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Rafts, Boats, and Cruise Ships Verhaegh, Sander University of Groningen Rafts, Boats, and Cruise Ships Verhaegh, Sander IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2015 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Verhaegh, S. (2015). Rafts, Boats, and Cruise Ships: Naturalism and holism in Quine’s philosophy. University of Groningen. Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne- amendment. Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum. Download date: 02-10-2021 RAFTS, BOATS, AND CRUISE SHIPS Naturalism and Holism in Quine’s Philosophy SANDER VERHAEGH RAFTS,BOATS,ANDCRUISESHIPS © Sander Verhaegh, Groningen, 2015 Cover design: Anne Jansen. Typesetting: This document was typeset using (a modified ver- sion of) classicthesis, a style developed by André Miede and inspired by Robert Bringhurst’s The Elements of Typographic Style. Printed by *studio Michał Sławi´nski. This research was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), Grant 322-20-001. ISBN: 978-90-367-8255-5 ISBN: 978-90-367-8254-8 (e-book) Rafts, Boats, and Cruise Ships Naturalism and Holism in Quine’s Philosophy Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. E. Sterken en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op donderdag 19 november 2015 om 16.15 uur door Alexander Alfons Verhaegh geboren op 18 maart 1986 te Helden Promotor Prof. dr. A.J.M. Peijnenburg Copromotor Dr. A.M. Tamminga Beoordelingscommissie Prof. dr. G. Ebbs Prof. dr. H.J. Glock Prof. dr. L.B. Decock CONTENTS list of abbrevations xiii acknowledgments xxiii list of publications xxvii 1 introduction1 1.1 Historical background . 1 1.2 Naturalism and holism . 10 1.3 Reading Quine in context . 11 1.4 Plan . 14 i immanent and transcendent 19 2 quine’s argument from despair 21 2.1 Introduction . 21 2.2 From certainty to straight psychology . 26 2.3 Two strategies . 35 2.4 Self-sufficient sensory languages . 37 2.5 Quine’s response to the sceptic . 42 2.6 Taking holism seriously . 45 2.7 Theory vs. evidence . 48 2.8 Reinterpreting “Epistemology Naturalized” . 52 3 internal and external questions 57 3.1 Introduction . 58 3.2 Internal and external existence claims . 62 3.3 Two distinctions . 68 3.4 Quine on metaphysical existence claims . 74 3.5 Rabbits and complement-rabbits . 80 3.6 The ideal of pure reason . 85 3.7 Conclusion . 89 ix x contents 4 boarding neurath’s boat 91 4.1 Introduction . 91 4.2 Quinean naturalism decomposed . 93 4.3 Commitment 1: empiricism . 95 4.4 Commitment 2: holism . 98 4.5 Commitment 3: realism . 100 4.6 Early empiricism and bold behaviorism . 102 4.7 Quine’s naturalism in the early 1940s . 105 4.8 Narrow and wide holism . 111 4.9 Unregenerate realism . 119 4.10 From nominalism to realism . 121 4.11 From phenomenalism to realism . 125 4.12 Conclusion . 130 ii naturalism and holism 133 5 varieties of holism 135 5.1 Introduction: the ‘discovery’ of Vulcan . 135 5.2 Evidential holism . 142 5.3 Falsification and scientific practice . 144 5.4 Grünbaum’s argument . 148 5.5 The whole of science? . 151 5.6 Universal revisability . 157 5.7 Meaning holism . 164 5.8 Conclusion . 170 6 science, scientism, and sets 173 6.1 Introduction . 173 6.2 Justifying the axioms of set theory . 176 6.3 Realism and naturalism . 180 6.4 Pure mathematics vs. pure astrology . 185 6.5 Mad mathematics . 189 6.6 Open-minded naturalism . 195 6.7 Haack’s argument . 196 6.8 Aposteriorism vs. scientism . 199 contents xi 6.9 Quine’s replies . 205 6.10 SCIENCE vs. science .................. 208 6.11 A deflationary theory of justification . 211 6.12 ‘Traditional epistemology’ revisited . 213 7 conclusion 219 bibliography 225 samenvatting 269 index 273 LISTOFABBREVIATIONS This section provides a list of abbreviations used in this disserta- tion to refer to W. V. Quine’s (published and unpublished) work. Detailed references can be found in the Bibliography. A com- plete list of Quine’s publications up to 1993 (including reprints and translations) can be found in Yeghiayan( 2009). For an over- view of papers, books, reprints, and translations after 1993, see Douglas B. Quine’s website http://wvquine.org. The unpub- lished papers, letters, lectures, and notebooks listed below (marked with an asterisk) are stored at the Harvard Deposi- tory and can be accessed at Houghton Library. The documents’ call numbers, box numbers, and item numbers are provided in the Bibliography. A catalogue of much of Quine’s unpublished work is provided by Houghton Library at http://oasis.lib. harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hou01800. ANM Animadversion on the Notion of Meaning (1949) AT* Afterthoughts (1987) AWVQ Autobiography of W.V. Quine (1986) BTJ* The Behavioristic Treatment of James’ Theory of Perception (1930) CA Carnap (1987) CB Comment on Berger (1990) CCE Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays (2008) xiii xiv abbreviations CD Contextual Definition (1995) CGC A Comment on Grünbaum’s Claim (1962) CH Comment on Haack (1990) CK Comment on Koppelberg (1990) CLT Carnap and Logical Truth (1954) CP Comment on Parsons (1990) CPT Carnap’s Positivistic Travail (1984) CNT Comments on Neil Tennant’s “Carnap and Quine” (1994) CVO Carnap’s Views on Ontology (1951) CWH* Concepts and Working Hypotheses (1931) DE Designation and Existence (1939) EBDQ Exchange Between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine Following Davidson’s Lecture (1994) EESW On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World (1975) EJ* Early Jottings on Philosophy of Language (1937-1944) EN Epistemology Naturalized (1969) ENP* Epistemology Naturalized; or, the case for psychologism (1968) EQ Existence and Quantification (1969) FLM* Foundations of a Linguistic Theory of Meaning (1943) abbreviations xv FLPV From a Logical Point of View (1953/1961) FM Facts of the Matter (1977) FME Five Milestones of Empiricism (1975) FSS From Stimulus to Science (1995) GML The Growth of Mind and Language (1997) GQW Nelson Goodman, W. V. Quine and Morton White: A Triangular Correspondence (1947) GT Grades of Theoreticity (1970) HO* Holism (1987) ICQ* In Conversation: Professor W. V. Quine. Interviews by R. Fara (1993) IKL* The Immanuel Kant Lectures: Science and Sensibilia (1980) ILP The Importance of Logic for Philosophy (1950) IOH Identity, Ostension, Hypostasis (1946) IPOS In Praise of Observation Sentences (1993) IQJ* Interview with Quine for “La Janguardia” (1990) IV Immanence and Validity (1991) IWVQ Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine. Interview by L. Bergström and D. Føllesdal (1994) LAOP A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem (1939) xvi abbreviations LC Lectures on Carnap (1934) LDHP Lectures on David Hume’s Philosophy (1946) LMAP Let Me Accentuate the Positive (1990) LSQ* Levine Seminar Questions for Quine (1982) ME* Mathematical Entities (1950) ML1 Methods of Logic. First edition (1950) ML4 Methods of Logic. Fourth edition (1982) MMT* Mathematics as a Mode of Thought (1930) MSLT Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory (1953) MVD Mind and Verbal Dispositions (1975) N1* Nominalism (1937) N2 Nominalism (1946) NDL* The Notre Dame Lectures (1970) NEN Notes on Existence and Necessity (1943) NK Natural Kinds (1969) NLOM Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means (1995) NNK The Nature of Natural Knowledge (1975) NR* Notes on Reading (undated) OAM On Austin’s Method (1969) OE* Ontology and Epistemology (1944) OK* On the Organization of Knowledge (1927) abbreviations xvii OLPL* Oxford Lecture: Philosophy of Logic (1953) OM* Ontology, Metaphysics, etc... (1944-1951) OME On Mental Entities (1953) ON* Ontology Notes (1944) ONAS On the Notion of an Analytic Statement (1946) OR Ontological Relativity (1968) OR67* Ontological Relativity (1967) ORE Ontological Relativity and other essays (1969) ORWN Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers (1964) OW Otherworldly (1978) OWTI On What There Is (1948) PIP* A Pragmatic Interpretation of Posivitism (1937) PL Philosophy of Logic (1970/1986) PML The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics (1953) PPE The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism (1975) PPLT Philosophical Progress in Language Theory (1970) PR Posits and Reality (1955) PT Pursuit of Truth (1990/1992) PTE* The Place of a Theory of Evidence (1952) PTF Progress on Two Fronts (1996) xviii abbreviations QBC* The Quine-Bergström Correspondence (1988-1996) QCC The Quine-Carnap Correspondence (1932-1970) QCC* The Quine-Church Correspondence (1935-1994) QD Quine in Dialogue (2008) QGC* The Quine-Goodman Correspondence (1935-1994) QHC* The Quine-Haack Correspondence (1975-1997) QHWC* The Quine-Hookway Correspondence (1988) QKC* The Quine-Koppelberg Correspondence (1981-1994) QQN* Questions for Quine by Stephen Neale (1986) QSM Quine Speaks His Mind. An interview by E. Pivcevic (1988) QU Quiddities (1987) QWC* The Quine-Woodger Correspondence (1938-1982) QWVO Quine/’kwain/, Willard Van Orman (b.
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