The Reich Associationof German Industry's Proposalto "Privatize"the GermanNational Railway, 1921-1922 Alfred C. Mierzejewsld SchoolofArts andSdences AthensState University This paperis aboutperceptions. It is aboutthe viewsof the German peopleconcerning capitalism and private profit. It is alsoabout the mispercep- fionsof a generationof historianswho have uncrifically adopted the views of somecontemporaries with whom they sympathize. This paper focuses on the proposalsof HugoStinnes and the ReichAssociation of GermanIndustry (Reichsverbandder deutschenIndustrie - RdI) to reorganizethe German NationalRailway (Deutsche Reichsbahn - DR) in late1921 and early 1922. It is a complicatedstory that highlightsGerman fears of capitalismand Amer- icanizationborn of theirown nationalist, commonweal, corporafist values. Our accountsof the RdI reorganizationoffer provideus with an incompleteaccount of its courseand a veryinaccurate picture of whatit was intendedto achieve.Probably the bestrendering is by GeraldFeldman in his recent book, The GreatDisorder. However, Feldmanends his narrativebefore the affair concludedand, like all of his colleagues,takes Hugo Stinnes'sbad faithfor granted[Feldman, 1993, p. 376].Hugo Stinnes, one Germany's leading industrialistsat the time, had greatlyexpanded his businessempire by pur- chasingcompanies at discountprices caused by inflation.Stinnes' behavior at internationalconferences on reparations,and the mere fact that he hadbecome verywealthy while others were suffering, earned him the loathing of bothleftist politiciansand umonists at the time, and historians since. Stinnes' most important biographer,Peter Wulf, single-mindedly portraysStinnes as exploiting the difficulties of hiscontemporaries for selfish personalgain [Wulf, 1979, pp. 274,276, 281,283-286]. He claimsthat Stinnes usedthe Reich'slack of resourcesto attemptto seizecontrol of the Reichsbarn purelyto servehis own businessinterests. A similarLine is takenby Hans Mommsenin hisrecently translated history of theWeimar republic [Mommsen, 1996,p. 116].Charles Maier devotes considerable space to describingthe RdI's offerto reformthe Reichsbahn in his history of Europeafter World War I. He tellsthe storyaccurately, then, ignoring his own account,accuses Stinnes and theRdI of cynicallyattempting to takeprivate advantage of theReich's difficult situation[Maier, 1988, p. 263]. Finally,in what is currentlyconsidered the

BUSI2XJESS/INDECONOMIC HISTORY, VolumeTwenty-seven, no.2, Winter 1998. Copyright¸1998 by theBusiness History Conference. ISSN 0894-6825.

477 478 / ALFRED C. MIERZEJEWSKI

standardhistory of reparations,Bruce Kent condenmsStinnes and German industryfor seekingto exploittheir nation's dire need for theirown personal profit [Kent,1989, p. 263]. These critiquesof the RdI and Stinnes share some common characteristicsand raise some questions that this paper is intendedto explore. They all take it for grantedthat state ownershipand operationof the Reichsbahn,and of other sociallyimportant enterprises, was preferableto privateownership and operation.They imply that allowingthe marketto allocateresources was and is immoral[Dahrendorf, 1969, pp. 46-55].They reflectthe Germanidealist view of the stateas above partisan politics, as the embodimentof the nation[Dahrendorf, 1969, p. 31;Pyle, 1974, pp. 132-137]. Consequently,the fact that Stinnesand the RdI proposedtaking the Reichsbahnaway from the direct managementand ownershipof the governmentmeant to the criticsthat industry must have been seeking private gain,which to themwas morally reprehensible [Feldman, 1993, p. 380;Wulf, 1979,pp. 274, 284-5,292; Maier, 1988, pp. 264,266]. This raisesthe question of howGermans viewed private gain and what Germans meant when they used theword "privatization? [James, 1989, pp. 76-7; Craig, 1982, pp. 104-25]"Were Stinnes'and the RdI's plans unworkable, were they simply not to the likingof theirclass enemies, or did theyoffend deeply held cultural values? This raises the broaderquestion of whetherin timesof nationalemergency, we should considerthe behaviorof the "dollar-a-year"men of the USA in WorldWar II as normal.Put differently,is privateprofit incompatiblewith servingthe nation?Are egalitarianpolicies necessary for the successfulmastering of a nationalemergency? US business earned very large profits in bothWorld War I andWorld War II, yet the USA wason the winningside in both. In the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies, the oligopolisficDutch Republic traded withits Spanishand French enemies, yet defeated them militarily [Vatter, 1985, p. 56; Barbour,1950, pp. 31-5;Elliott, 1969,p. 374; t' Hart, 1993,p. 102]. Moreover,in light of the excellentfinancial and serviceperformance of the governmentowned, privately operated Reichsbalm under the Dawes plan, and recentpositive experience with the privatizafion of theJapanese railways during the 1980'sand the partialderegulation of US railroadsunder the StaggersAct of 1980,maybe the reorganizationplans of the RdI and Stinnesdeserve a reexaminafion.As wewill see,Stinnes and the RdI proposeda mixed enterprise in whichownership would have been shared by all socialgroups, and would havebeen managed separately from the Reich government. In short,industry proposeda solutionin keepingwith the Germancorporafist/commonweal traditionthat, in lightof subsequentexperience, might very well havesolved theReichsbahn's problems. It wasa solutionthat would hardly be considered privatizafionin theWest. To understandthe emotionalreaction to industry'sReichsbalm reform proposal,it is necessaryto takea brieflook at theconditions that prevailed in Germanyin 1921.The WeimarRepublic was faced with a sizablereparations bill and lackedthe cashand foreignexchange necessary to pay it. The Republic'sfinances were in disorderdue to its predecessor'spolicy of funding PROPOSAL TO "PRIVATIZE" THE GERMAN NATIONAL RAILWAY / 479 the war effort throughcredit. Making matters worse, the WeimarRepublic attemptedto expandthe socialwelfare state that it inherited,although it lacked the tax revenuesto do so.The resultwas a budgetdeficit that preventedthe governmentfrom payingreparations and from gainingintemational credit. It addressedthis problem by runningthe printing press and waging a campaignto evadeits reparationsobligations [Ferguson, 1995; Schuker, 1988; Mommsen, 1996,p. 117].One of the mostimportant immediate causes of the govern- ment'sdeficits were the operatinglosses of the Reichsbahn.The DR hadbeen createdthrough the amalgamationof the sevenstate owned railways in April 1920. Until the outbreakof the war, the staterailways, and especiallythe Prussian-Hessiansystem, had eamedsubstantial operating surpluses. In 1913, thecombined operating ratio of the staterailways was 72.13. However, in 1919, their combinedoperating ratio balloonedto 151.89.The new Reichsbahn sufferedan operating ratio of 172.9in 1920,improving it onlyto 123.6in 1921. The resultwas the lossof billionsof Marks.A disputeerupted concerning the causesof the deficits,with industryblaming the govemment'spoor managementand the left calling for the socializationof the railway [Mierzejewski,1993, pp. 407-9]. In addition,the atmospherein Germanywas poisonedby a bitter distributionstruggle [Wulf, 1979, p. 293;Mommsen, 1996, Ch. 3; Maier,1988, pp. 138-46].The left soughtthe transferof wealthfrom the capitalistclass to theworkers and to increasethe influence of employeeson the policies followed by theiremployers in a processcalled "codetermination" (Mitbestimmung). The left hopedthat the governmentwould assume control of important industriessuch as coal mining. The right,including many industrialists, sought the returnof the old regimeand the defeatof socialism.The stnagglewas overlaidwith a generalfear of "Manchesterism."This involved the rejection of competitivecapitalism on thenineteenth-century British model as inhuman and unsuitableto Germany'ssuperior culture. Simultaneously, on both the right andthe left, therewas a combinationof apprehensionand respect for Amer- icanindustrial methods and achievements, and in particularfor themethods of HenryFord and Frederick Taylor [Kanigel, 1997, pp. 492,494, 526-32]. Many Germansfeared that the adoption of Americanbusiness practices would erode the Germancommonweal system. There was a consensusthat the German nationcomposed of occupationaland regional groups was more important thanthe individual. The impartialgovernment should provide every disadvan- tagedgroup with economic and social assistance to equalize wealth and status acrossthe society.Competition was seen as wasteful of nationalresources and morallyrepugnant. Consequenfiy, the government encouraged the formation of cartelsand owned enterprises itself. Disparities of wealthwere perceived as unfair,immoral and politically destabilizing. Through the tax system,social welfareprograms and its own enterprises,including the Reichsbahn,the governmentattempted to equalizethe distribution of wealthacross the society. AfterWorld War I, industry,the labor unions and the government cooperated to builda systemof corporatistrepresentation to allowboth the workersto participatein themanagement of the firms where they were employed, and to 480 / ALFRED C. MIERZEJEWSKI shapenational policy [Wengenroth, 1997; Abdshauser, 1984; Bowen, 1947; Wehler,1974; Nicholls, 1994; Dahrendorf, 1969, pp. 35-41,49, 54-5]. Whilethis economic straggle was being waged, the government resisted attemptsby pardcularistgroups, especially the Bavarians, to escapeits authority andto break-upthe Reichsbahn [BA-MA, NachlaB Groener]. The governmentof JosefWirth addressed the reparationsproblem in thisatmosphere of intenseinterest group conflict. Facing the need to pay500 milliongold marks to the ReparationsCommission on 15 January1922, and 250 millionGM on 15 February1922, it soughtsources of cash.The Social DemocraticReichstag representative Rudolf Wissel proposed a schemeunder which the governmentwould seizea quarterof the equityin Germany's corporations[Maier, 1988, p. 256].Wirth, reluctant to violateprivate property rights,approached industry to determineif it wouldhelp voluntarily in lateJuly and earlyAugust 1921, [Maier,1988, pp. 252, 257;Wulf, 1979,pp. 26%70; Feldman,1993, pp. 358;BT, 11 November1921, p. 1]. The RdI communicatedits intentionsto the Wirth governmentin Septemberand November 1921, and January and April 1922.Complicating our understandingand confusing contemporary observers was the split that existed in the RdI betweenthe group'sleadership around Hermann Bficher, Otto Wiedfeltand Kurt Sorge,and the grouparound Stinnes, Paul Silverbergand AlfredHugenberg [BA-MA, NachlaB Groener]. The leadershipinitially sup- portedthe Kraemerplan to useindustty's foreign credit to obtain1.5 billion GM for thegovernment [Feldman, 1993, pp. 359,362; Wulf, 1979,p. 362;BT, 25 November1921, p. 1].The Stinnesgroup opposed simply arranging a credit for thegovernment with industry bearing the risk in lightof thegovernment's disorderedfinances. Instead, it proposedprivatizing government enterprises suchas the Reichshahn so thatthe Reich deficit would be reducedand so they couldprovide collateral for the loanand service it fromtheir surpluses [BT, 6 November1921, 1; Sozialisierungskommission, 1922,pp. 162,164]. On 7 September1921, the RdI madeits initialproposal to Wirth. It raised officially for the first time the demandthat the Reichshahnbe reorganizedin orderto supportan internationalprovision of credit[ARK, I, 1973,p. 238;BA, R 43 I]. Bficher,Stinnes, Sorge and Silverberg then discussed theirconcept with Wirth in moredetail on 10 November1921. Silverberg criticizedthe poormanagement of the Reichsbahn,which Wirth couldonly admit. B•cher stressedthat until the government'soperating deficit was eliminated,and the DR causedthe greatest part of thatdeficit, it couldnot gain intemationalfinancial support. For thisreason, he, Silverberg and Stinnes called for the "privatization"of the Reichshahn[ARK, II, 1973,pp. 377-8].They explainedthat the Reich would be relievedof financialand operational responsibilityfor the railways.This would allow both managementand employeesto usetheir full initiativeand adopt methods from private business to makethe enterprisesolvent once again. Significantly, Stinnes stressed that "Representativesof management and the workers must deal with the problem together.The plancan not be carriedout againstthe will of the workersand professionalemployees [ARK, II, 1973,pp. 370, 377-8;BA, R 43 I]." In a PROPOSAL TO "PRIVATIZE" THE GERMAN NATIONAL RAILWAY / 481

statementto thepress after the meeting, Biicher insisted that the employees hadto approveand participate in the transformation:"We aren'tconsidering transferringthe wholerailway to a privateindustrial concern, but havethe opinionthat the Reich,industry, the unions,trade, agriculture, in shortthe whole Germaneconomy, must participate [BT, 11 November1921, p. 1]." Biicher,Stinnes and the RdI proposeda mixedcompany in line with the German commonweal tradition. On 24 January1922, the RdI delivereda more detailedproposal to Wirth. It informed the chancellor that its examination of the Reichsbahn was incompletebecause the Reich Transportation Ministry had still not provided all of theinformation that it hadrequested [ACDP NachlaB Stinnes]. The RdI had formeda panelof formerrailway officials and otherexperts to preparea comprehensivereport with recommendations [RdI, 1922, p. 4]. In theinterim, the RdI remindedWirth that restoring the Reichsbahnto financialhealth was theprerequisite to gaining a foreign loan. It alsodescribed its plans, advocated primarilyby Stinnes,for rejuvenatingthe railways of easternEurope as part of a schemeto stimulatethe eastEuropean economy and ultimately the world economy.Restoring the Reichsbahnto fiscalhealth would allow Germany to participatein thisprocess as an equalparmer with the capitalistWest. This proposalintimated that the Reichsballcould be usedto payreparations for Germanyand that unlessthe Germansput the DR in order,American investorswould extendtheir controlover it, leadingto a lossof German economicsovereignty [ACDP, NachlaB Stinnes]. The RdI deliveredits fully articulatedplan for the reform of the Reichsbahnto Wirthon 3 April 1922.It proposedreorganizing the DR intoa commonwealjoint stock company in whichall sectors of theGerman economy wouldparticipate. A boardof directorscomposed of representativesof the cities,states, industry, agriculture, commerce, railway employees and the Reich wouldestablish company policies. The railwaywould adopt modem manage- ment and cost accountingmethods, and new technologyto becomemore efficient.It wouldprice its servicesto reflectthe costof generatingthem. It wouldlay-off unnecessary employees and cancel construction projects that had no operationaljustification. Public councils organized on a corporatebasis wouldadvise the railway at thelocal, regional, and national levels. The railway's financeswould be separatefrom the Reich budget. The nationallegislature, the Reichstag,would have no jurisdictionover it. The Reichwould sell the railways to the mixedcompany which would hold them on behalfof the German people.Its aimwould be to serveand promote traffic, not generate maximum profits[BA, R 43 I; RdI, 1922,pp. 13,20, 23-6,29-30, 37, 39;ACDP, NachlaB Stinnes]. Theresponse to theRdI's concept was vigorous and highly critical, but, ironically,incorporated many of its features.The unionsand the Social DemocraticParty (SPD) vehementlyrejected handing the railwayover to capitalists.Initially, the GermanRailroader's Association (Deutscher Eisen- bahnetVerband - DEV) and the GeneralAssociation of GermanUnions (Allgemeinedeutscher Gewerkschaftsbund - ADGB) rejectedprivatization and 482 / ALFRED C. MIERZEJEWSKI calledinstead for the socializationof the Reichsbahn[Deutscher Eisenbahner, 19 November1921, p. 3; BT, 17 November1921, p. 3; ARK II, 1973,p. 416]. Withina fewdays, however, the DEV anda coalitionof otherunions admitted thatthe DR wasbadly managed. They claimed that the railway's problems were dueto thelingering effects of thewar and to priceg9. uging by its suppliers, and thatit did not havesurplus employees. In publicationsbeating rifles such as "The Marchof Stinnesizafien"and "Handsoff the Reichsbalm,"they called forthe preservation of the eight-hour day and the professional civil service, and demandedthat the Reichassume the railway'sdebt. They proposedtrans- formingthe DR into a mixedenterprise in whichrailway users and employees wouldhold stock. The company would serve commonweal ends, and would be removedfrom parliamentary oversight. They also called for it to usebusiness managementtechniques to becomemore efficient [DEV, 8 November1921, pp. 1-3, 10-13,15-20; Deutscher Eisenbahner, 26 November 1921, pp. 341-2; DeutscherVerkehrsbund, November 1921, pp. 2, 10, 12, 16;ACDP, Nachlag Stinnes].The Unionof GermanRailway Employees (Gewerkschaft deutscher Eisenbahner)also proposed converting the DR to a mixedcompany [ACDP, NachlaBStinnes]. The GermanUnion Association (Deutscher Gewerkschafts- bund- DGB) calledfor preservingthe commonweal character of theReichsbalm by convertingit intoa mixedcencem separate from the Reichadministration and finances.Under the DGB plan,the variousinterest groups would hold stockin the company,surplus employees would be dismissed,new technology wouldbe introduced,and modem accounting and management practices inclu- dingTaylerist methods would be implemented.The DGB explicitlyendorsed thebasic concept proposed by the RdI, while insisting that the railway serve the interestsof all of theGerman people [ACDP, Nachlag Stinnes]. The Reich TransportationMinister, Wilhelm Greener, followeda surprisinglysimilar line, but with one criticalphilosophical difference. He too proposedremoving the Reichsbalmfrom direct parliamentaryinfluence, separatingits budgetfrom that of the Reich,allowing interest groups to participatein its decision-makingprocess, reforming its managementand accountingprocedures, and reducing the sizeof its workforce.As he put it in October1921, "Everything good from private companies shall be adoptedby theReichsbalm." But he quicklyadded, "...the Reichsbahn will remaina Reich enterprise..."[DeutscherEisenbahner, 12 November 1921, p. 328]. Greenerwas convincedthat the nationalgevemment was the onlyentity that couldfairly and equitablyserve the needsof the whole people.He insistedthat the Reichsbahnpursue the missionof promotingeconomic development while assistingdisadvantaged groups in sharingnational prosperity and cultural life [BA-MA, NachlaBGreener; Greener, 3 November1921, p. 821; Greener, January1922, p. 8; BA, NachlagSilverberg; ARK II, 1973,p. 384].In short, Greenerbelieved that the Reichsbahnshould pursue distinctly non-economic goalswith an emphasison the redistributionof wealthand the equalizationof opportunity.He contended,with some justification,that he had akeady implementedpolicies that would solvethe DR's financialproblems. He intendedto use tayleristtechniques and new technologysuch as electric PROPOSAL TO 'q•RIVATIZE" THE GERMAN NATIONAL RAILWAY / 483

tracfonto makethe Reichsbahn'soperafons more efficient. He phrmedto increasetariffs, adjusting them fully for inflafon.He wasdrafting a law that wouldallow the railwayto makemore efficientuse of its hbor forceby modifyingthe eighthour day and by permittingby-offs. Finally, he was preparinglegishfon that would thoroughly reform the Reichsbahn'sfinances, separatingthem from the government budget and making the DR responsible for its own operatingand capital expenses [Groener, 24 November1921, p. 878;OrganisafonsausschuB, 1921,pp. 6, 9, 38-9;BA, R 43 I; BA-MA,Nachlag Groener;Reichstag, 1922, pp. 48-9,93]. In lobbyingfor hisapproach, Groener raisedthe bogeyof Brifsh andAmerican capitalists gaining control of the Reichsbahn.He impliedthat theywould manage it accordingto hard-nosed capitalistprinciples to the detrimentof the railwayemployees and German nafonalinterests. At thesame time, he portrayed the Ruhr industrialists around Stmnesas heartlesstaskmasters who wouldexploit the railwayworkers and denythe na6on the benefits of itsrailway for the sakeof privategain [BA-MA, NachlagGroener]. Boththe RdI, includingStmnes, and its opponentsstruck a numberof cormnonthemes. They all stressedthe needto separatethe Reichsbalmfrom the Reichbudget and remove it fromReichstag influence. They all advocated usingbusiness management techniques and new technologyto make the railwaymore efficient. They all sawthe need to by-offemployees. All pointed to the threatof foreigncapitalists gaining influence over Germany'svaluable railway.They agreedthat corporafist oversightwas necessaryand that the Reichsbahnshould emphasize serving the needsof the economyrather than generatingprofits and paying dividends to shareholders.In short,there was very considerablecormnon ground between industry, the Reichgovernment andthe unions. The majorpoint of contenfonconcerned who would own the railway.The RdI andthe unionscalled for a mixedenterprise, while Groener, supportedby a segmentof labor,insisted on maintainingReich ownership and operafon.A seconddifference was that the Reichand the unionssupported tariffincreases, while the RdI thoughtthat reforms would permit tariff cuts. Ultimately,the privatizafondebate lost its urgencybecause the Allies grantedGermany a dehy in makingits reparafonpayments [Kent, 1989, p. 173].But it highlightsunderlying German cultural attitudes toward business. Contraryto the contemporaryaccounts, the RdI neverformally proposed the privatizafonof theReichsbahn. Stirroes and Silverberg spoke of it, but Stmnes in particularwas preparedto acceptworker participafonin the reformed enterprise.The unionsand Groener opposed the RdI andStmnes because they fearedloss of controlto a groupthat they thoughtwas unaccountableand whichthey perceived as holding values that they loathed [BT, 11 November 1921,pp. 1-2;BT, 12 November1921, p. 3; BT, 19 November1921, p. 1]. Their ideologicalfears prevented them from seeingthe commonground that theyshared with the industxialists.Both sideswere moved by nafonalistand commonwealideals. The historianshave not beenable to penetratethe haze causedby thiscontroversy and have unquesfoningly adopted the opposifon's categoriesand rhetoric. Ironically, a solufonsimilar to whatthe RdI proposed 484 / ALFRED C. MIERZEJEWSKI wasimplemented in 1924. The Dawes Phn transformedthe Reichsbalm into a governmentowned, company operated enterprise. Increased management freedomenabled the reformed Reichsbahn to improve its operating ratio to the low eightiesfrom 1924 through 1929 while at thesame time meeting all of its reparationsobligations punctually [Mierzejewski, 1993, p. 434]. What then does this examination tell us about the German definition of privatizafion?It implies that profitwas seen as a dishonorablemotive for publicand much business activity. It demonstratesthe greatextent to which considerationsof distributivejustice shapedGerman attitudestoward economicpolicy. The Germanideal was mixedenterprise that coveredits operatingand capital costs, while eschewing profits in orderto keepits prices aslow aspossible and to deliverunprofitable, but sociallydesirable services. A nationalizedconcern was also acceptable, but seemedto be lessefficient. Most Germansfelt that the market could not be reliedupon to allocateresources and rewardsfairly and that non-economicgoals were more important than profit, especiallyfor publicutilities like the Reichsbalm.Only a minorityin the RdI proposedcreating a private national railway, and then only for a shorttime and mostexplicitly rejected the idea.In fact,corporafist and commonweal goals were sharedby both sidesin the debatereflecting how Germanorganized capitalismdiffered from the competitive market capitalism of theUnited States and Britaha.

Abbreviations

ACDP Archivf/it christlich-demokratischePolitik, Sankt Augustin, Germany. ADGB Allgemeinedeutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (General German Union Association) ARK Aktender Reichskanzlei (Documents of theReich Chancelloty) BA Bundesarchiv,Koblenz. BA-MA Bundesarchiv-Milifiirarchiv,Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Germany. BT Ber•nerTageblatt DEV DeutscherEisenbahner Verband (German Railroaders Association) DGB DeutschetGewerkschaftsbund (German Union Association) DR DeutscheReichsbahn (German National Railway) RdI Reichsverbandder deutschen Industrie (Reich Association of GermanIndustry)

References

Abelshauser,Werner, "The FirstPost-Liberal Nation: Stages in theDevelopment of Modem Corporafismin Germany,"European Histo{y.Q#arter}, 14 (1984), 285-317. ACDP, 1-220,NachlaB Sfinnes. BA, R 43 I, Reichskanzlei. BA, NL 13,NachlaB Silverberg. Barbour,Violet, Capita•ra in Amsterdam in the t 7thCtntnty (Baltimore, 1950). Ber•nerTageblatt. Bowen,Ralph H., GermanTheories ofthe Colorafire State (New York, 1947). Bundesarchiv-Milit'firarchiv,N 46, NachlagGroener. Craig,Gordon A., TheGermans (New York, 1982). Dahrendorf,Ralf, Sodqy and Deraocra•y in Germany (Garden City, 1969). DeutscherEisenbahnm PROPOSAL TO "PRIVATIZE" THE GERMAN NATIONAL RAILWAY / 485

DEV, DieReichseisenbahnen - Staatsbetrieb- Stinnesierung- GemeinMttschafl? (Berlin, 28 November 1921). DeutscherVerkehrsbund, Ha•de •veg yon der Reichseisenbahn (Berlin, November 1921). Elliott,John H., EuropeDivided (New York, 1969). Feldman,Gerald D., TheGreatDisorder(Princeton, 1993). Ferguson,Niall, Papere• Iron.Hamburg business and German poetics in theera of inflation, 1897-1927(Cambridge, 1995). Germany,Reichstag, Verhandlungen, vol. 372, Anlage, Aktenstiicke •ur ReparationsaqagevoraMai 1921bt) M'd• 1922(Berlin, 1922). Groener,Wilhelm, "Zum Geleit,"Die Reichshahn, 1 0anuary 1922), 3-8. (Groener),"Reichsverkehrsminister Groener fiber die Entstaatlichung,"Zeitschnfi des Vetoins deutscherEisenbahnvenvaltungen, 61 (24.November 1921), 878-9. James,Harold, A GermanIdentity, 1770-1990 (New York, 1989). Kanigel,Robert, The One Best IVqy (New York, 1997). Kent,Bruce, The Spoih of IVar (Oxford, 1989). Maier,Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton, 1988). Mierzejewski,Alfred C., "The GermanNational Railway Company, 1924-1932: Between Privateand Public Enterprise," Business Histo{y Revie•v, 67 (Autumn1993), 406-438. Mommsen,Hans, The Rise and Fall of IVeiraar Deraocraff, Elborg Forster, Larry Eugene Jones, trans.(Chapel Hill, 1996). Nicholls,Anthony J., Freedom mth Req•onsibi• (Oxford, 1994). OrganisafionsausschuB,Staatsbahn oder P•ivatbahn? (Berlin, 1921). Pyle, Kenneth B., "Advantagesof Followership:German Economicsand Japanese Bureaucrats,1890-1925," Journal of]apanese Stua•es, I (Autumn 1974), 127-164. Roth,Eugen, Die Reichseisenbahnen. Staatsbet•ieb- P•vatbet•eb- Geraein•ttschafl? (Berlin, 1921). Schulze-Bildingmaier,Ingrid ed., Akten der Reichskanglei. DasKabinett IVitth, 1 (Boppard, 1973). --, Aktender Reichskanglei. DasKabinett IVitth , 2 (Boppard,1973). Schuker,Stephen A., American•teparations' to Germany 1919-1955: Irap•cations )•r theThird - IVorldDebt C•isis (Princeton, NJ, 1988). Sozialisierungskommission,Verhandlungen derSo:•ia•sierungskoraraission iibera•e Organisation der Reichseisenbahnen(Berlin, 1922). 't Hart,Marjolein C., TheMaking of a BourgeoisState: IVar, Poetics, and Finance during the Dutch Rev0/t(Manchester, 1993). Vatter,Harold G., TheU.S. Econoray in IVorld IVar lI (NewYork, 1985). Wehler,Hans-Ulrich, "Der Aufstiegdes organisierten Kapitalismus und Intervenfionsstaates in Deutschland,"in H. Berding,et al.,eds., Organisierter Kapitalisraus (G6ttingen, 1974), 36-57. Wengenroth,Ulrich, "Germany: Competition abroad - cooperationat home,1870-1900," in AlfredD. Chandler,et al eds.,Big Business and the IVealth of Nations (New York, 1997), 139-175. Wulf,Peter, Hugo Stinnes: IVittschaft und Po•tik 1918-1924 (Stuttgart, 1979). "Die Zukunftder Reichseisenbahn,"Zeitsch•ifi des Vereins deutscher Eisenbahnvenvaltungen, 61 (3 November1921), 821.