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Walter Feichtinger

Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 7/2021

The Middle

This special Fokus series on the Strategic Review The Abraham Accords, signed by , Arab countries to be fit for future, they of Global Hotspots consists of seven parts and is , the United Arab , and the need Israel. Consequently, the Pales­tinian based on the AIES online discussion on the same US in summer 2020, launched a new era issue will not be the key point for the topic. The online lectures of the authors are in MENA relations. The Abraham Ac- future. available at: aies.at/global-hotspots cords can effectuate fundamental changes in bringing countries in the Another power struggle is taking place in together and in establishing strong co- the between the US and , When it comes to the situation in the Middle operation with Israel. For instance, , where Israel, as well as , , East every analyst is facing uncountable , and may be in talks to Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are allied with challenges because of lacking transparency join the Abraham Accords as well, while the US, while , , and the Lebanese and invisible networks. Therefore, it is neces- , Jordan, and already have Hezbollah have strong relations with Iran. sary to define exactly what one is talking or normalised relations with Israel. The Arab writing about. The intention of this article countries that are increasingly engaging Iran’s increasing and stable influence is to identify relevant trends and develop- with Israel follow a simple formula: we ments in that war-torn in order to cannot win against Israel, but we can win The international community was hopeful gain a strategic overview. In this regard, five with Israel. about stabilising its relations with Iran strategic trends in the Middle East will be in 2015, when the Joint Comprehensive discussed: 1) A new geopolitical orientation Instead of Israel, Iran is now being percei- Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in on the Arabian ; 2) A stronger ved as the largest security threat on the Vienna. The intention was to bring Iran Israel; 3) An anti-Iran coalition; 4) The failing . New arrangements in to the negotiating table in order to find a ‘Arabellion’; and 5) Turkish aspirations in the the region are focused on building up a solution for Iran’s nuclear aspirations and region. strong alliance against Iran. to prevent nuclear armament. Since Israel is widely presumed to possess nuclear A new geopolitical orientation on the Israel is stronger than ever before weapons and has rivalry relations with Arabian Peninsula Teheran, Iran’s nuclear aspirations could Israel generally enjoys strong support from provoke a nuclear arms race and an inflam- Shifting alliances on the Arabian Peninsu- the US, but during the Trump Administra­ mable situation in the Middle East. Hence, la are changing the geopolitical orien- tion, it had an even greater support than US President Trump’s decision to with- tations in the region. For instance, Qatar before. The increased political enga- draw from the JCPOA in 2018 once again was in a diplomatic crisis with many other gement with Israel could be noticed in increased the concerns about nuclear Arab countries since June 2017, but at the reality: the US acknowledged escalation in the Middle East. After the US end of 2020, some bans and blockades as capital of Israel in 2017 and ordered its had withdrawn from the JCPOA, it adopted imposed on Qatar were lifted and eased Embassy to move there, the US recognised a strategy of exerting maximum pressure. the crisis, in which the were the as part of Israel in 2019, However, this strategy has not yielded the supportive and inventive as well. What and the US ‘accepted’ Israeli settlements results the US aspired. Firstly, there has we are witnessing now, can be a game- on the . Hence, some say the been no regime change in Iran. In fact, one changer. two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian could argue the ‘hardliners’, who oppose conflict is an illusion, as the West Bank is Iran’s engagement with the west, have More importantly, Israel is no longer already in the hands of Israel, to a large only increased their influence over Iran’s enemy number one on the Arabian Penin- extent. Furthermore, ’s leverage politics since. Secondly, Iran has remained sula. Israel is a strong player in the region over US policy in the region has decreased. a strong player and has kept its allies in the as it is a modern state with a highly so- region. The country can still have signi- phisticated industry and economy. On the Moreover, Israel is a modern country that ficant political impact on Iraq, , other hand, the economies of several other can enable neighbouring Arab countries Saudi Arabia, Syria, and . Arab countries rely heavily on oil revenu- to make economic and political transitions. es, causing them to be financially fragile. The economic and security cooperation The isolation of Iran and the US’ maximum As such, Israel is being reconsidered as a with Israel yields new options for the pressure strategy have failed. The US potential ally, in order to overcome eco- whole region. Furthermore, the political assassination of Iranian top general Qasem nomic transitions. Since more cooperation images of some Arab countries, such as Soleimani on 3 January 2020 could be with Israel is likely to continue to unfold, Saudi Arabia, have been worsening. In this understood as a provocation and a test of geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East regard, a better relation with Israel could Iran’s capabilities, but Iran’s reaction to the are evolving as well. be beneficial to them as well. So, for some assassination was largely rhetorical and

1 The Middle East

Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 7/2021

did not to further escalation. Further- successful – those are the empirical results Today, this has changed significantly: Tur- more, one should not forget that , from many cases that were studied after key has regional power aspirations. For in- Russia, , and Qatar maintained their 1945. stance, it is seeking new energy sources in relations with Iran. Iran’s aforementioned the and its foreign ties with Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon are also Syria is still a hotspot, although it is not policy is militarising. Turkey’s search for still in place. comparable to what we experienced in in the Eastern Mediterranean 2017 and 2018. There is still a concentrati- is causing problems not only with Thus, a reorientation to regard Iran as a on of jihadist fighters in the Idlib region in and , but also within NATO and the strong actor in the region was necessary. northwestern Syria. Along Syria’s northern EU. Meanwhile, Turkey is showing the cold The questions for the future are whether , Turkey has a strong influence. shoulder to and the West and is Iran can be brought back to the nego­ Those issues will be on the table the next providing demonstrative support for the tiating table, whether the JCPOA can be couple of years. Muslim Brotherhood. Besides, it main- reinstated, or whether there will be more tains strong relations with Qatar and it is escalation. Another point that has to be mentioned involved in . President Recep Tayyip in this context is Daesh. Daesh’ strategy Erdoğan recently indicated that Turkey will Ten years of ‘Arabellion’ currently looks like this: continue to stay in Libya, despite calls from the international community to withdraw. We will look at the situation in the MENA  Survival: the was destroyed, Although Turkey should not be underesti- region, ten years after the start of ‘Arabel- but not Daesh as a whole and its mated when looking at the MENA region, lion’ (the term ‘’ is misleading). ideology; its economic situation is fragile, which There are still demonstrations in ,  Expansion: although Daesh lost large could eventually have an impact on its the country of which we had the most parts of its in Iraq and Syria, . Besides, if there is a strong hope to overcome its issues. Besides, there its remnants are still active in many alliance of Arab states, it can turn on have been regime changes in Libya and countries, providing a source for future Turkey as well. Egypt. Meanwhile, there is a civil war in expansion; Syria and Lebanon is totally shaken up.  Demonstration of power: Daesh aims Additionally, the economic, political, and Iraq is on a good track, to a certain extent, to show that it is still alive. A single military relations between Turkey and but whether it can make the transition to attack, like the one in Austria on 2 Russia have huge political implications. a more inclusive government is yet to be November 2020, allows them to show For NATO, this raises the question whether seen and depends on other actors, such that their spirit is alive; it can rely on Turkey at its southern flank, as Iran.  Inspiration: meanwhile, Deash will con- when it has such a strong relationship with tinue to aim to inspire others, and the Russia. In this context, a report by the Center for Covid-19 pandemic increases ‘opportu- Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), nities’ for online radicalisation. Outlook assessing the situation in the MENA  Patience: Daesh is waiting to see what region, said: “The results are not good. the political developments are in the Many European governments were Far too many countries have become region and is waiting for its chance hoping for US President Biden to win the ‘failed states’ in ways that go beyond the to act again, like they did from 2015 US elections in November 2020 and are threat posed by Iran, extremism, and onwards. expecting the new US Administration ethnic and sectarian divisions. They have to be part of the solutions to different failed to make adequate progress in civil Turkey’s aspirations in the region political disputes across the . Whe- and economic reforms, and they have ther the US will be, however, is doubtful, stopped short of reducing corruption and Back in 2011, many policymakers, analysts, because Biden has many economic and incompetence in national politics and and scholars were talking about the ‘Tur- societal issues to face domestically. Besi- governance.” * kish model’. Some were hoping it could be des, the Middle East is important to the a model for MENA countries that were fa- US, but Biden will have to focus on The revolutions’ lack of success in the cing turmoil, because Turkey had a strong and China in particular. A question for MENA region could be ascribed to the re- political role for , but also a strong Biden is whether the Abraham Accords volutions’ lack of organised structures and political model based on secularism. It will survive and whether it will have a set goals. We do not know what the im- was also the time of Turkey’s foreign policy positive impact on Saudi Arabia, since it pact will be in the next years, because we concept of ‘zero problems’. Turkey was is an important strategic ally of the US. know from experience that revolutions like very proud to announce that it had stable Nevertheless, Biden’s next steps regar- the ones we witnessed here take time: 25 relationships with countries in its neigh- ding the Middle East will most likely be years on average. So, the ‘Arabellion’ is not bouring . informative, not decisive. over yet. Only 50 percent of revolutions are

2 The Middle East

Special Series on the Strategic Review of Global Hotspots FOKUS | 7/2021

At the same time, Russia will not give up its positions in Syria and Libya. Russia has effectively identified and filled vacuums in the region over the last ten years. As op- posed to Turkey, Russia has a more ‘silent’ approach. What Turkey and Russia do have in common is that their foreign actions can serve as a tool for improving their image at home, aiming to appear successful and strong. Nevertheless, Russia might have more to offer than Turkey in the region, such as .

How the following issues regarding the fu- ture of the Middle East will evolve remains to be seen: a) whether the Gulf countries will engage in strong relations with Israel; b) what the international community can offer Iran to bring its nuclear programme under control again in a peaceful way; c) how the 2021 Palestinian legislative, presi- dential and National Council elections – to be held in the occupied West Bank, inclu- ding , and Gaza – will turn out; and d) whether Turkey can maintain its strong game.

Finally, the first of the two biggest ques- tions is whether it will come to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This depends highly on Iran’s actions and engagement with the international community. The second one is whether the two state solu- tion to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a future. On the ground, there seems to be less confidence in it than before.

Dr. Walter Feichtinger, Präsident, Center für Strategische Analysen

Endnotes © Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik, 2021 * Cordesman Anthony, 2020, “The : From the “Arab Spring” to the “Axis of Failed States”, Centre for Strategic Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater- gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren wieder.

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