The Cabal Metaphor and Governance Deficit in Nigeria’S Democracy
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International Journal of Politics and Good Governance Volume X, No. 10.3 Quarter III 2019 ISSN: 0976 – 1195 THE CABAL METAPHOR AND GOVERNANCE DEFICIT IN NIGERIA’S DEMOCRACY Fredrick O.Onyia & Anthony A. Aroh Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka ABSTRACT This study is designed to establish the nexus between the Cabal metaphor in the Presidency and Governance deficit in Nigeria’s democracy. The central argument in the study is that weak political leadership at the Presidency creates a lacuna in governance. This lacuna in turn throws up a Cabal that surreptitiously hijacks the day to day administration of the government while, ostensibly acting in the President’s name. Using the Capture Theory of Politics as a theoretical framework, the study argues that once a Cabal captures the soul of the Presidency, the President loses control of governance. Actions taken in his name even without his knowledge are presented to the public as having Presidential endorsement; reduced to a lame duck, the ship of state flounders. Being a qualitative study, data was generated through documentary method and analyzed using content analysis. The study recommends that for the Cabal contraption to be eliminated from the Presidency, the President has to demonstrate strong leadership by being in effective control of his government. With this done, no lacuna will be left for Cabals to exploit. Keywords: Cabal, Governance deficit, Presidency, Leadership, Democracy. Introduction The terms Cabal and Governance are two concepts that often feature in political discourse among academics, politicians, Civil Society and the general public in Nigeria especially when democracy is the focus of discussion. The meaning and interpretation given to each of them varies according to the perspective of the discussants. The word Cabal is derived from the esoteric Hebrew word “Kabbalah” meaning a received doctrine, a cult or secret society with mystical powers and often insidious influence (Kwiatkowski, 2010; Albert, 2012). The term is also believed to have gathered its 1 International Journal of Politics and Good Governance Volume X, No. 10.3 Quarter III 2019 ISSN: 0976 – 1195 contemporary momentum from the supposed secretiveness and lack of responsibility of five Privy Councilors who formed the Committee for Foreign Affairs to King Charles 11 of England, Scotland and Ireland from 1668 to circa 1674. The five of them were Sir Thomas Clifford, Lord Arlington, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord Anthony Ashley, and Lord Lauderdale. The initials of the five of them coincidentally spelt CABAL (Albert, 2012).They were so labeled primarily because of the problem the people faced coming to terms with the powers of British royalty being exercised by five powerful individuals. Although there seems to be no universally accepted definition of Governance when used in political literature, the International Centre for Parliamentary Studies (2010) posits that the concept is owed to Plato, the Greek philosopher who is reputed to be the first to use the Greek word “Kubernao”, meaning to steer a ship, metaphorically, in the context of steering men. The centre states that over time, the concept assumed a generic meaning, encapsulating the nexus between stakeholders in multiple set ups. Scholars and institutions across the globe have given different definitions, some of which we will restate here. Pierre (2002) states that “governance refers to sustaining coordination and coherence among wide range of actors with different purposes and objectives”. Such actors according to him may include political actors and institutions, interest groups, civil society, NGO’s and transnational organizations. The key words in this definition are coordination and coherence and which of course have to be sustained. This definition brings to the fore, elements of governance that draws it closer to the concept of administration. In his own account, Hirst (2000) defined governance as “the means by which an activity or ensemble of activities is controlled or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable range of outcomes according to some established standard”. Implied in this definition is the issue of service delivery. It is when this qualification is brought to bear on the definition that people begin to apply value judgments to governance leading to such qualifiers as “good governance” and “bad governance”. Canada’s Institute of Governance (2002) on the other hand, asserts that “governance is the process whereby societies or organizations make important decisions, determine whom they 2 International Journal of Politics and Good Governance Volume X, No. 10.3 Quarter III 2019 ISSN: 0976 – 1195 involve and how they render account”. In this definition, we could see there is an expectation of accountability as a deliverable of governance. Two multilateral institutions namely the World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have also given definitions of governance that are quite similar. First, World Bank (1993) defined governance as “the method through which power is exercised in the management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for development”. While UNDP (1997) states that “governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels”. It further states that it comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their difference. Probably because the UNDP definition was endorsed by the UN Secretary General’s Inter- Agency Sub-task force to promote integrated responses to UN conferences and summits, it has become the globally accepted definition of governance and the most often cited in the extant literature. The UN went a step further to qualify governance by introducing the concept of good governance. It identified eight characteristics of good governance. These are participatory; consensus-oriented; accountable; transparent; responsive; effective and efficient; equitable and inclusive and which follows the rule of law. What this presupposes is that when these characteristics are lacking either in whole or in part, then there is a deficit. It is in this context that we have appropriated the phrase governance deficit in this study. Having explicated the concepts of Cabal, Governance and Governance Deficit, the question that naturally arises is: what is the relationship between the Cabal Metaphor in Nigeria’s Presidency and Governance deficit in Nigeria’s democracy? That is the puzzle this study seeks to unravel. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one is this introductory part. In section two, we will articulate the theoretical framework that guides the study. The focus of section three would be on the civilian administrations of President Shehu Shagari, Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua/Goodluck Jonathan and the present government of Muhammadu Buhari. Section four discusses the nexus between the Cabal Metaphor and 3 International Journal of Politics and Good Governance Volume X, No. 10.3 Quarter III 2019 ISSN: 0976 – 1195 Governance Deficit and how this weakens democracy in Nigeria. We conclude in section five with our recommendations. Theoretical Framework We adopted Regulatory Capture Theory as our framework of analysis. The theory was propounded in 1971 by George Stigler, a Nobel Laureate Economist at the University of Chicago, USA. Regulatory Capture also known as Economic Theory of Regulation states that regulatory agencies may come to be dominated by the industries or interests they are charged with regulating. The result is that the agency which is charged with acting in public interest, instead acts in ways that benefit the industry it is supposed to be regulating. Stigler noted that regulated industries maintain a keen and immediate interest in influencing regulators whereas ordinary citizens are less motivated. In many cases, the regulators themselves come from the pool of industry experts and employees who then return to work in the industry after their government service. This is a version of the system known as the revolving door between public and private interests. In some instances, industry leaders trade the promise of future jobs for regulatory consideration, making revolving doors criminally corrupt. Stigler further states that Regulatory Agencies that come to be controlled by the industries they are charged with regulating are known as Captured Agencies. Eventually, a captured public-interest agency operates essentially as an advocate for the industries it regulates. Such cases may not be directly corrupt; rather the regulators simply begin thinking like the industries they regulate, due to heavy lobbying. Other scholars of the Regulatory Capture persuasion who have contributed in advancing the frontiers of the theory include Nash (2010), Thierer (2010) Wilson (2001) and Onuoha (2008). For Nash, a significant insight emerging from Capture Theory is that a regulator may act, either intentionally or unintentionally in a way that result in personal or institutional gain. This can be fostered through a close relationship between industries and regulatory agencies. Thierer posited that Capture Theory is closely related to rent-seeking and political failure theories developed by public choice school of economics. He went further to say that another 4 International Journal of Politics and Good Governance Volume X, No. 10.3