A publication of ihe African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies

No. 51 • December 10, 1985

Two (Hopeful) Views of Nigeria

1. Why Babangida? The August 27 Eid ai-Kabir holiday coup in Lagos was and Babangida-with a Buhari-ldiagbon team taking hardly worthy of the name. Even calling it a "palace an increasingly hard line on any sort of dissent within coup" seems an overstatement, and the phrase "change the SMC, and with Babangida taking a quiet lead for of government" could be misleading. Perhaps the head­ the SMC's moderate majority. On the overriding eco­ line in the Lagos Daily Times described it best, saying nomic issues, Buhari and ldiagbon were seen to be in­ simply: "Babangida Steps In." creasingly wed to a head-in-the-sand policy on negotia­ In fact, it was a very short step. The charismatic tions with the IMF, and determined to push ahead with Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, who had spent the huge ill-conceived and poorly administered counter­ preceding 20 months serving as chief of army staff and trade schemes which most observers felt were clearly as a leading member of the Supreme Military Council not in the national interest. The Babangida faction in (SMC), had been one of the key movers in the Decem­ the SMC, with the key support of Minister of Defense ber 31, 1983 coup which overthrew the civilian govern­ (Major-General) Domkat Bali, Major-General Sanni ment of President Shehu Shagari and installed a some­ Abacha (commander of the strategically placed Second what reluctant Major-General Muhammadu Buhari as Mechanized Division), Air Vice-Marshal Ibrahim Alfa, head of state. and most other SMC members, was growing increas­ The Buhari government managed to be simulta­ ingly displeased with the Buhari-ldiagbon style of neously indecisive and oppressive in its efforts to deal "tough-guy-but-no-results" leadership. The Buhari­ with Nigeria's truly daunting economic problems. It ldiagbon ruling in late July that any sort of political was at least as ineffective as the Shagari government debate would be seen as an act against state security in response to the crushing collapse of Nigeria's oil may have been the last straw for most Nigerians, market (production fell from 2 million barrels per day whose propensity for spirited political debate is in 1980 to 1.2 million in 1983, and annual oil earnings legendary. dropped from $22 billion to $10 billion). The coup surprised no one, except for its timing. In the 1983 coup, Buhari was the "compromise can­ Some thought it was due by mid-June, others by mid­ didate" chosen to lead because he was seen as an October. Perhaps typically, Babangida split the differ­ honest and competent technocrat who knew the oil ence. The takeover was meticulously planned and ex­ business. Major-General Tunde ldiagbon was chosen as ecuted without a hitch. There was no opposition, no Supreme Headquarters chief of staff because he was confusion. Buhari was quietly taken into custody at known to be a competent military administrator. But midnight August 27 at Dodan Barracks in Lagos; true political power rested with the collective leader­ Idiagbon was in Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage (he has ship of the only real mass political organization in the since voluntarily returned to quiet detention); and the country-the military establishment, dominated by the head of the increasingly extralegal Nigerian Security army. And the army's heart belonged to Babangida. Organization (NSO), Ambassador Muhammadu Rafin­ By the end of 1984, after some months of uncertainty dadi, was quickly arrested. And that was that. These and internal squabbling, it appeared that a lopsided three were to be the only public villains (in reverse troika of leadership was emerging-Buhari, ldiagbon, order of villainy) in this quiet coup almost completely

Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate: J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. • Production/Circulation: Evelyn Barnes CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400 , 1800 K Street, N.W , Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone (202) 887-0219 • ISSN 0736-9506 2 ...... free of rancor and vindictiveness. Kalu, a strong proponent of dealing with the IMF, as The following morning, Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro minister of finance, gave rise to (premature) specula­ came on the radio to announce the dissolution of the tion that he would come to terms quickly with the IMF. SMC. Later in the day, Major-General Sanni Abacha During the next few days, most political detainees announced that Babangida would serve as president were released unconditionally (although ex-President and commander in chief. And that evening the new Shagari still remained under house arrest as of president went on national television and radio to ad­ December 1985); the fractious Nigerian press was in dress a calm but curious populace. He said: full bloom again; a competent 22-man cabinet was The principles of discussions, consultation, and sworn in (including 10 civilians, some of whom were cooperation which should have guided the deci­ serious and vocal critics of the Buhari government); sion.making process of the Supreme Military and, for better or worse, Babangida threw the issue of Council and the Federal Executive Council were accepting an IMF loan into the turbulent arena of disregarded soon after the government settled Nigerian public debate. down in 1984. Where some of us thought it ap­ One of Nigeria's leading journalists and social critics, propriate to give a little more time, anticipating Dele Giwa, wrote " . .. Babangida, who removed the a conducive atmosphere would develop in which padlocks, gave Nigeria a tester: go and talk about the affairs of the state could be attended to with a IMF ... Babangida has given a new insight into the greater sense of responsibility, it became increas­ meaning of democracy." The front page "Thinking ingly clear that such expectations could not be Corner" of the leading daily National Concord com­ fulfilled. mented: "All of a sudden, everyone is talking in Regrettably, it turned out that Major-General Nigeria: Take the loan; Don't take the loan. Do a Buhari was too rigid and uncompromising in his census; Don't do a census. Replace Kalu I. Kalu; attitude to issues of national significance. Efforts Don't touch Kalu I. Kalu, etc. It may not all make to make him understand that a diverse polity like sense, but it sure feels good." Nigeria required recognition and appreciation of differences in both cultural and individual con­ Time: The Precious Commodity ceptions only served to aggravate this attitude. What does all of this mean for the future of Nigeria? Major-General Tunde ldiagbon was similarly in­ Clearly, Babangida is popular and very much in clined. . . . He arrogated to himself absolute charge. He is a very political soldier indeed, and he knowledge of all problems and solutions and certainly understands the basic democratic principle acted in accordance with what was convenient to of governance by the consent of the governed. He is him, using the machinery of government as his an instinctive consensus builder, and has a reputation tool. . . . The situation was made worse by a for acting decisively once a consensus is in place. number of other government functionaries and His speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary organizations, chief among which is the Nigerian of Nigeria's independence (October 1) gives some clues Security Organization .... To prevent a complete as to his intentions. He declared a 15-month state of erosion of our given mandate, therefore, we had economic emergency, and, in effect, warned everyone to act so that hope may be restored .... that hard times were in store (including possible fur­ ther drops in oil income), but that the suffering would Actions Taken be shared equitably. (He subsequently cut military and Among the immediate measures announced by government salaries, to lead the way.) He promised, Babangida were a repeal of Decree No. 4, which had inter alia, that countertrade would be reconstituted restricted press freedom; a policy of respect for basic only on a selective basis for priority capital develop­ human rights and a review of the status of political ment projects; that importation of rice and maize detainees; reorganization of the feared N80; a halt to would cease; that small-scale farming would be en­ countertrade dealings; a realistic approach to IMF couraged; that interest rates would be increased; that negotiations; and respect for international agreements. the government would begin to sell off selected state Hardly a radical new departure in any sense, and all enterprises; and that the legendary bureaucracy would cast in terms of a return to the original purpose of the be streamlined to encourage trade and commerce. Buhari government. The big question is whether or not Nigeria can The new ruling body dropped the title "Supreme" in come to terms with the IMF. There is more th .. m a favor of a more modest "Armed Forces Ruling Coun­ $2.5 billion IMF facility at question; another $1.5 bil­ cil," and "Supreme Headquarters" became "General lion in World Bank fi nancing and perhaps $2 billion in Headquarters." It dropped only 6 of 19 members, and bank and commercial credit are also at stake. The added 15 to give broader representation. major stumbling block is the apparently tough IMF The public's initial muted wait-and-see acceptance demand for massive devaluation of the naira-an issue of the new leadership gave way quickly to openly ex­ which has become highly politicized. Ma ny argue that pressed approval as it became clear that Babangida since the naira has already gone. through a large de­ really did mean to restore human rights, and appeared valuation in the past few years, it ought to be possible to be serious about his approach to the economic to work out a formula for continued gradual devalua­ problems at hand. His appointment of Dr. Kalu I. tion that would both satisfy the IMF and prevent a CSIS Africa Notes, December 10, 1985 ...... 3 political backlash in Nigeria . Babangida runs true to form, he will try to wait for a But the issue remains in doubt. Babangida has said viable consensus to develop, and then move deci­ "We shouldn't be in a hurry .. . If the country is deter­ sively. He knows the futility of trying to make major mined to do without [the loan], fine." Meanwhile, the decisions stick in Nigeria without benefit of consensus. spirited debate goes on, in search of a uniquely But he also knows that, on this issue, time is a Nigerian consensus. Some observers have noted that precious commodity. there has recently appeared to be a little less heat in -Gerald A. Funk the process, and a little more light. If President

2 . The Six Phases of Nigerian-U.S. Relations The development of Nigerian-U.S. relations in the past markable impression on the American elites of the 25 years can be divided into six phases: (1) The Era early 1960s, who saw Nigerian political elites as friends of Good Feeling-the period from independence on and potential allies. Similarly, Nigerian political leaders October 1, 1960 to the January 15, 1966 military coup had no hesitancy in making manifest the desirability of that toppled the civilian First Republic headed by Sir U.S. friendship. On October 7, 1960, for example, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and resulted in the latter's Nigeria chose the United States rather than Britain to death; (2) The Period of Uncertainty (January 1966 to introduce the new nation to the United Nations in New January 1970), which was marked by crisis, conflicts, York. The address to the General Assembly by U.S. and the Nigerian civil war; (3) Mending Relationships, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter expressed the period from 1970 to the overthrow of General "warmest admiration" for the way the people of Nigeria Yakubu Gowon on July 29, 1975 (exactly nine years had gone about winning their independence, and left after he came to power); (4) Confrontation and Rap­ no one in doubt that Nigerian-U.S. relations were prochement, the period from 1975 to 1979 marked first starting out on a basis of mutual accommodation and by stormy weather in U.S.-Nigerian relations (because mutual admiration. of disagreement over the U.S. role in the Angolan civil Soon after President Kennedy came to power, war and subsequent allegations of CIA involvement in Nigeria's prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the February 1976 assassination of head of state was among the first foreign heads of state or govern­ General Murtala Mohammed during the abortive Dimka ment to receive an invitation to make an official visit to coup), and then by movement toward better relations Washington. The personal rapport and conviviality that during the period of Genera l Olusegun Obasanjo's rule; developed between the two leaders set the stage for a (5) The Return of Optimism (October 1979-December relationship that was remarkable in its optimistic ex­ 1983), covering the election and incumbency of Alhaji pectations. During his 1961 visit, Sir Abubakar was Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's first executive president; and given the opportunity to address a joint session of (6) The Return of the Generals (December 31, 1983-?). Congress-something reserved for those foreign leaders especially favored by the U.S. government. Soon there­ The Era of Good Feeling (1960-1966) after, U.S. economic, financial, educational, and tech­ This period is especially interesting to both Nigerian nical assistance started to flow. and U.S. analysts of diplomatic relations between the The evolving "special relationship" was primarily due two countries. Unlike the case in many other African to the fact that most of the Nigerian political actors countries, Nigerian independence was peacefully nego­ were well known in U.S. circles and had established tiated and effected without bitterness between the various linkages that favored positive interaction. retreating British colonialists and Nigeria's new political Specifically, the philosophical and cultural conditions elites, who shared mostly Western values and were that gave rise to the Era of Good Feeling lay deep in reluctant to make new friends, preferring rather to the character and political orientations of the Nigerian tread cautiously into the complex jungle of world poli­ political elites. Their political and social backgrounds tics. Here was a classic case of elites from the periphery as well as their tactics found immediate favor with linking up culturally, politically, economically, and even U.S. policymakers. These Nigerian elites methodically philosophically with the elites of the central metropolis avoided ideological or militantly nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to justify power and maintain legitimacy and conducted their diplomacy in a discreet manner. at home. In this phase, stability and peace were incon­ Pragmatic in outlook, they were more interested in ceivable without strong and visible attachments to the winning friends and influencing people than in making reluctantly retreating imperial power. And for a while points. Their priority objectives-political independence this complex alliance or allegiance brought Nigeria an on the one hand and economic development on the uneasy peace. other-account for the intensity with which this gen­ The process of Nigerian independence made a re- eration of Nigerians pursued friendly relations with the

CSIS Africa Notes, December 10, 1985 4 ......

United States and chose Washington as sponsoring emergence as the new head of the SMC following godfather in the United Nations. Mohammed's assassination on February 13, 1976. President Jimmy Carter's election in November 1976 The Period of Uncertainty (1966-1970) gave Obasanjo an opportunity to repair the damage The bloody military takeover of January 15, 1966 in­ done to Nigerian-U.S. relations by the controversies troduced an element of uncertainty in Nigerian-U.S. over Angola and the Murtala assassination. It was an relations. Nigeria's new military rulers, under the uneasy period, but Carter's two most visible diplomats­ leadership of Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-lronsi, Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young and were unknown in Washington, and this confused an Ambassador to Nigeria Donald Easum-made a tre­ American foreign policy elite used to obtaining a sense mendous impression on Nigerian government officials of a foreign leader's personality and character before and the public, and Nigeria's ambassador in Washing­ getting close to his government. The even more violent ton, Edward Olu Sanu, was also an ideal selection for Northern-led countercoup of July 29, 1966, in which fence-mending. These factors, together with Obasanjo's Lieutenant-Colonel (later General) Gowon succeeded dogged efforts, once more rescued Nigerian-U.S. the assassinated Aguiyi-lronsi, only increased the diplomacy from the abyss. sense of "wait-and-see" tactical uncertainty in From the outset, Obasanjo reassured Nigerians (and Washington. Washington) that he would adhere to the legacy in­ The civil war that began in July 1967 between the herited from his predecessor-the 1975 pledge to carry central government and the Biafran (lbo) secessionists forward a step-by-step program focused on restoration in the Eastern Region compounded this uncertainty of civilian rule in 1979. Both this commitment and because the war was not of the classical variety ap­ Obasanjo's political style were key factors in the rap­ pealing to U.S. interventionists. There were no clearly prochement and amity that marked this interim period, distinguishable ideological "good guys" or "bad symbolized by President Carter's official visit from guys"- no radicals, communists, or anticommunists. March 31 to April 3, 1978. The U.S. "non-role" in this stressful period caused a severe strain in Nigerian-U.S. relations that lasted The Return of Optimism (1979-1983) until the war ended with Biafra's military defeat in When Obasanjo handed over power to Nigeria's first 1970. popularly elected president on October 1, 1979 (and retired in dignity to his farm in his native Ogun State), Mending Relationships (1970-1975) the United States had special reason to be pleased. The years from 1970 to 197 5 saw only slight improve­ The new constitution was patterned on the U.S. presi­ ment in relations in spite of enormous efforts by offi­ dential system, and the parallels between the relation­ cials of both governments. The bitterness of the war, ships of the states to the central government were the euphoria of victory, the agony of defeat, and the also of special interest. And despite some grievances determination of the Supreme Military Council to han­ over specific aspects of the elections, there was also a dle independently the task of national reconstruction strong mood of optimism in Nigeria about the return aggravated relationships between Lagos and Washing­ to elected government after 13 years of military rule, ton. One factor that particularly upset the Americans upheavals, and civil war. was the increasing fraternization of Nigerian officials Both President Shagari and Vice President Alex with Eastern bloc countries and Nigeria's recognition Ekwueme made official visits to the United States, of more socialist states. Perhaps what the Americans and two serving U.S. vice presidents (Walter Mondale did not understand was that Nigeria was using the im­ and George Bush) paid official visits to Nigeria during mediate postwar period to balance its diplomatic rela­ this period. In terms of ceremonies and postures of tionships more evenly between NATO and the Warsaw friendship, relations between Nigeria and the United Pact. States became reminiscent of the days of the First As the period progressed, there was a shift of em­ Republic. phasis from political to economic and trade relations between the two countries. The oil boom had a The Return of the Generals (1983-?) smoothing effect, as the United States became a prin­ When a new group of Nigerian generals overthrew cipal importer of Nigeria's crude. But the belief on President Shagari's government on New Year's Eve, both sides that economics had triumphed where poli­ 1983, they also ended Nigeria's Second Republic. tics had failed proved to be premature. From the U.S. perspective, the return to military rule after only four years was particularly disturbing be­ Confrontation and Rapprochement cause it brought a sad and sudden end to the first After Gowon was forcefully "retired" and replaced by genuine African experiment with a U.S .-style presiden­ Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed on July tial system. Diplomatic relations between the two na­ 29, 1975, Lagos and Washington entered a new period tions cooled during the 20 months of Major-General of anxiety and uncertainty. Relations worsened as Muhammadu Buhari's rule. President Ford and Mohammed slugged it out over the On August 27, 1985, Buhari was replaced as head of U.S. intervention in the Angola civil war. Rapproche­ state by Major-General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida ment had to wait for Lieutenant-General Obasanjo's has impressed the United States and the rest of the

CSIS Africa Notes, December 10, 1985 ...... s world with a greater respect for fundamental human The main problem Americans have had in dealing rights than his predecessor. While it is still too early with Nigeria has been the frequency of regime to be sure of the course of Nigerian-U.S. relations changes. U.S. diplomats have suffered silent agonies during Babangida's tenure, increasingly encouraging as personalities came and went in a quick succession. gestures and postures are manifesting themselves in For Nigeriims to benefit in their relationship with the Lagos and Washington. United States they must come up with a clear defini­ tion of their goals and mission. Nigeria must define Elements of Continuity where it stands in its international relations, because Two factors binding Nigeria and the United States over flux and drift in foreign policy objectives leave both these 25 years of ups and downs are the acceptance friends and foes guessing. There are no fundamentally by U.S. policymakers that Nigeria is a potential power irreconcilable conflicts between Nigeria and the United in Africa and that the Nigerian elite class is predomi­ States, except perhaps over the issue of South Africa. nantly made up of people whose economic philosophy tends to be free market-oriented. -George A. Obiozor

Dr. George A. Obiozor is a Senior Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos.

Gerald A. Funk heads a new consulting firm, Jerry Funk & Associates, Washington, D.C. He was a senior staff member (Africa) on the National Secur­ ity Council in the Carter White House, and later a vice president for political risk analysis at Bankers Trust Company in New York. He lived in Ethiopia from 1968 to 1974, serving as regional director of the African American Labor Center (AFL-CIO). He served as full-time political media advisor to Presi­ dent Shehu Shagari's reelection campaign in Nigeria in 1983. Mr. Funk's previous contributions to CS/S Africa Notes include "Some Observations On Strategic Realities And Ideological Red Her­ rings On the Horn of Africa," issue no. 1, July 1, 1982, and "Can Ethiopia Survive Both Communism and the Drought?," issue no. 40, March 15, 1985.

CSIS Africa Notes, December 10, 1985 N''~"'1:11\rfJ~orE?. · ...... · ~ ....- ...... - .. .· '

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