Hob'Armored Corps- Centra) Circular No. 6 0061630 Washington D, C, Septenber 27, 1944-• Foreign Liaison Branch, Roon 2B 715, Pentagon Bldg,, Washington, D. C. Subject: Royal Armoured Corps - Central Mediterranean Force Operational Circular No. 6. % are' enclosing the above nanod report for your ON •y, infernation. Distribution has been made as shoTin below. 01 C. A - ^ 'c vt. Jc hif/C ff/V V/ A, H, Gatehouse, Major-General A.F.V. - S.D, III. Distribution; Gomd, Gen,, Army Ground Forces, Chief, Research & Development Service, Ord. Dept. Arm, Force Liaison Off,, Aberdeen. G.2, Fort Knox, The Armoured Board, Fort Knox. Commandant, Arm. School, Fort Xnox. Comd, Gen.5 Office, Chief of Ord.-Detroit. Comd. Gen,, 20th Arm, Div. Comd, Gan., Tank Destroyer School. Med. Research Lab., Fort Knox. COFI NO. R.A.G. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 6. HQ RAC, c/o MAIN HQ MI, RAC/30/7/38 9 September 19LL. 1, A circular memorandum entitled "Lessons from Armoured Operations in Recent Fighting" was produced and circulated in this theatre by H,Q, 5 Corps which was recently responsible for the training of a number of formations temporarily in reserve.- 2. It is the province of D.M.T's Branch to consider this document and extract such information as the General Staff consider should be included in official War Office or theatre publications. It is felt, however, that the contents are of such immediate interest from an R.A.C, point of view that they should be circulated as an R.A.C. Operational Circular, the Circular to be read merely as a statement of views having the degree of authority indicated in this covering letter and in the document itself. Obviously th^so notes are of immediate value to all concerned with R.A.C. equipment and training. 3. The document deals primarily with the period of the recent offensive opera­ tions which commenced on the 12th luay 1944> with the assault on the "Hitler Line", It can only be read with complete understanding if the nature of the terrain in Italy is fully appreciated, and the general strategical and tactical background of tho period is understood. Briefly, during the period in question the enemy, after standing firm and being defeated on his well prepared "Winter Line" north of Rome was forced into a disorganised withdrawal on his whole front. As, however, tho nature of the country precluded the wide turning movements necessary to complete his defeat the pursuit was necessarily direct and the enony was gra­ dually able to recscvcr control. Therefore, he conducted a slow, stubbornly contested co-ordinated withdrawal taking full advantage of the close and difficult country so admirably suited to rearguard fighting. In tho pursuit and follow-up operations our armour lias found scope for employment throughout, but always with limitations as to tho strength which it has been possible to deploy at the point of contact, and only in close co-operation with infantry and the other arms. The onc-my has now reached his next defended line, tho "Gothic Line", tho preparation of which his slow retreat has been designed to cover, 4. The influence which air power has played throughout our operations in Italy must also be taken into account. Throughout the period under review v/o have enjoyed an air superiority which lias been overwhelming from tho enemy's point of vior and may now be described as complete. (Sgdfl) H.R.3, -lATKINS, Brig. B.R.A.C. FiEfl ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO.6. m CONTENTS LESSONS FROM ARMOURED OPERATIONS IN RECENT FIGHTING (Procluccd by H.Q. 5 Corps) Papos PART I Tanks 1-12 PART II Infantry Co-operation .12-14- PART III Armoured Rcconnaissanco 14 - 18 PART IV • Artillery 19 - 20 PART V Royal Engineers 20-21 PART VI Mcdical 21-22 PART VII Camouflage 22 PART VIII Air 22 - 23 PART IX Encny 23-25 oOo ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCE OPERATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 6 LESSON FROM ARMOURED OPERATIONS IN RECENT FIGHTING (Produced by H.Q. 5 Corps ) PART I - TANKS 1. ORSMIZATION 25 Tk Bdo (a) Formation. NIH had two troops of Churchills supported by two troops Shermans* NIH consider one troop of Shermans or Churchills fitted with 75$ all that is necessary. Note by The equipment of two troops per Squadron with Sherman tankg B.R.A.C. was to meet a General Staff requirement for a proportion of 75 mm guns in each tank squadron. The theatre policy is to restore Churchill equipped units to a 100$ Churchill basis as soon as Churchill tonics mounting the 75 mm gun are available. The policy will be to retain always one 6-pr troop owing to the penetrative value of the 6-pr Sabot amn. 6 SA Armd Piv. (b) Notes on Organization. (i) Under normal operations each Armoured Regiment has tinder command one company of Motor Battalion and a dctachment of RE personnel. In difficult tank country3 additional infantry may be allotted to the leading armoured regiment. (ii) Reconnaissance Regiment - for operations 9 - 10 J[une 44t two squadrons of Reconnaissance Regiment wore placed under command of the Armd Bde. Those sqns wore working either in front of the leading armd regt or protecting flanks. Note by The Armd Recce Regt of 6 SA Armd Div is on tho Armd Recce Regt B.R.&.D. Type 'B' Establishment - admixture of cut-dorm Stuart tanks and Sherman Tanks. (iii) S.P. ftegts were operating as a regtj FOOs were for­ ward with loading troops. It does not seem normal to placo one battery under command of an armd regt, except on very special occasions, Hcnce, normally, there 'rill NOT be Armd Regt Gps complete.' (iv) Bulldozers have been found extremely useful. Two were kept very wo11 forward with RHQ of Recce Regt. They arc proving invaluable for filling in craters and overcoming demolitions along tho roads. They should be kept as far forward as possible, as they are cumbersome vehicles to bring up quickly. Note, by Theatre policy is to provide Sherman dozers on a scale of four. perTank and Armoured Brigado| these to bo hold in FD8. No infor­ mation is at present at hand with regard to tho availability of tho necessary blades from production in USA other than the initial allotments earmarked for 1 Assault Regt RAC/RE 2. 'RECONNAISSANCE. 25 Tk. Bdo. (a) Tank reps must take part in infantry patrols, (b) Extract from 25 Tk Bde Intelligence Summary. No. 6 - May 25. '£A. Further investigation shows that the constant changing of plans gave no chance for a reconnaissance before the main attack, and in any case the country is so thick, it is difficult to see _any distance. On the evening of tho 22nd it was docidod that 51 change places in the line, NIK to go on continued/ •2- R.A.C. C.M.F. OPERATIONAL CIRCULAE I" RIGHT and 51 R.Tanks in CENTRE. 51 R.TEHP the RIGHT as they had been fighting there the day before. As a result of this both regiments attacked over ground they had not jboccod and with infantry they did not knot?. (c) Exercise "r.m.STF.CT'TElT.n" (Hitler Line). Reconnaissance was extremely difficult. Tank reps accompanying infantry night patrols brought good information about the going, but naturally could get none about Anti-Tank guns and MGs. Reconnaissance by day was not possible owing to snipers and raortar fire and the fact that thick . woods prevented anyone seeing very far. 9 Armd Bdo (d) Infantry Commanders must allow Tank Commander adequate time for ground reconnaissance if tank support is expected. 5 Gdn Armd Div (o) Close Country. The country .between CEPMNO and FROSINONE is very close country. The only method of getting tanks forward in this typo of country is for individual tank commanders to dis­ mount and carry out recces on foot. This, naturally, is a very slow procedure and results in holding up the general advance of the force. It is considered that general progress can be made much better by using, in this typo of country, infantry who can go for'rard clearing roads of mines, or with sapper assistance creat­ ing diversions around obstacles, all of which facilitates the for- ward move of tanks to support then whon they require that support. 3. TACTICS. ,9 Armd Me (a) Scissors Bridges. The Valentine Scissors Bridge Troop proved invaluable throughout operations 26 fey - 2 June They were repeatedly used by armoured squadrons and a bridge allotted to leading regiments by Brigade. This policy is sound. , In FROSINONE, owing to falling of main road, bridges wore laid at call within an hour, enabling a large part of 78 Div to pass through FROSINONE during 2-3 Juno and serious delay avoided. (b) Tactical Handling of Squadrons. Although the appearance of large numbers of tanks on a broad front undoubtedly caused the enemy to withdraw hurriedly, it is generally considered inadvisable^ to deploy more than two troops per squadron in support of a battal* ion and for the squadron leader to keep remainder close to him as a reserve. (c) Motor Battalion. 'The lack of the Brigade Motor Battalion was very severely felt. A normal close country advance guard of Motor Battalion, Squadron tanks, Regiment R.A., Troop or better still, Fd Squadron R.E., would- have quickened the pace of the advance. Armoured Regiments and Motor Battalion have trained together in this type of operation and ,it is impossible to expect ad hoc formations married up at the last moment to co—oper.tc with real ' rapidity and dash.