Joint Force Quarterly a PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Joint Operations in the Civil War 92 by Scott W

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We have got to be of one family, and it is more important today than it ever has been.

— General Dwight D. Eisenhower National War College October 20, 1950

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CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by John M. Shalikashvili

Assessing U.S. Strategic Priorities 10 by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson

Building a New Defense Consensus 18 by Michael B. Donley

Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning 28 by Clark A. Murdock JFQ

JFQ FORUM Service Identities and Joint Culture 36 by Paul G. Cerjan

America’s Two Armies 38 by Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Once and Future Marines 47 by Thomas W. Linn and C.P. Neimeyer

The Limits of Seapower: Joint 52 Warfare and Unity of Conflict PHOTO CREDITS by Colin S. Gray The cover photo captures a C–17 Globemaster over Fort Sumter (U.S. Air Force/Dave McLeod); the cover insets (from top) show farewell tatoo Why We Need an Air Force in honor of Allied troops at the Brandeburg by Charles M. Westenhoff Gate (DOD/Helene C. Stikkel); Marine security 62 post in Cap Haitien (U.S. Marine Corps/C.S. Fowler); Army Blackhawk helicopters practicing take offs from USS Eisenhower (U.S. Navy/ Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Martin Maddock); President Clinton on board 68 Unintended Consequences USS Theodore Roosevelt (U.S.Navy/Bob McRoy); a tactical satellite dish (Combat Cam- by Steven L. Canby era Imagery/ Marvin Krause); and Union guns engaging fortifications along the Mississippi as depicted by C. Parsons and engraved by W. Ridgway (Naval Historical Center). The front inside cover and cross-over page photo features USS Carl Vinson and ships in OUT OF JOINT its battlegroup (U.S. Navy/David C. Lloyd). The background photo on these pages The State of Civil-Military Relations: Two Views shows M1A1 Abrams tanks laying smoke (U.S. Army Recruiting Command). The insets (from top left) show silhouetted infantryman (DOD); Civilian Control: USS Nassau preparing to launch amphibious 76 A Useful Fiction? assault vehicles (Navy Combat Camera/ Robert N. Scoggin); F–15 in flight (DOD); and by A. J. Bacevich President Clinton leaving the Pentagon (DOD/R.D. Ward). The back inside cover shows soldiers during Civilian Control: Exercise Roaring Lion (U.S. Air Force/Efrain A National Crisis? Gonzalez). 80 The back cover is an artist’s rendering of by Mackubin Thomas Owens the FS–X fighter (Mitsubishi Heavy Industry).

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AUTUMN/WINTER 1994–95 / NUMBER 6

Shaping Arms Export Policy 84 by Sumner Benson Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Joint Operations in the Civil War 92 by Scott W. Stucky Hans Binnendijk Editor-in-Chief Patrick M. Cronin OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN Executive Editor Robert A. Silano 106 Omar Nelson Bradley Editor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Production Coordinator IN BRIEF Calvin B. Kelley Senior Copy Editor 107 Joint C2 Through Unity of Command by K. Scott Lawrence The Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction.

111 Standing Down a Joint Task Force Joint Force Quarterly is published for the by Scott M. Hines Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Stud- ies, National Defense University, to pro- 114 Implications of Information-Based Warfare mote understanding of the integrated by Donald E. Ryan, Jr. employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat opera- THE JOINT WORLD tions conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development. 117 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, The editors invite articles and other and Education contributions on joint warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and topics of common interest to the Armed 120 A Quarterly Survey Forces (see page 128 for details). Please of Joint Literature direct editorial communications to: Editor Joint Force Quarterly OFF THE SHELF ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 121 Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography Telephone: (202) 475–1013 / Compiled by Gail Nicula and John R. Ballard DSN: 335–1013 FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012 127 Operation Downfall: A Book Review Internet: [email protected] by H.P. Willmott The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not POSTSCRIPT necessarily reflect the views of the De- partment of Defense or any other agency 128 A Note to Readers and Contributors of the Federal Government. Copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of copyright proprietors. An ac- knowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents. NOTICE: This issue is designated number 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994–95) and the next will be number 7 (Spring 1995). Resequencing the seasonal designation compensates for the lag in This publication has been approved by production that resulted in past issues arriving toward the end rather than the start of each the Secretary of Defense. quarter. Accordingly, number 7 will appear approximately three months after this issue with subsequent ones published at a similar interval. This does not mean the loss of an issue; November 1994 regular readers and subscribers will receive four issues over the coming year. JFQ

ISSN 1070–0692

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Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Publisher GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff AWordfrom th Chairman of the Advisory Committee Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF National Defense University Members of the Advisory Committee BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF The Joint Staff MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA U.S. Army War College Brig Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF evolutions fall into two cate- Armed Forces Staff College Maj Gen John C. Fryer, Jr., USAF gories. Some are abrupt, rau- National War College cous, chaotic. They wreak great Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC Marine Corp War College havoc and cannot be ignored. Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF The Joint Staff Political revolutions are fre- Col Andrew Pratt, USMC Rquently of this sort. Others are steady, subtle, Marine Corps Command and Staff College BG Randall L. Rigby, USA hard to discern. Often the damage of these U. S. Army Command and General Staff College silent revolutions is only felt afterward and Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF Air War College causes grief for those who failed to see them RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces coming. When the American auto industry RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN was caught off guard by the Japanese revolu- Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF tion in production techniques, the penalty Air Command and Staff College was two decades of marketshare losses and Chairman of the Editorial Board declining profits before Detroit recovered. Hans Binnendijk Institute for National Strategic Studies When the French underestimated the revolu- Members of the Editorial Board tion in military affairs set in motion by the Richard K. Betts advent of the airplane, radio, and tank—a Columbia University COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA revolution that the Germans fully grasped— U. S. Army Command and General Staff College the result was swift, humiliating defeat. Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Today, those of us who serve in the

COL Robert A. Doughty, USA Joint Combat Camera Center (Heather M. McMurry) U.S. Military Academy Armed Forces are caught up in the coinci- LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC dence of three revolutions. One is noisy and Marine Corps War College Aaron L. Friedberg obvious while two are Princeton University silent and far more Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces as we move into an uncertain future subtle. The first began COL Peter F. Herrly, USA National War College with Mikhail Gorba- Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF we must get better as we get smaller chev and accelerated Naval War College William T. Hodson when Boris Yeltsin Information Resources Management College stood on a tank in COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA U.S. Army War College front of the Soviet White House. The ramifi- Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College cations of the end of the Cold War and col- Thomas L. McNaugher lapse of the Soviet Union still reverberate Brookings Institution Col Charles H. Mead, USAF through the international system. They are Armed Forces Staff College sparking conflicts in regions formerly at John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago peace, even as peace breaks out in areas long Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF Air Command and Staff College at war. Among the direct influences on this LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Nation are the changing role of long-stand- Hudson Institute Stephen Peter Rosen ing alliances and a range of situations in Harvard University which we are called on to use military force. James H. Toner Air War College LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) RKK, Limited

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ends, defense budgets will shrink to less than half of their 1988 Cold War apogee. A drop of this magnitude will inevitably change how we think about, plan, and build our defenses. The Armed Forces traditionally responded to dramatic resource reductions by falling back on their core competencies—components of land, sea, and air forces that make each service dominant in its domain. After all, by law and custom, all the services are charged with training, organizing, manning, and equipping forces to perform the missions and

Joint Combat Camera Center (Heather M. McMurry) functions assigned to them. Fielding questions in However, our challenge is to Port-au-Prince. do it differently, to drive our The impact on our planning processes logic to a higher plane of thinking. is equally profound. In the past, we took The third revolution is what some have planning and programming cues from our dubbed the revolution in military affairs and projections of Soviet military capabilities, others call the military technical revolution. projections the Soviets made easier and Like previous revolutions that were techno- more calculable by their methodical and in- logically driven, whether a revolution is oc- cremental approach. Now perceptions of curring at all is debatable. But as the debate military threats are far less certain. From a rages, advances like broad area surveillance, planner’s perspective, what we gained in los- effective communications, and precision ing a threat of the magnitude of the Soviet guided weaponry have transformed the bat- Union has been offset by the ambiguity and tlefield to such an extent that American proliferation of threats around the world. forces using them four years ago were able to We have traded frightening certainty for achieve the most lopsided victory in modern dangerous uncertainty. history. We prevailed against an Iraqi force The second revolution is a byproduct of that would have been far more evenly this change in world affairs. Because of our matched with our own only a decade before. new strategic situation, defense budgets are In the pace of this revolution it does not declining along with military resources. This take long for a force to go from state-of-the- has instigated a silent revolution, albeit a art to obsolescence. revolution nonetheless. Before this century

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FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Unfortunately, this revolution runs largely on the first six months of work by counter to the strains of the second, namely, EJROC, extensive discussions between its the steady decline in defense budgets. Thus members and the unified commanders in far we have taken the lead in this technol- chief (CINCs), and between myself, the ogy-driven revolution. It was American in- CINCs, and Joint Chiefs, I submitted my rec- vention, after all, that was validated in the ommendations on the FY96–FY01 Defense sands of Kuwait. But revolutions are fickle. Program in September. They were forwarded Once begun, they have a tendency to drift to the Secretary of Defense as part of the into the hands of those who are willing to Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), an stoke the fires of change. We must now ei- innovation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. ther stay ahead of this revolution or watch There are specific recommendations in our position erode. this CPA, some programmatic in nature, re- Combined, these revolutions pose a garding future military capabilities. What is daunting challenge. Our Armed Forces are perhaps most important and gives the CPA the best in the world. We must ensure that special merit is that these recommendations they remain the best, but on a much more are based on a consensus of our four-star modest diet. The heart of the challenge is leaders. Those familiar with the history of this: as we move into an uncertain future we joint intervention in the realm of program- must get better as we get smaller. ming can appreciate the significance of this stride. It is the outcome of a new process— EJROC and the Chairman’s one that will be continued and strengthened Program Assessment in the years ahead. It is to tackle this formidable challenge The fate of my specific recommenda- that the Joint Chiefs and I directed—and tions is still being mulled by the Secretary of strongly encouraged—developing a new ap- Defense et al. as the defense portion of the proach to planning and programming. President’s budget proposal is completed. Much of this approach is embodied in the Without infringing on either the President’s activity of the Expanded Joint Requirements or the Secretary’s prerogatives, I can sketch Oversight Committee (EJROC) which is the major thrust of this year’s CPA and sum- chaired by the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs marize the programmatic directions which of Staff, and comprised of the vice chiefs of emerged from the superb work of EJROC. staff of the services. EJROC and the analytic efforts supporting it have been described Hedge Against the Future, Not the Past previously in JFQ, and I do not want to re- We must take prudent risks by investing hearse that discussion here. But I would like in resources for the future. Accordingly, I to say a bit about the effort. have recommended four steps: retire some Two outcomes result from this new ap- old systems earlier than originally planned, proach. First, the corporate wisdom and ex- slip introduction of selected weapons until pertise of the Nation’s senior military leaders their potential is enhanced by advanced sys- is tapping productive ways to recommend tems and munitions, reduce the bloated infra- how we can best meet the challenges posed structure to levels commensurate with force by the revolutions outlined above. Second, a structure and basing requirements, and screen clearly articulated consensus emerges about out some older R&D projects. The resources where we should go from here. made available by these actions should then The first significant product of this ef- be applied to bolstering military strength. fort has already been completed. Based There are three areas in which the Armed Forces lead the militaries of other nations:

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Shalikashvili

readiness, joint operational capabilities, and general understanding of actions that ex- technology. Certainly our advantages can be haust or degrade long-term readiness. Many debated, and all of these measures of military times we have seen DOD eat its seed corn to excellence have remarkably short half lives; feed a current appetite. We cannot let that but we do lead in all three areas today. happen this time. To use a phrase that has When it comes gained currency in to readiness, how- the marketplace, no other nation can match our ability ever, comparisons we must recapital- are dangerous. The to combine forces on the battlefield ize for the future. readiness of our and fight jointly This means invest- Armed Forces to re- ing in three com- spond quickly and ponents which are effectively to a range of contingencies—from the brick and mortar of readiness by assuring peacekeeping to major conflicts—is un- that the quality of our men and women who matched; but the challenges to readiness are serve in the Armed Forces remains superb; unmatched as well. No other nation is on a that equipment and weapons are well main- hair trigger to deploy forces across the world tained, modern, and technologically un- to a threatened South Korea or a still tense matched; and that investments allow future Southwest Asia. Joint operational capabilities forces to respond quickly to crises abroad. are also an area where we have no peer. Joint Operational Capabilities. The Army, Since the end of World War II we have Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are with- steadily progressed along the path of joint- out doubt the most powerful and competent ness by a combination of pushing and individual services in the world today. This pulling. Our ability to operate jointly is sim- is the result of a long-standing national ply unequalled. Notwithstanding such excel- commitment to superior military capability lence, this work has far to go. And, while across the broad spectrum of warfare. More- some high leverage technologies are prolifer- over, no other nation can match our ability ating, the United States still sets the stan- to combine forces on the battlefield and dards. My programming recommendations fight jointly; but for all our progress, a great are therefore formed around readiness, joint deal more has to be done. If one compares operating capabilities, and high leverage the way the services train and prepare forces technologies. to perform service missions with the way the Readiness. There are two dimensions of joint world prepares its forces to operate, force readiness which equate to broad cate- there is a gap. For example, the use of com- gories of requirements: short-term force puter driven simulations in training has readiness—that is, over the next two years or steadily increased over the past fifteen years. so—and long-term force readiness where it is Today all services have refined models and nearly impossible to predict threats. We software to test and train their forces to exe- know how to define and assess short-term cute service doctrine. Yet, despite the impor- readiness. By most measures the military is tance we have attached to simulations, no- ready to conduct current missions as well as body has yet developed a fully tested, those it expects over the next few years, and reliable, single joint warfighting model. DOD is already committed to increase Also, consider the fact that even in one of spending on short-term readiness. Long- the high profile priorities of jointness— term readiness is harder to measure in any namely, C4I—there are joint operating forces detail. But past experience has given us a

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FROM THE CHAIRMAN

that cannot talk directly to one another. tary for incorporation into next year’s De- There are two paths to improving joint oper- fense Planning Guidance and service Program ational capabilities. One is to expand and re- Objective Memoranda. And the work will fine those programs that promote joint exer- continue into summer 1995 as we prepare cises, training, and doctrine. The other is to for the next CPA. move toward greater standardization aimed Revolutions are challenging enough at improving systems interoperability even when faced singly; but contending with as it reduces overall costs. three at once is a truly monumental task. Yet High Leverage Technologies. While ad- we cannot retreat, we must go forward. I am vanced military technologies steadily find confident that we will triumph in these rev- their way into the wrong hands in many re- olutions and that our Armed Forces will regions of the world, America still leads other main the most formidable in the world. nations in two critical areas of technology and systems competence which shape the battlefield. We excel in advanced weapons JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI and hardware, like precision guided muni- Chairman tions, high-speed digital communications, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sensors; and we also lead in the ability to tie intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance architecture to advanced and responsive C2 architecture to give our forces staggering acu- ity, speed, lethality, and potency. We must ex- tend our edge and increase our advantages. This requires introducing new intelligence and surveillance systems and more advanced programs to C4I architecture, systems that cut across service boundaries and improve our ability to fight and operate jointly. Other obvious areas of improvement include adding precision guided weapons and adjusting existing organizations to fully exploit the technology and training that accompanies change.

The program assessment that I submitted to the Secretary of Defense was an important and encouraging step. It was a result of super work and cooperation among the Joint Chiefs, CINCs, and EJROC members. Now the focus has shifted to the FY97–FY02 Defense Program. EJROC will revisit the CINCs in February armed with insights on requirements that are now being refined by joint warfare capabilities assessments. By March 1995 I hope to submit my recommendations for future programs to the Secre-

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON THE Revolution in Military Affairs

o encourage innovative thinking on how the Armed Forces can remain at the forefront in the conduct of war, JFQ is pleased to announce the first annual “Essay TContest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc. The contest solicits innovative concepts for oper- Contest Rules ational doctrine and organizations by which the Armed 1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians Forces can exploit existing and emerging technologies. (from the public or the private sector) and of any nationality. Essays written by individual authors or Essays that most rigorously address one or more of the groups of authors are eligible. following questions will be considered for a cash award: 2. Entries must be original and not previously ▼ published (nor under consideration for publication The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of elsewhere). Essays that originate from work carried change compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. out at intermediate and senior colleges (staff and war colleges), service schools, civilian universities, How might emerging technologies—and the integration of and other educational institutions are eligible. such technologies—result in a revolution in conducting 3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length warfare in the coming decades? What will be the key and must be submitted typewritten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. They should include a wordcount measures of that change? at the end. Documentation may follow any standard ▼ academic form of citation, but endnotes rather than Exploiting new and emerging technologies is depen- footnotes are preferred. dent on the development of innovative operational concepts 4. Entries must be submitted with (1) a letter and organizational structures. What specific doctrinal clearly indicating that the essay is a contest entry together with the author’s name, social security concepts and organizations will be required to fully realize account number (or passport number in the case of the revolutionary potential of critical military technologies? non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, telephone number, and FAX number (if available); (2) a cover ▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies sheet containing the contestant’s full name and in innovative ways to gain significant military leverage essay title; (3) a summary of the essay which is no more than 200 words; and (4) a brief biographical against U.S. systems and doctrine? sketch of the author. 5. Entries must be mailed to the following address Contest Prizes (facsimile copies will not be accepted): RMA Essay Winners will be awarded prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 Contest, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, Washington, D.C. 20319–6000. for the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of $500 6. Entries must be postmarked no later than will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an August 31, 1995 to be considered in the 1994–95 contest. officer candidate or a commissioned officer in the rank of 7. JFQ will hold first rights to the publication of major/lieutenant commander or below (or equivalent all entries. The prize-winning as well as other essays grades). A selection of academic and scholarly books dealing entered may be published in JFQ. 8. Winners’ names will appear in JFQ and the with various aspects of military affairs and innovation will prizes will be presented by the President of the also be presented to each winner. JFQ National Defense University at an appropriate ceremony in Washington, D.C.

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ASSESSING

Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis) U. S. St r a t e g i c Priorities By HANS BINNENDIJK and PATRICK CLAWSON

ive years after the Cold War lapsed, A New World Order the United States is still searching for There have been five world orders since a new strategic compass. A clear un- America gained independence that are de- Fderstanding of global security trends, fined by the character of relations among national interests, and strategic priorities is great powers during each period: the essential to sound foreign and defense policy. Napoleonic, the Congress of Vienna, Ger- The following appraisal, based on Strategic many’s drive to become a leading power (ac- Assessment 1995, a new publication of the In- companied by the carving up of Africa and stitute for National Strategic Studies at the Asia among the colonial powers), the League National Defense University, offers a frame- of Nations, and the Cold War (along with the work for developing national security poli- eclipse of colonization). At present we are en- cies as the century draws to a close. tering a sixth period, one in which European concerns may not dominate the world as they have over the last several centuries.

Summary

The traditional ideological divisions among nations are being replaced by a tripartite global system of market democracies, transitional states, and troubled states. Above all, the United States must be concerned over the course of transitional states, since they will be influential in determining the world order of the future. Trou- bled states, however, are the likely source of local conflicts in the years ahead. This suggests four priorities in formulating national strategy that include, in order of importance, ensuring peace among the major powers, engaging selectively in regional conflicts, responding to transnational threats, and assisting failed states. One consequence of these priorities is that the Nation may be required to reconsider its nearly two-major-regional- conflicts strategy in order to maintain a balanced force structure. The implications of that decision would have significant import for strategic planning and the capability to conduct joint operations.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent those of either the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Transitions between these orders have ing into political chaos and economic decline. The typically lasted several years. The one under- future of the transitional states will be one of the way is likely to take longer than most because most important determinants of the new system. ▼ there was no definitive, cataclysmic end to Troubled states, primarily located in Africa, the last order, and because the international the greater Middle East, and parts of Asia, are falling behind the rest of the globe economically, system is truly global, not just European. politically, and ecologically. Many are plagued While its nature is becoming clearer each with rampant ethnic and religious extremism; year, the emerging order may not fully gel some are failed states that are slipping into anar- until after the end of the decade. The fluid chy. A few—like Cuba and North Korea—are de- character of the world order is a major reason caying, die-hard communist dictatorships; others why recent administrations in Washington are, or threaten to become, rogue states. have had such difficulties articulating a U.S. Some important countries fall into two policy vision and deciding when to use force or even three of the above categories. For in- to support U.S. interests. stance, China can be considered transitional: The final shape of the emerging world economically, it is moving toward a market order will depend crucially upon such factors democracy. On the other hand its politics re- as the degree of U.S. involvement in world af- semble those of a troubled state which leads fairs, the progress of Eu- many analysts to fear that instability when the overall trend suggests a ropean integration, de- Deng Xiaoping dies could push much of growing gap between market velopments inside Russia, China back into the troubled camp. the extent to which democracies and troubled Despite the indefinite nature of the di- Japan assumes new inter- viding lines, the overall trend suggests a states national obligations, the growing gap between market democracies ability of China to hold and troubled states. The gap reveals differ- together and remain on a path to prosperity, ences in economic growth, political stability, and the control of nuclear proliferation. and adherence to international human rights The emerging world order is arranged standards. along different lines than those of the Cold Divisions among market democracies, War. In particular, ideology is no longer the transitional states, and troubled states is not basis of division, although the ideals of the only way in which analysts see the world democracy and free markets that gave the evolving. Other lines of division are empha- Free World victory in the Cold War remain sized by national security analysts. important. The emerging lines of division Economic/political blocs. Regional blocs appear to be the following: based on trade and political cooperation ▼ Market democracies comprise a growing seem to be emerging in Europe, the Ameri- community of free and prosperous (or at least cas, East Asia, and the Commonwealth of In- rapidly developing) nations that is expanding dependent States (CIS). The proportion of from North America, Japan, and much of Europe foreign trade and investment in each bloc is to large parts of East Asia, Latin America, and rising. The implications for the world order Central Europe. ▼ Transitional states are ex-authoritarian and of such blocs, if consolidated, depend on ex-communist lands that are working toward how open or closed they are to trade and po- democracy and free markets, as well as countries litical cooperation with states outside of such as India that seem to be making progress to- their region. The danger of tension, possibly ward freedom and prosperity from a low baseline. escalating into conflict, is greatest in the Many states in this category run the risk of backslid- case of blocs that jealously guard themselves from outside influence and that see world trade and politics as zero-sum games. With the possible exception of CIS, such closed blocs do not seem to be emerging. Thus the Hans Binnendijk is Director of the Institute for development of economic and political National Strategic Studies at the National Defense blocs is not as important at present for un- University and serves as Editor-in-Chief of JFQ; derstanding national security interests as is Patrick Clawson is a senior fellow in the Institute the split among market democracies, transi- for National Strategic Studies and Senior Editor of tional states, and troubled states. Middle East Quarterly.

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STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Spheres of influence around a great power. vision separating Central European states Closely related to the emergence of eco- that are doing well both economically and nomic and political blocs has been the focus politically and those that are floundering. In of military attention by the great powers in many regions where the Islamic world meets their spheres of influence. Peace operations other civilizations (such as northern India, serve as an illustration. For example, recent the Levant, and Caucasus) violence erupts. Security Council debates on Rwanda, Haiti, While culture, ethnicity, and religion must and Georgia made clear that the major pow- not be overestimated, they seem to exacer- ers are accepting the principle bate and lend emotional depth to strife the new world order is that each can take some re- caused by concrete historical grievances, po- being shaped by tech- sponsibility for its respective litical disputes, and geostrategic factors. We areas of interest, with France, are therefore skeptical about using civiliza- nological change as well the United States, and Russia tion division as a primary basis for arranging as by democratic values taking the lead. As with the the emerging world order. economic blocs, the chief con- In this system of market democracies, cern is with exclusivity. If a great power transitional states, and troubled states, three seeks to exclude the influence of other pow- types of conflict correspond loosely to those ers and to compel its weaker neighbors to three groups, namely: act against their interests, then neo-empires ▼ Conflict among the major powers is the could develop and great powers could clash greatest concern to the United States but is least over the boundaries between their domains. likely to occur. The great powers—the United America has historically rejected a notion of States, Japan, China, Russia, and the major states national security based on great power ma- of Western Europe—are at peace with each other. neuvering. U.S. policy has been most suc- No power feels threatened by another; no power cessful and acceptable when it is based on is actively preparing for conflict with another. both national values and interests. This situation, almost unprecedented in history, Civilization. Ancient divisions among is a powerful basis for U.S. security so long as it lasts, which may not be forever. cultures, ethnic groups, and religions seem to ▼ Conflict among regional powers, mainly have retained more political importance than involving either transitional or troubled states, many would have thought a few years ago. will occur periodically, often as the result of ag- The fault line between Roman Catholicism gressive states seeking regional hegemony. The and Eastern Orthodoxy closely resembles the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction line of conflict between warring parties in could increase the propensity of aggressive states the former Yugoslavia and, generally, the di- to threaten their neighbors and world peace. ▼ Conflict involving troubled states, nearly always starting within a country, is likely to be the most prevalent form. At the same time, this C–141 in Goma, Zaire, type of conflict is the least threatening to U.S. in- during Support Hope. terests. The great powers are often willing to provide economic and political support for troubled states. However, they are increasingly reluctant to intervene militarily unless a crisis threatens to escalate and engulf other states, create a humanitarian disaster, or affect other great power interests.

The Trends The new world order is being shaped by political, economic, and military trends which are rooted in technological change as well as by a diffusion of democratic values. Proliferation is increasingly a contemporary, not a future concern. Nuclear weapons programs by rogue states are difficult to stop despite the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Combat Camera Imagery (Val Gempis)

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The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a Information technology is displacing heavy rogue state could destabilize whole regions industry as the base of national power. Those and severely complicate U.S. power projec- industries growing most rapidly are in the tion operations. The problem is likely to get computer and communications fields which worse on the supply side. Many countries continue to introduce new technology at are developing the industrial base to pro- breathtaking rates. Extending this trend to duce nuclear weapons (by now a fifty-year- the battlefield suggests that information- old technology), and continuing economic based warfare will become widespread in a problems in the former Soviet Union are decade or two. Defense requirements will de- making criminal diversion of mand greater investment in information sys- America is increasingly nuclear material and know- tems and less in tanks, ships, and aircraft. prone to placing economic how more likely. Access to International organizations are assuming a chemical and biological legitimizing role despite their limited capability concerns ahead of defense weapons may prove even and potential encroachment on national issues easier. The challenge is to sovereignty. The weight of international orga- persuade countries that ac- nizations is felt most strongly in the desire quire the technical ability to produce for market democracies to seek authorization weapons of mass destruction not to make to use force. While the Cold War legitimized use of that capacity. the Free World alliance and left the United Economic interests as opposed to traditional Nations impotent, the passing of the Cold security interests are becoming more important War has given life to the U.N. role in legit- to governments. Thanks to the peace among imizing the use of force. However, the first the great powers, states are free to turn their blush of enthusiasm for multilateral action attention to other issues. Successful states has faded as international organizations see security not only in terms of military prove to be less than effective in humanitar- preparedness but also in terms of a strong ian disasters and civil wars. The Clinton ad- economy. Concerns about prosperity and ministration underwent a sea change from employment are playing a greater role in an early embrace of assertive multilateralism shaping international and domestic policies. to outright caution in Presidential Decision America is increasingly prone to placing eco- Directive 25 issued in May 1994. Multilateral nomic concerns ahead of defense issues. It is action has proven difficult because of differ- also likely to place concerns over the budget ing political objectives among states and or- deficit, low levels of national savings, and ganizations, delays in making timely deci- investment needs ahead of the long-term sions, the limited capabilities of multilateral impact of current reductions in defense organizations and ad hoc coalitions, public expenditures. sensitivity to casualties, and the cost of oper- The domestic focus of many countries limits ating in a multilateral fashion. Nonetheless, national security capabilities. In much of the the United States will need to form ad hoc world, public opinion is less concerned about coalitions to respond to crisis in areas once foreign policy, largely due to the end of the judged peripheral when the main mission Cold War and peace among the major powers. was Soviet containment. Regional organiza- At the same time, there is a preoccupation tions may lead in resolving local problems, with domestic issues such as worsening social or the United Nations may delegate its role ills and the low economic growth rates of the to the powers most affected. last twenty years. As a result of this emphasis Globalization is creating transnational and the realization that the great danger to threats as well as benefits. Technological ad- world peace—the Soviet threat—is gone, pub- vances and open societies allow an unprece- lic opinion now insists on lower defense dented free movement of ideas, people, and spending. This translates into a reluctance to goods. The pulse of the planet has quick- deploy forces overseas. Sustained commit- ened and with it the pace of change in ments are especially unwelcome, as distinct human events. These trends are likely to from emergencies. Also, emergency operations continue as communication costs fall and are impeded by increasing public sensitivity to casualties, particularly in situations that are not considered vital to national interests.

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the World Trade Organization facilitates dis- are often related to the decreasing ability of mantling of trade obstacles. Trade, finance, states to respond to the needs of their peo- and communications are all becoming ple. Fragmentation pressures take various global. Computers, faxes, fiber optic cables, forms, but sovereign states face no greater and satellites speed flows of information threat than minorities whose desire to break across frontiers, as illustrated by the explo- away is sometimes justified by their treat- sive growth of Internet. While most flows ment at the hands of intolerant majorities. It are beneficial, some of the flood across boris difficult to reconcile the principles of ma- ders is pernicious. For example, both pro- jority rule and national self-determination democracy activists and the proponents of when a cohesive minority wants to opt out ethnic cleansing can easily disseminate their of a larger state. The sad results of such respective views. Transnational threats take intra-state tensions can be seen in many various forms: terrorism, the international- places, as violent ethnic and ethno-religious ization of crime centering on illegal drugs conflicts are becoming more common and (or even the smuggling of nuclear material), more bloody. international environmental problems such U.S. Involvement as global warming and ozone depletion, and In his 1994 National Security Strategy of disruptive migration resulting from political Engagement and Enlargement, President Clin- strife or natural disasters. ton stated: “Our national security strategy is Democracy is becoming the global ideal, if based on enlarging the community of mar- not the global norm. Democracy has proven to ket democracies while deterring and con- be contagious. The world has experienced a taining a range of threats to our nation, our wave of democratization since the 1970s. In allies, and our interests.” Such a strategy Latin America and Central Europe, it is the stresses three primary objectives: enhancing norm, not the exception. Even in Asia and security, promoting domestic prosperity, and Africa, where many governments remain au- advancing democracy. An analysis of world tocratic in practice, most feel compelled to trends and U.S. interests tends to confirm present themselves as democratic or in tran- the importance of these goals. sition to democracy. The overthrow of demo- Unlike the Cold War, the United States cratically-elected governments has become no longer has to dedicate its resources to unacceptable in the eyes of the world com- achieving a single overriding goal. With its munity. But elections are no guarantee that primary interests easier to achieve, the Na- freedom will prevail. In some places elections tion is free to pay more attention to sec- have been held before the emergence of a ondary goals. But not all of those goals are free press and other institutions, resulting in worth pursuing simultaneously, given costs a fear that some nations may experience and competing domestic claims on re- “one person, one vote, one time.” sources. Hence, America must be selective The sovereign state is losing its unique role about where to get involved. The United as the fundamental unit of organization within States is most likely to engage where it can the world system. As economies become inter- simultaneously promote its national inter- twined, it is difficult to identify what consti- ests and values. tutes an American or German corporation. Whereas the Cold War priority was to Financial markets are so interconnected that contain communism, the new focus of U.S. control of interest and exchange rates by foreign and defense policies is engagement central banks is increasingly attenuated. and enlargement—and expanding the com- With the explosion of international commu- munity of market democracies. Enlargement nications and cultural links, news, fashions, has several aspects, some more vital than and ideas are more global and less national. others: As globalization proceeds, governments lose ▼ some measure of control and are less able to Sustaining democracy and free markets in address the problems of their citizens. Frus- countries where it is well-rooted is vital. But this trated by the inability of governments to re- does not require urgent efforts, since free institutions usually face little challenge in the market solve their problems, people may turn away democracies. from the sovereign state and embrace more local politics. Thus, fragmentation pressures

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▼ Promoting a move from authoritarianism against rogue states that refuse to adjust to democracy in transitional states (such as Rus- peacefully into the world system. The most sia, South Africa, and Central Europe) is both likely areas of involvement are in traditional vital and time-consuming for policymakers. regions of concern: the Korean peninsula, ▼ Encouraging free markets and democracy Persian Gulf, Levant, and the Caribbean. in troubled states is difficult. While it is critical This list is by no means exhaustive, since from the perspective of promoting American values and serving long-term geostrategic interests America could fight almost anywhere if sig- by fostering a stable world order, enlargement to nificant interests were at risk. In defending encompass the troubled states is not a top prior- vital interests and principles, the Nation ity from the perspective of short-term national se- must be prepared to use decisive force. It curity interests. must also be prepared to act alone, although acting as part of a coalition is preferable as U.S. Priorities long as America exercises leadership in that In terms of traditional security interests, coalition. and putting aside other important considera- The third priority is responding to trans- tions such as economics, a series of signifi- national threats such as drug trafficking, terror- cant priorities flows from the above analysis. ism, and illegal refugees, problems which cross The first is ensuring peace among the major pow- national borders. While it is not always clear ers. Though the health of alliances with which assets are best suited to respond to such Japan and Europe is primary, the United hazards on the national level, some threats States also wants good working relations with seem to call for military involvement rather Russia and China which will be easier if there than reliance on only the traditional tools: is a transition to democracy and free markets government regulation or police who are in those countries. Besides having good bilat- often outgunned and outmaneuvered by eral relations with the major powers, the Na- criminal syndicates. Quasi-police operations tion also benefits from the peaceful resolu- have been conducted routinely by the mili- tion of disputes among the major powers. taries of many nations including the United Creating mechanisms for nonviolent States. But there can be resistance in the conflict resolution will become all the more Armed Forces to using scarce resources for urgent if the world does divide into distinct quasi-police functions when the natural incli- great power spheres of influence, because his- nation is to focus on preparing for major con- tory suggests that those powers tend eventu- flicts rather than being drawn into situations ally to fight over the boundaries of such where the military is less obviously needed. zones. To date, these spheres of influence are On the other hand, the absence of great too amorphous to identify possible conflicts. power strife or major regional conflicts pro- But clashes could arise, for example, in Asia, vides the luxury of using the military for other where the pattern of influence remains mud- missions. One reason to give priority to such dled, or in Central Europe, which lacks clear transnational threats is the risk that if left lines separating possible spheres of influence. unattended these problems can escalate and This interest in peace among the great pow- affect vital interests or create massive humani- ers is not likely to get the same close atten- tarian disasters, which would then demand tion devoted to troublesome regional crises, U.S. intervention on a much larger scale. but the deterioration of relations among the The fourth priority is assisting failed states. major powers would be more threatening to Americans are likely to aid such states in those the United States in the long term than any cases where the military can respond con- regional crisis. structively and at relatively low cost. An ex- The second priority is engaging selectively ample is providing relief in the wake of a hu- in regional conflicts. Washington will hope- manitarian disaster. Likewise, if local violence fully decide to exercise leadership primarily threatens to spill over international borders, in those situations where both U.S. interests monitors and military aid can be effective. and principles are at stake, rather than Similarly, if parties to a conflict agree upon a where only its principles are tested. Priority political solution but are suspicious of the should be given to traditional commitments willingness of the other side to live up to its and cases in which action is now needed to promises, peacekeepers can make a difference. prevent a greater danger later, particularly

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Messy internal conflicts create problems for military intervention. Yet public pressure to prevent a humanitarian disaster or genocide can encourage intervention in cases where America has few direct and immediate interests, as in So- malia which caused difficult foreign and defense policy problems for the last two administrations. In Rangers loading on general, the role of the Armed board USS George Forces in failed states will be to Washington.

provide humanitarian aid, protect U.S. Army (Joe Hendricks) non-combatants, and prevent conflicts from spreading to other countries. The military is less likely to play a sources may be insufficient to accomplish all major role in nation-building, at which its of them equally well. Thus, Washington is record is mixed at best. But the services are likely to face difficult choices about how to unlikely to avoid all nation-building responsi- allocate available resources. These missions bilities, as our intervention in Haiti demon- are, in priority: strates. One danger in nation-building is that ▼ Hedging against the emergence of a peer restoring political institutions often leads to competitor over the next two decades. This re- choosing sides in an ongoing conflict. The quires developing capabilities for leading edge side not chosen may then see American forces warfare. The Armed Forces want to be better posi- as the enemy and attack them, leading to ca- tioned than any potential rival to exploit new, sualties that erode public support for the oper- commercially developed technologies for military ation. Of course, humanitarian operations can use. Taking advantage of the revolution in mili- also have a downside: underlying problems tary affairs requires new doctrine and organiza- that were suppressed when the Armed Forces tion as well as new technology. While easy to overlook in the short run, this mission may well were present often re-emerge after those forces be the most vital in the long run. have departed, leading to questions about the ▼ Preparing for major regional conflicts with efficacy of intervention. rogue states. This calls for careful stewardship of a Forming coalitions for peace operations ready force with superior warfighting capabilities. is difficult. No nation, including the United Much current military analysis, including the Bot- States, wants to take responsibility for lead- tom-Up Review, is focused on this challenge. The ership in those cases where history and nightmare scenario is two nearly simultaneous common sense suggest that intervention major regional conflicts, such as one in the Per- will be lengthy, costly, and complicated. sian Gulf and another on the Korean peninsula. When national interests are not directly at In view of likely budgetary constraints, success in issue, America may choose to be marginally such a situation may well require regional allies. ▼ Developing cost-effective responses to involved or to press for a clear exit strategy meet transnational threats. Operations such as in- should intervention go badly. terdicting illegal immigrants, intercepting nar- Implications for the Armed Forces cotics shipments, and fighting forest fires will be By combining these trends and priorities one part of the military’s vigorous engagement in certain implications for the Armed Forces support of national interests. At the same time, such missions do not require expensive combat can be drawn in order to prepare for con- systems. Nor should such operations be allowed flicts that may be encountered in the com- to tie up personnel with specialized combat skills ing years. for extended periods. Balancing forces among fundamentally dif- ▼ Engaging selectively in troubled states. ferent missions. The military will be expected The Armed Forces may prefer to minimize this to accomplish four basic missions, flowing mission, both to husband resources for major from the four priorities listed above. Re- conflicts and to avoid so-called “mission creep” (in particular, humanitarian operations that take

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on aspects of nation-building for which the mili- The military should anticipate a decline tary is ill suited). But the hard reality is that failed in the importance of large weapons plat- states are becoming more common and the Amer- forms. Classical organizations—formations ican public often insists on intervention in the with tanks, ships, and aircraft—are no longer face of massive humanitarian disasters. the sole pillars of military might. For major The United States should increasingly industrial countries, integrating advanced expect to operate with ad hoc coalitions weapons and communication/sensing sys- rather than alliances. There is no overpower- tems is increasingly the key to success in ing threat that will cement new enduring al- war. It has two effects: some platforms are liances the way the Soviet threat brought becoming more vulnerable to precision- NATO into being. Like-minded states, includ- guided munitions and smaller weapons ing NATO members, will not always agree on come along with smaller platforms. In less

U.S. Army (Joe Hendricks) which regional crisis deserves attention, so technologically advanced nations, success in coalitions will shift from case to case. Public limited warfare against major powers may be opinion, in the United States possible by deploying “silver-bullet” the United States should and abroad, will typically insist weapons systems that can accomplish one on intervention by a coalition particular task well (for example, brilliant increasingly expect to rather than by America alone, mines or portable anti-aircraft weapons). operate with ad hoc even if coalition partners add With the proliferation of weapons of mass coalitions rather than nothing to—or even compli- destruction, dispersed forces are more attrac- cate—the military equation. tive than concentrations of forces. alliances Most important, if defense The Bottom Line spending declines, the United It will not be possible to meet all four States will need to increasingly rely on coali- missions and deal with the other challenges tion partners to accomplish the four missions described above if budget cuts continue at discussed above. the current rate. If they do continue, the Military planning should be keyed to ca- pressures to maintain a two major-regional- pabilities, not threats. After fifty years of a conflict capability and to undertake peace patent threat, the military may have to re- operations could require Pentagon planners turn to a method of planning which ad- to neglect the top priority of the Armed dresses a world full of unforeseen dangers. Forces, hedging against a future peer com- The best way to plan for the unknown is to petitor by taking full advantage of the revo- identify the sorts of tasks that the military lution in military affairs. JFQ will be assigned, not to guess about the specifics. A capability of growing importance will be interaction with coalition partners. The Armed Forces must identify appropriate command structures. The trend in the military has been toward placing more power under CINCs. Information technology and communications, however, are shifting power to those with the most powerful computers and the largest number of sensors, regardless of location, which could mean empowering Washington at the expense of the regional commanders. At the same time, the punch packed by the individual soldier is increasing, eroding the role of field commanders and resulting in flatter command and control structures. The fluid- ity of the political scene also complicates the formation of stable command divisions, since crises may flow across the areas of responsibility fixed during the Cold War.

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Building a New Defense Consensus By MICHAEL B. DONLEY

t least two certainties exist besides 1994. And some 300 major and minor in- death and taxes: defense build-ups stallations are slated for closure or realign- end and defense reductions must ment, a list that will grow next year.1 Aeventually end too. This Nation has Defense decisionmakers and analysts ask ridden a roller coaster of increases and de- when reductions will cease. President Clin- creases in defense spending four times in the ton expressed hope in a State of the Union last five decades. History shows that such de- address that Congress would not cut defense clines normally stopped in response to a for- further than already proposed; but the ulti- eign policy crisis or on the eve of war. The mate outcome is unclear. The FY95 budget most recent reduction is in its ninth year, hav- allows for continued real declines in defense ing begun in the 1980s and gaining momen- budget authority and outlays through FY99, tum with the breakup of the Soviet Union. We although at a lesser rate in the final two must develop an alternate approach to this years.2 The end to cuts appears to be unre- current trend in spending that does not con- lated to the calendar or to a particular level demn us to repeat the mistakes of the past. of deficit reduction. It is neither connected Since FY87 total defense outlays have to minimally acceptable force levels nor spe- declined 23 percent in constant dollars, with cific requirements of an evolving post-Cold overall investment in research and develop- War strategy. So how will we know when the ment, procurement, construction et al., drawdown is completed? Or whether de- down 30 percent. The defense share of gross fense cuts have gone too far? domestic product (GDP) has fallen by a third If past experience is repeated analysts to 4.3, the lowest since 1948. Active military and interest groups representing various sec- personnel—who have been reduced on aver- tors will critique foreign and defense policy age by 80,000 each year—are projected to on all sides. From a fiscal perspective there reach a pre-Cold War level of 1.6 million in will never be a good time to stop the de-

Summary

Defense budgets have had their ups and downs since the end of World War II. The current decline in defense is cutting deeper and lasting longer than many observers think wise. Absent a national security crisis, revitalizing defense resources will be a difficult and complex process which must factor in strategic uncertainties and fiscal constraints while avoiding partisanship. This suggests the need to review the historical record of defense budget cycles, weigh the resource decisions that lie ahead, and consider those opinions which count in any effort to build a new defense consensus. By targeting the political center, shifts in defense spending can be moderated and popular support generated in lieu of less effective crisis response and factional debates that aggravate the budget process. This process boils down to forging a stable bipartisan approach to defense policy.

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crease in spending. Both defense officials and military leaders could be torn between exercising their professional judgment and cleaving to decisions made by their chains of command. The President’s budget will be defended, but a leaking game might begin. Sus- picion and mistrust could divide decision- Members of the makers. A growing defense debate could take 25th Infantry Division s on partisan political overtones, as happened departing for Tandem in 1960 and 1980. And it is possible that the Thrust ’93 debate might not end—Congress being truly unsure of what to do—until the Nation is faced with a national security crisis. Unfortunately, such a scenario is familiar and undesirable. It suggests a perverse political logic that relies on foreign policy setbacks to preserve defense. But it is equally undesirable for a defense program to rely on pre- sumptive or optimistic peaks and valleys in spending foreign policy outcomes. A more prudent ap- relate to World War II, the proach should be found Korean and Vietnam conflicts, that is less dependent on and the Reagan era assumptions about international events, more

fiscally stable, and more U.S. Army (Kevin Thomas) firmly grounded in a long-term perspective of U.S. interests. In sum, we should not wish for a foreign policy crisis and, more to the In turn, such an assessment may proffer point, military and civilian leaders should broad principles that could become the consider the possibility that the Department foundation of a new bipartisan defense of Defense (DOD) and Congress might have consensus and could encourage rational al- to depend on their own initiative to prevent ternatives which are less prone to fiscal inef- a steady erosion of defense capabilities. ficiencies and national risks associated with Decisionmakers need fresh thinking and crisis response. more rigorous analyses about when to stop Historical Perspectives cutting defense. The following discussion of- A brief look at defense build-ups and fers a three-part assessment of this problem: downsizing can be instructive in thinking ▼ an historical perspective on the cyclical about how to create a consensus. The peaks nature of declines in defense spending ▼ and valleys in defense spending over the last a deeper look into the current defense fifty years relate to World War II, the Korean management agenda, what potential decisions lie and Vietnam conflicts, and the Reagan era. ahead, and how further analysis might provide criteria to determine military sufficiency These four episodes can be seen from various ▼ a review of whose opinions matter so perspectives, from budgetary emphasis on that subsequent efforts to fashion a bipartisan build-ups to the economic impact of reduced consensus on defense can be targeted at the right spending.3 Of particular interest are the rela- audience. tionships among foreign, defense, and fiscal policies during inter-conflict periods. These periods—the valleys through which the policies of the post-war era evolved and which Michael B. Donley is a senior fellow at the Institute preceded decisions to rebuild defense assets— for Defense Analyses. He was Acting Secretary of can provide added insights for decision- the Air Force and served on the staffs of both the makers as they evaluate the development of National Security Council and Senate Armed a consensus to end downsizing. Services Committee.

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Post-World War II. In the months and defense establishment.6 Thus the steadily years after World War II the attention of growing requirements of containment were American policymakers shifted to Soviet ex- neither fully recognized nor considered af- pansionism. This became evident in political fordable in the context of prevailing fiscal and economic terms through the Marshall policies. Plan and Truman Doctrine, then in collec- It took Soviet explosion of a nuclear tive security agreements and military assis- device in 1949, the fall of China, and a com- tance programs. U.S. national security policy prehensive policy review in NSC–68 to even- depended on overwhelming economic tually press home that post-war strategy and strength, a nuclear monopoly, and an ability fiscal priorities were disconnected; and the to mobilize as carried out between 1939 and outbreak of the Korean War finally galva- 1942. Prominent issues included unification nized foreign and defense policy. Most no- of the Armed Forces under the National tably, the use of American forces in Korea Security Act of 1947, a debate over which reversed three years of policy development service would be responsible for delivering and military planning which had previously nuclear weapons, and universal military concluded that such a commitment would training. As one historian noted, prepared- be avoided.7 The first post-war defense build- ness was perceived as the ability to mobilize up was thus underway, but not without a quickly in the event of war rather than to cost. During the first month of the Korean maintain ready forces to prevent war.4 conflict the United States sustained a series Economic policy was focused on sup- of tactical defeats and over 6,000 casualties pressing inflation and balancing the budget. before stabilizing a slim 140-mile perimeter President Truman adopted a so-called remain- around Pusan. der method for calculating the defense bud- Post-Korea, Pre-Vietnam. The perception get, subtracting all domestic expenditures that America faced an intractable and global from projected revenues before setting an ap- foe with a large, nuclear capable force led to propriate level for defense. His experience as a build-up that lasted beyond the end of the chairman of a wartime Senate committee in- Korean War. Thus, post-war downsizing did vestigating military waste, and the intense in- not reach pre-war levels. After hitting a peak, terservice rivalry of the late 1940s, led to Tru- manpower leveled off at around 2.6 million man’s belief that—with proper management men, compared with 1.4 million in 1950. In and organization and reliance on swift mobi- the Korean conflict the United States estab- lization—the military could make do with lished a substantial presence in Europe and fewer resources.5 The Bureau of the Budget initiated steady growth in nuclear forces. held that the economy could not stand the America built and deployed forces abroad deficit thought necessary to finance a larger to both contain Soviet expansionism and M–1 Abrams tanks in fight on short notice if deterrence and crisis the Saudi desert. management failed. By 1960 nearly 700,000 U.S. troops were stationed overseas. In addition, serious programs were undertaken for continental air defense and civil defense. Throughout the mid-1950s and early 1960s there was a series of international crises involving the use or threatened use of force, including confrontations with the Soviet Union over Berlin (twice) and Cuba. At the same time, however, strategic thinking gravitated from problems of general and nuclear war toward deterrence and limited war. Military doctrine, in simple terms, shifted from Mas- sive Retaliation to Flexible Response, although the United States would still rely on nuclear forces to defend Europe. The rise of national independence movements and breakup of colonial empires intensified Cold U.S. Army

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War competition in the Third World. America Panama, these issues reflected an underlying also maintained a considerable military assis- concern that Moscow had achieved at least tance program and strengthened its uncon- nuclear parity with the United States, and ventional warfare capabilities. that conventional defense of Europe was thus By 1963 the Armed Forces sustained 42 even more problematic. Uncertainty over So- casualties among the 23,000 advisors in Viet- viet intentions was bolstered by disputed in- nam, foreshadowing a decade of upheaval terpretations of arms control agreements and not only in U.S. national security policy but Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Angola, the also domestic politics and national priorities. Horn of Africa, and Nicaragua. Yet it was in the post-Korean War era that the Meanwhile, Federal spending priorities Nation continued to focus on the Soviet had shifted dramatically. Domestic expendi- threat, developed a bipartisan consensus on tures increased by about 50 percent in real foreign policy, built a Cold War defense estab- terms. Between 1973 and 1980 the defense lishment commensurate with the policy of share of outlays dropped from 34 to 23 per- containment, and sustained significant de- cent, and the defense burden on GDP fell fense expenditures without damage to Amer- from 6.9 to 5.1 percent. The defense budget ica’s economy and rising standard of living. was essentially stagnant, struggling to cope Post-Vietnam. The 1970s were a period of with the impact of large increases in the multipolarity abroad and turmoil at home. price of oil and high inflation. By 1979 active America was bruised domestically duty manpower was nearly 25 percent lower, past experience and by Vietnam, Watergate, and criti- and defense investment accounts were 28 cal reviews of the intelligence percent lower after inflation, than the pre- national attitudes are community. Europe and Japan Vietnam levels of 1963. Low personnel reten- relevant to shaping were stronger economically, rifts tion and spare parts shortages caused a de- current and future among communist countries were cline in readiness. Once again, however, openly visible, the Middle East international events served as the key cata- policy faced another war, and interna- lysts for change. The Iranian revolution and tional terrorism presented a grow- subsequent hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion ing threat. In his Guam Doctrine President of Afghanistan, and then a failed hostage res- Nixon stated that the United States would cue mission inside Iran combined in late provide a nuclear shield for vital allies and 1979 and early 1980 to highlight the need in cases of Third World aggression would for greater attention to defense and produce provide military and economic assistance a political climate to support it. when requested, but would look to the na- Applying Historical Experience in the Post- tion directly threatened to furnish man- Cold War Era. The events described above are power in its own defense. Containment was within the living memory of many foreign now pursued through détente, which and defense policymakers, and those which emerged as a means of controlling conflict have occurred since the early 1960s are with the Soviet Union and featured arms within the span of their personal experience. control as one of its centerpieces. But even Leaders today can be reminded of the Ameri- with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty can tendency toward isolationism before and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks World War II and lack of overall prepared- (SALT) agreement in place, and follow-on ness prior to Korea; some have poignant first negotiations, there was debate through the hand experience of the Vietnam quagmire, mid-1970s over the growth and moderniza- the lack of readiness in the 1970s, and most tion of Soviet nuclear and conventional recognize the fiscal consequences of deficit forces. spending in the 1980s. They also appreciate Among the important changes in policy the benefits of the last build-up and what it were the end of conscription and the transi- took to succeed in the Gulf War. tion to an all volunteer force that would in- Past experience and national attitudes clude more women. There were major foreign are thus relevant to shaping current and fu- and defense policy debates over the B–1 ture defense policy. They constitute the bomber, Panama Canal treaty, Selective Ser- vice registration, and SALT II. Except for

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backdrop of an era of strategic ambiguity, an combined trends suggest an historically fa- era that began with the erosion of Moscow’s miliar pattern, a political preference for both influence in Eastern Europe, German reunifi- budgetary growth in domestic entitlement cation, and break-up of the Soviet empire. spending and budgetary restraint in discre- National policies, regional alliances, and tionary programs such as national defense. global institutions continue to adapt, but the The challenge, then, is twofold: first to re- character of the strategic landscape is un- concile strategic ambiguity and requirements clear. The evolution of Russia and China— for forces with a reduction in capabilities, and both critical to a myriad of U.S. interests in second to prevent planned reductions from Europe and the Pacific—cannot be predicted. spinning out of control as a result of bud- Changes prompted by the end of the getary pressures. This discussion proceeds Cold War argue for force structure adjust- from the assumption that these are the pre- ments along the lines of those undertaken be- vailing conditions and trends defining the tween 1990 and 1993; an ambiguous era does political environment in which changes to not demand a buildup. But at the same time defense policy can potentially take root, and it does not argue for an open-ended decline further, that at present—absent a crisis—suc- in capabilities. As DOD and Congress debate cessful changes are more likely to result from the purpose of two major regional contingen- incremental adjustments. We must crawl be- cies as planning scenarios, a number of recent fore we walk. Strategic instability, ambiguity and continuing commitments in which the on the international horizon, and domestic Armed Forces play a role suggest the enduring constraints are important starting points; ef- need for a highly trained, well equipped mili- forts to establish a new consensus for a strong tary that can be deployed in widely separated defense must recognize and work within the areas and be supported by a range of capabili- constraints of this environment. ties in strategic depth. Experience shows that The Current Agenda substantial forces have been committed in In thinking about how and where to places where prior strategic analysis con- draw the line against reductions, defense offi- cluded they would not be needed. cials must be clear about current priorities, A second major feature on the post-Cold the most significant problems to be avoided, War landscape is the problem of fiscal con- and what the future holds if current trends straints. As a result of the Omnibus Budget continue. This allows for many functional, Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, pro- service, and joint perspectives, but defense jected budget deficits are down from $235 policymakers need a common view of a core billion in FY94 to $165 billion in FY95, with management agenda and of how to measure moderate growth to over $180 billion in progress on this agenda. Recent Secretaries of FY99. As a percent of GNP deficits will fall Defense have faced similar challenges in this from 4 to 2 percent, well below the post-war period of rapid change: how to manage a sig- high of 5.2 percent in FY83. However, the ef- nificant downsizing of the Armed Forces and fects of previous deficits will linger in annual where to set a lower limit while providing payments for net interest on the national the Nation with the capabilities to remain debt, now projected at 14 percent of the engaged in a world more complex than that budget each year through FY99.8 of the Cold War. In response, defense leaders But more troubling is the large projected made a straightforward decision in 1990–92 increase in mandatory entitlement spend- to reduce the size of the military to protect ing, from $730 billion in FY94 to $1,051 bil- readiness and modernization. It is the high lion in FY99. The total budget share devoted quality of personnel, training, maintenance, to this spending increases from 46 to 57 per- and logistics that yields readiness, and it is cent over the same period. Thus, the growth readiness and superior technology—together in domestic entitlement programs which with global communications, intelligence, began in earnest in the late 1960s and 1970s transportation, and power projection—that is now joined by the effects of 1980s deficit combine to distinguish our Armed Forces as spending in an imposing fiscal trend: the the finest in the world. FY95 budget projects that by FY99 entitle- While the details have been debated, ment spending and net interest will account there has been a strong consensus that this for over 70 percent of annual outlays. The

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USS Normandy deploying to the Adriatic for Sharp Guard. U.S. Navy (David W. Hanselman)

resource allocation cient to meet falling budget authority or framework is appro- tight outlay ceilings. FY94 defense procure-

U.S. Navy (Mike Poche) priate for a new ment is down 50 percent in real terms from SEAL aiming M–4 environment and FY90 levels, and congressional committees equipped with M–203 significant defense reductions. No one wants note that FY94 outlay targets reduced opera- grenade launcher. a hollow force. With the Soviet Union and tions and maintenance as well as research Warsaw Pact gone, the size of U.S. forces will and development accounts below prudent give way to an emphasis on quality and levels. Of the $104 billion in savings from technology. Many accounts, program ele- the Bush baseline forecast between FY95 and ments, and mission areas have been reduced FY99, BUR estimates 23 percent will come over the past eight years, but this allocation from force structure and over 50 percent framework—cutting force structure to pay from investment.9 for readiness and modernization—has re- From a fiscal perspective no significant cently provided a tem- relief is in sight. The budget deficit and con- it is becoming more clear that plate for major decisions tinuing growth in entitlements will substan- readiness and modernization and planning guidance. tially limit efforts to raise defense spending. It is found in the Presi- As DOD looks to the mid- to late-1990s, it is are far from immune to cuts dent’s FY95 budget mes- becoming more clear that readiness and sage to Congress: “We modernization are far from immune to cuts; can maintain our national security with and the force structure outlined in BUR is forces approved in the Bottom-Up Review potentially unsustainable. Protecting an ade- (BUR), but we must hold the line against fur- quate level of readiness, a reasonably sized ther defense cuts in order to protect fully the force structure, and minimal modernization readiness and quality of our forces.” seems now to depend more than ever on That framework, however, has been necessary but uncertain savings from infra- steadily eroded as budget realities have set structure cutbacks and acquisition reform as in. Forces are being reduced through well as forecasts of low inflation. FY90–FY99 as planned in the base force, and This situation will require defense offi- now BUR: from 28 active and Reserve divi- cials to emphasize their resource allocation sions to 15, from 16 aircraft carriers to 12, priorities internally and with Congress to and from 36 active and Reserve tactical prevent loss of focus. Developing a meaning- fighter wing equivalents to 20. Such reduc- ful baseline on where defense stands today tions alone have not provided savings suffi- and where it should be, say, in three years is essential to restoring bipartisan support. The goal, it seems, should be to improve confi-

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dence in the ability to arrive analytically at pact between the Armed Forces and the peo- collective judgments with Congress about ple they serve. the status of its highest priorities. Readiness is a combination of many fac- There appear to be five major manage- tors but primarily a union of personnel, ment priorities: protecting readiness, reduc- equipment, and training. If DOD is inter- ing force structure to BUR levels, protecting nally responsible for setting standards and future technological superiority and contin- requirements for training and equipment, uing only essential modernization, establish- then it can be said the Nation as a whole is ing a new relationship with industry, and responsible for setting the wages for military reducing support infrastructure. In each area personnel. Congress and the American peo- DOD and Congress should build measures of ple owe service members the respect of de- merit, boundaries, goal posts, and tools to cent compensation. There is always room for define criteria for satisfactorily attaining give and take, for commitment and reform objectives. With regard to readiness, for ex- in personnel policies. But self-assessment by ample, one should be able to identify and ar- the military is the key indicator since it is ticulate standards and components of readi- likely to be reflected in morale, retention, ness which are the most important to experience, and combat effectiveness. Mu- protect or further develop. Risks and impli- tual agreement by service members and cations of any force structure reductions be- Congress that compensation is fair and that yond BUR should be thoroughly evaluated. readiness meets high standards is essential. Investment road maps should be developed Given the experience of the late 1970s it in key mission areas to focus limited re- would seem that agreement on this point sources and clearly define the projected still has broad appeal across the political workload in key sectors of the defense indus- spectrum. The concept of a compact be- trial base. tween the American people and the military In these and other areas defense leaders which provides ready forces could be consid- must develop a sense of where we are and ered among the potential cornerstones of a are not succeeding, where we can squeeze new defense consensus. harder and where we have squeezed too A second agenda item that could con- much. Internal DRB-level reviews could be tribute to a consensus is infrastructure reduc- organized around major priorities and per- tion and, more broadly, structural reform. haps scheduled on a regular basis. Alterna- Budget reductions and smaller forces have in tively, if DOD cannot articulate the benefits many respects been propelled by base clo- and limitations of its resource allocation sures, consolidations, a roles and missions re- framework, its strategic and management view, and DOD initiatives that were long agenda, then there is less likelihood it can overdue. Such structural reforms deserve avoid a continued erosion in capabilities careful attention. As experience with base below those now forecast or build the sup- closures suggests they may or may not pro- port necessary to do something about it. duce near-term savings but should be pur- There are major decisions to make on sued based on merit. At the same time DOD packaging and articulating the management should not for the sake of budget savings agenda, but potentially there are three areas pursue nor succumb to expedient manage- of emphasis that, if developed thematically, ment or command arrangements it will later could contribute to strengthening the con- regret. Each opportunity for reform will have sensus for a strong defense. its own unique programmatic characteristics. The first is readiness. Attention to readi- Thus a second principle of a new de- ness ensures that the President can respond fense consensus is that an end to defense quickly to crises by maximizing military ca- cutbacks does not mean an end to structural pabilities. Regardless of the size of the reform. DOD has a self-interest in finding Armed Forces, it should be argued, DOD real savings and applying them productively owes America readiness and optimum effec- and, by being aggressive, deterring outside tiveness. This should be seen as not only a meddling in internal affairs. It must thus reflection of military necessity but as a com- sustain a genuine commitment to continuous self-evaluation. Congress must be confident that prudent steps are being taken to

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on all component cylinders, and yet is unable to maintain a reasonably sized force structure and standards of preparedness and modernization, it may then con- clude that the current downsizing should end. The Right Audience Unease over the pace and duration of the drawdown among defense experts in Naval Historical Center Helicopters waiting for Congress is one sign that a fuel in Vietnam. wider debate may be forthcom- cut infrastructure and eliminate unnecessary ing. Senate Republican leaders told the Presi- duplication. dent in late 1993 that further cuts would Acquisition reform is a third priority that seriously damage national security. Likewise, can build confidence that the military is get- Democrats in the House arranged a quiet ting the most from every dollar. Here too the meeting with the President last December to concept can be broadened to include not outline what they believe is a disconnect be- only how we are buying but what we are buy- tween BUR strategy and forces. But ing. Concentration of priorities Democrats on the House Budget Committee the outcome of the should be more apparent as R&D also warned the President of gridlock if his defense budget debate and procurement shrink. By in- defense budget proposals departed from the ference, DOD should have an agreed FY94 deficit reduction plan.10 will depend on the increasingly solid rationale sup- The FY95 budget debate, then, was char- plurality in the middle porting its investment decisions acterized by concerned groups on both sides and greater certainty about what of the defense spending issue who are ma- it is unable to afford but needs. In neuvering to influence the President and key evaluating whether to relax the budgetary committees amid uncertainty about the fun- pressure on defense, public and political damental character of the strategic environ- opinions will be shaped by judgments of ment abroad and a long list of domestic pri- whether DOD is putting its scarce resources orities, including deficit reduction. The where they really belong. outcome of the defense budget debate for One should note that effectively using FY96 and beyond, however, will depend not the defense management agenda faces uncer- on the few certain votes at each end of the tainties and shortcomings. Themes related to spectrum, but on the plurality in the middle. good stewardship through reductions in in- Opinion leaders should not only be thinking frastructure, etc., may run headlong into po- about when, why, and how to determine litical interests which support a strong when defense reductions have gone far defense by leaving local bases, units, or pro- enough, but also about how their judg- grams intact. But in general the current ments, once articulated, will be perceived by agenda has much to offer to the substantive the plurality of congressional votes that debate over when to stop cutting defense. make the difference. These are political mod- With more explicit goals for each stated erates of both parties and members less priority, the slippery slope can perhaps be re- active or opinionated on national security is- placed by steps suggesting limits to prudent sues, more inclined to appreciate the range reductions in readiness, force structure, and of important issues on the national agenda modernization as well as indicating that the and to be open to both sides of an issue. Re- potential savings from structural reform building a sustainable bipartisan consensus have limits. Conceptually, when Congress for a strong defense means rebuilding the perceives that the engine of the defense political center. management agenda is active and running Political centrists in general prefer to avoid being whipsawed by hard line views from either end of the political spectrum but

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are inclined to take action when public opin- shape the emerging debate, the moderate ion is clear. Opinion in support of increases plurality should be the audience of choice. or decreases in defense spending can and History offers important insights into the does influence government policy though re- lack of connectivity among foreign, domestic, search indicates per- and fiscal policies which has contributed to ceptions of the arms dramatic swings in defense spending. Except race and budget for the late 1950s, in the years between deficit have been planned declines and sudden build-ups Amer- equally or more influ- ica squeezed defense spending between a fis- ential in generating cal preference for growth in domestic pro- changes in policy. grams and/or deficit reduction, and Opinion research on optimistic foreign policies which reinforced defense spending also the perception that we could safely cut de- suggests groups sup- fense. While the U.S. economy was large porting decreases are enough to shoulder even Cold War burdens most likely to be ef- without impairing a high standard of living, fective when linked defense management efficiencies, mobiliza- with other social tion policies, arms control, and allied burden- forces to increase do- sharing have all been used as rationales for U.S. Air Force (Lem Robson) mestic spending or smaller budgets. With these rationales it American and Japanese aircraft during Cope oppose tax increases, seemed we could lessen tensions, share global North 94–1. while groups supporting increases are most leadership in a more balanced fashion, and likely to be effective when public opinion avoid higher defense expenditures. Thus we can be mobilized against a particular incident have sometimes been reluctant to recognize damaging to American prestige. Overall, con- important diplomatic and military trends; cludes another study, “the whole history of and when foreign policy reacts to an urgent public opinion on military spending shows a threat defense capabilities have sometimes remarkable susceptibility of public opinion been insufficient to support it. to transient events.”11 In applying such experience to the If such research is correct, a recitation of strategic environment of the mid-1990s, it the scope of defense reductions since the appears the Nation must be prepared to live peak of the mid-1980s is not itself likely to with ambiguity, uncertainty with regard to be perceived as sufficient reason to halt the the evolution of former adversaries, and in- current decline in defense spending. Re- stability in its relations with allies. Such an search supports the view that crises change approach would avoid over-reliance on republic opinion and government policy; but sponding to threats far in advance and mo- this is not the answer. A crisis can produce bilizing to meet them (something which we the support needed for effective foreign pol- have not done very well in the past), and icy response or a commitment of forces. But would downplay overly optimistic assump- sharp increases in defense spending that tions about influencing the internal politics sometimes follow can disrupt budgeting and of allies and potential adversaries alike. neither deter nor affect the outcome of the There is pressure for deficit reduction and crisis at hand. more emphasis on domestic priorities. But Absent a crisis the current defense man- America has the underlying economic agement agenda must be used with the best strength to support with moderate, steady possible effect. In the current environment, investment a defense establishment self-con- further contributions to debate should ex- fident in its ability to adjust to sudden plicitly recognize the problem of strategic changes in foreign policy, from whatever ambiguity and uncertainty, and the reality source. Another overarching constant re- of other fiscal priorities, while making the mains: the United States is responsible for case for the military and fiscal benefits of making its way in the world. If this Nation is moderate, stable investment in defense. And to be a leader in global affairs there is no as the military and civilian defense leaders substitute for tending to our own defense. in DOD and Congress have opportunities to

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The problem for defense planners is not maintain the capabilities necessary to sup- freefall but steady erosion: inexorable, unin- port it, and guard against foreign encroach- tended, marginal adjustments that blur pri- ment as well as domestic neglect. DOD and orities, shade requirements, mask real losses congressional leaders should prepare for this in capabilities, and quietly increase risk. larger question which lies at the heart of an- Nevertheless, there is a defense management nual budget skirmishes. Their preparations agenda that could contribute to an informed should include working through the military and productive debate over time, focused on implications of strategic uncertainty and ar- building a political center needed to stop the ticulating what is needed for defense over decline and support stable long-term na- the long haul, developing moderate and sus- tional security policies. This suggests princi- tainable budget requirements that do not ples around which a sustainable bipartisan rely on major shifts in fiscal priorities, and consensus for a strong defense might be developing broad principles that will res- achieved in an atmosphere clouded by onate with the political center and establish strategic uncertainties and hampered by fis- a stable bipartisan approach for future de- cal constraints: fense policy. JFQ ▼ The arrest of a continuing real decline in defense is not driven by a fabricated or inflated NOTES threat, but by a more sober, independent assess- 1 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Comp- ment of assets which the Nation must protect troller, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY94 (Wash- over the long haul. ington: Government Printing Office, May 1993). ▼ There is no urgent need for significant in- 2 U.S. Department of Defense, FY95 Department of creases in defense spending that could threaten Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress sound fiscal policy. A more sustainable approach (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1994), p. B–2. to spending will simply avoid costly cyclical ex- 3 See U.S. Department of Defense, From War to tremes. Stopping decline now rather than after a Peace: A History of Past Conversions, annex B, Report of crisis makes good strategic and fiscal sense. the Defense Conversion Commission, LMI report DC ▼ The Nation should sustain a careful ap- 201R4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, Jan- proach to committing forces. Being stronger and uary 1993). See also Lawrence Korb, “Growth and De- more independently prepared for rapid geopoliti- cline of Accounts through the Defense Investment cal changes and potential swings in foreign policy Cycle,” Defense Analysis, vol. 9, no. 1 (April 1993), p. 89. does not mean being more inclined to use force 4 Maurice Matloff, editor, American Military History where the costs, benefits, and risks are uncertain. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 539. 5 ▼ DOD owes the Nation a capable force, re- Ibid. See also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 34, and David McCullough, gardless of size. In turn, the American people owe Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 737. service members fair compensation. Congress 6 Sam Postbrief, “Departure from Incrementalism in must be steadfast in maintaining this compact. U.S. Strategic Planning: The Origins of NSC–68,” Naval ▼ An end to defense cuts does not mean an War College Review, vol. 33, no. 2 (March–April 1980), end to structural reform. All prudent steps will p. 34. continue to be taken to reduce infrastructure and 7 Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and eliminate unnecessary duplication. Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: ▼ DOD is putting scarce resources where Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 52–86. they belong and striving to get the most from 8 Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year every dollar. 1995 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 235. See also historical tables on p. 242, and analyti- The emerging defense debate is far more cal perspectives on pp. 187, 214. fundamental than deciding whether to buy 9 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom- another carrier, which service is responsible Up Review (Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1993), p. 108. for deep strike missions, the future of heavy 10 See Aerospace Daily, December 15, 1993; Defense armored forces, or even the next threat. Daily, December 10 and 23, 1993. These issues are important but will be re- 11 T. Goertzel, “Public Opinion Concerning Military solved in due course. The larger question is Spending in the U.S.: 1937–1985,” Journal of Political whether the political center, absent a crisis, and Military Sociology, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 61–72; Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, “Public can define the Nation’s role in the world, Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Mili- tary Spending in the U.S.?,” American Political Science Re- view, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1992), p. 905.

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MISSION-PULL and Long-Range Planning By CLARK A. MURDOCK

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Vehicles on board LCACs during Agile Provider ’94. Navy Combat Camera (Alexander Hicks)

hroughout the Cold War, the Soviet threat drove long-range planning—indeed, it drove all planning—in the defense community. In essence, we projected the Soviet threat and matched it or developed T competitive strategies to counter it. It is hardly an overstatement to claim that we did not plan for, but rather programmed against, a projected threat. Since the Soviet Union invested steadily in its military machine, the pace of U.S. military innovation was fueled by threat-based obsolescence— new weapons were introduced into the force because the old ones were deemed to be incapable of coping with new Soviet weaponry. With that threat as the fulcrum, scenarios became the dominant form of defense planning.1 Geopolitical scenarios were used to test strategies for containing Soviet-led communism, and war gaming provided the means for structuring U.S. and allied forces. Given relative certainty in terms of who constituted the threat and the context in which the Armed Forces were expected to operate, geopolitical assumptions in scenarios were generally taken as reasonable expectations. This Cold War consensus, of course, un- derlay the utility of scenario-based planning as a credible means of examin- ing and justifying force structure and projected defense programs.

Summary

With the demise of a monolithic threat, planners might do well to discard their scenario-based tools that are geared to identifying specific military requirements. What they need is a flexible method of long-range defense planning against generic threats. To be farsighted planners should focus on missions likely to arise 18 to 20 years from now. Given that acquisition decisions made today will result in fielding weapon systems which can endure for forty years and that the mindsets of the leaders of 2010 have already been shaped, it is time to apply the mission-pull approach developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Partially used by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, this new approach offers an analytic tool that is especially suited to the defense budgeting process.

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In the post-Cold War world the case for to institutionalize this kind of thinking scenario-based planning is far less convinc- about long-term needs. Instead of focusing ing. In thinking about the future security en- on where or when force may be used, which vironment, unknowns predominate: is what scenarios tend to do, we should de- ▼ What role will the United States play? termine what capabilities are needed to cope ▼ What are the threats? with generic contingencies. The key is to au- ▼ Who will have the capabilities and the thoritatively identify the future missions of will to challenge our interests? the Armed Forces. ▼ How much of the budget will be dedi- How far ahead should we look? Choos- cated to defense? ing an appropriate timeframe is critical. It Given the scope of such uncertainties, it should reach far enough into the future that is hardly surprising that senior decisionmak- if we want a new class of capabilities there is ers are finding scenario-based planning a less enough time to acquire it. But it also must than credible device for sizing and shaping be close enough that if we do want new ca- future forces.2 The need for long-range plan- pabilities, we can start to take action. This is ning has increased even as the un- relevant planning. If the planning process is certainties of the post-Cold War era not connected to resource decisions it is we no longer have a make our ability to conduct it merely an academic exercise. single threat to drive more difficult. As the world’s pre- Without threat-based obsolescence, age innovation eminent military power, we no and sustainability are likely to determine a longer have a single threat to drive weapon system’s life expectancy. Decisions innovation. Bureaucratic momen- made under the current Five-Year Defense tum alone will lead us to retain capabilities Plan (FYDP) will be far-reaching, because that won the last war. Declining budgets and today’s systems may remain in service over reduced force structures—coupled with the forty years. For example, the F–111 aircraft is increased tempo of peacetime commit- still projected to be in service well into the 21st ments—will only reinforce the preoccupa- century, fifty years after the tactical fighter ex- tion with current problems to the exclusion perimental (TFX) program began; many M1A2 of preparing for tomorrow’s conflict. Deci- tanks in service during the second decade of sions which affect the future of the Armed the 21st century will be thirty years old; and Forces then will be based upon near-term the average Spruance-class destroyer in 2015 considerations, increasing the risk that we will be over thirty-five years old. This trend is will possess the wrong capabilities for the so pervasive in post-Cold War planning that battlefield of the 21st century. an analysis by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicates that only about one- A New Approach quarter of the major systems deployed in 2011 Despite uncertainty over where and when will have been programmed after the five-year or against whom we might use force, we still plan for FY94–FY99.4 can think about how it might be used. Dur- Moreover, this trend will be true for peo- ing the mid-1970s the United States could ple, too. In large part, the perceptions and not anticipate the 1991 war with Iraq; but skills of those who will lead the military of based on analyses of the Vietnam conflict 2010 have already been set. For instance, the and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 we per- class of 1994 will be squadron, battalion, ceived the need to penetrate heavy, inte- and ship commanders in 2014; the individ- grated air defenses. This resulted in what ual who is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Secretary of Defense William Perry called Staff will have entered the force around “offset strategy,” which emphasized among 1980; and fully one-third of the officers of other things stealthy aircraft and suppres- 2010 will have been commissioned before or 3 sion of enemy air defense (SEAD). We need during the current FYDP. Decisions made in one FYDP, if executed as planned, will largely determine capabilities for at least two Clark A. Murdock is Special Assistant to the Under additional FYDP periods. The current five- Secretary of the Air Force. He previously served as year plan, however, only projects programs, Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and also has worked as a congressional forces, and budgets out six years, to the end staffer, intelligence analyst, and educator. of this century. Clearly, greater attention

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E–2 Hawkeye on USS America during Deny Flight.

F–117 stealth fighter.

Combat Camera Imagery (Raymond T. Conway)

futurologists—for example, a new Soviet Union or cyberwar—are more likely to emerge in the second decade of the 21st century, not by 2011. It would take time and effort to weaponize new technology and overcome current U.S. military advantages, especially in light of the fact that we are now spending more on defense than the DOD next eight highest spending countries combined. Each operating environment was defined according to three factors: should be given to the period 18 to 20 years out, since decisions today will determine al- ▼ future threat environments—specific opera- most 75 percent of the force structure in tional contexts broadly encompassing a range of 2010–15. Therefore the timeframe selected enemy capabilities—conventional and, when appro- for the OSD analysis was 2011 since it was priate, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—and conditions imposed by the physical environment exactly three FYDPs (18 years) away from ▼ future missions—future operational objec- the starting point of our long-range plan- tives to be accomplished by military forces ning effort in June 1993. ▼ critical tasks—key activities necessary to 6 Mission-Pull successfully execute a future mission. The key to effective planning at a time Assessing the relative difficulty of per- of declining resources and uncertainty about forming missions and associated critical threats and strategies is to think long tasks is vital to mission-pull since it is the range—particularly regarding missions. principal means of determining the ultimate What decisionmakers need, therefore, is a effectiveness of proposed capabilities. In an means to develop a common understanding era of declining resources it is not enough of future missions and then to apply this un- simply to avoid acquiring redundant or understanding to decisions made today. The necessary capabilities; we also cannot afford mission-pull approach began with a survey to buy ineffective capabilities, that is, capa- of work by futurologists and long-range bilities that cannot accomplish the critical planners to identify probable operating envi- tasks needed to achieve future missions. ronments in which the Armed Forces could The Process Counts be employed in 2011.5 As indicated in the The mission-pull approach provides an accompanying figure, the favorites of many analytic tool for rigorously defining future military missions. In sum, it disaggregates

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M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. Military Photography (Greg Stewart)

will result in proponents of a given proposal shaping the mission to fit it. During the Cold War the ubiquitous So- viet threat provided some discipline to the process, though the form of that threat projection often masked a struggle between competing force structure or weapons system proposals. From a planning perspective, there is no consensus on the American role in the post-Cold War world, nor on that which the Armed Forces should play in sup- U.S. Navy (Petty) Spruance class port of yet undefined national security inter- destroyer USS Hewitt. ests. Just as after World War II, this will take the 2011 security environment into 12 oper- years to develop. ating environments, over 60 military mis- What defense planners can do, however, sions, and over 200 critical tasks.7 Although is to suboptimize by building a consensus the analytic effort in creat- around missions so that a future President from a planning perspec- ing our mission grids is in- can have effective options for dealing with structive—if only to clarify security challenges in 2011. This is a point tive, there is no consensus how future conflicts are that bears repeating in a slightly different on the American role in the likely to be fought—the key way—a lack of foresight today will limit the post-Cold War world to making mission-pull an strategic alternatives of a future President. If effective tool is to incorpo- the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era rate it in the policymaking makes it difficult to predict what our 2011 process. Decisions about capabilities are national security strategy will be, our near- made in many circles in the Pentagon, of term task should be to preserve future mili- which the Defense Review Board, Defense tary options by making decisions to acquire Acquisition Board, and Joint Requirements or retain effective capabilities to execute the Oversight Council are the most authorita- missions of tomorrow, not those of today or tive. While competing proposals should be yesterday. judged on their ability to accomplish the mission, neglecting to define the mission

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Operating Environments of 2011 maritime role of the Navy or the expeditionary role of the Marines). Second, an Type Description approved list of missions could guide tech- economic warfare military operations in support of or defending against economic war nological investments as declining resources Restore Comfort humanitarian aid in ethnic conflict or rogue states limit possible technological applications. For at least the next twenty years this approach counterterrorism offensive and defensive operations against terrorism can drive the majority of technological in- Just Cause replacement of illegitimate foreign regime novations.8 Third, future missions are start- peoples war rural-based insurgency ing points for defining roles and missions. Sarajevo urban guerrilla warfare Since missions provide a joint, integrated, Yongbyon military operations against WMD facility long-range vision for the services, they can Tel Aviv regional defense in WMD environment serve as the basis for competition. Taiwan Straits “blue water” conflict to deter invasion of third country Roles and Missions Strait of Hormuz littoral warfare Most would agree that roles should be MRC major regional conflict in WMD environment assigned on the basis of future missions rather than on those of the Cold War. The homeland defense defense of CONUS against full threat spectrum first obstacle is semantic. The terms roles, functions, and missions each have specific meanings as discussions in these pages have 9 Military Photography (Greg Stewart) Authoritatively defining future missions indicated. But the term mission is widely is not a trivial pursuit, because the stakes for used to suggest more than a CINC’s mission. both the services and defense agencies are The mission-pull approach, for instance, high. In a sense DOD would be trying to uses it more familiarly in references to oper- build a consensus on a yardstick that mea- ational objectives to be achieved sometime sured competing proposals for requirements. hence. The consequence is that the debate A Defense Futures Working Group, chartered over roles and missions often does not focus by the senior leadership—the Secretary and on the central issue, a tenet of mission-pull: Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chair- that roles, functions, and missions cannot be man and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs appreciated without grasping what tomor- of Staff—and comprised of OSD, Joint Staff, row’s operational missions are likely to be. and service planners, would develop and co- The corollary is that once missions are iden- ordinate a set of mission grids which opera- tified the capabilities needed to perform tionally define the security envi- them must be acquired while unnecessary or capabilities must be ronment of 2011. The resulting redundant capabilities are discarded. Capa- bilities must be defined in terms of accom- defined in terms of product would be approved definitions of future missions, in- plishing missions. accomplishing missions cluding critical tasks to be ac- Selecting capability areas, then, is the complished for mission success; next step in applying the mission-pull ap- this would constitute a common future-ori- proach to an analysis of roles and missions. ented framework for decisionmakers. Each area should reflect projected capabili- Underlying a host of unresolved post- ties needed to carry out the missions of Cold War debates about the future has been 2011. Defining areas on the basis of future the lack of formal consensus on capabilities. missions with associated critical tasks will The mission-pull approach provides a basis provide a way of determining whether cur- for planners and decisionmakers to think rently programmed forces can perform the long-range about missions and, ultimately, missions and whether forces that may later future capabilities; but the true added value be available can perform them. This ap- of developing definitions of missions can be proach highlights an oft-neglected aspect of identified in discrete terms. First, clearly de- the roles and missions debate, namely, that fined missions are goals that the services can it is not enough to avoid buying redundant use to direct long-range planning. This or unnecessary capabilities; we must also, as would replace a situation in which each ser- stated earlier, avoid ineffective capabilities. vice shapes long-range planning to coincide with its self-defined identity (such as the

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Illustration of Capability Area: Forcible Entry

Selected Mission Area: Insertion of Forces

Critical Tasks (highest rating)

Tasks that will exist Difficult tasks requiring Highly demanding tasks collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence significant attention for creating major problems for protect support ships mission accomplishment mission accomplishment conduct show of force or demonstration destroy heavy weapons clear very shallow water and surface mines isolate borders and lines of communication gain and maintain air superiority acquire/neutralize intermingled targets identify access and egress routes capture/secure entry and exit points internal defense/guerrillas maintain surveillance of remote access and attack/destroy ground forces provide ballistic missile defense egress routes prevent external interference secure airfields/ports/roads and logistic sites track/escort incoming vehicles detain prisoners of war find and clear land mines find and defeat armor conduct ground reconnaissance defend against cruise missiles and precision find and neutralize C 3 guided munitions locate all critical facilities/materials attain information supremacy coordinate air/land/sea interdiction provide fire support for forces ashore destroy hostile weapons of mass destruction reach strategic value targets launchers maintain interoperability with allied forces defeat satellite surveillance interdict enemy supply detect and defend against biological and identify in-country destination chemical weapons defeat shore gun batteries locate supply caches

We used four criteria in defining capa- ▼ information operations bility areas: collectively, they must be com- ▼ forcible entry prehensive (theoretically offer capabilities to ▼ missile and WMD defense. perform a range of missions), comparable These areas, however, represented only (have similar levels of aggregation), distinct the first step in providing a framework in (represent qualitatively different aspects of a which to aggregate over sixty missions and force and minimize the overlap between two hundred critical tasks identified in areas), and unconstrained (disregard fiscal or twelve future operating environments. Each technological limits). Previous studies also area had to be divided into mission areas or were reviewed.10 It was determined that groups which together represent a key com- some force qualities previously designated as ponent of the capability. Only then was it functional areas—especially readiness and found that the level of aggregation allowed command and control—were common to all for both a manageable and meaningful anal- areas and should be treated as inherent to ysis of capabilities across future operating them. Ten tentative areas were selected environments. which represented a broad set of capabilities One example of this process is the capa- that taken together define the qualities bility area of forcible entry. Analysis derived needed by the Armed Forces of 2011: four areas: force deployment, insertion of ▼ deep strike forces, conduct of offensive operations, and ▼ nuclear strike transition to next phase. Of the four mission ▼ land combat areas, insertion of forces was used to illus- ▼ force projection and sustainment trate the process. Once this area was se- ▼ air combat lected, we surveyed matrices developed for ▼ space operations each of the future operating environments ▼ sea combat to select those missions which relate to in- serting forces. The related critical tasks for

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each mission, with associated ratings on the 4 This analysis was done by the Office of the Secre- level of difficulty, also were selected. The tary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in tasks then were organized by the assigned Autumn 1993 to support development of the mission- degree of difficulty. pull approach by OSD. 5 Futurologists and social theorists with a proclivity for perfection are of limited value as few of them sys- Similar assessments of all mission areas tematically examine potential operating environments. of each capability area would provide a Fewer still go into future operational military missions complete, in-depth analysis of the capabili- or threat environments in detail. The extant literature is ties which the Armed Forces of 2011 will re- primarily suggestive about future operating environments and consequently was used only to establish the quire. Such a rigorous analysis is necessary glossary of potential operating environments. to address the tough roles and missions de- 6 Critical tasks, as defined by mission-pull, are anal- cisions which face defense officials today. ogous to operational objectives as found in the RAND The assessments might answer vital ques- strategies-to-tasks planning methodology. See Glenn tions such as: are we investing in capabili- Kent and William Simons, “Objective-Based Planning,” in Paul K. Davis, editor, New Challenges for Defense Plan- ties that are effective or ineffective, com- ning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough (Santa Monica, plementary or redundant, necessary or Calif.:, The RAND Corporation, 1994), pp. 59–72, and irrelevant? The answers, in turn, could be Thaler, Strategies to Tasks. used to address questions on whether the 7 Mission grids were developed by the Institute for services can provide effective capabilities for Defense Analysis. 8 The relationship between mission-pull and technol- future missions. Most importantly, the mis- ogy-push in developing capabilities is complex. But lim- sion-pull approach offers a rigorous method ited resources and uncertainty over a threat means mis- for the services and defense agencies in sion-pull should dominate in the next 15–20 years. their competition for roles and functions on Beyond that, technology-push will likely become in- the basis of the ability to execute opera- creasingly important. 9 For example, see Carl H. Builder, “Roles and Mis- tional missions effectively. JFQ sions: Back to the Future,” in Joint Force Quarterly, no. 4 (Spring 1994); and Daniel T. Kuehl and Charles E. Miller, NOTES “Roles, Missions, and Functions: Terms of Debate,” in 1 The varied roles of scenario-based planning in de- Joint Force Quarterly, no. 5 (Summer 1994). 10 veloping a common perspective among key decision- Of them, the work of the Joint Requirements makers—inside and outside government—is well re- Oversight Council (1994) includes nine functional hearsed elsewhere. For example, see Peter Schwartz, The areas: strike, ground maneuver, strategic mobility and Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncer- its protection, air superiority, counterproliferation of tain World (New York: Doubleday Currency, 1991); Perry WMD, command and control and information warfare, M. Smith et al., Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, overseas pres- Planning for National Security (Washington: National De- ence, and joint readiness; the CJCS review (1989) also fense University Press, 1987); Charles W. Taylor, Alterna- cited nine functional areas: land warfare, air warfare, tive World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations (Carlisle maritime warfare, littoral warfare, homeland defense, Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War strategic nuclear warfare, space warfare, strategic trans- College, 1993); James E. Dewar and Morlie Levin, As- portation, and special operations. sumption-Based Planning for Army 21 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1992); James A. Dewar et al., Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corpo- ration, 1993); David E. Thaler, Strategies to Tasks: A Framework for Linking Means to Ends (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1993); and Ralph Mc- Nulty, Applying the Future Now! Project 2025 (Washing- ton: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1991). 2 Some argue that scenarios assist planning efforts in times of uncertainty; see Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, and Dewar, Assumption-Based Planning. While scenarios can help the decisionmaker during uncertain times if properly used, their utility is greater when a set of specific underlying assumptions in times of greater certainty are agreed upon. 3 See William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 68–73.

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Service Identities and Joint Culture Introduced by P AUL G. CERJAN

uch is written these days—especially in the pages of JFQ—about the need to foster joint culture. More often than not these calls for institutionalizing jointness are accompanied by a discussion of building joint culture on the foundation of service cultures. This raises some obvious questions. What exactly are ser- Mvice cultures? Who ultimately defines them? In a certain sense the answers are relatively apparent: soldiers know what Army culture is, sailors know what Navy culture is, and so on. But even if one accepts that the culture of each service is second nature to its members, how does that instinctual approach enlighten members of other services? What do marines really know about Army culture or airmen about Navy culture? Here a facile answer appears far more elusive, and a reliance on instinct becomes highly suspect.

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How a service sees itself—from customs have limitations that lead them to joint and to warfighting spirit—can vary dramatically combined operations to offset limitations. For from how other services perceive it. Thus, if Britain the limits of seapower are more palat- service culture is really the able than the limits of landpower or airpower how a service sees itself can stuff of which joint cul- as the leading edge of military prowess. Will vary dramatically from how ture is made, what do the the expanding body of naval doctrine in the services know about each United States reflect the same realities? other services perceive it other? As a response to The thrust of “Why America Needs an that unabashedly rhetori- Air Force” is that the rationale used in World cal question, JFQ Forum presents a series of War I to found the world’s first independent perceptions that address service identities in air arm—the Royal Air Force—is still relevant parochial as well as comparative terms. The in the case of the U.S. Air Force. In the Per- articles focus not only on the expertise of the sian Gulf War a separate service ensured doc- U.S. Armed Forces, but also on lessons drawn trine was in place which focused on air- from the relationships among the services of power and thereby maximized mission other nations. reliability while minimizing casualties. In “America’s Two Armies” the author Moreover, air forces also make an excellent states that sustained combat ashore is the instrument for creating ad hoc coalitions. Is norm for the Marines, not the exception. As this overall hypothesis as relevant today as it a result the United States has the benefit of was in the heady days of 1917? having two services concerned with conduct- “Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended ing operations on land. But while the Marine Consequences” stresses that suppressing ser- Corps has unique capabilities that must be vice culture—the unique way each service preserved, that alone cannot justify a second operates—inadvertently promotes homo- army in times of diminishing resources. How geneity among the Armed Forces by depend- does that “sync” with joint doctrine? ing on generalized all-purpose assets suitable “Once and Future Marines” reminds us for all occasions. One of the unintended that the premier practitioners of amphibious consequences of this trend may be a military warfare have traditionally been called on to that is less effective, more costly, and not as perform un-amphibious missions despite the capable of genuinely joint operations. To fact that critics see the Marine Corps as wed what extent should we accept these inherent to the amphibious assault. Geography, poli- risks suggested by the author? tics, and national interests underscore the These articles are not encyclopedic in need for an expeditionary force—a niche their treatment of service culture. After read- filled over the years by the Marines. But ing them, however, if one is aroused to ask should that assumption go unchallenged? where the stand-alone article on the Army’s Next, in “The Limits of Seapower: Joint culture is or why the elimination of redun- Warfare and the Unity of Conflict,” the ques- dant combat support capabilities has not tion is whether British defense policy should been raised, then the varied perspectives have a naval tilt. Without making a leap of have indeed accomplished their aim. Your faith that same question can be raised about thoughts on those subjects should find their the U.S. Navy. way into the pages of JFQ and other profes- Forces with a ge- sional journals. Mull them and publish Lieutenant General Paul G. Cerjan, USA (Ret.), ographic focus them—encourage debate! Let’s get it right was the seventh President of the National before the “wet run.” JFQ Defense University. Previously he served as the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe, and Seventh Army, and as the Commandant, U.S. Army War College.

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Two Armies 2By RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR. The fundamental fact is that the United States will be an air and naval power, not a land power . . . it should not be in the business of preparing expeditionary forces which will never sail. . . .1

rior to the Persian Gulf War, many Soldiers advancing during Roaring Lion. experts predicted the end of large- scale land warfare. As that conflict Pproved, however, ground forces that can be deployed over strategic distances and win decisive battles remain the basic currency of the military. The United States has enjoyed the luxury of two overlapping land forces for years, the Army and the Ma- rine Corps. We have two services which see their core business as sustained land operations. Today, we are in the midst of harsh defense cuts. It is time to face the fact that U.S. Air Force (Efrain Gonzalez) America can no longer afford two armies. A major effort to reexamine the roles and missions of the Armed Forces is now underway. It should look hard and carefully at the propensity of the Marine Corps to wage major operations on land. Given the statutory mandate of the Army to fight the Na- tion’s wars on land and the cost of fielding two rival land forces, the time has come for Marines leaving the Marine Corps to return to its traditional landing site. mission of amphibious operations and forego major land operations. U.S. Marine Corps (Michael T. Huff)

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For various reasons the military has North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Southern France, maintained redundant capabilities in the air and the largest amphibious invasion in his- and on the ground for more than forty years. tory, Normandy), the Navy-Marine Corps But the willingness of the polity to support team evolved into a large, extraordinarily ca- them is eroding as the strength of arguments pable instrument of maritime and amphibious mustered to defend them is waning. Simply warfare. put, much of what Army and Marine ground By 1945 the Marines had grown to six forces do is the same. This fact may discomfit large divisions supported by strong organic S some, but it must be explored. air forces. The post-war era saw the Marine Corps entrench itself as an independent ser- The Argument vice, complete with a hefty training base (in- Armies have two characteristics which are cluding separate staff and war colleges) and central and defining: first, they are organized its own bureaucracy in Washington. Today on a regular footing as an independent mili- the active Marine Corps establishment sup- tary service; and second, their core function is ports three four-star generals: the comman- sustained land com- dant, a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs; Marine forces that fought in the bat. The Marine the assistant commandant; and, on a rotat- Corps passes muster Gulf performed functions ashore ing basis, the Commander in Chief, Central with flying colors on indistinguishable from those of Command, as well as the Commander in both counts. Indeed, Chief, Atlantic Command. their Army brethren Marine forces that More than sixty Marine generals oversee fought in the Gulf a force whose active combat strength were larger and more capable than many regu- amounts to three divisions and three aircraft lar armies of the world, and they performed wings with supporting logistical units. Of functions ashore indistinguishable from those the more than 18,000 commissioned offi- of their Army brethren. cers, fewer than 8,000 actually serve “with For much of their history marines pro- the fleet” (that is, in operational billets with vided naval commanders with both elite se- ground divisions or air wings), and many curity and on-board striking forces for am- serve in officer-intensive aviation units phibious landings and raids. The marines or which duplicate functions found in the naval infantry of most major nations retain Navy and Air Force such as strike aviation, that role and serve as fleet auxiliaries, usu- air refueling, and electronic warfare.2 The ally organized along regimental lines to con- balance occupy billets in the Pentagon, serve duct amphibious raids or spearhead landings on joint staffs 3 and in American embassies ahead of conventional ground troops. For abroad, or are in various Marine headquar- the Marine Corps, however, all that changed ters or training assignments throughout the on the eve of World War II. United States and overseas.4 Pearl Harbor committed the United States The presence of so many officers in non- to amphibious warfare on a grand scale. The operational billets is common in the other military power of Japan in the Pacific was services, which must maintain large training based on occupying island archipelagos and establishments, provide for systems procure- holding the naval anchorages and airfields ment and research and development, and found there. In the unique circumstances of perform all the other functions associated the Central Pacific war, extensive amphibious with raising, equipping, and training large operations made sense. While Army units active and Reserve forces. But the Marine conducted numerous amphibious assaults (in- Corps has few of these responsibilities. Its cluding landings in the Southwest Pacific, Reserve structure consists of one division and one air wing scattered across the country. Much of its hardware is developed by Major Richard D. Hooker, Jr., USA, is deputy com- other services. It has no significant reconsti- mander of the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne. He has tution or mobilization responsibility and no taught history at the U.S. Military Academy and requirement to plan global land campaigns. served on the staff of the National Security Coun- It has no field army headquarters or eche- cil; he edited and contributed to a recent book en- lons above corps, no National Guard estab- titled Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology. lishment, no Corps of Engineers to adminis-

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ter in every state and territory. The entire Exocet missiles) and primitive technology combat echelon of the active Marine Corps, (such as high density floating mines) make moreover, is about the size of the Army’s III major amphibious operations exceedingly Corps at Fort Hood. Most Marine officers, dangerous.6 To maintain organizational via- therefore, perform functions that help the bility under these conditions, marines must Corps compete on an equal footing as a engage in conventional operations ashore powerful, full-fledged service, not an integral that look very much like traditional land part of the Fleet Marine Force. warfare, inevitably raising the question: why If the status of the Marine Corps as a co- does America have two armies? equal, independent service is well estab- Counting the Cost lished, what is the evidence that its principal, For more than forty years the simple ex- core business is land warfare? Except for their planation for having two armies was that we glorious exploits in the Central Pacific during could afford them. The Cold War provided a World War II, modern marines have done ready rationale for defense budgets, and the very little by way of large amphibious opera- Marines were so firmly entrenched as a full- tions. But they have a long and varied experi- fledged service that no argument about re- ence with protracted operations on land. dundancy could be made that was com- In World War I, Korea, Vietnam, and the pelling enough to overcome its inherent Persian Gulf, Marine units political advantages. The same may hold from brigade to corps size true today; no matter how scarce resources he Marine Corps shall be fought inland under Army become, the Marines’ hold on public imagi- organized, trained and equipped commanders. Marines nation may guarantee them a place as a sep- T to provide Fleet Marine Forces have often had roles indis- arate service which fights on land. But while to combined arms, together with tinguishable from those of this may be construed as evidence of the or- Army units in Operations supporting air components, for service ganizational solvency and vitality of the Ma- Other Than War (OOTW), with the fleet in seizure or defense of rine Corps, it is a poor substitute for ration- such as in the Los Angeles advanced naval bases and for the ally defined roles and missions in a sharply riots and Provide Comfort conduct of such land operations as constrained budget environment. as well as disaster relief may be essential to the protection of a The costs of maintaining two armies, after Hurricane Andrew. In naval campaign. These functions do however, go beyond tax dollars. As painful fact, the sight of marines as it may be to reopen old wounds, the not contemplate the creation of a operating inland beside record of Army/Marine cooperation in battle second land army. the Army has become so is littered with the debris of interservice ri- —National Security Act of 1947 familiar that most Ameri- valry. From Saipan to Seoul, Khe Sanh to cans, and most political Desert One, Point Salines and Panama City leaders, fail to see an obvi- to Wadi al Batin, the Army and Marine ous redundancy. This is not to suggest that, Corps have clashed over roles and missions.7 virtually without exception, the Marines This historical record does not imply the have not performed brilliantly in these oper- existence of intentional parochialism or de- ations. But it does raise a compelling ques- liberate hostility among the services. This is a tion in these austere times. Why do we have point that warrants repeating: differing opin- two separate services doing the same thing? ions on the use of military forces do not nec- This preoccupation with sustained oper- essarily suggest personal shortsightedness. ations ashore is unavoidable for the Marine Most military leaders, and marines in partic- Corps. Like all healthy organizations it ular, have a keen sense of cooperation and wants to preserve itself and expand in size selflessness born of years of team work in and importance. The problem is that there peace and war. Nor do marines bear all or are few opportunities to conduct large-scale even most of the blame for recurring tension. amphibious landings. Sometimes landings But there are reasons for the lack of close are staged anyway, as when the Marines links between the Army and Marine Corps. went ashore at Danang 5 and Mogadishu. On Each service practices its own tried and tested the rare occasion when an amphibious as- operational routines and defends its preroga- sault becomes a true operational option, such as in the Gulf War, the combination of modern technology (such as Silkworm and

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tives and autonomy if threatened. Marine Marines must do, they must perforce exist commanders are understandably reluctant to under a fragile truce, punctuated by recurring be placed under Army budget and doctrinal debates in peacetime loss of operational autonomy command, even when and accommodation and sometimes violent to another service has never the preponderance of disagreement in time of war. Over the years ground forces in a the- the two services have by and large made been greeted with equanimity ater are Army as hap- things work; but the record shows that they pened in World War I, have done so in spite of their unique service Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. Loss of perspectives and not because of them. operational autonomy to another service has Aside from traditional aversions, basic never been greeted with equanimity. organizational problems can confound well- Indeed this is just the point. Service per- meaning attempts to integrate Army and Ma- spectives can be fused into truly joint plan- rine forces in sustained operations on land. A ning and execution when their responsibili- principal cause is the lack of logistical where- ties are grounded in the fundamental withal in the Marine Corps to wage sustained dimensions of land, sea, and air operations ground campaigns at the operational level of which define core competencies. It is only at war. Alone—or in concert with the Navy— dimensional margins, where defining compe- Marines cannot field and sustain themselves tencies collide, that the services must gen- ashore for long. Lacking operational sinews uinely reconcile competing views. One illus- of war on land, the Marines must remain tied tration is the highly visible and apparently to the beach, or move inland and be linked unresolvable differences among the Navy, to Army life-support systems. Marine Corps, and Air Force over theater Laymen often fail to realize what is in- fixed-wing air assets. When two services con- volved in supporting land operations. Only tend in one dimension, as the Army and the Army has brigade-sized artillery, armored cavalry, engineer, psychological operations, Marine tank civil affairs, and military police units; only coming ashore. the Army fields high altitude air defense, intelligence, special operations, transportation, signal brigades and groups, as well as extensive corps-level logistics, maintenance, am- munition, and material handling units which make campaigning at the operational level possible over months and even years. Even in a relatively small operation such as the Kurdish relief effort in northern Iraq and humanitarian operations in Somalia, these capabilities proved to be essential. For larger and more protracted operations on land, they provide the difference between short- term tactical operations and long-term oper-

U.S. Marine Corps (R.D. Clayton) ational and theater strategic operations. In brief, as a stand-alone formation, the Army tank conduct- Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is config- ing live fire exercise ured for short-term operations near the in Egypt. beach. Beyond that arena, logistics and the command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure needed to support extended operations must come from the Army.8 And if taxpayers are paying for Ma- rine divisions to fight like Army divisions and be sustained in the field by Army logistics, supported by Army tanks and artillery, and flanked by Army combat formations, U.S. Army (Jeffrey T. Brady)

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then the boundary separating the core busi- tion base force, the Marines fought success- ness of the two services is blurred indeed. fully to prevent their end strength from being reduced to a base force level of Corps Business 159,100.10 To be sure the Marines do have unique These and similar initiatives have little capabilities which must be preserved. The to do with amphibious operations and ev- ability to organize and conduct amphibious erything to do with sustained, high intensity landings and raids is an important part of land warfare. The push to entrench this ex- our strategic repertoire. Self-contained Ma- panded capability for land warfare is re- rine Expeditionary flected in official publications which tout half of the Marine combat Units (MEUs) built the ability to deploy Marine Air-Ground around infantry bat- echelon must offload in secure Task Forces “with speed and reach, yet with talions with aviation locations rather than conduct the firepower, tactical mobility and sustain- and logistics assets ment of heavier forces.” 11 maritime forced entry can be invaluable Some question whether the Army when stationed off should field non-mechanized divisions at all, potential trouble spots to evacuate U.S. na- suggesting that all land warfare below the tionals or perform missions where presence high intensity threshold should be the is critical. By stationing bulk stores and province of the Marine Corps. Aside from equipment at sea in Maritime Prepositioning giving the Department of the Navy the lead Ships (MPSs), the Marines can deploy sizable military department in land warfare (due to forces to hot spots and, under certain condi- the relative infrequency of major high intentions, conduct a forced entry from the sea. sity conflicts), this proposal ignores the fact Both Marine security guards at American that the Army can sustain its light forces embassies and Marine ceremonial units play ashore with comprehensive operational level vital roles as representatives of the Nation at combat support and combat service support home and abroad. Not least, the Marines which does not exist in the Marine Corps. possess an ethos and elan which is a na- Army light forces also possess unique capa- tional treasure. They have earned their place bilities to conduct large-scale airborne and through sacrifice and victory in battle. air assault operations and an unmatched These important capabilities, however, ability to fight at night in close terrain. Per- are not enough to justify separate status as a haps more importantly, the Army’s long ex- second army. As noted above, an ability to perience with light forces and statutory pri- play in conventional land warfare is impera- macy in land warfare—as well as a proven tive in justifying the large overhead of the track record—argue against elimination of Marine Corps. Over the years, Marine avia- Army light forces. tion has grown far beyond its original focus Such proposals suggest far more than a on close support of ground formations to in- need to mount a credible amphibious assault corporate a strike capability that reaches out capability. In fact, since the Navy only has many hundreds of miles. M1A1 heavy tanks enough amphibious assault shipping to pro- and M198 155 mm howitzers have been ject two and a half brigade-sized elements of added to Marine divisions. Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) at any Marine logisticians are now analyzing given time, half of the Marine combat eche- what steps should be taken to give the Corps lon must travel and offload in secure loca- a true theater sustainment capability of its tions rather than conduct the type of mar- own.9 In the late 1980s light armored vehi- itime forced entry which is ostensibly its cle (LAV) battalions were fielded in Marine raison d’etre.12 divisions, and the Corps has considered organizing a heavy regiment in each division Expeditionary Warfare composed of tank and LAV units—in es- Is it not possible that the future of the Corps sence, a duplication of Army heavy brigades. could—and should—be uncoupled from the future of At a time when other services have fought amphibious operations? 13 and lost the battle to maintain the end strengths proposed in the Bush administra-

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Without colliding head on with the pabilities unique to a single service. They are Army’s established primacy in land warfare, not uniquely or even predominantly linked the Marine Corps justifies its excess forces in to naval and amphibious warfare. Marine a range of broader claims. The principal forces are trained and equipped to conduct claim is that the world of expeditionary war- forced entry from the sea, but they have no fare belongs to maritime forces. Naval doc- monopoly on the expertise needed to move trine holds that Marine forces can and troops and equipment by sea. This the Army should engage in large-scale, sustained land has done for decades and will continue to do combat so long as it comes “from the sea.” as long as the airplane remains an inefficient Army forces thus play supporting roles in all platform for moving tanks and supplies. but the largest and most intense forms of Rightsizing the Marines land warfare.14 After the initial entry into an As defense budgets reach historical lows, area or theater of war, current Navy/Marine the Armed Forces face an increasingly diffi- Corps doctrine describes naval expeditionary cult dilemma: the military will be eroded un- forces as “capable of a full range of action— less roles and missions are sharply redefined from port visits and humanitarian relief to to eliminate redundancies and duplications major offensive operations.”15 These claims which are not absolutely essential. To pre- deserve closer examination. What exactly is clude a hollow force, the Marines should be meant by expeditionary warfare? And is it in- refocused on their true mission and core eluctably a maritime phenomenon? competency: spearheading amphibious as- In the post-Cold War era, expeditionary saults as experts in amphibious warfare and warfare means the projection of military mounting amphibious raids and coastal op- force from the continental United States to erations of a maritime nature. Noncombat- deter, compel, or defeat regional adversaries. ant evacuations contiguous to littorals, river- As forward presence declines, power projec- ine operations, disaster relief in coastal areas, tion must assume a central role in national and similar missions call for the unique ca- military strategy. The forms of military force pabilities of the Marine Corps. will vary according to the situation and may Structuring and funding the Marine include engineer, medical, civil affairs, and Corps for divisional and multidivisional psychological operations units as well as land operations as in the past will result in pure combat forces. The force may be deliv- redundancy, inefficiency, and interservice ered by air or sea. It may proceed to its destination without opposition or be threatened by interdiction as it enters the theater of operations. It may be sustained by military or commercial sealift, by air, from prepositioned stores ashore and afloat, or by some combination of these means. In the future, a major regional conflict requiring a serious response will feature short notice deployment of task-organized combat formations (battalion-sized airborne MH–60 Blackhawk flying over Egypt or Marine units or both), followed by more during Bright Star. deliberate movement by air and sea of large U.S. Air Force (Steve M. Martin) combat units and associated support echelons. The force may arrive at ports and airfields still held by allies or conduct a forced entry against opposition from enemy ground forces and harassment from opposing air and naval units. In short, expeditionary warfare is a form of joint warfare encompassing different kinds of capabilities from all the services. Power Refueling AV–8 Harrier projection, forced entry, and logistical sus- in support of Agile tainment over strategic distances are not ca- Provider. U.S. Marine Corps (D.S. Murphy)

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friction. Divided command and competing views on the best way to employ forces cannot be masked by ever louder and more fre- quent protestations of devotion to the creed of jointness from all quarters. The services are different, and must be to master warfare in their defining elements. When employed together in a single operating dimension, different operat- Rangers making vertical landing. ing styles and methods emerge a three-division Corps U.S. Army (Daniel Hart) quickly and powerfully. Good might well survive a intentions and a propensity for thoroughly rationalized innovation have served Ameri- Marines making can commanders well in over- amphibious landing. analysis of roles and coming such difficulties, but the missions, but not in its efforts have all too often relied current form upon a healthy margin for error and suboptimal strategies and campaign plans. Today, as a growing number of people view the stated strategy of winning two nearly-simultaneous

major regional contingencies as barely exe- U.S. Marine Corps (Maness) cutable, suboptimality and faith in an ability to muddle through are not good enough. True joint warfare blends core compe- serve—with air wings and logistics groups tencies—on land, at sea, and in the air—to needed to form complete MEFs, could pro- produce optimal force packages and cam- vide the strongest amphibious force in the paign plans in aid of strategic objectives. Ob- world. So structured, much of the overhead vious redundancies call for careful scrutiny in the Marine Corps could be reduced or and review. To preclude overt redundancies shared within the Department of the Navy. in land warfare, Congress, National Com- While initial entry, infantry, and amphibi- mand Authorities, and Joint Staff should ous warfare training should remain exclu- clearly demarcate roles and missions for the sively Marine business, most other training Army and Marine Corps based on the princi- could be done at Army training centers aug- ple of core business. For the Army, that mented with Marine training detachments, means land warfare; for the Marines, that as now happens on a limited scale. means amphibious warfare. With amphibious operations back at the A fresh approach to traditional strengths center of their organizational vision, empha- and unique expertise means taking a new sis on the regiment as the basic building look at organization as well. Today the block for the Marine air-ground task force Marines field three active divisions and three (MAGTF) would help refocus the service on active aircraft wings with organic logistics its amphibious roots and move it away from groups and air wings which comprise three its current orientation on major land cam- MEFs.16 The Marine Corps Reserve provides paigns. When needed, added armor and another division and aircraft wing with sup- heavy artillery from corps level Army forma- porting service support organizations which tions can be provided, as the Chairman of is thoroughly manned with former active the Senate Armed Services Committee has 17 duty marines. A three-division Corps might suggested and was done in the Gulf. In ex- well survive a thoroughly rationalized analy- tremis, two full-fledged MEFs would remain sis of roles and missions, but not in its cur- quickly available with another ready to 18 rent form. stand up. A two-MEF active force is pru- Since half the Marine operational forma- dent and realistic; the last time America tions cannot be deployed for amphibious as- needed even that many amphibious assets saults, a standing organization comprised of three divisions—two active and one Re-

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was in 1945. Today, two active MEFs, backed sions, the Marine Corps has done so largely up by one more in reserve, is the right size in the interest of maintaining large ground for America’s amphibious establishment. formations configured to fight land campaigns.20 During the Cold War redundancies Sustained combat ashore has been the in land warfare could be accepted or even norm for the Marine Corps, not the excep- welcomed in the interest of bringing more tion.19 On balance the system works, but not forces to the fight, but those days are gone. as smoothly and efficiently as might be an- With a thin margin for error, the Armed ticipated if service boundaries were not in- Forces need clear guidance and decisive lead- volved. Longstanding areas of contention ership about service roles and missions, and U.S. Army (Daniel Hart) will almost certainly persist given the cur- those roles should not commit two services rent roles and missions of the services, if for to sustained combat operations on land. JFQ no other reason than that they always have. As long as the Marines fight on land along- NOTES side the Army, they will resist unified 1 Eliot Cohen, “The Future of Force and American ground command. As long as the Marines Strategy,” The National Interest , no. 21 (Fall 1990), p. 3. control powerful air forces, they will resist 2 Aside from close air support, there is no justifica- tion for such fixed-wing aviation other than a desire to unified air command. And as long as the own one’s own assets. Ostensibly acquired to support Marines are a competing land force, they Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), F/A18s are will contend for center stage in those strate- likely to participate as land-based naval tactical aviation gic and budgetary battles that define our like the NATO air umbrella over Bosnia where no Ma- military institutions. By so doing, the Ma- rine ground units are deployed and land-based Air Force units are clearly the optimal force. rine Corps obeys the iron laws of bureau- 3 For example, marines are often found on special cratic politics and does what it must to sur- operations staffs in unified command headquarters— vive and prosper in an intensely competitive despite the fact that they have no special operations bureaucratic environment. Nevertheless in- community of their own. stitutional conflicts count on the battlefield. 4 To support a Fleet Marine Force of about 98,000, the Marines have legislative liaison, legal, acquisi- Unity of command, efficient use of every tion, and Reserve affairs offices—all headed by gen- source of combat power to achieve concen- eral officers. tration at the decisive point, speed in plan- 5 “On the morning of March 8, marines in full bat- ning and execution, and many other crucial tle regalia splashed ashore at Danang, the first combat operational imperatives are inhibited, not troops to set foot on the mainland of Asia since the end of the Korean conflict. They rushed onto the beach, just strengthened, by these conflicts. as their fathers had stormed Pacific atolls during World Such assertions are certain to draw fire War II—to be greeted by grinning Vietnamese girls dis- from those who see the Marine Corps as the tributing garlands of flowers and a poster proclaiming: Nation’s military service of choice. The es- ‘welcome to the gallant marines.’” Stanley Karnow, Viet- sential point, however, bears repeating: the nam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), p. 416. 6 An account of internal discussions on proposed Marines do not exist to win wars—either amphibious landings in the Gulf War is found in Rick large or small—on land. That role is settled Atkinson, Crusade (New York: Houghton Mifflen, 1993), by law and custom on the Army. As seen the pp. 169–73, 239. Marine Corps competes aggressively not 7 On Saipan in 1944, LtGen Holland “Howling Mad” only to provide maritime intervention Smith, USMC, relieved the Army commander of the 27th Division, MG Ralph Smith, creating a storm that reached forces, but perhaps more relevantly, large to the highest levels of the defense establishment. In land forces “capable of a full range of ac- Korea, relations between the Xth Corps commander, LTG tion.” Such a role falls well outside the in- Ned Almond, USA, and 1st Marine Division commander tent of the law governing service roles and MajGen Oliver P. Smith were strained over employing missions and well outside the logic of de- Marines. The attempt to incorporate Marine air into ground operations in Vietnam precipitated another fense budgeting in a post-Cold War world. breach in service relations that was elevated to the na- Overall the Marines have outperformed tional level and prompted GEN Westmoreland to con- the other services by a wide margin in cop- sider resigning. [“I was unable to accept that parochial ing with downsizing. In avoiding direct considerations might take precedence over my command clashes with the Army over roles and mis- responsibilities and prudent use of assigned resources.” William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 344. See also, Willard J. Webb, “The Single Manager for Air in Vietnam,” Joint Force Quarterly,

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no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 88–98.] The decision by the 13 William S. Huggins, “Forcible Entry in the Age of Marine commander of the Khe Sanh combat base not to Jointness,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 78, no. 3 (March relieve the beleaguered Special Forces camp at Lang Vei 1994). precipitated a deep rift that persisted for years. Army and 14 The Marine position on the subject is unequivocal: Marine relations in Vietnam were so troubled that Gen- “If a crisis does require a heavy land-based army . . . the eral Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland’s successor as MAGTF will be the enabling element for their introduc- Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, tion.” U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Concepts and Is- and later Army Chief of Staff, refused to consider a senior sues, p. 21. Marine officer as his deputy. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt! 15 Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 208–09. In Corps, “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service Grenada this author noted the frustration of Army for the 21st Century” (Washington: Department of the ground commanders over the JTF commander’s refusal to Navy, 1992), p. 5. place the single Marine battalion under unified ground 16 This force is further organized into eight infantry command, complicating Army attempts to coordinate regiments and a total of 24 infantry battalions. Support- unit boundaries on the small island among six battalions ing armor, engineers, air defense, reconnaissance, and with the lone Marine contingent. In Panama, marines ex- artillery are organic to the MEF. Seven battalions are de- pressed frustration at having all but token forces in the ployed at any one time as the infantry component of initial assault, despite the lack of a requirement for am- MEUs, which also have supporting aviation, artillery, phibious operations. See Bernard E. Trainor, “Jointness, and logistics. Marine aviation consists of 29 active heli- Service Culture, and the Gulf War,” Joint Force Quarterly, copter squadrons and 33 active fixed wing aviation no. 3 (Winter 93–94), p. 71. For an account of Army con- squadrons (F/A18, AV8B, KC130, and EA6B). Fact sheet, cerns over the lack of a Joint Force Land Commander in USMC element, U.S. Army Command and General Staff the Gulf, see Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: United College, Summer 1993. States Army in the Gulf War (Washington: Office of the 17 Senator Sam Nunn in The Congressional Record Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 140–41. (Washington: Government Printing Office, July 2, 1992). 8 “Protracted continental operations require a func- 18 Marine Reserve forces are considerably more ready tioning logistics pipeline and in-theater reception and than Army National Guard forces for the simple reason distribution system. This latter is a function of the that most Marine Reservists have served previously on Army.” Department of the Navy, FMFM1–2, The Role of active duty, unlike Guard personnel. The Marine Corps the Marine Corps in National Defense (Washington: Gov- also furnishes large active duty advisory teams. ernment Printing Office, 1991), pp. 3–11. 19 It is true that the Marine Corps has conducted nu- 9 The attempt to expand Marine logistical capabili- merous small actions over the years that cannot be clas- ties is apparent but somewhat confusing, even for Ma- sified as “sustained land combat.” However, these oper- rine publicists. For example, one authoritative source ations (such as landing on Koh Tang Island during the touts the ability to deploy a MEF “complete with 30 Mayaguez incident or evacuating noncombatants from days of supply” on one page, and then expands this to Mogadishu) cannot be used to justify a robust force “capable of 60 days of sustainment, Marines are the one structure. force that does not have to be reshaped to meet the ex- 20 The Marines devote an entire manual, FMFM1–1, pected threat” four pages later. See United States Marine Campaigning, to waging extended campaigns on land. Corps Concepts and Issues (Washington: Headquarters, Though the text includes case studies of such major U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), pp. 16, 20. land operations as the German invasion of Poland, 10 See James Longo, “The Smaller Corps,” Navy Times Grant’s campaigns in Virginia, and Allied operations in (February 24, 1992), p. 1. northwest Europe, there is virtually no mention of co- 11 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Concepts and Is- operative ventures with the Army within the context of sues, p. 16. modern operations and only passing mention of the 12 Assertions by senior Marine leaders that very large joint nature of modern warfare: “[A] MAGTF may be re- numbers of marines can be moved to a crisis scene in a quired to conduct a campaign...as part of a larger mar- matter of days should not be viewed uncritically. For ex- itime campaign or as part of a larger land campaign by ample, one official text maintains that “a force of a JTF. In some cases the MAGTF may itself be the JTF 45,000 marines—complete with 30 days of supply and headquarters.” FMFM1–1, Campaigning (Washington: over 300 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters—could de- Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1990), p. 29. ploy from CONUS to any littoral region in less than 14 days.” This claim is disingenuous at best. It presumes that MPS shipping is close by and has not been attacked, a secured airfield is available to receive units, and amphibious assault shipping is collected in sea ports of embarkation when the crisis erupts. These assumptions may obtain in some crisis scenarios, but clearly not in most. The numbers are also somewhat misleading, giving the impression of a large number of combatant marines and aircraft. In fact, more than 35,000 of the marines in the MAGTF serve in support, not combat, roles while more than half of the aircraft referred to have noncombat roles in transport, refueling, electronic warfare, etc. Ibid.

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Haiti. Haiti. U.S. Marine Corps (P.S. Royston) Once and Future Marines By THOMAS C. LINN and C. P. NEIMEYER

Vietnam. isenhower called it a “second land Founding Fathers eschewed the European U.S. Marine Corps (Partain) army.” Recently, a retired Army gen- concept of a standing army that could be eral referred to it as an “antique lux- committed without popular consent. Instead Eury.” To some it may seem that they divided responsibility for defense be- other services could replicate the Marines. tween the President and Congress under the After all, many nations maintain their secu- Constitution. While the President was com- rity without such an institution. While there mander in chief, the duty to “declare war” have always been critics of the Marine and “raise and support armies” rested with Corps, especially in times of tight budgets, Congress. questions about its purpose take on greater The Nation’s initial foreign policy chal- relevance today as Congress reevaluates the lenges made it apparent that the President roles and missions of the Armed Forces. needed a limited means of resolving con- Often regarded as an anomaly, the flicts abroad. Geography, as well as acts of Marines are actually indicative of a larger Congress, mandated a naval force. Marines anomaly—the American way of war. The were to be used at the President’s pleasure both ashore and at sea. Congress repeatedly affirmed this authority. In fact, legislators would state that this was the most important duty of the Marine Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Linn, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel C.P. Neimeyer, USMC, are both assigned to the Strategic Concepts Branch, Plans Division, at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

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Early History detachments. It was a secure institutional The Marine Corps was created by Con- existence, and although some still ques- gress on November 10, 1775. Early legisla- tioned the need for a Marine Corps, its function on recruiting marines was unique in dition within the national force structure recting that care be taken to select men remained virtually unchanged for almost the acquainted enough with “maritime affairs as entire 19th century. to be able to serve to advantage by sea when Roles and Functions Watershed required.” Congress obviously wanted In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner told marines to not just be naval infantry but the American Historical Association that the “soldiers of the sea.” United States no longer had a western land Throughout the Revolution marines frontier. Nearly simultaneously, naval strate- served to advantage in various roles—in ships’ gist Alfred Thayer Mahan developed his detachments or fight- ideas on the role of seapower in shaping na- ing beside their blue- the Marines remained virtually tional policy. Without a continental frontier, jacketed brethren in and given the maritime orientation of our unchanged for almost the naval raiding parties. commerce, many saw U.S. interests moving th At the end of the war, entire 19 century offshore. however, the Corps However, by the 1890s the Marine Corps, along with most of the like the horse cavalry, had become function- military establishment quietly went out of ex- ally obsolete. To many it was a vestige of a by- istence, the feeling being that a standing army gone era since it no longer fulfilled the tradi- was a threat to nascent republics. tional role of ships’ detachments. Faced with That idealism received a sharp blow by an officer corps numbering only 75 in 1880, 1798. Commerce was being preyed on by Bar- even pro-Marine reformers called for a “fu- bary pirates and French privateers. Despite a neral or resuscitation.” But as Presidents and basically inward focus, there was no escape administrations toyed with various organiza- from the fact that the new United States tional ideas regarding the diminutive Corps, greatly depended on overseas commerce for the Nation’s global outlook changed dramati- its economic survival. This dependence led cally with the end of the Spanish American Congress to recreate a maritime force and War. Suddenly, the United States found itself quickly pass the Naval Act of 1794 and the a world power with far-flung responsibilities. Marine Corps Act of 1798. Congress, how- With national interests stretching from the ever, added another sentence to the tradi- Philippines to Guantanamo Bay, the need of a tional role and function assigned to marines seaborne force to protect American interests during the Revolution: now they were also to abroad and, if need be, seize advanced naval be used for “any duty on shore as the Presi- bases for a new steam powered fleet became dent, at his discretion, may direct.” evident. There was a good reason for giving the Thanks in large measure to American ex- President such discretionary powers. At the perience during the Spanish American War, time, the United States was hotly engaged Mahan wrote a corollary to his ideas on with its former ally, France, in a “quasi-war.” seapower about maintaining a large fleet-in- Hoping to avoid taking on a European su- being: “In the future, the Marine Corps must perpower in a full-fledged conflict, President constitute...the backbone to any force John Adams opted to conduct a limited landing on [an] enemy’s coast.” 1 Colonel naval campaign designed to get Napoleonic Commandant Charles Heywood observed France to respect the Nation as a neutral. after the war that the use of marines in ex- From 1798 to the 1880s, the Marines es- tended operations near Santiago Bay in Cuba sentially fulfilled this traditional role and “showed how important and useful it is to function derived by their Revolutionary War have a body of troops which can be quickly experience and the Marine Corps Act of mobilized and sent on board transports, 1798. When major wars occurred in 1812, fully equipped for service ashore and afloat, 1846, and 1861, the Corps quickly expanded to fight jointly alongside the Army while continuing to support the Navy with ships’

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to be used at the discretion of the com- example, even though the Army had pre- manding admiral.” Although Heywood prepared for nearly a year to deploy to Mexico, viously supported keeping marines in a its logistical tail and defective transports traditional role as ships’ detachments, he foreclosed any hope for rapid deployment. now proposed creating a 20,000-man force In fact, much to its chagrin, the Army did of “well drilled and equipped marines” ready not arrive until after the fighting was over. to sail at a moment’s notice and respond to The deployment of naval forces fared world troublespots “without the necessity of only slightly better. Navy bluejackets sup- calling on the Army.” 2 porting the landing took heavy casualties in But this proposal was not meant as a house-to-house fighting, the result of a lack crass attempt to undercut the Army. Hey- of expertise in land warfare. Because of wood, like President John Adams in 1798, lessons learned at Vera Cruz, some who par- recognized that sea-based forces were a ticipated in the landing, including a number means of conflict resolution short of war. By of future commandants—Lejeune, Neville, using marines for lesser conflicts a robust Russell, and Vandegrift—began to argue for a Corps would neither com- professionalized force to occupy the critical Vera Cruz was critical to the pete with the Army nor interstice between an intervention force and constitute a second land larger, more capable follow-on Army forces. institutional development army. Moreover, commit- The lessons of Vera Cruz proved impor- of the Marine Corps ting the Army to overseas tant in another regard. They allowed the intervention meant that a Corps to resolve an internal debate about its foreign policy threshold had been crossed. own future role and function within the na- Sea-based forces were seen as temporary, tional force structure. One group of officers, hence the cause of less consternation from led by double Medal of Honor winner Maj- an international point of view. Again, such Gen Smedley D. Butler, favored continued an arrangement as suggested by Heywood emphasis on deploying small bodies of comported nicely with America’s self-image marines as colonial troops or forces function- as an occasional world power. Protected by ally designed for small unit operations to surrounding oceans, the United States opted keep the peace in places like Haiti or to bask in relative isolationism. Nicaragua “where the Marine Corps was already engaged.” Others, however, led initially Marines as Amphibians by MajGen Commandant John A. Lejeune In 1914 it became clear that the United and later by a visionary planner, Major Earl States did indeed have overseas interests be- H. Ellis, stressed that the Corps should be yond its territorial possessions. The Marines equipped and trained for instant readiness to received their first test as a seagoing force-in- not only fight our Nation’s small wars but to readiness when President Woodrow Wilson provide substantial operational support to ordered U.S. forces to quell unrest and protect naval campaigns. For Lejeune and Ellis, this American interests near Vera Cruz, Mexico. role and function implied an amphibious The initial landing force consisted of a tradi- focus. Further, such emphasis would keep the tional mix of marines and Navy bluejackets. Marine Corps concentrated as a force-in- This had been the standard procedure for readiness for the fleet rather than parceled decades and naval officers in charge saw no out in detachments as Butler suggested. reason to change a proven formula. However, By 1939 the Marines had been used 139 some quickly regretted this decision. times, mostly for Presidentially directed du- The Vera Cruz operation was critical to ties. Secretary of War Patrick Hurley stated in the institutional development of the Marine 1931, “The Marine Corps can land on for- Corps. Moreover, problems encountered dur- eign territory without it being considered an ing the landing presaged similar and more act of war, but when the Army moves on for- deadly ones faced by British-led forces at eign territory, that is an act of war. That is Gallipoli in 1915. The operations served to one of the reasons for a Marine Corps.” remind the War Department just how diffi- The view of Lejeune and Ellis proved cult landing on hostile shores could be. For highly successful in the Pacific during World War II. After some severe trials at Tarawa,

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Saipan, and Iwo Jima, the Marines devel- ate forces able to fight small wars as they oped, in the words of the eminent strategist had in 1798. Passage of the Douglas-Mans- J.F.C. Fuller, “one of the most far-reaching field Act, sometimes referred to as “the Ma- tactical innovations” to come out of the war, rine Corps Bill,” served to give the Corps a providing a test bed for demonstrating the more stable force structure of three divisions feasibility of amphibious assaults against and three air wings. But Douglas-Mansfield enemy-held objectives. must be seen in the same light as the Marine The Army and Marine Corps conducted Corps Act of 1798. The 1952 law, like that many amphibious operations both individu- passed in 1798, envisioned using marines ally and jointly throughout the war. Only a “to conduct such land operations as may be few were single-service operations. Thus, de- essential to the prosecution of a naval cam- spite the deserved perception of marines as paign.” The 1952 law, however, contained amphibians, the service held no monopoly on the sort of ambiguity legislators relish. Naval such operations. The true and transcending campaigns are difficult to define precisely. value of the Corps, therefore, was its skillful What the law really reflected was the con- synchronization of the application of sea- gressional desire for a standing force pre- based power projection, making the sea and pared to conduct contingency operations the shore no longer obstacles that hindered from the sea. This, of course, implied a focus the prosecution of land operations. The on expeditionary warfare. Marines became “enablers” for follow-on joint But distinctions among the roles of the forces. Both the Guadalcanal and Saipan oper- services blurred during the Cold War. The ations indicated this strategic focus. surprise of the Korean conflict created a perception that America must be prepared for Post-War Crisis “no-notice war.” The Pentagon favored the Like the close of all major conflicts sort of military advocated in 1955 by Army fought by the United States, the end of General James Gavin: “a sizeable force-in- World War II led the country to reexamine being, ready to move by land, seas, or air its military infrastructure to determine what and fight anytime, anyplace.” An uninten- sort of post-war national defense organizational result according to one observer was tion would be needed. Because amphibious that “the connection between the American warfare was not the only Army and the American people was weak- innovative operational the Korean War proved to be ened in the name of insuring more rapid re- capability to be fully de- another roles and functions sponse” with an “Army answerable more to veloped in the war, some the Executive than to the American people.” watershed for the Marines began to advocate greater The consequences of this departure investment in strategic from the American way of war became ap- airpower and atomic weapons. Many parent in the Vietnam conflict. A major por- thought that those two breakthroughs alone tion of the Armed Forces was committed not made land warfare largely obsolete. As a re- to a people’s war, but to what many viewed sult, distinctions between the roles and func- as Johnson’s or Nixon’s war. The War Powers tions of the services and their underlying Act was one expression of legislative concern cultures became blurred. More than a few over what some dubbed an imperial Presi- defense officials supported the dissolution or dency. In the wake of Vietnam, the relation- diminution of the Nation’s land forces in the ship between the Army and the people was name of efficiency and economy. reaffirmed. As General Fred C. Weyand, USA, The Korean War, however, caused such aptly commented, “The American Army is plans to be put on hold and proved to be an- really the people’s army” and “not so much other roles and functions watershed for the an arm of the executive branch as it is an Marines on a par with the Spanish American arm of the American people. The Army, War. Korea taught hard lessons about limited therefore, cannot be committed lightly.” war and the inability of airpower alone to wage it. By 1952, with the lessons of Korea Back to the Future still being learned, Congress moved to recre- Successive commandants have reempha- sized the expeditionary nature of the Corps in words reminiscent of the Marine Corps

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Act and Heywood. General Robert H. Barrow and air forces. They occupy the critical inter- said “we must be prepared to fight anyone, stice between the shore and the sea while anytime, anyplace. If not, who else?” Gen- continuing to be a ready means of conflict eral Alfred M. Gray stated in unequivocal resolution short of all-out war. terms that “the Corps is an expeditionary in- The American way of war reflects geog- tervention force with the ability to move raphy as well as political culture. The Nation rapidly, on short notice, to whatever need[s] is not landlocked but situated amidst the to be accomplished.” General Carl E. world’s oceanic community. The inherent Mundy, Jr., was even more emphatic when dilemma we face was described by General he commented that expeditionary warfare as George Marshall in 1938: “Geographic loca- practiced by marines is a “capability that has tion and situation make it literally impossi- been carefully designed...over the years of ble to find definite answers to...who will historic use to be the cornerstone of United be our next enemy . . . [in] what theater of States defense.” operations will [our next war] be fought and In the 1990s the Marines advertise what will be our national objectives?” themselves as the Nation’s premier force-in- readiness prepared The existence of the Marine Corps en- the existence of the Marine Corps to fight anytime, sures strategic balance in an uncertain future. anyplace. In fact, As a microcosm of the military, it can re- ensures strategic balance in an the Marines have spond to varied and far-flung crises, which it uncertain future intervened in small has done on some 209 occasions since World conflicts numerous War II. By doing so the Marines prevent the times since 1945. In a long and winding Armed Forces from being fragmented and road from the Spanish American War, the misdirected from their intended purpose. Corps seems to have traveled a great circular This division of labor is fundamental to a path that has led them back to expedi- strategy which must contend with the possi- tionary warfare. bility of fighting two major conflicts as well The past has become prologue. Through- as meeting lesser threats. Moreover, the Ma- out the 20th century ostensible Marine rine Corps buys time for mobilization—after amphibians were called on to do very un-am- the American people decide to go to war. phibious work. In fact, while the identity of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, the Corps is fixed in the public mind (and “The life of the law has not been logic; it has perhaps its own) as singularly amphibious, been experience.” So it is for the laws that its greatest utility is in conducting expedi- guide the American way of war. The Marine tionary operations on short notice under a Corps reflects this approach to warfighting. It Presidential order. is the Nation’s warrior class—those ready to go Nonetheless, some continue to see the into harm’s way to protect national interests Corps as exclusively wedded to amphibious from minor international threats. It also al- assaults as symbolized by John Wayne’s por- lows the citizenry ample time to determine if trayal of Sergeant Stryker in “Sands of Iwo they will commit blood and treasure to war. Jima.” Having amphibious expertise is impor- These fundamentals are relevant to the United tant as the lessons of Vera Cruz, Tarawa, and States as it considers an aberration of the Cold Inchon attest, but the Marine Corps contin- War—a large standing military. JFQ ues to be unique among world military organizations for the sole reason that the United NOTES States is unique among nations. Geography, 1 Alfred Thayer Mahan, quoted in John J. Reber, politics, and global focus have mandated that “Huntington’s Battalion Was the Forerunner of Today’s America possess forces of an expeditionary FMF,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 63, no. 11 (November 1979), p. 74. nature. Although the Corps claims a 219-year 2 Charles Heywood, cited in Jack Shulimson, The Ma- lineage, it actually has a much shorter func- rine Corps Search for a Mission: 1880–1898 (Lawrence: tional history—certainly less than a century— University Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 193, 197. although with distinct ties to the era that pre- dates the Spanish American War. Today’s Marines have a niche in joint force structure as necessary and relevant as other land, sea,

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Coalition ships at Mina Salman for Southern Watch.

The Limits of Seapower:

U.S. Navy (April Hatton) Joint Warfare and reappears as the challenge, “should Britain’s strategy and forces have a maritime ‘tilt?’” Unity of Conflict It is politically correct, as well as strategically prudent, to observe that today the By COLIN S. GRAY prevention, and if needs be the conduct, of war is both invariably joint (multiservice) and typically combined (multinational) in character. So much is true and even obvious. he theme of this article is hardly a Rather less obvious is what this joint force new one; indeed it was well aired truth implies for an ever more resource-con- in the interwar years by Major- strained British military establishment. As al- T General Sir Frederick Maurice ways, the first challenge is to identify the when he wrote: right question. If, as the Field Service Regulations say, the prime The question is not how best to shape object of the Army in war is “in cooperation with the British policy, strategy, and military capabili- Navy and the Air Force, to break down the resistance ties for the distinctly transitional conditions of the enemy’s armed force in furtherance of the ap- of the 1990s, essential though that is for improved plan of campaign,” it follows that the Army mediate political cover. Rather it is how to can be most effectively employed and our military shape policy, strategy, and military capabili- power as a whole can be most effectively exercised ties so that they both yield the necessary when our Army is within comparatively easy reach of effect for the transitional period of the mid- the coast. Therefore in choosing the object of a war, 1990s and provide a legacy for the future. when we have any liberty of choice, that particular Designs effected in this transitional period feature of our power must be ever in our minds, and we should be very chary of going far inland unless cir- should be such as to provide a sound basis cumstances leave us no option in the matter.1 upon which the British strategic contribution to the next great balance-of-power Those words must have made particu- struggle can be founded. larly poignant reading in the last weeks of May 1940. Stated as a question, my theme

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History does not repeat itself, at least Julian Corbett recognized and underlined for not in detail. Nonetheless, Britain in the war at sea and on land to be coordinated by mid-1990s, seen strategically, is more than preponderantly maritime or continental casually reminiscent of Britain in the Lo- strategy 3 was frequently honored in the carno era of the mid-1920s. Often in defense breach. How much more difficult it is today debates assumptions about the relevant time to coordinate defense plans for the expanded dimension are an underrecognized factor dimensions of war, and also to understand molding attitudes and opinions. Is the prob- just what military prowess in one geographi- lem for the defense planner one of the mili- cal medium implies for combat power else- tary serving foreign policy in the mid-1990s, where and for strategic effectiveness overall. or is it preservation of the ability to respond Contemporary seapower, for example, tolerably promptly to the strategic conse- has so far coopted more maritime-relevant quences of this period? For a related airpower that it is a matter of choice to distin- thought, I suggest that the challenge today guish where the one ends and the other be- is not to so reform NATO that it becomes gins. Slowly but inexorably seapower is recog- well crafted to cope with the nizing also that it must coopt spacepower if it the defense planner unsettled conditions of the is to be fighting fit on the frontier of informa- must contend with five mid-1990s. The Alliance is far tion-age warfare.4 It is difficult to assess the too important to risk expend- relative military effectiveness, and hence the geographically distinctive ing its scarce political capital strategic potency, of seapower. Navies both dimensions of war all but frivolously on Balkan fuse with air and space forces, as they always quarrels. NATO should be re- have done with modest-size amphibious as- formed when we know how to reform it, sault forces, and are able to perform tradi- which is to say when we can discern the tional naval tasks much more effectively be- shape of the return of threats to vital secu- cause of the enabling action taken, say, in an rity interests.2 The task is to keep the NATO air—and one day a space—campaign. framework sufficiently alive that it can be Defense analysis that declines to assume purposefully revived when bad times return, an end-to-end character and that has a no- as surely they will. ticeably truncated view of the sources of military effectiveness can fail to comprehend Puzzles for Peace with Security the joint nature of modern war. Sharp-end The strategic history of the 20th century analysis, for example, of the strategic bomb- can be deployed to illustrate many proposi- ing campaigns conducted in Europe and tions, but one of the more striking contrasts Western Pacific during World War II, or of is that between the complexity of the de- the air campaign against Iraq in 1991, can fense planner’s world in the 1890s and today. neglect to notice that those generally land- A century ago the strategic world was two-di- based air campaigns were, in effect, con- mensional, to ignore the faint glimmer of ducted as extensions of superior seapower. more extensive possibilities: land and the Landpower, seapower, airpower, and surface of the sea. By way of sharp contrast, spacepower are distinguishable, though the the defense planner must contend with five potency of each typically depends on the per- geographically distinctive dimensions of war, formance of one or more of the others; each as well as with what could amount to a nu- (with the exception of spacepower) embraces clear “wild card” that could trump otherwise well-established activities that would appear successful non-nuclear performance. Today, to belong more properly to another (for ex- therefore, the designs of the defense planner ample, a navy with its own small army and must accommodate the possibilities of war air force); and each contributes more or less on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and on strategic effectiveness overall to the outcome the electro-magnetic spectrum. The need that of the authentically unified phenomena of deterrence and war. It is possible to recognize Colin S. Gray is Director, Centre for Security the uncertainty of margins between, say, Studies, and Professor of International Politics at seapower and airpower, or landpower and air- the University of Hull. His many books include power, as well as the synergisms for improved The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic performance that exist among geographically Advantage of Navies in War.

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specialized forces. It is also important, how- execution caught up with airpower theory, ever, that appreciation of the scope for strate- as witnessed by the conduct and results of gic choice should not be lost amidst wise- the Gulf War.” 8 The theorists of airpower in sounding military ecumenism. America have continued to seek vindication Uncertain margins recognized, the syner- of service independence in unmistakable ev- gism of jointness granted, there are possibili- idence of the capacity to achieve decision in ties for choice among geostrategic emphases war by independent action in and from the that remain. The fact, for example, that war- air. This somewhat curious and strategically fare ultimately must have landward refer- forlorn ambition may not be unique to air ence, and that navies since 1940–41 cannot forces, but certainly it is strongly characteris- perform their tasks absent a tolerably benign tic of them. The fact is that airpower is im- air environment (cover for their overhead portant in virtually all conflicts and very oc- flank), most emphatically does not mean casionally just might be a military executive that seapower or maritime strategy are bereft agent for decisive success. More to the point, of identity or meaning. Even in the most perhaps, airpower’s potency over an increas- challenging case for the tidy-minded theo- ing range of operational contexts (not just rist, that of superpower Cold War wherein the desert or the sea on a clear day) implies a land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles growing ability to function as the key force could threaten to function as in either deterrence or defense,9 the key each of the dimensions long-range artillery menacing force to which land, sea, and space elements of war enhances the barrage attack against naval strictly have only adjunct status. Yet the lim- task forces, and sea-launched itations and advantages of seapower find performance of the other missiles could threaten to neu- ample parallels in the actuality and even the tralize the most continental of potential of airpower. For example, Rear Ad- target arrays, still it made sense to distinguish miral J.C. Wylie may not be entirely correct maritime from continental strategies. in writing that “the ultimate deterrent in J.F.C. Fuller insisted that of the principal war is the man on the scene with a gun,” 10 characteristics of a weapon, its range of effec- but one knows what he means and can ap- tive action was by far the most significant.5 preciate what speed, altitude, and distance To discuss the limitations and advantages of can mean for local control. seapower, it is essential to acknowledge first Politically, strategically, operationally, that both landpower and seapower can find and tactically, each of the geographically dis- the reach occasionally to grasp each other’s tinctive dimensions of war enhances the per- center of gravity ashore and afloat. Second, formance of the other. Indeed, the strategic there can be no evasion of the complication challenge often is to find ways to transmute posed by the emergence of a mature airpower success in one environment into good that truly has a global range (though not for enough performance in one or more of the a sustained campaign, as contrasted with a others. As Donald Kagan observed in the raid or two). It is usual to compare maritime magisterial conclusion to his commentary with continental strategies, and similarly to on the Peloponnesian War, think of national strategic-cultural orienta- ...[the] war was one of those classic confrontations tion in terms of that binary choice. In the between a great landpower and a great naval power. view of some commentators, however, a Each entered the war hoping and expecting to keep its third choice has finally appeared. In early own element and to win a victory in a way that con- 1991 banners proclaiming that “Douhet was formed to its strength at a relatively low cost. Within right!” were hung from some U.S. Air Force a few years events showed that victory would not be buildings. To cite the immortal words of the possible that way for either side. To win, each had to principal author of the air campaign in the acquire the capacity to fight and succeed on the 11 Gulf War, “The world has just witnessed a other’s favorite domain. new kind of warfare—hyperwar. It has seen The virtues of jointness suggested by airpower become dominant.” 6 fashion and good manners as well as com- In a slightly less triumphalist view, Ed- mon sense can, however, be overstated. It is ward Luttwak proclaimed that “airpower had finally done it.” 7 Alternatively, to quote a leading historian and theorist, “airpower

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true that because the seat of political pur- Balanced Forces pose must rest on land, seapower, airpower, That familiar concept contained in the and spacepower typically will play enabling credo of politically correct modern strategic roles, which is to say roles that enable con- thinking is balanced forces. “I believe in flict to be concluded successfully on land. jointness, and in balanced forces that some- Contrary to the apparent implication of that times will be combined,” and so on and so point, however, advantage at sea, in the air, forth. Rarely is it evident what is meant, let or in space quite literally may provide a deci- alone implied, by endorsing balanced forces. sive edge in war overall. It sounds very much like a politician’s con- To grasp the joint nature of warfare is all cept. Few people are inclined or willing to very well, but general truths can be less than stand up for unbalanced forces; indeed, if you compelling when applied to particular histor- are sufficiently careful in your lack of preci- ical choices in defense policy and planning. sion, you will never need to do so. In com- It is one thing to assert the essential unity of mon with stability, the notion of balance deterrence and war and the many synergisms can mean virtually whatever you wish it to that work among their different dimensions. mean. Since the superpowers negotiated off It is quite another to know what that should and on for over twenty years in SALT, then mean for actual historical choices.12 Not all START, without benefit of an agreement on policymakers and defense planners find what was stabilizing and what was not,17 much in Clausewitz’s conclusion: perhaps the indeterminacy of balanced Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for forces should not be cause for surprise. I will solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on attempt to advance the argument by sug- which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting gesting five non-exclusive meanings for the a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the concept of balanced forces. mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and First, services need to be balanced for of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the their external strategic integrity rather than higher realms of action.13 for their internal beauty. The latter is not to be Typical scholarly evasion, one might despised, but it stands to external integrity think. The scholar explains the structure of much as tactical prowess stands to strategic ef- the problem and thereby helps educate the fect. Whatever their composition, the services minds of those who must make discrete exist primarily as more or less complex instru- choices on policy, forces, or taking action. ments of the grand strategy of the state; they The great man was correct, of course, though are not funded to function as a well-oiled ma- not in a way that busy officials find useful. chine as an end in itself. Military power, there- The rather bounded utility of Clausewitz’s fore, should be balanced against best estimates reasoning helps explain the longstanding of a nation’s need for it. It is not for nothing popularity of the more positivist view of the- that mass, or concentration, is cited as a prin- orizing represented by Jomini,14 a tradition ciple of war: numbers matter. A naval estab- continued by Mahan,15 and—in our time— lishment may be wonderfully balanced perpetuated by “stability theorists” from the among its constituent parts—in a happily intellectual stable of the RAND Corporation clockwork strategic universe—but there may in the 1950s and after.16 be too little of it to deter, and if needs be to The sheer complexity of the multidi- fight, the Queen’s enemies. mensionality of warfare poses puzzles for Second, and to be more respectful of a peace and security. It may be true that the clockwork universe, the services need to be five dimensions of war function synergisti- balanced as a military machine. Land-based cally to enhance overall strategic effective- elements that conduct an air campaign may ness, but is it also useful? If everything en- require the supply of fuel and ordnance by hances everything else, what should we buy? sea; naval forces operating far beyond ready A helpful guide through what otherwise can sustenance from shore bases require the as- be an impenetrable thicket of ideas on joint sistance of a fleet train,18 et al. Whatever the and combined operations lies in a sensible mix chosen among environmentally special- approach to a long familiar concept. ized forces, whatever the trends in joint doctrine and combined operations, the military must work in combat if it is to serve national

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or coalition security well enough. It is essen- analyses of such distinguished scholars as tial, however, that the understandable fasci- Paul Kennedy and Michael Howard.22 Even if nation in peacetime with the internal in- we do not theorize about this century, as- tegrity of the services, so that they can work suredly we theorize from this century. This well tactically and operationally, should not century has, of course, underlined the peri- obscure unduly their strategic function. odically appalling scale of the continental Third, the services need to be balanced dimension to Britain’s security problems. against the calculated demands that could be Finally, armed forces need to be bal- placed on them across a more or less exten- anced by strategic reasoning rather than sive range of conflict scenarios. This, most arithmetically. The principle of balance profoundly, is a matter for could suggest scales that measure equal armed forces should be judgment in foreign policy. It weights. The nation should not invest in is not for the armed forces to armed forces that are neatly balanced among balanced expediently for try to decide how intensely themselves either in terms of resource inputs comfort and convenience the nation may be possibly en- or even performance outputs. Who cares in a strategic culture gaged here or there in the fu- whether service (functional) budgets are ture. Nonetheless, the services, arithmetically equal any more than whether suitably joint in orientation or not British landpower, seapower, and air- and hopefully combined usefully with the power all generate like amounts of combat forces of other polities, have to be developed power? Such standards would be absurd. The so as to be balanced for deterrence or defense armed forces need balance to meet the vis-à-vis several kinds of conflicts, most prob- strategic demands of those conflicts that for- ably in diverse geographical contexts. The eign policy insists they enter. spectrum of conflict extends from unpleas- I have not suggested here that Britain’s antness that may attend humanitarian inter- services should be so balanced for comfort- vention, through local and regional quarrels, able fit with dominant national strategic cul- up to and including the appearance of yet ture that they become massively specialized another great balance-of-power struggle. (over-specialized) for operations in and from Fourth, the services should be balanced one geographical environment only. Having for tolerable fit with unique national strate- said that, I must add that what might be gic needs and preferences, as well to exploit called full service armies, navies, and air national strengths and provide suitable forces can provide an impressive flexibility cover for weaknesses. In other words, consis- in their ability to influence events in other tent with the generation of an adequate environments. Often there are alternative strategic effectiveness in support of overall military ways of performing tasks for foreign foreign policy, British and other armed policy. Landpower, seapower, airpower, and forces should be balanced expediently for one day spacepower are no more clearly mu- comfort and convenience in a strategic cul- tually distinctive than are land powers, sea ture: they should reflect a nation’s geostrate- powers, or putatively air powers or space gic circumstances, traditions, habits of mind, powers. Most polities have some land, sea, and effective practices.19 That may sound and airpower. The questions are how much unduly conservative, even romantic, or of each, and is there a dominant geostrategic both; really it is just prudent. One does not orientation for each? have to endorse, for example, a particular It is useful to descend from the great ab- view of British strategic culture that Corbett stractions to include two significant caveats. derived significantly from studying the First, grand strategy, no matter how valid at Seven Years War,20 or that Basil Liddell Hart its own elevated level of analysis, always is adopted in repudiating Britain’s 1916–18 21 vulnerable to embarrassment in particular vintage continental role, in order to find historical cases. Events that could produce value in the concept of a British way of war. conflicts in which Britain would decide it Similarly, the exaggeration of the maritime must join in some capacity would be no dimension in British policy and grand strat- more random than pertinent foreign policy egy by Corbett and Liddell Hart should not decisions. But the future can only be antici- blind us to the exaggeration of the continen- pated by classes of possibilities; it cannot be tal dimension that one finds even in the

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HMS Gloucester along side USS Niagara Falls during Desert Storm. U.S. Navy (Rob Clare)

HMS Invincible during NATO exercise. U.S. Navy (Raymond H. Turner II)

predicted in detail. The Perils of Planning One can always I am enough of a positivist to be suspi- point to a truly ex- cious when I read that the leitmotiv for plan-

U.S. Navy (John Bouvia) ceptional conflict ning is the need to cope with the unex- Royal Navy Harrier. that might generate pected or manage uncertainty. It used to be strategic demands the nation could meet said that the coronation of uncertainty as a only by monumentally adaptive military strategic principle governing NATO’s con- practices. (One particularly clear example is cept of flexible response was all too appro- the scale and duration of Britain’s continen- priate, given the confusion in our minds. If tal commitment in The Great War).23 If so our response was unpredictable even to us, much is granted, still the nation should not, how much more uncertain must it seem to indeed politically could not, balance prepa- Soviet statesmen? It is very well to speak rations to fit the emergence of what could seemingly wisely and prudently about amount to a truly super threat.24 preparing for the unexpected, but what The second caveat is that just because does, or should, that mean in terms that one identifies possible conflicts of interest to could lend themselves pragmatically to assist Britain, and just because competent military the defense planner? Where are the bound- performance in those conflicts would require aries of the unexpected: an asteroid from joint operations of a most testing kind, it space, a nuclear-armed Zhirinovsky inse- does not follow necessarily that Britain either curely in command of the Russian ship of needs to intervene or would need to inter- state, a United States that decides it has vene with decisively effective British forces in done its duty often enough in this century all environments. These thoughts bring us to for the balance of power and world order? the subject that can be deferred no longer— policy guidance for defense planning.

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There is a wide menu of options for de- effectively to neutralize the effects of such fense planning; there is probably a methodol- surprise. The forms that conventional deter- ogy to suit most tastes.25 But planning meth- rence could assume include threats to take odologies lack a quality that is key to the both offensive and direct defensive action. purposeful integrity of the enterprise: namely, Though history is inconveniently more political guidance expressing foreign policy than cyclical but less than arrow-like,29 still a judgment has to be provided as an input for great deal about the future that should inter- defense planning. Defense planning does not est defense planners is identifiable in general have integrity unto itself. There is no correct terms. With a suitable bow to the fashionable way to conduct defense policy and force plan- chaos theory that alerts us to possible non- ning, though the positivist defense rationalist linearity in events,30 the continuities in the in this writer persists, against the historical conditions that shape strategy and statecraft evidence, in believing that there are better as are impressive and worth recalling. For the contrasted with worse ways for defense plan- leading example, geography in all its aspects ners to proceed. and implications for policy, as well as culture Field Marshall Sir Nigel Bagnall observed and the preferences it teaches and expresses, that, “over the centuries identifying a na- mean that planners and their political mas- tion’s future strategic priorities has proved to ters do not confront a tabula rasa when they be a very imprecise art, and as a result peace- wonder what the late 1990s may bring. It is time force structures have seldom proved rel- instructive to identify what is known and un- evant when put to the test of war.” 26 This a known in useful detail in order to determine harsh judgment, yet probably correct and what information is available for planning. certainly well worth worrying Needless to say, perhaps, you will be aware there is no correct way to about. There is no elixir that a that it may be an unknown unknown that defense planner can imbibe poses the most severe challenge. Nuclear conduct force planning that will allow him or her to planning was often troubled by the discovery distinguish the fanciful from of hitherto unknown or underappreciated the real future. Nonetheless, it is possible to weapon effects. Defense planners cannot offer some general thoughts that approxi- know exactly what will be demanded of the mate in spirit, at least, what Clausewitz iden- military or when; but they should have a rea- tified as the character and purpose of theory. sonable idea concerning the why, the where, Theory exists so that one need not start afresh the whom, and, even in general but still use- each time sorting out the material and plowing through ful terms, the kind of what. it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is Second, it so happens that we do know meant to educate the mind of the future commander or, important things about the security environ- more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not ment of the future. For example, bad times to accompany him to the battlefield.27 always return; perhaps the 1990s will dis- First, an approach suitable for dealing prove this dictum, but the smart money is with the unexpected or uncertainty excludes on the continuing validity of the lessons foolish and impracticable pursuits of surprise from the better part of three millennia. Also, avoidance. The future is full of surprises, we know that the purportedly novel primacy some pleasant like the collapse of the Soviet of issues of economic and environmental (et empire and some unpleasant like the persis- al.) security over traditional areas of security tent violence of intra-Balkan hatreds, most of almost surely reflects the confusion of an ex- which carry little if any obvious meaning for traordinary, temporary period, for some per- British defense policy. However, although we manent sea change in security. Of necessity, cannot plan against surprise, we can plan military power is built on economic power, against many of the worst of predictable sur- but at any given historical juncture, military prise effects.28 For example, the precise iden- power will come up trumps: guns outrank tity and timing of a modestly scaled but pos- fat purses. sibly not modestly armed ballistic missile Third, a British policymaker or defense threat to British forces or Britain itself cannot planner cannot know precisely when, where, be predicted; we will be surprised in detail. or by whom British interests will be in peril. Nonetheless, we can prepare prudently and

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But, following as much of Sun Tzu’s counsel Because every war is waged in unique condi- as should prove practicable, he can know tions, it does not follow that its military himself and his own society in advance of meaning is utterly distinctive. certain knowledge of the enemy.31 He can The joint and combined warfare stories specify the hierarchy of national interests— evolve. Defense planners need to monitor from those of a survival evidence and argument concerning the rela- revolutions in military affairs down to an other cate- tive combat prowess and significance of the gory—that, in descend- different dimensions of war and the differ- are never precisely bounded ing order, are more and ent components to each dimension. A diffi- then less likely to require culty with revolutions in military affairs is military support. It is interesting but not that they are never historically precisely crucial for the defense planner to acquire an bounded, nor are they universal in their au- improved understanding of the unfolding thority. Consider the longstanding debate character of the global security environ- over the survivability of surface ships.34 ment. The crucial question is what this un- Strategic, operational, and tactical contexts folding character means for Britain. A na- are everything. The tactical relationship be- tional interest discriminator has to be tween surface ships and their foes must alter applied by the makers of foreign policy. with the political identities of adversaries Fourth, Britain remains very much a mar- (whose surface ships and whose weapons itime nation. The international trade on menace them?) and the highly variable ge- which the prosperity of its industrial civiliza- ography of potential combat. Similarly, de- tion depends is overwhelmingly, as it has al- bate over the future of heavy land forces ways been, maritime international trade. For needs to be informed by awareness of trends heavy or bulky goods, Mahan remains author- in net tactical advantage as between ar- itative in his 1890 judgment that “both travel mored fighting vehicles and their enemies and traffic by water have always been easier (anti-tank guns, helicopters, infantry anti- and cheaper than by land.” 32 Married to the tank missile systems, mines, and new un- continuity of the seas and oceans and the con- conventional weapons). But a general trend tinuing comparative advantage of sea trans- that plainly leans to the tank’s disadvantage port in ton-mile costs, Britain’s insular geo- may well mean little in a particular place, at strategic condition all but ensures the a particular time, against a particular enemy necessity of a maritime framework for its for- not well equipped to neutralize one’s tanks eign policy. Unless allies are logistically com- and armored personnel carriers. petent and accommodating, or the mission The strategic course of this century points has the character of a special operation (which out that defense planning is a perilous enter- is to say it is very small in scale, brief, and prise. More often than not, those providing stealthy), the center of gravity for British defense guidance and planners themselves strategic effectiveness has to remain maritime. were significantly in error. This is not the Fifth, whatever statesmen may prefer by place to explore why that should be, but it is way of policy logic in guidance for their de- the place to register the fact. Why were Field fense planners, there is, après Clausewitz, a Marshal von Moltke (the elder) and Lord grammar to military affairs that can and Kitchener so lonely in their prescience about should impose itself on defense plans.33 For the probable duration of the next European example, if Luttwak was correct in his judg- war? A systematic study of pre-war expecta- ment that “airpower had finally done it” in tions would be a worthwhile enterprise— the Gulf in 1991, what if anything does that though probably it would reveal no common imply for the relative weight of investment methodology for success, rather the statistical that airpower merits in our defense future? point that someone had to get it right! Although it is unwise to draw sweeping con- Limitations and Advantages clusions and to rewrite doctrine on the basis Those who engage in public debate over of one campaign that may or may not have strategy will be painfully aware of the signif- lessons of wider validity, surely it would be icance of context (viz., notional-theoretical, unwise to ignore relationships visible in the latest active passage of arms on a large scale.

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political, strategic, operational, tactical) for ▼ geographically unrestricted routing authority of argument. Good ideas can in- ▼ superior observation stantly become bad ideas if they are shifted ▼ flexibility in concentration. from a general concept of operations to al- In thinking about the limitations and leged operational proposi- advantages which pertain in general terms services perform in joint and tions. For example, would to each form of military power, it can be in- combined contexts precisely you charge far into the structive to attempt a four-way analysis. Norwegian Sea with irre- Specifically, land, sea, air, space, and nuclear to offset limitations placeable carriers against a forces can be analyzed in terms of what each Cold War-era Soviet foe capability can uniquely perform, cannot per- with its defenses unattrited and fully pre- form at all, tends to perform well, and tends pared—in short, undertake a maritime to perform poorly. The services plan to per- Charge of the Light Brigade? 35 To win the form in joint and combined contexts pre- battle of the context for debate most proba- cisely to offset limitations. For Britain, if it is bly is to win the debate itself. necessary to choose where the balance should be among geographically focused di- Each kind of geographically oriented mensions of war, the limits of seapower are force has distinctive limitations and advan- more bearable, and culturally and strategi- tages, albeit limitations and advantages of cally more tolerable, than would be the lim- varying weight for different conflicts. The its of landpower or airpower as the leading limitations of seapower are: edge of military prowess. ▼ essentially an enabling agent This analysis has had as its center of ▼ difficulty gripping continental foes gravity the issue of seapower in relation to ▼ strategically slow in operation landpower and airpower for Britain. The sub- ▼ tactically relatively slow ject here is not the strategic utility of ▼ high expense of platforms means few seapower versus landpower versus airpower platforms, modest-scale distribution of value versus spacepower, at some abstract, free- ▼ weather. floating level of strategic assay. And, finally, By contrast, the advantages granted by the argument has avoided contention over superior seapower are: sea control vis-à-vis power projection in ▼ flexibility, mobility, adaptability good part because there is not much worthy ▼ endurance on station of discussion in that realm. Jan Breemer is ▼ enables global strategy wrong. Naval strategy is not “dead,” 36 rather ▼ noncommitting continuous presence it is resting pending the next call to action ▼ places strategic frontier close to enemy’s when bad times return to world politics, as coastline surely they will. JFQ ▼ provides means to bind together global coalition, provides interior lines of communication. NOTES

For the sake of comparison, similar lists 1 Frederick Maurice, British Strategy: A Study of the can be developed for other forms of military Application of the Principles of War (London: Constable, power. Airpower includes the following dis- 1927), pp. 85–86. 2 advantages: Charles L. Glaser, “Why NATO Is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe,” International Se- ▼ gravity, expense to offset curity, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5–50, generally ▼ sophistication, expense, low numbers is sound. ▼ weather 3 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strat- ▼ brevity of presence egy (Annapolis: Naval Policy Institute, 1988; first pub- ▼ altitude—distance from the ultimate seat lished 1911). 4 A thesis which I developed in “Vision for Naval of action ▼ Space Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, political boundaries in the air. no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 63–68. The advantages of airpower are: 5 An argument advanced in J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on His- ▼ ubiquity, a global medium tory from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second ▼ overhead, encompassing, surrounding, World War (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946). comprehensive flank, high ground ▼ range and reach ▼ speed of passage

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6 John A. Warden III, “Employing Air Power in the strategy], if continued, suggests that the danger may Twenty-First Century,” in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and soon, or already, be that scholars become too dismissive Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., editors, The Future of Air Power of the influence of sea power upon history and thus ex- in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell Air Force Base, plain away the popularity of Mahan’s ideas as being Ala.: Air University Press, July 1992), p. 81. simply due to the heady expectations of that ‘age of 7 Edward N. Luttwak, “Air Power in U.S. Military navalism’ which occurred in the two decades prior to Strategy,” in ibid., p. 19. the First World War.” “The Influence and the Limita- 8 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and tions of Sea Power,” The International History Review, the Gulf War (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, vol. 10, no. 1 (February 1988), p. 7. 1992), p. 7. 23 See Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: 9 John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two Combat (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), pp. 6–9, World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972), especially 123–27. p. 57. 10 J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of 24 This thought is pursued in my work entitled Power Control (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989; Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military first published 1967), p. 72. Emphasis in original. Technology (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 11 Donald Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire 1993), pp. 95–99, “Super Threats.” (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 423. 25 The contemporary bible comprises the three-volume 12 See Michael D. Hobkirk, Land, Sea or Air? Military set: Naval War College, Fundamentals of Force Planning, Priorities, Historical Choices (New York: St. Martin’s Press, vol. 1: Concepts; vol. 2: Defense Planning Cases; vol. 3: Strat- 1992). egy and Resources (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated 1990–92). by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince- 26 Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, “Foreword” to ton University Press, 1976; first published 1832), p. 578. Hobkirk, Land, Sea or Air? 14 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War 27 Clausewitz, On War, p. 141. (London: Greenhill Books, 1992; first published in 1862). 28 Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, p. 325. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz 29 I am grateful to Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow, and Jomini (London: Frank Cass, 1992), is useful. Time’s Cycle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 15 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power 30 Amidst a still burgeoning literature, see David Ru- upon History, 1660–1783 (London: Methuen, 1965; first elle, Chance and Chaos (Princeton: Princeton University published 1890). Press, 1991); Stephen H. Killert, In the Wake of Chaos: 16 See Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Prince- Unpredictable Order in Dynamical Systems (Chicago: Uni- ton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chapter 1; and versity of Chicago Press, 1993); and for a bold venture Colin S. Gray, “The Holistic Strategist,” Global Affairs, into strategic application, Stephen R. Mann, “Chaos vol. 7, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 171–82. Theory and Strategic Thought,” Parameters, vol. 22, 17 “While negotiating START in 1987–91, the parties no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 54–68. were not operating on any mutual understanding of the 31 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. meaning of ‘stability’ . . . only at the final stages of talks Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 84. “When did the Americans and Soviets arrive at a common defi- you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your nition of strategic stability, albeit a general and vague chances of winning or losing are equal.” one.” Alexei G.A. Arbatov, “We Could Have Done Bet- 32 Mahan, Influence, p. 25. ter,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 47 (November 33 Clausewitz, On War, p. 605. 1991), p. 37. 34 For an unpersuasive yet trendy belief in an “empty 18 See Geoffrey Marcus, Quiberon Bay: The Campaign ocean,” see John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evo- in Home Waters, 1759 (London: Hollis and Carter, 1960), lution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), p. 66. pp. 266–75. 19 See, for example, David French, The British Way in 35 See Jack Beatty, “In Harm’s Way,” The Atlantic Warfare, 1688–2000 (London: Unwin, Hyman, 1990). A (May 1987). Also, Robert S. Wood, “Fleet Renewal and more skeptical view is A.D. Harvey, Collision of Empires: Maritime Strategy in the 1980s,” in John B. Hattendorf Britain in Three World Wars, 1793–1945 (London: Ham- and Robert S. Jordan, editors, Maritime Strategy and the bledon Press, 1992). Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth 20 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War: A Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 330–55, Study in Combined Strategy, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, provides an effective reply. Green, 1907); and Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 36 Jan Breemer, “Naval Strategy Is Dead,” U.S. Naval Strategy (New York: AMS, 1972). Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 2 (February 1994), 21 Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (Lon- pp. 49–53. don: Faber and Faber, 1932), chapter 1, and History of the First World War (London: Pan Books, 1972). 22 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976); and Michael Howard, “The British Way in Warfare: A Reap- praisal,” in The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (Lon- don: Counterpoint, 1983), pp. 189–207. Kennedy more recently noted that “this further swing in the historiog- raphy [towards the continental aspect of British grand

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Why we need an U.S. Air Force AIR FORCE By CHARLES M. WESTENHOFF

n the summer of 1917 Britain was under explanation of why the United States needs siege. German submarines had been an air force can be illuminated by surveying causing havoc on the seas for three years, the history of warfare since 1914, starting Ibut a direct terror struck as Gotha with the way in which a group of army and bombers attacked London. The government naval officers brought an independent air immediately appointed a committee to force into being. study this threat. On August 17, 1917 the On the Basis of Reason committee unequivocally recommended cre- Britain created the world’s first indepen- ating an independent air force. In proposing dent air force as a response to air raids on its what became the Royal Air Force (RAF), the cities during World War I.1 Prime Minister committee relied on reason, not precedent. Lloyd George formed a “Committee on Air Because the origins of the first armies and Organization and Home Defence Against Air navies are not similarly documented, the Raids” and staffed it with army and naval of- RAF provides a case study of the establish- ficers in order to turn the problem over to ment of a new branch of the military. Any

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military experts. The committee, under Field was timely and crucial, since all the belliger- Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, recounted the ents were approaching a point of exhaustion “acute controversies” between separate army and beginning to see the military revolution and naval air arms over how military air- at hand: “Manpower in its war use will more power should be organized. It noted that ex- and more tend to become subsidiary and isting air services, the Royal Flying Corps of auxiliary to . . . mechanical power.” 5 the army and the Royal Navy Air Service, Organization was another considera- were used like artillery—to accomplish tasks tion. The committee made eight recommen- assigned by their re- dations in its report to the Prime Minister. ultimately the foremost reason spective services. These The first was to create a ministry for air, a for establishing an air force organizations were not cabinet department equal in status to those capable of establishing of the army and navy. The second was to was national survival policy or planning and form an air staff “equipped with the best conducting major air brains and practical experience available.” 6 operations since they lacked expertise, An air department was the first step in build- means, and especially authority.2 The re- ing a national air force; manning the service quirement to form an autonomous air force, with air professionals was necessary to make however, was clear to the committee: it function. Essentially the position of an air service is quite Effectiveness and efficiency were the different from that of the artillery arm, to pursue our third consideration. The report surveyed the comparison; artillery could never be used in war ex- field of possibilities for organizing an air cept as a weapon in military or naval or air opera- force and discarded each option that could tions. It is a weapon, an instrument ancillary to a have the effect of reducing national air service, but could not be an independent service itself. strength and effectiveness. In sum, the com- Air Service, on the contrary, can be used as an inde- mittee determined that an air force was pendent means of war operations....Unlike artillery, essential. The officers who made these rec- an air fleet can conduct extensive operations far from, ommendations explicitly considered putting and independently of, both Army and Navy.3 them off until after the war but determined The soldiers and sailors who comprised that failing to create an air force was a risk.7 the Smuts committee focused on the needs Ultimately the foremost reason for establish- of the country rather than the demands of ing an air force, without precedent or evi- their services. The committee realized that dence of modern airpower capabilities, was both services were fully competent in their national survival. respective fields, but neither was “specially competent” to devise and direct the indepen- On the Basis of Evidence dent air operations Britain planned for 1918.4 When Congress passed the National Se- In recommending creation of a separate air curity Act of 1947 it had ample evidence to force, these officers ensured that strong air justify an air force, and nuclear deterrence 8 support would be available to both the army was only the latest. In the theaters of World and the navy. Their expressed reasoning was War II, airpower had proved necessary and farsighted, objective, and comprehensive. sometimes sufficient to achieve major war Strategic perils on the near horizon were aims. The campaigns in the Southwest Pa- their first consideration. The committee rea- cific provide excellent examples of joint air soned that a national air force was needed to operations. General Douglas MacArthur de- fully develop the new technology, organize scribed Japan’s first major defeat in the the- forces to make the most of that technology, ater in these words: and employ those forces to make the greatest The outstanding military lesson of this cam- possible contribution to the war. Their delib- paign was the continuous calculated application of air erate focus on the implements of air warfare power, inherent in the potentialities of the Air Force, employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops.9 Across the globe at the same time, Ameri- Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, can air forces in Britain were attacking Ger- is assigned to the Air Force Roles and Missions man war industries while others in the Group at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He compiled Mediterranean wrested control of the air from both Military Air Power and JFACC Primer.

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the Luftwaffe, shielded surface forces from air over its opponents. Both used their air re- attack, supported a series of amphibious cam- sources primarily in a combined-arms fash- paigns, and bombed Axis oil supplies. As soon ion, to support ground operations. By con- as Sicily was in Allied hands, the trast, the American and British forces the need for a separate Mediterranean air effort was fo- centralized control of air assets at the theater cused on Italy to prepare for am- level, alternated between independent and air force was clearest phibious landings at Salerno and supporting missions as needed, and created at theater-level Messina. After six days of concen- higher opportunities for the overall cam- trated bombing, Mussolini was paign.13 The tactical and operational compe- overthrown and the Italian government sued tence demonstrated by Soviet and German for peace. Ground forces continued to fight a air forces in supporting their ground arms terrible campaign in Italy in an intimate could not make up for strategic shortfalls in union with air forces, but only German occu- air planning. It would be futile to try to ex- pation forces opposed them.10 plain what might have happened if either Two Axis belligerents of World War II— side had employed its forces using a higher- Italy and Japan—surrendered after Allied level construct of joint operations, but it is forces occupied their outlying territories, but significant that the Eastern Front was by far before assaults on their central homelands the bloodiest in World War II.14 began. This can be attributed to a fear of air- A U.S. Air Force power or invasion. More precisely, these fac- Thinking about a postwar air force tors are inseparable since mastery of the air began seriously in 1943, when then Major was a prerequisite for amphibious operations. General Thomas T. Handy of the General As General Dwight Eisenhower remarked to Staff wrote a planning paper on future de- his son after Normandy, “If I didn’t have air fense needs. He pointed out the requirement supremacy, I wouldn’t be here.” 11 for “a complete correlation of national pol- Before the campaign for Northwest Eu- icy with military policy and the political rope could begin, Allied air forces gained con- ends to be sought with the military means trol of the air over the to achieve them.” General George C. Mar- theater, attacked key shall, the Army Chief of Staff, endorsed the industries, and pre- paper and made this marginal note: “I think vented the German maintenance of sizable ground expedi- forces from reinforc- tionary force probably impracticable. Having ing Normandy after airpower will be the quickest remedy.” 15 D-Day. As Allied Handy and Marshall focused on future forces advanced, the policy needs, and then Vice President-elect U.S. 9th Air Force op- Harry S. Truman wrote presciently in 1944: erated primarily in support of ground Our standing air force will undoubtedly remain forces while the 8th larger than ever before in peacetime. We will need an Air Force worked pri- active air force to carry out the policing missions that will be required of us by the forthcoming United Na- marily far beyond the tions agreement to put out aggressor fires while they

Combat Camera Imagery (Andy Dunaway) lines, creating long- are still small. This air force will be more alert and C–5 Galaxy at San Vito term advantages. But experimental than ever before—it will keep up with Air Station for Deny it would be a mistake the latest developments, and will create developments Flight. to draw a sharp distinction between the mis- of its own. It will be in a constant stand-by condition, sions of tactical and strategic air forces; all a powerful deterrent to any fleet of long-range available forces worked together repeatedly, as bombers or salvos of super-robot bombs capable of overall needs required.12 long flight and pinpoint aim.16 Allied air forces secured the air over Note that Truman had no knowledge of every theater save one. On the Eastern Front, nuclear weapons at this time; he foresaw neither Russia nor Germany succeeded in that the future air force would be a “power- using air forces to gain lasting ascendancy ful deterrent” in itself.17 Fulfilling this role required that this air force be ready and responsive.18 The need for a separate air force was clearest to commanders at theater-level

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who saw most directly the benefits of em- with the goal of using technology and fire- ploying such forces both in coordinated power to minimize casualties. Some of its joint operations and in areas where other soldiers and airmen had as many as eight forces were absent. Eisenhower was so con- years combat experience. Iraq was a vinced of the need for a separate air force formidable regional power and well aware of (“No sane officer of any arm would contest it.21 These facts are too often overlooked in that thinking”) that he conveyed this con- the light of the swift collapse of Iraqi forces. viction to a meeting of the Army Staff in De- Allied operations could have begun with cember 1945, saying: an air effort, frontal assault, flanking attack the Air Commander and his staff are an organization of any size, airborne operation, amphibious coordinate with and coequal to the land forces and assault, or combination of these measures. the Navy. I realize there can be other individual opin- Trevor N. Dupuy analyzed all these possibili- ions....But that seems to be so logical from all of ties, projected casualties, and concluded, our experiences in this war—such an inescapable con- “the proper solution is to begin the war with clusion—that I for one can’t entertain any longer any the air campaign [to minimize casualties].... doubt as to its wisdom.19 If this should result in an Iraqi surrender, so The National Security Act of 1947 for- much the better.” 22 malized the responsibilities assigned to the Desert Storm was not solely an Air Force Air Force, but did not create a monopoly on triumph; it was a modern warfare success in operating air forces. Rather, it stipulated that which air forces played a bigger part than in the United States would rely on the Air Force earlier wars. It relied on specialized compe- to develop and apply airpower. No other ser- tence in all media of warfare, on excellence vice is so charged. With this mandate Con- in weaponry, tactics, logistics, operational gress established symmetry among services, art, and strategy. No amount of superiority fixing responsibility for developing and in one field could have overcome deficien- maintaining specialized military competence cies in others, except at great cost. It demon- in the ground, sea, and air media. strated that the Armed Forces of the United Creating the Department of the Air Force States, when employed synergistically, are and a service within it ensured that there exceedingly difficult to defend against. would be a military arm responsible for nur- Command at the component level leveraged turing the potential of aviation, developing each arm within a joint construct that en- air capabilities to serve national needs, for- sured mutual support and created synergy. mulating and executing air policy and strat- The air component rapidly gained com- egy, and fostering special competence and mand of the air, devastated Iraqi command expertise unique to conducting military oper- and control, destroyed key strategic targets ations in the air environment. Since the Air (including electrical power generation and Force was founded, the Nation has relied on transportation), isolated the battlefield, and it for deterrence, combat, and early crisis re- destroyed about half of Iraq’s firepower in sponse as well as strategic, operational, and Kuwait—all before the allied ground offensive tactical leverage—and as a way to achieve na- began. But how did having the major share of tional policy aims in joint and combined op- this airpower organized, trained, and erations, as it surely did in 1991.20 equipped by the Air Force make a difference? Eliot Cohen has pointed out that Air Force The Gulf War dominance in planning air operations against The accomplishments of all the services Iraq ensured coherence of the allied plan: in Desert Storm have been seriously under- valued. The Iraqi military had more combat American defense planners should look at what experience employing modern weapons—in- happened and ask whether these improvisations do not point the way to greater effectiveness. After several cluding precision guided munitions, night decades of insisting that “service” means “parochial,” vision devices, recent generation artillery military reformers might ponder the individual merits and rockets, cluster bombs, laser designa- of the services, each of which can pool a great deal of tion, and electronic warfare—than the coali- operational expertise along with a common world tion nations which it faced. Iraq had spent view and an esprit de corps difficult to find among a and borrowed tens of billions of dollars melange of officers.23 equipping its forces in its war against Iran

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Had Gulf War operations been guided and naval forces cannot reach or are not pre- by a doctrine calling for simultaneous em- sent remains a primary military advantage of ployment of all forces, or had air operations an air force. To cover the logical field of possi- been driven solely by surface force support bilities noted by Smuts, an air force can sup- requirements, allied forces would have suf- port efforts on land and at sea, operate where fered far more casualties. The Air Force en- ground and naval forces cannot, and under- sures that there are always professionals take various operations that can feasibly be within the Armed Forces thinking about performed only from the air. Similarly the how airpower can best serve joint forces and Army and Navy have unique operating capaci- the Nation. ties for which the Air Force cannot substitute. The complexities of air operations still In conventional conflicts since World stem from operating in three dimensions War II air forces have set the conditions for with no option to stop moving, from operat- joint operations, establishing advantages ing above the apparent horizon with no- and opportunities for all components. As where to hide but the immensity of airspace Admiral William F. Halsey told Congress or the interstices of the terrain, and from the after World War II: “The lesson from the last interdependence of air and space units. war that stands out clearly above all the oth- However, the complexity of air and space ers is that if you want to go anywhere in systems today was undreamt of decades ago. modern war, in the air, on the sea, on the It takes a decade or more to master a modern land, you must have command of the air.” 24 aircraft—aircrews and system maintainers This is no less true today, although space never stop learning. Preparation to plan and supremacy and informational dominance conduct air operations is a lifetime commit- have become necessary accompaniments to ment, just like the mastery of ground and air supremacy. naval warfare. Many of the reasons for creating an air The current place of the Air Force in force have not changed significantly since conventional warfighting and Operations the Smuts committee issued its report in Other Than War would not have surprised 1917. First and foremost, an air force exists the Smuts committee, which observed that to develop and maintain special capacities to “as far as can at present be foreseen there is promote and defend national interests (as absolutely no limit to the scale of [air- the other services do, each in a distinct way). power’s] future independent war use.” 26 Though air attack on the United States What might surprise those prescient soldiers seems a remote possibility,25 the Nation and sailors? Perhaps the ease of operating must have an air force capable of helping its coalition air forces together in a common friends and allies protect their people and purpose. Possibly the global preeminence forces from hostile attacks. The big picture the U.S. Air Force enjoys, largely as a result mission of the Air Force, to control and ex- of investing in technology which maximizes ploit air and space, has two dimensions. In mission reliability and minimizes lives at the foreground, controlling includes every- risk.27 Probably not the interplay of air capa- thing needed to control air or space. In the bilities and national security policies. The background, exploiting includes tasks that are one outcome that might surprise the army best done in air or space and those that con- and naval officers on the Smuts committee fer special advantages when conducted by today is the power of their foresight. JFQ air or space forces. Planners continue to devise means to exploit air and space and tasks NOTES that are best performed by air forces. Post 1 Germany operated separate army and naval air World War II examples include space mis- arms throughout World War I, a fact it later lamented. sions, global airlift, air refueling, and wide- See James M. Spaight, “The Coming of Organized Air area surveillance. Also, new ways of accom- Power,” excerpted in Eugene M. Emme, The Impact of Air Power (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1959), pp. 41–44. plishing existing missions keep evolving. Increased speed, reliability, and responsiveness have fortified the presence of air forces, if relatively. The ability to conduct independent missions in areas where ground

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2 The Smuts committee, noting that British aircraft 17 Paul H. Nitze discussed the suitability, value, and production in 1918 would exceed army and navy sup- even superiority of conventional forces as a centerpiece of port requirements, wrote: “In settling in advance the deterrence in “A Conventional Approach,” U.S. Naval In- types [of aircraft] to be built, the operations for which stitute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 5 (May 1994), pp. 46–50. they are intended apart from naval or military use 18 General Harry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, Commanding should be clearly kept in view. This means the Air Board General of the Army Air Forces, served throughout the has already reached the stage where the settlement of war as a member of the Joint Chiefs and had an Air Staff, future war policy in the air war has become necessary. with Army Air Forces operating as one of three au- Otherwise engines and machines useless for indepen- tonomous Army commands along with Army Ground dent strategical operations may be built.” H.A. Jones, Forces and Army Service Forces. Neither the ground nor The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the the service forces commanders were JCS members. This Great War by the Royal Air Force, appendix II (Oxford: confusing command arrangement combined with short- Clarendon Press, 1937), pp. 10–11. falls in Army Air Force support created unacceptable 3 Ibid., p. 10. constraints on one of airpower’s key strategic attributes, 4 Ibid., p. 10. responsiveness. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Post- 5 Ibid., p. 11. war Air Force, pp. 23, 27–29, 48, 74. 6 Ibid., p. 12. 19 Ibid., p. 97. 7 Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig took exception to 20 It is not possible to recapitulate airpower history the Smuts committee in a letter to the Chief of the Im- since World War II. But rather than dodging Vietnam, perial General Staff dated September 15, 1917. While accept this summary of Momyer, Summers, Krepine- some objections may appear to be sophistry, Haig al- vich, Clodfelter, and Tilford: relying on firepower or air- lowed that the military potential of air forces could best power is not a satisfactory substitute for strategy. There be determined by those with relevant practical knowl- are many lessons from Vietnam, but none so vital as the edge, and that their optimism was a matter of “urgent need for sound and clear strategic thinking. This, at importance.” Letter reproduced in Air Power Historian, least as much as the excellence of the services, paid off vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1956), pp. 153–57. in Desert Storm. 8 Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic 21 See, for example, Anthony H. Cordesman, The Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1907–1960 Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984–1987 (New (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, York: Jane’s, 1987). Anthony H. Cordesman and Abra- 1989), passim; Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing ham R. Wagner provide a more complete, updated ap- the Postwar Air Force, 1943–1947 (Washington: Office of praisal in The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 2, The Iran-Iraq Air Force History, 1984). War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), but typo- 9 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Re- graphical errors make this a frustrating account to read. ports of General MacArthur, vol. 1, The Campaigns of 22 Trevor N. Dupuy, testifying before the House MacArthur in the Pacific (Washington: Government Armed Services Committee, December 13, 1990, recapit- Printing Office, 1966), p. 98. ulated in If War Comes: How to Defeat Saddam Hussein 10 See, for example, Peter F. Herrly and Lillian A. (McLean, Va.: HERO Books, 1991), pp. 100–01. Pfluke, “Southern Italy: Strategic Confusion, Opera- 23 Eliot Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” For- tional Frustration,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 4 (Spring eign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994), p. 118. 1994), pp. 70–75. 24 Quoted in House Armed Services Committee re- 11 Quoted in Richard P. Hallion, D-Day 1944: Air Power port of October 1949 hearings in Emme, The Impact of Over the Normandy Beaches and Beyond (Washington: Air Air Power, p. 639. Force History and Museums Program, 1994), p. 44. 25 Something we take for granted because of the rapid 12 Kent Roberts Greenfield, The Historian and the retaliatory capability of the Armed Forces. This is a tre- Army (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1954), pp. mendous bargain compared to maintaining a leakproof 84–85. Greenfield thought the greatest Army Air Force defense. contributions to the ground campaign were operations 26 Jones, The War in the Air, p. 10. commanded at the component level. Omar N. Bradley 27 See, for example, William J. Perry, “Defense Aero- et al., Effect of Air Power on Military Operations, Western space and the New World Order,” in The Future of Aerospace Europe (Wiesbaden, Germany: 12th Army Group, July 15, (Washington: National Academy Press, 1993), pp. 7–14. 1945) provides a more mixed assessment. 13 David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter Paret et al., editors, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 637–38. 14 Soviet casualties alone probably approached 25 million. Trevor N. Dupuy et al., editors, International Military and Defense Encyclopedia (Washington: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 2957. 15 Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, p. 201; Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, p. 48. 16 Harry S. Truman, “This Administration’s Air Pol- icy,” Flying, vol. 35, no. 6 (December 1944), pp. 157–58.

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JFQ FORUM Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences By STEVEN L. CANBY

Order a naval rating to “secure the house” and he’ll enter it, A qualitative approach is needed to close all doors and windows, and probably throw a line over maintain the integrity of the force, reach the roof and lash it down. higher levels of readiness and training, and lower costs. That approach is maneuver war- Order an infantryman to “secure the house” and he’ll enter fare, as conceptualized in a theory which it, shoot anything that moves, and then probably dig a displays its organizational, manpower, and trench about it. training implications. Such issues must be addressed together with vexing problems Order an airman to “secure the house” and he’ll stroll down to like burdensharing, reconstitution, and ac- the local estate agent and take out a 7-year lease on it. quisition. —A British military adage The Armed Forces are being buffeted by uncertain strategic bearings and budgetary issues. The U.S. military is designed to fight he challenge facing the American similarly organized militaries that threaten military is to sustain the size and our vital interests, while the demands actu- readiness of its forces while reduc- ally being placed on them come from less T ing its budget. Greater jointness is threatening rogue states and peace opera- needed; but it will not resolve or signifi- tions, the latter often resembling acute cases cantly affect this challenge. Nor is there a of the domestic missions of the National mother lode in realigning roles and mis- Guard. In the main, change in the military sions. Jointness seeks to gain synergism and has meant downsizing to capture a much avoid parochialism by command arrange- sought peace dividend. Forces are shrinking, ments and broader multiservice training. It arguably to a level too small to support an unfortunately institutionalizes the presump- articulated strategy of meeting two nearly sition that joint operations are preferable to multaneous major regional contingencies. single-service operations even when joint- Congress, particularly the House Armed ness complicates an operation that should Services Committee, would reduce budgets be swift, small, and discrete. Current initia- more. Because it sees budgets and forces as tives to realign roles and missions simply re- irrevocably linked and virtually synony- plow the same old fields in the same old mous, it is pressing for a major realignment way. The variables today are political: the of roles and missions to reduce what it sees spotlight shining on the current effort will as waste from duplication and overlap. An- give greater weight to its conclusions, while other thrust is consolidating support func- the aura of jointness may diffuse those vari- tions. The agenda thus calls for further draw- ables by evoking multiservice complemen- downs in wings, ships, and divisions and tarity (static synergy) and assistance (en- still greater defense-wide provision of com- abling). Savings will accrue, though mainly mon training and logistical support. at the expense of force structure and loss of service identity in support functions.

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The Joint Staff and U.S. Atlantic Com- with subordinate units cobbled together on mand (ACOM), which presides over most an ad hoc basis. This is necessary since reac- CONUS-based forces, are institutionalizing tion time is normally short and the in- joint (multiservice) exercises and adaptive creased (Clausewitzian) friction inherent in joint forces packages to stretch productivity, jointness multiplies the risks of another substitute home-based force projection for Desert One debacle (a case where what is forward basing, and rectify the long-stand- known in today’s parlance as an adaptive ing embarrassment of a lack in interservice joint force package, though well-rehearsed, cooperation. They are also seeking to deflect fractured under stress along cultural lines). the impact of realignment with themes of Intricate operations such as Desert One multiservice synergy and enabling. The are facilitated by reducing the friction of Armed Forces should have unity of effort jointness through joint culture. On the and be interoperable and mutually support- other hand, a contingency need not be joint ing. Ironically, successive Secretaries of De- and a joint force can be built sequentially fense have preached multinational interop- rather than by a “mix-master” of “oars in erability to our NATO allies the water.” 2 And of course for mainline op- Secretaries of Defense have but have never achieved erations requiring major forces, service cul- multiservice interoperabil- tures offer an indispensable insight into the preached multinational ity at home. way each service operates in its unique land, interoperability but have It is another thing, sea, or air environment. Suppression of ser- never achieved multiservice however, to view units vice cultures is only acceptable, and perhaps nominally similar and even mandatory, for the few units which interoperability functionally interoperable, must act in multiservice unison in chaotic such as wings and divi- environments. But requirements for those sions, as composed of interchangeable com- few should not be extended to the entire ponents and to divide and group their dis- force. As Bernard Trainor has warned, service parate parts in task forces and expect them cultures are intangibles to be exploited, not to function as intricately as single-service suppressed.3 Nonetheless, procedures and units (especially if single-service units suit- vocabularies (for instance, a term like secure) able for a mission already exist). For large should be standardized to avoid confusion and medium-sized contingencies, there is a and facilitate interoperability. need for an overarching joint command Suppressing service cultures may well in- framework (that is, CINCs and joint com- duce a conformity which could lead to “a mands) to fit in and coordinate service con- military that is inflexible, uncreative, and tributions; but there is little need for compo- most importantly predictable.” 4 That con- nent packaging. For small contingencies, tention may be difficult to prove but it is especially those of a coup de main nature, suggested from observing large multiservice jointness itself may not be operationally de- and multinational staffs. It is true that sup- sirable and should be held to a minimum.1 pressing cultures undercuts service identities The nature of the new world order and and the morale benefits which accrue from increasing dominance of fire mean more op- it, and countervails the aim of joint packag- erations should be conducted as coups de ing, namely, orchestrating diverse capabili- main. The possibilities are so diverse that it is ties from within each service and thereby not practical to anticipate and organize pre- shielding them from the realignment ax. existing adaptive joint forces packages truly Knee jerk suppression of service cultures and tailored for each variation. Instead one must uniqueness inadvertently reduces the rely on officers attuned to mission orders essence of combined arms—its diversity—to and highly trained in specialized arms along a new homogeneity already manifest in the American military, that is, generalized branch arms and all-purpose units putatively Steven L. Canby teaches the history of the opera- suitable for all occasions and therefore less tional art at Georgetown University. He has pub- than optimal for each. lished numerous articles on defense manpower, The unintended consequences of un- regional security, tactical airpower, strategy, bounded jointness may be a force that is less technology, and acquisition. effective, more costly, and not fully capable

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of intimate joint operations even if inflexi- service has and another finds too small or bility and predictability are not problems. A episodic in demand to duplicate, and by fo- realignment of roles and missions com- cusing on linkages like fire direction centers pounds these negatives. For example, re- rather than involving whole units. When alignment has its eye on eliminating one or full units must be involved, the added stress more of the four service air forces on the jointness places on the services can be grounds of efficiency. Marine aviation is a bounded and moderated by predesignating a likely candidate. This may result in trading pool of units on a long-term basis, rather an intimately integrated joint team for an than the current habit of generalizing the re- uncertain one whose jointness may be po- quirement and passing it from one unit to tent but definitely not intimate and agile. another and starting from scratch each time. Moreover, a lot of what passes for jointness How Much Jointness? is contrived or unnecessarily difficult. Navy No one opposes jointness in principle. ships may occasionally need attack heli- The issue is its meaning. Jointness must bal- copters assigned to them that should come ance the reduction of friction among the ser- from sea-familiar Marines with the Army vices against negatives like layering com- backfilling normal Marine Corps aviation. Combat Camera Imagery (C.H. Rudisill) mand arrangements and costly field And Navy fighters should not provide close Walking the wire at exercises. Only a fraction of officers need be support for the Army when another service Camp Able Sentry. cross-trained in service cultures and lan- can do this specialized task and the Navy guages. It may also be desirable for standing backfills the interdiction role, and so forth. joint commands to be composed of augmen- And sometimes jointness reveals a deficiency tation cells with predesignated augmentees as in the case of putting Army Rangers and command post exercises on medium- aboard aircraft carriers. What happened to sized operations—as smaller, Marine Special Boat Squadrons? joint training is not intimate joint operations are Joint training is not cost-free; it comes based upon service headquar- cost-free; it comes at the at the expense of other training. This con- ters around which predesig- straint is illustrated in FM 25–100, Training expense of other training nated specialized augmenta- the Force (see figure). Readiness and training tions from other services proficiency of units vary like a sine curve rapidly form. Equality among services with units “up” only a third of the time. should not be a driving concern. Maintaining readiness in line units under Jointness is demanding. But fortunately the current personnel system is like being on much can be resolved by unity of command a treadmill. Hi-tech, like the Army’s digitized and predesigned interoperability like com- battlefield, adds more demands. Jointness patible communications and refueling. Also, means something else must give, such as except for Army ground forces and Air Force branch proficiency or multi-branch com- tactical aviation, demand for intimate inter- bined arms training. The Marines, however, facing is surprisingly small. It can be limited are a joint land-sea-air team. Their inclusion to interfacing special capabilities that one in things that are joint for jointness sake would mean less combined arms training The Band of Excellence and less intimacy in providing the jointness it already has with the Navy. U.S. military units are “continuous life” units because personnel come and go indi- vidually. Readiness and training proficiency are accordingly bounded, never reaching the extended high and the short down periods of unit-replacement “born, live, and die” units. In continuous life units, the payoff from joint training for units is short-lived and is lost soon after deployment as personnel leave, and any residual effect can only be retained by assigning the task to the same Source: FM 25–100, Training the Force unit repeatedly. Otherwise the worst of both

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Amphibious assault be based abroad without nor- vehicles during Agile mal base operating support Provider ’94. costs and, ironically, can be grouped with non-national elements in smaller units than is desirable for multiservice national units. This is because not only must deployments be multinational in scope, but it is desirable that opponents not be able to focus on particular national elements to undermine CJTFs. Furthermore, many interventions like that in

Navy Combat Camera (Johnny R. Wilson) Rwanda are small and do not involve intense combat. Nor personnel systems does collocation preclude reforming na- occurs: the loss of tional units for combat or unilateral action. expensively-gained In the past the Armed Forces frequently unit skills shortly lacked unity of effort and only reluctantly after joint training, accepted subordination to officers of other and repetitive train- services. Today the problem is interoperabil- ups starting from ity in all its facets and a service tendency in

Combat Camera Imagery (Mickey L. Foster) scratch each time as providing defense-wide functions to give Securing soft duck units with totally short shrift to jointness while assigning a boat on MH–53 different officer and NCO cadres lacking priority to its own components. The author- helicopter. joint experience are tasked. In sum, if the fu- ity of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as now in- ture is operating jointly on a continual basis, stitutionalized in ACOM, and the authority a new personnel system is needed—one that of CINCs, resolves this problem through allows greater training continuity and hence multiservice complementarity: the static greater training depth and retention of ex- meaning of synergism. The danger is that pensively-gained unit skills. the process is biased by the presumption A cheap and comprehensive solution is that multiservice actions are preferable to simply collocation, given that the number of single-service actions. Navy units which must be cross-trained with The Air Force contends, once incorrectly Army and Air Force units is not large. Famil- although perhaps correctly today, that its iarity reduces a need for formal exercises. On bombers and fighters can unilaterally smash the Atlantic seaboard companies or battal- an enemy and attain victory with few casual- ions from Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg can ties. They therefore shield aviation, special periodically switch places as can Army and electronic assets, and airlift from joint or Marine units on Oahu. Similarly, Marine and combined use. The Air Force has its own pri- Air Force squadrons or half-squadrons from orities, and its fighters have become a semi- nearby bases can collocate and operate from strategic light bomber arm with little within the larger wing/group structure of thought given to their role in furthering land their host service. and coalition warfare. Jointly, Air Force tacti- Collocation, synthesized with a unit re- cal aviation can be thought of as a primary placement and rotation manning system, element of the combined arms team. Its can also be used to form large pools of name itself is a misnomer, for in continental highly trained units for a Combined Joint warfare it ought not to be used tactically but Task Force (CJTF). Thus far NATO CJTFs have operationally to realize synergism. been little more than cobbled-together na- One difficulty in coming to closure with tional units serving under a facade of multi- the practical application of jointness is tied national command arrangements. Colloca- to the meaning of the synergism provided tion is especially attractive for CJTFs since units such as squadrons and battalions can

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by combined arms on land and at sea. It is were used strategically and tactically but not one of those terms given lip service without operationally in the maneuver style. Inade- appreciation of depth of meaning or the so- quate Iraqi air defense meant allied ground phistication of its implications. The Air forces could have swept quickly and blood- Force employs tactical aviation in an applied lessly around and well away from overex- firepower, attritional mode. The definition tended Iraqi forces within Kuwait to the Eu- of combined arms is phrates and Tigris in a strategic turning vaporous, to wit: “the movement reminiscent of Napoleon’s Ulm tactics, techniques, campaign. Any attempt to interfere with this and procedures em- movement would have required Republican ployed by a force to Guard units without air defenses moving integrate firepower 100 kilometers across open desert before and mobility to pro- making contact. duce a desired effect The confusion associated with integrat- upon the enemy.” 5 ing combined arms has run over into joint- Combined arms is not ness. The proper term here is “orchestrat- about integration but ing.” The notion of integrating the disparate about orchestration. ways in which the military thinks about em- This is a confusion in ploying force leads to Bernard Trainor’s ad- military art that goes monition. Orchestrating disparate ways the Joint Combat Camera Center (Andrew W. McGalliard) back for several mil- services think about employing force is an Downed Aircraft Recovery Team, lennia. There is no entirely different matter. Similarly, jointness Mogadishu. conflict between specialization and syner- should be valued for its synergism, however gism; indeed specialization on the battlefield large or small the force. generates (dynamic) synergism. Its power is Deriding jointness was once a sign of seen episodically when rather small light service parochialism. In the wake of the arms (land and sea) have ripped apart large Goldwater-Nichols Act, however, jointness heavy forces; yet the reverse occurs when has become an instrument for transcending smallish heavy forces are provided with a parochialism. But its utility certainly in- complement of other arms. cludes deflecting force slashing under a re- The arms of a combined arms team (ex- alignment of roles and missions by display- cept counter battery) should ideally not be ing multiservice complementarity and used arm against arm, as is the tendency, but enabling assistance, and through the partici- against another arm to expose its weakness pation of all services in contingencies so for still another arm to exploit. This implies that redundancies do not appear. When ac- distinct differentiation among the arms. In- tions like Grenada and Panama occur each deed much of the history of the operational service participates. This may justify bud- art is about creating and or- gets, but it is perverse. The Army and Air jointness should be valued chestrating diversity to re- Force were not needed in Grenada, and the for its synergism, however duce an enemy to impo- Navy and Marines were not needed in tence and create conditions Panama. Such actions—unless units are per- large or small the force for its collapse. In the case manently assigned for quick reaction mis- of the air-ground team, sin- sions—inherently lead to a lack of familiar- gle-service combined arms expand to multi- ity with joint operations. They add a service combined arms. In maneuver war- command layer and make coordination fare, landpower makes enemy operational more complex than in a Navy-Marine opera- reserves move and become exposed to air- tional maneuver from the sea, and thus less power, while air lowers an enemy’s tempo of agile and less suitable for mounting fast- operations to give one’s own ground an ad- breaking responses like a coup de main, a ca- vantage in tempo, and therefore an ability to pability increasingly important to escape avoid frontal assault and to pin and envelop today’s all-pervasive firepower. the enemy. This conceptual point was Surprise (often gained from smallness), missed entirely in Desert Storm as air forces tempo, and (battle) synergism are force mul- tipliers and can often accomplish what size and firepower cannot. Accordingly, there

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should be a greater division of labor and spe- normally derive from tailoring services to cialization among services, and jointness in meet specific needs. Nonetheless significant this type of operation should often take the cost savings can be made in medical support form of lead services rather than formalized by re-engineering dental and labor-intensive joint commands. Some contingencies are field services—an approach outside the more appropriate for the Army-Air Force framework of a realignment of roles and with their special forces. Others are more missions. suited for the Navy-Marine team. There is a The thrust of a realignment, however, is natural division of labor between the two in sorting out combat forces for the services. and they generally need not and should not The payoffs are huge. Contrary to be blended except for large deployments widespread belief, however, a review is not such as Desert Storm where both were an appropriate vehicle for appraising the needed and intimate jointness was not a re- major forces. Its own economic logic is quirement anyway. flawed, for it is based on attrition style warfare when the services are grappling for an The Limits of Realignment updated maneuver style, and it is unable to The purpose of realigning roles and mis- handle the political-military premises under- sions is to achieve savings by consolidating lying the structure and use of forces. This re- support establishments and eliminating reduces the process to appraising minor redun- dundant field forces. Few oppose consolidat- dancies like Navy SEALs patrolling deserts ing support services; but while more can be with fast attack dune buggies and savings done, there are limits. Some support func- from the Army providing tank and reinforc- tions observe economies of scale, and con- ing artillery support to the Marines in lieu of solidation may lead to diseconomies, a their own organic components. prevalent phenomenon in the military. The logic of realignment is centered on Medical support is a case in point. The scale economies, yet when field forces are services share training facilities, dispensaries, evaluated Adam Smith’s division of labor and hospitals. But unifying medical support and specialization on which they are based would be dysfunctional. At best it would is rejected. The focus is on efficiency and mean another level of headquarters; at worst quantifiable measures like firepower scores it would lead to standardized medical field that are measures of effectiveness. The result services (that is, the small units assigned to is forces of generalized homogeneity. That is ships and divisions which account for half suitable for linear, attrition style warfare in of all medical personnel) where each meets a which forces are deployed in the attack and different need and functions in a different defense like a chain across the front. In this environment. Medical consolidation has model of war, units are appropriately homo- three negatives: more overhead, loss of ser- geneous because the front is no stronger vice identity, and none of the savings which than its weakest unit. For linear tactics, there is no demand for diversity nor for tempo— only quick response fires. By contrast differentiation and tempo are the very basis of non-linear maneuver warfare. The methodology of a realignment of roles and missions breaks down when premises dictate diverse forces for diverse purposes rather than all-purpose forces. This is apparent in areas that many see as budgetary show-stoppers: bombers versus carriers and consolidation of air forces and infantry—huge dollar issues striking at the F–16s being launched heart of force sizing. from Aviano Air Base. The most prominent of them is the bomber versus carrier fray. The Air Force advances the compelling case that stealth, precision weapons, and quick response bomb Combat Camera Imagery (Steve Thurow)

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damage assessment by satellite offer hereto- may utilize much the same equipment, but fore unobtainable capabilities.6 The Navy ar- their employment and coordination require- gues equally compellingly that regional con- ments differ vastly. Coloring Marine aviation flicts mandate carriers like never before. blue and regrading its raison d’être as green is These arguments pro- one way to alter perceptions and reduce tac- the realignment of roles and ceed from differences in tical air forces to three though nothing submissions is deceptive in that it national strategy. If that stantively changes. Logistical support is al- strategy requires de- ready hued blue. Its danger lies in blue’s has little to say about either stroying opponents, increased leverage over green and naval avia- bombers are clearly the tion’s insensitivity toward the specialization answer, though naval forces are not totally and command arrangements that make Ma- eliminated from the equation due to com- rine aviation effective. plementarity and their enabling strategic The issues in tactical aviation (which bombing (and other operations).7 But if consumes half the conventional force de- strategy is more complex and involves Oper- fense budget) are sizing and internal ations Other Than War (OOTW), then economies. The realignment of roles and equally clearly bombers lose and carrier task missions is deceptive in that it has little to say about either and amounts to running a rabbit across the fox’s trail. Even if there were but one tactical air force, there would still need to be four branches reflecting the peculiar needs of each service—hence the issue of sizing remains. The alternative is more expensive all-purpose wings moder- ately effective in all environments. And even this does not address a key sizing and budgetary question: the air-to-surface trade- off. Nor are internal economies insured when the focus is on consolidating existing institutions rather than how they were organized in the first instance. U.S. military aviation is labor intensive and cost-ineffective relative to other top air forces, the Swedes and Israelis in particular. There is nothing inherently wrong with four tactical air forces per se, as long as each is different and costs are controlled. The first condition is met; the second is not and consolidation likely worsens it. Naval aviation is sea-oriented and force projection keeps it from entangling with land-based aviation. Air Force tactical aviation should be “opera- U.S. Navy (Charles Alley) tional,” while Marine aviation is more “is- USS Monsoon, the latest class of coastal land” oriented and therefore appropriately patrol ship. forces gain value. This is an old argument “tactical.” Furthermore, Marine aviation is that a realignment of roles and missions will leaner by a factor of two than the Air Force’s not resolve. even though Marine air is expeditionary and A second saving allegedly lies in consoli- operates from inherently inefficient, roughly dating tactical air forces. In practice this hewn air strips. Consolidation in this case means reducing the four air forces to three thus leads to three negatives: higher costs, with Marine helicopters going to the Army lower effectiveness, and less intimacy in and Marine fighters split between the Air joint operations. Force and Navy. This destroys the Marine Corps and may well be the agenda some hide. Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters

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The third large saving involves eliminat- ory is in all its ramifications. Beyond opera- ing apparent duplication in non-mechanized tional and equipping implications the power infantry of which the Army has four and the of maneuver warfare lies in recasting the in- Marines three divisions. Three of the Army’s ternal procedures by which the military oper- are specialized airborne, helicopter assault, ates: manning, training, and mobilizing. and mountain/cold weather. Only one is These were last cast half a century ago and “all-purpose” and it is tied to Korea. The are now entirely dated and no longer in har- three Marine divisions are amphibious-ori- mony with new service operational concepts ented but more generalized than the Army’s. of maneuver warfare and requirements for They are also larger, hence more vulnerable supporting peace operations. JFQ on both counts to a realignment in roles and missions. NOTES Another perspective should be consid- 1 For a comparative analysis, see Steven L. Canby ered. The Army is attuned to large-scale and Edward N. Luttwak, A Systematic Review of “Com- warfighting and the Marines traditionally mando” (Special) Operations (1939–1980) (Washington: C&L Associates, 1982). show the flag and keep the peace among 2 Carl E. Mundy, Jr., “Thunder and Lightning: Joint Lit- lesser entities. Both are needed. Yet it is diffi- toral Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 4 (Spring 1994), cult to maintain both functions within the p. 50. same military service. It is too much to ask 3 Bernard E. Trainor, “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Army and Air Force to orient themselves the Gulf War,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 3 (Winter 1993– 94), p. 74. both to hi-tech warfare against similar mili- 4 Ibid. taries and to peace support missions where 5 U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 6–30, Employment of the their weaponry must be muzzled and will ac- Light Armored Infantry Battalion, August 1992, p. C–3. tually inhibit their agility and ability to field This publication raises points relative to jointness, joint “cops on the beat.” Vastly different skills are doctrine, and roles and missions. These units are new, recently renamed light armored reconnaissance battal- needed and one will always wither under the ions, and only four exist. FMFM 6–30, a highly abridged other. The British Army is a case in point. Its copy of an Army manual, and related publications are colonial performance was nearly brilliant; an unnecessary expense and, worse, cause friction when but its performance on the European conti- Army heavies support Marine units. The relevant dis- nent has been spotty. tinctions should be published in an appendix to the Army manual. FMFM 6–30 simply provides institutional The implication is that rather than ho- distance. It would be undesirable to restrict the Marine mogenizing Army and Marine infantry and Corps from issuing manuals in areas such as armor and reducing a division, realignment could save artillery (of which it has little) under the rubric of joint- money by stressing their distinctiveness. Ma- ness or roles and missions. This practice might frustrate rine infantry should be oriented toward raid- jointness by suggesting to one service that joint doctrine starts with another service, rather than at the Joint ing and quick interventions mounted from Warfighting Center. the sea, light armor constabulary duty, and 6 See Buster C. Glossen, “The Impact of Precision peace support. Such forces need to be politi- Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” Airpower Journal, cally attuned, equipped, and trained for vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993), and Edward N. Luttwak, these missions. Money is saved because the The Utility of Strategic Airpower, vol. 1, Strategic Airpower in the New Geo-Economic Era (Washington: C&L Associ- forces are light and do not need the full ates, September 1992). array of arms and services. Present practice is 7 See, for example, William A. Owens, “Living Joint- to use regular formations for these missions ness,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 3 (Winter 1993–94), even though they are too encumbered to pp. 12–14. perform well and they thus bloat the size and cost of commitment.

American combat forces are not large by international standards and should not be shrunk further. Nonetheless, they are too expensive, and while their readiness and training proficiency is high, those standards were set for a conscript military, not for a long service military. Jointness and roles and missions are not the solvent. But maneuver the-

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Civilian Control: AUseful Fiction? The White House Down home with the By A. J. BACEVICH Commander in Chief.

recent gathering of Washington- together suggest an officer corps that views types was convened to discuss the current crop of civilian leaders with Richard Kohn’s provocative essay thinly veiled contempt. Yet Kohn does not re- A entitled “Out of Control: The gard the problem as merely military antago- Crisis in Civil-Military Relations.” Since the nism toward the President and his adminis- beginning of the Clinton presidency, articles tration. Rather, he argues that a combination critical of the current state of civil-military re- of political, strategic, and structural factors lations have appeared with some regularity. have contributed to an erosion of civilian Of them, only Kohn’s—published in the control over time, a trend whose effects are Spring 1994 issue of The National Interest— only now becoming apparent. struck a nerve. His thesis is blunt and uncom- The discussion of Kohn’s article drew a promising: today’s military is “more alienated roomful of both serving and former govern- from its civilian leadership than at any time ment officials, journalists, retired officers, in American history and more vocal about and policy-oriented academics who exam- it.” As befits a distinguished historian, Kohn ined his thesis that civilian control in the marshals an impressive array of evidence to Clinton era had become increasingly tenu- support that thesis. He cites a clutch of inci- ous. The question they considered was sim- dents—all previously reported in the media ple: has anything really changed? The ease but quickly discarded when they used up with which the Washington veterans their quota of newsworthiness—that taken reached a consensus and disposed of Kohn’s argument was dramatic: whatever the particulars of Clinton’s difficulties with the mili- Colonel A. J. Bacevich, USA (Ret.), is Executive tary, in their view, nothing of substance had Director of the Foreign Policy Institute, School of changed. In their experience, the Pentagon Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and commanded the 11th Armored had always engaged in political maneuvering Cavalry Regiment in the Gulf War. as evidenced, for example, in efforts to derail

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The U.S. military is now more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, and more vocal about it....[T]he roots of the crisis go back to the beginning of the Cold War, when the creation of a large, “peacetime” standing military establishment overloaded the traditional process by which civilian control was exercised....Civilian control is not a fact, but a process, that varies over time and is very much “situational,” that is, dependent on the issues and the personalities, civilian and military, involved at any given point.

—Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest

the President’s initiative on gays in the mili- Roosevelt and Marshall tary. Shorn of its peculiar cultural sensitivi- For the top brass to find itself at odds ties, that controversy revealed the military with a sitting President is hardly a new phe- indulging in the sort of interest group poli- nomenon. Yet to recall how senior officers in tics that it routinely (and in the eyes of this an earlier era handled disagreement with the group all but inevitably) plays. When it man in the White House is to point out how comes to matters that the services consider much things have in fact changed. Nor is it vital to their well-being—budgets, weapons necessary to reach too far back into history: systems, defense policies—no President in consider the relationship between President recent memory has controlled the military in Franklin Roosevelt and Chief of Staff of the the strictest sense of that term. To imagine Army General George Marshall. Perhaps that all aspects of basic national security more than ever people today appreciate Roo- policies promulgated by presidential edict sevelt as a masterful commander in chief. are actually decided in the Oval Office is Marshall, by the same token, remains the simply naive. Much of the real action occurs preeminent icon of American military pro- behind the scenes through negotiation, in- fessionalism. He seems somewhat austere by trigue, deal-making, and the occasional art- present-day standards—imagine a soldier ful dodge—a complex game that the Pen- who considers it unseemly to cash in on his tagon plays with single-mindedness and renown and who therefore declines lucrative considerable skill. As those accomplished in offers to publish his memoirs or sit on cor- the ways of Washington must know, this is porate boards. Yet when it came to matters how the system works. Kohn’s slightly over- of strategy during World War II, Marshall wrought hand-wringing notwithstanding, it and Roosevelt clashed repeatedly. Indeed, always has. Marshall was not alone among the Presi- This view that nothing has changed is im- dent’s advisors in considering FDR’s forays portant—and misleading. Drawing on first- into grand strategy as impulsive and whimsi- hand experience extending back to the Cold cal if not, on occasion, altogether daft. War, these sophisticates effectively demol- At no time was disagreement between ished the common journalistic take on Clin- the two sharper than in the difficult months ton’s rocky relationship with the military: between the fall of France in early summer that the problem is one of simple animus on 1940 and America’s entry into the war in De- the part of senior officers who cut their teeth cember 1941—a period, it seems fair to say, in the Vietnam-era. Putting personalities when challenges besetting the Nation out- aside this view has utility, but to then con- weighed even the danger of permitting ac- clude that all is well with American civil-mil- knowledged homosexuals to serve in uni- itary relations is dead wrong. form. The outlines of the dispute are well

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known and can hardly have been more fun- behavior evidences with regard to the sub- damental. With aggression running rampant stance of civilian control. Despite the politi- across Asia and Europe, the United States was cal explosiveness inherent in the question of engaged in a crash effort to bolster defense, aid to Britain, Marshall did not attempt to preparing for the moment when the preda- advance his cause by engaging in leaks to fa- tors turned their attention to the Western vored journalists. He did not undermine Hemisphere. As Marshall saw it, rearming FDR by making end runs to the President’s America was an absolute priority. Yet with many congressional critics. He did not avail that process barely underway, Roosevelt con- himself of the pages of Foreign Affairs or cluded that the Nation must simultaneously other journals to drop oblique hints regard- aid Britain in its lonely struggle against Ger- ing which policies the Army would or would many. By any measure, the British cause was not support. Nor, once it was clear that forlorn. Meeting the demands of Winston Roosevelt was not to be budged, did Mar- Churchill and his chiefs of staff, moreover, shall sow a paper-trail of dissent to deflect would only squander the modest gains made criticism from himself if things turned sour. until then in rearming America. Materiel di- Instead, by deferring to the President verted to Britain would almost surely be Marshall invested our policy with a coher- wasted, the U.S. build-up would be thrown ence needed for success. In doing so he off schedule, and national security would not helped turn a long shot into a winner. In be enhanced but jeopardized further. Marshall’s eyes, there was no other recourse. Marshall was not alone in seeing aid to As he remarked years later, “I honestly Britain as a dubious proposition. Even apart thought that it was ruinous [to the country] from considerations of grand strategy many for me to come out in opposition to my Americans found reasons for opposing efforts Commander in Chief.” Neither by coy ma- to rescue the British Empire. Those ele- neuvering nor by foot-dragging would Mar- ments—including members of Congress, in- shall presume to challenge the legitimacy of fluential journalists, leaders of ethnic groups, the President’s authority. and lobbyists—formed a ready source of sup- The Post-Cold War World port for military professionals who were per- Contrary views of present-day political suaded that even a slight delay in rearming elites notwithstanding, Marshall’s reaction the Nation was intolerable. Yet Marshall shows just how much the norms of civil-mil- chose not to exploit the opportunity offered itary practice have changed over the decades. by such potential allies. Instead, he directed Practices seen today as within the acceptable his objections forthrightly to the President. bounds of military conduct—such as active When Roosevelt rejected Marshall’s represen- duty officers publishing defiant op-ed pieces tations, insisting that the United States would or service chiefs overshadowing their service aid Britain, the Army Chief of Staff loyally secretaries—are in fact recent innovations. accepted the President’s decision. Marshall In Marshall’s day, they were unheard of and would not, to use his own expression, “fight would have been considered improper and the problem.” On the contrary, he would unprofessional. Indeed, today’s politicized henceforth do his utmost to make FDR’s pol- and politically adroit military is yet one icy work. Thus, for example, when Congress more legacy of the Cold War. In ways that in early 1941 took up lend-lease, legislation many Americans fail to appreciate, the im- designed to share the largess of American in- perative of keeping the Nation on a perpet- dustry with Great Britain, Marshall’s em- ual, semi-mobilized footing transformed the phatic testimony on its behalf was crucial— traditional civil-military equation. As a re- perhaps decisive—in securing its passage. sult, the Pentagon’s influence mushroomed, History shows that in this the instincts mostly at civilian expense. of Roosevelt, the strategic tyro, were superior The inherent dangers of confrontation to the considered judgment of Marshall, the with the Soviet Union provided powerful in- seasoned professional. More important for centives to leave the implications of this our purposes, however, is what Marshall’s transformation in civil-military relations un- examined: neither of the superpowers could afford to convey to the other an impression

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that its soldiery was under anything except control has suffered the fate of consen- the tightest rein. Thus, as long as a Cold sus. . . . No one, civil or military, is ever War-induced compact on national security against civilian control. Consequently, it has policy remained intact, the potential conse- achieved acceptability at the price of becom- quences, adverse or otherwise, of any ing meaningless.” changes in civil-military relations remained In an era that bids fair to be rich in per- hidden: on the questions of most fundamen- plexity and frustration, Americans can ill af- tal importance, military leaders and senior ford the luxury of consensus that is devoid civilian officials saw eye-to-eye. By and large, of meaning. There is no crisis in civil-mili- therefore, the subject could be consigned to tary relations today, but we must insure that the status of academic curiosity. we do not invite one through either inatten- Yet no sooner did the Cold War end tion or inadvertence. Doing so requires act- than that strategic compact began to un- ing promptly to reinvigorate civilian control ravel. A mere four years after the fall of the over the military, helping it to recover from Berlin Wall—arguably the most important the anemic state into which it has slipped in geopolitical event of this century—the chief the course of the last fifty years. Although characteristics of U.S. national policy have returning to the era of George Marshall may become drift and inconsistency. A great de- be impossible, a fresh and stringent delin- bate is underway to redefine America’s role eation of allowable military prerogatives is in the world, a debate inextricably linked to in order. parallel controversies over the existing con- Once the parameters have been estab- tent and future evolution of lished, civilian officials must fulfill their There is no crisis in our culture. Today’s military obligation to assert authority energetically, civil-military relations feels no compunction about forcefully, and consistently. This will not thrusting itself foursquare only safeguard democracy but may even—as today, but we must insure into that process at points it did in Marshall’s day—produce sound pol- that we do not invite one of its own choosing. In icy. If nothing else, it will preclude the possi- through either inattention doing so, its perspective is bility of Americans ever awakening to dis- anything but disinterested. cover that civilian control has become a or inadvertence. Like other participants in fiction. Soldiers and civilians alike share an the debate, the services eval- abiding interest in insuring that that day uate the present and envision the future never dawns. JFQ through the distorting lens of their own institutional biases and expectations. But unlike other participants the Pen- tagon has a massive budget, large pockets of which are hidden from public scrutiny. It allocates a substantial chunk of research and development dollars. By virtue of vast defense spending it has intimate relations with corporate America. This Cold War legacy invests the military with a capacity to tilt the debate in ways that advance its interests but do not necessarily serve the common good. Unless subjected to rigorous oversight, this capacity is open to abuse. In a society increasingly confused about its basic values and showing signs of moral decay, these ten- dencies could even at some point in the future pose a threat to the established order.

Nearly forty years ago Samuel Hunting- ton noted that: “In Western society civilian

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Civilian Control: President Bush DOD (R.D. Ward) seeking advice in August 1990. A National Crisis? By MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS

s there a crisis in American civil-military These are serious charges. Are they true? relations? Is the influence of generals on The answer largely depends on what one policy excessive? Several experts on mil- means by civilian control of the military. Is Iitary affairs think so. Richard Kohn, the Kohn afraid that the Armed Forces are about former chief historian of the Air Force, has to overthrow the Constitution? Well, no. argued that civilian control of the military “The real problem of civilian control is the has decayed to an alarming degree.1 Edward relative weight or influence of the military in Luttwak specifically indicts the Joint Staff for the decisions the government makes, not having conducted a bloodless coup against only in military policy and war, but in for- the civilian leadership of the Pentagon.2 Rus- eign, defense, economic, and social policy sell Weigley, a respected military historian, (for much military policy can have vast impli- contends that civilian control “faces an un- cations for various aspects of national life).” certain future.” 3 The situation outlined by Kohn is, of course, a far cry from the threat of an immi- nent coup. But it apparently is enough to set A briefer version of this article appeared as an editorial in Strategic Review, vol. 22, no. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 5–6.

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off alarm bells in the night. To some, any mili- vice to Clinton who, for whatever reasons, tary presence at the policymaking table repre- took it. According to accounts which have sents a danger to the Republic. They seem to been published since the Gulf War, Powell prefer an officer corps that meekly acquiesces opposed the early employment of military to civilian dominance over military affairs. force against Iraq after the invasion of In the view of the writers cited above, a Kuwait. His commander in chief at the time major villain is General Colin Powell, the for- chose not to accept that advice. mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Luttwak As to Kohn’s contention that Powell calls him the “most manipulative of generals” unilaterally imposed a personal strategic vi- and contends that he “overruled” President sion on the Nation without coordination Clinton “with contemptuous ease” on issues and consultation, it should be noted that such as revising military policy toward homo- the Goldwater-Nichols Act reinforced the sexuals and using force in ex-Yugoslavia. leading role of the chairman in developing Kohn accuses Powell of “turning the age-old military strategy. However, such strategy is Clausewitzian formula about war being an ex- developed in the context of a broader na- tension of policy on its head” by insisting tional security strategy to which the chair- that “political objectives must be carefully man is only one contributor. If Powell suc- matched to military objectives and military ceeded in shaping the debate over national means and what is achievable.” He also states security strategy, it is a tribute to his powers that Powell developed a “new national secu- of intellect and persuasion, not a manifesta- rity policy for the country” tion of some sinister conspiracy against civil- the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1990–92 without con- ian control of the military. reinforced the leading sulting his civilian superi- If Powell exceeded his powers, can it be ors. Kohn further takes argued that Goldwater-Nichols is flawed? role of the chairman in Powell to task for publicly Those reforms, it should be recalled, were developing military strategy airing his views on military passed to nearly universal acclaim by national intervention in Bosnia. security experts, including Luttwak and Kohn Did Powell exceed his powers? It is clear (indeed Luttwak, displaying his characteristic that the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorgani- humility, claims credit for the passage of the zation Act of 1986 substantially strength- Goldwater-Nichols Act). Only a handful ob- ened the office of the chairman. It is incon- jected. Some, like John Kester, were con- trovertible that Powell exercised his cerned over the power of the chairman. Oth- statutory powers more fully than the first ers, like this writer, feared that a unified staff chairman to function under the new law, would be driven by strategic monism, the Admiral William Crowe. But his actions dominance of a single service view or strate- seem altogether consistent with the intent of gic concept when strategic pluralism is the ap- Congress in passing Goldwater-Nichols: pre- propriate approach for the United States.4 A cisely to strengthen civilian control by mak- variation of this concern was voiced by oth- ing the chairman rather than the corporate ers, such as former Secretary of the Navy John Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military Lehman, who worried that the strategic view advisor to the President. of the naval service would be overwhelmed Powell certainly had strong views on the by the Army and Air Force. relationship between the use of force and This writer now concedes that his con- political objectives. We know that he was cern over strategic monism was misplaced. very effective in conveying those views to Strategic pluralism still reigns, but the arena the President and the Secretary of Defense. has changed. The Joint Staff, after all, consists But Luttwak’s claim that Powell “overrode” of officers from the Army, Navy, Marine Clinton is absurd. On gays in the military Corps, and Air Force who still demonstrate a and intervention in Bosnia, Powell gave ad- healthy attachment to the strategic concepts of their respective services. The result is what Mackubin Thomas Owens teaches defense Congress intended: improved coordination economics and strategy at the Naval War College and cooperation, not total integration or the and is Editor-in-Chief of Strategic Review. His review essay, “Vietnam as Military History,” appeared in JFQ, no. 3 (Winter 1993–94).

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dominance of one strategic view. That, ironi- policy as developed by the President and cally, is now exactly what Luttwak deprecates: Congress. Thus the chairman has a responsi- Charged to define an all-new military structure bility to make his views and those of the for the post-Cold War era, the Joint Staff duly cogi- Joint Chiefs known to the President and tated and calculated and coordinated—only to come Congress, whether they relate to turning the up in the end with the same old mix of ground, air, military into a laboratory for social experi- and naval forces as before. Itself manned by fixed ra- mentation or intervening in Bosnia. tios of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force officers at The next point is a corollary of the first. each hierarchical level, the Joint Staff predictably Based upon an array of powers anchored in obeyed the logic of its own composition by resisting the Constitution, civilian leaders have vari- any genuine reappraisal of the mix of U.S. military ous tools at their disposal to ensure control forces. . . . The Great Pentagon Reform has shown us of the military. These include the powers to that the only thing worse than interservice rivalry is interservice harmony. enact budgets, to reorganize the defense establishment, to define roles and functions, What Luttwak really deplores, his touch- to influence promotions (and conversely to ing solicitude for civilian control notwith- fire commanders), and most importantly to standing, is precisely the lack of strategic deploy the Armed Forces. monism. His expectation that Goldwater- The third point is that civil-military re- Nichols would result in the institutionaliza- lations are manifest in different ways over tion of his strategic concept explains why he time. The role of America in the world is dif- initially supported the reforms with enthusi- ferent today than it was in the late 19th and asm. The fact that U.S. strategy is increasingly early 20th centuries. The nature of military based on the recognition of complementary operations also has undergone significant service strategic concepts rather than strategic changes. As two analysts at the U.S. Army monism accounts for his new opposition. War College have recently concluded: There are at least four other reasons to reject the contention by Kohn et al. that Civil-military relations were simplified in the nineteenth century by the quarantine of the military, there is a problem with civil-military rela- both intellectually and geographically, and by the tions. First and most importantly, civilian rigid distinction between war and peace. The Cold control of the military is not merely bureau- War demanded a more holistic strategy, but the future cratic control of senior officers by DOD offi- is likely to require an even more inclusive notion, pos- cials. This view, which suffuses the writings sibly leading to a fundamental transformation of U.S. of Kohn and other critics, implies that the civil-military relations.5 military should not debate a policy ad- The point is that what may look like a vanced by bureaucrats, no matter how hare- crisis in civil-military relations is instead a brained it may be. It implies that not only change in the conditions to which civil-mili- policy but also strategy are within the exclu- tary relations must adapt. sive domain of Pentagon bureaucrats. Finally, if the military is so influential, Thus it should not be a surprise that if it can “overrule” the President and the Kohn’s exemplar of civilian control of the Secretary of Defense “with contemptuous military is none other than Robert Strange ease,” why has it so meekly acquiesced in McNamara who, it is observed favorably, as Clinton’s Haiti policy? Haiti, after all, is ex- Secretary of Defense under Presidents Ken- actly the type of operation that the military nedy and Johnson, “ignored or dismissed mil- would most like to avoid. Why has force itary advice, disparaged military experience structure been cut by 30 percent from the and expertise, and circumvented or sacked Bush administration’s proposed base force? generals or admirals who opposed him.” But Why is it likely that the services will lose McNamara also confused strategy with eco- several weapons systems which they believe nomics and accordingly bears a major respon- are necessary to future effectiveness? Why sibility for the greatest military failure in are combat specialties being opened to American history—the Vietnam debacle. women? Why is it likely that the courts will In contradistinction to the position held by Kohn, civilian control of the military sig- nifies, or should signify, constitutional subordination of military means to national

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eventually lift the ban against practicing ho- officers have always done. Until there is rea- mosexuals in the military? son to expect some other response, there is Kohn and others of his ilk are correct in no crisis in civil-military relations. JFQ one respect: there is a growing disparity between the quality of military officers and NOTES their civilian counterparts, although they err 1 Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in in thinking that this constitutes the whole Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest, no. 35 of civil-military relations. (Spring 1994), pp. 3–17. there is a growing disparity 2 Edward M. Luttwak, “Washington’s Biggest Scan- This change is primarily a dal,” Commentary, vol., 97, no. 5 (May 1994), pp. 29–33. between the quality of result of improvements in 3 Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Professional Military Educa- Principle of Civilian Control from McClelland to Pow- military officers and their tion (PME), especially at ell,” Journal of Military History, vol. 57, no. 5 (October civilian counterparts the war college level, and 1994), pp. 27–58. 4 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The Hollow Promise of the fact that, as Congress JCS Reform,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 3 (Winter intended in passing the Goldwater-Nichols 1985–86), pp. 98–111. reforms, the services now increasingly select 5 Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, “American Civil- their best officers for joint duty assignments Military Relations: The State of the Debate,” The Washing- after they complete courses at the war col- ton Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 210. leges. In the first instance, PME emphasizes the relationship of policy, strategy, and resources. This helps to foster a military perspective with a coherence that is often absent among the civilian officials who make defense policy. In the second instance, the better educated officers frequently compete with civilians who are technocrats rather than innovative thinkers, appointees whose jobs are repay- ment for political debts, and a Pentagon bureaucracy that is increasingly designed to “look like America.” Thus it is not surprising that General Powell was successful in shaping the debate over not only a post-Cold War military strategy, but national security strategy as well. But if the relative weakness of civilian policymakers constitutes a real crisis in civil- military relations, it is easily rectified. As Luttwak concedes, “The only true remedy is to keep a very strong Joint Staff, but to balance it with the counterweight of equally assertive civilian leadership.” No evidence exists to suggest that civilian control of the military, properly understood, has atrophied. The President and Congress determine policy, from force structure and acquisition to the use of military force. Senior military officers have a constitutional responsibility to ensure that a military voice is heard. Of course, if the civilian leadership chooses not to accept military advice, it is the duty of any commissioned officer to carry out the resulting policy or tender his resignation. This is exactly what professional

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SHAPING Arms Export Policy

U.S. Air Force (Dean Wagner) By SUMNER BENSON

oint force commanders and joint of conventional weapons poses genuine planners have an obvious interest in dilemmas that make it difficult even for ex- the balance of forces in regions where perienced and conscientious policymakers to Jthey may be called on to conduct op- establish firm guidelines. Some dilemmas are erations. Understanding foreign capabilities rooted in the differing goals found in legisla- requires exchanging information with tion on arms sales while others stem from a friendly governments and collecting intelli- strategic environment which, according to gence against other governments—tradi- General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of tional activities technologically updated for the Army, is shifting “from the unitary and the information age. Commanders and plan- relatively predictable adversary we knew in ners also have an opportunity to help shape the Cold War, to the diverse, ambiguous, regional environments by influencing policy and dynamic threats that we confront on arms exports and conventional arms today.” 1 Some emerge from the enhanced transfers. To have an impact, planners must importance of economic competitiveness. recognize that in the mid-1990s the transfer

Summary

Joint force commanders and planners can exercise a positive influence in shaping regional security environments through their roles in developing arms exports policy. To be effective this process must take into consideration economic and security factors that work for and against such exports. This includes fostering regional stability, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and bolstering economic competitiveness. A review of the relative benefits of placing American manufactured avionics on MiG–29s recently helped frame an important policy on upgrading foreign aircraft. The Joint Staff, combatant command staffs, and service staffs can play a part in drafting export policy as the administration addresses issues like the integration of technology on foreign platforms, transfer of theater missile defense systems, and initiation of international cooperation on restraining conventional arms transfers. This could influence the kind of weaponry that the Armed Forces face on a future battlefield.

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Strengthening Collective Security Efforts at arms cooperation will be lim- There are three arguments in favor of ited by declining defense budgets in most arms exports. First, these exports can help al- countries, by industry and legislative pressure lies and friends defend themselves against to keep production at home, and by a belief existing and emerging threats. According to that military-related technology is key to eco- the Arms Export Control Act that governs nomic competitiveness. Nonetheless, the such sales, the United States and other “free United States and other nations probably will and independent countries” have “valid re- develop significant cooperative programs that quirements for effective and mutually benefi- will support future military operations. For cial defense relationships” and for “interna- instance, it is reported that although Euro- tional defense cooperation.” 2 America has pean countries are reluctant to purchase the sold weapons to and shared technology with all-U.S. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack friendly nations to increase interoperability Radar System (JSTARS), they may accept an and lower costs to all parties concerned. As approach that allows them to put American planners in both the European and the Pa- radar and electronics on a European airframe. cific Commands know, there is extensive co- Countering Proliferation operation among NATO members, Japan, The second incentive for arms exports is and South Korea. Moreover, in the Persian countering the threat posed by the prolifera- Gulf War the Department of Defense released tion of weapons of mass destruction and ad- technology previously available only to vanced conventional weaponry. Aside from treaty partners to Arab coalition members. declared nuclear-weapon states (United The administration is building on this States, Britain, France, Russia, and China), at cooperation. In April 1993 then Under Secre- least twenty other nations have acquired or tary of Defense are attempting to secure weapons of mass exports can help allies and friends for Acquisition destruction. In most areas where U.S. forces and Technology defend themselves against existing could conceivably be engaged on a large John Deutch in- scale, such as in Korea or the Persian Gulf, and emerging threats formed the NATO likely adversaries have chemical and biologi- Conference of cal weapons. Moreover, North Korea, Iraq, National Armaments Directors that DOD in- and Iran appear determined to acquire nu- tends to “create a renaissance of defense co- clear weapons. These nations have evaded operation” across the Atlantic.3 Secretary of international nonproliferation controls, Defense William Perry, former Secretary Les such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Aspin, Under Secretary for Policy Frank Wis- Missile Technology Control Regime, and de- ner, and Under Secretary John Deutch all veloped indigenous capabilities to produce have told Japan that the United States weapons in part by actively seeking dual use wishes to increase military cooperation with (civilian and military) technologies abroad, that nation. both legally and illegally.6 Arms cooperation with Japan and other Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Asian nations bolsters the strategy of cooper- identified increased proliferation as a major ative engagement which U.S. Pacific Com- threat (along with regional instability, rever- mand has developed to support strategic sal of reform in Russia, and economic dan- goals.4 Also, U.S. Central Command and the gers).7 The Under Secretary of State for Inter- Saudi air force reportedly are discussing the national Security Affairs testified before integration of communications systems in Congress that “proliferation of weapons of conjunction with the Peace Shield Com- mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and ad- mand and Control Air Defense System vanced conventional arms, as well as the which American companies are building in technologies which are necessary for their Saudi Arabia.5 development” represents the “most critical security threat we face.” 8 DOD is dealing with this problem in part Sumner Benson is Director of the Office of Trade by working with friendly nations to identify Security Policy, Defense Technology Security and counter ballistic missile threats to U.S. Administration, and chairs the DOD Arms Export and allied forces in Europe, the Middle East, Policy Working Group.

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ARMS EXPORT POLICY

and Northeast Asia. Washington and Tokyo, and Patriot) depend upon foreign sales “to for example, have discussed deploying the keep production lines open and to preserve upgraded Patriot missile and the projected the jobs of highly skilled U.S. defense work- Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ers.” 11 At a recent meeting a DSAA official missile in Japan to deter or defend against a commented: “You are still worried about North Korean attack by nuclear weapons car- Russia and China as military competitors. ried on ballistic missiles. The United States The competitors that industry is worried has also discussed theater missile defense about are Britain, France, and Israel, because with South Korea and members of NATO. they are going after our share of the global defense market.” Bolstering Economic Growth More widely, the administration believes The third argument for promoting de- that defense research and development fense sales comes from the increased impor- (R&D) and defense sales have a significant tance of foreign trade to the economy. For impact on civilian production. For example, perspective, one should recall that when Laura Tyson, Chair of the President’s Coun- President Jimmy Carter tried to reverse the cil of Economic Advisors, has pointed out growth of arms exports in 1977, the initia- that foreign sales by defense-related indus- tive was perceived tries furnish companies with revenues to (except by defense President Clinton has emphasized support long-term R&D for civilian as well as companies) as a de- that arms exports are critical military products. In a study of international fense and foreign competitiveness she notes that “the coun- to economic growth policy issue rather tries that boast the major commercial air- than an economic craft producers are also the biggest arms-sell- consideration. That is in stark contrast to the ing democracies.” 12 policies and perceptions of the nineties. DOD has increasingly invested in dual- President Clinton has emphasized that use R&D, given the Advanced Research Pro- overall arms exports are critical to economic jects Agency a critical role in converting de- growth while Secretary of State Warren fense industry to civilian production, and Christopher instructed chiefs of mission “to created the position of Principal Deputy Assis- support actively U.S. firms by seeking out tant Secretary for Dual-Use Technology Policy market opportunities...giving [firms] our and International Programs. Under Secretary full backing in competitions for contracts Deutch has established a study group on and projects [and] keep[ing] a sharp eye on global defense markets, and representatives of what foreign competitors are doing.” 9 the Office of Management and Budget and Within DOD, Secretary William Perry (while the newly formed National Economic Coun- still serving as Deputy Secretary) stated, “We cil have attended meetings of the group. should not only be willing to sell equipment to foreign countries, but the government Restraining Arms Exports should be willing to help in certain limited These three factors favoring arms exports ways.” But he added, “provided that we can are balanced and at times outweighed by assure that sales do not risk proliferation of equally strong considerations in favor of re- weapons of mass destruction, particularly straint. The first is a congressional injunction nuclear technology, and that we are not ag- that the executive branch take the lead in try- gravating an unstable region in which re- ing to limit worldwide arms sales. Though the gional wars are likely.” 10 The Deputy Direc- Arms Export Control Act supports defense tor of the Defense Security Assistance sales that contribute to collective security, the Agency (DSAA), which manages govern- act also states that it is the “sense of the ment-to-government arms sales, testified be- Congress” that the President should “main- fore Congress that “as our own defense tain adherence to a policy of restraint in con- spending decreases, defense exports have be- ventional arms transfers.” The act affirms that come much more important to the viability American policy is “to encourage regional of individual U.S. defense firms and to our arms control and disarmament agreements overall defense industrial base.” This official also stated that “some of our important domestic defense programs” (such as the F–15

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and to discourage arms races.” It notes that China) initiative on arms control in the Mid- “particular attention” should be paid to “con- dle East; and increasing the transparency of trolling the flow of conventional arms to the arms sales by means of the United Nations nations of the developing world.” 13 Register of Conventional Arms. These congressional guidelines have Maintaining Regional Stability helped hold down the technological level of The second reason that the United weapons in Latin America and sub-Saharan States exercises restraint in arms sales (and Africa. Further, they inject a note of caution urges other nations to do so) is to preserve into most decisions on arms exports. They specific regional military balances. The Joint reinforce the fact that, in contrast to foreign Chiefs of Staff have stated that weapons pro- sales of commercial liferation contributes to regional instability goods, the President proliferation of weapons of mass around the world, indicating that “technol- is required under ogy on the open market, such as high-reso- destruction reinforces restraint law to approve all lution satellite imagery and space navigation in conventional arms transfers sales of “defense ar- and communications systems, may also give ticles” and “defense advanced capabilities to powers that could services.” Although never afford to develop them on their defense industries support more relaxed leg- own.” 15 This is why Secretary Perry’s state- islative guidelines, there is no indication ment of support for defense exports con- that Congress thus far intends to make tained the cautionary note “provided that major changes. we can assure that sales do not risk prolifera- Two current senior defense officials pro- tion of weapons of mass destruction, partic- posed a parallel approach to restricting inter- ularly nuclear technology, and that we are national arms sales prior to being named to not aggravating an unstable region in which the Clinton administration. In a Brookings regional wars are likely.” study, William Perry (now the Secretary of De- The proliferation of weapons of mass defense) and Ashton Carter (now the Assistant struction reinforces the requirement for re- Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterpro- straint in conventional arms transfers. At the liferation) developed a concept of global coop- outset of the Gulf War, for instance, coali- erative security to replace the Western-oriented tion commanders were particularly con- collective security of the Cold War. Under this cerned about the possible Iraqi use of biolog- concept all nations would work toward the ical and chemical weapons. But the coalition goal of “restrain[ing] the ground forces and victory depended upon maintaining superi- tactical air assets that provide the firepower for ority in advanced conventional weapons offensive operations.” Moreover, they would and preventing the use of weapons of mass “less stringently limit systems that are more or destruction. Coalition air strikes were in- less unambiguously defensive and that can tended to destroy Iraq’s air defense system only be used to resist offensive intrusion on and large inventory of tanks as well as Scud national territory.” 14 missiles and biological and chemical To reinforce the control of global arms weapons plants. Iraqi air defenses and armor transfers, the United States is seeking multi- owed much to Western and Soviet transfer national agreements for restraint, particularly of weapons and technology. with regard to unstable regions and rogue A similar situation exists with respect to states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Iran. The United States strongly opposes Korea. American diplomacy is concentrating Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and on establishing a successor organization to acquisition of ballistic missiles from China the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral and North Korea. These weapons, if de- Export Controls (COCOM), through which ployed, would add a degree of terror to a NATO and Japan embargoed defense-related broader military buildup that already trou- technology to the communist bloc during bles Iran’s neighbors and threatens stability the Cold War; reviving the five-nation in the Gulf region. The United States has (United States, Britain, France, Russia, and shown that the anxiety over Iran goes far beyond weapons of mass destruction by attempting to persuade its allies to ban the

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Singaporean F–16. Combat Camera Imagery (Marv Lynchard)

sale of civil aircraft which could transport our weapons and equipment.” 16 The former troops and weapons for offensive operations Vice Chairman, Admiral David Jeremiah, ob- and by considering an embargo on trucks served that “increasingly, our [military] supe- which could support ground operations. riority depends on having the latest mi- The United States also seeks to limit crochip, the latest superminiature sensor, or conventional arms transfers to South Asia, the most advanced information-processing where both India and Pakistan are consid- software.” 17 Furthermore, General Sullivan ered friendly nations. This region is a testbed said that the “thrust of Army exploitation of for counterproliferation policy since these the microchip is to improve battlefield aware- two countries reportedly possess nuclear ness through horizontal integration and in- weapons. In such an environment each side sertion of digital technology.” 18 pays close attention to its rival’s fighter air- Economic competitiveness also influ- craft capabilities. Because the United States ences decisions on exports. The very sales wishes to avoid any action that could lessen that would furnish revenue to support mili- its ability to act as an honest broker, DOD tary and civilian R&D could transfer ad- has responded with restraint to proposals vanced technology to major commercial that American companies help upgrade competitors. Congress has stipulated that India’s MiG–21 aircraft. the Secretary of Defense must consider the effects on the defense industrial base of any The Technological Edge existing or proposed memorandum of un- A final factor in restraining arms exports derstanding (MOU) on arms cooperation. is the need to protect our lead in key tech- Congress also requires the Secretary to solicit nologies for both military and economic rea- the recommendations of the Secretary of sons. Defense officials agree that U.S. superi- Commerce on the trade implications of such ority in military technology must be MOUs and their potential effects on the “in- sustained as troop strength and weapons ternational competitive position of United drop. The Bottom-Up Review spoke of a tech- States industry.” 19 nological revolution and stated that we must “maintain the technological superiority of

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Turkish Rapier anti- The Joint Dimension aircraft missile system Joint commanders and planners bring at Incirlik Air Base. two strengths to policymaking that involve the broad range of security and economic considerations which have been described. The first is a sense of urgency. Joint planners in Washington and regional commands must know as quickly as possible which weapons or technologies are going into each region. One flag officer on the Joint Staff told a recent meeting that he needed firm decisions on whether U.S. companies would be allowed to upgrade Soviet-built fighter aircraft worldwide. He could live with any decision; but his staff had to project the military capabilities of potentially friendly and hostile forces so that the CINCs could adjust operational plans accordingly.

U.S. Air Force (Buck Walker) Action officers adopt an even blunter approach to Pentagon policymaking. One member of the Joint Staff who will soon take Technology reciprocity (a two-way command of an artillery battalion told his street) is now key to armaments coopera- civilian counterparts: “I have a very practical tion. In 1989 Congress conditioned accep- interest in arms exports. I want to know Combat Camera Imagery (Marv Lynchard) tance of co-development of the FS–X fighter which weapons my battalion may go up program on assurances of access to manufac- against.” In this view (too easily overlooked turing technology for active phased array in Washington) destabilizing weapons sys- radars and composite aircraft wings, two tems are those that prevent commanders areas in which Japan appeared to lead the from accomplishing their missions. United States. The second contribution that planners The administration is trying to increase make to arms export policy is operational reciprocity in both civilian and military tech- knowledge of weapons and technology. If nology, particularly with respect to Japan. members of the Joint Staff or regional com- The President’s national technology program mands start as amateurs in arms export proce- calls for greater access to “foreign science and dures, they are already professionals in the technology” as well as a “trade policy that substantive issues at stake. The Joint Staff, encourages open but fair trade.” 20 American combatant commands, and services regularly trade officials are pressing Japan to guarantee review applications to sell weapons and de- industry a specific percentage of the Japanese fense technology abroad (that is, munitions market in semiconductors, telecommunica- licenses). Moreover, when a nation seeks a tions, and automobile parts. Senior defense system that is substantially more capable officials have urged Japan to be more forth- than the corresponding one now deployed, coming in sharing military technology. One the Joint Staff—often aided by regional proposal is to exchange American military CINCs—provides an assessment of threats to technology for Japanese dual-use technology. that nation and a judgment as to whether the To help ensure that defense industries proposed improvement is militarily justified. remain competitive a decade or two from now, DOD ordinarily prefers that American Fighter Upgrades firms export finished military systems or In late 1993 and early 1994 the Joint Staff components (end items) and the technology applied its experience in munitions licensing needed to maintain them. DOD is reluctant to help develop an important arms export to transfer design, development, and manu- policy. The Directorate for Strategic Plans and facturing technology because this could Policy (J-5) asked DOD to determine whether strengthen foreign competitors.

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American companies would be permitted to MiG–29 review one official stated that engi- modernize MiG–29 fighters in twenty coun- neers in his office could describe the techni- tries in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. J-5 cal gains made from modernizing MiG maintained that these MiGs represent a quan- avionics but that he needed the input of sea- tum leap in capability over other Soviet-pro- soned fighter pilots to grasp the real effect of duced fighters that have modernization on the military situation in been widely exported (the specific regions. joint planners will influence MiG–21 being described as Beyond fighter upgrade policies, the the administration’s policy an entry level system). Thus Joint Staff, regional CINCs, and services are statement on conventional DOD had to consider that directly supporting the DOD counterprolif- improvements in MiG–29 eration initiative by determining which arms transfers communications, naviga- friendly countries face the greatest military tion, radar, and weapons threat from hostile ballistic missiles and systems might change the military balance in what would be the most effective U.S.-allied regions critical to U.S. interests. Such im- defenses in each situation. provements also could challenge American Finally, joint planners will influence the air superiority in those regions. administration’s policy statement on conven- Civilian as well as military staffs through- tional arms transfers. The Joint Staff has been out the Pentagon accepted this determina- tasked to draft the section of that statement tion. The DOD Arms Export Policy Working on weapons and technologies which if trans- Group drew up a policy that specified whose ferred could have a marked impact. Since op- MiG–29s can be upgraded and what level of posing arguments on defense sales tend to technology can be provided. That policy takes offset one another, this operational and tech- into account factors such as foreign policy, re- nical section may have a greater impact on gional stability, defense sales, and technologi- arms exports than others dealing with cal superiority. broader policy and economic considerations. Joint Staff and CINC planners also can help resolve difficult export cases concern- It has been said that because CINCs may ing the integration of U.S. technology in for- have to face any weapon that enters their re- eign aircraft. American companies that spe- gions, they instinctively oppose transferring cialize in defense electronics and systems “anything more advanced than a spear.” But integration see the growing global market the author also has heard field grade and for aircraft modernization as an opportunity general officers comment that “The Presi- to sell products beyond a shrinking domestic dent has said ‘It’s the economy, friend,’ and market. Some Pentagon officials support we will support him.” That tension will be such sales as the only way to maintain the felt by joint planners trying to evaluate the lead in many technologies critical to mili- many factors that bear on arms export pol- tary superiority. icy in the mid-1990s. If planners remember Manufacturers, however, believe that up- that their job is to explain how the weapons grades may reduce sales of new aircraft. In and technologies under review will affect op- their view, integrating American avionics erations, they can help shape decisions that (the world’s best) into Russian or European will strengthen both national security and airframes offers a relatively cheap way for for- economic competitiveness. JFQ eign governments to acquire modern fighter aircraft. That concern was expressed in the NOTES MiG–29 review by one senior officer who in- 1 Gordon R. Sullivan, “Projecting Strategic Land dicated that he did not want to put American Combat Power,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer weapons or technology on aircraft that could 1993), p. 9. 2 Arms Export Control Act, Public Law 90–629 (as become a threat to our Armed Forces. amended), section 1. It will be hard to devise a DOD policy 3 Giovanni de Briganti, “U.S. Position on Arms Cheers that satisfactorily balances these competing Allies,” Defense News, May 3–9, 1993, p. 16. See also “Pen- interests. Joint planners can help by assess- tagon to Revitalize the NATO-Nunn Programme,” Jane’s ing the relative military benefits of integrat- Defence Weekly, December 4, 1993, pp. 19–20. ing U.S. technology on foreign platforms versus buying new U.S. aircraft. During the

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4 Charles R. Larson, “Cooperative Engagement,” 11 Glenn A. Rudd, “U.S. Military Assistance and Sales Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 82–87. to East Asia,” The DISAM Journal [Defense Institute of 5 Barbara Starr, “USA, Saudi Arabia Plan ‘Crisis’ Coop- Security Assistance Management] (Summer 1993), p. 86. eration,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 13, 1993, p. 16. 12 Laura D. Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom?—Trade Con- 6 For an unofficial description of one aspect of the flict in High-Technology Industries (Washington: Institute problem, see Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging for International Economics, November 1992), p. 160. Threat, 1992, produced by System Planning Corporation 13 Arms Export Control Act, section 1. for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (Wash- 14 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. ington: Department of Defense, 1992). Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, 7 Remarks by Les Aspin to the National Academy of Brookings occasional papers (Washington: Brookings Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Institution, 1992), pp. 8, 10–11. Control (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on the (Public Affairs) transcript, December 7, 1993), p. 1. See Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the also Michael R. Gordon, “Pentagon Begins Effort to Com- United States (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Febru- bat More Lethal Arms in Third World,” The New York ary 1993), p. I–5. Times, December 8, 1993, p. 15; John Lancaster, “Aspin 16 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washing- Pledges New Military Efforts to Counter Weapons Prolif- ton: Department of Defense, October 1993), pp. 12, 33. eration,” The Washington Post, December 8, 1993, p. 7. 17 David E. Jeremiah, “What’s Ahead for the Armed 8 Statement by Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary of State Forces?” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer 1993), p. 32. for International Security Affairs, before the Committee 18 Sullivan, “Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power,” on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Depart- p. 11. ment of State typescript, November 10, 1993), p. 1. 19 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 9 David Silverberg, “Clinton Defies Wisdom, Backs 1990 and 1991, Public Law 101–189, November 29, 1989, Defense Sales,” Defense News, May 17–23, 1993, p. 3. section 815. 10 David Silverberg, “Perry Backs Limited Aid to 20 William J. Clinton, Technology for America’s Economic Boost U.S. Arms Exports,” Defense News, June 7–13, Growth: A New Direction to Build Economic Strength (Wash- 1993, p. 24. ington: The White House, February 22, 1993), p. 3.

Joint Force Quarterly 1994 Readership Survey

questionnaire distributed to all readers of JFQ with issue number 3 (Winter 1993–94) yielded a total of 576 responses through June 30, 1994. The following Asummary of the survey’s results provides a snapshot of the readers and their preferences during the journal’s first year of publication. Readership Profile Of all respondents, 83 percent were members of the Armed Forces. The service affiliation of the active and Reserve component respondents combined was Army, 30 percent; Navy, 32 percent; Marine Corps, 7 percent; Air Force, 30 percent; and Coast Guard, 1 percent. Majors and lieutenant commanders comprised 29 percent of military readers; lieutenant colonels and commanders, 32 percent; colonels and captains, 19 percent; general and flag officers, 8 percent; and junior officers et al., 12 percent. Readership Acceptance Of the officers, 49 percent normally read most articles and another 41 percent read some of them. Other than feature articles the most stimulating contributions (ranked in order of popularity) were Out of Joint (or commentary), professional notes (The Joint World), book reviews, and letters to the editor. In terms of overall relevance, balance, and accuracy, 31 percent rated JFQ to be excellent and 65 percent either very good or good. In responding to how faithfully the journal met its purpose—to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces—28 percent stated that it was right on target and another 66 percent indicated that it met the purpose either very closely or closely. JFQ

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Joint Operations

in the CivilWar By SCOTT W. STUCKY

Marching through South Carolina (Harper’s Weekly).

Naval Historical Center

Summary

While the earliest example of jointness in American military history may be the subject of an open debate, two campaigns conducted during the Civil War display characteristics attributed to joint operations today. The capture in 1862 of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers respectively, involved riverine operations mounted by the Army and Navy. Though Union forces achieved their objectives, there were no joint commands or doctrinal pubs to show the way. The successful assault on Fort Fisher on the South Carolina coast in 1864–65 was an operation undertaken on a much greater scale that called upon the warfighting skills of soldiers, sailors, and marines. That victory revealed the emerging organizational capabilities of joint forces and demonstrated that senior commanders were becoming adept at employing the assets of each service to wage war both on land and at sea.

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experience in joint operations was limited U.S. Navy Landing at Fort Fisher (Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper). n analysis of two campaigns of Naval thinking on joint operations was the Civil War—at Fort Henry and sketchier. The traditional attitude was that Fort Donelson on the Tennessee aspiring officers could learn everything they A and Cumberland Rivers and at needed to know by putting to sea at an early Fort Fisher on the North Carolina coast— age. The Naval Academy was not established may determine the significance of these until 1845, but since no naval counterpart of early joint operations on the evolution of Jomini had yet emerged the Navy paid little the American way of war. Did the Union attention to the theory of war, let alone am- have a coherent joint strategy in 1861–62? phibious or other joint operations.5 Were ad hoc joint operations conducted Experience in joint operations before based upon the personalities of Army and 1861 was limited. The Revolutionary War in- Navy commanders? What role did politics volved several amphibious expeditions in- play in fostering interservice cooperation? cluding a combined French-American fiasco Were there any lasting effects of jointness at Newport in 1778 and a successful opera- during the Civil War? tion at Yorktown in 1781.6 But the fact that In 1861 Clausewitz had been dead for the Navy was not established until 1794 thirty years. However his major work, On (and then virtually abolished again by Jeffer- War, had yet to be translated into English son) illustrates that no lasting lessons on the and was largely unknown to Americans.1 efficacy of joint operations were learned. The tactical manuals in use at the U.S. Mili- The most recent experience before the tary Academy, Mahan’s Out-Post 2 and Civil War was Winfield Scott’s unopposed Hardee’s Tactics,3 did not mention joint op- landing at Vera Cruz in 1847, a superbly exe- erations. Jomini’s The Art of War, the princi- cuted operation using the first specially de- pal strategy text of the day at West Point, signed landing craft in U.S. military history. contained a short item on “descents” (a term Some 8,600 troops were put ashore in a few of art for amphibious operations), but stated that such operations were “rare” and “among the most difficult in war.” 4

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hours without losing a man, a fitting pre- in active command. Second, the notion that lude to a brilliant campaign.7 Scott, aged 75, McDowell’s corps was essential to victory on was general-in-chief of the Army in 1861, the peninsula is nonsense. McClellan always though physically unfit for field service. He greatly overestimated his opponents, and foresaw a long and difficult war. In May McDowell would not have made a differ- 1861 he wrote to his successor, George B. ence. Third, McClellan had no authority McClellan, describing his famed Anaconda whatsoever over naval forces. To assume that Plan to strangle the Confederacy by means as general-in-chief in Washington he could of a blockade and to invade the South by have forced Army-Navy cooperation in dis- joint operations conducted down the Missis- tant theaters flies in the face of experience sippi to New Orleans. The appointment of throughout the Civil War. Finally, this inter- McClellan to command the Army of the Po- pretation simply ignores fatal flaws in his tomac, friction among generals, and Scott’s character. An unwillingness to move quickly debility prompted his retirement and re- and fight, consistent overestimation of his placement by McClellan in November 1861. opponents, secretiveness about his inten- McClellan’s tenure as general-in-chief tions, and contempt for his political masters lasted only four months; yet it has been in this most political of wars destroyed Mc- claimed that in this time he formulated a Clellan in the final analysis. There is abso- revolutionary strategy of joint operations lutely no reason to think that if he had been that would begin with strikes at Charleston, general-in-chief and given everything he New Bern, Mobile, and New Orleans, and wanted in the Peninsular Campaign it would then, driving inward along railroads and the have made any difference. Spinning out Mississippi, cut internal communications grandiose plans was an activity that McClel- and split the Confederacy.8 In this interpreta- lan enjoyed; execution was another matter. tion, the Peninsular Campaign is viewed as a Neither command arrangements nor doc- triumph of jointness that was only unsuc- trine for joint operations existed at the time. cessful because of Lincoln’s obtuseness in Successful joint operations, like much else, keeping McDowell’s corps in Washington, by would have to be improvised by those on fumbling on the part of the Navy, and by the the scene. demotion of McClellan, which “prevented Forts Henry and Donelson him from coordinating the movements of The first large-scale joint operation in other Federal armies...or obtaining rein- the western theater was the campaign for forcements from less active theaters of war.” 9 Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, which The final conclusion is that a major opportu- brought Ulysses S. Grant to public attention. nity slipped away: Central Tennessee was of strategic impor- The Navy . . . was allowed to pursue an indepen- tance to the Confederacy. It was a fertile dent strategy while the Army commanders, lacking farming area and held large iron deposits as McClellan’s foresight and flexibility of method, agreed well as numerous forges and furnaces. With with the Lincoln administration that wars were only the lack of industrial capacity in the South, won by slugging it out on the battlefield. The failure of the Peninsular Campaign signalled both the demise the area was a resource almost beyond esti- of Federal grand strategy and the demise of [joint] op- mate. The immense natural problems of de- erations planning.10 fending it, however, were devilishly complicated by Kentucky’s attempt to remain This revisionist interpretation is deeply neutral. Since neither side wanted the op- flawed. First, it posits that McClellan could probrium of violating this neutrality, defen- have, with the nebulous powers of general- sive works to protect central Tennessee had in-chief, achieved results with field armies to be built outside Kentucky.11 that he was unable to do with his own when Given the poor roads and lack of north- south railways, the likely invasion route into central Tennessee was by the twin rivers, the Scott W. Stucky is chief of the Legislative Branch, Tennessee on the west and the Cumberland General Law Division, in the Office of The Judge on the east. To counter this threat Confeder- Advocate General, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. ate fortifications were constructed on both He completed this article while attending the rivers in 1861. Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, National War College.

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was poorly located on low land facing Ken- were launched by November. The Army tucky over the river. Fort Donelson, 12 miles Quartermaster Corps, however, was terribly east on the Cumberland, was a stronger posi- slow in paying the contractors. Foote also tion. It sat on a bluff 75 to 100 feet above had enormous trouble getting crews. As late the river and was surrounded by gullies that as January 9 Foote still had to commission would hamper assault by land.12 In Novem- Cincinnati and Carondelet with only one- ber 1861, Union Army forces in the area third of their crews. And at the start of the Fort Henry expedition Halleck was still au- thorizing Grant to detail soldiers for gunboat duty.15 Nevertheless, by the end of January Foote had a workable gunboat fleet. In early January Halleck directed Grant to reconnoiter up the Tennessee to keep Polk from sending reinforcements to Bowling Green, toward which Buell was planning an advance in response to Lincoln’s desires. This excursion turned into a miniature version of General Ambrose Burnside’s “mud march” a year later. Grant said, “We were

Naval Historical Center out more than a week splashing through the Attack on Fort Henry mud, snow, and rain, the men suffering very (Thomas Nast; in much.” 16 The reconnaissance had its in- Pictorial Battles of were shaken when Major General Henry W. tended effect in that Polk sent no reinforce- the Civil War). Halleck assumed departmental command in ments, and General George Thomas was vic- St. Louis. Grant was subordinate to Halleck. torious at Mill Springs, thereby erasing the But not all Union forces in Kentucky were threat of a Confederate move against Buell’s under Halleck. Rather he shared responsibil- flank. Grant, however, was restless and im- ity for the state with Major General Don patient; he saw opportunity in a joint opera- Carlos Buell who commanded the Army of tion up the twin rivers but had to persuade the Ohio from Louisville. Buell’s department Halleck to approve such an expedition. He included Kentucky east of the Cumberland accordingly traveled to St. Louis for an inter- and all of Tennessee.13 view with Halleck, which went badly. Hal- Lincoln was eager for a campaign in leck barely knew Grant but was familiar with Tennessee to succor the Unionists in the the stories of Grant’s drinking.17 Grant re- eastern part of the state. But mounting such counted the scene in his memoirs: an expedition depended on naval forces I was received with so little cordiality that I per- which did not as yet exist. The first naval haps stated the object of my visit with less clearness commander in the west, John Rodgers, was than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sent to the Mississippi primarily to interdict sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was pre- clandestine commerce, although he was also posterous. I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.18 charged with beginning work on the Ana- Crestfallen Grant may have been, but conda Plan’s advance down the river. This his spirits revived upon his return to Illinois, thrust, it was thought, required construction where he consulted with Foote, who agreed of a fleet of ironclads. Building them was a on the advisability of a joint operation down joint Army-Navy affair, and squabbles over the rivers. Therefore, on January 28 both of- the contract resulted in the recall of Com- ficers cabled Halleck, asking permission to mander Rodgers and his replacement by occupy Fort Henry. Foote stated that four Captain Andrew Hull Foote.14 ironclads would suffice. Foote’s endorsement Foote, a strongly religious New Englan- of the plan changed Halleck’s mind.19 der and a strict temperance man, was in- Grant and Foote worked closely together structed by Secretary of the Navy Gideon in arranging transportation and planning for Welles to cooperate with the Army without the landing of troops. The expedition sailed subordinating himself. He threw himself into constructing the ironclads and seven

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Fort Donelson: Situation on the Night of February 14–15, 1862.

DOVER

Source: The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959).

Fort Donelson: Situation at Noon on February 15, 1862.

Source: The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959).

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Fort Donelson: Situation on the Night of February 15–16, 1862.

Source: The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959).

on February 4 and landed troops early the crew, and the Columbiad was accidentally next day some miles north of Fort Henry. spiked by a broken priming wire. With the The land advance was slow because of severe gunboats firing at point-blank range, Tilgh- rains and poor road conditions. On February man raised a white flag. The river was so high 6 Foote took his gunboats down to the fort that the boat sent to accept the surrender and began a bombardment. floated in through the fort’s sally port. Grant’s The river in the winter of 1862 crested forces arrived only 30 minutes after the sur- some 30 feet above normal. This flood was a render, having been delayed on the roads, disaster for the Confederacy because it made and Foote turned the fort over to the Army.20 the mines anchored to the river bottom use- Foote, who felt unprepared for another less and put part of Fort Henry under water. attack against fixed fortifications so soon Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, com- after the heavy Fort Henry action, nonethe- manding there, had 3,000 men and 17 guns; less attacked Fort Donelson on the 14th. This however, only two of the riverside guns, a bombardment was as unsuccessful as the one Columbiad and a 24-pounder rifle, were ef- on Henry had been successful. Donelson, lo- fective against armor. Tilghman, thinking cated on high bluffs, could subject gunboats Fort Henry indefensible, had sent most of to an intense plunging fire. One after an- his men to Fort Donelson. other, the gunboats were disabled and floated The artillery battle between Foote’s gun- back downstream. St. Louis, now Foote’s flag- boats and the fort was heavy. USS Essex was ship, was hit 59 times and Foote himself was hit in a boiler by the Columbiad, causing wounded. The weather had now turned bit- “carnage” below decks and scalding the cap- terly cold, and Grant was faced with contain and others. USS Cincinnati, Foote’s flag- ducting a siege under unfavorable condi- ship, absorbed over 30 hits. But then the fort’s 24-pounder burst, killing most of the

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Strategic Situation at the End of the Campaign (c. February 27, 1862).

Source: The West Point Atlas of American Wars (New York: Praeger, 1959).

tions. On the 15th he met with the wounded Grant to invest the post, missing the opportu- Foote, who said he would have to return to nity for strategic withdrawal and the saving of Cairo to repair damages but would return the 17,000 who eventually surrendered. After within 10 days and lay siege to the fort with squabbles within the Confederate command, his gunboats. In the meantime, the least the episode ended with unconditional surren- damaged vessels would remain on station.21 der to Grant on February 16. While Foote’s attack had been a tactical The Henry and Donelson Campaign il- failure, it had important operational results. lustrates several points about the conduct of The Confederate commanders in the fort, joint operations at this stage of the war. mesmerized by the naval threat, had allowed First, of course, in the absence of unified command or meaningful joint doctrine, the conception and execution of joint operations totally depended on ad hoc actions by

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Stucky Naval Historical Center Fort Donelson (Harper’s Weekly). the responsible commanders, and therefore and even then they depended more on per- upon their personal chemistry and commu- sonalities than on well-thought-out doctrine. nications. Foote and Grant were very differ- Finally, although the Henry-Donelson ent individuals—one a teetotaler who Campaign produced important strategic re- preached sermons, the other a cigar-smoking sults, it was not followed up. Halleck seemed quasi-alcoholic who had left the Army under more intent on curbing his ambitious subor- a cloud—yet they worked well together. dinates than on exploiting the victory. As a Whatever their differences, they shared a result, Grant’s services were essentially lost to common inclination to attack the enemy, the Union until fall 1862, and much that lay both hating inactivity. They maintained ex- open to conquest after Henry and Donelson cellent communications without undue (including East Tennessee, so vital to Lin- worry as to who would get the credit—a coln) had to be won by bloody attrition later. quality rare in Civil War commanders. Fort Fisher The second point is that the command Operations at Fort Fisher in December arrangements which did exist on the Army 1864 and January 1865 differ from the Fort side hampered rather than encouraged suc- Henry and Fort Donelson campaign in sev- cessful joint operations. Although Grant de- eral important particulars. First, by late 1864 scribed Foote as “subject to the command of most observers would have pronounced the General Halleck,” 22 he was not in any formal Confederates defeated as opposed to early sense. His instructions from the Navy Depart- 1862 when the issue was still in question. ment were to cooperate, and he did that ad- Second, there was difference of scale, the as- mirably; but he was not Halleck’s subordi- saults on Fort Fisher being vastly larger. nate. Halleck therefore had true operational Third, the amicable relations that had control of only half the joint operation. marked the Union high command during Moreover, Halleck’s the Henry-Donelson Campaign were con- Fort Fisher bore more similarity dislike and distrust spicuously absent in the first phase of the of Grant almost de- to the amphibious landings in the operations at Fort Fisher. Finally, of course, stroyed the opera- Fort Fisher was a coastal rather than a river- Pacific during World War II tion before it began. ine operation and the execution bore more In addition, depart- similarity to the amphibious landings in the mental arrangements then were highly un- Pacific during World War II than to Fort satisfactory. Halleck had no operational con- Henry and Fort Donelson. trol over Buell, who was supposed to be Fort Fisher was located on a peninsula moving in support of Grant, but who between the Cape Fear River and the Atlantic adamantly refused to budge. Another two Ocean 18 miles south of Wilmington and de- years would pass before the North developed scribed as “the largest, most formidable forti- satisfactory high command arrangements, fication in the Confederate States of America.” 23 After the Battle of Mobile Bay,

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pulse a land assault.26 By late 1864, Fort Second Attack on Fort Fisher Fisher, mounting 44 large guns, was truly impressive. Its principal weakness was manpower, the permanent garrison numbering only 600. The impetus for a joint Army-Navy expedition against Fort Fisher came from Secre- tary Welles. When Wilmington became the preeminent blockade-running port in mid- 1864, Welles persuaded Lincoln and Secre- tary of War Edwin M. Stanton to support a joint operation. But Grant, by now a lieutenant general and general-in-chief of the Union armies, was cool to the idea since he did not want to commit a large number of troops and disapproved of the War Depart- ment’s choice to lead the Army contingent, Major General Quincy A. Gillmore, who had performed badly in the opening phase of the Richmond campaign earlier in the year. Eventually, Grant approved committing about 7,000 troops to the operation, but ve- toed Gillmore and instead chose Godfrey A. Weitzel. Grant particularly approved of Weitzel because he agreed that the fort could be taken without a huge mass of infantry. Welles had command problems as well. Source: Walter A. Lane, The Soldier in Our Civil War, vol. II (New York: Stanley Bradley, 1890). The naval command was offered to Admiral David G. Farragut, but the hero of Mobile Bay was in poor health and declined, believing the expedition to be dubious. It was then Wilmington, always popular with blockade offered to Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, runners, was the only port open for such the brash son of a hero of the War of 1812. commerce—the South’s sole lifeline to the Seeing a chance for glory and advancement, outside world. One hundred blockade run- Porter threw himself into the planning of ners sailed in and out of Wilmington during this largest naval expedition of the war.27 the war.24 Blockading the port was difficult Command arrangements were then because two separate inlets into the river, completely upset by the commander of the separated by 25 miles of shoals, had to be Army of the James, Major General Benjamin watched—an arc 50 miles long.25 F. Butler, in whose area of responsibility Fort Colonel William Lamb, the commander, Fisher lay. He decided to take personal com- had been working steadily on the fortifica- mand of the Army portion of the expeditions for two years. By late 1864, an L-shaped tion. Butler was the stormy petrel of Federal earthen work consisting of a half-mile land- command who sowed controversy wherever face crossed the peninsula. Made of 15 thirty- he went. A brilliant and eccentric Mas- foot traverses containing bombproofs and sachusetts lawyer and politician, he had, as a connected by a tunnel, the fort mounted 20 delegate to the Democratic convention in Columbiads, three mortars, and several field 1860, voted 57 times to nominate Jefferson pieces. For a half-mile north, trees had been Davis. Commissioned a major general of vol- felled to present a clear field of fire. The land- unteers in 1861, he regarded escaped slaves face was also defended by a minefield—a as contraband of war. Although scandal re- great innovation. Twenty-four buried shells sulted in Butler’s relief at New Orleans in and mines were connected electrically to re- 1862, his status as a leading War Democrat ensured his continued employment, despite

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rascality and almost total failure in the in a rage, ordering his transports to follow as field.28 The problem with his assuming com- soon as they finished taking on coal. mand was that he and Porter despised each Louisiana, under Commander Alexander other. But the immediate effect of Butler’s C. Rhind, was towed close to Fort Fisher on interposition was delay. Some of this was the the evening of the 23rd. Her engines were normal confusion attendant upon such a then started and the ship was moved closer. switch; most of it, however, was due to the The night was clear, however, and a blockade famous affair of the powder-boat.29 runner, Little Hattie, inconveniently ap- Butler was greatly interested in innova- peared. Not wanting to alert the fort’s sen- tive military technology and an unsuccessful tries, Rhind anchored his vessel at a point he inventor himself. Prompted by newspaper thought was about 300 yards away but was accounts of the destruction caused by the ac- actually about twice that.32 The fuses were lit cidental explosion of two gunpowder barges and the crew got away. Louisiana went up in in England, he conceived the idea of packing a huge explosion shortly before 0200 on the a hulk with explosives and running it in 24th. Allan Nevins called it “one of the most near Fort Fisher. At a meeting with Grant ludicrous fiascoes of the war.” Rhind, watch- and Porter in November, he predicted that ing his work go up in smoke, remarked such a huge explosion would flatten the “There’s a fizzle,” and went below. The explo- fort’s wall and kill most inside, so that in- sion, though impressive, did absolutely noth- fantry could walk in and take it. Grant was ing to the fort except waken its garrison and unenthusiastic but let the scheme proceed. badly frighten the teenaged recruits. There Porter, despite his dislike for Butler, was would be no easy entry into Fort Fisher.33 taken in and agreed to provide the ship, ex- On December 24, Porter began an excep- plosives, and transport. The ship selected tionally heavy naval bombardment, firing was USS Louisiana, a flat-bottomed, shallow- over a hundred rounds a minute. The fort draft vessel assigned to blockade duty. It was replied with fairly limited fire because the disarmed, cut down, camouflaged to look bombardment made the gun emplacements like a blockade runner, loaded with 200 tons exceedingly uncomfortable and to save am- of gunpowder, and fitted with an elaborate munition. Nevertheless, several of Porter’s ignition system.30 ships were damaged by fire. More serious were The expedition left Hampton Roads on five accidental explosions of Parrott rifles in December 13 and 14. Butler’s transports car- the fleet which caused 37 casualties and forced ried two divisions, 6,500 men; Porter had 57 Porter to silence the 100-pounders. ironclads, frigates, and gunboats. The expe- Butler finally arrived late in the day, ex- dition arrived off Wilmington December 19, ceedingly disgruntled by Porter’s actions. but a gale began to blow and the transports Porter, in turn, was peeved at the transports returned to Beaufort to wait it out. The arriving too late to attempt a landing that storm lasted three days which enabled day and suspended the bombardment. Some Colonel Lamb to bolster his defenses; by De- 10,000 shells had been thrown into Fort cember 23 he had some 1,400 troops in the Fisher with very little effect.34 fort, though a third were “junior reserves”— The landing took place north of the fort boys 16 to 18 years old.31 on Christmas. About 2,000 troops went Butler sent Porter word that he would re- ashore under Weitzel’s command, while turn on the 24th, with bombardment and Porter resumed the bombardment. While landing on Christmas Day. Porter, whose unopposed, the landing soon made it appar- ships had ridden out the gale without serious ent that the fort was still full of resistance. damage, decided to set off the powder-boat Canister exploded in the advancing ranks, early on the 24th—in the Army’s absence— and mines took their toll. Moreover, the and begin bombardment the same day. wind was coming up, which meant reem- When he heard this, Butler exploded. The barkation might be impossible. Finally, Con- old animosity between the two commanders federate prisoners boasted that 6,000 men fused with the Navy’s seeming desire to get under General Robert Hoke were on their all the glory. Butler promptly steamed south way from Wilmington. Though Butler’s orders from Grant explicitly directed him to entrench and besiege the fort if necessary, he

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to add to your brow the laurels thrown away by General Butler after they were laid at his feet by the Navy, and which neither he nor those with him had the courage to gather up.” To Welles in Washington Porter wrote: “I feel ashamed that men calling themselves soldiers should have left this place so in- gloriously....[In] a war like this, so many incompetent men in the Army are placed in charge of important trusts....If this temporary

Naval Historical Center failure succeeds in sending On the Ogeechee near General Butler into private Fort McAllister (in The life, it is not to be regret- Soldier in Our Civil War). thought it impossible to carry the place by ted.” Later, when Butler attempted to blame storm and did not want to undertake a siege. the failure on the Navy, Porter pronounced He therefore ordered a withdrawal, although Butler’s report “a tissue of misstatements officers on the scene felt that a determined from beginning to end.” 37 The fiasco ended attack would have worked. The withdrawal Butler’s military career. had to be broken off when the surf became While Porter had wanted Sherman to re- too high to bring in the boats. Butler sailed place Butler, Grant’s choice, Major General for Hampton Roads, leaving 700 men on the Alfred H. Terry, was excellent, as unlike the beach.35 Porter was livid. Even prior to the flamboyant Butler as imaginable. Though attack, relations between the two had be- not a professional soldier, he had risen to come so bad that they only communicated command a corps on merit. He was quiet, through intermediaries. Now Butler aban- dependable, and easygoing, attributes that doned the joint effort, leaving his men and helped in dealing with the mercurial, self- Porter in the lurch. Porter, to his credit, kept promoting Porter.38 Grant’s instructions to up continuous fire and managed to get the Terry left no doubt that he did not want a 700 men off the beach when the wind repetition of the former command friction. changed the following day. He then gradu- He wrote to Porter in the same vein: ally withdrew to Beaufort. I send [Terry] with the same troops General But- The rebels were naturally jubilant at the ler had, with one picked brigade added, to renew the repulse of the huge expedition. Lamb tele- attempt on Fort Fisher....[He] will consult with you graphed, “This morning, the foiled and fully, and will be governed by your suggestions as far frightened enemy left our shore.” The depart- as his responsibility for the safety of his command mental commander, General Braxton Bragg, will admit of.” 39 wrote President Davis commending Lamb Porter was somewhat dubious of Terry, and Brigadier General W.H.C. Whiting, for because he had been a subordinate of Butler’s “gallantry, efficiency, and fortitude displayed and because the additional troops he brought under very trying circumstances.” 36 were colored, of whom Porter disapproved. Reaction in the North was stinging. However, once the two men met at Beaufort Grant wired Lincoln that “The Wilmington on January 8, things went well. After a three- expedition has proven a gross and culpable day gale they set out on January 12, the failure....Who is to blame will, I hope, be largest expedition ever to sail under the known.” Porter, in writing to General American flag to that time. Porter had 59 war- William T. Sherman, whom he hoped would replace Butler, criticized the Army: “When you have captured [Savannah] I invite you

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ships mounting 627 guns, while Terry had to the scene. On seeing well-entrenched Fed- nearly 9,000 men in 21 transport vessels.40 eral troops (who he overestimated), Bragg The fleet arrived at Wilmington late at thought the assault futile, especially given night. Porter had been dissatisfied with the the power of the fleet. He countermanded accuracy of naval gunnery in the first bom- his order and Hoke remained quiescent.43 bardment; far too many shells had sailed Porter resumed the bombardment on over the fort and landed in the river or sim- the 14th. It had a substantial effect. General ply buried themselves in the sand. His in- Whiting, who thought Bragg a fool and had structions directed commanders to not fire come to share the fort’s fate, said, “It was beat the fort’s flag but to pick out the guns. yond description, no language can describe The Parrott rifles, whose explosions had the terrific bombardment.” The fort took caused problems, were to be fired with re- some 300 casualties, and only one gun on duced charges if at all.41 the landface was still operational.44 The Confederate garrison was only 700 Porter and Terry met that night aboard strong. Hoke’s division, which had arrived Porter’s flagship and planned the land as- just as Butler withdrew, had itself been with- sault. The fleet would bombard until 1500 drawn to Wilmington by Bragg, who did not on the 15th. Then two columns would as- think that the Union would attack again be- sault the fort, one Army, one Navy. While fore spring. Lamb, on sighting the fleet, ur- 4,000 Army troops assaulted the landface gently appealed to Bragg, who ordered Hoke near its western end, the Navy with 2,000 back, telling him to prevent a landing, and if sailors and marines would attack the north- it had already occurred to establish a defen- east bastion. The remaining 4,000 soldiers sive line to protect Wilmington. ashore would protect the rear against an at- Porter began the bombardment before tack by Hoke. The naval assault was a dubi- dawn on the 13th, hoping to provoke the ous proposition, consisting of sending fort’s guns into disclosing their location by sailors ignorant of infantry tactics and muzzle flashes. This worked, and after sunrise armed only with cutlasses and pistols against the rest of the fleet joined in, firing as heavy strong works. Perhaps Porter, despite excel- as, and substantially more accurately than, lent cooperation with Terry, was loath to the December bombardment. The landing give the Army all the glory of storming the began between 0800 and 0900 hours. To fort. The assault failed and the sailors were guard against a repetition of the December fi- badly cut up by musket fire and canister, tak- asco, where the men had been marooned for ing about 300 casualties. Pinned down, they a day, the troops carried three days’ rations. desperately attempted to dig holes in the Terry’s biggest fear was an attack during the sand and finally broke and ran. landing by Hoke’s troops; therefore, the Fed- However, the naval assault had done the eral troops were ordered to establish a defen- Army attackers a great service. Convinced sive line facing north. But the landing was that this was the main attack, the rebel man- unopposed and 8,000 men got ashore by power and attention were diverted from the mid-afternoon. Porter kept up the bombard- landface. Even as the exultant Confederates ment until dark and left ironclads at work all watched, in Lamb’s words, “a disorderly rout night to discourage repairs to the fort. Several of American sailors and marines,” Union ships were damaged but none severely.42 flags appeared on the western end of the By this time, Hoke’s division had ad- landface. A counterattack was mounted, but vanced from Wilmington and set up a de- then the fleet opened up on the Confeder- fensive line. Despite appeals from the fort, ates massed in the fort, creating havoc. Fierce Bragg, thinking the Union force too strong hand-to-hand fighting ensued at the land- to resist, at first refused to order Hoke to at- face, where ships could not fire without hit- tack on the peninsula. Lamb was reinforced ting friendly forces. The fight moved from with North Carolina soldiers and sailors, one traverse to another and did not end until bringing his force to about 1,550. On the about 2200 hours.45 The fort surrendered 14th, Bragg ordered Hoke to attack and went with some 2,000 men and 169 guns. Terry sustained 955 casualties and Porter 386. An-

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other 250 Union casualties resulted from an tional maturity which the war vastly acceler- accidental explosion in the main magazine ated in the North. Much of this sophistica- on the day after its surrender. tion would be lost after the war (as logistical The essential part joint operations nightmares and command squabbling dur- played at Fort Fisher was readily apparent to ing the Spanish-American War were to participants of both services. Porter wrote to show), but for the United States to have at- Welles: “[Terry] is my beau ideal of a soldier tained it in the 1860s, with a volunteer and a general. Our cooperation has been army, was a remarkable feat. Indeed, opera- most cordial; the result is victory, which will tions of this scale and maturity were not always be ours when the Army and Navy go seen again until World War II. hand in hand.” 46 Stanton wrote to Terry and Finally, notwithstanding such advances, Porter: “The combined [joint] operations of the command structure for joint operations the squadron and land remained deficient throughout the war. Ulti- commanders thought jointly forces of your commands mately, success or failure of these operations in considering the resources deserve and will receive depended upon the personalities of the the thanks of the Nation, Army and Navy commanders. In the absence which the Army and Navy and will be held in admi- of a unified command, it was only by coop- brought to the table ration throughout the eration and good relations between them world as a proof of the that victory could be attained. The hatred naval and military prowess of the United between Butler and Porter was enough to States.” 47 doom the first expedition to Fort Fisher in spite of the military, economic, and political What conclusions can be drawn about power that lay behind it. In our own age we jointness from these two Civil War cam- have succeeded, we think, in exorcising in- paigns? The first is that joint warfare existed terservice rivalries by giving real powers to and could be effective. Joint operations did joint combatant commanders. Have we? The not come of age until World War II or per- experience in the Persian Gulf was positive, haps until passage of the Goldwater-Nichols but anyone who thinks that formal com- Act in 1986; but commanders such as Grant, mand arrangements can guarantee control Porter, and Foote thought jointly in consid- of events understands neither history nor ering the resources which the Army and the fog and friction of war. All they can do is Navy brought to the table, and how each of provide the best possible framework for the services fought to achieve common ob- what must be done, and those in the Civil jectives. Both the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson War were deficient in that respect; ad hoc re- and the Fort Fisher Campaigns presented lationships, not formal organization, were many problems of terrain, weather, logistics, the essence of success in joint operations. tactics, and strategy. Jointness solved them Lincoln, in his second annual message to to the extent needed for success. Joint opera- Congress in 1862, observed: “The dogmas of tions perhaps were not essential to victory, the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy as Joint Pub 1 claims, but they contributed present....As our case is new, so we must in important ways to attaining victory.48 think anew, and act anew. We must disen- Second, by the end of the war, joint op- thrall ourselves, and then we shall save our erations had reached a high degree of so- country.”49 Those men who conducted joint phistication. The contrast between the operations in the Civil War had disenthralled rather small-scale Henry-Donelson opera- themselves from military dogma; the occasion tion, advocated by Grant in the face of op- brought forth innovation, organization, and position from the Army, uncoordinated with ultimately victory on a grand scale. JFQ other movements, and not followed up, and the Fisher operation, which was done on a huge scale with the full support of both the Warand Navy Departments, and detailed planning, is instructive. Fort Fisher illustrates as well the industrial and organiza-

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NOTES 24 A ton of coffee could be purchased in Nassau for $249 and resold in Wilmington for $5,500; the block- 1 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated ade runner could then buy cotton for 3 cents a pound by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince- and resell it in Great Britain for $1 a pound. A bottle of ton University Press, 1976). gin purchased in Bermuda for $4 could be resold in 2 Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Ad- Wilmington for $150. Ibid., p. 8. vanced-Guard, Outpost, and Detachment of Service of 25 Ibid., pp. 11–21. Troops (New Orleans: Bloomfield and Steel, 1861). 26 Ibid., pp. 17–21. 3 William J. Hardee, Hardee’s Rifle and Light Infantry 27 Ibid., pp. 34–37; Reed, Combined Operations, Tactics (New York: J.O. Kane, 1862). pp. 331–33. 4 Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Philadel- 28 Gragg, Confederate Goliath, pp. 38–39. See gener- phia: J.B. Lippincott, 1862), pp. 248–52. ally Dick Nolan, Benjamin Franklin Butler: The Damnedest 5 Geoffrey S. Smith, “An Uncertain Passage: The Bu- Yankee (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1991). reaus Run the Navy, 1842–1861,” in Kenneth J. Hagan, 29 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, vol. 8, The Orga- editor, In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval nized War to Victory, 1864–1865 (New York: Charles History, 1775–1984 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Scribner’s Sons, 1971), p. 190; Hattaway and Jones, How 1984), pp. 86–87. the North Won, pp. 658–59. 6 Bruce Lancaster, From Lexington to Liberty (New 30 Grant, Personal Memoirs, p. 663; Gragg, Confederate York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 358–59, 430–55. Goliath, pp. 40–42; also see Reed, Combined Operations, 7 K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846–1848 (New pp. 337–38. For the scientific calculations supporting York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 236–44. the idea see U.S. Navy Department, Official Records of 8 Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebel- (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978), see chapter 2, lion, series I, volume II (Washington: Department of the “The Army Takes the Initiative.” Navy, 1900), pp. 207–14 (hereafter cited as O.R.N.). 9 Ibid., p. 188. 31 Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, vol. 3, Red 10 Ibid., p. 189. River to Appomattox (New York: Random House, 1974), 11 The obvious place for fortifications on the Ten- pp. 715–17. nessee and Cumberland Rivers was at the Birmingham 32 Gragg, Confederate Goliath, pp. 50–51; O.R.N., I, II, narrows between Paducah and Eddyville, where the pp. 226–27. rivers are only three miles apart. However, this site is 33 Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, p. 190; Gragg, Confeder- well within Kentucky and therefore was politically off- ate Goliath, pp. 51–53. After the war, Butler blamed the limits in 1861. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Forts Henry failure of the powder-boat on Navy incompetence. A typ- and Donelson: Key to the Confederate Heartland (Knox- ical Butlerian squabble followed. O.R.N., I, II, pp. 237–40. ville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987), p. 46. 34 Foote, The Civil War, p. 719. 12 Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson, p. 46. 35 O.R.N., I, II, pp. 149–50, 250–51; Gragg, Confeder- 13 Bern Anderson, By Sea and By River: The Naval His- ate Goliath, pp. 88–97; Foote, The Civil War, p. 720. tory of the Civil War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 36 Foote, The Civil War, p. 720; U.S. War Department, 1977), p. 91. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 14 Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson, pp. 23–24. Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, series I, vol- 15 Ibid., pp. 25–27; U.S. Army Service Schools, Fort ume 44 (Washington: Government Printing Office, Henry and Fort Donelson Campaign Source Book (Fort 1893), p. 825 (hereafter cited as O.R.). Leavenworth, Kans.: The General Service Schools Press, 37 O.R., I, pp. 44, 832; O.R.N., I, pp. 11, 264, 268; 1923), p. 158. Grant, Personal Memoirs, p. 668. 16 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant 38 Foote, The Civil War, pp. 739–40; Gragg, Confeder- (New York: Library of America, 1990), p. 189. ate Goliath, pp. 103–04. 17 William S. McFeely, Grant: A Biography (New York: 39 O.R.N., I, pp. 11, 404–05. W.W. Norton, 1981), pp. 96–97. 40 Gragg, Confederate Goliath, pp. 107–09. 18 Grant, Personal Memoirs, p. 190. 41 O.R.N., I, pp. 11, 425–27; Anderson, By Sea and By 19 U.S. Army Service Schools, Source Book, pp. 139–44; River, pp. 281–82. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval History Division, 42 Foote, The Civil War, pp. 741–42; Gragg, Confeder- Civil War Naval Chronology 1861–1865 (Washington: De- ate Goliath, p. 114. partment of the Navy, 1971), p. II–14. 43 Gragg, Confederate Goliath, pp. 126–27. 20 Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson, pp. 101–06; 44 U.S. Department of the Navy, Chronology, p. V–11. Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North 45 Gragg, Confederate Goliath, pp. 157–90. Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana: Univer- 46 Grant, Personal Memoirs, p. 670; Foote, The Civil sity of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 66–67. War, p. 746; Gragg, Confederate Goliath, pp. 232–42. 21 Anderson, By Sea and By River, pp. 96–97; U.S. 47 O.R.N., I, pp. 11, 458. Navy, Chronology,p.II–22; Grant, Personal Memoirs, 48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the p. 204; Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson, p. 136. U.S. Armed Forces (Washington: National Defense Univer- 22 Grant, Personal Memoirs, p. 190. sity Press, 1991), p. iii; Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, chap- 23 Rod Gragg, Confederate Goliath: The Battle of Fort ters 13 and 14. Fisher (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 2. 49 Roy P. Basler, editor, Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1946), p. 688.

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General of the Army Omar Nelson Bradley (1893–1981) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Clark, Missouri; graduated from Military Academy (1915). Assigned to 14th Infantry and duty in the West (1915–19). ROTC duty, Minnesota and South Dakota (1919–20); instructor, West Point (1920–24). Advanced course, Infantry School (1925). Served with 19th and 27th Infantry, Hawaii (1925–27); in charge of National Guard and Reserve affairs for Hawaiian Islands (1927–28). Attended Command and General Staff School (1929) and Army War College (1934). Instructor, Infantry School (1929–33) and West Point (1934–38). Chief, operations branch (G–1), War Department (1938–40); assistant secretary, General Staff (1940–41). Commandant, Infantry School, and established infantry OCS (1941–42). Comman- der, 82d and 28th Infantry Divisions (1942–43). Personal representative of commander, North African Theater of Operations (1943). Commander, II Corps in North Africa and Sicily (1943), and First Army and 12th Army Group in invasion and final European campaigns (1944–45). Adminis- trator of veterans affairs (1945–47). Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1948–49); responded to National Security Act of 1947 with Army reorganization leading to appointment of vice chief and two deputy chiefs of staff, consolidated technical services under a director of logistics, and finance and management under a comptroller. Served as first Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1949–53), and first Chairman, NATO Military Staff Committee (1949–50); promoted to General of the Army (1950). Died in New York City.

[In 1949] Congress enacted several laws modifying the 1947 National Security Portrait of General Act, designed to intensify unification. One [law]...established the formal post Bradley by Clarence of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would serve a two-year term Lamont MacNelly.

(and be eligible for reappointment to a second term in time of peace) but who Courtesy of the U.S. Army Art Collection would not have a formal “vote” in the JCS. Probably on Ike’s recommendation, [Secretary of Defense] Johnson then turned to me, even though I had told Ike earlier in the year I did not want the job. I now changed my mind. I agreed to serve in the job one term—two years. The main reason for my change of heart was my deep concern about the state of the military establishment. Owing to the cancellation of the supercarrier, there was a vicious mutiny afoot in the Navy...[which] could conceivably tear apart the Department of Defense, possibly tempting the Kremlin to capitalize on our military disarray. A firm but fair JCS Chairman, assisted by a neutral Army general (my replacement as Army Chief of Staff), might be the moderating force that could prevent a crippling brawl. On August 12, Louis Johnson and I went to the White House, where President Truman announced my nomination as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Senate approved the nomination at once, and at 0900 on August 16, in a modest ceremony at Johnson’s office, I was sworn in. The reaction to my appointment generally was positive. I was still blessed with a “favorable press.” However, to the Navy I was still an enemy. With the JCS now officially enlarged to four men...the Navy felt that even though I had no official vote, its voice would be further weakened.

—From A General’s Life by Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair

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IN BRIEF Joint C2 Through Unity of Command By K. SCOTT LAWRENCE

ownsizing the defense estab- and recognizes the need for unity of not necessarily part of the same com- lishment is putting a tremen- command in realizing unity of ef- mand structure....In multinational Ddous strain on the ability to fort. The new FM 100–5 defines the and interagency operations, unity of wage two nearly simultaneous re- principle of war to be “for every ob- command may not be possible, but gional conflicts. The force structure jective, seek unity of command and unity of effort becomes paramount. 2 proposed in the Bottom-Up Review unity of effort.” This new defini- The final version appears to be a along with continuing fiscal pressure tion puts unity of effort on an equal compromise in the definition of point to further reductions in com- footing with unity of command. The unity of command and its relation to bat capability. In the midst of this emphasis is on seeking unity of unity of effort. It is a shift in doctrine unprecedented scale-down the roles command, not ensuring unity of ef- but not as profound as that found in and missions of the Armed Forces fort through unity of command. FM FM 100–5. Air Force Manual 1–1, are being scrutinized. Each service, 100-5 still accepts that unity of com- Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United along with the Joint Staff, has mand “requires a single commander States Air Force, adopts almost the rewritten key warfighting doctrine with the requisite authority to direct same definition as the 1986 edition over the last several years. Since total all forces in pursuit of a unified pur- of FM 100–5: “Ensure unity of effort obligation authority is on the line, pose.” It goes on to stipulate: for every objective under one respon- service doctrine inevitably focuses Unity of effort...requires coordi- sible commander.” 4 on how to organize and fight inde- nation and cooperation among all In war there are multiple ele- pendently. The Armed Forces have forces—even though they may not nec- ments of combat, combat support, yet to come up with a coherent doc- essarily be part of the same command and combat service support directed trine that can fuse individual service structure—toward a commonly recog- at a common objective under a single attributes into a coordinated joint nized objective. Collateral and main commander (as shown in figure 1) warfighting machine. Unity of com- force operations might go on simultane- who ensures that the objective is un- mand in a joint doctrinal framework ously, united by intent and purpose if derstood through his intent and mis- is the key to an integrated yet simple not command....In combined and in- sion orders. A commander articulates command and control structure, teragency operations, unity of command objectives to subordinates and ensures which is needed to achieve initia- may not be possible, but the require- they understand how these objectives tive, agility, depth, synchronization, ment for unity of effort becomes and versatility on the battlefield. paramount. Figure 1 The following discussion uses princi- This paragraph contains some ples established in component ser- SINGLE COMMANDER vice doctrine to develop a joint com- significant misperceptions. Emphasis has now shifted from ensuring unity mand and control structure at the COMBAT of effort under a single commander COMBAT COMBAT SERVICE strategic and operational level that SUPPORT SUPPORT emphasizes unity of command. to permitting “intent and purpose” To understand unity of com- to replace a single commander. Army doctrine has profoundly mand, it is important to review the OBJECTIVE evolution of the concept in doctri- shifted in its definition of that prin- nal circles, especially in recent years. ciple of war known as unity of com- In 1986 Army Field Manual 100–5, mand. The final draft of Joint Pub Operations, stated, “for every objec- 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, had CJTF Headquarters for an identical definition: “For every Cobra Gold ’93 at Fort tive, ensure unity of effort under a re- Naraysuan, Thailand. sponsible commander. This principle objective, seek unity of command 3 ensures that all efforts are focused and unity of effort.” In the final on a common goal.” 1 This defini- version of the publication (Septem- tion concentrates on the objective ber 1993) the definition was changed to read: Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objec- Major K. Scott Lawrence, USAF, is assigned to tive....Unity of effort, however, re- the Office of Assistant Secretary of the Air quires coordination and cooperation Force for Acquisition. An F–16 pilot, he was among all forces toward a commonly the first to fire an operational test shot of the recognized objective, although they are

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile. U.S. Air Force (Marvin Krause)

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Figure 2 needed to control all combat, com- complexity of the problem an air bat support, and combat service sup- component commander faces by port forces in order to ensure unity keeping span of control more in har- of effort. A JFC normally names a mony with situational awareness. COMBAT single air, land, and sea commander Moreover, delegation has the advan- COMBAT COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SUPPORT to control forces fighting in their re- tage of reducing the enemy’s ability spective media (see figure 3). Justify- to create friction by attacking the or- ing unity of command along service ganization exercising control.” 6 OBJECTIVE component lines is primarily based ACC must structure command and on the concept of inherent exper- control, using subordinate comman- work together to accomplish the bat- tise. It is thought that to fully ex- ders to create an optimum span of tle plan. A commander’s intent pro- ploit the combat potential of a ser- control over theater air assets. The vides the framework for resolving vice, forces must remain under a subordinate’s responsibilities must conflicts that arise in the course of single component commander who be drawn to ensure focused objec- battle and steers subordinates toward is specifically trained to employ tives, clear responsibilities, and a solutions that meet objectives. forces in a given medium. Since ser- manageable span of control. The in- In this evolving notion of unity vice component lines—or the terdependence of targets in the the- of command unity of effort is medium in which they are em- ater deep and defense of the theater achieved by an overarching “intent ployed—are not objectives, they rear creates interwoven objectives. and purpose” (figure 2). But who re- should not be the primary criterion To ensure unity of effort, ACC solves differences in an element’s by which unity of operational com- should designate a commander with perceptions, intent, and purpose? mand is established. primary responsibility for theater Who ensures that perceptions do A JFC must ensure unity of deep battle and overland theater rear not change as a conflict progresses? command while maintaining a rea- battle. This position can be called What is the main effort? Without sonable span of control. And accord- the strategic air division (AD) com- unity of command, unity of effort is ing to Joint Pub 3–0, the theater area mander. It is also imperative that never ensured—left to chance, hope, of operations (AO) comprises three ACC designate an air commander and luck. In the fog of war nothing types of operations, deep, close, and with operational level focus and pri- as critical to an objective as unity of rear, around which the AO should mary responsibility in the theater effort should be trusted to anything be divided (figure 4). The areas are close battle. This position can be but a single responsible commander. oriented on missions and an enemy called the operational AD comman- This is a principle of war. and provide a basis for structuring der as depicted in figure 5. Unity of command “ensures theater command and control where Targets in the theater deep are that all efforts are focused on a com- unity of command should be fo- at the heart of an enemy’s warmak- mon goal.” 5 At theater level a single cused. Visualizing major areas assists ing potential. Destroying them can commander—a CINC or JFC—is a JFC in stating the mission and cause an enemy decisionmaker to defining strategic and opera- fail in the conduct of a campaign tional requirements to meet and can undermine enemy morale Figure 3 campaign objectives. At the- and leadership credibility. The tar- ater level, a JFC provides gets include air forces, strategic JFC unity of command and as- weapons, and strategic reserves; sures forces are employed in a command, control, and communica- AIR COMPONENT LAND COMPONENT NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER COMMANDER COMMANDER coordinated manner. Below tions centers and power and trans- (ACC) (LCC) (NCC) theater level, a JFC will task portation systems; and targets whose component commanders destruction has more long-term ef- with clear and concise cam- fects, such as manufacturing sys- Figure 4 paign objectives that can be tems, sources of raw materials, and achieved using assets under their re- critical stockpiles. ACC would have spective control. authority to allocate theater deep as- In a developed integrated land- sets to strategic ADs based upon the- THEATER DEEP sea-air theater, the Air Combat Com- mand (ACC) span of control is too Figure 5 THEATER CLOSE broad to directly control all air forces. Centralizing air tasking order (ATO) JFC X XXX X XXX planning and command and control XXX of air operations in the Air Opera- ACC LCC NCC THEATER REAR tions Center creates a vulnerability STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL that can be exploited by an enemy. AD AD According to Air Force Manual 1–1, “Delegation of control reduces the

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ater campaign objectives and JFC in- A strategic AD commander is Figure 7 tent. The strategic AD projects power subordinate to composite wings into the theater deep against an (CW), theater air defense (TAD) enemy’s key military and economic brigades, and theater deep and rear power base. Army and naval avia- intelligence assets. The strategic AD THEATER DEEP tion, surface-to-surface and cruise will task-organize forces to achieve missiles, drones, etc., allocated for theater deep and rear objectives. A CORPS DEEP THEATER CLOSE CORPS CLOSE XXX operations in the theater deep area, command element such as a com- XXX X are planned and coordinated with posite wing will serve as a strategic XXX X XXX XXX the strategic AD commander as well AD subordinate command to exe- CORPS REAR THEATER as Special Operations Forces and sur- cute theater deep operations. A TAD REAR face reconnaissance forces. The abil- brigade will be a strategic AD subor- ity of the commander to coordinate dinate command to execute theater the planning and execution of all as- rear operations. Mission orders pass sets projected into the theater deep sequentially from the JFC to ACC area will ensure maximum syner- and strategic AD and then on to the fight and shape the deep battle gism and economy of force. CW and TAD brigade. A strategic AD while rapidly exploiting openings.7 Controlling the air over the the- commander with clear area bound- Command and control measures, ater rear is critical to a JFC’s strategic aries and objectives ensures great which delineate a commander’s area maneuver potential. The primary flexibility and coordination. of responsibility, are critical to coor- threat to the rear is aircraft and sur- In a developed theater, land dinate and deconflict deep fires and face-to-surface missiles (SAMs), forces tend to be the primary combat maneuver between echelons of com- many of which are projected from forces operating in the theater close mand. The placement of the corps the theater deep. Area defense is pro- area. Theater close battle operations outer boundary is dependent on vided by defensive counter-air air- are focused on destruction of the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and craft, SAMs, and antiaircraft artillery, enemy, with the final objective many time available (METT–T); it must be as well as counter-offensive action times being to gain or maintain terri- far enough out to allow the corps against the theater deep. The re- tory. In this developed scenario, the commander to shape his close bat- quirement for air and missile forces land component commander (LCC) tle. Outer boundary placement is to coordinate defense of the theater provides the vision and concept of METT–T dependent, although the rear makes it prudent to have a sin- operations necessary to win the deci- range of deep fires, intelligence capa- gle commander controlling all forces sive battle. The land commander bility, and enemy forces are driving directly defending the theater rear must fight to the depth of his factors in ultimate placement. The area. ACC would have authority to weapons to properly shape the battle, corps outer boundary defines a corps allocate theater rear assets to strate- destroy the enemy, and retain or gain restrictive fire control measure, gic ADs based on theater campaign the initiative. Air operations must be which requires other command ech- objectives and a JFC’s intent. Theater integrated with land operations and elons to coordinate with corps to fire Army aviation, theater air defense closely coordinated to ensure the syn- inside the boundary. missile systems, surface air defense chronization needed to attain maxi- The ability of corps deep attack radars, etc., employed for defense of mum combat power. Confidence in assets to effectively mass and syn- the theater rear area, are planned air operations and timing between air chronize will depend on the extent and coordinated through the strate- strikes and ground maneuver are crit- they are integrated into the ground gic AD commander (see figure 6). ical to gain maximum synergism. scheme of maneuver. This will be the LCC can then confidently maneuver result of unity of command in the at the greatest speed, and preserve corps deep battle. Unity of effort firepower and critical logistical re- within the corps AO requires the Figure 6 sources. The interdependence of mis- commander to have operational con-

JFC sion objectives and need for all forces trol over all combat, combat support, to be closely coordinated to attain and combat service support assets re- ACC LCC NCC maximum combat power makes it quired to accomplish the mission. prudent to have a single commander The corps close battle already has over all forces employed in the the- unity of command with divisions di- STRATEGIC AD ater close battle. viding areas of responsibility. The LCC divides the theater close majority of deep attack assets that THEATER DEEP AND REAR RESPONSIBILITIES battle into subordinate AOs (figure the corps uses to shape the close bat- AIR FORCES 7). The corps commander uses deep tle belongs to air forces. Therefore, it CRUISE MISSILES DRONES battle to shape the battlefield for his is prudent to establish an operational AIR SURVEILLANCE THEATER SAMS divisions. The extent to which the RECONNAISANCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES battlefield is nonlinear is driven by the corps commander’s ability to

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air division commander with com- Figure 9 deploy, stage, and disperse air-land- mand of Air Force assets and opera- sea forces in theater. tional control over other assets em- The key to success in future JFC ployed in the corps deep battle. This joint operations will be the ability to

operational AD commander is under ACC LCC NCC synergistically prosecute the war command of ACC and works directly throughout the depth of the theater.

under the operational control of the STRATEGIC This ability begins by assuring unity corps commander, ensuring unity of AD CORPS of command at all command eche- effort in the corps deep area as lons, providing explicit clean lines CORPS OPERATIONAL shown in figure 8. AD of command and communication, The operational AD commander and by focused, coordinated objec- OPERATIONAL is directly responsible to the corps AD tives. As the force structure shrinks, COMMAND commander, who writes mission or- OPERATIONAL component services cannot afford to ders and provides guidance on shap- CONTROL fight inefficient parallel campaigns. ing corps deep battle, supporting the The United States may have had the close battle, and defending the corps employ long-range corps artillery as- luxury, due to overwhelming fire- rear. ACC allocates air forces to the sets under direction of the opera- power, of employing combat forces operational AD based upon theater tional AD. The operational AD less efficiently in past wars; now the campaign objectives, JFC’s intent, would use CWs to execute corps move must be made toward more and coordination with corps and deep operations and elements under jointness to retain the same effec- LCC. The operational AD will plan the ADA brigade to execute corps tiveness with fewer forces. JFQ and coordinate all corps deep fires to rear operations. Mission orders include all air allocated by ACC, would pass sequentially from JFC to NOTES corps Army aviation, long-range ar- LCC, corps, and operational AD, and 1 Army Field Manual 100–5, Operations tillery, drones, corps deep battle re- then to CW, ADA brigade, and deep (Washington: Department of the Army, connaissance, et al. In addition to fire cell. This level of unity of com- May 1986), p. 175. deep fire assets, most corps rear demand enhances the synergistic ef- 2 Army Field Manual 100–5, Operations fense forces would be placed under fects between operational fires and (Washington: Department of the Army, the operational AD commander to the ground scheme of maneuver. June 1993), p. 2–5. include air forces, corps Army avia- In the initial stages of a conflict 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3–0, tion, radar, SAMs, et al. The opera- Navy and Marine forces operating in a Doctrine for Joint Operations, proposed final tional AD commander controls the littoral or near land area are a forward draft (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1993), p. A–3. air over the corps AO and coordi- presence and a direct deterrent. If a 4 Air Force Manual 1–1, vol. 2, Basic nates all corps level air resupply conflict escalates these assets provide Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air through tactical airlift or helicopter. enabling forces to secure forward op- Force (Washington: Department of the Air Subordinate to the operational erating bases. The Navy component Force, March 1992), p. 12. AD commander and under his oper- commander assigns a strategic AD 5 Army Field Manual 100–5 (May 1986), ational control would be a compos- commander to fight the theater deep p. 175. ite wing commander, corps air divi- and rear battle. A Marine air-ground 6 Air Force Manual 1–1, vol. 2, p. 131. sion artillery (ADA) brigade task force (MAGTF) commander could Martin Van Creveld, Command in War commander, a deep fire cell formed be assigned to fight the theater close (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, by the corps artillery commander, battle. The MAGTF Aviation Combat 1985), pp. 265-67, 270, 274 is cited in the manual to support this statement. and corps deep and rear intelligence Element commander accomplishes 7 Army Manual, Corps Deep Operations assets. The deep fire cell would be operational AD responsibilities. As a Tactics Techniques and Procedures Handbook formed from corps artillery assets, conflict escalates, naval aviation, (Washington: Department of the Army, have a senior artillery officer, and long-range bombers, and surface-to- 1990), p. 1–2. surface missiles attack critical strategic nodes, destroying command and con- Figure 8 trol and denying long-term logistical support to an enemy. With forces di- THEATER DEEP rectly off-shore, high operational CORPS DEEP THEATER CLOSE tempo would be sustained while attacking targets inside an enemy’s deci- XXX XXX sion loop. Unity of command in the

CORPS CLOSE theater deep battle would ensure syn- Division Deep XX X XX ergistic effects that force an enemy to XX Division Close X reach a culminating point earlier, per- Division Rear mitting successful amphibious opera- CORPS REAR tions and providing critical time to

THEATER REAR

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IN BRIEF Standing Down a Joint Task Force By SCOTT M. HINES

U.S.-Honduran color guard at ceremonies for Ahuas Tara III. U.S. Air Force (Lemuel Casillas)

ften established in a crisis, Cano Air Base. Joint Task Force-Bravo without the task force, saving DOD joint task forces (JTFs) are (JTF–B), directly subordinate to approximately $22 million annually.2 generally designed to re- SOUTHCOM, consists of approxi- O Background History spond to a specific set of circum- mately 800 members of the Army The U.S. Armed Forces and stances. What happens to JTFs when and Air Force and U.S. Government Honduran military have conducted the crises which originally de- civilian personnel. JTF–B has opera- bilateral training exercises since manded their formation disappears tional control over all forces de- 1965. By the early 1980s, however, or is resolved? Emphasis is placed on ployed to Honduras, coordinates re- the frequency and size of exercises standing up JTFs; but how does the gional logistics, supervises began to increase in response to the Department of Defense determine engineering projects, maintains a situation in Nicaragua and El Sal- when it is time to stand one down? search-and-rescue and medivac heli- vador. In Spring 1982, Honduras ap- Are there criteria used to make this copter capability, and assists Hon- proached the United States and decision, or is it a matter of judge- duras in counterdrug actions.1 Since began negotiations granting access ment? In addition, this decision can the United States has no base leasing to Honduran naval and air facilities. be clouded by competing bureau- agreement, its military presence is Congress appropriated $13 mil- cratic interests which seek to justify dependent on the express permission lion in 1983 to upgrade Palmerola Air a continuation of the presence long of the government of Honduras. Base (later renamed Jose Enrique Soto after it is needed. The following case SOUTHCOM has had a presence Cano Air Base by Honduras) in Co- of Joint Task Force-Bravo, Honduras, at Soto Cano for over a decade. The mayagua. Construction was com- illustrates this tendency. original reasons for establishing JTF–B pleted by June 1983, extending the U.S. Southern Command faded with the Cold War, but a lack runway to 8,500 feet. That same (SOUTHCOM) maintains a small of policy guidance from Washington month the United States established American military presence in Hon- has resulted in an American extended the Regional Military Training Center, duras at a facility known as Soto presence. Although SOUTHCOM continues to justify JTF–B as a critical a facility operated by Special Forces to hub for U.S. military training in Cen- train friendly countries in basic coun- First Lieutenant Scott M. Hines, USAF, is tral America, most of the missions in terinsurgency tactics. SOUTHCOM currently attending an intelligence course question could be accomplished at Goodfellow Air Force Base.

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also created JTF–11, later known as United States. By 1990, however, the task force could be accomplished JTF-Alpha, to coordinate show-of- these operations changed from pre- by other means. For example, force training deployments on the dominantly combat-related exercises SOUTHCOM points out that JTF–B Nicaraguan border. With congres- to more engineering and humanitar- contributes millions of dollars annu- sional approval for a “temporary but ian oriented deployments. During ally to the local economy of Comay- indefinite presence,” JTF-Alpha was re- the Bush administration, “peacetime agua and that the departure of Amer- named JTF-Bravo in 1984.3 engagement” was the byword for ican troops would cripple the fragile Throughout the 1980s the U.S. military operations in the region, economy. In addition, JTF–B employs presence at Soto Cano served as a and the frequency and scope of de- approximately 700 local Hondurans, valuable staging area for intelligence ployments increased dramatically. many of whom were previously un- gathering missions against both the Honduras became a favorite location employed. It is true that the contri- Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the to train, not only because of the bution of JTF–B to the economy is FMLN insurgents in El Salvador. local government’s permissiveness significant, but on closer analysis Also, JTF–B continued to coordinate but also because the services of one finds that the tremendous influx large- and small-scale exercises in JTF–B reduced costs for deploying of Chinese investments to the Co- Honduras. Most of all, however, the units. By 1993 JTF–B was no longer mayagua Valley have begun to dwarf presence was meant to demonstrate the nucleus for anticommunist ac- any contribution made by a contin- America’s commitment to the region tivities in Central America; instead it ued U.S. military presence. and to send a message to the San- evolved into a regional logistics With regard to missions per- dinistas and their Cuban/Soviet sup- hub—coordinating training and as- formed by JTF–B, many are obsolete porters. By 1987, the budget for sisting Honduras in its fight against or can be accomplished without a JTF–B had swollen to $25 million drug trafficking. $22 million dollar effort. The hope and the organization had grown to However, modifications to that counterdrug support operations over 1,000 personnel, all assigned on JTF–B missions have not convinced would become the primary mission temporary duty (TDY) ranging from everyone that the presence is still of the task force has proven ineffec- four weeks to six months.4 needed. The issue of JTF–B has be- tual. In 1993 JTF–B participated in come an enormous interagency bat- only fifteen missions and did not A Shift in Mission tle, drawing fire from various significantly support the U.S. Cus- With peace being negotiated in sources. The General Accounting Of- toms Service and Drug Enforcement El Salvador and the election of Presi- fice released a report stating that Administration in the region. Also, dent Violletta Chamorro in JTF–B has outlived its usefulness. the Clinton administration’s empha- Nicaragua, the original purpose of The Department of State continues sis on interdiction instead of eradi- JTF–B evaporated. Accordingly, ele- to argue that the presence serves no cation has shifted the focus from ments of the executive branch began real purpose except as a military Central American trafficking to An- to question the continued need for a convenience. Honduran President dean producer-nations. Country military presence in Honduras. An Roberto Reina has appointed a com- teams, specifically military groups, interagency Policy Coordinating mission to reevaluate the original can achieve missions such as logisti- Committee (PCC) examined the protocols negotiated with the cal coordination in each Central issue in late 1990 but reached no United States and examine the “use- American country as they have in agreement on the fate of the task fulness” of the current arrangement. other regions that do not have JTFs force. This generated JCS interest in JCS continues to see the need for the to provide such support. Large-scale the question, resulting in a flurry of task force but has not provided ade- intelligence collection from Soto taskers to SOUTHCOM requesting quate policy guidance for SOUTH- Cano is also irrelevant now that information on JTF–B. Feeling pres- COM. As a result, the command or- democracies firmly in place in both sure to justify its presence, SOUTH- ganized a committee with the task of Nicaragua and El Salvador. COM began to consider new mis- justifying U.S. presence in Honduras. The strongest argument for sions for JTF–B, fundamentally to Thus, instead of an objective evalua- maintaining JTF–B is in support of alter its nature. tion of the need for JTF–B, the issue engineering exercises and humanitar- SOUTHCOM decided to make of a continued presence in Honduras ian aid in the region. There is little JTF–B the premier counterdrug oper- erupted into an interagency debate. doubt that the American military has ations support unit for the region. In the middle is SOUTHCOM, a contributed to this impoverished re- This seemed a logical choice because command whose future is itself in gion, gaining worthwhile training ex- of the high volume of narco-traffick- question, desperately trying to hold perience in the process. But it is ing through Central America and onto its assets in Honduras. doubtful that this training will be dis- the Caribbean. In addition, after continued if JTF–B is stood down. seven years of coordinating exercises Time to Stand Down? This assumption is primarily based in Honduras, JTF–B was proficient in Most of the reasons SOUTH- on the fact that large-scale training hosting units deploying from the COM furnishes for maintaining occurs elsewhere in Latin America JTF–B are superficial. Added to this, many missions currently assigned to

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where JTFs are nonexistent. For ex- assignments at Soto Cano. More- NOTES ample, the National Guard has con- over, other means are available to ducted very large exercises in Ecuador achieve JTF–B missions. Why main- 1 U.S. Southern Command, “Joint Task without support and coordination tain a JTF, normally used in crises, Force-Bravo Fact Sheet,” Quarry Heights, from a standing JTF. Some critics when the United States can achieve Panama, August 20, 1993. 2 The current annual budget for JTF–B is argue that JTF–B, by providing logisti- the same ends without the cost of approximately $16.5 million. In addition, cal and transportation support, de- stationing of troops abroad? the services pay approximately $5.5 million nies deploying units of valuable as- More importantly, the mission in TDY reimbursements for JTF–B members. pects of overseas training. By having drift by JTF–B is a dangerous prece- 3 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, units deploy to a bare bones environ- dent. What is the message when a JTF Subcommittee for Military Construction, ment, training may be more realistic is stood up in a crisis, then continued Hearings on “Central American, Persian than with an established JTF nearby. until political pressure terminates it? Gulf, and Pacific Construction Programs,” It is true, however, that without If DOD wants to exercise a degree of March 26, 1987. 4 JTF–B the cost to National Guard and autonomy in choosing when to stand U.S. General Accounting Office, “Hon- Reserve units training in the region up JTFs, it must act responsibly by duras: U.S. Military Presence at Soto Cano Air Base,” Briefing Report to the Chairman will increase marginally as the units standing them down. To avoid the of the Subcommittee on Military Construc- will have to support themselves dur- bureaucratic inertia arising in the tion, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. ing deployment. case of JTF–B, standing down JTFs Senate (Washington: Government Printing SOUTHCOM has eyed the base should be just as methodical a proc- Office, March 1989), p. 18. in Honduras as a potential site to ess as standing them up. JFQ reposition assets as the command draws down in preparation for its departure from Panama in 1999. However, based on several SOUTH- The National Defense University will COM studies, “keeping the option open in Honduras” is infeasible. First sponsor the following and foremost, Soto Cano is a small airstrip, hardly able to accommodate symposia in the next year: more than a few additional helicopters from Panama. Second, given political trends, it is doubtful the P ACIFIC SYMPOSIUM Honduran government would per- Multilateralism in Southeast Asia mit a sizable increase in the U.S pres- to be held in Honolulu, Hawaii ence. Finally, maintaining a forward on February 22–23, 1995 military presence there provides lit- (cosponsored by U.S. Pacific Command) tle strategic advantage over simply positioning assets in Florida. It is interesting to note that JTF–B played NATO SYMPOSIUM no role in Operation Just Cause in NATO Enlargement 1989; thus it would most likely not be used in a future large-scale con- to be held in Washington D.C. tingency in Latin America. on April 24–25, 1995 (cosponsored by the NATO Defense College) JTF–B does not significantly contribute to U.S. national security. JOINT OPERATIONS SYMPOSIUM It assists deploying units to Hon- duras and Central America. It coor- to be held in Washington D.C. dinates regional logistics and pro- on June 27–28, 1995 vides some support to counterdrug operations. But without a vital mis- To obtain registration information for these events—or to be placed on the sion for JTF–B like that of the 1980s, mailing list for announcements about future symposia—contact: it is hard to justify spending $22 million that could be used else- National Defense University where. It is equally difficult to ex- Institute for National Strategic Studies (Symposia) cuse the tremendous disruption Fort Lesley J. McNair caused when members are pulled Washington D.C. 20319–6000 from active units to fill lengthy TDY Telephone: (202) 287–9230 or DSN 667–9230 FAX: (202) 287–9239 or DSN 667–9239 Internet: [email protected]

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IN BRIEF Implications of Information-Based Warfare By DONALD E. RYAN, JR.

he methods and instruments right. Again, under technological victory in the 21st century that must of war evolved over centuries pressure, instruments of war are be addressed in order to make the Tto accommodate or counteract changing and leading to a concomi- necessary sweeping changes in joint technological change. Armor was de- tant need to change methods of war. doctrine, force structure, and na- veloped to protect cavalry and to For the United States these methods tional military strategy for a multi- lend weight and shock to the attack. are found in joint doctrine. How- polar, coalition-dependent world. The introduction of the crossbow re- ever, as technology changes the in- When does war begin? How should sulted in thicker armor. That, in struments of war, imaginative ways it be fought? How will one define turn, led to innovations such as victory in the future? the English longbow and gunpow- Joint doctrine acknowledges der, to pierce armor. The history of the importance of secure, reliable, war can be characterized as an robust C4I capabilities but it is imaginative use of technology to mute on nonlethal IBW. For exam- nullify advantages of mass. The ple, a conflict in Europe could in- most successful militaries have ap- volve information-intensive plied technology and mass to pro- friendly and adversary weapons vide striking power, maneuverabil- systems. Just as the U.S.-led coali- ity, and agility. tion took months to construct a C2 All Source Analysis picture of Iraqi forces in the Per- The Electronic Battlefield System at National Training Center. sian Gulf War, and the Israelis to Until recently technological develop a diagram of Syrian forces innovation was largely limited to prior to the Bekaa Valley cam- combat and logistics; that is, to paign, a resurgent Russian war ma- moving troops to the battlefield chine would have to undertake a and sustaining them. In the last similar effort to target NATO. The century information technology commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) in the form of the telegraph began dependent military environment to impact on the military, forever of the next generation will make altering the course of war. The this task far simpler due to the telegraph and subsequent devel- availability of future C4I systems opments enabled commanders on the open market. thousands of miles away to main- Doctrine must be revamped to tain an electronic battlefield pres- reflect the fundamental impor- ence and eventually coordinate U.S. Army (Larry Lane) tance of IBW in the conduct of fu- theater-wide operations. Over the ture wars. Also, joint doctrine past 150 years information tech- must recognize that IBW can and nology has increased in complexity to use them in other than a tradi- probably will occur long before a and become indispensable to com- tional environments are lacking. In shot is fired and that success in combat operations—so pervasively that other words, information technol- bat is likely to rely on IBW cam- modern militaries are utterly depen- ogy is seen as a handmaiden of the paigns. Depending upon an enemy’s dent upon it to maintain, deploy, instruments of war, not as a tool in level of information dependence, and employ virtually every weapon itself. It is time for change. moreover, it may be possible to pre- system in their arsenals. Perhaps the most fundamental vail without a resort to combat. We have reached a point where change needed is a reevaluation of However, the relevance of these pre- technology which supported combat the nature of war. During Desert cepts to future warfighting is not has become a weapon in its own Storm, the piecemeal destruction of widely accepted. Iraqi forces was made possible by Critics point out that not every paralyzing its central nervous sys- adversary in potential conflicts (for Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Ryan, Jr., tem—that is, C4I links. This was a instance, low-intensity warfare in USAF, is currently attending the Industrial harbinger of the crucial role that in- the Third World) will be as informa- College of the Armed Forces. A communi- formation-based warfare (IBW) will tion-dependent as technologically cations officer, he is the author of The play in the future. It also raises some Airship’s Potential for Intertheater and practical questions about war and Intratheater Airlift.

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advanced nations. This is a legiti- conducting unopposed espionage in deception, and destruction, are fa- mate observation; but it overlooks peacetime. miliar to electronic warfare practi- the fact that technologically ad- The last question—how will one tioners; others may include viruses, vanced, information-intensive mili- define victory in the future?—is es- feints, reconnaissance, conquest, tary organizations are more vulnera- pecially salient for joint doctrine and infiltration. ble to information warfare simply which registers victories in terms of Viruses—the bane of microcom- because they are information depen- enemy soldiers killed, aircraft de- puter users—can be considered a dent. It is theoretically possible for stroyed, and territory occupied. If “fifth column” in an IBW construct an enemy to disrupt our informa- military action is merely the culmi- capable of sabotage and electronic tion systems so that we cannot fight. nation of extensive information ma- “guerrilla” action behind the lines. An adversary need not be informa- neuvering prior to actual hostilities, Possibly, specially tailored “sleeper” tion-dependent to upset our infor- then victory is derived from employ- viruses could be inserted into an mation lifeline. Since information ing information resources without enemy’s (or potential adversary’s) in- systems will increasingly come from enemy obstruction. This freedom of formation systems and left dormant, commercial sources, vulnerability action depends on the reliability of perhaps for years. The viruses could analysis by potential enemies will be friendly information (that is, C4I) re- be called into action (or awakened) simple (buy it on the open market sources. Warfare in the next century when needed. Nazi Germany under- and learn how to break it). Thus may be reminiscent of 18th century mined its adversaries with human IBW in a technologically advanced indirect warfare when forces maneu- fifth column agents in much the theater such as Europe will be a de- vered to place their adversaries in same way prior to World War II. fense-offense operation (protect your untenable positions. Just as an 18th Feints could resemble deception systems and attack the enemy’s), century general sought to win a war with an IBW twist of leading an while in a low-intensity conflict en- without fighting a single battle, so enemy to think a given information vironment it will be almost purely in the 21st century commanders system (technology or industry) had defensive (ensure the enemy cannot might seek, through information been targeted. Under the proper attack your systems). maneuvering, to put enemies in circumstances, an enemy could be Seen from this perspective, the positions where their information encouraged to devote valuable re- first question posed—when does war resources are useless or, worse, un- sources to protecting its information begin?—has alarming consequences. reliable. If we reach a state where C4I capability. The real target, of course, If the United States invests heavily resources cannot be used, or if we would lie elsewhere and might not in the protection of its information can no longer trust the information, enjoy the same level of protection. lifeline, how should it regard an at- then victory as traditionally defined IBW reconnaissance has been tempted probe of its systems for in- might well be unattainable, despite pursued in a limited way for years. It herent weaknesses? A land force overwhelming lethal military power. consists of electronic warfare order commander would describe this as of battle and intelligence databases reconnaissance in force. In an IBW Information Maneuvering used to facilitate operational mis- context, these could easily constitute The purpose of information sions. However, in an IBW construct acts of aggression, warranting a mili- warfare, like conventional armed these would be subsets of a larger ef- tary reaction. Responses might range combat, is to impose one’s will on fort. In a broad sense, reconnais- from a quid pro quo to the use of an enemy. The premise of Western sance would consist of identifying force to discourage further probes. warfare is Clausewitz’s idea of anni- vital political, military, and eco- This is a matter on which joint doc- hilation, where one side seeks to nomic information elements of trine is silent. neutralize an adversary’s ability to power, correlating them to informa- Likewise the second question— fight by destroying, or by rendering tion target sets, identifying informa- how should war be fought?—raises incapable of further resistance, his tion centers of gravity, and defining interesting issues with respect to military force in the field. Informa- recommended threat/attack options force structure investment. If only tion warfare, however, does not fit for the entire conflict spectrum lethal combat systems are regarded the Clausewitzian mold because, as a (peacetime through total war). as force structure, then developing comparatively nonlethal form of Conquest would be the overt IBW-type weapons systems will lag combat, its primary goal is to deny neutralization or denial of an adver- behind. Moreover, since using force or incapacitate rather than annihi- sary’s information assets. Destruc- requires political approval, and it is late. Destruction has a place in IBW, tion is one form of conquest. But improbably that IBW-type attacks but it is a single point on the IBW jamming, power supply disruption, (which are nonlethal in nature) continuum, representing only one or physical capture would also be would be seen as national security of several possible response options. considered conquest. Differentiating threats, a lethal response is unlikely. What constitutes information between conquest and infiltration, In such a case, the United States maneuvering is still open to debate. which is the next maneuver, would would be at the mercy of a potential Some maneuvers, such as jamming, depend on whether an enemy was adversary. This would pose a threat fully aware that its information ca- roughly equivalent to an enemy pability had been neutralized.

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Infiltration would be covert litical realities and congruent with mation systems that can operate neutralization or denial. This would IBW precepts. from a host nation support base. be the maneuver of choice for most First, a change must be made to Third, force structure must be information operations, since an reassess the importance of the tradi- changed to accommodate smaller enemy, unaware its information had tional support arms of intelligence force packages with greatly increased been compromised (that is, owned by and information. At a minimum, lethality to operate without extensive the other side) would continue to these systems must receive the same logistical support for a longer period use (trust) it. One has only to allow funding and R&D priorities as of time. For information systems, this the mind to wander for a moment to weapons systems. This is appropriate implies modifying current mainte- grasp what unobstructed access to for a national security strategy based nance concepts and designing enemy logistics, intelligence, com- systems to be maintained at command and control, operational, ponent replacement level. Other economic, and political informa- factors include the increased pur- tion resources could mean at every chase of maintenance spares above point on the war continuum. For current levels and the preposition- example: aviation fuel might be ing of spares either in theater or the requisitioned, but water would ar- prepackaging of them at CONUS rive; an enemy armored division bases for rapid movement. might be moved to a wrong loca- Lastly, IBW vulnerabilities tion to weaken vital defenses; or must be addressed and a dual track false intelligence data could be in- program implemented to deal troduced in exactly the right place, with this area in future systems. ostensibly from a reliable source, The first track is defensive: ensure to skew an estimate, causing an that the vulnerabilities of COTS enemy to react to false stimuli systems are identified and ade- (that is, chase phantoms). Obvi- quate safeguards implemented. ously, the possibilities are limitless. The second is to develop an offen- Those maneuvers are the most sive IBW capability which pro- obvious. Most military operations vides aggressive quid pro quo re- will have a counterpart in the IBW sponses to enemy probes and arena. It is precisely this similarity develops an adversary information between IBW operations and con- B–52–H navigator order of battle to ensure domi- ventional combat that makes it rechecking course nance on the battlefield. prior to sortie. imperative to develop an IBW em- The demise of the Soviet employment concept. Information Combat Camera Imagery (C.H. Rudisill) pire has not made the world warfare is increasingly viewed as safer—only made the prospect of another military instrument, rather on a two-year intelligence lead time global nuclear war more remote. The than the reverse with armed conflict on adversary rearmament. Given the collapse of the bipolar power struc- being regarded as the final stage of total reliance of weapons systems on ture, however, unleashed nationalist, information warfare. In sum, the use information resources for proper religious, and ethnic forces. The of force can have a peripheral effect employment, relegating them to world community is entering a pe- on information warfare by destroy- secondary or tertiary importance is riod of extensive economic competi- ing or incapacitating targets, but unacceptable. tion among allied and friendly IBW can alter, interdict, or destroy Second, in an era of coalitions nations, complicated by threats of re- information and information assets, greater attention must be paid to en- gional strife in areas where economic thereby determining the outcome of suring interoperability of weapons interests are limited. America needs military operations. and information systems. Parallel credible military capabilities to meet development of systems with crucial the challenges of regional conflict Changing the Force Structure differences which render them non- and deny potential enemies a mili- The Armed Forces, especially in interoperable cannot be tolerated. tary advantage, despite reductions in concert with NATO, are well- Given a trend away from forward de- spending and forward deployment. equipped under current joint doctrine ployment and towards forward pres- This can be accomplished only by to fight corps-sized engagements in ence, the Armed Forces must plan for modifying joint doctrine and force Europe. In light of the foregoing dis- more combined exercises mounted structure to capitalize on informa- cussion of IBW, however, this force from alliance and coalition partner tion technology, retaining sufficient structure may be totally inadequate bases, rather than from bases built power projection capabilities to infor the most likely war scenarios. To and run by the United States. This sert forces, and attaining superiority meet future challenges, joint doctrine implies fielding weapons and infor- in information-based warfare. JFQ and force structure must be modified to be consistent with the new geopo-

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emergencies and civil defense for at- Doctrine Lessons Learned tacks directed against the territory of the United States. Included under JOINT PUBS OPERATIONS assistance for civil disturbances is UPDATE OTHER THAN WAR military support to domestic law enforcement agencies, protection of The following titles have re- Since Desert Storm the CJCS ex- life and Federal property, and pre- cently been approved as part of the ecute order has required that lessons vention of disruptions to govern- Joint Publication System: learned be reported in a total of 35 mental functions. ▼ Joint Pub 0–2, Unified Action NCA-ordered joint operations per Doctrine covering OOTW is Armed Forces, provides basic doctrine Joint Pub 1–03.30. The lessons are contained in the Joint Pub 3–07 se- on unified action and, with Joint Pub 1, documented in Joint Universal ries. The first draft of Joint Pub 3–08, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Lessons Learned System (JULLS) for- Interagency Coordination During Joint serves as the capstone document for all mat as part of a supported CINC’s Operations, should be distributed for joint doctrine; links joint doctrine to after action report (AAR), entered in comment in November 1994. national security strategy and national the Joint Center for Lessons Learned Among the various operational military strategy; sets out concepts, re- (JCLL) database, and vetted for Re- lationships, and processes for unified and exercise lessons learned during medial Action Projects (RAPs) to be action for joint operations; and out- civil support operations in the pe- lines the nature of joint operations and resolved at the joint level. Not sur- riod since the Gulf War are: prisingly each of the 35 operations the comprehensive exercise of com- ▼ Hurricane Iniki (PACOM/17 falls under the rubric of Military Op- mand authority in conducting them JULLS)—Disaster response operations (August 11, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor erations Other Than War (OOTW). conducted prior to and after the hurri- and lead agent: J-7). The focus of this column is civil sup- cane passed across Oahu and Kauai on ▼ Joint Pub 3–07.4, Joint Counter- port operations as documented in September 11, 1992. The initial action drug Operations, describes the overall several representative AARs. included activating a Disaster Re- DOD counterdrug effort; emphasizes As discussed in Joint Pub 3–0, sponse Team (DRT) and standing-up a joint and interagency responsibilities OOTW cover a range of activities in Crisis Action Team (CAT). In response and coordination; and addresses the which the military is used for pur- to an execute order from the Director threat, strategy, planning, organiza- of Military Support and a Presidential tions, and missions associated with poses other than large-scale combat operations associated with war. Such declaration of a major disaster, CINC- counterdrug operations (August 9, PAC activated JTF Hawaii and ap- operations usually involve a mix of 1994; Joint Staff sponsor: J-3, lead pointed the Commander, U.S. Army agent: ACOM). land, sea, air, space, and special op- Pacific, as JTF commander and Defense ▼ Joint Pub 5–0, Doctrine for Plan- erations forces (active and/or Reserve Coordinating Officer (DCO). Many ning Joint Operations, provides the doc- components) under the commander lessons concerned interagency proce- trinal foundation for planning the em- of a joint task force (JTF) who re- dures, especially regarding the Federal ployment of joint forces; presents the ports to a supported unified combat- Emergency Management Agency responsibilities, principles, concepts, ant commander. They may occur (FEMA) and initial coordination and integrated national process anywhere, from foreign territory to among Federal, state, and local agen- through which planning for joint oper- cies. Recommendations included: ations is accomplished; covers the domestic urban areas as part of mili- strategic framework in which joint op- tary support to the civil authority. • Potential JTF staff attend train- eration plans are produced; emphasizes OOTW include combating terrorism, ing on implementing the Federal Re- plans and processes that provide strate- support of counterdrug operations, sponse Plan (FRP). gic direction to joint operational plan- nation assistance, noncombatant • FEMA should facilitate funding ning and that integrate the statutory evacuation operations, peace opera- transfers including processing mission assignment letters (MAL) to expedite DOD functions of military departments and tions, support to insurgency, and services into joint operation planning; relief operations and reimbursement. civil support operations. In addition • Collocate JTF, Federal, state, and focuses on the formal processes that to joint forces and DOD agencies, govern the development and execution local government agencies, and NGOs participants in OOTW can include of operational plans by combatant, sub- headquarters if possible; ensure full ex- unified, and JTF commanders both in other Federal agencies, nongovern- change of liaison officers (LNOs). deliberate and crisis action planning; mental organizations (NGOs), the • Coordinate, publish, and dis- and discusses the role of joint opera- United Nations, NATO, combined or seminate FEMA support request proce- tional planning as a way of measuring multinational forces, and state and dures to Federal and state agencies, warfighting capabilities and force devel- local authorities other civil activities, and NGOs affili- opment (August 15, 1994; Joint Staff Civil-military operations com- ated with disaster relief operations. •Centralize control of airlift sponsor and lead agent: J-7). JFQ prise worldwide humanitarian assis- operations. tance operations, including disaster • Include the Customs Service and relief, support to displaced persons, Department of Agriculture among Fed- and civil assistance. Support to the eral agencies for coordination purposes. civil authorities includes domestic actions applicable to disaster-related

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• FEMA, in conjunction with ity, and limitations of the Posse Comi- build ups and draw downs ending in state and local officials, should be re- tatus Act. Throughout the operation June 1993. At a peak population of sponsible for approving the release of the JTF had to constantly monitor mis- 13,392 in May 1992, measurable opera- military emergency communications sions so that Federal troops did not get tional costs were almost $59 million. when no longer required. inadvertently drawn into law enforce- This operation presented unusual chal- ▼ Eligible Receiver 94–1 ment which is the province of civil au- lenges, such as testing thousands of (PACOM/25 JULLs/Secret)—Part of a thority, even when local authorities migrants and treating HIV-positive in- No Notice Interoperability Exercise wanted such action. Major lessons individuals as well as actual AIDS cases. (NIEX) program focused on respond- cluded that there is a need for civil dis- Extensive coordination with the Immi- ing to a request for natural disaster as- turbance operations in unit training; gration and Naturalization Service sistance. Since responsibility for for- that short-term Federalization of Guard (INS) was necessitated in the face of eign disaster assistance falls under the personnel does not justify the enor- legal challenges to American policy Department of State, the scenario led mous efforts required to conduct physi- that seriously impacted on JTF opera- to an Office of Foreign Disaster Assis- cal exams and administrative actions tions. Lessons cover a range of issues, tance (OFDA) request for defense sup- when de-Federalizing troops; that siz- from the need for linguists, integrating port through the National Security able public affairs elements should ac- Reserve volunteers, rules of engage- Council. NCA designated CINCPAC as company deploying forces; that civil ment to cover security requirements the supported CINC, who in turn des- disturbance plans must provide for Fed- (for example, potential for mass break- ignated the Commander, III Marine eralizing and de-Federalizing the Guard outs, hostage taking, or rioting), to Expeditionary Force (MEF) as JTF com- (including combat support and combat problems created by INS working mander. Issues addressed include using service support) and contain an annex hours. Also contained are recommen- trained JDISS operators, WWMCCS, on Posse Comitatus and the differences dations from combatant ships on Special Assignment Airlift Missions in National Guard authority under Title berthing and feeding hundreds of men, prior to TPFDD development, lack of 32 (state active duty) versus Federal au- women, and children awaiting further joint pubs at JTF level, Special Opera- thority under Title 10 (including UCMJ processing. One of the most difficult tions Forces, command awareness of authority); and the large number of aspects of Operation GTMO was the OFDA activities, Army Prepositioned LNOs needed due to extensive coordi- demand placed on military medicine. Afloat (APA) and Maritime Preposi- nation in support of law enforcement The report identifies a lack of under- agencies and civil authorities. standing on the part of Federal agen- tioning Ships (MPS), early command ▼ and control of airlift, and clear NCA Hurricane Andrew Relief cies concerning the ability of military guidance to CINCs on the transition (FORSCOM/185 JULLs)—AAR repre- medicine to care for HIV patients at to civilian control of disaster relief/hu- sents the seminal report on support to small, out-of-CONUS medical treat- manitarian operations. The exercise civil authorities for domestic disaster ment facilities. In addition, it has de- highlighted PACOM Deployable JTF related civil emergencies and execu- tailed JULLs on how the JTF provided Augmentation Cell and written guid- tion of FRP. It contains a summary and medical support with limited resources ance contained in instructions cover- JULLs for CINCFOR, CJTF, component while screening, handling, and treating ing crisis command and control and commanders, and supporting CINCs HIV-positive migrants. It makes recom- establishment of a contingency JTF on a full range of strategic to tactical mendations on how to organize mili- and JTF SOP. Clear guidance and joint issues. Over 400 RAPs were generated tary medical personnel (including expertise personnel augmentation for corrective action on the joint, OSD, short-term augmentation by active and from the combatant command-level and interagency level as a result of the Reserve components), obtain adequate avoids the numerous problems associ- worst American disaster in terms of fi- supplies, ensure relief operations are ated with an ad-hoc approach to estab- nancial losses and property damage integrated under the JTF, and handle lishing a contingency JTF. which occured in August 1992. The the medical records of migrants that ▼ resolution of many problems, espe- may be used in future legal procedures. JTF–LA/Garden Plot (FORS- ▼ COM/36 JULLs)—After the outbreak of cially with FRP/FEMA and the need for Somalia—Joint operations cov- civil disturbances in Los Angeles, JTF– governing joint doctrine, has been or ering civil support (CENTCOM AARs LA was activated following Federaliza- is in the process of being completed. on Provide Relief and Restore Hope/ tion of selected Army National Guard Others, such as access to Reserve com- 256 JULLs) and peace operations con- units and a Presidential declaration of ponent civil affairs experts and the ducted under the United Nations. the city and county of Los Angeles as a need for clear NCA guidance on an op- JCLL has CENTCOM AAR on JTF So- major disaster area. Deployed in May erational end state, remain open. malia/UNITAF (chapter 6, peacekeep- 1992, active component forces included Though there have been significant ing operations) and interim report on 7th Infantry Division, I MEF, and other changes written since, it is required UNISOM II (chapter 7, peace enforce- units stationed in California. The re- reading for any command that may be ment). The final AAR on UNISOM II sponse was authorized by DOD Direc- tasked as part of a joint force conduct- should be forwarded from CENTCOM tive 3025.12, Department of Defense ing military support for civil authori- by October 1994. Though not a joint ties during a domestic disaster. report, the Army Somalia AAR, which Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), ▼ and the draft CINCFOR Civil Distur- Operation GTMO (ACOM/89 documents findings of the Mont- bance Plan. The AAR is a comprehen- JULLs)—Covering a period of almost gomery Board (named for the com- sive document on problems and lessons two years, the JTF GTMO AAR ad- mander of U.S. Forces in UNISOM II), associated with Federalizing the Na- dresses Haitian migrant operations at is an excellent source. (Since the tional Guard (especially for short peri- NAS Guantanamo through various lessons learned from Somalia encom- ods), the fact that Federal forces act in pass a wide range of concerns, they support of—not in lieu of—civil author- will be the theme of a separate TJW column in a subsequent issue of JFQ.)

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Perhaps the simplest yet most authorities, especially interagency 1984 and the Air Force Senior Offi- fundamental lesson learned from coordination. As lessons in opera- cer Combat Employment Course OOTW is that they support civil au- tional AARs are forwarded for review which was started the following thorities and are conducted under a as potential RAPs and inclusion in year. These courses led to the cre- joint organization and commander. the JCLL database, they will be made ation of a joint Army-Air Force pro- This supporting role may present a available for planning OOTW mis- gram in 1986 that was expanded to challenge to commanders and a sig- sions, refining doctrine, and resolv- include officers from the Navy and nificant change for those accus- ing problems. Marine Corps in 1987. The Septem- tomed to unilateral military opera- —Contributed by ber 1994 JFOWC was the 22d course tions. In domestic operations, the CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN to include general and flag officers change involves U.S. Atlantic Com- Exercise and Analysis Division (J-7) of all four services. JFQ mand (ACOM) as the joint force in- Joint Staff JFQ tegrator. Because of a change in the Unified Command Plan, the incorporation of Forces Command Education COMMAND AND (FORSCOM) under ACOM gives uni- CONTROL PRIZE fied combatant command responsi- JOINT The Center for Advanced Com- bility to ACOM that formerly fell mand Concepts and Technology has under FORSCOM as a specified com- WARFIGHTING FOR announced the creation of the NDU batant command. The Secretary of GENERAL/FLAG Command and Control Prize to the Army remains executive agent OFFICERS recognize work which significantly for military support to civil authori- improves the field. Papers should de- ties (MSCA) and military assistance The Joint Flag Officer Warfight- scribe the results of work substantially for civil disturbances (MACDIS). ing Course (JFOWC) is administered performed within two years of sub- Under a CJCS-approved implemen- by the Commandant, U.S. Army mission and that has not been pub- tation plan ACOM is responsible for War College; President, Naval War lished. Papers must be received no preparing assigned forces to provide College; President, Marine Corps later than April 15, 1995. For details both MSCA and MACDIS, as di- University; and Commander, Air write to the Director, Center for Ad- rected by the Secretary of the Army, University, and conducted at vanced Command Concepts and within the 48 contiguous states, Dis- Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The two- Technology, NDU–NSS–RD, National trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and week course is offered three times a Defense University, Washington, D.C. Virgin Islands. With regard to year to prepare major generals and 20319–6000. JFQ OOTW, ACOM is also responsible for rear admirals for theater-level com- integrating CONUS medical contin- bat leadership responsibilities. gency planning, acting as executive JFOWC provides future CINCs, ser- agent for the Key Asset Protection vice component commanders, and JOINT ESSAY Program, providing military support JTF commanders with an apprecia- CONTEST for counterdrug operations within tion of the strategic and operational The U.S. Naval Institute pub- CONUS and geographic areas of re- levels of war. Eighteen officers (six lished the winning essays in the first sponsibility, and providing CONUS Army, four Navy, two Marine Corps, annual Colin L. Powell Joint forces to support peace and humani- and six Air Force) are enrolled in Warfighting Essay Contest in the tarian assistance operations not al- each course and study the applica- September 1994 issue of Proceedings. ready assigned to other combatant tion of joint and combined forces to The top prize was awarded to Lt Col commands. As the ACOM Army meet crises. Jay L. Lorenzen, USAF, for an essay en- component, however, FORSCOM The objectives of JFOWC are to titled “Marshall-ing Joint Leadership”; has been delegated lead operational promote understanding of the oper- first honorable mention went to CPT authority to plan and execute many ational level of war and associated Dean T. Katsiyannis, USA, for “Com- functions outlined above, including decisionmaking; joint and combined bined Arms, Combined Services”; operational control of JTF 6. operations as well as coalition war- and second honorable mention went From relief efforts in Rwanda to fare; and force employment at com- to CAPT Powell A. Fraser, USN, for the Haitian migrant operations, ex- ponent, JTF, and theater levels. The “Reengineering Combat Readiness.” perience in OOTW has increased course exposes participants to both The deadline for entries in the next dramatically since the Persian Gulf active and retired CINCs, compo- contest is April 1, 1995. For details War. While AARs on operations car- nent and JTF commanders, and offi- call Bert Hubinger, (410) 268–6110; or ried out in the wake of floods and cials of the Departments of Defense write U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Mary- earthquakes in 1992 have not yet and State as well as other civilian land Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland been received, they should reflect leaders. 21402–5035. JFQ progress in military support to civil The origins of JFOWC are found in the Army General Officer War- fighting Course which began in

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MONOGRAPHS Affairs,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 3 JFQuarterly Survey Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri (Autumn 1994), pp. 18–36. of Joint Literature Alcalá. Whither the RMA: Two Dean T. Katsiyannis, “Combined Perspectives on Tomorrow’s Army. Arms, Combined Services,” Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, BOOKS Studies Institute, U.S. Army War vol. 120, no. 9 (September 1994), Keith E. Bonn. When the Odds Were College, July 1994. 46 pp. pp. 82–84. Even: The Voges Mountains Cam- Brooks L. Bash. The Role of United Carnes Lord and Gary J. Schmitt, paign, October 1944–January 1945. States Air Power in Peacekeeping. “Strategic Engagement: Some Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Modest Proposals,” Comparative 1994. 294 pp. $24.95. University Press, June 1994. 44 pp. Strategy, vol. 13, no. 3 (July– [ISBN 0–89141–512–2] Center for Advanced Command Con- September 1994), pp. 253–59. James W. Bradin. From Hot Air to cepts and Technology. Command Jay L. Lorenzen, “Marshall-ing Joint Hellfire: The History of Army Attack and Control in Peace Operations. Leadership,” U.S. Naval Institute Aviation. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Workshop no. 1. Washington: Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 9 Press, 1994. 253 pp. $21.95. Institute for National Strategic (September 1994), pp. 78–81. [ISBN 0–89141–511–4] Studies, September 1994. 16 pp. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to James R. Brungess. Setting the Jeffrey R. Cooper. Another View of Computer: The Pattern of Military Context: Suppression of Enemy Air the Revolution in Military Affairs. Revolutions,” The National Interest, Defenses and Joint War Fighting in Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30–42. an Uncertain World. Maxwell Air Studies Institute, U.S. Army War John Mackinlay, “Improving Multi- Force Base, Ala.: Air University College, July 1994. 46 pp. functional Forces,” Survival, vol. 36, Press, 1994. 225 pp. no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 149–73. ARTICLES D.M. Giangreco. Stealth Fighter Pilot. Giandomenico Picco, “The U.N. and The Power series. Osceola, Wis.: Andrew J. Bacevich, “Preserving the the Use of Force,” Foreign Affairs, Motorbooks International, 1993. Well-Bred Horse,” The National In- vol. 73, no. 5 (September/October 128 pp. $14.95. terest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 43–49. 1994), pp. 14–18. [ISBN 0–87938–716–5] Robert E. Coffin and David D. Scott, John Gerard Ruggie, “Peacekeeping John T. Hoffman. Once a Legend: “Operations Dragoon: A Forging of and U.S. Interests,” The Washington “Red Mike” Edison of the Marine Allies,” Army, vol. 44, no. 8 (August Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 4 (Autumn Raiders. Novato, Calif.: Presidio 1944), pp. 40–46. 1994), pp. 175–84. Press, 1994. 434 pp. $24.95. Wayne Danzik, “Coalition Forces in Hugh Smith, “Intelligence and U.N. [ISBN 0–89141–493–2] the Korean War,” Naval War Col- Peacekeeping,” Survival, vol. 36, Karl P. Magyar, et al., editors. Chal- lege Review, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 174–92. 1994), pp. 25–39. lenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Jim Starling, “Experiment in Joint Military Security Concerns. Maxwell Charles Dobbie, “A Concept for Post- Ops,” Army, vol. 44, no. 7 (July Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Cold War Peacekeeping,” Survival, 1994), pp. 36–39. Press, 1994. 431 pp. vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), Paul L. Tomlinson, “How Joint pp. 121–48. Martha E. Maura. Coalition Command Officer Management Legislation and Control: Key Considerations. Stephen M. Epstein et al., “JTF Haiti: Is Dividing Our Officer Corps,” Center for Advanced Command A United Nations Foreign Internal Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 78, Concepts and Technology, Defense Mission,” Special Warfare, no. 10 (October 1994), pp. 25–31. National Defense University; vol. 7, no. 3 (July 1994), pp. 2–9. Lamar Tooke, “Formulating a Theater Program on Information Resources Matthew J. Faletti, “Close Air Support Strategic Concept of Operations,” Policy, Harvard University. Wash- Must Be Joint,” U.S. Naval Institute Military Review, vol. 74, no. 6 (June ington: Institute for National Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 9 1994), pp. 9–14. Strategic Studies, 1994. 147 pp. (September 1994), pp. 56–57. Daren J. Wilson, “Psychological Keith William Nolan. The Magnificent Powell A. Fraser, “Reengineering Operations in Somalia,” Australian Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Combat Readiness,” U.S. Naval Defence Force Journal, no. 107 Defense of Dong Ha, 1968. Novato, Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 9 (July/August 1994), pp. 35–42. JFQ Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. 380 pp. (September 1994), pp. 85–88. $24.95. [ISBN 0–89141–485–4] Richard N. Haass, “Military Force: William L. Smallwood. Strike Eagle: A User’s Guide,” Foreign Policy, Flying the F–15E in the Gulf War. no. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 21–37. Washington: Brassey’s, 1994. 218 David Jablonsky, “U.S. Military Doc- pp. $23.00. [ISBN 0–02–881058–9] trine and the Revolution in Military JFQ lists recent selected titles of interest to its readers. Publishers are asked to forward new works to the Editor.

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JOINT TASK FORCES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY Compiled by Gail Nicula and John R. Ballard

M1A1s boarding LCUs oint task forces (JTFs) have been at Camp Lejeune for Jthe response of choice for most Agile Provider ’94.

contingencies since the Vietnam U.S. Marine Corps (Pixler) conflict. Nonetheless the organization and functioning of JTF staffs are among the least understood areas of quires a much broader range of in- Daniel P. Bolger. Americans at War, operational warfighting. JTFs form formation than found in individual 1975–1986: An Era of Violent Peace. the crucial link in the operational service doctrine. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1988. Ana- planning and execution continuum, JTF staffs exist because single- lyzes military operations from the connecting strategic objectives of service assets are rarely able to ad- Mayaguez incident and Gulf of Sidra the National Command Authorities dress crises effectively. Multi-service air engagement to the Grenada in- as well as theater campaign plans of efforts automatically create problems vasion and Achille Lauro crisis. CINCs to the execution of mission- of confused terminology and lack of Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, essential tasks at the sharp end of familiarity with service-specific pro- and Caleb Baker. Operation Just the bayonet. This bibliography in- cedures and equipment. The reader Cause: The Storming of Panama. troduces members of the Armed will note that many of the sources New York: Lexington Books, 1991. Forces, particularly Joint Specialty listed below highlight command Describes problems of timing, Officers (JSOs), to sources on the and control, which is the primary rules of engagement, public affairs, requirements for JTF staffs. task of JTF staffs. Having access to post-conflict resolution, and the By their nature, JTF staffs deal the right information is crucial. This integration of joint forces. with emerging crises. Time is always bibliography is annotated to assist Richard A. Gabriel. Military Incompe- short, plans are often inadequate or readers in identifying source mate- tence: Why the American Military nonexistent, and forces are usually rial to aid them in accomplishing Doesn’t Win. New York: Hill and just being alerted for deployment. tasks on the JTF level. Wang, 1985. Reviews the Sontay raid, Mayaguez incident, Iran res- The major demand is properly utiliz- BOOKS ing JTF personnel in the face of time cue mission, Marine compound constraints, insufficient informa- Mark Adkin. Urgent Fury. Lexington, bombing in Beirut, and Grenada tion, and overall uncertainty. At a Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. operation in stinging terms. basic level, each officer has to arrive Outlines the formation and crisis Maxwell O. Johnson. The Military as at JTF headquarters ready to work action planning for JTF 120; dean Instrument of U.S. Policy in South- and able to immediately confront a tails an operation that most clearly west Asia: The Rapid Deployment crisis as the organization adapts to highlights the difficulty of form- Joint Task Force, 1979–1982. Boul- new members. This underscores the ing a JTF on short notice. der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. importance of being able to call on C. Kenneth Allard. Command, Con- Considers various issues including the expertise and tools required to trol, and the Common Defense. New the Carter Doctrine, the Rapid De- do the job. Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. ployment Joint Task Force, and JSOs should not fail to under- Provides a comprehensive history Gulf Cooperation Council. stand JTFs nor be prepared to func- of U.S. military command struc- David A. Quinlan. The Role of the tion on that level. JTF staffs remain ture and calls for the services “to Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment the most common response not develop and refine a truly unified Forces. Washington: National De- only to combat but to a plethora of body of joint military doctrine.” fense University Press, 1983. Un- crises currently lumped under the James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. derscores the advantages of Ma- rubric Operations Other Than War. Blechman, editors. Making Defense rine Corps task organization in Responding to such diverse issues re- Reform Work. Washington: rapid deployment operations. Brassey’s, 1990. Contains back- Jeffrey Record. The Rapid Deployment ground information on defense re- Force and U.S. Military Intervention form including essays on planning in the Persian Gulf. Cambridge, military operations and the role Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Gail Nicula is Library Director at the Armed of joint institutions in defense Analysis, 1981. Argues that the Forces Staff College; Major John R. Ballard, resources. Rapid Deployment Force was both USMC, is assigned to the Joint Training Di- flawed and hastily put together rectorate (J-7) at U.S. Atlantic Command.

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from existing units and that it suf- Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Gary W. Deulley. Joint Organization: fered from inadequate strategic Command and Staff College, Where Do We Go after Goldwater- and tactical mobility as well as 1986. [DTIC AD B102 872] In- Nichols? Maxwell Air Force Base, forcible-entry capability. cludes a consideration of the need Ala.: Air War College, 1989. [DTIC U.S. Joint Task Force One. Bombs at for JTFs in low-intensity conflict AD A217 256] Advocates increas- Bikini: The Official Report of Opera- operations. ing joint exposure for all officers tion Crossroads, Joint Task Force One. Antonio M. Cogliandro and Frank R. through education and exercises. New York: William H. Wise and Prautzsch. Identification and Assess- Michael Finn. Does Copernicus Wear Son, 1947. Looks at a JTF created ment of Joint Exercise Command, Purple Robes? Newport, R.I.: Naval by JCS with representation from Control, and Communications (C3) War College, 1991. [DTIC AD B157 land, sea, and air forces to conduct Failures. Monterey, Calif.: Naval 999] Explores Navy Copernicus ar- tests in 1946 on the effects of Postgraduate School, 1986. [DTIC chitecture for C4I and concerns atomic bombs on naval vessels. AD B101 624] Assesses joint plan- over the horizontal linkages for U.S. Joint Task Force Two. Report on ning and training, the dilemma of command at sea, especially for the Low Altitude Test 4.4: Target Acqui- command, and joint communica- naval components of JTFs. sition Tactical Air Reconnaissance. tions control. James W. Fondren, Jr. Joint Task Force Sandia Base, N.M.: n.p., 1968. Ex- John C. Coleman. Tumbling “Compo- Operations in the Persian Gulf. amines a JTF organized to conduct nent Walls” in Contingency Opera- Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air tests to obtain data on low altitude tions: A Trumpet’s Blare for Standing War College, 1989. [DTIC AD air offensive and defensive Joint Task Force Headquarters. Fort A217 341] Reviews operations to weapons systems operations. Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Ad- protect eleven U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti vanced Military Studies, U.S. Army tankers from attack by Iran. MONOGRAPHS AND Command and General Staff Col- Jeremiah F. Garretson. Confronting UNPUBLISHED THESES lege, 1991. [DTIC AD A243 329] Challenges to Jointness: Initiatives for Stephen E. Anno and William E. Examines the CINC’s need for a Joint Command and Control. New- Einspahr. Command and Control standing JTF headquarters to pro- port, R.I.: Naval War College, and Communications Lessons vide command and control for 1993. [DTIC AD A266 909] Ana- Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands contingency operations involving lyzes operational requirements Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya forced entry et al. using “C4I for The Warrior” as a Raid. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Michael P. Currie. Operational Lessons point of departure and concludes Air War College, 1988. [DTIC AD of Urgent Fury. Newport, R.I.: Naval that JTFs are the logical benefac- A202 091] Makes a case for unity, War College, 1988. [DTIC AD B123 tors of such support. simplicity, and autonomy; covers 621] Discusses experience with JTF Daniel J. Gilbert. Joint Task Force communications architecture and operations during Operation Urgent Command, Control, and Communi- planning. Fury and urges a dedicated effort to cations: Have We Improved? Fort Lance A. Bentros. Coping with Uncer- conduct routine joint training. Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army tainty: The Joint Task Force and Command and General Staff Col- Multi-service Military Operations. lege, 1989. [DTIC AD A215 795] Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991. [DTIC AD A240 USS Kitty Hawk 414] Finds that doctrine recog- underway off the nizes the need for JTFs but service Virginia Capes. parochialism often frustrates joint commanders. Wayne W. Boy. Joint Task Force Bravo: A Model for Forward Presence. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1992. [DTIC AD A250 546] Describes the evolution of JTF-Bravo as an example of transitioning from forward deployment to forward presence in the wake of declining resources. James D. Chambers, Patrick J. Evans, and Karl H. Johnson. Command and Control in Low Intensity Con- flict: Adequacy of Current Military Arrangements and Joint Doctrine. U.S. Navy (Gallagher)

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Examines whether commanders staff must work together on a con- Thomas C. Loper. A Candidate Func- are better able to exercise com- tinuing basis to be effective in tional Architecture Design for the De- mand and control over JTFs today contingency or other operations. tection and Monitoring Process of a than in the past and whether pre- Marc R. Hildenbrand. Standing Joint Counterdrug Joint Task Force. Mon- viously identified C3 problems Task Forces: A Way to Enhance terey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate have been fixed. America’s Warfighting Capabilities? School, 1993. [DTIC AD A272 515] Robert G. Gorrie. Joint Battle Staff Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Considers the design of JTFs using Training. Newport, R.I.: Naval War Advanced Military Studies, U.S. a systems engineering approach College, 1991. [DTIC AD A236 Army Command and General Staff of top down decomposition which 279] Validates the need for trained College, 1992. [DTIC AD A256 establishes a format for baseline command and joint battle staff 594] Provides an analysis of requirements. teams to lead multi-service joint whether force allocation proce- Jerry W. McElwee. Principles for Orga- task forces. dures or standing JTFs better serve nization of Joint and Combined Nicholas P. Grant. Joint Task Force warfighting needs. Staffs. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Staffs: Seeking a Mark on the Wall. Ernest E. Hugh. Joint Task Force Bravo: U.S. Army Command and General Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, Wave of the Future or Legacy of a Staff College, 1986. [DTIC AD 1993. [DTIC AD A266 560] De- Discredited Past? Monterey, Calif.: A167 675] Describes the role of the scribes how EUCOM, PACOM, and Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. military staff and summarizes the the Joint Staff prepare JTF staffs for [DTIC AD B161 802] Argues that a major organizational principles of contingency operations. revamped JTF-Bravo in Honduras Marshall, MacArthur, and Eisen- Brent J. Griffin. The Joint Intelligence which emphasized civic action hower during World War II as well Center Pacific: A Case Study in could serve as a model for future as those of current leaders. Modern Joint Intelligence Operations U.S. involvement in Latin America. Gary E. Morgan. Joint Logistics Doc- (U). Monterey, Calif.: Naval Post- Jared A. Kline. Joint Communications trine—Yes or No? Washington: graduate School, 1992. [DTIC AD in Support of Joint Task Force South Industrial College of the Armed C959 978L] Discusses the Joint during Operation Just Cause. Fort Forces, 1988. [DTIC AD B133 959] Intelligence Center Pacific and its Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Uses after-action reports from Ur- initial performance in support of Command and General Staff Col- gent Fury and Ahaus Tara III to ex- PACOM forces and JTF intelligence lege, 1991. [DTIC AD A241 732] amine improvements in logistics support capabilities. Analyzes tactical and strategic planning for JTF operations. Michael E. Haith. CINC-ronization communications used in invading Donald L. Morris. A Multinational (Synchronization): The Critical Tenet Panama and provides a detailed Amphibious Task Force for NATO in Future Operational Art. Fort Leav- account of communications sup- (U). Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. enworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Com- port provided to a JTF engaged in Army War College, 1980. [DTIC mand and General Staff College, contingency operations. AD C025 202] Examines the feasi- 1990. [DTIC AD A234 163] Exam- Richard W. Kokko. Joint Operations bility of establishing a standing ines critical synchronization issues Involving Marine Amphibious Forces combined amphibious task force confronting CINCs and JTF com- and Army Airborne Forces. Newport, for Europe’s northern flank. manders in conducting joint and R.I.: Naval War College, 1988. H.M. Murdock. Doctrine for Combined combined operations. [DTIC AD B122 715] Provides case Airborne and Amphibious Operations. James R. Helmly. Future U.S. Military studies of the Dominican Republic Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Strategy: The Need for a Standing and Grenada to demonstrate that Army Command and General Staff Joint Task Force. Carlisle Barracks, sequencing force deployment is College, 1991. [DTIC AD A258 Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1991. driven by the enemy situation, 499] Looks at the complexity of in- [DTIC AD A237 692] Points out mission, terrain, and the need for tegrating airborne and amphibious that, based upon historical experi- surprise. operations in a joint and com- ence, contingency forces in the fu- Robert D. Lewis. Combined Joint Task bined environment through a ture should be organized into a Force Provide Comfort: What Are We series of historical examples. standing JTF. Trying to Do? What Is the Way Thomas P. Odom. Dragon Operations: Michael L. Henchen. Establishment of Ahead? Newport, R.I.: Naval War Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964– a Permanent Joint Task Force Head- College, 1992. [DTIC AD A249 1965. Leavenworth paper no. 14. quarters: An Analysis of Sourcing a 846] Identifies national policies Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Command and Control Structure which JTFs appear to support and Studies Institute, 1988. Reviews Capable of Executing Forced Entry discusses operations that the JTF joint and combined operations in Contingency Operations. Fort Leav- “should be prepared to undertake.” central Africa and concludes that, enworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Com- inter alia, too many bosses and in- mand and General Staff College, effective communications created 1993. [DTIC AD A272 885] Em- major limitations. phasizes that members of a JTF U.S. Navy (Gallagher)

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Andrew Petruska. Operation Sharp Edge: The Evacuation of Liberia—A Prototype for Future Joint Littoral Op- erations. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994. [DTIC AD B174 463] Traces events involving the evacuation of noncombatants from Liberia during Operation Sharp Edge. John C. Race, Jr. Grenada: Command and Control Lessons Learned in Oper- ation Urgent Fury (U). Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1987. [DTIC AD F–117 stealth C042 294] Discusses operational se- fighters. curity, planning, communications, Combat Camera Imagery (Marvin Lynchard) maneuver boundaries, designation of a ground force commander, fire support coordination, and airspace Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri. headquarters in the Dominican Re- management. Overview of Selected Joint Task public, Exercise Golden Pheasant, William S. Ramshaw. Operation Just Forces, 1960–1993. Alexandria, Va.: and Operation Just Cause. Cause Command and Control: A Center for Naval Analyses, George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Case Study. Monterey, Calif.: Naval September 1993. Compares con- Adam B. Siegel. JTF Operations Postgraduate School, 1991. [DTIC tingency versus standing JTFs in- Since 1983. Alexandria, Va.: Center AD B159 072] Gives straightfor- cluding Power Pack (Dominican for Naval Analyses, July 1994. ward account of the operational Republic), JTF–LEO (Congo), and [CRM 94–42] Incorporates infor- planning and C2 organization. Bold Face (Mexico). mation from the JULLS database David M. Rodriguez. Task Force Syn- A.G. Smart. Military Support to Do- and unit histories in a functionally chronization: What Is Essential? Fort mestic Disaster Relief: Doctrine for organized guide to JTF issues. Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Ad- Operating in the Wake of the Enemy? Stephen M. Townsend. Command vanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. and Control Architecture for Joint Command and General Staff Col- Army Command and General Staff Task Forces (U). Monterey, Calif.: lege, 1989. [DTIC AD A210 929] College, 1993. [DTIC AD A274 Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. Stresses the importance of time 105] Analyzes disaster relief pro- [DTIC AD C958 855L] Examines and space factors to the maneuver vided after Hurricane Andrew in the combat environment, deci- ability of JTFs to synchronize of- 1992 and finds that this type of sionmaking, and information re- fensive operations. operation, while not understood, quirements to determine the best B.A. Ross. The Joint Task Force Head- will grow in importance. methods of organizing a JTF. quarters in Contingency Operations. Michael N. Smith. Putting the Com- Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. mander in Control: The Light Cav- ARTICLES Army Command and General Staff alry Regiment’s Utility to the Joint S.L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, “A College, 1993. [DTIC AD A274 Commander. Newport, R.I.: Naval Power Projection Army in Opera- 327] Takes stock of JTF headquar- War College, 1993. [DTIC AD tions Other Than War,” Parameters, ters in contingency operations by A264 458] Concludes that an vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1993–94), reviewing the foundations of C2 Army light armored cavalry regi- pp. 4–26. Examines lessons learned functions, selected historical ex- ment is the best capability avail- from Operations Andrew Relief and amples of crisis response opera- able to the JTF commander for Restore Hope with emphasis on tions, and current doctrine. gaining and maintaining positive boundaries between the strategic William A. Saunders. Joint Pub 5–00.2, C2 in contingency operations. and operational levels of activity. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance John E. Sterling. The Corps Staff in the Timothy D. Bloechl, “Operation Just and Procedures: A Critical Review. JTF Role. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Cause: An Application of Opera- Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War Col- School of Advanced Military Stud- tional Art?” Low-Intensity Conflict lege, 1992. [DTIC AD A250 545] ies, U.S. Army Command and Gen- and Law Enforcement, vol. 2, no. 3 Claims that this publication does a eral Staff College, 1992. [DTIC AD (Winter 1993), pp. 546–77. Sum- good job of addressing doctrinal and A255 147] Assesses the experiences marizes the events in Panama im- procedural voids in past JTF opera- of XVIII Airborne Corps as a JTF mediately prior to Just Cause, then tions but fails to discuss functional compares operation planning and command organizations. execution with doctrine.

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George Bush, “Remarks at the Aspen William E. DePuy, “For the Joint Spe- creased Soviet capability to project Institute Symposium in Aspen, cialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb,” power overseas and subsequent Colorado, August 2, 1990,” Weekly Parameters, vol. 19, no. 3 (September improvements in lift generated by Compilation of Presidential Docu- 1989), pp. 2–12. Underscores the its formation. ments, vol. 26, no. 31 (August 6, pitfalls of Goldwater-Nichols in ad- Robert B. Killebrew, “Force Projec- 1990), pp. 1190–94. Identifies the vising NCA, honing operational art, tion in Short Wars,” Military Re- basic and far-reaching change in generating joint requirements, con- view, vol. 71, no. 3 (March 1991), defense policy and includes a ra- trolling collateral operations, and pp. 28–37. Focuses on the impor- tionale for increasing the empha- synchronizing cross-service support tance of time management and sis and reliance on JTFs. on the tactical level. public opinion in joint operations Robert D. Chelberg et al., “EUCOM— Thomas A. Fabyanic, “Conceptual and highlights the importance of At the Center of the Vortex,” Field Planning and the Rapid Deploy- forcible entry as a joint capability. Artillery (October 1993), pp. 12–16. ment Joint Task Force,” Armed Forces Donald Kropp, “Task Force Commu- Notes that the EUCOM approach and Society, vol. 7, no. 3 (Spring nications: The Special Operations to burgeoning crises is to develop 1981), pp. 343–65. Explores the Paradigm,” Special Warfare (May Combat Camera Imagery (Marvin Lynchard) an expeditionary mindset and in- purpose of the RDJTF, deployment 1993), pp. 30–32. Draws attention crease training for potential JTF and employment concepts, and to the fact that SOF must have a staff officers. risks inherent in such a force. powerful roll-on/roll-off commu- “Civil Disturbance Rules of Engage- Henry G. Franke, “Ocean Venture nications capability which is de- ment: Joint Task Force Los Ange- ’93: An Overview,” Field Artillery ployed with the warfighters. les,” Army Lawyer (September (October 1993), pp. 17–19. Pro- Victor H. Krulak, “The Rapid De- 1992), pp. 30–32. Presents rules of vides an overview of JTF formation ployment Force: Criteria and Im- engagement for a JTF composed of and employment, command rela- peratives,” Strategic Review, vol. 8, almost 10,000 California National tionships, et al., with emphasis on no. 2 (Spring 1980), pp. 39–43. Guardsmen, 1,500 marines, and coordinating among echelons. Spells out four vital criteria for over 1,700 soldiers. Jack Grace, “MAGTF CE Congruent success that remain valid today: John H. Cushman, “Fight as a to JTF HQ,” Amphibious Warfare readiness, prepositioning, ade- Team,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- Review (Summer/Fall 1993), pp. quate tactical and logistic support, ings, vol. 119, no. 1 (January 42–43 and passim. Advances the and effective decisionmaking. 1993), pp. 58–62. Suggests that Marine Air-Ground Task Force Thomas C. Linn, “The Cutting Edge commanders should ignore the (MAGTF) command element as a of Unified Actions,” Joint Force roles and missions debate and ex- model for improving jointness and Quarterly, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), ercise hands-on control over as- interoperability. pp. 34–39. States that, since the signed forces to accomplish the Gilbert S. Harper, “Logistics in integrity of units which do the mission, regardless of service doc- Grenada: Supporting No-Plan fighting must be preserved, the trine, in order to fight as a team. Wars,” Parameters, vol. 20, no. 2 force is more joint and combined ———, “Joint Command and Con- (June 1990), pp. 50–63. Looks at at the top than at the bottom. trol,” Military Review, vol. 70, no. 7 the role of logistics requirements James P. McCarthy, “Commanding (July 1990), pp. 25–34. Uses a the- for operational success of JTFs. Joint and Coalition Operations,” oretical command structure to Robert Holzer, “Adapting Missile De- Naval War College Review, vol. 46, show C2 deficiencies stemming fense,” Navy Times (March 28, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 9–21. from a legacy of service compart- 1994), p. 32. Reviews ACOM plans Addresses the pitfalls of joint oper- mentalization even among unified for JTF 95 to test new technologies. ations including communications commands. Jonathan M. House, “Joint Opera- during planning, changes in mis- ———, “Joint, Jointer, Jointest,” U.S. tional Problems in the Cuban sion, not using the best forces, Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 118, Missile Crisis,” Parameters, vol. 21, the impact of politics, the power no. 5 (May 1992), pp. 78–85. no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 92–102. of CNN, anticipating problems, Describes JTF Provide Comfort, Contains valuable insights into and momentum in modern which was formed in April 1991 to the politico-military aspects of warfighting. bring humanitarian relief to Kurds joint operations and the dangers John J. Meyer, III, “JTF Communica- fleeing Iraqi forces as one of the of operating without a JTF based tions: The Way Ahead,” Military most joint and combined missions on plans for military operations Review, vol. 73, no. 3 (March assembled to date. against Cuba in 1962. 1993), pp. 85–87. Argues that ———, “The New USACOM: Provid- Thomas M. Johnson and Raymond commercial communication sys- ing the Punch,” U.S. Naval Institute T. Barrett, “The Rapid Deployment tems must and can be made avail- Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 5 (May Joint Task Force,” U.S. Naval Insti- able to JTF commanders and sug- 1994), pp. 96–99. Discusses the re- tute Proceedings, vol. 106, no. 11 gests that the Defense Information sponsibilities of ACOM for training (November 1980), pp. 95–98. Out- Systems Agency take the lead in JTF staffs and orchestrating joint lines the rationale for forming the guiding investment in commercial force packages for employment. RDJTF as a response to the in- capabilities.

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(Summer 1994), pp. 98–110. Discusses differing service perspectives on the Joint Force Air Com- ponent Commander fairly and demonstrates the solid reasoning behind assigning the JFACC command responsibilities. Gordon R. Sullivan, “Hurricane An- drew: An After-Action Report,” Army, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 16–22. Describes the relief effort under JTF Andrew to ameliorate the devastation caused by the hurricane which struck southern Florida in August 1992. John E. Valliere, “Disaster at Desert Training in Egyptian One: Catalyst for Change,” Param- desert during Bright eters, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn Star ’94. 1992), pp. 69–82. Analyzes the 1980 hostage rescue mission (Eagle DOD Claw) in Iran to include planning, operational sequence, and com- Paul D. Miller, “The Military after John G. Roos, “Joint Task Forces: Mix mand and control by JTF 1–79. Next: Shaping U.S. Armed Forces ‘n Match Solutions to Crisis Re- Dianne Yancey, “Joint Task Force for the Next Century,” U.S. Naval sponse,” Armed Forces Journal Inter- Bravo,” Military Police (June 1993), Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 2 national (January 1993), pp. 33–39. pp. 12–14. Outlines the missions (February 1994), pp. 41–44. Treats Observes that the disappearance of (nation building, training, and the capabilities derived from adap- the Warsaw Pact has turned a contingency planning) of the tive joint force packaging and token commitment to jointness 1,200-person joint Army-Air Force JTFs, and the new mission of U.S. into serious considerations of the JTF headquartered at Soto Cano Atlantic Command. contributions of core service capa- Air Base, Honduras. Allan L. Mink, “JTF Planning Cell: Ini- bilities to joint planning. Lawrence A. Yates, “Joint Task Force tial Response to the Yugoslavia Cri- Alan N. Sabrosky and William J. Olson, Panama: Just Cause—Before and sis,” Military Review, vol. 74, no. 3 “USCENTCOM Reconsidered: A Case After,” Military Review, vol. 71, (March 1994), pp. 68–70. Examines for Reform,” Journal of Strategic Stud- no. 10 (October 1991), pp. 58–71. the creation of the Yugoslavia Joint ies, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 1987), Takes a look at the JTF activated by Planning Cell by EUCOM in 1992 pp. 310–30. Summarizes the history SOUTHCOM in 1988 to coordi- to bridge the gap between crisis of strike forces, REDCOM, and nate security operations, engage in planning and full JTF operations. RDJTF, and analyzes CENTCOM contingency planning, and man- John F. Otis, Jr., “Joint Task Force prior to its success in Operations age the tactical aspects of the crisis Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette, Desert Shield/Desert Storm. in Panama. JFQ vol. 71, no. 1 (January 1987), pp. Jeffrey E Stambaugh, “JFACC: Key to 24–26. Provides a primer on divid- Organizing Your Air Assets for Vic- ing responsibility and require- tory,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 2 ments for a Marine Corps component commander within a JTF. Jerry A. Roberts, “Ocean Venture ’93 and the Joint Targeting Coordina- Suggested additions to this bibliography should be sent to tion Board,” Field Artillery (October the following address: 1993), pp. 20–21. Details the functioning of the Joint Targeting Coor- Commandant dination Board (JTCB), breaks down Armed Forces Staff College the steps in the joint targeting pro- ATTN: LIB/62 cess, and offers a useful JTCB 7800 Hampton Boulevard agenda for JTF joint fires personnel. Norfolk, Virginia 23511–1702

Telephone: (804) 444–5155 / DSN 564–5155 FAX: (804) 444–2053 / DSN 564–2053 Internet: [email protected]

126 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1994–95 1906OTS 3/27/04 9:26 AM Page 127

OPERATION Entering Nagasaki, DOWNFALL September 1945. A Book Review by H.P. Willmott

The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb by John Ray Skates Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. 276 pp. $27.95 [ISBN 0–87249–972–3]

ince 1945 conventional wisdom Shas held that the atomic bomb spared the United States the daunting task of invading the Japanese home islands. This wisdom has been consistently lurid in its portrayal of the nature of the resistance and the casualties that would have been in- curred in Operation Downfall. One has always been skeptical of conventional wisdom. How projected Allied casualties tallied with the order of battle has eluded this writer, and one always questioned an implied DOD Japanese effectiveness far beyond that of a better equipped Wehrmacht can firepower would be greatest or hamper operations. Third, correctly in France during 1944. hold forces inland in the certainty deducing where landings would take In The Invasion of Japan John that they would never get into bat- place was of small account given Ray Skates squares the circles: the tle; how to reconcile the need to dis- Japan’s inability to cover all beaches conventional wisdom is fraudulent. perse airpower in order to preserve it adequately. Drawing largely upon primary but concentrate it forward for attack With these matters known to sources and having walked battle- purposes in the face of overwhelm- the American high command, the fields that were not, Skates provides ing U.S. air superiority; and how to unfortunate aspect of this book is the lie to orthodox “truths.” Set plan for the defense of the Kanto that it will be invoked to question down in this account is the hope- Plain with static infantry against a the decision to use the bomb in Au- lessness of the Japanese high com- mobile, armored enemy. gust 1945. Thus it is important to re- mand’s position as it faced dilemmas Moreover, Skates provides cor- member that it took two bombs, not that confounded their German op- rectives to common mythology in one, to bring Japan to defeat, and posite numbers in dealing with the three critical areas. First, for all its only because the Emperor made de- western theater in 1944: whether to numbers the Imperial Army was cisions that were above and beyond defend Kyushu and thus exhaust the hopelessly unready to resist inva- the Supreme War Council. More rel- reserves needed for the Kanto Plain sion: the cohorts raised in 1945 were evantly, one wonders whether the or retain forces for Honshu and untrained and wretchedly equipped course of events would have been thereby compromise what little and the few good divisions were better served by Operation Downfall hope there was of denying southern compromised for want of established than ruin from the air. Defeat in op- Kyushu to the enemy; whether to lines of supply within the home is- erations on home soil disposes of deploy on the beaches where Ameri- lands. Second, while there was talk national alibis. The Invasion of Japan of “arming the people” for a last- poses a number of questions long ditch defense next to nothing had overdue. JFQ H.P. Willmott teaches in the Department been put in hand by summer 1945: of War Studies, Royal Military Academy, Tokyo, rather than wanting a peo- Sandhurst. His books include The Great ple’s war, sought to evacuate civil- Crusade: A New Complete History of the ians from threatened areas lest they Second World War.

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POSTSCRIPT

In addition, distribution is made of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appro- A NOTE TO to the Office of the Secretary of priate. Other submissions, however, Defense, defense agencies, Joint Staff, to include letters to the editor, items READERS AND unified commands, service colleges, of commentary, and brief essays are CONTRIBUTORS and other selected activities. Changes invited. Reproductions of supporting of address for these copies must be material (such as maps and photos) DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is published communicated to the Editor. should be submitted with manu- four times each year for officers scripts citing the source and indicat- of the Armed Forces. One copy is SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available ing their availability; do not send distributed for every two officers on by subscription from the Govern- originals. active duty assigned to joint billets ment Printing Office (see the order and one copy for every four majors/ blank in this issue). To order for one lieutenant commanders and year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) lieutenant colonels/commanders on the order and mail with a check across all the services. for $19.00 ($23.75 foreign) or pro- Copies are distributed to the vide a VISA or MasterCard account field and fleet through respective number with expiration date to the service channels. Corrections in Superintendent of Documents, shipping instructions, quantities P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Penn- received, and addresses for service sylvania 15220–7954, or FAX the distribution should be directed to order to: (202) 512–2233. the appropriate activity listed below. CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes ▼ ARMY—Contact the installation submissions on all aspects of joint Publications Control Officer or write and combined warfare from mem- to the U.S. Army Publications Distribu- bers of the Armed Forces as well as tion Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, from defense analysts and academic Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 (ref- specialists from both this country erence Misc. Publication 71–1). and abroad, including foreign mili- ▼ NAVY—Contact the Aviation tary personnel. There is no standard Supply Office, Navy Publications length for articles, but contributions and Forms Directorate (Code 10363), 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120–5000; FAX: (215) 697–2601/DSN 442–2601. ▼ MARINE CORPS—Contact the Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, CORRIGENDA Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, Georgia 31704. The article on “Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Controversies,” in ▼ AIR FORCE—Contact the base Publishing Distribution Office to number 5 (Summer 1994), was establish requirements. Service-wide submitted by Colonel Michael functional distribution is then made Luers, USAF, who is on the faculty by the Air Force Distribution Center, of the U.S. Army War College. Our 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, sincere apologies for misspelling Maryland 21220–2896. his name. The list of honors awarded in ▼ COAST GUARD—Contact the Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic the 1994 CJCS Strategy Essay Coast Area (AO), Governor’s Island, Competition which appeared in New York, New York 10004–5098, or issue number 5 misidentified the Commander, Coast Guard Pacific institutional affiliation of one Area (PO), Coast Guard Island, contestant. The co-winning essay Alameda, California 94501–5100; or by Colonel Gerard A. St. Amand, write to U.S. Coast Guard Headquar- USA (“Schizophrenic Sanctioning: ters, ATTN: Defense Operations Divi- A Failed U.S. Policy Toward China”), was an entry of the sion, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washing- ton, D.C. 20593–0001. National War College. —The Editor JFQ

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To facilitate review, provide the manuscript and the endnotes the submission of contributions is three copies of the manuscript to- should be typed in double-space with available by calling (202) 475–1013 / gether with a 150-word summary. one-inch margins. DSN 335–1013, FAX (202) 475–1012 / Place personal or biographical data If possible submit the manu- DSN 335–1012, or writing: on a separate sheet of paper and do script on a disk together with the Editor not identify the author (or authors) typescript version. While 3.5- and Joint Force Quarterly in the body of the text. Follow an 5.25-inch disks in various formats ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ accepted style guide in preparing the can be processed, WordPerfect is Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 JFQ manuscript, but endnotes rather preferred (disks will be returned if than footnotes should be used. Both requested). Further information on

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