
Turkey is the unique state in terms of acceptance rate of the Syrian refugees since the
beginning of the crisis in 2011. That’s why Turkey is selected as a modern and an extreme case
aspect of the refugee number. For comparative case study, the selection of the cases depends
on method of difference. In other words, for the unit level analysis, the political parties are
selected according to their common categorization, their ideology. How they differ despite their
ideology and closeness is the starting point for this research.
Former researches on CHP and HDP aspect of their ideologies, nationalism, exclusions
and inclusions, relevant speeches of party members and party leaders, party manifestos,
electoral manifestos, past experiences, future plans, and any migration related books or
documents are analyzed by applying the method of process tracing to see casual mechanism. I
translated documents and speeches from Turkish to English. In the method of process-tracing,
the main purpose is to see the chain of events behind the ideologies and either exclusionary or
inclusionary policies of the parties.
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24
CHAPTER 3: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHP AND HDP: VISIBLE IDEOLOGIC CLEAVAGE
3.1. The left-wing party politics and CHP
Before historically analyzing of the CHP in terms of either inclusionary or exclusionary
policies in Turkey, it is necessary to indicate that in 2010, with the new party leader of CHP,
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, social democracy became the official ideology of the party.95 In this
research, when either the current face or the historical part of CHP are analysed, the aim is not
to discuss in detail the economic aspect of social democracy within the party politics. The main
aim is to measure its level of inclusion and solidarity in leftist parties in light of Giddens’s
inclusionary society in social democracy.96
When Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was nominated and selected as a new party leader of CHP,
his inclusionary rhetoric becomes visible in the party agenda.97 It can be interpreted either
reconciliation process with the non-Muslim people of Turkey who were othered during the early
Republican era of Turkey by CHP98 or reconciliation with the Kurds who are all their own
people of Turkey.99 It is consistent with the explanation of Giddens in terms of an inclusionary
society understanding of a social democratic party in terms of ethnic pluralism.100
However, when we look at the historical evolution of CHP, the core of social democracy
cannot be seen even in the rhetoric of the party leaders. CHP excluded the non-Muslims in the
early Republican era during its single party rule (1923-1950). Hence, for Öniş, calling it a social CEU eTD Collection
95 Uysal, Ayşen. (2011) “Contiunity and Rupture: The ‘New CHP’ or What Has Changed in the CHP’.” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 4: 140. 96 Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. 97 Cingi, Aydin. “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy.”: 1. 98 Ibid 7. 99 Ibid 7. 100 Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. 105. 25
democratic party was inappropriate101 because there were just visible tendencies to become
social democratic in a comparison with the right of Turkey. During 1960s workers’ movements,
CHP had started to adopt social democracy in Turkey because of intrinsically overlapping
points and consistency between CHP and social democracy that were thought by the party elites
at that time.102
At that point, defensive nationalism103 is the repeated concept in the literature before
mentioning ideological cleavage in CHP. It has become both in the written and unwritten
manifestos of the party, and it is tried to be protected as a legacy of Kemalism, the founding
ideology of the party.104 Hence, otherifications, orientalizations, and exclusionary nationalism
against non-Muslims and the Kurds during 1930s by CHP government can be analysed with its
historically sharp defensive nationalism understanding which is contrast to social democracy
and its inclusionary understanding.
In the era of post-2010, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his elites, they are becoming social
democratic and directly adapting the inclusionary understanding of Giddens’s analysis on social
democracy. With the beginning of his leadership, Kılıçdaroğlu states, “a less nationalistic and
more social democratic position” for the party.105 Then immediately, he focused on
improvement of human rights in Turkey.106 However, currently CHP excludes the Syrians from
the Turkish society.
Thus, when CHP faces a similar situation that was seen in the history of the party, the
remanences of the former party patterns and strategies are more likely to be visible vis-à-vis the CEU eTD Collection
101 Öniş, Ziya. (2007) “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3: 250. 102 Cingi, Aydin. “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy.”: 3. 103 Öniş, Ziya. “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey.”: 251. 104 Ibid 293-294. 105 Cingi, Aydin. “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy.”: 1. 106 Ibid 8. 26
new case that has an ethnic dimension to follow an exclusionary policy although the adaptation
of social democracy is clear in the rhetoric of the party. In March 2016, Kılıçdaroğlu clearly
stated how CHP responded the Syrian refugees:
“The Syrians will corrupt Turkey. We do not know their exact economic burden
on us. They will occupy the underground of our country and damage our welfare. If you
do not believe in me, you can ask the mayor of Gaziantep where many refugee camps
are. AKP’s Turkey is responsible for that number of Syrians who live in Turkey. We are
not guilty when we propose to resend them back to Syria.”107
In this quotation, it is clear that Syrians are not wanted by CHP. As Mardin (1973)
referred, historically, CHP is a center-orientated party, and its constituencies are not
disadvantaged groups of the society. Hence, CHP’s electoral considerations derived/derive
from its constituencies’ expectations. In the early Republican era, during the single party rule
of CHP, non-Muslims and Kurds are othered by CHP and its constituencies. In 1946, when the
first plural party election made, CHP was still dominant party. Hence, othered and excluded
part of the society did not cause a certain reaction against CHP by its constituencies.
The Syrian refugee crisis and the acceptance of the refugees caused to repeat the
exclusionary nationalism of CHP against another ethnic group because now its electorate is
against the Syrians. As discussed in the next Chapter, CHP excludes in a similar manner with
the extreme right because it directly excludes the Syrians due to national differences between
them.108 CHP’s repeated defensive nationalism against a disadvantaged group, even harsher
CEU eTD Collection than the exclusionary nature of social democracy against the immigrants, is an example of
107 Ervin, Murat. “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: Suriyeliler bütün düzenimizi bozacak.” (In English, “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: The Syrians will damage our unity.”) Habertürk. March 12, 2016. Accessed date May 22, 2019. https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1208609-kemal-kilicdaroglu-suriyeliler-butun-duzenimizi-bozacak. 108 Altindag, Onur., and Kaushal, Neeraj. (2017) “Do Refugees Impact Voting Behavior in the Host Country? Evidence from Syrian Refugee Inflows in Turkey.” IZA Institute of Labor Economics. No. 10846: 6. 27
chauvinist and exclusive party structure. When CHP’s voters are analyzed, according to the
research of Doğan in KONDA research center, among the voters of Turkey’s political parties,
voters of CHP are the most suspect people against the acceptance of the Syrians in Turkey.109
In her research, in general, CHP voters assume that Syrians come to Turkey for their economic
considerations, there is no threat of war, and they are burden in Turkey.110 To understand CHP’s
current exclusionary nationalism, their voters’ approach is key. The changed electorate of CHP
is still exclusionary nationalist, but the new enemy is the Syrians.
CEU eTD Collection
109 Doğan, Sevinç. (2017) “KONDA Seçmen Kümeleri: CHP Seçmenleri.” (In English “KONDA Clauster of Voter: Voters of CHP.”) The Report of Konda Research Center. Accessed date May 17, 2019. http://konda.com.tr/wp- content/uploads/2018/05/KONDA_SecmenKumeleri_CHP_Secmenleri_Mayis2018.pdf. 38-40. 110 Ibid 38-40. 28
3.2. The left-wing party politics and HDP
Despite certain ethnic character of HDP as a Kurdish party for the democratic
autonomy111, in the current party politics, also, it is defined as a left-wing party.112 HDP,
founded in 2012, is the most leading Kurdish party in Turkey. However, when it is analyzed
either as a continuation of the Kurdish party tradition that has a Marxist core or directly as a
left-wing party, its social democratic and inclusionary rhetoric, policies, and party agenda have
a priority for the marginalized people of Turkey.113 This is a clear example of how minority
parties are inherently incentivized to be inclusionary in their policies.
As discussed in the first Chapter, social democracy aims to establish an inclusive
society. Moreover, equality and solidarity are key principles for an inclusive society. In general,
these grand concepts are tried to be targeted for their own people. However, in the case of HDP,
its inclusionary rhetoric is clearly visible, and it includes all segments of the society. This is
especially true for people who are marginalized by the other political parties from their
electorates, via HDP’s inclusionary discourse of bizler (plural version of “we” in Turkish).114
When HDP was founded, there is a clear target to be “a party of Turkey”, not just for
one ethnic group in its party agenda.115 This is a clear example of multi-dimensional party
understanding of a minority party that is discussed by Chandra for the consolidation of
democracies by minority parties and their roles of representations for people who are not
represented by the other parties.116 Hence, there is also a clear consistence between Giddens’s
inclusionary society understanding of a social democratic party and HDP. Moreover, it does CEU eTD Collection
111 Tekdemir, Omer. (2016) “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4: 656. 112 Ibid 652. 113 Gunes, Cengiz. (2017) “Turkey’s New Left.” New Left Review, No. 107: 12. 114 Tekdemir, Omer. “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.”: 657 115 Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. (2016) “The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the 2015 elections.” Turkish Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1: 42. 116 Chandra, Kanchan. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.”: 235. 29
not exist for the sake “the people” of Turkey because it aims to cover “people of Turkey”. It
means people who live in Turkey currently without any discrimination. This is embedded in the
discourse of bizler.
HDP does not refer to historical strategies of its founding ethnic group in its migration
policy. It aims to be a party of Turkey, and the most important proof of that is embedded in the
party constitution:
“HDP is the party for the excluded part of Turkey. It is for all folks, all religion
communities, women, workers, the unemployed, immigrants, LGBT+. We came
together against exclusion and exploitation.”117
History, historical patterns and interest of its founding ethnicity are just one of the
chapters of the party. If HDP prefers to refer to historical patterns and behaviors of its ethnic
group, ethnic demands and traumas of the Kurds are repeated in general. It does not fit in multi-
dimensional party formation. In 2016, Demirtaş stated overall how HDP responded the Syrians
in Turkey:
“Syrian refugees may apply to the status of Turkish citizenship. They are not
guilty, and the law of citizenship is clear. We should not accuse them, and they did not
do anything. AKP is responsible for the current living standards of the Syrians in
Turkey. We should not behave them racist.”118
HDP’s rhetoric and policies for the immigrants do not have any signal of defensive
nationalism that is generally attached to CHP in the Turkish politics. Defensive nationalism CEU eTD Collection
could be seen for the sake of the Kurdish people who live in Turkey by HDP, but as a contrast
117 HDP Parti Tüzüğü. (In English, “HDP Party Consitution.”) Last version uploaded in June 22, 2014. Accessed date May 22, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/parti/parti-tuzugu/10. 118 “Demirtaş: Arzu Eden TC Vatandaşlığı Alabilir.” (In English, “Demirtaş: Whoever wants, S/he Can Obtain Turkish Citizenship.”) BIA NET. July 12, 2016. Accessed date May 24, 2019. https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/176643-demirtas-arzu-eden-tc-vatandasligina-basvurabilir. 30
to the counter-minority party scholars, HDP does not create a sort of hierarchy between the
Kurdish identity and other ethnic or other identities. This is a clear example why HDP tries to
protect the Syrians and their rights, lives, and future in Turkey.119
When the protectionist and inclusive features of HDP are analyzed, it is important to
say that HDP is nourished by the core of the social democratic and socialist party
understanding.120 As an evidence, Filiz Kerestecioğlu’s speech, an MP of HDP, before June
2018 election is important:
“We will get the votes of the leftist people in Turkey. We are the real left of
Turkey because of our inclusive policies for all people.”121
This is a rational strategy for a minority party to survive during the elections.
CEU eTD Collection 119 Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP)., “Mülteciler, Hakları, Sorunları ve Çözüm Önerileri.” HDP Araştırma Birimi Yuvarlak Masa Toplantı Raporu: 5-64. (In English, “Refugees, Their Rights, Their Problems, and Alternative Solutions.” HDP Round Table Report of Research.) January 2016. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/raporlar/hdp-raporlari/multeci-raporu/8742. 120 Celep, Ödül. (2017) “The moderation of Turkey’s Kurdish left: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).” Turkish Studies, Vol. 19, No. 5: 727-743. 121 “HDP’den dörtlü ittifak yorumu: CHP’nin sol seçmenine yazık.” (In English, “HDP’s comment on alliance of four parties: It is unfortunate for the leftist voters of CHP.” Sputnik Turkey. May 2, 2018. Accessed date May 22, 2019. https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201805021033274980-hdp-chp-iyi-parti-sp-dp-ittifaki/. 31
CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNIC TOLERANCE IN TURKEY: DO THE LEFTISTS DIFFERENTIATE?
4.1. The Syrian refugees and CHP
CHP excluded the non-Muslims in the early Republican era during its single party rule
(1923-1950). This is a clear example of its ethnonational exclusion122 and nationalism vis-a-vis
the Greek people who were exchanged with the Turks of Greece in 1923.123 There were loyal
Greek origin-Turks, and they were also sent to Greece because of their Orthodox identity.124 In
a consistent manner of its exclusionary policies, “1934 anti-Jewish Thrace riots were planned
actions by CHP.”125 It was resulted in an expulsion of the Jews and a visible decrease in their
population in Turkey. The main pattern of expulsion(s) of both Greeks and Jews was to destroy
their economic position in Turkey and create a space for the Turks to maximize their economic
activities.126 As indicated in the previous Chapter, in the first plural party elections of Turkey,
1946, there was no reaction against CHP by its electorate to protect the rights of the non-
Muslims. This is a clear example of how the voters for CHP is the dominant part of the Turkish
society and nationalist because when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded modern Turkey in 1923,
he aimed to consolidate civic Turkish identity for the sake of the Turkish nation state. CHP was
also founded by him, and it aimed to represent dominant Turkish part of the society. Excluded
part was pushed to define themselves as Turk (and Muslim).
CEU eTD Collection 122 Eligur, Banu. (2019) “Ethnocultural nationalism and Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities during the early republican period.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol, 46, No. 1: 158. 123 Akturk, Sener. (2009) “Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti- Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 45, No. 6: 896. 124 Ibid 896. 125 Eligur, Banu. (2017) “The 1934 anti-Jewish Thrace riots: the Jewish exodus of Thrace through the lens of nationalism and collective violence.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1: 88. 126 Ibid., Akturk, Sener. “Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood.” 32
Furthermore, civic nationalism-based exclusion was also seen in the ontology of CHP
against Kurds because of Turkey’s suppression of its citizens by naming them as Turks.127 In
other words, there was no binary-either Turk or Kurd-in the early Republican era by CHP, and
everybody was named as Turk. This demonstrates how the Turkish identity is important for
CHP from the beginning of its foundation. For Atatürk, Turkish identity is the future of Turkey.
As discussed in the third Chapter, during 1960s, the inclusionary social democracy
started to become an ideology of the party. Moreover, with Kılıçdaroğlu, solidarity and equality
as new principles are targeted to integrate in both party and Turkey and a reconciliation with
their own people of Turkey, native minorities, who were othered in the early Republican era
started. Hence, if the early Republican era is also evaluated as the left, for Belge, it is not a kind
of the history of Turkish socialism, this is a typical example of Turkish fascism.128 Kılıçdaroğlu
tries to include the motto of “tolerance”129 that belongs to left on behalf of the party. However,
it works and is accessible for their own people in the current situation. In other words, the
refugees and asylum seekers are not subject to Kılıçdaroğlu’s grand inclusionary policy. As
Kaya observed in his research that despite the electoral decisions of native minorities, Greeks
or Jews, are not visible in Turkey, a certain reconciliation is a part of Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric
with native minorities of Turkey.130 However, for now, the pattern to exclude is observed
against the Syrians who live in Turkey by CHP. Furthermore, Doğan’s research proves, in CEU eTD Collection
127 Eligur, Banu. “Ethnocultural nationalism and Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities during the early republican period.”: 158. 128 Belge, Murat. (2009) “Nationalism, Democracy and the Left in Turkey.” Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1: 18. 129 Çarkoğlu, Ali. (2007) “The Nature of Left–Right Ideological Self‐placement in the Turkish Context.” Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2: 268. 130 Kaya, Ayhan. (2013) “Applying Tolerance Indicators: Annex to the Report on Political Tolerance for Native Minorities.” Accept Pluralism, 2013/19 A: 9-14. 33
general, nationalism of electorate of CHP against the Syrians by perceiving them as national
threat and burden.131 Thus, they do not want the Syrians in Turkey.
What do CHP's electorates think of work permit for the Syrian refugees?
Cons 22% Hesitants 52% Pros 26%
What do CHP's electorates think of residence permit for the Syrian refugees?
18% Cons Hesitants 24% 58% Pros
“KONDA Clauster of Voter: Voters of CHP” 41-42.
When I analyze the electoral manifestos of CHP for the elections after the Syrian refugee
influx started to come in Turkey, there are clear points that were preserved in each of them for
the refugees. In the manifestos of June 2015, November 2015, and June 2018 parliamentary
CEU eTD Collection elections; aspect of the Syria refugees, the repeated argument is to prevent “unfair competition
in the labour market”.132 It means, the burden of the Syrian refugees causes this problem
131 Doğan, Sevinç. “KONDA Seçmen Kümeleri: CHP Seçmenleri.” (In English “KONDA Clauster of Voter: Voters of CHP.”) 38-40. 132 (First) This manifesto could not be accessed via the official website of CHP. It was retrieved from Radikal (daily newspaper in Turkey). “CHP’nin 2015 seçim bildirgesinin tam metni.” (In English, “The whole text of 2015 34
because of their existence in Turkey. CHP’s constituencies are working class, therefore most
threatened by job losses with the immigrants. This reminds us ethnonational exclusion of CHP
in the early Republican era by referring to economic reasons. In the last electoral manifesto,
inclusionary rhetoric, especially for the Syrian refugee children are also seen.133 Moreover, in
the Migration Report of CHP, ethnographic researches and daily problems of Syrian children
and women are discussed in detail.134 Hence, in the written documents of CHP, exclusion is not
as harsh in the statements of both Kılıçdaroğlu and party members. After the analysis on
Kılıçdaroğlu’s five speeches and interviews that contain the issue of the Syrian refugees in
Turkey, exclusion is concrete against the Syrians.
Moreover, in the selected five speeches and actions from the party members vis-à-vis
the Syrian refugees who live in Turkey, the consistency with Kılıçdaroğlu is seen, but inclusion,
solidarity and equality principles of the social democratic party understanding are not clear.
Social democracy is close to exclude less harshly than the right and extreme right because of
its ethnic pluralism. But, in this case, historical nationalism of CHP and its electorate
demonstrate why the left-wing parties are welfare chauvinist despite the parties’ humanitarian
and egalitarian core. Social identity theory explains this. People who “belong to a social
category and group” categorize themselves as self, so out-group is not important.135 Hence, in
electoral manifesto of CHP.”) April 19, 2015. Accessed date April 28, 2019. http://www.radikal.com.tr/secim- 2015/chpnin-2015-secim-bildirgesinin-tam-metni-1339188/., (Second) It was reached from the archive of t24, website of daily news in Turkey. “CHP’nin 2015 Kasım Seçim Bildirgesi: Önce Türkiye.” (In English, “2015 November Electoral Manifesto of CHP: First Turkey.”) September 30, 2015. Accessed date April 29, 2019. https://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-chpnin-secim-bildirgesinin-tam-metni,311360., (Third) It was accessed from the official website of CHP. “CHP’nin 2018 Seçim Bildiregi: Millet için Geliyoruz.” (In English, “CHP-2018 Electoral Manifesto: We come for Millet (Nation).” May 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2018. CEU eTD Collection http://secim2018.chp.org.tr/files/CHP-SecimBildirgesi-2018-icerik.pdf. 133 It was accessed from the official website of CHP. “2018 Seçim Bildiregi: Millet için Geliyoruz.” (In English, “2018 Electoral Manifesto: We come for Millet (Nation).” May 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2018. http://secim2018.chp.org.tr/files/CHP-SecimBildirgesi-2018-icerik.pdf. 134 It was accessed from the website of the Research Centre of Asylum and Migration in Turkish. “CHP Göç ve Göçmen Sorunlarını İnceleme Komisyonu Mülteci Raporu.” (In English, “Refugee Report of CHP on the Problems of Migration and Migrants by the Committee of Investigation.”) June 20, 2016. Accessed date April 29, 2018. https://www.igamder.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/SINIRLAR-ARASINDA-BASKI2.pdf. 135 Stets, Jan E. and Burke, Peter J. (2000) “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory.” Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 3: 225. 35
general, ideology does not matter in the dichotomy of either exclusion or inclusion of
immigrants. Ideology is an expected way to think possible party patterns for them, but the other
reasons, as the discussed historical nationalism, matter for the degrees of exclusion among the
left-wing parties for their electoral considerations.
Chronologically, firstly, in 2014, he participated in one of the discussion programs in
CNN Turkey with Ahmet Hakan. During his round, firstly, he mentions the current grievances
of the Syrian refugee children and women in Turkey referring to the international reports. As a
conclusion, he adds that “being traitor is to allow the 1.500.000 Syrians to enter in Turkey.”136
Hence, the Syrian refugees are seen as a burden for Turkey, and acceptance of them is a national
anomaly for him because of their economic cost on the Turkish nation.
Secondly, In the Summer of 2016, the issue of citizenship for the Syrians became a
scandal for CHP, and according to news of Al Jazeera, Kılıçdaroğlu’s one of the first reactions
is close to virulent nationalistic arguments. He says that “the acceptance of the Syrian refugees
at that level aims to destroy Turkish genetic code.”137 This claim also refers to hate and
primordial understanding that is observed during the expulsions of early Republican period.
Thirdly, just before the election in June 2018, in his one of the interviews, he states,
“there is no conflictual and catastrophic situation in Syria anymore, then they (the Syrian
refugees) should go back to their hometown now.”138 However, just after one day, according to
the news of Al Jazeera, “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad warned US-backed Kurdish forces CEU eTD Collection
136 Kemal Kılıçdaoğlu participated in an interview by Ahmet Hakan in CNN Turkey in October 2014. Accessed date April 29, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iBn5WNwsu8I. 137 Al Jazeera Turkey. “Muhalefetten ‘Suriyelilere vatandaşlık’ tepkisi.” (In English, “A reaction by the opposition against ‘the citizenship of the Syrians’.”) July 12, 2016. Accessed date April 29, 2018. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/muhalefetten-suriyelilere-vatandaslik-tepkisi. 138 Sputnik Turkey. “Kılıçdaroğlu: Suriyeliler artık ülkelerine dönmeli.” (In English, “Kılıçdaroğlu: The Syrian refugees should go to their country now.”) May 30, 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2019. https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201805301033653670-kemal-kilicdaroglu-suriyeliler-ulkelerine-donmeli/. 36
he wouldn't hesitate to use force to retake one-third of the country they currently control.”139
Hence, there is no total peaceful conditions for the refugees in Syria when he speaks on behalf
of them, and an expulsion is aimed for the refugees.
Fourthly, in October 2018, one of the labour workshops of Turkey, Kılıçdaroğlu
criticizes AKP and its refugee policy by comparing Turks and Syrians. He says, “you donated
$35.000.000.000 for the Syrian refugees who live in Turkey, but for the pensions of Turkey?”140
“I am not fascist; I just protect the rights of my own people.”141 Therefore, the focus on “their
own people” is seen again in a nationalistic sense for electoral considerations.
Lastly, in December 2018, in an interview for Hürriyet, a daily Turkish newspaper, he
responded the questions of Deniz Zeyrek. He concludes that “educate the Syrians, they should
fight for their country.”142 Hence, territory is seen as sacred by him. It demonstrates primordial
nationalism in CHP. Moreover, it is argued for another ethnic group. So, for the preservation
of ethnic purity of Turkey, they are tried to be dismissed by referring primordial nationalist
arguments.
By referring to these arguments that are stated by Kılıçdaroğlu during his tenure as a
party leader of CHP, exclusionary understanding is concrete against the Syrians. Moreover, he
gets close to virulent nationalism by referring to “Turkish genetic code”. Also, he clearly depicts
how he does not care the lives and security of the Syrians by offering to resend them without
peaceful conditions in Syria. And, the focus and main desire to protect is seen for their own
139 Al Jazeera. “Syria’s Assad Vows to Retake Areas Held by US-Backed Kurds.” May 31, 2018. Accessed date CEU eTD Collection April 29, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/syria-assad-vows-retake-areas-held-backed-kurds- 180531072938002.html. 140 Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech was from one of the labour workshops in Turkey. “Kılıçdaroğlu: Suriyelilere veriyorsun, emekliye yok.” (In English, “Kılıçdaroğlu: you just donate for the Syrians, no for pensions.”) October 23, 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=modIz61rvtw. 141 Ibid. 142 It was accessed from the archive of CNN Turkey. “Kılıçdaroğlu: Suriyelileri eğitin, ülkeleri için savaşsınlar.” (In English, Kılıçdaroğlu: Educate the Syrians, they should fight for their country.”) December 11, 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2019. https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/kilicdaroglu-suriyelileri-egitin-ulkeleri-icin- savassinlar. 37
people, not refugees. The focus on protection of their own people is about electoral
considerations to obtain the votes of nationalist dominant part of the society like in the past.
Exclusionary and nationalistic rhetoric within CHP is not unique for Kemal
Kılıçdaroğlu. Among party members, there are similar statements vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees.
Firstly, in March 2018, an MP of CHP, Erdoğan Toprak speaks similar with Kılıçdaroğlu’s
rhetoric against the refugees. He states, “they live in Turkey, but my young boys will die for
them. Turkey donates money for them and protects their health (rights). Turkish citizens have
to pay for their health (insurances), but they don’t. Turkish citizens have to pay tax, but they
don’t. The time for the watch is for them (the Syrian refugees who live in Turkey).”143 In this
quotation, it is clear that he thinks they should join the Free Syrian Army to defend their country.
This argument is consistent with Wimmer and Schiller Glick who explained that one of claims
of the nationalists who are against the immigrants in their societies is to accuse the immigrants.
Additionally, Muharrem İnce, the last presidential candidate of CHP in the former
presidential elections of Turkey, in his one of the public speeches in TV channels, talks about
the Syrians. He questions “how the Syrians return to Syria to visit their families during the
religious fests.”144 He says, “if they prefer to visit their relatives, I won’t receive them back to
Turkey.”145 “Turkey is not a kind of public soup-kitchen. My own people are unemployed.”146
In this speech, the focus on their own people is protected. But also, celebration of the religious
fest is seen as criteria that the refugees should not be part of it due to their refugee identity and
143 Sputnik Turkey. “CHP Milletvekili Toprak: Suriyeli mülteciler eğitilerek ÖSO bünyesine alınmalı.” (In English, CEU eTD Collection “A Member of Parliament of CHP, Toprak: The Syrian refugees should join the Free Syrian Army by teaching them military education.”) March 4, 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2019. https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201803041032492289-chp-erdogan-toprak-suriyeli-multeciler-egitilerek- oso-bunyesine-alinmali/. 144 Cumhuriyet. “Muharrem İnce: Bayrama giden Suriyeli’yi almam.” (In English, “Muharrem İnce: I don’t accept the Syrians who go to Syria for the religious fest.”) May 24, 2018. Accessed date April 29, 2019. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/982379/Muharrem_ince__Bayrama_giden_Suriyeli_yi_almam.h tml. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 38
current trauma. If they prefer, it means there is no trauma for them and there is no chaotic
situation in Syria. This is a clear example of nesting-orientalism(s). The Syrians are othered
because of their identity and the situation in their state. They are also othered orientally by
referring their religious celebration.
Another comparison between their own people and the Syrian refugees is made by
Ayhan Barut, an MP of CHP. In his one of the parliamentary speeches in October 2018, he
refers to seasonal workers of ÇAYKUR. He states that “ÇAYKUR, a Turkish tea company, has
seasonal workers, and they cannot work six months.”147 Barut discussed this issue in the Turkish
Parliament to solve the future-related problems of these workers. He compares their situation
with the Syrians and “criticizes AKP due to its spending for the lives of the Syrians in
Turkey.”148 When CHP is analyzed historically, in the early Republican era, the non-Muslim
workers were dismissed from their positions149, and this is a similar way to alienate the Syrians
in social and economic spheres of Turkey by prioritizing their own people.
Moreover, in March 2019, CHP’s Platform of Science criticizes AKP. The main focus
is how the refugees stole the jobs of our citizens when they criticize the wrong migration policy
of AKP.150 They demonstrate the main discourse of the xenophobia against the Syrians. Just
after around one month these critiques, in the municipal elections of Turkey, CHP increases the
numbers of its mayors. Tanju Özcan was elected as a new mayor of city of Bolu from CHP.
After he received his official document (mandate) to start working as a new mayor of Bolu, his
147 It is a parliamentary speech of Ayhan Barut, MP of CHP. “CHP Milletvekili Barut: Suriyelilere Para Varken CEU eTD Collection ÇAYKUR Mevsimlik İşçisine Neden Para ve Kadro Yok.” (In English, “CHP’s MP, Barut: There is money for the Syrians, but there is no money and official cadre for the seasonal workers of ÇAYKUR.” October 10, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxF8f0lBvCY. 148 Ibid. 149 Eligür, Banu. “Ethnocultural nationalism and Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities during the early republican period.”: 166 150 T24. “CHP Bilim Platformu: Sarayın yanlış göçmen politikasının faturasını vatandaş ödüyor.” (In English, “CHP’s Platform of Science: The citizens face the results of the wrong migration policy of the Palace.”) March 16, 2019. Accessed date April 29, 2019. https://t24.com.tr/haber/chp-bilim-platformu-sarayin-yanlis-gocmen- politikasinin-faturasini-vatandas-oduyor,812434. 39
first action was to stop any sort of aids for the Syrian who live in Bolu from the budget of
municipality.151 Hence, alienation of the refugees from Turkey, in an economically sense, is
also a repeated action by the party members of CHP for the sake of their own people and
electoral considerations.
CEU eTD Collection
151 Euronews Turkey. “Bolu'nun yeni CHP'li Belediye Başkanı Özcan'dan ilk icraat: Suriyeli mültecilere yardım kesildi.” (In English, “The first action of the new mayor (from CHP) of Bolu, Özcan: The aids for the Syrians were cancelled.”) April 10, 2019. Accessed date April 29, 2019. https://tr.euronews.com/2019/04/10/bolu-nun-yeni- chp-li-belediye-baskani-ozcan-dan-ilk-icraat-suriyeli-multecilere-yardim-yok.
40
4.2. The Syrian refugees and HDP
HDP does not refer to Kurdish issue and demands of Kurdish people in its migration
policy on the Syrians. There is no hierarchal understanding in HDP when it analyses the Syrians
in Turkey, and it does not alienate them from its party agenda because HDP sees immigrants
and refugees as a part of its constituents. It is clearly indicated in the party constitution:
“HDP is the party for the excluded part of Turkey. It is for all folks, all religion
communities, women, workers, the unemployed, immigrants, LGBT+. We came
together against exclusion and exploitation.”152
Although some of the Syrians have citizenship, therefore they are effective actors during
the vote competition, HDP does include all refugees in an inclusive way. It is important to see
(in)visible weak nationalism of social democracy and political inclusion of HDP in a consistent
manner with its multi-dimensional minority party politics.
Moreover, in contrast to nationalistic pattern of CHP against the Syrians, there is no
reference for historical patterns and behaviors of ethnically Kurdish group in Turkey. HDP
consciously avoids referring to historical Kurdish issue in its migration policy to depict itself
as a totally inclusive party as it can be understood from the rhetoric of bizler (plural version of
“we” in Turkish and the motto of the party).153 One of the most concrete examples of its
inclusive and separate migration policy is that there is no room to refer to PKK, Partiya
Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdish militant political organization. It is not reframed or associated CEU eTD Collection
with the Syrians. PKK is a guerrilla movement in Turkey for the democratic autonomy of
152 HDP Parti Tüzüğü. (In English, “HDP Party Consitution.”) Last version uploaded in June 22, 2014. Accessed date May 22, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/parti/parti-tuzugu/10. 153 Tekdemir, Omer. “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.”: 657 41
Kurds. Although HDP does not block the whole channels with PKK, it never repeats its name
and its arguments in its other policies.154
To understand the migration policy of HDP for the Syrians, I will analyze electoral
manifestos of the last three parliamentary elections that HDP participated, migration report of
HDP, and statements of party leaders and party members. In the formulation of migration
policy, the target is to demonstrate HDP’s both leftist and minority party position for the Syrians
by not referring to historical patterns for political and total inclusion of the refugees.
In the electoral manifesto of June 2015 elections, there was no direct article for the
Syrian refugees as a specific subtitle or article. HDP stated the Syrian refugees in its electoral
manifesto in November 2015 elections to include them in Turkey. Hence, HDP realizes why
the Syrians are also important for its constituencies in its second election. However, in terms of
the foreign policy of HDP, the party states to “work to end the civil war in Syria. We struggle
for a solution that depends on brotherhood and equality.”155 Moreover, at the beginning of the
manifesto, the repeated concepts are “rights of all of us”, “freedom of everybody”, “justice”
and “equality”.156
For the elections of November 2015, the same focus of the June electoral manifesto for
Syria is preserved:
“We work to end the civil war in Syria. We struggle for a solution that depends on brotherhood
and equality.”157
CEU eTD Collection 154 Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. “The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the 2015 elections.”: 40, Gunes, Cengiz. “Turkey’s New Left.”: 28. 155 This manifesto was retrieved from the official website of the HDP for the 7 June 2015 parliamentary election. “HDP 2015 Seçim Bildirgesi: Büyük İnsanlık Çağrısı.” (In English, “HDP 2015 Electoral Manifesto: Invitation for the Grand Humanity.”) April 23, 2015. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/materyaller/secim-arsivi/genel-secim-7-haziran/6010: 45. 156 Ibid 3. 157 This manifesto was retrieved from the official website of the HDP for the 1 November 2015 parliamentary election. “HDP 2015 Seçim Bildirgesi: Büyük İnsanlık, Biz’ler meclise.” (In English, “HDP 2015 Electoral Manifesto: Grand Humanity, We(s) into the Assembly.” Accessed date May 2, 2019. 42
Furthermore, under the title of “Struggle against Unemployment”, there is a specific
article for inclusionary policies of immigrants:
“All discriminations are tried to be prevented against women, LGBT+ members, and migrants
who have different native tongues, identity, and culture.”158 Historically marginalized people
are integrated into the agenda of the party in a leftist sense.159
Also, in the same manifesto, there is a specific chapter named as “Humanitarian Attitude
for the Immigrants”:
“Migrant workers will be worked as if they were citizens of Turkey.”160 “Secure living
conditions, secure corridors to reach Turkey, and making easier the visa application processes
are other points.”161 In the articles of this chapter, the main focus is on right to live and right to
work for the refugees without any discrimination.
For the electoral manifesto of June 2018 elections, the same focus for the sake of
independent Syria is also preserved.162 Also, the problems of the refugee women are targeted
to be solved due to their refugee and woman identity.163
As seen in the electoral manifestos of the CHP in the three consecutive parliamentary
elections, inclusionary rhetoric is also visible in the case of HDP. HDP’s rhetoric gets close to
https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/HDP%20Se%C3%A7im%20Bildirgesi%20Tam%20 Metin.pdf: 13. 158 Ibid 35-36. 159 Tekdemir, Omer. “Conflict and Reconciliation between Turks and Kurds: the HDP as an agonistic actor.”: 12. 160 This manifesto was retrieved from the official website of the HDP for the 1 November 2015 parliamentary CEU eTD Collection election. “HDP 2015 Seçim Bildirgesi: Büyük İnsanlık, Biz’ler meclise.” (In English, “HDP 2015 Electoral Manifesto: Grand Humanity, We(s) into the Assembly.” Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/HDP%20Se%C3%A7im%20Bildirgesi%20Tam%20 Metin.pdf: 45-46. 161 Ibid 45-46. 162 This manifesto was retrieved from the official website of the HDP for the 24 June 2018 parliamentary election. “2018 HDP Seçim Bildirgesi: Biz’le Değişir.” (In English, “2018 HDP Electoral Manifesto: Changes with Us.”) Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/materyaller/secim-arsivi/24-haziran- secimleri/11967: 64. 163 Ibid 89. 43
solve the problems of the immigrants and for the protection of their lives by depending on
equality principle of the social democracy.
In HDP’s report for the problems of refugees, the same inclusive narrative for the
refugees is observed:
“When HDP analyzes the case of refugees it is necessary to say that it is an
internal issue, and it should be dealt with in the borders of Turkey.”164 “Another focus
is on the total acceptance of the refugees in Turkey and provide them rights in the social
and economic spheres in a structured manner.”165 “HDP decides to fight against
religion-based and ethnicity-based discrimination against the refugees.”166
Thus, when HDP indicates the issue of religion and ethnicity-based discrimination, it is
clear that defensive nationalism of CHP is not visible in HDP.167 The process of orientalization
and otherification cannot find a place in the party agenda. This is key to see how HDP
formulates an inclusive party structure in a rational manner to maximize its numbers of voters.
In the statements of party leaders and members, in contrast to certain exclusion of CHP,
human rights and equality-orientated explanations are observed for the Syrians. Before
analyzing the speeches and actions of party members, it is necessary to remind that as Tarlan
stated, the electoral camp of HDP is more positive and inclusionary for the Syrians in a
comparison with the other parties of the current Turkish parliament. So, HDP also represents CEU eTD Collection
164 Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP)., “Mülteciler, Hakları, Sorunları ve Çözüm Önerileri.” HDP Araştırma Birimi Yuvarlak Masa Toplantı Raporu: 5-64. (In English, “Refugees, Their Rights, Their Problems, and Alternative Solutions.” HDP Round Table Report of Research.) January 2016. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/raporlar/hdp-raporlari/multeci-raporu/8742: 65. 165 Ibid 66. 166 Ibid 66. 167 Celep, Ödül. “The moderation of Turkey’s Kurdish left: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).”: 726. 44
the people who care the Syrians in Turkey.168 In a consistent manner with Tarlan’s argument,
KONDA’s research demonstrates inclusive ideas of the electorates of HDP for the Syrians:
What do HDP's electorates think of the Syrian refugees?
The Syrian refugees should be accepted in Turkey because of the historical and geographical 0% responsibility of Turkey The Syrian refugees should be 47% accepted in Turkey because of 53% humanitarian responsibility
Against the Syrian refugees in Turkey
“KONDA Clauster of Voter: Voters of CHP”-February 2016
In October 2014, the current chairwoman of HDP, Pervin Buldan, questioned the
marriage scandals of fifty-four child-girls in one of the refugee camps.169 She conducted an
ethnographic research, and according the claims of the refugee families, they have to allow
these marriages due to the security of their daughters. In the rhetoric of HDP, it directly accuses
AKP in a similar manner with the elites of CHP, but they totally care the right and welfare of
the refugees.170 That’s why they criticize AKP how it could not establish secure living
conditions for the refugees. There is no point to accuse the Syrians and to target to resend them
CEU eTD Collection 168 Tarlan, Kemal Vural. (2016) “Vatandaşlık ve İskan Kıskacında: Suriyeli Mülteciler.” (In English, “In the Binary of Citizenship and Settlement: The Syrian Refugees.”) Birikim Dergisi. http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel- yazilar/7793/vatandaslik-ve-iskan-kiskacinda-suriyeli-multeciler#.XMrMD1szbIU. 169 It was retrieved from the official website of the HDP, and it is a parliamentary question by Pervin Buldan to Efkan Ala, the Minister of Internal Affairs at that time. “Buldan AFAD kampındaki tecavüz iddialarını Ala’ya sordu.” (In English, “Buldan asked the rape scandals in the camp of AFAD to Ala.”) December 3, 2014. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/guncel/meclis-calismalari/buldan-afad-kampindaki-tecavuz- iddialarini-alaya-sordu/5607. 170 Ibid. 45
to Syria as a solution in the agenda of the party members and no reference for ethnic demands
of Kurds.
In July 2016, Demirtaş, before he was arrested, mentioned the possibility of citizenships
of the Syrians:
“Firstly, we should give them, the Syrians, the refugee rights. Then, if some of them prefer,
they can be citizens of Turkey.”171
In contrast to CHP, there is no perception of threat by the Syrians against the Turkish
race via citizenship. In the news of Al Jazeera, at the same meeting, Demirtaş states, “when I
proposed the idea of referendum for the citizenship of the Syrians, I could not explain myself
correctly. I did not want to exclude anybody, and it is not our party politics. We care about the
rights of the Syrians in Turkey.”172 He also clarifies his blurred explanation vis-à-vis the
refugees to depict the total inclusion of the party.
In October 2018, Sezai Temelli, current chairman of HDP criticizes Erdoğan because
he argues how Erdoğan does not obey the law of the refugee and how he uses the bodies of the
refugees for his corrupted politics.173 In a similar manner with CHP, HDP argues the failure of
AKP in its Syrian policy, but there is no visible or embedded hate or exclusionary attacks
against the Syrians who live in Turkey in contrast to CHP.
In a consistent manner with former and current party leaders, party members also argue
the issue of the Syrians extensively inclusionary. This is certain in their speeches and also in
171 Demirtaş’s speech that was recorded during a meeting for solidarity in İzmir was retrieved from Hürriyet. CEU eTD Collection “Demirtaş’tan ‘Suriyelilere vatandaşlık’ açıklaması.” (In English, Clarification for the citizenship of the Syrians.” July 13, 2016. Accessed date May 2, 2019. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/demirtastan-suriyelilere- vatandaslik-aciklamasi-40144578. 172 This news was retrieved from the website of Al Jazeera Turkey. “Demirtaş: Referandum diyerek haksızlık yaptım.” (In English, “Demirtaş: I made a mistake by proposing the referendum.”) July 14, 2016. Accessed date May 2, 2019. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/demirtas-referandum-diyerek-haksizlik-yaptim. 173 This speech was made for an evaluation of Brunson affair between Turkey and the USA by Sezai Temelli and retrieved from a Turkish daily news website, Evrensel. “Sezai Temelli: Mevzu pazarlık, rahip bir figür.” (In English, “Sezai Temelli: The case is bargaining, priest is just a figure.”) October 13, 2018. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/363515/sezai-temelli-mevzu-pazarlik-rahip-bir-figur. 46
their actions. Inclusion of the Syrians is generally argued as a compulsory step of the migration
policy of HDP.
“Integration policies for the Syrians should be prepared to protect their cultural
differentiation. They should continue to speak in their native tongue, and we should
respect for their religion/rituals of religion.”174
In July 2016, in the interview that was conducted by the DW Turkey with Mithat Sancar,
an MP of HDP, by Hilal Köylü, he clearly depicts the party policy of HDP for the Syrians. He
states, “HDP always cares the rights and lives of the Syrian in Turkey and will say yes for
everything to contribute positively to their daily lives. However, AKP uses them in its polices,
and clearly this is a depiction how AKP corrupts the case of the Syrians in Turkey.”175
Before June 2018 election in Turkey, Yalçın Yanık, an MP candidate of HDP who has
African root, mainly defenses the proletariat and losers of the society. He is also familiar among
the Syrian refugees who live in İzmir and he tries to solve the daily problems of the Syrian
refugees.176 This is quite important example because an African root MP candidate defenses
the rights of the refugees. This is a clear illustration of how HDP is “the champion of more than
one ethnic groups” as a minority party in consistent with Chandra’s argument.
In 18 January 2019, HDP wanted to investigate the issue of human trafficking,
especially for the refugees, with a parliamentary inquiry. The focus is generally on the Syrian
174 Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP)., “Mülteciler, Hakları, Sorunları ve Çözüm Önerileri.” HDP Araştırma Birimi Yuvarlak Masa Toplantı Raporu: 5-64. (In English, “Refugees, Their Rights, Their Problems, and CEU eTD Collection Alternative Solutions.” HDP Round Table Report of Research.) January 2016. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/raporlar/hdp-raporlari/multeci-raporu/8742. 175 It was retrieved from the website of the DW Turkey. “Suriyelilere vatandaşlık tartışması.” (In English, “The debate of citizenship for the Syrians.”) July 5, 2016. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.dw.com/tr/suriyelilere-vatanda%C5%9Fl%C4%B1k-tart%C4%B1%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1/a- 19377980. 176 The information about Yalçık Yanık was retrieved form the interview of BBC Turkey before the June 2018 election. “Yalçın Yanık: HDP’nin Afrika kökenli İzmir milletvekili adayı.” (In English, “Yalçın Yanık: the MP candidate of HDP who has African root.”) June 4, 2018. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-44331693. 47
refugees, and how their lives destroyed during the process to refuge.177 This is quite important
because during a parliamentary session, the issue of Syrian refugees is argued by HDP. So, as
for Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst stated, minority parties can serve political voices of the migrants
during legislative processes.
Moreover, in one of the parliamentary speeches of Ertuğrul Kürkçü, honorary president
of HDP, argues the foreign policy of AKP on Syria. He concludes that “today we have the
Syrians in Turkey, and now we have to share our bread.”178 He also focuses on the issue of
citizenship as a solution which depends on equality principle of the HDP’s “grand humanity”.
As a response to Erdoğan Toprak who wants the participation of the Syrian refugees in
the Free Syrian Army as fighter, Gülsüm Ağaoğlu, the spokeswoman of the Commission of
Migrant and Refugees in HDP blames him. Ağaoğlu:
“We totally against a new warfare, and we against the death of the refugees. Otherizations and
exclusions against the refugees cannot be accepted though the human rights and by us.”179
Ağaoğlus’s statement is a way to see the main differentiation between CHP and HDP in
their migration policies for the Syrians. There is a difference from the beginning when they
formulate the issue of the Syrians in their agenda. That’s why contradiction is inevitable and
sharply visible.
In January 2019, in the parliamentary question hour, Garo Paylan, Armenian MP of
HDP, proposed five refugee-related questions in terms of their right to work, identities, rights,
177 It was retrieved from the official website of the Turkish Parliament, as an official parliamentary inquiry. https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d26/10/10-20425gen.pdf. CEU eTD Collection 178 This speech was retrieved from the official website of HDP. “Kürkçü: Suriyelileri Afrin’e yerleştiremezsiniz, eşit yurttaşlıktan başka çıkış yok.” (In English, “Kürkçü: you cannot settle the Syrians in Afrin, there is no way except the citizenship.”) February 8, 2018. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/guncel/haberler/kurkcu-suriyeli-multecileri-afrine-yerlestiremezsiniz-esit- yurttasliktan-baska-cikis-yok/11602. 179 This criticism was directly retrieved from the official website of HDP and written by Gülsüm Ağaoğlu. “Suriye’den ülkemize sığınan mületiclere yönelik düşmanca politikalar son verin.” (In English, “Stop to hostile policies against the Syrian refugees who asylum in our country.”) March 5, 2018. Accessed May 2, 2019. https://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/basin/basin-aciklamalari/suriyeden-ulkemize-siginan-multecilere-yonelik-dusmanca- politikalara-son-verin/11690. 48
and refugee status for the Minister of Family, Labour, and Social Services, Zehra Zümrüt
Selçuk.180 In other words, he questioned their lives in terms of their legal rights and freedoms
in Turkey as a receiver state, and he referred several scandals.181 As Bloemraad and
Schönwälder observed, minority parties can work as mediating institutions between new-
comers and host states, and HDP’s questioning is an important example of it.
In light of the parliamentary discussions and multi-ethnic representation of HDP, its
politically inclusion and humanitarian rhetoric is sharply visible. Syrians are welcomed, their
problems are internalized and equally treated as problems of Turkey. This fits in the discourse
of bizler. Adopted core of the left is never close to CHP’s historically nationalist position and
when HDP borrows from the arguments of the left: No reference for “defensive nationalism”.
Stories of orientalism(s) are concretely eliminated from both written and rhetorical policies of
the party. Thus, HDP’s migration policies are consistent with scholars who argue inclusive role
of minority parties. HDP does not prioritize just Kurds, and rationally includes more than one
group of the society. This is the strategy for maximization of the votes all around Turkey.
CEU eTD Collection
180 It is a parliamentary discussed that was initiated by Garo Paylan, Armenian MP of HDP, and retrieved from the website of the Turkish daily news, Evrensel. “Garo Paylan, mülteci ölümlerini meclise getirdi.” (In English, “Garo Palyan brings the issue of refugee causalities into the assembly.”) January 22, 2019. Accessed date May 2, 2019. https://www.evrensel.net/haber/371725/garo-paylan-multeci-olumlerini-meclis-gundemine-getirdi. 181 Ibid. 49
CONCLUSION
This thesis explores why ideologically similar parties do not always support similar
migration policies in their states. Inclusive or exclusive policies cannot be generalized by
referring to ideologies of the parties. In other words, there can be a dissonance between
ideologically inclusive parties/left-wing parties. I selected Turkey as a case study because since
the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis (2011), Turkey received huge number of the Syrian
refugees, and the acceptance rate of the Syrians caused a dissonance between the political
parties of the Turkish parliament.
Selected parties define themselves as social democratic and left-leaning parties in terms
of their inclusive society formulation. Majority left-wing party, CHP, excludes sharply the
Syrian refugees. Despite weak nationalism of the left to exclude immigrants, CHP excludes
them in a virulent nationalistic path, and its exclusion against the Syrians draws heavily from a
reservoir of ethnosymbolism182 embedded historical nationalism of the party and that of its
electorate. In the early Republican era of Turkey, CHP excluded non-Muslims, especially
Greeks and Jews, from Turkey via expulsion and dismissing from state offices in consolidating
ethno-cultural control over the state. Also, for the sake of civic Turkish nationalism, CHP
excluded Kurdish identity during the single party rule (1923-1950). As Mardin argued that CHP
focused on the votes of Turkey’s center. In other words, the dominant Turkish nation was the
goal of CHP in the elections. Hence, in the early Republican era, native minorities and Kurds
are dismissed from its electorate. In the first plural party election of Turkey, 1946, the absolute
victory of CHP is a way to understand that its electorate was not suspicious of the CHP due to CEU eTD Collection the exclusion of non-Muslims and Kurds. In its current migration policy, the targeted aim is to
exclude and expulsion of the Syrians from Turkey for the sake of their own people, and their
182 Kaufman, Stuart J. (2001) Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Cornell University Press. 50
social and economic welfare. Therefore, CHP comes close to the extreme right by reflecting its
historical nationalism which is part of party formation and its electorate.
On the other side, ethnically left-wing party of Turkey, HDP, tries to include all
segments of the society by not prioritizing its ethnic friends/Kurds. Hence, even the weak
nationalism of the left is not visible in HDP when it formulates its migration policy for the
Syrians. In this thesis, the aim is to demonstrate the political inclusion of minority parties
especially for the disadvantaged groups. Giddens’s inclusionary society structure of social
democracy nourishes ethnically left-wing parties, so in general, the focus on protection of their
own people is not seen among these parties because they rationally prefer to include everybody.
Moreover, HDP’s inclusive policies for the Syrians is consistent with Chandra’s focus on
“multiple dimensions of ethnic (minority) parties”. On the road of more inclusive minority party
politics, they avoid referring to historical patterns of its founding ethnic group. This situation is
seen risky for an inclusive minority party, and that’s why the problems of their ethnic group is
seen as one separate chapter of their party agendas. HDP’s migration policy and approach for
the Syrians fit in inclusive multi-dimensional understanding of minority parties in a rational
manner for the elections. Hence, in this research, the comparison between ideologically
inclusive parties, CHP and HDP, aims to show the failure of the scholars who argue conflictual,
destabilizing, and polarizer role of minority parties by demonstrating a certain degree of
inclusion of a minority party which is unexpected.
CEU eTD Collection
51
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