G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) but Itakethistobesimplyte arship. those whoadvocateabandoningthisa those the semanticsofthese English phrases aretheof Russellians, correct account present KingofFranceisbald”.Those sentences involvingquanti of de semantics of The BertrandRussellResearchCentre,McMasterU. russell: M at http://mind.oxfordjournals.org./content/vol114/issue456/index.dtl. 809–1,244. Guesteditor:StephenNeale. Special issue:“100Yearsof‘OnDenoting’ was language. it on theory isalmostexclusivelyfocused France androundsquares.Sz thatitsavedthemfrombeli students approach isexempli ‘On Denoting’as gradually cametosee Russell’s ogy, but“posterityabandoned He locatesRussell’sownconcernsasfocu is providedbyZoltánGendlerSzabóin after the passage of 100 years.Aconvenienthistoryof reception/interpretation One question behind anysuchcentenaryisthe signi the originalarticle,alongwitharticles Mind 1 Heactuallysaysthis is “where Ru W rst published. The issue consistsof rst published.Theissue MIND very appropriate 100thanniversaryissu paper “On Denoting”isthis seminal Russell’s of arking thepublication , whichquestions almostallfocuson the JournalofBertrandRussellStudie 1 The truth ofthiscontentionisexempli The W z CELEBRATES nite descriptionphrasesasbeingsemanticallyequivalentto W ed bypost- South Stra mporal chauvinismaboutthesigni W Michael Scanlan scanlanm cation and identity,àlaRussell’srewritingof“the abó correctlyreportsthat today the interestin P.O. Box95 T wwii ssell’s theorymadearealandlastingdi ord, eviews by a distinguished group of contributors. of byadistinguishedgroup @ eving innon-existentpresentkingsof a milestoneinontology”(p.1,199).This pproach aremainlyreferentialistswho who think that something likethisisa who thinkthatsomething s application tothesemanticsofnatural s n.s.27(winter2007–08): 259–82 s sover.net his article “The Loss of Uniqueness”. hisarticle“TheLossof vt textbook treatmentswhichadvised issn OD focus onlogicandepistemology a convenientphotographicreprintof sed on issues inlogicandepistemol- sed onissues 05070, {{{ ”. about theadequacyoftreating the e ofthejournalinwhichpaper 0026-4423. £10; $20; ¤16.Online zz Mind ’S CENTENARY W usa ed bythearticlesinthisissue W z 114, no.456 (Oct. 2005): cance oftheoriginalpaper W cance ofcurrentschol- issn 0036-01631 T erence”, G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) be theproductofatypographer’ser description concepts books”. son, whereheconsidersauseofthe and 8 trasts with Russell’sownfocuswhich wasonexamplessuchof as“the sum tive materialtouniquelydeterminearefe common for de known astheproblemof“incomplete”de tributions tothisissue. something tosayaboutallofthesetopi existence, quanti di of raft a debates aboutcontext,object-depende “… on hangs rently itssuccessat(a).This inturncur- on notes that itsusefulnessfor(b)depends the reveal to cal toolthatcanbeused (a) a contribution to natural language semantics…and(b)ahandyphilosophi- th reports thatinterestinthe accurately (objects). de commitment toa category of entities (classes)whilethecontextualde strategy ofeliminatingde the on observes thatwhilethe Especially usefulinthisregardisalo question oftherelationRussell’sth letters” (p.819n.41).Healsomakes is soundinnotingthatonemain guments concerningthepurpose of Ru contains acollectionofobservationson and two mainpartstohiscomments.One(§§1–2)isprincipallyhistorical manner ofMill’scontentlesspropernames. contend thatde 260 have longrecognizedthatonechalleng is ratherdeterminedbythespeaker’sus contentofthe sentenceasaRusselliansemanticswould suggest,but semantic uniqueness ofthetablereferredtoina use W A number of the articles in this collection focus on what hascometobe on A numberofthearticlesinthiscollectionfocus In Neale’sdescriptionofthepresentst The editorforthisissue,StephenNeal 2 P. nite descriptionexpressionsdoesnoteliminateanentireonticcategory x 5”. The originofthe“problem” in the y Reviews F. Strawson,“OnReferring”, 2 Strawsonarguesthatsincether W W nite descriptions to occur whic nite descriptionstooccur W nite descriptions can betreated semanticallysomewhat inthe cation, scope, logical form and anaphora” (p. 828). Neale has Neale cation, scope,logicalformandanaphora”(p.828). don’t PM z denote.Hequips,“ThetitleofRussell’sarticlecould z contextualde U cult, unresolved,andoftenhorriblyintertwined W nite descriptions, it serves to eliminate ontic eliminate to nite descriptions,itserves Mind ror, atranspositioninvolvingthe logical formsofsentences…”(p.827).He point of Russell’s theory is that de that point ofRussell’stheoryis eory toquestionsofonticcommitment. ng footnote(p.823n.59)inwhichhe e is to accommodate such “incomplete” e istoaccommodate eory “centresonthetheoryconstruedas onthevexed very helpfulobservations e ofthesentenceincontext.Russellians ssell’s theory.Neale Inthese comments z nce, possession,uniqueness,plurality, 59 (1950): 320–44. 59(1950): sentence, “The table is coveredwith table “The sentence, cs, largely in response to various con- various to cs, largelyinresponse W rent, suchas“thecrazyguy”. This con- e, provides an introductorypiecewith e, provides nition ofclassexpressionsismodelled e are many tables in the world the world the e aremanytablesin ate of the theory ofdescriptions,he theory ate ofthe the (surprisingly) still unsettledar- still the (surprisingly) literature seemstodatefromStraw- scriptions. In naturallanguageit is In scriptions. of such a sentence is not part of the of of suchasentenceisnotpart h don’tcontainenoughdescrip- W nition of W rst two W nite G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) Russellian propositionexpressedbythede anygivencontextofuse.ThusinSchi in plete descriptions classic Russellianresponseisthatthereanimplicit is deranged)fortheretobea unique re richer than be must tent” of“Theguy’sderanged” But theybothmeanthesamepropositio speaker “says” in an utterance andwhatthespeaker“means”inacontextof use. an incomplete description approach and aGriceandistinctionbetweenwhat a of these sortsof scenarios. analyses brief abstract.Iwillfocusonhis responsetoRussellian my than nuances ' identifying properties arebeingdrawn fr given utteranceof“Theguy’sderanged”becauseitis“indeterminate”what erate asemantictheoryth ' guy’s deranged” sayssomething di distinction to argue that, intheWashin guy” inthis context, i.e.both have zerosemantic content. di a and thatthereisnoreasontoattribute in thiscontextonlymakes “He” that arms wildly,wearingapinkbathrobeandbunnyslippers facie ential usesofde what she“implies”inauseofsentence. descriptions. salt”. me in thetypicalcontextwhat’ssaid but Thus, someone who says “Can you pass the salt?”expressesacertainquestion, Washington SquarePark trast isbetweensaying“He’sderanged”ofan erratic man in a pink bathrobe in description. In his article“Russell’sTheory of De scenario that usetheGricea scenario identifying propertiesto ranged)? Thereisnotheoreticalbasis z z ! ! z z The classic response to this classic response is that the Russelliancan’tgen- is The classicresponsetothis classicresponse Schi Stephen Schi Schi 4 3 Schi x x Schi This is avariantof This Strawson’s is distinction between whataspeaker “asserts” and y y case for the equivalence of an admi case fortheequivalenceofan ( ( x x isamalehuman is amalehuman T T T T er naturallypresentsamuchricher er considers aRussellianresponsethat would invokethe say/mean er goes through a number of challenges to his interpretation ofthe interpretation er goesthroughanumberofchallengestohis er teaches at W T nite descriptions usinghypoth er iswell known fordefendingtheexistenceofgenuinelyrefer- nyu z & z & “complete” thedescription. 3
. at tells us which speci which at tellsus and saying “The guy’s deranged”. Schi deranged”. guy’s “The andsaying x
x He characterizesonetypeofresponseascombining issalientinourjoint n machinery and the notion that the semantic con- semantic the that n machineryandthenotion is standing between us and the fountain the and isstandingbetweenus T erent fromaspeakerof ferent determined bythedescription.The sense as a referential Millian nonce name nonce sense asareferentialMillian for fasteningonanyonepossiblelistof ttedly referentialexpressiontoade gton Squarecontext,aspeakerof“The ans the distinct request“Pleasepassthe n. For this to work the “semantic con- n. Forthistoworkthe om thecontext.Forinstance,whynot W T nite descriptionsentencemightbe discussionofthescenarioandits erence insemanticcontentto“the W etic scenariosthat make a W c propositionisexpressed by a eld ofvisionwhilewavinghis W ' nite Descriptions” the con- z ! W z x lling outofsuchincom- y ( x isamalehuman z &
z “He’sderanged”. x T isderanged). er’s scenariothe Reviews T er contends z &
x isde- prima W nite 261 z &
x 4 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) audience (viaaprocessofGriceanlingui suggest thatthecollectionofsloppi they a speaker andanaudience speaker a has andidentifythemistakeasbe Problem of IncompletenessRestedonaMi thearticlebyRay of focus tions isthe preferred semanticsfornaturallanguage. ber ofdetailed responses toNeale’ssuggestion,invokingfeatures of Neale’sown for descriptivecontentto a Milliannameseemstoaban involving “ seems the de seems the described, e.g.JuliusCaesar.Theau is and hearerdon’thaveadirect speaker to attributiveusesofde communication issuccessful. the audience identi ' the propositionexpressedby“Theguyisderanged”wouldbe Thus formula. bytheRu for called additional material erential uses of an incomplete description such as “The guy”,determiningthe response by StephenNeale. Neale proposes thatHe here. details in the case of apparently ref- tent of a description may beindeterminate.Iwillnotattempt to summarize the 262 proposition distinct from the disjunction intoade veloped de- be can’t context and hearerimplicitlysupplytheneededcontentin speaker utterance. the audiencetoidentifyasinglepropos desperation asa“Russellian”responsetoSchi I cannotresistthepersonalcommentthatthissmacksof wars, the reference the fellowofinterestinWashingtonSq p meaning of thesentenceissuchthat meaning aconc theyendorse Instead, misguided. this e x 2 x or x = y The sameproblemof the incompleteness ofmanyordinary de The sloppy-meaning approach advocate The sloppy-meaningapproach Buchanan and Ostertag accept that the standard Russellian response that Buchanan andOstertagacceptthatthestandardRussellianresponse 5 ( An“object-dependent” propositionismean x a p isamalehuman T z ” apredicatecomparableto“ 3 Reviews ort to identify a unique proposition expressed byasentenceinuseis ort toidentifyauniquepropositionexpressed or…”wherethisisaperhapsinde W nite description has an(unRussellian W nishes, however, by separately consideringhowever, adistinctnishes, Russellian W nite semantictheory.Asanalternative,theysuggestthatall W es theintendedpropositionas z & W nite descriptions. That is,mostclearly, incaseswhere
determine reference.Schi x = requires a
z &
x thataspeaker’sutteranceincontextleads isderanged), where x lief that successful communication between lief thatsuccessfulcommunication the speakercanuseittomean“either is a male human”. To invoke an identity epistemic connection with theobjectthat epistemic connectionwith BuchananandGaryOstertag,“Hasthe thors alsoconsidersituationsinwhichit don the Russellian intuition of the need don theRussellianintuitionof ly meant propositions servetopointthe stic reasoning) to the object-dependent reasoning) tothe stic ept of “sloppy meaning”. The linguistic ept of“sloppymeaning”.The uare Park. Although I take nosidesin take I uare Park.Although ition asthatintendedbythespeaker’s of descriptivepropositionswhichisthe ssellian theoryshouldbeanidentity W stake?”. Theynaturallythinkthatit d inthisarticleseemswelladapted nite list of propositions. As long as nite listofpropositions.Aslong ingful only if the re the ingful onlyif T er. Only in a technical sense is sense er. Onlyinatechnical ) referential use. Inthesecases referential ) T one ofthoseonthelist, er himself presents a num- himself presentsa er a isaMilliannamefor levant objectexists. W nite descrip- p 1 or 5 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) Szabó contends that a Russellian shouldgiveup the Szabó contendsthataRussellian joining hisfellowroyalsforaparty.Us if therewerealreadymanyotherkings fa was walked intotheroom.Theking references backtotheintroducedmateri inde sentences. Linguisticsteaches us,he says outoftheirgrammaticalrolein arises it doesn’t ariseoutoftheirsemantics, guishable. Szabó’sresponseisthatth a treatmentmakesthedi such tence de a thatRussell tohave beenmistakenininsisting takes unnecessary fora“Russellian”treatment is included byRussellinthecontextualanalysisofde condition defend He is alongtheselines. mentioned of the“incompleteness”problem.The present-day Russelliansinterested in it’s only necessary that the de it’s onlynecessarythatthe solving for by pointingoutthatuniquenessisnotneeded “the” phrases. de speaker’s actualmeaning. Jónsson runs throughvariouscurrenttheoriesofde Jónsson semanticsof“thebike”inthesesentences. puzzle ishowtoaccountforthe bike”, butlaterintheday“Lottawasre and earlier in the day“Lottawasinagoodmood,anddidnotthinkabout Lindgr one. receive birthday butfailedto from anAstridLindgrenstoryabou the shortarti in Jónsson by ÓlafurPáll form treatmentofde himself wasuptowiththetheoryofdescriptions, is mostlyclearthateliminatinguniquenessnot at all suitable for what Russell this and OD (and whichmakesnarrow scope readingnot to thescopeofdescript W But isthisa“Russellian”treatmentofde A couple of otherarticlesinthecollectionlookatsomewhatdi 6 A nice compendium of theproblems The article by Oliver and Smiley makes this quite clear. quite this makes Smiley and byOliver Thearticle nite description sentencesentailuniquene nite z ) he calls“minimallyRussellian”.Hi ) he W nite article is forintroducinganewsubject,whilethede is nite article entails W ts moresatisfyinglyintothevagari z the uniqueness of the described object. Many would objectthat would theuniquenessofdescribedobject.Many W nite descriptions astermsinnaturallanguageis provided ion inthewholesentence. W T nite descriptionanalysisproducean ambiguity as erence between “the table” and “a table” indistin- table” erence between“thetable”and“a atheoryofnaturallanguage. t Lotta who wanted a bike forher bike a t Lottawhowanted cle “TheBikePuzzle”.Thepuzzlecomes t”, thestorycouldwellmakesense even e distinction betweenthetwophrases e distinction in theroomandjollyking was only minded of the bikeandgotangry”.The of minded associatedwithattemptsto article by Szabó that has alreadybeen that article bySzabó ing this sort of argument, and others, ing thissortofargument,and , thatinmanydiscourse situations the en tellsusthatLottagotother presents s theradicalthesisthatuniqueness al. So in the sentences, “Ajollyking sentences, the al. Soin s owntreatmentofdescriptionsdoes of the semantics of description. Szabó description. of thesemantics W es of English language “the”. Szabó es ofEnglishlanguage“the”. entail thewidescopereading,asin nite descriptions?Szabódefends it ss ifsheistobefaithfulEnglish 6 buthispointissuitedto W A treatment thatdoesthis nite descriptionsandin- OD OD W nite descriptionsen- z requirementthat ’s threepuzzles but W nite descriptions T Reviews erent versions W nite article W nd auni- W 263 fth G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) semantics has setitself,inspired by Readers whoturnto in constructingsingle-valuedfunctionssuchas“the which applied toaclass which tradition inmathematicallogicoflimiti of thepolynomial plural in ordinarymathematicalwritingof natural language semantics ofpluralterm PM out of the “logical”materialofgeneralrelations is one in (following Frege and Peano)toconstruc way. The connectionseemstobethat Russell’suseofde is toallowforadistinctionofsuchcollectiveanddistributiveuses. distributive distinction is notmarked.One thecollective/ English, in atleast Unfortunately, her individualchildren. Mary”, loves “Jane tively” andwecaninfer children love her”ally gaveMaryaCaribbeancruise.On we assume ch Mary’s of one that is Jane if Even “M tively”. her aCaribbeancruiseonretirement authors saythatanexpressionlike“M all happywiththis this ofMarydenotes theto classes,Children classofMary’schildren. Inafashion the actualrelation. class puter modelofhumanrelations the fact that the constructingacom- someone her aCaribbeancruiseonretirement.”For the theory inthisrealm. The main funct as withthepriorarticlesitexplores But language. isaboutmathematicalandnot“natural” Functions”, Many-valued de dicates how they allfailtomakesenseof 264 to amemberof as Many”in puzzles Russellfoundinthedistinctionbetween“theclassasOneand descriptive termslookslikeandbrie plural W What does this have to do with Whitehead and Russell? Not much inadirect Notmuch WhiteheadandRussell? do with to have this does What distributively) and The authors(presumablybothcollectively Authors concernedwithnaturallanguage The article by Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley, “Pluraldescriptionsand Smiley, The articlebyAlexOliverandTimothy childof treatment of plural descriptions as de treatmentofpluraldescriptionsas nite description.Itindicatestherath of her children gave Mary the cruise the ofherchildrengaveMary PM Reviews z device might be used to express z relation toaparent relation The PrinciplesofMathematics b . Thisnotation f yz ( * PM x 37 of z )”. Theyprovideaprécisof b {{{ -style treatment of “Mary’s children”. Traditionally children”. -style treatmentof“Mary’s denotes theclassofthingswhichhave PM z
y W . Sincethepluraldescriptivefunctionapplies nd adeviceof“PluralDescriptive Functions” could OD ion of the theory of descriptions in descriptions ion ofthetheory the limits of the ap the limitsof ary’s children” in “Mary’s children gave ary’s children”in“Mary’schildren sortofrepresenttheobjectsthatarein the other hand, in the sentence “Mary’s sentence the the otherhand,in ary’s children” isbeingused“distribu- ary’s ildren we can’tinferthatJaneindividu- ildren . t single-valuedmathematicalfunctions thisseeminglyquiteordinaryuse of a ng the conceptoffunction tosingle- the ng might be close enoughasananalogof be might s. Inparticular,theyhighlightthe use the content of “Mary’s childrengave of the content ” designates Mary’s children“collec- Mary’s ” designates “GeorgelovesMary”,etc. if these are er daunting task that philosophical that er dauntingtask z X function expressions, e.g. “the roots function andelsewhere. signating classesisinadequatefora signating job for the logicofsuchpluralterms job y indicate how it might obviate the obviate might y indicatehowit semantics will not,however,be at PM whatalogicincorporating treatment meansthatthe X x thatis father of uential exampleofthe plication ofRussell’s W nite descriptions W nd thatthe R z relation PM y z is z ”. G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) de that theyexpress.Ratherasentencecontaining propositional component expressed his intentbysayingthey are “f de descriptions. OnRussell’stheory ofdescriptions he famouslyconcluded that to the inthewayRusselltakesthem paradoxical else th propositional components, or distinctionfordescriptive content/reference a of existence the about assumptions number of criticaljuncturesRusselldoes textual problemsinthe Th notation. perspicuous terminologyand content of this, accordingtoRusse “… thinks that andnot“byacquaintance”.Salmon description willonlybe“bydescription” W signi the knellofpartingday”.The tolls about thereference;inexample stead Smiley, by one functions.Asispointedoutinthisarticleandanearlier valued Knowledge proposition thatwastobe as in“The of the descriptivequotation phrase, using doingdescription, asRussellsuggests nameforthecontentofde alternative istoformanon-descriptive ofthe a descriptivephrasewhichreferencesthecontent tion phrase,anypropositionaboutthecont between the content (meaning)andreference(denotation)ofade and ledhimtoseekanalternativeapproach. to him caused abandon thinking which hi quent expositionsofhis theory ofdesc Elegy Nathan Salmon.Hepresentsanin plural terms. guidedbymathematicalprac expressions positive andnegative)forsomeargume functions (unde nds inthisfactisthatanyknowle W W Salmon’s interpretationisbasedona“translation”ofthe 7 The argumentthatSalmon One articlethatdoesfocuson Russell’s own argumentationin T. nite description phrase expressesthe much morecomplexpropositiondic- phrases are“incompletesymbols”.Hemight have better description nite Argument ( y gea J. Smiley,“TheTheory of Descriptions”, in 7 therearemanycaseswheremath , ed.T. y ] de W a centralargumentativeroleindefendingRussell’s rst lineofGray’s W W y nite descriptionsmysteriousandinexplicable”(p.1,071). R. Baldwin and Smiley (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2005), pp.131–61. (Oxford:Oxford U.P.,2005), Smiley and R. Baldwin ned forsomearguments)orfunctionswithmultiplevalues (e.g. gea ) in gea OD aboutcontent ofthe the de . Given his translation, Salmon . Givenhistranslation, Elegy . Russellneverrepeatedthisargumentinsubse- W nds inthe terpretation ofthenotoriouslydi z ”. But then, onRussellianassumptions,the”. dge we have of the content of a de dge wehaveofthecontenta W n’t drawthecorrectconclusionfromhis e conclusionshedrawsaren’treally riptions, but it seems to representthe riptions, butitseems it references thesentence,“Thecurfew ailed symbols”,i.e.thereisnodistinct cance Salmon,andhebelievesRussell, s previous theory of denoting concepts s previoustheoryofdenoting ll, rendersourcognitivegripon[the nts. A formal treatment of function nts. Aformaltreatmentof tobe.Nevertheless,Salmonassigns tice leadstotheneedforalogicof is addressesmanyofthelong-noted gea ent ofthe phrase mustitselfcontain Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Logic of Studies inthePhilosophy ematicians happilyusepartial text isthatoncewedistinguish W nite descriptionisin- W rst description.The gea text intoamore W Reviews OD W OD nds thatata U nite descrip- cult Gray’s theoryof z is that by that is W W nite nite 265 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) more willing to accept the “somew de integrating thenotionof of problems know that itisSocrateswho iswise? These sortsof expresses, necessarily “The teacherofPlatoiswise”,meaning Socrates iswise. function appliedtotheobjectSocrates might betheproposition in sentences.Instead, English speakerstreatde nothing liketheRusselliananalys inEnglish.Theobjection descriptions incredible interpretation” ( tated by the theory ofdescriptions.Ma 266 ent of the proposition thatisitsvalueforargument. ent oftheproposition tant isthattheobjectapropositionalfunction is applied to mustbeaconstitu- functions fromobjectsto as extensional places Russell peculiar requirementsthat ofthe anumber notes Cartwright 915). heexpectedof ofwhat (p. them” some them andthatcanprovide commodates agooddealofwhatRussellsaysabout Cartwright, nevertheless,o tence formsandsometimesasactualfu herent treatment of“propositionalfunc RichardCartwrightnotesthatRusselldoesn’thaveaco- ositional Functions” classes denoting conceptsand eliminates Salmon’s andtheyareimpossibletosummarizehere. Unfortunately,thedeta speakers. English “content” ofade not be[a] he citesinthe‘Gray’s phenomenon Salmon of (eliminating)descriptions. de by theircontent,butthe determined Weak RussellLanguage( a singular termwithareferenceandcontent. tions andtheircorrespondingprop sketches some oftheproblemsthisprod of Platoiswise W W The concept of “propositional function” looms large in in The conceptof“propositionalfunction”loomslarge Salmon posesthischallengeforRussell 8 Thisanaspectoftheconfusionwith nite descriptions toidentifyproposit nite nite descriptionsare Reviews wrl y Butthen,doessomeonewhoun ? Itseems ” (p. 1,081). 1,081). Speci ” (p. W nite description that is assumed for a for nite descriptionthatisassumed stipulated Socrates iswise f wrl OD T z (the teacherofPlato)shouldbethepropositional ers anaccount of propositionalfunctions“thatac- , p.482; ). Ina is inmindwhentheyusede W z tomatchthosegeneratedbyRussell’stheory cally, the hat incredibleinterpretation”( ositional values. Thevalueof ositional values. Elegy truth-conditions for sentences containing truth-conditions forsentences wrl namesubstitution believes “Russellwouldpointtothevery Papers ny authorshavefoundthis“asomewhat propositional functionswiththeuseof tions”, sometimestreatingthem as sen- uces foridentifyingpropositional func- propositions.Oneofthemostimpor- . But is there a proposition . Butistherea andthustheresultingpropositionis ional components clearlymadeRussell onpropositionalfunctionsthoughtof is roughly that English speakers have speakers roughlythatEnglish is nctions fromobjectstopropositions. that she is aware of aware that sheis in favourofit.In“RemarksonProp- z ’ argument to showthatEnglishcan- de ils areessentialinanargumentlike in termsofwhatKripkehaslabelled W gea 4: 417) of the semantics of de of semantics 4:417)ofthe nite descriptionshaveareference W derstands the Englishsentence derstands issupposed toshow that the nite descriptions asaformof nite descriptions into sentenceforms. into wrl 8 Cartwright nicely thepropositionit W PM isn’tavailableto nite descriptions after Russell OD f The teacher z (Socrates) , p. 482) , p. W nite G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) di an overarchingthesisbutprovidesa except perhapsfor compelling reasontoascribethetheory names like“Bertie”.Cartwrightgive tion” thesepushhimintothedisguised byAc “Knowledge from about1911in epistemicconcernsaboutthenatureof“acquaintance”andhow of Russell’s Plato iswise”. meaning in isolation sell’s treatment of de commentsin part oftheRussell’s articlediscusses an object,the“course-of-values”,with problems Fregehadinattemptingtocorrelate the of some discusses latter half of thesepresentsatheory/speculat The parts. overall paperdividesintotwo theory ofdescriptionsin“Reading‘O English sentence. that heo of theimportanceforRussell operator inthis“reduction description de leave Russellwithou to 949). This seems the in theory ofdenotingthatRussellpresents theory ofdescriptions. knowledge by acquaintanceandknowledge symbols, i.e.oneshethoughtwereinvo Russell how tousecontextualde showed question ofwhyRussellfeltit was im tional functionandadescriptionoperator. mathematical concept“function”fr basic from propositionalfunctionsviaade of deriving “denoting functions”(singl arehighligh andwhich Kaplan describes, in asymbolismforde the derivations of in written whileRussellwastryingto there, the to of Volume 4 U W The secondThe half ofCartwright’s article Davida varietyofideas Kaplandiscusses that areconnected with Russell’s In the Kaplan’s account is consistent with recent is consistent with account Kaplan’s nite descriptions. Kaplan nite descriptions.Kaplan culties Russell faced indeterminingth culties Russell T W ers for the proposition expressed by a sentence like“Theteacherof ers forthepropositionexpressedbyasentence rst halfofthe W , toallde PM ctional names like “Apollo”. The article itself doesn’t have like “Apollo”.Thearticleitselfdoesn’t names ctional Collected Papers W nite descriptionsin W , as providing a contextinwhichtheproblemsinvolved nite descriptions cametothefore.Thespeci nite descriptions W rst half Kaplan lays out his understanding ofthe rst halfKaplanlaysouthisunderstanding W W nds asolutioninAlasdairUrquhart’s introduction nite descriptions,properaswellimproper”(p. ion onRussell’spurpose in writing . Urquhartpointstothepaperscollected portant toeliminatetheuseofde OD W e-valued, totalfunctionsofmathematics) ”. Kaplanconsidersonepopularaccount guide to some of the often of overlooked guide to some quaintance andKnowledgebyDescrip- nite description operator.Thisderives a s a good account ofwhythereisno s agoodaccount to Russellpriorthispoint,e.g.in every oneofhis functions.The second every lved ingeneratingcontradictions.The lved n Denoting’ on Its Centenary”. The om arguablylogicalconcepts,proposi- description theoryofordinaryproper theoryofdescriptions.Thisisthatit t anyclearmotivationforeliminating ted byUrquhart, focusonhis strategy develop a coherent symbolism touse developacoherentsymbolism W W is devotedtotheratherdistinctissue rst parthasitselftwoparts.The nitions to“eliminate”troublesome by descriptionanditsrelationtothe PoM e propositionexpressedbyagiven scholarship.Yet,thatstillleavesthe Principles
already OD gavemeaning,evena onthedistinctionof . Kaplannotes,“Rus- Reviews OD W cs that . The W OD 267 W nite rst , G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) have descriptions andnamesth have descriptions acquaintance. Insteadhefavours linguistic (after aconvolutedsetofconsideration felt thisconcern,butKaplan’s Russell sp Albanian the about Orcutt,ifheis someone whoknowsthattheAlbaniansp the propositionisabout.Manypeoplenevertheless are (intellectually)acquainted,whilenot every function, contradiction. ThiscentresonAxiom to lead system reference choices of about the to presentafranklyspeculative,butveryilluminating,accountofhow systemic Contradiction” (p.953). which thetheoryofdescriptionsmight from a logicalpointofview,soIcontinuetolookformoreinteresting ways in PM of de apprehended contains propositional functions,e.g. apprehended containspropositional context of Russell’stheory of descriptions based bydescription is knowledge how premium on knowledge ofthingsbyacqu losophers havetakentobecentralthesigni acquaintance andknowle knowledge by his thinkingabout“incompletesymbols”. motivation forRussell’streatmentofde storyaboutthe the to gles toavoidtheContradiction.Butweneverquiteget bols” which Russelldeveloped in his theory of descriptions facilitated his strug- theory” (p.968). “Once courses-of-valuesareeliminated, AccordingtoKaplan, courses-of-values asdistinctobjectsforeachfunction. out howthisisanalogousforFregetokeepingfunctions,butabandoning be non-referential. Kaplanpoints could abstract class descriptions meantthata oftheclassabstractnotat treatment class symbols in class symbols importance ofthisisoftensupported 268 “elimination” of classsymbolsin de of-values. This leadstocontradiction.Th abstract notation W Kaplan’s “might have been” is important in the above statement. He goes on goes “might havebeen”isimportantintheabovestatement.He Kaplan’s The last half of Kaplan’s article fo article The lasthalfofKaplan’s This isallilluminatingclari nite description. The correspondingnotationforRussellin description. nite treatment ofextensionspropositio treatment W nite description operators in nite descriptionoperators Reviews f yz ( PM y ˆ e y z ( ), therebeacorrespondingobject, f . Kaplanmakessomeacuteobservationsabouthowthe y ) for each propositional function ) foreach at “denote” (i.e.referenc W cation ofhowthenotion of “incompletesym- PM singular expressionsinFrege’s OD ion onanalogywiththetheoryofde z functionsdi by pointingtoRussell’s“elimination”of own concerns along theselinesleadhim W y andtheyareunacquaintedwithhim. . Kaplanconcludes,“Idonotthinkthe cuses onthe Russelliandistinction of on knowledge by acquaintance. Inthe acquaintance. on knowledgeby nite descriptionswhichinturninspired s) to reject anyepistemicprimacyfor s) toreject dge bydescription,whichmanyphi- containing the individual thingwhich containing the thismeansthattheactualproposition e course-of-valuesnotationis a sort of aintance. Thisledhimtotry to show direct reference. In our language we language directreference.Inour y is in this crowd knows something crowd y isinthis nal functions[classes]isimportant have been seen as relevant to the Grundgesetze W cance of T erently fromtheelimination v x isaman W e and his insistencethat for z ’ nd it peculiar to saythat nd itpeculiar e) entities.Thisdenoting z f ( transformsintotype f e OD z y ), whichisitscourse- . ButtheRussellian . Russellplaceda , with which we PM Grundgesetze was aclass W nite z G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) scriptions. In with connected sets ofconsiderations gives uscontactwithmanythings. is it Kaplan, our languagemeaning.For was ourcontactwiththeentities,whethe its we comprehend therepresentation,weca linguistic According to Kaplan,“Thekey to our or are all extensional, as is thecasein as are allextensional, eralized intermsoftheusualtreatm yield propositionswithdi of author to evenauniquelyreferringdescriptionlike“the scope as GeorgeIV’saskingaboutScott’sau ondary occurrence”). Thisresultof ondary rence”) or the operator scope iswithin that of the description (Russell’s “sec- tes”, whether itsscopeis the descriptionisuniquelyreferring that description and any truth-functionalcompoundsentence,undertheassumption other English speakers have and that enables haveandthatenables speakers other English power inthelanguageisasocialconc * and arising fromdi as explains that “TheKingof Fran would have the standard problemsifwedid this with “SantaClaus”. whichautomatically hasareference.We treating “Socrates”asapropername case thatSocratesisbald”or“Socrate bald”, itdoesn’tmatterto the truth-value in the mannerofgrammaticallysimplena in scope ambiguities and thesecondistrue,i.e.theyareno the interestingresultthatifulti ortherearemultiple other descriptions thinking especiallyaboutcaseswhereis descriptions arepartsof He languages. description. 14 the “scope” terminology isusedalong terminology 14 the“scope” z
content” (p. 999). Kaplan wants to reverse Russell’s scheme. ForRussellit Russell’sscheme. reverse to Kaplanwants 999). content”(p. ~ Saul Kripke inhis article“Russell’sNot Saul Kripke considers the extenttowhichthis“scopeindi Kripke considers 9 At theendof In In v
' of z ! OD z x PM y ( representations Kx Russell writes of primary and second Russellwritesofprimaryand , then themoredemandinggeneralscopeindi
z OD &
Bx T PM , Russell explains some puzzling cases involving descriptions involving , Russellexplainssomepuzzlingcases ering scopes of the desc ering scopesofthe z ). LackingapresentKingofFrance,the
OD * 14, Whitehead and Russellprovethatforanyde 14, Whitehead , not acquaintance with thatwhichis , notacquaintance z asevidencethatde within the operator scope (Russell’s “primary occur- within theoperatorscope(Russell’s T ering truth-values. ce isnotbald”canmeaneither PM ents of descriptionelimination in mate propositionsuseonlytheprimitive * 14 onlyholdsifthepropositionalcontexts oction. I’venevermet any Albanians, but t the same proposition. Russellusesthese . If we have an intensional context, such context, intensional an have we If . thorship, thengivingwiderornarrower use Russell’s treatmentofthescopede- s isnon-bald”.Thisbecauseweare our, sociallyprovided,languagewhich , thedescriptionfunctionslike“Socra- descriptions inasentence.Hereports r individuals or universals,whichgave with explicitnotation ription intheutterance. oflanguageiscomprehensionthe n use it toreachwhatisrepresented, use n ion of Scope” has two rather separate ion ofScope”hastworather whether wereadthisas“Itisnotthe mes. In the case of “Socrates is not mes. Inthecaseof“Socrates ary occurrencesofadescription.In W nite descriptionsdon’tfunction me z to talk talk about Albanians. to T T erence” canbegen- erence theoremcan W represented rst of theseisfalse forthescopeofa ' Reviews z ! Waverley z x 9 y Notably,he ( Kx W rst-order
z & . When
~ z W ” can
269 nite Bx PM ~ z ) G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2054.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 13, 2008 (7:35 pm) Russell suggested intheRussell second edition of Butiftheprimitiveconnectiveistakentobe She proven. be 270 di cansaythattheposterityof backwe looking OD may seemasdistant asourdescendantsbut without willbe100yearsfrom now, of theclichédescriptionitasa theideas in to addressing claim havesome which notion ofscope. solving it,hedoesraiseahistoricalquestionaboutthein nevertheless, unableto was notinspiredlosophical by linguistics that suchinvocationofscopeshiftam in theunderlying voking scopeshifts guage aboutpropositionalattitudes or modality isstandardlyconstruedbyin- the peoplealloftime.”Similarly, is commonlyinvokedforvariantquanti have beenfrequentlyusedtoexplainna century philosophyandlinguisticsinwh reference toRussell’streatmentofde theorem can’tbeproven. descriptions keepappearingwhichneedfu neverbefullycarriedoutbecausenewinstancesof can texts theelimination T The variegated nature ofthearti The variegated Beyond thisspeci erence inhowanalyticphil they would not be what they are. Our own posterity is problematic, but theywouldnotbewhatare.Ourownposterityisproblematic, Reviews W c result, Kripke’scommentsco result, c W nd explicitacknowledgement bylaterworkers.Without osophers viewtheirwork. “seminal” article. Thesedescendantsof “seminal” article. cles collectedinthisissueof W tural language sentence ambiguities.This nite description scope in late twentieth- nite descriptionscopeinlate natural languageuseofintensionallan- representations. Kripkeisunconvinced biguities inlatetwentieth-centuryphi- W Russell’stheory ofdescriptions. Heis, ich scope variants inunderlyingforms scope ich PM er scopesasin“Youcanfoolsomeof rther elimination, sothatthe general , then insu OD OD havemadeafundamental , callsuptherootmeaning ncern thelackofexplicit U ciently complexcon- X uence ofRussell’s T Mind er stroke,as , allof OD