Philosophy of Language Study Guidance for Seminar 3: Readings on Russell’s Theory of (Definite) Descriptions

Study Guidance The readings for this seminar consists of two pieces by Russell (in which he lays out his theory and makes a case for it), two critical pieces (by Strawson and Donnellan), and a background piece on ‘rules of conversation’ and conversational implicature (by Stephen Neale). There is a huge literature on Russell’s theory, including a great many helpful introductory and survey pieces. Since the set readings are relatively short, you are encouraged to seek out and read some secondary material independently. (This will be a useful exercise in independent research.)

Reading Guidance Guidance on Reading ‘Descriptions’ by Bertrand Russell This paper provides an introduction to Russell’s theory which is easier to approach than ‘On Denoting’. You should read this paper before you go on to look at ‘On Denoting’.

Note that Russell holds that definite descriptions (e.g. ‘The Prime Minister of the UK’, ‘The man standing in Central Hall holding a fish’) function differently from proper names (e.g. ‘Venus’, ‘Everest’, ‘York’). Unlike Frege, he uses ‘proper name’ so it does not apply to definite descriptions. In reading Russell, you should focus on what he says about definite descriptions: it is useful to note what he says about proper names, but you should be careful to distinguish this from his main points about (definite) descriptions, which are our main concern at the moment.

Give answers to the following questions based on your reading of ‘Descriptions’ (the first three questions are central, the others are intended as more detailed guidance on study):

1) What kind of phrase/expression definite descriptions are according to Russell (which phases/expressions they function like)? 2) In what way Russell is trying to account for the significance of definite descriptions (what he’s telling us how to provide for each sentence including a definite description)? 3) What is Russell’s positive view of definite descriptions?

Guidance note: p. 168, para 2. Russell talks here and in ‘On Denoting’ of ‘propositional functions’. By this he means, roughly, a phrase like ‘x is human’ (or something expressed by such a phrase). Russell’s talk of propositional functions can be transposed into quantificational talk, and should be so transposed for your purposes. So, when Russell has ‘The function “I met x and x is human” is sometimes true’, you can understand this as ‘There is at least one thing x such that I met x and x is human’. (Compare the horrible proposition functions version of the core of

Philosophy of Language 4320012: Seminar 3 Study Guidance 1 Russell’s theory, at the top of p. 177, with the much clearer version in ‘ordinary language’ a little further down the page.)

4) P. 168, foot. Russell says that ‘I met a man’ is ‘obviously not of the form “I met x”, which accounts for the existence of the proposition “I met a unicorn” in spite of the fact that there is no such thing as “a unicorn”’. What does Russell mean here? (You may need to work on and come back to this question. Hint: Think about the simple theory of the functioning of singular terms here.) 5) P. 170, para 1 (middle of page). Russell says ‘the two words “a unicorn” do not form a … group having a meaning of its own’. What do you think Russell means by this? What does Russell think it is for an expression (a word or phrase) to ‘have a meaning of its own’? Does he intending ‘meaning’ here to have its everyday significance, or does he have a more specific, perhaps technical notion in mind? Guidance note: p. 178, near foot. Here Russell sketches a view of the significance of expressions like ‘Homer’ (which would at least seem to be ordinary proper names). This view will be important later, but for the moment focus on his theory of definite descriptions and continue to think about proper names in terms of the theory we’ve been investigating so far, on which they are referring expressions.

Guidance on Reading the Excerpts from ‘On Denoting’ by Bertrand Russell The excerpts from this paper present a detailed case for Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. You should study this material carefully. (Note that the passage continues overleaf after p. 202.)

Some features of Russell’s own original account make it much more difficult to understand and evaluate the core of the theory. In working on the paper you should try to present Russell’s ideas in a clear and accessible way. For instance, you’ll probably find it helpful to transpose Russell’s talk of propositional functions into terms of quantification (and/or simply note how Russell’s points were transposed into modern quantificational terms in the lectures).

Note on terminology: On p. 201 (column 2), Russell distinguishes between meaning and denotation. It seems clear that Russell here uses ‘meaning’ as a term for Fregean sense. Elsewhere in the paper, he uses ‘meaning’ differently—for example, on p. 200 (foot of column 1) it’s plausible he uses ‘meaning’ for reference.

Answer the following questions:

6) What are the puzzles Russell sets up for his theory to solve? (Explain these carefully in your own words.) 7) What are Russell’s solutions to the puzzles? (Again, explain these carefully in your own words. It will help enormously if you apply Russell’s theory to puzzle examples: that is, simply spell out how Russell’s core proposal says we should understand the significance of the puzzle sentences.) 8) How good are Russell’s solutions?

Philosophy of Language 4320012: Seminar 3 Study Guidance 2 9) Stand back from the detail for a moment and ask: How is Russell’s theory’s treatment of the puzzle cases meant to support the theory? How might that support be weakened or undermined?

Guidance on Reading the Excerpts from ‘On Referring’ by P. F. Strawson In working on Strawson, consider the following questions:

10) What is Stawson’s key complaint about Russell’s theory? 11) What sort of evidence does Strawson give/rely on?

Now, look at the excerpt from Stephen Neale’s Descriptions given at the end of the reading pack.

12) How might the ideas presented in the excerpt from Neale be used to defend Russell’s account of descriptions? 13) Is there just a stand-off between Strawsonians and Russellians? Or can a Russellian mount a counter-attack by giving objections to Strawson’s account?

Guidance on Reading the Excerpt from ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’ by Keith Donnellan Read Donnellan and answer the following questions.

14) What is the phenomenon that Donnellan uncovers? 15) Can an explanation be given of the phenomenon consistent with Russell’s account of the semantics of definite descriptions?

Philosophy of Language 4320012: Seminar 3 Study Guidance 3