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Red : connecter and divider: disruption waves from the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Weber, Annette

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Weber, A. (2017). : connecter and divider: disruption waves from the Arabian Gulf to the . (SWP Comment, 50/2017). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55595-5

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Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Red Sea: Connecter and Divider WP Disruption Waves from the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Africa

Annette Weber S

The Red Sea is a vital pathway for goods, people, arms, and livestock. European with passes through here as well as oil from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, and a sizeable amount of global marine cargo is hauled through the Canal and the Red Sea into the Indian . In addition to its significance as a , the Red Sea is a lane for migration between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa and a bridge for roving terrorists. Its water connects the Horn of Africa with the Gulf countries, although it also separates African and Arab political and social cultures. Moreover, many issues are contested in the Red Sea , ranging from military control to political . In order to avoid further rifts between the Horn of Africa countries as a consequence of the disruptive politics of the Gulf, the Horn needs to perceive itself as a region and find common interests rather than becoming fragmented and weakened. The stability of the Horn of Africa as well as the security of its trade routes are of vital interest to European countries and economies.

Today the Horn of Africa is among the most of emergency that has weakened the gov- conflicted in the . Civil wars ernment. in and South Sudan, frozen border On the other side of the shore, recent conflicts between and Eritrea, as developments are shaking the assumption well as border conflicts between Sudan and of political and social stability in the Gulf South Sudan are constant sources of insta- countries. The recent arrests of more than bility and violence. The region is the birth- 200 influential individuals – including place of the two newest African states princes and other members of the royal (Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011). family – in in November on Furthermore, jihadist groups have been allegations of corruption and embezzle- operating in the region since the mid-1990s, ment are unprecedented and call the estab- resulting in conflicts in and several lished social contract into question. The severe attacks in the region – mainly in split in the (GCC) countries along the . Ethiopia last June tore at the fabric of the GCC, which has experienced waves of public uprisings is far from being mended in the near future and demonstrations in response to a state and might leave insurmountable rifts be-

Dr. Annette Weber is a Senior Associate in the and Africa Division SWP Comments 50 November 2017

1 Map: Red Sea Region Asia, and 20 percent of its imports are from there. The main passages go through the Gulf of , the Red Sea, and the . Trade between the two shores of the Red Sea is of great importance for the region: Somalia’s main exports are livestock and charcoal to Saudi Arabia. More than 70 per- cent of Saudi investments in agriculture and food go to Africa, primarily Sudan and Ethiopia, with the United Arab (UAE) closely following in investment. became a massive obstacle for trade in the Red Sea and the in the mid-2000s. With an absent and later weak state in Somalia since 1991, the enterprise of hijacking merchant ships became lucra- tive; in 2008 alone, 111 attacks – including 42 successful hijackings – took place. More than 263 crew members were held hos- tage just in 2009. An EU maritime force was established in 2008 with a mandate to secure the World Food Programme’s Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map are only humanitarian shipments for the people of for illustration purposes. SWP is not taking any position on Somalia as well as to secure a corridor for disputes about territories or exact line of borders. merchant vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden. Other countries such as Russia, hind. There are several root causes of the South , China, and have also sent higher tension levels and increased nerv- vessels to secure their trade routes. ousness in the Gulf that can be identified: Military bases. has the largest the Saudi-led war in (2015–), the number of military bases of foreign nations tensions between the Gulf and Iran, as well on the African . The US base, Camp as the plunge in oil prices in June 2014. Lemonnier, has thousands of soldiers sta- Beginning with the Yemeni war and the tioned there, and there are reports about resulting GCC crisis, the tectonic shifts on the expanding its geostrategic one side of the Red Sea have changed the interests in Eritrea as well. China has also power balances on the adjacent shores. built its first base in Djibouti, which has The changes are being felt most brutally in made the United States nervous. NATO, Ethiopia, which, before the war in Yemen, France, Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia was the default hegemon in the region. also have military bases in the small coun- Simultaneously, other countries such as try. just opened its largest overseas Sudan and Eritrea are rising from obscurity military base in in October. due to the attention being given them by The security impact of the GCC crisis the Gulf countries, , and the United can be illustrated with the Eritrean Port States, albeit for different reasons. of Assab. The port is south of the country, roughly 50 km from the Ethiopian border, but 600 km from the Eritrean capital. Relevance: Regional and Global Before the war between Ethiopia and Eri- Trade routes and investment. The Red Sea is trea, the Port of Assab was used by Ethiopia. one of the main trade routes for German After the war, it was allegedly used by Iran exports: 16 percent of German exports go to in the mid-2000s and is now being lent to

SWP Comments 50 November 2017

2 the UAE as a naval base for Operation Re- three or four generations and supply the storing Hope in Yemen. In September 2016, financial backbone for many Horn of Afri- Houthi rebels fired grenades at the port; a can economies through their remittances. month later they fired on a US war ship in Whereas the majority of Sudanese and the Red Sea before the United States retali- Ethiopians came to the Gulf as regular ated with rockets on Houthi positions on working migrants (in construction and the Yemeni coast. This exemplifies the re- domestic services), a smaller number crossed gional as well as international dimensions the Red Sea or the from Punt- of the Red Sea and its acute vulnerability. land to reach Yemen and then cross into Between the Port of Assab and the Yemeni more affluent Gulf countries. coast, the distance is roughly 60 km, but the smallest strait, the Bab-el-Mandeb, only measures 27 km between the Arabian Pen- Three Waves of Gulf Disruption insula and the Horn of Africa. This triggers In the last couple of years, there have been security concerns that ripple beyond the three waves from the Gulf to the Horn of Red Sea. The security for shipping lanes – Africa. The first wave came with the fall currently assigned to EU Naval Force Ope- in oil prices in 2014 and the need for eco- ration Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden – needs nomic diversification. The second was cre- to be assessed, and further measures to pre- ated by the decision of some African states vent terrorist operations, including using to fight the Houthis in Yemen under a ships to block the strait, need to be enacted. Saudi-led alliance in 2015. The last wave, Terrorism/jihadism. The significance of the in 2017, was created by the rift among the Red Sea as a security nexus became appar- three leading GCC members – Saudi Arabia ent when al-Qaida operatives crossed the and the UAE on the one side, and on Gulf to attack US embassies in Nairobi and the other – forcing African states to take Dar es Salaam in 1998. Despite the demise sides, which has had a fragmenting effect of the Islamic State (IS) in and , on the already fragile region. jihadism is thriving in the Horn of Africa Whether these waves will lead to further and Yemen. The attack on the USS Cole by disruption in the Horn of Africa or consti- al-Qaida on the Arabian (AQAP) tute the need for collective security has yet in 2000 was the first terrorist operation in to be seen. What is unambiguous, however, the Red Sea, followed by war in Somalia is the tectonic shift in power that the waves and attacks in Kenya and Uganda. There is have produce in the Horn. In the following, no formal cooperation between jihadists on the three waves and their consequences the and al-Shabaab in regarding shifts in power in the Horn of Somalia; however, jihadists, weapons, and Africa are examined further while focusing ideologies travel freely through the Bab-el- on the cases of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea. Mandeb Straight. The missile attack by Houthis last July on a UAE vessel involved in the Yemeni coalition shows that the Red First Wave: Sea could easily become a battleground. Economic Changes and Diversification Migration. The Red Sea plays a significant The first wave came with the fall in oil role in migration between the two shores. prices in 2014. The Gulf countries needed However, migration from the Horn of to diversify their economies and did so by Africa to the Arabian Peninsula is rarely various measures. In addition, they changed just an attempt to reach Europe but rather their food security strategies and started a migration movement to the Gulf itself. investing in food production and agro- Hundreds of thousands of migrants from business across the shore in the Horn of the Horn are seeking employment in the Africa. Besides the investment in agro-busi- Gulf countries. Many have lived there for ness, the UAE’s DP World invested heavily

SWP Comments 50 November 2017

3 in the ports along the Red Sea and the Gulf thousands of Sudanese migrants are work- of Aden and is now administering to most ing in the Gulf, and their remittances are ports in the region, from Kismayo to Dji- essential for the economy and their families bouti. There is increasing nervousness back home. about what such a monopoly could mean The Saudi and UAE maritime bases in if future pricing policies are put out of the Eritrea and Djibouti as well as the massive reach of state governments. investments in agriculture by Gulf coun- Ethiopia, a country heavily reliant on agro- tries in the Horn of Africa countries reflect investments from the UAE, , and Saudi the ties between security and economic Arabia as well as European countries, feels interests. However, the region around the cornered from the activities on the other Red Sea does not perceive itself to be a side of the Red Sea. The landlocked hege- region, nor are there efforts to establish a mon, by default, lost its access to the Port collective security or common trade archi- of Assab in its war with Eritrea (1998–2000). tecture, which could counter – or at least The increasing dependency – from port buffer – the impact of the Gulf waves of access to investment as a source of foreign disruption. currency – in combination with the in- creased militarization of its surroundings has made Ethiopia nervous. For one, after Second Wave: the October 2016 demonstrations in larger War in Yemen cities and rural areas alike, the government The second wave was created by the deci- reacted harshly: Hundreds of people were sion of some African states to fight the killed and thousands were imprisoned. The Houthis in Yemen under a Saudi-led alli- root causes of the demonstrations included ance. Unlike , which is supporting land-rights issues and political participa- the war but not sending troops, Sudan and tion. In addition, Ethiopia’s historical infra- Eritrea sent troops and provided a naval structural project, the Grand Ethiopian Re- base for the alliance in Assab. This has led naissance Dam (GERD), has opened another to a rise in status of the two Horn of Africa wound in its already unharmonic relation- countries, which had previously been ship with Egypt. Ethiopia is accusing Egypt politically isolated and in dire need of cur- of meddling with politics in Eritrea and rency to boost their economies. Saudi South Sudan as well as in the domestic Arabia is relying on allies from the Horn politics of Ethiopia in retaliation for the in its war in Yemen. Besides military bases Renaissance Dam, which challenges Egypt’s being provided in Djibouti (Saudi Arabia) claim to a fixed quota of the waters. and Eritrea (UAE), Sudan and Eritrea are The GERD is about to be completed in contributing troops and receiving foreign 2018 and will provide electricity to Ethio- currency in exchange. The normalization pia and Sudan. The dam is a fundamental process resulting from the Saudi coalition irritation to the and has already as well as European interest in cooperation led to announcements by Egyptian officials on irregular migration has helped the gov- of military action to stop its completion and ernments in Khartoum and Asmara to filling. The power afforded Egypt through regain power domestically and strength- its GCC affiliation could tip the delicate ened their regional standing. balance in the region even further. Sudan Sudan plays an equally active role in the currently has a strong position because it is Saudi alliance in Yemen. There are reports a member of the alliance in the Yemeni of more than 400 Sudanese soldiers having war, which could create a predicament for been killed in Yemen, and it is assumed the rival powers of Egypt and Ethiopia. that the number of soldiers sent there is in Sudan also has Saudi Arabia and the UAE the thousands. In addition, the Yemeni war as investors in agriculture. Hundreds of has functioned similarly to the final battles

SWP Comments 50 November 2017

4 of the Ghaddafi regime in Libya, from which A similar problem is likely to arise in rebels walked away with scores of peace mediations in Darfur, which are cur- arms, money, and ammunition. In the war rently chaired by Qatar. Although Sudan in Yemen, members of Sudan’s Rapid Sup- was able to remain neutral and support port Forces are allegedly being sent for ’s efforts to mediate between the training and to earn money. This military- GCC countries, Sudan’s dependency on economic link between the war in Yemen Saudi Arabia and the UAE might force it and Darfur and the wider region has to take sides against Qatar. Moreover, the so far been unexplored. crisis among the GCC countries is further disrupting the Horn of Africa region.

Third Wave: GCC Split – and the Role of Political Islam The Economy of Political Islam The rift among the three leading GCC mem- Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE are bers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one investors in agricultural projects and the side, and Qatar on the other – created the UAE is administrating almost all ports last storm in the Horn of Africa, with coun- on the African shores of the Red Sea, the tries being forced to take sides, resulting in Saudi’s aggressive push of Salafism is not a fragmenting of the already fragile region. looked upon favorably – both in Christian- Tectonic shifts. There are tectonic shifts and Muslim-majority countries in the Horn occurring in the crisis landscape around of Africa. One aspect of the GCC split that the Red Sea. The discord among the coun- has a potential impact on the Horn of tries of the GCC not only disturbs relations, Africa is the clash of ideologies. This will economic flows, and trust on the Arabian most likely manifest itself in Somalia and Peninsula, it also has critical effects on the Sudan first. The battle between Salafism Horn of Africa. The shores of the Red Sea and other forms of political Islam – includ- are moving closer together as a result of the ing the various branches of Egypt’s Muslim war in Yemen, the migration of people, the Brotherhood – might bring more conflict to trade route, and roving jihadis. the Horn than is currently being suggested. New conflicts erupted in 2017 in the In Sudan, this is reflected in the struggles Gulf region among GCC members. Saudi of the Islamic movement to retain power Arabia and the UAE wanted to coerce Qatar and the trend of the younger generation to follow their anti-Iranian regional agenda. joining the so-called Islamic State rather Qatar refused to follow suit, and diplomatic than following the political Islam of Hassan as well as economic and trade relations were al-Turabi – in power since 1989 – and the cut, leaving Qatar isolated. Beyond the inner- National Islamic Front. The increasing Gulf problems that this crisis has brought, number of madrasas and paid for, it has heavy repercussions for the broader and prayed in, by Saudi Salafi preachers is region, specifically across the Red Sea in the visible in Sudan, despite the government’s Horn of Africa. Qatar was a mediator in the friendly relations with the Muslim Brother- Horn, such as for the border issues between hood. Sudan was supportive of President Eritrea and Djibouti as well as in Darfur. Mohamed Morsi’s election in Egypt and Eritrea refused a request by Saudi Arabia hosted several members of the Muslim and the UAE to cut ties with Qatar, but later Brotherhood who fled after General Abdel went ahead and publicly criticized the coun- Fattah el-Sisi took power in . Many try. After the critique from Eritrea and the of them fled further to Qatar. Numerous siding of Djibouti with the other GCC coun- intellectuals and members of the Islamic tries, Qatar recalled their troops from their movement – inside and outside the govern- peacekeeping mission in the border dispute ment in Khartoum – therefore feel much between Eritrea and Djibouti. closer to Qatar and disagree with the Saudi

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5 school of Islam (Wahabism), but for eco- States’ recent partial lifting of economic nomic and political reasons, they cannot sanctions in early October. However, the come out in favor of Qatar. However, Sudan government in Khartoum feels emboldened has remained neutral and supports the by the alliance with Saudi Arabia and the mediation efforts by Kuwait. UAE in Yemen as well as by the normaliza- Similarly, the quest for a dominant ideol- tion resulting from migration cooperation ogy could hit Somalia hard. The political with the EU. Already there is a sense of re- landscape is dominated by political parties luctance by Khartoum to reengage in peace affiliated with branches of the Muslim talks with Darfur and the Sudan People’s Brotherhood. The competing ideology in Liberation Movement/-North in Kordofan Somalia is provided by the jihadist teach- and Blue Nile due to this perceived “new ings of al-Shabaab. However, it is not yet normal” by Khartoum. clear how an increase in Salafi mosques These political tradeoffs come with a and schools would shape the future of price, which will be paid by neighbor- Islam and politics in the country. Another ing Ethiopia. Addis Ababa is home to the factor is the influence of the Turkish African Union, and Ethiopia has been the schools of political Islam in the country chair of the regional organization Intergov- as well as their scholarship programs for ernmental Authority on Development for Somali students. more than a decade. It is leading in economic growth and infrastructural investment and is Europe’s closest ally in Political Consequences migration management. However, the Most apparent is the rift inside Somalia and Yemeni war and its alliances across the between Somalia and . Three shores of the Red Sea have changed this semi-autonomous provinces of Somalia cut position for Ethiopia, whose position has ties with Qatar, whereas the government in begun to weaken due to the militarization Mogadishu sided with the government in of the Red Sea shores by the UAE, close . The GCC split directly weakened the contact with Ethiopia’s arch enemy, Eritrea, central government and led to further frag- and the elevation of Egypt – a serious mentation in the country. Two of the prov- contender for regional power. It could also inces have ports managed and owned by bring about the hardening of a front in the the UAE, as does northeastern Somaliland, Horn of Africa through alliances with all of which sided with Saudi Arabia. Even either the Saudi–UAE axis or Qatar, which more influential is the high number of is the odd one out in the GCC. Considering Somali expats living and working in the the instability in the region, this is risky. Gulf – on whose remittances many families An additional geostrategic interest by the in Somalia rely. Prioritizing the alliance United States in the Red Sea could turn the with the investors over the unity of the balance of power even further away from country will have lasting consequences landlocked Ethiopia toward more authoritar- for the stability in Somalia. ian and repressive regimes, such as Eritrea. Sudan fears that an emboldened Egypt could derail the GERD dam in Ethiopia and force Sudan to publicly side with Egypt. The Region and Beyond Whereas the Yemeni coalition brought the The crisis nexus is spanning across the Red necessary economic boost and political Sea into the Sahel region. On the other shore, recognition for Khartoum to be self-con- it has reached relations between the GCC fident and strong, the GCC crisis has and Iran and is reverberating beyond the presented Sudan with a quandary. region. In the case of Sudan, much will depend Iran is accused of supporting the Hou- on developments following the United thi militias, who drove Yemeni President

SWP Comments 50 November 2017

6 Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi into exile in The increasing significance of Gulf coun- Saudi Arabia. Iran has also kept up good tries’ politics for the Horn of Africa is rever- relations with Sudan – Iran allegedly co- berating in the Red Sea region and far owned an arms and ammunition facility beyond. in Sudan (Yarmouk), which was bombed by Israel in 2012. As part of the negotiations with the CIA on counter-terrorism, the Repressive Regimes – government in Khartoum was asked to cut Hard to Maneuver their ties with Iran in 2016. Keeping Iran External actors often overestimate the in- out of the region is of interest to Saudi fluence they have on one side of the Red Arabia, the United States, and Israel, but Sea or the other. Given the authoritarian it limits Sudan’s strategic relations. systems prevalent on both shores, their Egypt has influence on the Red Sea – interests are less regional and more focused primarily, but not solely, because of their on the stability of their regimes. This makes control of the Suez Canal. How significant it harder to establish a system of collective this control can be on international trade security. For outside actors, it is prudent to could be seen during the 1967–1975 block- engage with regional organizations in an ade, when – as a reaction to the Six-Day effort to dissolve tensions. War with Israel – Egypt stopped all ship- None of the countries in the region are ping trade through the canal. The tensions democratic. However, the Gulf countries between the two contenders – Ethiopia and are far more anti-democratic than most Egypt – for regional power are fueled by of their counterparts on the African shore. the spillover from the GCC crisis. Whereas The political foundations of the Kingdoms Egypt is seemingly gaining power through and Emirates in the Gulf mainly remain its alliance with Saudi Arabia, it lacks stabile due to family relations, clientelistic trust, influence, and strong relations in and rentier systems, and the absence of the Horn of Africa region and clout in freedoms. This model is hardly relevant in the Gulf. the Horn of Africa. However, an increase Turkey has positioned itself clearly as a in political influence from the Gulf and “brother in need” to Somalia and Qatar. It the legitimization of reduced freedoms and has the biggest military base in Somalia, is repressive strategies should be a worrying in charge of the port as well as the airport sign for the citizens of the Horn of Africa. in Mogadishu, and it has developed close Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Saudi relations with Sudan. The government in Arabia already have the means to repress Ankara has no problem with Iran and is any attempts at transformation. In Somalia, closer to Russia than any country in the statehood is fragmented, and governance Gulf. In recent regional power shifts, is far removed from the state apparatus. Turkey is a mover and has placed its geo- The government of Sudan is involved in strategic cards well. two civil war fronts, and there is an arrest Israel has an interest in the Red Sea and warrant for its president from the Inter- bombed alleged arms convoys near Port national Criminal Court with charges of Sudan heading for Hamas territory in 2009. war crimes and crimes against humanity. Three years later, Sudan complained to the Europe’s influence is limited in the UN Security Council that Israel was bomb- region, as is the influence of the world’s ing the Yarmouk facility, close to Khar- powers. Waning US political influence, the toum. Israel argued that the facility was rise of China in economic, infrastructural, an Iranian munitions factory supplying as well as military matters in the region, weapons to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The and the role of middle powers such as Iran growth of Iran’s influence does not benefit and Turkey bring an explosive mix to the ’s interests. region.

SWP Comments 50 November 2017

7 The interests of Europe and Germany, in particular, are clear: securing the trade routes through the Red Sea, keeping chan- nels of communication open with all stake- holders, and engaging with Horn of Africa countries in matters of irregular migration. Analyzing the Yemeni war and engaging in a negotiated solution should be para- mount – the military engagement of the Saudi coalition and the United States is detrimental to a diplomatic approach. The escalation of sectarian hostilities between the Sunna and Shia – as currently being displayed in the GCC crisis – as well as a

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und widening rift between countries and popu- Politik, 2017 lations in the Horn are dangerous and All rights reserved counterproductive. These Comments reflect Europe can promote itself as a partner in the author’s views. support of a regional approach, furthering SWP economic cooperation and conflict preven- Stiftung Wissenschaft und tion rather than fragmentation and geopo- Politik German Institute for litical escalations. Europe can provide tech- International and nical expertise in water management and Security Affairs agro-industries as an alternative to the esca- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 lation of a Nile water-quota war between 10719 Berlin Egypt and Ethiopia. Inclusion and political Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 participation will ultimately engage citi- www.swp-berlin.org zens with their leaders, not repressive poli- [email protected] cies to ensure a status quo. ISSN 1861-1761 Fighting irregular migration has to be a long-term investment in the region’s dy- namics. The management of expectations is needed rather than the promise of quick solutions for bad governance, war, famine, and drought. Otherwise, the political trade- offs for supporting the security apparatuses of repressive governments will yield very little stability. The perception of the Horn of Africa as a region and the need for collective security would be preferable to further fragmenta- tion and should be supported by Germany and the European Union.

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