Hob'Armored Corps- Centra)

Circular No. 6 0061630

Washington D, C, Septenber 27, 1944-•

Foreign Liaison Branch, Roon 2B 715, Pentagon Bldg,, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Royal Armoured Corps - Central Mediterranean Force Operational Circular No. 6.

% are' enclosing the above nanod report for your ON •y, infernation. Distribution has been made as shoTin below. 01

C. A - ^ 'c vt. Jc hif/C ff/V V/ A, H, Gatehouse, Major-General

A.F.V. - S.D, III.

Distribution; Gomd, Gen,, Army Ground Forces, Chief, Research & Development Service, Ord. Dept. Arm, Force Liaison Off,, Aberdeen. G.2, Fort Knox, The Armoured Board, Fort Knox. Commandant, Arm. School, Fort Xnox. Comd, Gen.5 Office, Chief of Ord.-Detroit. Comd. Gen,, 20th Arm, Div. Comd, Gan., Tank Destroyer School. Med. Research Lab., Fort Knox. COFI NO.

R.A.G. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 6.

HQ RAC, c/o MAIN HQ MI,

RAC/30/7/38

9 September 19LL.

1, A circular memorandum entitled "Lessons from Armoured Operations in Recent Fighting" was produced and circulated in this theatre by H,Q, 5 Corps which was recently responsible for the training of a number of formations temporarily in reserve.-

2. It is the province of D.M.T's Branch to consider this document and extract such information as the General Staff consider should be included in official War Office or theatre publications. It is felt, however, that the contents are of such immediate interest from an R.A.C, point of view that they should be circulated as an R.A.C. Operational Circular, the Circular to be read merely as a statement of views having the degree of authority indicated in this covering letter and in the document itself. Obviously th^so notes are of immediate value to all concerned with R.A.C. equipment and training.

3. The document deals primarily with the period of the recent offensive opera­ tions which commenced on the 12th luay 1944> with the assault on the "Hitler Line", It can only be read with complete understanding if the nature of the terrain in Italy is fully appreciated, and the general strategical and tactical background of tho period is understood. Briefly, during the period in question the enemy, after standing firm and being defeated on his well prepared "Winter Line" north of Rome was forced into a disorganised withdrawal on his whole front. As, however, tho nature of the country precluded the wide turning movements necessary to complete his defeat the pursuit was necessarily direct and the enony was gra­ dually able to recscvcr control. Therefore, he conducted a slow, stubbornly contested co-ordinated withdrawal taking full advantage of the close and difficult country so admirably suited to rearguard fighting. In tho pursuit and follow-up operations our armour lias found scope for employment throughout, but always with limitations as to tho strength which it has been possible to deploy at the point of contact, and only in close co-operation with infantry and the other arms. The onc-my has now reached his next defended line, tho "Gothic Line", tho preparation of which his slow retreat has been designed to cover,

4. The influence which air power has played throughout our operations in Italy must also be taken into account. Throughout the period under review v/o have enjoyed an air superiority which lias been overwhelming from tho enemy's point of vior and may now be described as complete.

(Sgdfl) H.R.3, -lATKINS, Brig. B.R.A.C.

FiEfl ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO.6. m

CONTENTS

LESSONS FROM ARMOURED OPERATIONS IN RECENT FIGHTING (Procluccd by H.Q. 5 Corps)

Papos PART I Tanks 1-12

PART II Infantry Co-operation .12-14- PART III Armoured Rcconnaissanco 14 - 18

PART IV • Artillery 19 - 20 PART V Royal Engineers 20-21 PART VI Mcdical 21-22

PART VII Camouflage 22

PART VIII Air 22 - 23 PART IX Encny 23-25

oOo ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCE

OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 6

LESSON FROM ARMOURED OPERATIONS IN RECENT FIGHTING

(Produced by H.Q. 5 Corps )

PART I - TANKS

1. ORSMIZATION

25 Tk Bdo (a) Formation. NIH had two troops of Churchills supported by two troops Shermans*

NIH consider one troop of Shermans or Churchills fitted with 75$ all that is necessary.

Note by The equipment of two troops per Squadron with Sherman tankg B.R.A.C. was to meet a General Staff requirement for a proportion of 75 mm guns in each tank squadron. The theatre policy is to restore Churchill equipped units to a 100$ Churchill basis as soon as Churchill tonics mounting the 75 mm gun are available. The policy will be to retain always one 6-pr troop owing to the penetrative value of the 6-pr Sabot amn.

6 SA Armd Piv. (b) Notes on Organization.

(i) Under normal operations each Armoured Regiment has tinder command one company of Motor Battalion and a dctachment of RE personnel. In difficult tank country3 additional infantry may be allotted to the leading armoured regiment.

(ii) Reconnaissance Regiment - for operations 9 - 10 J[une 44t two squadrons of Reconnaissance Regiment wore placed under command of the Armd Bde. Those sqns wore working either in front of the leading armd regt or protecting flanks.

Note by The Armd Recce Regt of 6 SA Armd Div is on tho Armd Recce Regt B.R.&.D. Type 'B' Establishment - admixture of cut-dorm Stuart tanks and Sherman Tanks.

(iii) S.P. ftegts were operating as a regtj FOOs were for­ ward with loading troops. It does not seem normal to placo one battery under command of an armd regt, except on very special occasions, Hcnce, normally, there 'rill NOT be Armd Regt Gps complete.'

(iv) Bulldozers have been found extremely useful. Two were kept very wo11 forward with RHQ of Recce Regt. They arc proving invaluable for filling in craters and overcoming demolitions along tho roads. They should be kept as far forward as possible, as they are cumbersome vehicles to bring up quickly.

Note, by Theatre policy is to provide Sherman dozers on a scale of four. . perTank and Armoured Brigado| these to bo hold in FD8. No infor­ mation is at present at hand with regard to tho availability of tho necessary blades from production in USA other than the initial allotments earmarked for 1 Assault Regt RAC/RE

2. 'RECONNAISSANCE.

25 Tk. Bdo. (a) Tank reps must take part in infantry patrols,

(b) Extract from 25 Tk Bde Intelligence Summary. No. 6 - May 25. '£A.

Further investigation shows that the constant changing of plans gave no chance for a reconnaissance before the main attack, and in any case the country is so thick, it is difficult to see _any distance. On the evening of tho 22nd it was docidod that 51 change places in the line, NIK to go on continued/ •2-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAE I" RIGHT and 51 R.Tanks in CENTRE. 51 R.TEHP the RIGHT as they had been fighting there the day before. As a result of this both regiments attacked over ground they had not jboccod and with infantry they did not knot?.

(c) Exercise "r.m.STF.CT'TElT.n" (Hitler Line). Reconnaissance was extremely difficult. Tank reps accompanying infantry night patrols brought good information about the going, but naturally could get none about Anti-Tank guns and MGs. Reconnaissance by day was not possible owing to snipers and raortar fire and the fact that thick . woods prevented anyone seeing very far.

9 Armd Bdo (d) Infantry Commanders must allow Tank Commander adequate time for ground reconnaissance if tank support is expected.

5 Gdn Armd Div (o) Close Country. The country .between CEPMNO and FROSINONE is very close country. The only method of getting tanks forward in this typo of country is for individual tank commanders to dis­ mount and carry out recces on foot. This, naturally, is a very slow procedure and results in holding up the general advance of the force. It is considered that general progress can be made much better by using, in this typo of country, infantry who can go for'rard clearing roads of mines, or with sapper assistance creat­ ing diversions around obstacles, all of which facilitates the for- ward move of tanks to support then whon they require that support.

3. TACTICS. ,9 Armd Me (a) Scissors Bridges. The Valentine Scissors Bridge Troop proved invaluable throughout operations 26 fey - 2 June They were repeatedly used by armoured squadrons and a bridge allotted to leading regiments by Brigade. This policy is sound. , In FROSINONE, owing to falling of main road, bridges wore laid at call within an hour, enabling a large part of 78 Div to pass through FROSINONE during 2-3 Juno and serious delay avoided.

(b) Tactical Handling of Squadrons. Although the appearance of large numbers of tanks on a broad front undoubtedly caused the enemy to withdraw hurriedly, it is generally considered inadvisable^ to deploy more than two troops per squadron in support of a battal* ion and for the squadron leader to keep remainder close to him as a reserve. (c) Motor Battalion. 'The lack of the Brigade Motor Battalion was very severely felt. A normal close country advance guard of Motor Battalion, Squadron tanks, Regiment R.A., Troop or better still, Fd Squadron R.E., would- have quickened the pace of the advance. Armoured Regiments and Motor Battalion have trained together in this type of operation and ,it is impossible to expect ad hoc formations married up at the last moment to co—oper.tc with real ' rapidity and dash. (d) Control. It was found desirable that the Battalion Commander should net travel in the Squadron Loader's tank as he frequengly wished to go to places unsuitable for the Squadron Leader. It is recoionended that ho travel in a spare HQ tank or in the, F00 tank.

••eoklv Summary (o) (i) Armoured Fighting 17 - 2L May . The opinion of tiio 2 Polisv Armd Polish Armoured Rcgiment Commander was that the operation *Bde. would have succoeded quicker and at loss cost if some infan­ try had. been placed in direct support of the armoured regi­ ment. As his tanks could not leave the track - in fact, if a tank stopped on the track it had to be pushed over the side — offoctive fire could not bo brought on the enemy until tank crews had dismounted ana doployed on foot. There was little anti-tank gun opposition throughout the. operation.

(ii) The main lesson that emerges from these operations seen to be that it is essential that taps are always closely r, particularly in tho extremely [which those operations took place,

continued/ -3-

R.A.C. C.u.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR

25 Tko Bdo (iii) It is difficult to draw many lessons from lar operation (assistance in the advanco of 1 Cdn Div up the 7 LIRI valley). The closo country couplod with a slight morning mist and the dust raised by the artillery barrage restricted vision from the tanks to a minimum. Scarcely any tanks wore knocked out at ranges greater than 500'yardsj in some cases the rangG was loss than 100 yards. Bad visibility prevented the Shermans fulfilling their role of giving effective support by fire to the Churchill troops.

i •lC.anAr:nd Div (f) Road Bound Tanks. Curing the third Jihase ox the operations, 24-31 May, -/hen the tanlcs were almost entirely read bound, the following procedure was sloptod, which, it was considered, saved many casualties j whenever a tank approached a fairly open Stretch of road, which was probably covered by an enemy anti-tank gun sited to a flank, a member of the crew (usually the co-driver) would be sent forward to do a recce on foot. This recce often revealed the prosenc of an A/T gun which could be dealt with before the tanks had to expos themselves.

5 Cdn Armd Bdo (g) Maintenance of Direction during Operation, of Crossing the MELFA and the Securing of a Bridgehead. In closo country where tree foliage prevents landmarks on the flanks or in front being seen by tank commanders, the maintenance of direc­ tion is most difficult. Tuo methods <,?oro tried out during the latter phase of the 5 Cdn Arnd Bdo action and both proved to be of value. The- first method was the use of air bursts over definite points along the Centre Lino. Several variations of this were used consisting of high and low angle shots and also using salvos of air burst varying in number fron two to five rounds. The second method tied in vath •fcho type of artillery support hich was used by the Brigade and which consisted of a series of numbered targets. By calling down fire on these numbered targets it was possible for commanders to determine their relative position, 4. PROTECTION

25 Tk Bdo (a) If and when tanks become static, crews must dig deep slit trench The enemy is very fond of bringing down accurate shell fire on tank: harbour areas..

26 Armd Bde (b) Advance up Route 4- to TEKNI — 6 June LL» No infantry were up with them, but thu Brigade Commandor decidod to leave them there since any retirement' uight enccure.ro the enemy. Tac HQ moved up for the night to approx BlA'eJA.. It is interesting to note that had the enemy sent out anything in. the nature of a fighting patrol, they could certainly Ix.ve made themselves a menace.

j^SSQII % Against a retreating enemy it seems possible to lave tanks in a leaguer formation without any support through­ out the- entire night. Has this been done before?

5. RIVER CROSSING. Assault on the GUSTAV LI1-IE.

(a) The problem was to get the tanks over the RlyER GARI and dople^'ed in support of the leading infantry' by first light on D plus 1.

(b) The methods considered for putting the armour over woro:-

(i) Fording. As far as could be ascertained from intollignooo sources no suitable foi'ding places.

(ii) "Jading. Tanlcs waterproofed to maximum height not com­ pletely reliable since no positive information on depth of river/ A few tanks were water-proofed against possibility of bridges failing but when 26' Armd Bdo attomptoci to wade dis­ covered river in their sector eight feet or more deep.

(iii) Rafting. Not attempted with tanlcs owing "to sheer banks and lack cf sufficient suitable fording places. As ^ was discovered during the infantry crossing, the river was MiMWiFnflo-dng much faster than was anticipated and this would have -4-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL GIRCULA

made rafting extremely difficult in the dark,

(iv) Valentine Bridge Layer. Pd/ber over 60 foot wide.

(v) By Bailey fridge launchod by a turrotloss Sherman tank. This was used and is dcscribcd bo lor.'.

(vi) By ordinary Bailey Bridge built by Sappers after tho leading ihfaittry had secured a bridgehead on the enemy side of the river.

It was docidcd to put the tanks over by this method.

(c) Bridge launched by turrotloss Sherman Tank. The bridge was con­ structed to the required length (65 feet) in a grove of trees a good distance behind tho river and was conccalcd frogi tho enemy. It was built with the forward end aupportcd on two pillars, thus allowing a waterproofed turrotloss Sheriaan tank, fitted with a roller device on its top, to back between the two pillars and take tho weight of the bridge on the roller when tho two pillars were removed,

A second Sheriaan fitted with grappling irons on tho front then picked up the rearmost end of tho bridge so that the bridge was sus­ pended between the two tanks. Controlled by wireless, both tanks then moved forward over a selected route to tho water's edge. The turret- less Sherman proceeded as far across the rivor as possible and when it could go no further the rearmost Sherman pushed tho bridge over the roller on the forward turrotloss Sherman until the fore ond of the bridge rested on the enemy bank. This tank then disengaged the grappl­ ing irons from the bridge by moans of a quick release lever and backed away, clearing tho way for tho fighting tanks to cross the bridge.

Only one casualty resulted from this operation - that of the officer responsible for the launching of the bridgo who was wounded whon he got out of the turrotloss Sherman to direct the positioning of tho bridgo on the enemy bank.

Unfortunately, tho enemy bank was soft and swampy and the weight of the tanks passing over the bridgo caused tho ramps on the enemy side to sink, putting the bridge temporarily out of action until it could be strengthened. Two squadrons managed to pass over before this incident occurred, but several tanks became bogged in the mud on the far sido.

This bridge con be built and launched quicker than the ordinary Bailey, but on this occasion the workihg parties had some difficulty in finding the site to the dust and smeko on our side of the river and the tanks did not cross their bridgo before first light,

(d) General. In future operations of this kind a number of assault bridges which can be built in concealed positions behind tho river and launched quickly by a tank without exposing a large nugtber of men to heavy fire night well succood in gc-tting at least a few ajuadrons of tanks forward and deployed before dajrlight.

Mote by HQ Eight Army have now arranged for each armoured formation to prepare B.R.A.C. in their own Workshops two Shermans for launching the Plymouth type bridge as described in para 5 (c) above,

6, (c) Tank V. Anti-Tank Gun. In many cases our tanks had domination over onouy SP and A/T guns duo to good troop training and team work with infantry. Once tho A/T gun was spotted, usually by infantry, it was a comparatively easy task for the tank to dispose of it by firing H,E.

(f) Relative Positions of Tank s and Infantry when co-operating, Although there were some occasions when tanks led tho advance, it was normal for tho infantry to lead, the tanks closely shepherding tho infantry along. On occasions when tanks led it was- found that tanks had a tendency to push on too far ahead, the result being that the irif.mtrr did NOT follow closely behind and the tanks were then .out infantry support. continued/ -5- R.A.C. C.M.F. QPErUxTIClfe.L CIRCULAR HO. 6.

It was also found that it v/as normal fantry company and vice versa. In this connoction if" a vrot troops wore dctachod from a squadron to support one or more companies" of infantry, those troops worked ind^pondoritly of the squadron loader. This left only ono or two troops for the squadron loader to keep in hand with which he could directly influence the course of the battle.

6. COMMUNICATIONS.

6 Sk Armd (a) Wiroless. Regiments are working on a regimental frequency. This Div. has been found very satisfactory. Some method of tying down the full length aei-ial for the No. 19 sot is required. Aerial tends to get bent and damaged in close country.

Hote by A now aerial base has been designed in the United Kingdom and is being B.R.A.C. put into, production. This will enable aerials to bo clamped at any angle and tilted or lowered easily x?ithout damage to the base. No forccase of availability is possible yet. In the meantime, it is un­ derstood that certain formations have found locally produced Y shaped adaptors reasonably satisfactory.

9 Arnnd Bdo (b) Codewords. 3ounds and Report Lines,in Operations; 26 Mav - 2 Jun A

There was a great diversity of those, issued by Division,Brigades, Battalions and Regiments with much resulting confusion, If Division laid down sufficient codewords to cover all points and features likely to be met during 24 hours operations and gave instructions that no others bo used except the MB Map Reference Code, much confusion would be avoided.

5 Cdn Armd Bdo (c) Operations 2L - 31 May !XJX - Information and Liaison.

(i) At the commencement of the operations, the passing back of information from forward units was not good, but it improved rapidly. A lot of jamming was caused by outside stations working on the same or closely approx frequencies, but this is probably inevitable when large numbers of troops aro operating in a compare tively small area. During a particularly busy period, traffic was repeatedly obstructed by an American and a French Groupj a bilingual appeal was made to these stations to keep off the air for 30 minutes, ana though it was never acknowledged, it had the desired effect,

(ii) Liaison with 78 Infantry Division on the right, and the French on the loft, was found to bo essential, and L.O.s were sent to bothj these L.O.s were on the Arind Bdo command not, In spite of this it was often found impossible to find out whether troops seen on the flanks wore enemy or notj it was felt that those flank L.O.s should be further forward than the flanking Div HQs, if any value was to be obtained from them.

(d) Regimental Frequency. There still exists a difference of opinion 3,3 to the value of regimental frequency. The Ld SH who had most of the tank v tank action, used the regimental frequency throughout and arc convinced that it is the answer in an armoured regimentj on the other hand, the other two armoured regiments continued to use squadron frequency.

7. MAINTF-NANna* 26 Armd Bde (a) Mechanical Failure. In the advance on 6 June the LOTHIANS lost 8 or 9 tanks through mechanical failure. The troubles were shedding of tracks and burst oil seals, no doubt caused by a long and arduous approach march.

Would it not be policy to give crews a short time for maintenance between the: completion of a march and the committing to attack.

Grows c|!% Pyj-fci,)!•flbtfllminutes, 6Armd Div find 11 SU Armd Ml cf tho lack °f tranSport~ ers. The J- on thc crcw» partic ularly tiie driver and eomr-iander. Most approacn marches c.re Carried out at night on very dusty tracks, and one or two- Shermans continued/ mfom

R.A.C. O.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR

wore lost through going over the sides of tracks with deep The considerable track mileage comes into the question too.

Note by The need for a more generous allotment of transporters is fully realize B.R.A.C. and has been continuously represented. But the theatre has been allott all that can be spared from production sources, and these have been fully and continuously employed. The situation is unlikely to improve materially at this stage o.f the War.

11 SA Armd (b) Tracks. Sherman tracks are being run loose, as when used tight, Bde excessive wear takes place both on the driving sprocket and track links. No figures were available as to how many tanks were unfit, owir. to this defect, but the number ~as very small.

Note by Tracks must not be, either too loose or too tight. It is essential thej B.R.A.C. should be kept at the proper tension if undue wear is not to result. Full instructions have been issued in RAC Branch letter RAC/26/3l/C dated 6 Aug 44- and these instructions should be strictly observed.

8. AMMUNITION.

25 Tk Bde (a) Smoke. Far more smoko was needed than first thought.

(b) Could soft skinned vehicles with ammunition get up to replenish "tanks, and if not, what vehicles were used? Were mixed loads of ammunition used, if not is this method recommended?

N.B. 1. Only occasionally were tanks left out in FDLs, normally they r/ere pulled back a short way, but still -7011 within mortar range.

2. 51 R i'ks and 14.2 RAC were on restricted scale of trans­ port and had two aKiiaunition lorries and one petrol lorry per squadron.

3, Leaving main roads increased the supply problem con­ siderably. In some cases the turn round of ammunition and petrol lorries was 8 hours.

Generail, tanks had to move back to be jsplenished. 'B! Squadron 14.2 RAC wore able to replenish tanks with 10 3/4 tons of ammunition on 23 May, all of which was carried from the lorries to the tanks in s'hite Scout Cars, On the other part of the front the RASC had forward dupps of petrol and ammunition either near RHQ, lg- to 2 miles behind the lines, or at the SL for the attack. 'B' Squadron HIH also dumped petrol well forward by means of Tihite Scout Cars, which had to get back as quickly as possible to avoid mortaring.

•C1 Squadron HIH found jettison petrol tonics useful. Tanks would return to refill at dumps troop by troop.

51 R Tks and 14-2 RAC had mixed ammunition loads on their lorries, and were convinced that this is the only possible- method, especially when on light scale as they were. NIH had one lorry for Churchill ammunition and one for Sherman.

25 Tk Bde (c) Ammunition Scales.

Intention to load Sherman as follows : 60% HE 30?; AF 10% Smoke. Did the? find that loading on this scale satisfactory. or did they use a larger percentage of smoke?

The scale laid down by 25 Tk Bde is Lfi rounds HE 24 rounds AF B rounds Smoke.

142 RAC found for their particular action that they needed much more smoko, and they did not use so much AP. 'C Squadron 51 R Tks have added an additional 12 rounds of smoke and found they needed xj^.^^'B' Squadron NIH, against' strong positions and enemy armour found d too little AP.

Squadron NIH did nob seem short with 70/i HE 25% AP and 5$ continued/ -7-

&.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR Ni

American Smoke for burning out anti-tank gun. casemates. ^ m M Mr Mi

The NIH used 3" HOT; mainly for smoke - 90 Smoke and 30 HE are fitted in by modification of bins. The 3" HOT/ Smoke is considered by 14-2 RAG as useful for recovery after the battle as well as during it for normal operations.

'C' Squadron 51 R Tks hardly used the Close Support tanks at all. Smoke Emitters voro found to be useful.

'B1 Squadron 142 RAC considers Super (HE) ammunition essential for Sherman - always direct shoots and at snap targets.

11 SA Armd (d) Operations 9-10 .Turn; 75 mm Ammunition. The following types Bde of ammunition were available:-

(i) M,4-8 Super (ii) M.72 AP Solid Shot (iii) 75-mm Smoke

The Brigade Commander stated that he preferred M.4-3 normal to M.4-8 Super in close country, M.54 (air burst) was not available, but there had been practically no demand at all. M.61 APHE ras not available. The Brigade had never used it in battle and so no comments wore made.

Mote by Other formations are practically unanimous in demanding 75-mm HE B.R.A.C. Super ammunition and the accepted theatre policy is to provide small stocks of normal or reduced charge which can bo drar:n for special operations or special circumstancos.

75 mm HE M.48 fused 11.54 (air burst) is still oily available in spall quantities as marker ammunition for indirect or semi-indirect fire.

75 mm APC M,6l fused M.66.A.1 (APCBG) HE ammunition is now available in large quantities.'

Weekly Summary (e) Use of Smoke by Tanks - Assault on the Gustav Line 12-17 May&A. Smoke was s eldom put down by tanks to blind an anamy A/T gun or to conceal a flank since the nature of the country, i.e., close and abounding in trees and shrubs, did not lend itself to the use of smoke by tanks.

GUNNERY.

25 Tk Bde (f) Ranges. Ranges in normal tank v anti-tank fire wero 200 - 300 yds - 6 pr quite adequate : namely, 6 Panthers.

(g) Churchill / Sherman Squadron. In the very close country it was not really possible to support the assault tanks forward with 75 mm fire as nobody could see to do it or see anything to fire at. Ranges in tank v anti-tank were about 200 to 300 yards and the small gun (6 pr is quite adequate for the job. The more quickly loaded and aimed it can be, the bctterj the only one who has a real chance is tho comman­ der, who spots the anti-tank gun first and gets his snot in at once, 9. TYPES OF TANKS.

25 Tk Bde (a) Honeys. Strongly recommend tterets to be retained. Honeys are invaluable for replenishing tqnks under small arms and mortar fire.

Note by It has been agreed that in Tank Brigades, since they may be expected B.R.A.C. to be employed primarily in the heavy assault role, a proportion of light tanks of tho reconnaissance troops of units should retain their turrets. This is not because it is agreod that a tank with a turret on is a good reconnaissance vehicle, but because these vehicles, with turrets, have proved useful 'maids of all work1.

'mans. Comparison of '"'hurchill and Shermans cross-country: -country performance of Sherman at any time affect Squadron r's plan? continued/ -8-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO

Cross-country performance did not seem to affoot Squadron Commander' plan to any extent. The role of Shermans essentially Close Support and Sherman troop cannot normally replace the Churchill -troop in the assault. This means that the Churchill troops only have to take turns in loading the attack.

It *ras generally found ncccssary always to lceeo at least one Sherman troop stationery to give covering fire,

25 2k Bdo (c) U30 of Honeys : Operations 26 - 30 May £A.

(i) NIB At one time 'A* Squadron was isolated, roar area being covered by mortars and snipers, and Honeys were the only possible method of taking up replenishments.

Thif> was a normal use for Honeys, also for bringing back wounded.

(ii) 51 E Tks. Unturretted Honeys ferried ammunition and petrol from dumps to tanks at night •• this sometimes took a long time to complete.

Turretted H0ncys - a section rras attached to e

(iii) 1A2 RAC. Unturretted Honeys us,,d for Squadron reconnai­ ssance Officers, but the fact that they have no top makes it often impossible to get close enough to infantry because of mor­ taring. So Reconnaissance Officer has to leave set and go up on foot.

.11 SA Armd Bdo (d) Brigade Commander stated that a number of :is tanks had turret basket removed. Turret basket serves no really useful purpose and hinders evacuation v/hon a tank is hit. Any reinforcement tanks ear­ marked for 6 SA Armd Div should have this modification cax*riod out.

Note by The modification of tanks with armoured binning results in the removal B.R.A.C. of the obstructive parts of the turret basket.

9 Armd Bde (0) - Scorpions. The present scalc of mine detectors is insufficient. Had Scorpions been available it is considered that, used on the verges of main roads supported by troop tanks, much more progress would have been made and difficult cross-country deviations avoided.

Note bv Increased scales of mine dotoctors have been asked for but these are B.R.A.C. still in short supply.

Operations 11 May - 17 Hay LL.

(f) Cut-down Stuarts. Cut-down Stuarts of both 11 and 11, Canadian Armoured Regiments i/oro used to ferry supplies across to fighting echelons. Personnel stated that they rrcro dissatisfied with the turrctless Stuart ass -

(1) accuratc enemy mortar fire may land inside the tank killing the crew and causing the ammunition to explode, Trhon used in this role:

(ii) a comparatively thin under-bclly armour docs not afford a great deal of protection against the anti-tank mine.

Note by Again wo see a demand for a"turrctted carrier". I think it is impor­ B i i t «» G. tant that this demand should not be allowed to confuse the issue as to whether a reconnaissance troop equipped with vehicles suitable for reconnaissance is required. The ore t icj'.lly, it would scorn that there is a ease for a spccial carrier troop and that it is the need for such a troop which has led to the use of cut-down Stuart Light Tanks for a purpose for which they are not intended on establishment#

1 Cdn Armd Bde later utilised the turrotloss Sherman, used in tho pration in this role, and cr«&w expressed satisfaction with nlc as: - continued/ I

-9-

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(i) It gave the crew a greater measure of protcc fire owing to the thickor armour, and

(ii) the under-bully, being of thicke# armour, gives a greater measure of protection against an anti-tank mine.

5 Cdn Armd (h) Operations : 24. - 31 fey Bdo Stuart. The Stuarts of the reconnaissance troops did invaluable) Fork, It appears that the turretloss Stuart was more suitable for this typo of work than the turretted one. 3 Canadian Armoured Reconnaissanc> Regiment have devised a shoulder controlled mounting for the ,50 Brown­ ing gunj without some such mounting, accurate engagement of ground targets with this gun is extremely difficult. One Stuart from this regiment, fitted with this mounting, successfully engaged an 8,8 cm SP gun, by firing below the shield and wounding the giui crcw in the legs,

5 Cdn Armd (3) Scissors Bridge. The present :.rar Establishment of Scissors Brid- BDE ges an in armoured brigado is three. During the move forward from CEPRA.N0 towards FROSINONE two bridges '-'ore used 'and served a very useful purpose. However, after being crossed by an armoured regiment, unless it has been possible to put in firm bank scats, the bridges go out of alignment and are rendered unserviceable» Had the armoured brigado been sent forward again on the 31 May, its resources of Scissor Bridges would have been exhausted. It is recommended, therefore, that for an armoured formation working in country such as this, the War Establishment bo increased from three to six.

10, RECOVERY.

25 Tk Bdo (a) Workshops. Workshops must be kept wel3, forward owing to diffi­ culty of travelling in roar areas.

Likewise light scale echoIons,

Also battalion and brigade HQa,

25 Tk Bdo (b) Tank Replacement - Operations 26 May - 30 May UU - Did EDS get their tank replacements UP in time to use for action next day? Replacoments were made in all cases within 24 hours, and in some cases within 6 or 8 hours, 'B' Squadron 14.2 RAlS never went into battle short, except of Clos^ Support Tanks, 'C Squadron 51 R Tks reported that tanks they lost were made up the some night, but they had to send an officer to feteh thorn. Replacement tanks were fully crowed,

(c) 2 x T,2 (Grant Armd Recovery Vehicles). At present only 2 x T.2 (Grant Armoured Recovery vehicles) arc available, Ir consequence they are very much overworked. It is recommended that two 2 x T,2 vehicles be made available to each regiment in order that tanks may be recovered at an early opportunity. This vehicle has a much greater cross country capacity than an ordinary Scomraol,

The need for implementing the full scale of armoured recovery vehicles B.R.A.C is fully appreciated by the War Office,

1 Cdn Armd Mo (d) Assault on the GUS1AV LUTE 12 Mav - 17 ivlay LL. Since the enemy had patrol domination on the far bank positive information on routes forward after the crossing of minefields and areas of depigment was scant and had to bo determined mainly from going maps and air photos, A largo number of tanks, did, in fact, become fogged shortly after crossing the river on the morning of D plus 1 and 1 Cdn Armd Bde broke 25 Sherman tow ropes in their efforts to get the tanks out.

The importance of having T,2s or some other suitable recovery tank well forward in the battle cannot bo over emphasised. Note by From the technical jb int of view the Sherman tow rope should bo adoquat B.K.A.O.B,R.A.C. as it has £a breaking load at lea.st three times greater than the draw- )f the tank. In practice, however, on excessive strain is applied to the rope and numerous breakages have been re- ILASSfflEQ continued/ -10-

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portod, r,o aro pressing the War Offico to develop a stro: in future production but, in tho meantime, it is most inportaxr tho limitations of the present rope should bo fully understood and th" rope only used in conformity with such limitations,

"Jcckly Summary (G) Recovery Tanks. The present shortage of recovery tanks is very serious sincc not only is it difficult to get tanks quickly back into the battlo without them, but if tanks aro left for any length of time it has been found that their kits are looted,

As a result of experience in this particular operation (assault on . the GUSTAV LINE 12 May - 17 May) formations have again been impressed with the importance of at least one man being loft with every disabled tank to prevent pilfering of kits.

3 Cdn Armd (f) Operations 24. fay - 30 May 44.. The recovery tanks, although the Recce Rest ones used were just Shermans with additional recovery equipment, worked very well and all tanks were recovered and back on the road the follow­ ing day.

11. SUPPLIES. * 25 Tk Bdo Operations 26 May - 30 May 44..

(a) Generally speaking, throe day compo box of rations ""as carried on each tank. This was strictly a reserve for emergency. When used it takes some time to replace these.

Besides this, at least 24- hours rations for tho crow should always be carried. Congestion and condition of roads did not always allow trucks to got up.

(b) Could cooks' lorrien be brought UP? If not, how was replenishment of tanks organized? If cooking; was done by tank crews, could the cook­ ers be used; was any brewing up done at night? In the case of 14.2 RAC 'A1 Echelon with the Cooks' lorry was able t< get up close behind the tanks every night.except one. They were never more than 3 miles behind at night. Food was cooked and put in contain­ ers. These were brought up to the tanks on fhitc Scout Cars - wheels were considered better for this than half-tracks, and a White Scout Car better than a 3 tonner. Theso T", hites were under command of the SSMs who kept close to the Regimental Liaison Officer to keep in the picture and to receive instructions.

On the other part of the front it was generally ir possible to get cooks' lorries up. This was due partly to mortaring, but also to diffi­ culty to movement of three tonners on narrow roads and soft going - even in present conditions chains must be carried for 4- x 2 trucks - and to a bridge over tho Forme d'AQUINO being overworked. Both NIH and 51 R Tks used boxes such as 3 in How and 6 pr ammunition boxes with one complete days rations for the whole crew, these boxes have containers - sometimes 75 mm cases cut into short lengths with lids - in which the normal rations are put. Fresh food is partly cooked before splitting up into vehicle boxes, so that a minimum of cooking on vehicle cookers is necessary. For replenishment, empty ration boxes were exchanged for full ones carried on the cooks' lorry. Sometimes '"ihite Scout Cars were able to take these boxes to the tanks. Food dumping was tried by 51 R Tks with tanks going back by troops to colled But this was found to be a difficult operation in the dark along narrow roads.

12. ICESCELLAMEOUS.

25 Tk Bde (a) LOB.

(i) '""ere 2 IC's LQB? It was now 25 Tk Bde policy that 2 IC's of Regime: ts and Squadrons shall in future be LOB,

14.2 Q&C did not leave officers out in recent operations, other two regiments did. 2 IC NIH is in charge of all supply :ocovery organization, NIH have one Captain in each Squadron Continued/ -II-

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in 'B* Echelon for administrative duties. Captains are swopped around for this job.

(ii) If 2 IC is LOB was a subaltern Reconnaissance Officer used in Battle to follow Infantry Compander? If so. what did he travel in? 'C' Sqn 1£2 RAC Subaltern RO with Inf in Humber S/C. *BW Squadron 14.2 RAC CaptainrJteconnaissance Officer with Infan­ try Commander in Humber Scout Car with long line so that he could leave car and get into slit trench with Infantry Commander,

NIH all contact with Infantry was made through R egimental Signals Officer inThite Scout Car Wireless Trmck at Brigade HQ, He had 5 sets, (One) on Regimental Net, (two) on separate Squadron nets, if necessary* (three) on services net, (four) on Infantry Brigade Commander rear link net, (five) in Infantry Brigade forward net.

Squadron Second Reconnaissance Officer, IC of Close Support tanks, and ready to command half squadron if necessary.

'C1 Squadron 51 R Tks R connaissance Officer, taken from troop, travelled with Infantry Commander in tank. This was the first tank to bo knocked out and the Reconnaissance Officer killOd ae it was right up in the front. Reconnaissance Officer's troop under troop Serjeant in reserve. Best to change round troop commanders as Reconnaissance Officer.

Co-ordinated theatre opihion is that the cut-down Stuart Light Tank is B.R.A.C. the most suitable available vehicle for a Squadron Liaison Officer, As he may frequently have to leave his vehicle and accompany the infan­ try commander on foot we have recommended that he should be provided with two No, 3S sets. With a portable No, 38 Set he can maintain commu­ nication ?dth his vehicle and thence with his vqjit on the vehicle No, 19 Set.

5 Cdn Armd (b) LOBs. Any argument, which previously has been put forward with Me regard to not wishing to creat LOB personnel in each unit has now •been nullified. This formation, in accordance with the Corps Commander's policy, now that it has completed its first battle will maintain the . number of LOB personnel as directed.

25 Tk Bde (o) Operations 26 - 30 May - Sniping. There was constant sniping from trees and men in trees tried to lob grenades into tanks. But no casualties were reported from this. Mostly, steel helmets were not worn, 'B' Squadron NIH closed down a good deal and used periscopes. Most other tanks kept open. Cupola covers of 'C' Squadron NIH were jettisoned before the operation.

Vines gave a lot of trouble catching on the turret. There was some ditching of tanks due to bad visibility. This was not confirmed to our troops, A German assault gun was found ditched on the objective, and there was evidence of others having been similarly placed and towed out,

.6 SA Armd (d) Valentine Bridge Layer, Valentine Bridge Layers are very valuable Div. for bridge demolitions along a road. Track mileage must be kept down to a minimum,

6 SA Arwi (e) Goggles. Every man in tank crew must have goggles. At the moment Div. some tank drivers are iill without them, 5 Cdn Armd m. (f} Map Reference Code. (i) The present point map reference code was not found to be suitable for use by commanders working in tanks in action. It took too long to encode and decode and the possibility of error >o great. Locations were given by reference to the trace ^as prepared showing all positions likely to be held by tho «*• e.g.,"500 yards SSJ of position No, 4,3".

continued/ I ••12*

R.A.G. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRC'QLAT NOi

(ii) If a cojnmandor had lost his bearings (extremely easy in this country) and wanted to establish his position, ho could call for an air burst over the position to which he thought he was nearest. Five rounds air burst would then be firod, one High up, one low down and throe intermediate« If this could not be ooser­ ved, smoke would be put down on the position.

3 Cdn Armd THE CROSSING OF THE MKLFA. Bdo (g) Assembly Area. The Assembly Area in roar of 3 Cdn Inf Bdo in the initial attack was too small* In addition it was allotted so late that time did not permit of a reconnaissance by Division# Re­ connaissance of an assembly area by night presents too many Hazards when it is necessary to got troops across the SL at a definite time# In this particular instance, it was necessary to defer the time of crossing tho SL by two hours, because of the impossibility of getting tanks and infantry into their correct positions in the assembly area,

(h) Traffic Control# It is realised that centralized Traffic Con­ trol is the ideal to be aimed at, but when plans are changed on short notice, and time does not permit for the existing Traffic Control to bo made aware of change in plan, it is considered that sections^ of th< - Provost should be allotted to the brigade concerned, in order that the equipment can be brought forward# Movement into tho assemolj' are. in rear of 3 Canadian I fantry grigado was a case where sections of Provost working with brigade would have been of the greatest possible assistance.

oOo

PART II INFANTRY CO-OPERATION

1# OENERAL.

25 Tk Bdo (a) Infantry must make it their primary job to destroy anti-tank guns. Far more important than just gaining an objective only to be thrown off again owing to tho lack of tank support.

Infantry must lead tanks in very cjose country and keep near them. No use infantry going ahead if tanks are held up by anti-tank fire in tho typo of country where direction is easily lost and visi­ bility is so limited that tanks cannot see to support infantry at more than a few yards.

S ArnidJ3do (b) Operations 26 May - 2 June kL.

Going. Throughout these operations tanks were asked to move across most difficult country. Infantry insisted on tanks accom­ panying them at all times. This was done but many tanks were ditchcd, two falling down a cliff and turning over three tigies#

The factors appear to bo as follows# If tanks accompany infan­ try over this type of country the surprise effect on tno enomy is great and fewer anti-tank guns Y/ill be met. On the other hand, tho infantry will be frequently held up waiting for the tanks to catch up -dth them. Furthermore, owing to tho dusty nature of tho country the tanks drew/ fire which the infantry moving by themselves could have avoided. On many occasions the infantry were heavily mortared as so^ n as the dust raised by the tanks was observed.

Much of the country was frankly not tank country olid it is felt that at times Infantry must qdvanco alone, although it is appreciated that if the infantry suddenly emerge into tank country they will bo liable to counter-attack by enemy tanks. The correct answer i.ould at tanks accompany infantry over reasonable country, hl^is impossible infantry battle patrols should push continued/ -13-

R.A.C. C.Ivl.F. OPERATIONAL CIRC

forward boldly by themselves and the tanks follwo by the bio axis. There is no doubt that tho appearance of tanks in large numbers at unexpected places did force the enemy to withdraw more quickly than ho intended. Several enemy guns wcro hastily abandoned when tanks appeared to be outflanking then.

5 P.rln Anurid (c) Glose Support by Infantry at Night. In tho action NORTH of Bdo POFI an instanco arose whore the remnants of an armoured squadron which had been engaging enemy tanks found itself in a position from which it was not possible to leave, duo to tho tactical situation. The plan of the infantry brigade did not include protection on this flank by night. It was necessary to liaise with 2 Cdn Infantry Bri­ gade in order to obtain infantry personnel from them to patrol and cover the area in which the tanks remained for the night. It is re­ commended that as far as possible, whore units of the armoured brigade are sent on special tasks, that thought bo given by higher formations as to whether or not amour is to be withdrawn by night and if not what readjustment of the plan can bo made to provide tho necessary protection for the tanks.

2. INTERCOMMUNICATION.

25 Tk Bde (a) (i) 38 Set generally unsoccuessful - infantry got sniped or olso throw sot away when most needed.

(ii) 18 Sets from Squadron Comd to Infantry CO very good.

(iii) Separate squadron frequencies are needed in close country

25 Tk Bdc (b) Did wireless coisnunication between tanks and infantry work? In particular, was the method of having an infantry operator in thc^ co-driver's soo.t of the Squadron Leader's tank used - if so. with what success? Generally speaking. 38 Sets were not a succcss. Troop to Platoon direct speech on bell pressing worked. 'B1 Squadron NIH had trained all infantry to press the bell, and thoir tanks would swing to give protection and a pannier door be opened. *C* Squadron 14-2 RAC sugges a signal is needed to toll tanks to stop firing by infantry, possibly some coloured smoke,

18 Sets were used by 51 R Tks and NIH and found very satisfac­ tory, 'C Squadron 51 R Tks carried an infantry operator in the^ co-dirvcr' s seat of the Squadron Commander's tank - which will, in future, be a 6 pr Churchill. NIH had their own operators on the 18 Set and they would like a second set per Squadron. The aerial lead passes through the co- driver' s periscope, one bolt boin& removed. Sometimes an Infantry operator helps the tank operator to net the 18 Set, NIH also has communication to Igfantry Brigade and Infantry Battalions through Regimental LO at Brigade HQ. Squadrons did not normally have a reconnaissance officer at Infantry Battalion HQ,

14.2 RAC Squadrons had an LO with Infantry Battalion HQ in gin "palace or scout car. They arc converting a half track taken from a Squadron to be tho CO's Go Lima nd Vehiclo and Conference Room for orders. Fitted with two sets and a charging apparatus. This will enable the CO to go to Infantry Brigade HQ and not necessarily take his tank there. 11 SA Armd (c) No. 38 Set. Every tank should be fitted with telephone on Mc roar of tank, so that infantry may have direct communication with •Eank commander. No, 39 Sets have not always proved reliable, Igfantry personnel carrying "io, 38 Sets are usually first to be­ come casualties.

.9. Ariad Bdo (d) No. 38 Set. No, 30 Set was not used on a Battalion not and never higher than a Company HQ. infantry - Tank Communication. Generally speaking, tho 3$ igf^tank - infantry communication was not used successfully, s not necessarily mean that the 3^ Set used in this ro ~ continued/ -14-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR

will never work, sinco 26 Armd Bdc consider that thoy can trork it successfully with their oi7n infantry. It was found that the Number 18 Set as a tank - squadron link proved very Satisfactory.

There are a great many difficulties in tho loading infantry pla­ toons trying to work tho No. 33 Sot but it would appear that normal infantry arc not sufficiently wireless minded and do not therefore realize tho value of good wiroloss cosamunications.

Notes by- (a) In spite of early difficulties, the general opinion is that tho B.R.A.C. No, y& Sot has proved its value in tanks, and the policy is to fit these sots in all Churchills and Shermans except as mentioned in Note (b) below, Tho sets and installation kits are in short supply and it has only boon possible up to the present to equip approx 50% of all operational tanks.

(b) The No. 33 Set is not thought to be satisfactory on tho squadron to infantry battalion level and wo have recommended that No. IS or No. 4-S Sets should bo provided on tho scale of one for each Squadron Leader's tank in armoured reconnaissance regiments, armoured regi­ ments and tank battalions, together with a reserve of one set in each regiment.

i (c) The riar Office policy is to provide an infantry telephone for all Cruiser and Infantry tanks. The necossary stores have been in short supply but the policy has already boon largely implemented in this theatre from local resources.

(d) Experiments arc still continuing with a view to finding an in­ conspicuous aerial to prevent tho infantryman carryihg the No, 38 sot fro;.i being singled out as a spccial target. Preliminary reports of tho tin hat aerial have been discouraging, ih view of tho limited , range a<2hievod,

oOo -—•-—

PART III - ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE

ORGANIZATION.

3 Cdn Armd (a) Operations 2A - 31 May LL. Rocco Re eft Answers and Remarks to C uestionnaire of Army Commander. Eighth Army. 3 Canadian Armoured R connaissance Regiment (GGHG), operated throughout these operations on an establishment of three squadrons, each "squadron having four tank troops, each troop of two cut-down Stuarts and two Shermans, and one assault troop of four 'hite Scout Cars of troop HQ and three soctions, cach of eight ORs.

Q. In close country is there any nnod for a difference- between an armoured and an infantry reconnaissance unit?

A. In my opinion it is essential to have basically tracked vehicles,

Q. Is there any justification for a wheeled armoured vehicle?

A* In my opinion, while working in a country with roads, wheeled armoured vehicles such as scout cars, would be very valuable as per reconnaissanco troop on present V:ar Establishment.

Q, TTould some half-track Whites with 75 mm guns bo ..of assistance?

With Sherman tanks I do not see any requirement for the vehicles .y opinion half-track T\/hitos would be far superior to the out Cars that are being presently used in the assault troops !g -those operations, working on the flank, wo were working continued/ R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR

against the grain of the country and the grain of the roads, conse­ quently all work was cross-country and it was very difficult and in scac cases impossible to get Hhite scout cars through even with the troops themselves building log bridges across diversions, which was done in several cases. Q. Is not a sawn-off Honoy the best vehicle, supported by Shermans?

A. In ny opinion, the sawn-off Honey is an excellent vchicle. »"fo wro very satisfied with thoiaj they performed well and for reconn­ aissance purposes, working forward with the Shermans supporting, proved to work.

<4. How many vehicles per troop have you| is not three the maximum? 4i. have four vehicles per troop - two Stuarts cut-down and two Shermans. ' I believe this to bo an ideal number and it worked very well. Three, would not bo nearly as satisfactory,

Q. Would a jeep patrol per squadron assist over difficult, country?

A. Personally, I do not fool a jeep patrol per squadron to be nccessary, I do not think their cross-country performance is any better, if as good as, tanks and when in contact with the enemy, particularly snipers, of which "o ran into quite a number, I foci jeeps would bo much too vulnerable, also mines would crcate a great many casualties with a jeep patrol in my opinion.

Q. Aro throe squadrons per regiment sufficient3 any justification for four squadrons?

A. I feel that throe squadrons, as presently organized, arc suffi­ cient but I still feel that an assault squadron as per suggestion of TJar Establishment submitted in February 44> would be of great assis­ tance when operating in an advance purely, as the infantry personnel would be trained to work with tho regiment.

Q. That type of reconnaissanco tank is best for reconnaissance requirements? A. In my opinion, our present tanks, tho cut-down Honoy with tho .5 mounted and the Sherman, are quite satisfactory and I would not recc.'.unend any change except, as tank production improves naturally now and better typo vehicles as manufactured of the same typo would assist.

Q. How many mine detectors on Jar Establishment? A, 'Tar Establishment calls for seven nine detectors of which we have six. In my opinion this is not nearly enough. He should have at least fifteen and if possible a scale of ono per troop»

Q. Is tho carrior a suitable vchicle for a rcconnaissanoc uhit?

A, I believe the cut-down Stuart to be very superior to the carrier although if TMtc half-tracks aro not available; to replace tho Into S€out Cars for the assault troops, I fool carriers to transport assau It troop personnel would bo considerably bettor than the White Scout Cars,

3 Cdn Armd (b) Operations 2L - 30 May LL. Rcccc Rogt. Assault Troop. Tho Assault Troop in each squadron is undou­ btedly of very great value, but working as we were in this operation, across tho grain, not only to tho country^' but also to the roads, the ^hitc Scout Cars did not prove capable of getting through and it is suggested that possibly operating in this type of country, ~ carriers per assault troop rather than four ''hito Scout Cars o considerably more valuable. If working on road centre n a reconnaissanco role, this possibly would not bo as n drawback.

2, TACTICS. continued/ R.A.C. G.H.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCU

(a) Qperationa 2L - 31 'May LL. Answers and Reraarks to Questionnaire of Army Commander, Eighth Army.

Q, What is the usual order of march of leading vehicles;

A. Within the troop the training has been, and has proved satisfactory in operations, that the Stuarts lead supported from one bound to another by the Shermans, the Shermans stat­ ionary while the Stuarts are moving, and the Stuarts stationary whilst tho Shermans are moving, the length of bounds, etc., depending entirely on tho type of country, but duo to the long range of the 75s it is possible for them to support the Stuarts up to long ranges if the s,country necessitates long troop bound;

Q« Is every effort made to gut around or past obstacles?

A, Yes - and during these operations we wero working on a flank with no engineer facilities and, with the exception of coming in to the CL to cross the MELFA and the LIRI, in all other cases got forward entirely on their own initiative out on the RIGHT and LEFT flanks,

Q. What casualties were suffered from mines, AP, HE fire?

A, T7e ran into only throe minefields on one of which one tank had bogie flattened and two track blocks broken and front sprocket bent. This happened as tho tank had got into tho minefield before it was noticed and actually blew up when they were trying to back out. One man was seriously wounded from the blast as ho was out directing the tank back along its same track. Personnel should NOT dismount, in my opinion, to do this as they are quite safe if they remain in their tanks,

HE firo : Tho vast majority of our casualties .were caused by shell and mortar fire while squadrons were in harbour and personnel were out of their tanlcs, A drill I intended to practice as far as possible wag to always withdraw squadrons before going into harbour, if they had been relieved of pro­ tective responsibility, feack outside of normal mortar range, in other words, approx 4-,000 yards from the front lino posi­ tions if at all possible,

Q, ''-hat number of demolitions held up the advance for a per­ iod of hours, if any? "lore sappers available and prompt to deal with such cases?

A, The only obstacles that hold up our advance for any length of tijao were tho RIVERS MELFA AND LIRI, Otherwise on tho flanks we were able to keep up with the advance of the Divi­ sion without any sapper assistance, The big point on this is that it is necessary to drill into all officers' minds the fact that, as soon as mooting an obstacle, it should, if possible, bo out-flanked rather than trying to got across it.

Q. How far behind was the nearest bull-dozer?

A, He did not have any bull-dozers but, if operating as re­ connaissance in front of Division adv I feel that it is essen­ tial to have a minimum of one bulldozer per CL right up with the loading squadron,

Q. Have you a sufficient number of men employable as infantry to over como local opposition?

A. Contrary to TTrr Establishment I had formed one assault troop of one officer and thirty ORs per squadron. Those wero found by using only four instead of five tank t roops and by distributing the personnel presently shown as AA Troop to bring these troops up to the required strength. These are f a small number per squadronj I believe quite sufficient m mmr a squadron but, as previously mentioned, I foci that a Rp&r continued/ -17-

R.A.C. OPERATIOML CIRC

fourth assault squadron consisting of three troops like this would be a groat help when operating in an advance,

3 Cdn Armd Rocco (b) Comd. It was proved fron experience in a number of cases that Roet it is essential for a Commander, particularly a Squadron Commander iGtml to roraain at his HQ and maintain control all the time during the battle and it is necessary to resist the temptation to go forward to look and see what is going on. This possibly applies to our Squad­ rons more than any other unit as they are working on such a wide front, it is impossible for a Squadron Commander to sec his troops while they are working and it has to be largely controlled from a map (like playing chess),

3, GUNNERY.

5 Cdn Armd Bdo (a) The .5 Browning mounted on the Stuart Tanks. This proved to bo a very satisfactory weapon, Wo had nocked up and equipped all tanks with a shoulder control the sane as wo used to have on the old 2 prs in tanks which enabled the gunners to be extremely accurate, in fact in one case, the ,5 gunner cut off the legs of a German crew underneath the shield of their anti-tank gun and the claim is that this was dono to six Germans which indicates the accuracy with which the weapon can bo used. Also this brings out the point that firing underneath the shields of tho anti-tank guns, if thoy aro not in emplacements, is a very effective way of dealing with the guns. Also the loading of tho belts of the ,5 with HE and incen­ diary as well as AP and Tracer proved very satisfactory, the HE and Incendiary having a very marked moral effect on the Germans we en­ countered including some of the paratroops.

? Cdn Armd Recce Operations 2L - 30 May AA. Regt. (GGHG) (b) Use of .5 on Stuart tanks. This weapon proved to be an cxcollo: weapon and extremely offcctive, particularly when loaded with HE, Incendiary, Tracer and AP. A drill on the firing of this that" proved effective was the Bo" Gunner talcing over and firing while the ,5 was having its belt changed. Once personnel get over any feeling of exposure by standing up to fire this gun, they found it t be excellent and the shoulder control that had been nocked up and installed on all guns proved eminently satisfactory.

(c) Gunnery. The high percentage of AP that was received in the tanks '.Then wo got them, was prior to battle, thought to be too high, but squadrons report that this high nLrcenta^e of &S? is very useful, as the AP is extremely useful for working against houses, particu­ larly to find out if the house is occupied. A round or so of HE fired inside after the AP has knocked a hole, proves eminently satisfactory.

(d) The giving of gun control to tho gunners did not prove at all satisfactory, as when the gunner was controlling his gun in tho turret, he could not see trees coming and a number of traverse spindles (3) were broken by the guns hitting trees when the gunner was working on gun control, consequently tho practice of giving gun control has been discontinued by us,

(o) Smoke, Smoke was used in a number of eases, particularly to blind MG positions while tanks were going through difficulty going,- also during repair work. I do not feel that wo used smoke to quito as good advantage as it might have boon used and this is being discussed in discussions,

(f) 36 Grenades. A very good method of house-cleaning, as thoy can be thrown into the windo?/s of a house and save personnel going into tho houses with their To;.my Guns to clear it,

COMLflJNICATIONS.

Operations 2L - 30 fey ^L. 'assine of Information. After the first day, the passing of aation improved considerably and I feel that our systems continued/ -18.

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CDfttASSfEKD

worked out during training arc quite satisfactory and will work now that the personnel have got over the initial tenseness of tho first battle. Within Squadron HQ it has been found more satisfactory to have the 2 IC keep a log and to be responsible for passing back in­ formation, Also it is a groat help if squadrons r ccoivo as much in­ formation as possible about what is going on with troops in other parts of the battle, Tho passing of negative information as well as positive has boon of great value to tho HQ, This should bo dono at least evory 30 mins while troops are actually engaging. The opera­ tion of Regimental HQ proved reasonably satisfactory and should work quite satisfactorily in an advance and operating as a rocco rogt. The big point to remember here is that if tho Commander is with tho GOC and passing tho information direct to him, that this same information has to bo passed back through the normal channels to the G Staff at Main

(b) Remoto Control Sets,. Tho using of the remote control sets to an OP proved to be very useful and if theso remote control sets could bo issued on the scale down to tropps, it would help a lot,

Noto by Tho policy of providing remote control for all tanks including B.R.A.C. Stuard reconnaissanco regiments has boon accepted for some time. The interim policy is to provide a simple form of remote control with at least 100 yards of cablej ultimately proper facilities using Junction Remote Control Nos, 1 and 2 '>7111 bo supplied, Tho necessary storos will not be available for several months but every effort will be made to equip as many tanks as possible in tho short­ est time.

5. MISCELLANEOUS. 5 Cdn Armd (a) Command Vehicles. Wo have used the Stuart tanks that are on our War Establishment for the fifth troop per squadron as coni.ao.nd vehicles for RHQ, made up along the same lines as the DERBYSHIRE XJ5CMYNRY, This makes a very nice vehicle and with two wireless setjs gives good controlj also squadron commanders have each had a Stuart for the same purpose. The Stuarts proved to bo by far the best vohiclo for the evacuation of casualties. It can got anywhere tho troops go, it will carry very easily two stretchers on the back with othgr personnel inside and it gives the wounded a much smoother ride tha any other vohiclo, I would suggest, if possible, that tho White Scout Cars on the squadron establishments as casualty evacuation vehicles bo replaced by cut-off Stuarts, There can be no doubt that the cut-down Stuart Light Tank is a magnificent vehicle for many purposes. Unfortunately allotments arc insufficient to enable • us to consider their issue for purposes other than those for which they are authorised at present. krmd Operations 2L May - 30' May AA. Recce Rapt IGGHG) (b) Fatigue. It is common knowledge that a rocco regiment- can ex- poct to have tc operate for longer periods of time than most other armoured units. In this operation of seven days, most squadrons were in operations for approx four days and nights and I feel^that this is about the maximum that can be expected and still retain efficient operation, (c) Siting of HQ. and Unengaged Troops. It is rcco:.ffiionded that HQ and any troops that arc not actively engaged or fighting, whenever possible be sited outside mortar range as practically all our casualties wore paused from mortar fire when troops wore in harbour or leaguer and R ginental HQ which wa3 sited in all cases just out of mortar range,"received no casualties at all.

oOo -19-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 6.

PART IV - ARTTT.T.F.RV,

25 Tk Bde x« ARTILLERY in Breaking; of the HITLER LINE

(a) Barrage very unsatisfactory,

(b) Dust cuts down visibility to 10 yard3,

(c) Gives your own position away to the enemy and he brings mortar fire, etc,, on adv infantry,

(d) It does very little harm to well dug-in positions. On the HITLER LIKE defences had been in preparation for past six monthsj e.g., Panther turrets placed on top of concrete rooms which had been excavated to a depth of 12 feet. In these cases the gun was only about a foot above the ground level and consequently impossible to see until right on top of it. All anti-tank guns were well dug in and completely concealed,

2, Operations 26 May - 30 fey AA.

Extract from 25 Tank Brigade Intelliponco Summary No.6 dated 25 May 44, There was some morning mist covering the ground, and thi: was greatly thickened by dust from the barrage so that visibility was reduced for a long time to approx 20 yards. The infantry went on ahead and passed right through the first objective, but did not put the anti-tank guns out of operation nor pass back information.

The tanks found themselves completely without infantry support, 'G1 Squadron NIK got up into position, but had to get out again as there was no infantry, and it was then that they got shot up badly. The mist lifted to show the tanks close to the anti-tank guns

6 SA Armd 3, Operations 9 - 10 June ^A. S.P, regiments were operating as a regi­ Div ment| FOOs were forward with leading troops. It does not seem nor­ mal to place one battery under command an armoured regiment oxcept on very special occasions. Hence noramlly thore will NOT be armoured regiment groups complete,

2 Armd A« Operations 26 May - 2 June AA. " Me SP Regiment RHA. SP Regiment RHA was very boldly handled right up behind leading tanks and gave excellent support at all times. In a pursuit this policy pays a big dividend as the enemy feels that he must have been outflanked when our gun lihe ia apparently so close to his forward troops,

1 Cdn Armd 5, Assault on the GUSTAV LINE« Artillery co-operating with tanks during IDE this, phase of the battle was extremely good, 1 Cdn Bde found that the artillery F00 riding in the squadron Sherman OP tank could put a concentration down on the target indicated to his by the squadron leader in a matter of 1^- to 2 minutes,

5 Cdn Armd 6, Operations 2A - 31 May AA« Bde (a) 6A Jeep Battery (equipped with 75 mm) did excellent work. They were1particularly useful because, owing to the congested state of the roads, the heavier types of artillery could often not be got forward sufficiently quickly to give support to the armoured regiment

(b) Barrages were not in favour. It wr.s considered that thedust and smoke made by thera tended to make tanks lose direction comple-« tely. Artillery support "as given by concentrations and cbeorvod fire, though the latter was extremely difficult owing to the nature •' of the country. Far and away the best observation was obtained from the Air Ops, and Brigade HQ maintained a direct link from a scout car to the Air Op in the sky,

the advance from the R MELFA onwards a trace was prepared 'all positions likely to be held by the enemy, as far as d be foreseen from a careful study of the map. These continued/ R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATION CIR(

positions wore numbered, serially, and a copy of tho tracc issued down to tho tank troop commanders and to artillery units. There were, in fact, 105 such positions marked on tho trace between the R MELFA and FR0SIN0NE. Fire was then brought down on to targets merely by reference to thes numbered positions. This trace was also used as a means of giving locations of own troops and of maintaining direction.

5 Cdn Armd 7. Crossing of the R MELFA. Bdo (a) Jeep drawn 75 iaa. In country where roads are few and comprise mostly tracks, the Jeep Drawn 75 mm Gun is undoubtedly the answer. Tho battery which. worked under command of 5 Canadian Armoured Bri­ gade was able to move forward at all times despite bad roads and heavy traffic conditions. In order to keep pace with fast moving armoured action, it is recommended that when possible Jeep batterys bo includod as part of artillery support.

(b) SP Artillery. Tho value of SP artillery became most evident during the period 24 ~ 31 May AA when d .e .to road conditions and heavy traffic it was not possible to move forward tractor drawn artillery when required. During tho entire) period the armoured brigade had at all times the support of tho S'P artillery and at many times this was the only support available and ready to fire,

(c) Artillery Fire Programme. In armourod action where due to ground cohditions and due to situations w ich require quick and flexible change of plan, it was found that tho most suitable form of artillery support wrs that employed during the latter stages of the action. This consisted of selecting targets off tho map by study of aerial photos, a knowledge of tho method used by the enemy in sighting anti-tank guns and also positions likoly to be used as OPs, Without registration, these targets were numbered and recorded as Murders and Stonks by tho CRA's HQ. The target num>crs together with their map co-ordinates were then given to units on a basis of one list per troop leader. Not only did units use these numbered targets for artillery support which when required came down very quickly, but also used them as an easy and quick method of report­ ing their positions.

— o©o

PART V - ROYAL ENGINEERS.

25 Tk Bdo 1, S-apper Detachments or Sections. These must be under control of CO. Invaluable for helping to make detours around blown bridges, culvcrts, craters, etc., clearing lanes up to damaged tanks,.

II SA Armd 2. Operations 9-10 June LL - . Bulldozers. Bulldozers have been BDE found extremely useful. Two were kept very *i?cll forward with HQ of Reconnaissance Regiment. They are proving invaluablo for filling in craters and overcoming demolitions along the roads. They should be kept as far forward as possible as they are cumber­ some vehicles to bring up quickly.

3. BRIDGING.

(a) Bridge launched by tnrretless Sherman.

See Part I, para 5. (c).

General.

See Part I, para 5 (d).

5 Cdn Armd Reconnaissance and Working Parties. In the initial move Bde from the HITLER LINE to the RIVER MELFA detachments of 18 sappers per armoured regiment wore carried by each armoured regiment in continued/ ' * c

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R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO

Stuart tanks on the basis of 6 sappers sappers being carried in each of two StuarT •tanks, Here able not only to carry out sapper reconnaissance but to assist in clearing nines, carrying out demolitions and creating diversions where necessary.

9 Armd Bde 5. R.E. Support - Operations 26 May — 2 Juno AA. Policy adopted was and to allot two Honeys from Recce Troops for Sapper use to accompany 1 Field Troop RE leading squadrons. This proved invaluable and tKe greatest praise is duo to all ranks 1 Field Troop R,E«

Tho absence of bulldozers was a great disadvantage. At least one bulldozer or Shermondozer per regiment is required. There were never sufficient RE, and tank crows carried out much nine clearance.

oOo

PART VI - MEDICAL

25 Tk Bde 1. R.A.P. R.A.P. must remain static - preferably with the Infantry R.A.P.

25 Tk Bde 2; Answers to Questionnaire,

(a) How did the M.O. co-operate with the Infantry L0i3 Was the same R.A.P. used?

51 R Tks and 1A2 RAC had separate RAPs, but co-operated closely with Infantry M.O.s dealing with each others casualties to some ex­ tent, and rThitc Scout Cars and Infantry SBs otf-operatcd in bfinging in all tho casualties. The M.O. of the 51 R Tks was on tho Command Net. C'no White Scout Car per Squadron was used for the evacuation of casualties to the RAP. The batmen wore employed as Stretcher Bearers. They had boon trained for this purpose and all had protection certifi" cates.

The M.O. of tho NIH set up a combined RAP with the Infantry M.O. They dealt with 300 cases in 36 hours. Infantry Stretcher Bearers brought in some tank casualties. White Scout Cars helped to bring in Infantry casualties. The M.O, NIH considers the largo number of casualties could not have been dealt with otherwise. A full record vas kept of every case that came through to mako it possible to check up on individual cases afterwards.

(b) Was White Half-Track or ordinary White used as ambulance for evacuation - was it a cuaeess?

White Scout Car in all cases. There were some cases which had to bo evacuated by stretcher bearers as the h'hites could not get up far enough in safety, or else the roughness of the ground prevented it, N.B. ; 'C' Squadron NIH consider the first-aid kit on the tank should be split up between the crow. Each man should carry in his pocket

1, A Shell Dressing, 2, An ampoule of morphine, 3, Something for burns - gentian, etc.

3 Cdn Armd 3., Evacuation of Casualties : Operations 2L - 30 May UL, Recce Regt The evacuation of casualties proved to work out in actual prac­ tice alright. The Stuart tanks being used in a groat many cases for the evacuation of casualties, and it is recommended that if possi­ ble, the Stuart Tank would be a better vehicle than the T3iito (Car for the medical vehiclc in the squadron, continued/ R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRQTrT.AB » UKHSWIEI) 5 Cdn Arnd A* RCAMC - Crossing of the MELFA. The plan of placing ono scction Bde under command of each armoured regiment in the initial action from the HITLER LINE to the crossing of the RIVER MELFA was undoubtedly a bad mistake. This became evident as soon as sections x?ero opened and the extra assistance of the ADMS's -resources were required. It is considered that the best method of moving the nodical resources was that used by the ADMS in the succeeding phases of the action, when all of his resources wore retained under command and disposed as ho deemed necessary. The suggestion that the original plan was a mistake does not in any way suggest tha t the armoured brigade received none but the b st of nodical attention throughout the action; it is only included hero as a lesson of the battle which has already been rectified ; nd put into effect.

0O0

FART VII - CAMOUFLAGE

25 Tk Bdo Camouflage of Tanks.

(a) Our own tanks roust be well camouflaged before going into attack. It is suggested that wire netting, etc., is fitted to the hull and turret of all tanks to facilitate camouflage,

(b) Operationa - 26 - 30 May LL. Camouflage was not much tfcied but all squadrons are determined to use it in future by tying wire round turrets to hold foliage, 'B* Squadron 14.2 RAC are experi­ menting with captured enemy nets plaited with grass, 'C1 Squadron NIH camouflaged during recent operations and found it best to carry up foliage from harbour areaj impossible to collect and fit further up.

Note by Experiments in ground camouflage of tanks have recently been coia- B.R.A.C. pletod and Courses of instruction are now being instituted at the RAC School.

cOo

PART VIII - AIR

25 ffik Bdo 1. AIR PHOTOS-

(a) 24. inch air photo s r.rc essential xnd must bo issued down to lank Commander level.

(b) Assault on the HITLER LINE. Insufficient air photos were issucc"!

(c) Exercise "CHESTERFIELD" Troop Leaders and in many cases Squadron Leaders had to make do with 1/25,000. For such an attack those are of little use. Detail is insufficient to indicate targets toRA and docs not give any real idea of the country apart from the roads. The best photc is the 1/6,000 taken in.the evening though the 1/12,500 (gridded) will sometimes do. These must be provided down to Troop Leaders.

In this battle, the issue of these typos was insufficient.

5 Cdn Armd (d) Crossing of the MELFA - Photos and Maps. It is realized Bdo that the rate at which the formation moved off the 1/25,000 sheets made the distribution of maps a difficult task. In the case of an armoured commander a map means a great deal more than the provision of a layout of roads. Most movement is done across country and for a successful operation much detailed study must be rx.de from the of the area. Similarly with photos. The photos used in the action up to the RIVER 11'lF.T.Fh wore tho l/l2,500 scale. This continued/ -23-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CI

is by far the best scalc for armoured formations and it is rocommon- ded that those photos be produced, loir ahead of the tine required, in anticipation of the rqquiromonts of armoured regiments,

25 Tk Bdo 2* P.P.

(a) It is considered that there is a good ease for a tank officcr toboeome an air OP,

11 SA Arnd 3, (b) Brigade Commander suggested that a light aeroplane be made Bdo available for his use. It is an excellent method. of controlling a brigade in close country, when ground visibility is restricted. It is considered that both forward and rear link sots could be fitted and operated.

5 Cdn Armd (c) Air Tel. - Crossing of the MELFA. The air fcl with 5 Cdn Bdo Army Bdo Group HQ was used constantly, and proved to be of the greatest value in dealihg with targets which were of immediate im­ portance. It is understood from the air Tel that this formation made greater use of the air Tel than has any previous formation. It is reconmondod that all commanders be advised of the usefulness of this means of support and consider it as another fom of very effective and very quick artillery support. However, it is felt that when armour is being employed CABf&NK should be full as far as air force resources mil permit. There wore many occasions when the Air OP spotted targets TThich cither could not be dealt with by the artillery or which artillery fire could not effectively neutra­ lize. Yihen air support was requested it was found that tho CABRANK was not functioning and as a result this in some cases meant loss of target.

Note by There can be no doubt that light aeroplanes arc requiifod as a normal B.R.A.C. reconnaissance element in an armoured formation.

oOo

PART IX t ENEMY

A, ANTI-TANK GUNS

25 Tk Bde 1. Operations 26 - 30 May AA.

Extract from 25 Tk Bdc Intelligence Suramarv No.6 dated 25 May Lk.

It now seems reasonable to state that the basis of the ADOLF HITLER LINE was tho two-nan MG pill box against infantry and the concrete casciaatc surmounted by tho PANTHER turret against tanks. This basic lay-out was strengthened by mobile forces in the form of assault guns, tanks and Mobelworfer batterys. Liberal use was made of demolished buildings to house the permanent defences and so make them as near as possible proof against artillery fire.

25 Tk Bdo 2. Questionnaire on Operations 26 - 30 May LL.

ANTI-TANK GUNS

(a) Did Anti-Tank Guns open UP at lone or short rangp?

Invariably at short ranges, anything from 50 to 500 yards. This was duo partly to tho closonoss of the country and to the fact that many anti-tank guns wore sighted for short range shooting, but also bccauso of tho mist and thick dust which allowed tho tanks to get right up to the guns beforo they were visible.

Hero they used to cover minefields or were minefields sited t»o vert tanks on to guns? DIM Generally speaking, there were so many anti-tank and AFV guns"on tho position it "as possible to cover minefields and approa- continued/ y *24-

R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRC

ches. Many tanks that went up on minefieldsnefields in doad ground "-.Torewere notnoi attacked by anti-tank guns and wore recovered. On the other hand as socn as a minefield was breached on the right flank the gap was coverod by an anti-tank gun. Some of the main anti-tank gun posi­ tions had minefields in front of then.

Th-re were signs that the enemy's minefield programme had not been completed at the time the attack was put in.

In some instance obvious approaches "/ere blocked by foiled trees

25 Tk Bdo 3. Exercise "CHESTERFIELD".

Reconnaissance• Reconnaissance was extremely difficult. Tank re­ presentatives accompanying infantry night patrols brought good information about the going, but naturally could got none about anti-tank guns and MGs. Recce by day was not possible owing to snipers and mortar fire and the fact that thick -.'roods prevented any­ one seeing very far.

Defences. Based on dug-in tanks, dug-in anti-tank guns - in some cases tank turrets complete in concrete emplacements (several being from Panther tanks^ - MGs in steel casemates all of which were supported by S,P. anti-tank guns and a feu tanks which stalked any of our tanks they could find. These defences wore covered by mine­ fields and wire in a number of places and snipers were hidden in slit trenches over the area, to snipe infantry, sappers and tank commanders,

All anti-tank guns and MG casemates were most cleverly concealed and were rarely detected until one was right en top of them.

11 SA Armd L» Operations 9-10 June LL. Bdo (a) In general, 88 mm anti-tank guns were used for covering roads. They wore not the special anti-tank weapon, but a dual purpose gun. Smaller calibre weapons were sited away from roads, owing to a greater cross-country capacity.

(b) Close Range Anti-tank Weapons. The German equivalent of a "Bazooka" is being used on a largo scale. Normal range of operation ' is 30 yards. It is used by infantry in slit trenches. Once the first round has been fired, the petition of the operator is easily visible, May have also been used by enemy infantry, hidden in trees, the projoctil being directed downwards onto the top cf the tank.

1Z.2 RkCt 5. Operations 11-17 May LL. (a) A mortar bomb landed on the engine cover cf a Churchill, pierced the amour and destroyed the tank by "brewing<-up".

.(b) One tank was knocked cut by mi enemy infantryman concealing himself in the long gra.fis anc brush until the tank approached his position, and leaping out at the opportune moment lobbing a grenade into the turret of the tank. This set off the amminition and caused the tank to "brew-up"/

B, MINES.

25 Tk Bdo 1, Operations 26 May - 30 May LL, (a) In most cases minefields, where clearance was necessary, were cleared by RE Sections attached to squadrons. This was done very quickly on several occasions. Infantry pioneers also helped to clear mines in some cases. The crows did not have to clear fields on any occasion, The normal mine detector was not much use as wooden box mines were used extensively, Theso can only bo located by deep prodding.

Scorpions were used,

continued/ V ** /

R.ii.G. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRGt?lIHiSflfaED

(c) A few S mines were found very scattered in a minefield on our rights flanKw The Teller |.iinos were ih a deep bolt, about 200 yards deep, but scattered very'widely, so that only a few nines had to bo cleared, ^

The box nines however only need Lfi lb pressure to explode.

NB : Squadron Commander *B* Squadron 142 RAC went forward on foot and was shown ninefielcls by Recce Squadron Connandor before the battle. Germans had marked the fields with wire and had even left notices up.

9 Armd Bdo 2. Operations 26 .May - 7 .Tnrio .

Minos v;ere always laid in v. rges and in all side entrances to roads and tracks. The lesson is to travel on the centre of the road where possible and to avoid all obvious turnings. Many nines wore inserted under road surface from the ditchcs leaving surface undis­ turbed. Mines thus laid are undectablc if over 12" deep as they usually are. They do not explode until several vehicles have passed. This is a risk which must bo taken. The usual damage to a Sherman or Honey is a broken track and complete suspension blown off. This can bo replaced on average in 24. hours. This Brigade has carried several extra suspension assemblies for this purpose. 3 H practiced attaching a cable to first located nine ^nd pulling out the tank thereby exploding any other attached nines or booby traps. This is considered sound. The present scale of mine detectors is insufficicri Had Scorpions been available it is considered that used on the verges of main roads supported by troop tanks, much more progress would have been made and difficult cross country deviations avoided,

Weekly Summary 3. Armoured Fighting 17 - 2/, May /,/,.

(a) Perhaps the biggest single cause of the comparatively heavy casualties was the unexpected minefield which virtually prevented any tank support getting up on tho right to help 2 Canadian Infan­ try Brigade on thoir first objective. It is felt that a more com­ prehensive plan to deal tritji unexpected minefields night have been made| possibly SNAKES might have proved the answer. A gap was eventually made in this field, but it was costly in men and time, and the enemy had time to close the gaps with anti-tank fire.

(b) American Method of Gapping the 'Unexpected' Mine Field. Americans have a device by which it is possible for one tank to attach a tow-rope to another without any man having to dismount from either tank. Method of gapping minefield is for one tank to advance into the field until it strikes a niinoj it is then pulled out oftho way by moans of the above nonticned device, Tho opera­ tion is then repeated until- a gap (track marks only) is made through the minefield, Americans claim that to date they have never lost more than four tanks in carrying out this operation: they state that it results in fewer tank casualties than if tho gap is cleared by sappers, because tho latter operation takes so long that the enemy can cover the gap with anti-tank fire,

5 Cdn Amrd 4. Operations 24-31 May LA. All personnel arc trained to lift mines and it is not considered necessary^..although naturally it v/ould be a help, to have sapper personnel attached for this purpose. The method used is to hook on and drag the mines out with a tank although in this operation it was not necessary to practice this drill as all minefields en­ countered were outflanked and troops moved on without having to clear tho way. '/ *? ;:'V 7*.