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Naming and Necessity Library of philosophy and logic. Download as PDF Printable version. An extremely important book for the philosophy of language, and also very relevant in philosophy of mind. Either one of the properties, or a select group of them are believed by any given speaker to match up exclusively with objects of the type named. You have to wonder at the man's command of his subject: this lecture was given without notes and although the language is simple enough and the initial arguments beguile you into thinking that you can easily understand the thrust. Sep 23, Heath Allen rated it did not like it. I suppose it's interesting for people who already accept notions like necessity and the a priori, and for those who think that the notion of "meaning" is clear enough to lean on for any substantive philosophical work. Benjamin Franklin is Benjamin Franklin in every possible world. Central to his previous lectures was his attack on the descriptivist theory of reference. What properties of x would remain in that world and which would be different? It states that names are really abbreviations for a specific description, or a set of descriptions, of the thing named. It's quie amusing, very interesting and suprisingly easy to understand but not as easy as people tend to tell you. Mar 05, Andrew added it Shelves: analytic-philosophy , philosophy. But in general, it was not a work that I particularly enjoyed reading. Paperback , pages. He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid designators : A proper name refers to the named object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds. The book is clear, fresh and intriguing. How do they do this? The Web is full of names; many of them refer to something in the world. This can be contrasted with rigid designators that reference natural kinds, which seem at least have a stronger case for being representative of a single phenomena; although there seems to be an argument for these too being representative of two different entities. Dec 06, Rachael rated it it was amazing. Kripke is wordy and repetitive; this already short book could probably have been much shorter and crisper, or could have at least covered more territory. No trivia or quizzes yet. We imagine a situation that could have been otherwise. He not only drew the logical consequences of ordinary beliefs, but also solved intricate problems in mathematics. May 25, Shane Wagoner rated it it was amazing. In other words, you could only be certain about things you knew independently of experience. Natural and metaphysical necessity, naming, identity In Naming and Necessity , Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy:. So, the link between the property of being a murderer and the person referred to is contingent. It is metaphysically possible that there could have been different entities with the same name, but it is empirically impossible for those entities to have been our Hesperus and Phosphorus. This is a dummy description. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. After all, facts are easy to talk about; fiction is another thing entirely. His academic training was unique. Kripke's boyhood genius did not flicker out in the s, when he studied at Harvard, Oxford, Princeton and Rockefeller University or, more accurately, when he worked independently at these institutions and had occasional contact with his surroundings. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. Now we return to the above example. This book is full of genius, smart, and clear expression. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. Kripke points out that these things, and others, have two aspects: the way the thing feels to us in our sensory encounters with it; and its objective nature. That having been said, Kripke's claims often seem to work out even under scrutiny. Consequently, the universities let him alone and admitted him to their faculties when he said he was ready. Permissions Request permission to reuse content from this site. Kripke asks a couple quick questions, and then proceeds in about 90 seconds to work through, off the top of his head, all of the logic-work that this guy had done for the past three years "oh, but if you held X, then that would lead to Y, so you would need to circumvent that with Z He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined e. Dewey Decimal. Instead an initial baptism takes place when the name is first used. Naming and Necessity Writer

Fast read for a philosophy book and interesting ideas, particularly as regards how names work, the necessity of certain traits, and the existence of a posteriori analytic knowledge. Kripke's main goals in this first lecture are to explain and critique the existing philosophical opinions on the way that names work. Get A Copy. Maybe will put philosophy aside for a while Smith's view is controversial, and several well-known scholars for example, Stephen Neale and Scott Soames have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that his account is mistaken. Kripke himself notes the differences between the natural kinds case and the sensible phenomena case pointing out that natural kinds have their reference fixed upon their being certain properties believed to be characteristic to the kind that are used to place items not in the original sample identified as the kind into that kind. One of the most enjoyab Wittgenstein once spoke of a man who, despite pushing as hard as he could, could not open a door. Nevertheless, I think that most people, when they first learn of this theory, feel a bit uncomfortable with it. Like virtually all analytic philosophy, Kripke's work is basically outsider art 'outsider philosophy' -- that is, naively working with concepts and language without understanding the history of any of the terms involved, treating Plato's dialogues as a journal article written yesterday, and philosophy itself as something that sprung fully-formed from the head of Zeus in the early twentieth century with the work of Frege and Wittgenstein. Lecture I. This account is in contradistinction to Frege and Russell who argued for a descriptive account of naming, that names are equated to a cluster of properties so that if some object has the requisite cluster of properties it can be named such and such. Open Preview See a Problem? Naming and Necessity is an unusual thought experiment in relation to metaphysical reasoning and a priori thought of the things around us. May 07, Thuringiana rated it it was amazing. Saul A. When someone accurately claims that two names refer to the same object, the claim is necessarily true, even though it may be known a posteriori. Names do not have to be descriptions for this to work. Kripke in this book lecture series , powerful arguments against the theory [ which we say was Frege-Russell's theory] that we say: Like any proper noun "Napoleon" or " Richard Nixon "- corresponds to a definite description; For example, "Richard Nixon" corresponds to the "thirty-seventh president of the United States". Still, Kripke was arguing against a whole paradigm; and paradigms do not go gentle into that good night. Kripke asks a couple quick questions, and then proceeds in about 90 seconds to work through, off the top of his head, all of the logic-work that this guy had done for the past three years "oh, but if you held X, then that would lead to Y, so you would need to circumvent that with Z So, the name was fixed to its referent by a description. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on descriptivist theories of proper names. But I've been spending a lot of my time thinking about names of things at weird and inopportune moments sweeping the floor, swimming laps , which means I know this is on my mind. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. Instead an initial baptism takes place when the name is first used. Lecture II. It also makes it clear how two names can refer to the same thing: if the descriptions of two different names are matched by one object then we can say that they are one for example that Phosphorus is Hesperus. Damn philosophical questions! But both this sketch and the arguments of the book are marred by structurelessness and incompleteness. Titled Reference and Existence , they are in many respects a continuation of Naming and Necessity , and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. Start your review of Naming and Necessity. Kripke disagrees with this. Mainly though because it instills a sense of wonder into previously dry fields of l Hmm- just re-reading this classic and savouring it's utter greatness. View 2 comments. Jun 07, Jon Stout rated it really liked it Recommends it for: mathematicians and linguists. Or at least, that was the argument I had in mind when I started writing this review. I'm not a fan of reading primary sources so I resisted many recommendations to read this book. I've read Naming and Necessity four times now and am still surprised by it. Second, when the referent of a name is determined by a property attributed to the thing named, the link is contingent, rather than necessary or essential. Reference is derived from a causal relationship mediated through the Web. Naming and Necessity Reviews

What is the meaning? At that moment the name comes to be linked to whatever entity or type of entity named. In a much broader sense, this speaks to the issue of whether we invent concepts, and impose order on the universe, or whether we just refer to what is there. In this way, Kripke has shown that we can in fact have empirical knowledge of necessities. So, the name was fixed to its referent by a description. This can be contrasted with rigid designators that reference natural kinds, which seem at least have a stronger case for being representative of a single phenomena; although there seems to be an argument for these too being representative of two different entities. Naming and Necessity Author Saul A. It was thought that only necessary truths could be known a priori , and only a priori truths were necessary. Naming and Necessity is a book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke , at Princeton University in , in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. Smith's view is controversial, and several well-known scholars for example, Stephen Neale and Scott Soames have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that his account is mistaken. Some may say that there isn't much argumentation in this lecture series, that it really just amounts to presenting intuitions through examples and thought experiments for why, for one, the traditionally held d First of all, there need to be way more books like this - transcriptions of lectures of brilliant people speaking without any notes so the claim goes. Unbeknownst to the man, a simple pull was sufficient. So, the link between the property of being a murderer and the person referred to is contingent. It is interesting that Kripke developed his theory in his early age, which means that young men could achieve great goals in the field of philosophy. For example, once we identify something as water, and then discover that it consists of H20, then it is necessarily composed of H20, that is, must be H20 in every possible world. But after I heard Prof. Table of contents Preface. Lists with This Book. About Saul A. Some may say that there isn't much argumentation in this lecture series, that it really just amounts to presenting intuitions through examples and thought experiments for why, for one, the traditionally held descriptive theory of reference from Russell and Frege is wrongheaded. However, it certainly seems intuitively correct that the speaker is in fact referring to a unique person, that person being Rich Feynman. Oxford University Press pp. Preview — Naming and Necessity by Saul A. Not totally on board with the essentialism from lecture 3, but this is one of the most insightful and well-done books in the analytic tradition of the 20th century. Marcus, however, has refused to publish the verbatim transcript of the lecture. Request permission to reuse content from this site. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and priv Saul Aaron Kripke is an American philosopher and logician, now emeritus from Princeton. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind.

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More filters. It's easy to accept Kripke's argument solely based on how easy he is to read and understand rather than based on h Kripke outlines really well the history of philosophical theories of naming and then argues for his own theory and then talks about some interesting extensions of it. To put it in a disputable way, this In the wake of Kripke, analytical philosophy rediscovered or reconstructed metaphysics in the sense that we could talk of the genuine logical properties and relationships in things themselves rather than in discourses. IF then, a given object matches at least most or the most important properties included in this description, then that object is what that name refers to. As you can see if you read the other reviews, there are a lot of ways to approach Naming and Necessity , and some of them get into very technical philosophical territory. That having been said, Kripke's claims often seem to work out even under scrutiny. Kripke successfully paints a more accurate picture of how this happens than the accepted view. Dec 17, Dmk rated it really liked it. I've read Naming and Necessity four times now and am still surprised by it. Feb 04, laura added it Shelves: philosophy. Natural and metaphysical necessity, naming, identity Why do I and so many others like it so much? Examples include "Hesperus is Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things including people and of kinds of things, is revived. Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on descriptivist theories of proper names. A great deal of the book's brilliance lies in the astonishing simplicity of his solution to some of philosophy's most fiendish puzzles and the ease with which he lectures reveals the powerful grasp he has on the issues he describes. It explores the connections between our deduction and reasoning processes as to why we name objects, qualities, and even people. There are no discussion topics on this book yet. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. Sort order. He is esteemed for having invented the quantitative formulations of modality and for having opened up the ontological territory of possible worlds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author. Kripke points out that these things, and others, have two aspects: the way the thing feels to us in our sensory encounters with it; and its objective nature. I really don't know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking. Lecture III. Names do not have to be descriptions for this to work. https://cdn.starwebserver.se/shops/brandonpetterssonnk/files/a-tiny-bit-marvellous-413.pdf https://files8.webydo.com/9583133/UploadedFiles/0F8AC6F5-D1DF-C7E5-71AA-3F8BCBE4FA3E.pdf https://files8.webydo.com/9584354/UploadedFiles/FA9B85DD-0820-75DE-DA83-610A916CA307.pdf https://files8.webydo.com/9584258/UploadedFiles/0225AED3-5E71-A140-7576-2E0A68A7DDD6.pdf https://files8.webydo.com/9582894/UploadedFiles/B6B61F05-787C-E294-FF1F-4BCA2591E1CF.pdf https://files8.webydo.com/9583266/UploadedFiles/D0152619-5588-332B-38BE-5F71D6C9E27C.pdf