Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514

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Land Use Policy

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The political ecology of mangrove forest restoration in Thailand: Institutional arrangements and power dynamics T

Benjamin S. Thompson

Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117570, Singapore

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Mangrove forest restoration is practiced across the (sub)tropics to suppress ongoing deforestation and de- Co-management gradation of coastal ecosystem services and biodiversity. This article critically assesses mangrove restoration Conservation policies and initiatives in Thailand, using a political ecology lens focussed on institutional arrangements and Ecological restoration power dynamics. Analysis based on interviews with 44 respondents shows how formal and informal institutions Environmental management created by weak actor relations can inhibit long-term success. Revealed are inconsistencies between national Environmental policy mangrove restoration policies and the financial capacity of the government agency tasked with policy im- Neoliberalism Public-private partnerships plementation. This can create a reliance on private-sector funding via corporate social responsibility (CSR), Wetland which centres decision-making power with firms regarding how, where, and when mangrove rehabilitation is implemented. Loosely-defined national targets lead stakeholders to report ‘false successes’ based on the spatial area planted, rather than on the long-term survival rate of afforested or reforested mangroves. This creates a ‘cycle of failure’ with little institutional learning (i.e., feedbacks on the ecological reasons for failure), and duplicated rehabilitation efforts. The strong institution of corporate philanthropy in Thailand makes subsequent CSR money readily available, while coinciding restoration events with public holidays associated with the Thai Royal Family motivates local participants to try again. Contemporary narratives from two progressive mangrove rehabilitation projects – with long-term collaboration, cooperation, and monitoring – help identify re- commendations for overcoming these long-standing institutional challenges. The article demonstrates how weak and unequal actor relations – resulting from capacity limitations, power asymmetries, and cultural ideologies – creates gaps between policy design and implementation, thus leading to ineffective environmental governance.

1. Introduction social behaviour, based on mutual expectations between actors (Aoki, 2007; Bathelt and Glückler, 2014). An ‘institutional arrangement’ is “In Thailand, there has been tons of mangrove reforestation–we have formed when multiple vertical and horizontal institutions co-evolve to seen project after project, company after company coming in to replant, shape, in this case, environmental governance (Aoki, 2007; Young, and one after another they fail” (Municipal Government Official, 2010). ‘Horizontal’ institutions are created through interactions be- Chumphon) tween actors operating at the same level of social organisation (e.g., two “The total amount of mangrove seedlings that have been planted in national government agencies), while ‘vertical’ institutions are created Thailand could reforest the world” (National Government Official, between actors at different levels (e.g., a national corporation and local Bangkok) community). Although institutional analysis has long focussed on complementa- Environmental governance comprises an array of interrelated ac- rities between certain rules, norms, policies, and practices, it is also tors, institutions, and interventions, and requires inter alia sufficient important to understand how and why inter-actor relations produce financing, administration capacity, knowledge sharing, and stakeholder these rules, norms, policies, and practices in the first place (Ayana et al., participation to be effective (Armitage et al., 2012; Tiwari and Joshi, 2017; Jespersen and Gallemore, 2018). The rationale is that strong and 2015). The creation, maintenance, and disruption of institutions re- stable inter-actor relations will produce an institutional arrangement mains paramount to governing the environment from international to that is conducive to effective environmental governance. Each actor local scales (Jespersen and Gallemore, 2018; Paavola, 2007). An in- will play a unique role in shaping an institutional arrangement due to stitution is an established and shared pattern of formal or informal their individual remit, agency, motivation, and influence. Hence, while

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.07.016 Received 13 February 2018; Received in revised form 10 July 2018; Accepted 10 July 2018 0264-8377/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. B.S. Thompson Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514 institutional analysis is important for examining environmental gov- contemporary accounts of two progressive and relatively successful ernance issues, it isn’t flawless; as Fabinyi et al. (2014: 28) note, mangrove rehabilitation projects in the Gulf of Thailand (Section 5), “overemphasis on institutions can create blind spots around issues of and the third part offers pragmatic recommendations to improve in- agency, which is unevenly distributed and largely about power”. Power stitutional arrangements and reduce power dynamics (Section 6); con- is conceptualised as the ability to make or influence decisions, and clusions follow (Section 7). The objectives are to: therefore, it is also important to scrutinize how power asymmetries between actors manifest decision-making processes, knowledge flows, 1 Scrutinize the relationships between actors and institutions that can and ultimately shape institutional arrangements in environmental lead to unsuccessful mangrove rehabilitation in Thailand, focussing governance (Ayana et al., 2017; Fabinyi et al., 2014; Powell and on political, financial, and socio-cultural factors; Osbeck, 2010). 2 Investigate how two recent mangrove rehabilitation projects in Due consideration of institutional arrangements and power dy- Thailand have overcome some of these institutional challenges; namics is increasingly advocated in studies on ecological restoration 3 Recommend improvements for mangrove rehabilitation in the con- policies and practices (Borgström et al., 2016 Nigussie et al., 2018). text of actor relations, institutions, and practices. This article critically assesses relationships between actors and in- stitutions concerned with mangrove forest restoration and rehabilita- 2. Mangrove management in Thailand tion1 in Thailand. Mangrove management typically involves multiple actors, operating at multiple governance levels, in contested spaces Estimates of change in Thailand’s mangrove area over the second between land and sea – situations that can create conflicting policy half of the last century show high variability, with an average annual objectives and implementation challenges (Afroz et al., 2016; Friess loss of 0.71% (Friess and Webb, 2014). This deforestation was largely et al., 2016; Orchard et al., 2015; Thompson et al., 2018). Policies for driven by conversion to shrimp aquaculture (Barbier and Cox, 2004; mangrove rehabilitation have received particular scrutiny (Biswas Martinez-Alier, 2001) and establishment of charcoal concessions et al., 2009; Dale et al., 2014), with Bosire et al. (2008: 255) stating, (Moriizumi et al., 2010), while coastal erosion remains a current threat “most attempts to restore mangroves often fail completely, or fail to (Thampanya et al., 2006). However, between 2000–2012, average an- achieve the stated goals”. While several rehabilitation methods are nual mangrove loss in Thailand was only 0.11%, which is among the available, Brown et al. (2014) discuss how planting mangrove propa- lowest rates in Southeast Asia (Richards and Friess, 2016). Encouraging gules (and transplanting seedlings) has become the “normative” ap- figures such as these are often due to contemporary policies that pro- proach, with ‘failures’ typically referring to low survival rates (Ellison, mote mangrove conservation, restoration, and address the drivers of 2000; Kodikara et al., 2017; Primavera and Esteban, 2008). The eco- mangrove loss, e.g., by promoting aquaculture intensification rather logical, hydrological, and biophysical factors leading to low survival than expansion (Feller et al., 2018; Hishamunda et al., 2009). Indeed, rates have been widely reported; for example, species are often planted in-line with conservation efforts to slow mangrove deforestation at the wrong intertidal elevation such as on mud flats which results in (Pongthanapanich, 2010) and intensify aquaculture (Lebel et al., 2002), too much tidal inundation and drowning, or above the high tideline Thailand has drafted policies and set goals to restore and rehabilitate which results in drought and competition from terrestrial species mangrove forests across the country. These stemmed from the ratifi- (Kodikara et al., 2017; Lewis, 2005; Walters et al., 2008). Other factors cation of international environmental conventions, a rise in environ- include algal accumulation, invasion by barnacles, sediment smo- mental consciousness in the 1990s (Field, 1999; Memon and Chandio, thering, and planting in high energy zones that hinder establishment 2011), and increased awareness of how mangrove deforestation can (Bosire et al., 2008; Kodikara et al., 2017). Meanwhile, ‘restored’ reduce ecosystem services, biodiversity, and impede the livelihoods and mangrove monocultures are criticised for low biodiversity (Lewis, wellbeing of coastal communities (Sathirathai and Barbier, 2001). 2005), or being planted for timber/charcoal production (Ellison, 2000). Mangrove restoration activities increased further following the 2004 Crucially, the reasons for failed mangrove rehabilitation go far be- tsunami, based on the rationale that mangroves help protect coastlines yond these ecological factors, which neglect the inter-actor relations (Barbier, 2006). and institutional arrangements that determine how astutely ecological Strategies and targets for mangrove restoration have been stipulated knowledge is used, and how credibly rehabilitation decisions are made. in Thailand’s recent National Economic and Social Development Plans This requires identification of the political, financial, and socio-cultural (NESDPs), which aim to direct and coordinate public expenditures to- factors that shape relationships between the actors and institutions wards development programs (Ongprasert, 2011). The 11th NESDP involved (Biswas et al., 2009; Dale et al., 2014; Mangora, 2011; Powell (2012–2016) targeted “At least 5000 rai [800 ha] per year of mangrove and Osbeck, 2010). Scrutinizing these relationships can reveal under- coastal reforestation”. More recently, the 12th NESDP (2017–2021) lying reasons for failure that can then be addressed; for example, weak featured the following goal, “The mangrove forest area is enlarged from actor relations due to limited communication and cooperation, or un- 1.53 to 1.58 million rai” – an increase of 8000 ha over five years. These equal actor relations due to power asymmetries, which may produce mangrove targets stem from a national goal to have 40% of all forested institutional arrangements that do not deliver long-term environmental area inside national parks, with the current area around 33% outcomes, as seen elsewhere (Ayana et al., 2017; Nigussie et al., 2018; (Ongprasert, 2011). As part of this goal, the 1992 Reforestation Act was Tiwari and Joshi, 2015). This resonates with the scope of the current drafted to encourage private sector investment in forest restoration article. After contextualising mangrove management in Thailand (Sec- (Ongprasert, 2011). Also notable is the recent ‘Get Back Forest’ policy tion 2), and describing the methods (Section 3), the article is split into operated by Thailand’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment three main parts. The first part uses interview data to reveal institu- (MONRE) and the Thai Military, which evicts illegal settlers, businesses, tional reasons why mangrove rehabilitation in Thailand is largely un- or any other land occupier from degraded land that can then be re- successful (Section 4), the second part balances this critique with habilitated. Akin to other countries in Southeast Asia, mangrove management in Thailand has historically been governed by numerous laws and over- seen by several ministries and departments (IUCN, 2007), including the 1 While these two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, mangrove re- storation aims to ambitiously recreate the original (often pristine) state, while Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) mangrove rehabilitation aims to merely recover some of the degraded ecosys- and Royal Forest Department (RFD). However, since its establishment tem’s functions and services (Walters et al., 2008). Selecting the right term is in 2004, mangrove conservation and rehabilitation efforts have been important for managing expectations, setting goals, and monitoring outcomes led by the Department of Marine and Coastal Resources (DMCR), which of related policies and projects (Dale et al., 2014). is under MONRE. DMCR is split into two branches: marine (covering

504 B.S. Thompson Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514 coral reefs and seagrasses) and coastal (covering mangroves) – with 3.1. Specific study sites fisheries resources falling under a separate department altogether. The mangrove branch is further split into two divisions: ‘protection forests’ While mangrove rehabilitation is taking place at myriad sites across (conservation of existing mangroves) and ‘restoration forests’ (refor- Thailand, it was not logistically feasible to visit a large number of re- estation of degraded sites). DMCR is further split into 45 ‘substations’ habilitation sites given the timeframe of this investigation, and so the that administer the Department’s policies and remit in their respective focus was on two current rehabilitation sites identified with the help of subnational areas. Each substation has a ‘Mangrove Management Unit’ Thailand’s Biodiversity-based Economy Development Office (BEDO) (MMU), and all of Thailand’s mangroves fall under the jurisdiction of an (Fig. 1). These sites both sit along Thailand’s industrial eastern sea- MMU unless within National Parks (which are managed by DNP). While board, which contains a large concentration of corporations that are literature on environmental governance notes that subnational gov- engaging in CSR. The same corporation is involved at both sites - a large ernment departments require expertise and capacity equal to their Thai-owned agri-business, anonymized as ‘FLOW’. In addition to in- upper hierarchy in order to perform effective management (e.g., Wever terviews, site visits were also made, and archive data was acquired et al., 2012), it is unknown if this is the case for DMCR’s MMUs. (e.g., from corporate sustainability reports). Restoration at both sites – Other civil and private sector actors, including the military and both historically and currently – has involved planting propagules and navy, are often involved in mangrove restoration – particularly at seedlings of Rhizophora spp. mainly provided by DMCR. subnational and local scales (Aksornkoae, 2004). NGOs may provide a facilitating role, and many corporations are engaging in mangrove re- 3.1.1. Chumphon storation through corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Mather Stakeholders in Chum Kho Municipality, Chumphon Province are et al., 2014). Based on the best available data, at least 12,000 rai currently working to conserve and rehabilitate 103 ha of mangroves. (1900 ha) of mangrove restoration has been financed by three cor- The primary rehabilitation site is an illegal shrimp pond (proximal to a porations in the last five years, in the provinces of Rayong, Chantha- basin mangrove forest) repossessed from a local elite in 2014 (Fig. 1b). buri, Songkhla, and Nakhorn Sri Thammarat (DMCR, unpub.). DMCR Ecological engineering has taken place to restore the local hydrology, have strict internal policies over the receipt of CSR monies due to anti- by excavating a channel that allows the pond to flood naturally with the corruption laws. As such, corporations can fund and conduct the ac- high tide. Additional mangrove afforestation is taking place on mudflats tivities directly, pay locals to plant, and/or pay DMCR to supply man- along the coast (Fig. 1c) – despite mud flat planting being generally ill- grove seedlings. Although instigated by the 1992 Reforestation Act, advised since mangroves may not naturally be found here (Biswas et al., CSR actions can be fraught with political struggles, power dynamics, 2009; Lewis, 2005). A local village, Moo 2 (176 households; 708 re- and hidden agendas – especially when used to fill an environmental sidents) has de facto land tenure over the rehabilitation areas, while the governance gap (Haalboom, 2012). While often transient efforts (e.g., funding is provided from the CSR budget of FLOW’s local business unit – one-off planting events), some corporations in Thailand are developing a shrimp aquaculture hatchery. The primary objective of the re- longer-term restoration programs – for example, the contemporary ac- habilitation is to enhance local biodiversity and provide ecosystem counts discussed later in this study. services (i.e. seafood abundance) for the local population. Despite Finally, it is widely held that local communities should be involved current optimism, the community have seen a history of predominantly in planning and implementing mangrove rehabilitation activities both unsuccessful rehabilitation attempts, involving one-day planting events. as the gatekeepers and as agents that can adapt national policy to local These were predominantly orchestrated and financed by the military contexts through creating locally-exclusive laws, customs, and en- and other Thai corporations, particularly a large petrochemical firm forcement measures (Aung et al., 2011; Biswas et al., 2009). Evidence anonymized as, AKRA. suggests that Thai communities that have received training, established mangrove conservation committees, and worked with NGOs, can ef- 3.1.2. Samut Sakhon fectively manage and conserve mangroves (Sathirathai and Barbier, In Bang Tho Rat Municipality, Samut Sakhon Province, stakeholders 2001; Sudtongkong and Webb, 2008). are working to conserve and rehabilitate approximately 100 ha of Despite ample restoration targets and multi-sectoral actions, it has mangroves. Moo 6 (> 1000 households) has de facto land tenure over been suggested that Thailand’s mangrove restoration efforts have been the rehabilitation area, which stretches along the coastline. A bamboo largely unsuccessful (Erftemeijer and Lewis, 1999; Havanond, 1997; fence had been constructed by the Provincial Government in order to Memon and Chandio, 2011). Reasons reported include a lack of policy protect planted mangrove saplings from incoming waves and build-up integration, a lack of coordination among different actors, and “half- soil accretion on the landward side of the fence (Fig. 1a) – such struc- hearted support” from government agencies (Memon and Chandio, tures have been used elsewhere, e.g., Vietnam (Albers and Schmitt, 2011: 108) – although these are not expanded upon. Conflicting ob- 2015). The primary objective of the rehabilitation is to reduce coastal jectives and motives for mangrove restoration activities may exists erosion, which is rife across the province due to local bathymetry and between stakeholders (Moriizumi et al., 2010), as well as across dif- the orientation of the coastline (Saengsupavanich et al., 2009). Since ferent scales and sectors, as is common in forest governance elsewhere 2014, FLOW’s local business unit, an aquaculture feed mill, has been in Southeast Asia (e.g., Laos, Cole et al., 2017). financing mangrove rehabilitation through their CSR budget.

3.2. Semi-structured interviews 3. Methods Care was taken to stratify the sample of respondents across various In-depth interviews were conducted with 44 key informants in- national organisations/agencies in Bangkok, and project stakeholders at volved in mangrove rehabilitation at multiple governance levels, and the two restoration sites, respectively. At the national level, the priority across public, private, and civil sectors. Analysis of the traditional in- was to interview individuals involved in decision-making on mangrove stitutional arrangement for mangrove restoration in Thailand is based management (e.g. through policy formulation). Interviewees included on data elicited from all respondents, while the contemporary accounts Directors of the most relevant government departments, plus key in- of two recent rehabilitation projects are based only on data from the formants from academia and NGOs. At the sub-national level key stakeholders involved in these projects, typically at the subnational (Chumphon and Samut Sakhon) respondents represented key project and local levels (Table 1). Research was conducted September-De- stakeholders. Primary project stakeholders included a local FLOW cember 2016. business unit, a local DMCR MMU, and the local community, led by a village head and with support from its mangrove conservation

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Table 1 Affiliation and details of respondents at the national and subnational levels, with corresponding interview codes. Name of corporation has been anonymised. HQ: Headquarters.

Respondent affiliation Description Code

National Level (Bangkok) DMCR Marine HQ x1 Research and Conservation Director working in the marine branch of DMCR, and so not focussing on mangroves. NL1 DMCR Coastal HQ x2 Strategy and Planning Director, and Manager of a large Mangrove Reserve, working in the coastal branch of DMCR. NL2 RFD HQ x1 Director responsible for Thailand’s international commitments on forest conservation. NL3 DNP HQ x1 Director with responsibility over Thailand’s National Parks, including those that contain mangrove areas. NL4 BEDO x1 Public Organization attached to MONRE; remit to explore neoliberal conservation approaches in Thailand. NL5 FLOW HQ x1 CSR Director of FLOW, a large agribusiness with a history of mangrove conversion across Thailand; funding mangrove conservation NL6 through corporate social responsibility since 1993. NGO x1 Project manager of an NGO and Donor involved in forest restoration projects in Thailand. NL7 Academics x2 Technical specialists at a Bangkok-based University that have consulted on previous forest restoration projects involving the private NL8 sector.

Subnational Level (Chumphon) DMCR MMU x4 Staff involved in mangrove rehabilitation at the site; providing information, outreach, and mangrove propagules and seedlings. CH1 FLOW shrimp hatchery x5 Plant manager and CSR staff. Hatchery is a 32 ha site that produces up to 1 billion post-larvae per month; opened in 2003; half-way CH2 through a 5 yr CSR plan in the area. Mayor x1 Mayor of Chum Kho Municipality. CH3 Village head x1 Moo 2 village contains around 176 households; main livelihoods are fishing and working on the rubber, coconut, and oil palm CH4 plantations; they have de facto land rights over the largest mangrove forest in the Municipality. Mangrove association x6 Established in 2011, to proactively improve coastal management. CH5 Village associations x3 Heads of the fishers, oil palm planters, and ecotourism associations. CH6

Subnational Level (Samut Sakhon) DMCR MMU x4 Staff involved in mangrove rehabilitation at the site; provide information, outreach, and mangrove propagules and seedlings. SS1 − FLOW aquaculture feed mill x2 CSR project managers at this business unit, which was constructed 1988; expanded in 2004; shrimp feed capacity of 500,000 t yr 1; half- SS2 way through a 5 yr CSR plan in the area. Mayor x1 Mayor of Bang Tho Rat Municipality. SS3 Village head x1 Moo 6 contains over 1000 households and resembles a small town; main livelihoods are fishing, salt farming, and factory work. SS4 Mangrove association x2 Established in 1982 due to concern over erosion, and large volumes of garbage and waste water coming from upstream; hope to continue SS5 increasing mangrove area. Village associations x4 Heads of the youth, senior citizen, housewives, and salt flat workers associations. SS6

Fig. 1. Map showing the study site locations at Chumphon (orange) and Samut Sakhon (turquoise), within Thailand, supplemented with site photographs: (a) bamboo fence to protect planted mangroves from waves and coastal erosion in Samut Sakhon; (b) rehabilitation on a former shrimp pond in Chumphon; (c) afforestation attempt on mudflats at Chumphon. All photos: author. association. Secondary stakeholders that had observed current and audio-recorded, and transcribed. Interview duration was typically previous rehabilitation efforts included the Municipal Mayors, BEDO, 1–2 h, and respondents were assured of their anonymity. Where in- and additional village associations. These respondents were identified dicated, group interviews were held with similar stakeholders; some 20 through project documents, existing connections with BEDO, and separate interviews were conducted, with a total of 44 respondents snowball sampling. (Table 1). Interview questions were grouped into three main sections. All interviews were conducted face-to-face, aided by an interpreter, In Section 1, questions explored stakeholder roles in mangrove

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Fig. 2. Four phases of the ‘cycle of failure’ for typical corporate-financed mangrove restoration in Thailand. Phase 1 (bottom-left, blue) depicts the incapacities and pressures faced by DMCR. Phase 2 (bottom-right, green) depicts how DMCR relinquish decision-making power to corporations that finance restoration via CSR, leading to a restoration attempt. Phase 3 (top-right, yellow) depicts how actors seldom monitor survival rates meaning ‘false successes’ are reported. Phase 4 (top-left, red) depicts how, upon failure, duplicated restoration attempts are made (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article). rehabilitation, the challenges they face in fulfilling these role, their shows how CSR monies are often sought, which can shift decision- motivations and objectives for rehabilitation, and their awareness of making power to corporations, allowing them to choose ‘good’ com- mangrove laws and policies in Thailand. In Section 2, questions dis- munities with whom they have worked on CSR project before (Section cussed the histories of the specific study sites, their cultural and socio- 4.2). This culminates in the initial plantation event. Phase 3 then de- economic backstories, and the opinions, details (e.g., timeframe), and picts how all stakeholders are content with the attempt rather than the outcomes of past rehabilitation attempts (generally over the last ten long-term outcomes of the rehabilitation, a situation that leads to in- years), including how decisions were made and by whom. Finally, in sufficient monitoring, aftercare (e.g., replacing dead propagules with Section 3 attention turned to the recent project involving FLOW. These new ones), and project evaluation (Section 4.3). Phase 4 shows how in questions sought to ascertain the inception and design of the project, its subsequent years, further attempts are made, driven by the strong implementation, and early outcomes. In particular, whether and how ideologies of corporate philanthropy and public holidays associated the FLOW-financed project differed to previous rehabilitation attempts with the Thai Royal Family, which re-motivate the stakeholders to try was probed. The results are discussed below. again – often leading to duplicated efforts (Section 4.4). Consequently, the cycle continues (Fig. 2). Importantly, while each failed rehabilitation attempt will likely 4. A cycle of failure have been due to a combination of ecological factors – such as poor upfront ecological knowledge, absent aftercare of planted mangroves, The results below outline a sequence of events that have historically or simply using unsuitable methods of rehabilitation – it is institutional culminated in repeated mangrove rehabilitation failures. These events factors that produce phases 1–4, and most importantly, close the cycle, are driven by actor relations that produce an institutional arrangement limiting institutional learning. This leads to the repetition of failure, hereby conceptualised as a ‘cycle of failure’–which can be split into through duplicated efforts in the same location by the same (or similar) four phases (Fig. 2). Phase 1 shows how national targets to increase the actors. The actor relations and resultant institutional arrangement that mangrove area are delegated to DMCR MMUs that have limited fi- underpin this cycle of failure are now analysed and discussed. nancial capacity, and face ‘pressure to plant’ (Section 4.1). Phase 2

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4.1. Incapacity, pressure, and corporations (phase 1) business benefits such as reputation enhancement and gaining a social licence to operate (LTO) in a given area may be prioritized over eco- Regarding formal institutions, Thailand’s mangrove restoration po- logical outcomes – in which case, disinformation may be used to mis- licies and targets as stipulated in national plans are difficult to achieve lead consumers (Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Fabinyi et al., 2014). In- on the ground because DMCR aren’tafforded the financial capacity nor deed, some respondents questioned the philanthropic nature of the manpower to implement the policy autonomously. Specifically, within corporations, “They are involved because they have a policy to pay back to the coastal branch of DMCR, the ‘protection forests’ division appears to the Kingdom; they know being big conglomerates that they must have de- receive priority over the ‘restoration forests’ division, as exemplified by stroyed lots of stuff [had a negative environmental impact]” (CH5). Re- this quote from the DMCR MMU in Chumphon, “The mangrove re- garding the ecological outcomes, actor relation between the public storation side of DMCR gets far less baht2 than mangrove conservation sector (DMCR) and private sector (corporations) appear to be fraught, side… Our substation does not have money for restoration of this large size” with each party contesting their importance in rehabilitation efforts. (CH1). This is representative of an institutional gap at the state level, One CSR Director stated, “DMCR are looking for help with coastal erosion due to inconsistencies between a national policy and the capacity af- because normally their one-day mangrove planting events fail – when the sun forded to the agency tasked to enact that policy – leading to a failure in goes up, they are dead” (NL6). This was in stark contrast to the DMCR application. Similar capacity restrictions exist for agencies managing view, “I think they [corporations] are interested to plant mangroves because mangrove forest resources in other countries, for example Bangladesh we showed them that the survival rate could be high. With no help from (Afroz et al., 2016), Philippines (Calicdan et al., 2016), and Vietnam DMCR the survival rate will probably be 0%” (SS1). These contestations (Orchard et al., 2015). may stem from trust issues and insecurities associated with the fraught Some of the budgetary issues were further compounded by changes financial norms of mangrove rehabilitation in Thailand, which creates a in government – which have occurred frequently in Thailand over the power asymmetry, as the next subsection demonstrates. last decade – and the perceived disorganisation that ensues; a DMCR Director stated, “Changing government is also a challenge; it creates 4.2. Power dynamics and selecting ‘good’ communities (phase 2) changes in budget allocations and policies” (NL2). Indeed, the recent ex- pansion of mangrove-relevant policies that fall under DMCR’s remit, The institutional arrangement depicted in phase 1 of the cycle of has increased the ‘pressure to plant’. For example, the coercive ‘Get failure has clear implications for actor-relations in phase 2, particularly Back Forest’ policy operated in cooperation with the Thai Military between DMCR and the various CSR Departments with which it inter- provides new land to rehabilitate as the same respondent explained, acts. Notably, decision-making power over mangrove rehabilitation is “The military evict illegal settlers such as fish farmers and charcoal produ- shifted from DMCR to the corporate financiers, which typically select cers from the mangrove areas. There are even helicopter patrols, and 18,000 project sites and partner communities according to their internal CSR rai has been reclaimed so far in 2016 [interviewed in September] – but now protocols. For example, FLOW “measure a 5 km radius around each we need to replant” (NL2). This policy increases pressure on DMCR to business unit, and instruct the unit to undertake CSR in that zone” (NL6). plant mangroves at a similar rate to which coastal land is being ‘re- Furthermore, the local communities felt that they had been strategically claimed’. chosen by FLOW to participate in the rehabilitation efforts, “I think we These pressures and capacity limitations mean DMCR requires ex- are lucky that FLOW chose us – they must have tried other places but chose ternal financial support to fulfil its role within Thai environmental us because they can see we are a good community (tight, together, re- governance. Historically, money usually came from international do- sponsible), so we have the most potential. FLOW wouldn’t be here if our nors and NGOs, with manpower provided by civilian groups and the community was weak… we are not so close to their factory” (SS4). This military, as elucidated by a Municipal Mayor, “Planting from outside by notion of corporations targeting what they perceive to be ‘good’ com- third parties occurred, for example by schools and the army… Back then munities, with strong informal institutions, was seconded by re- CSR was not a big thing” (SS3). Yet, because the institutionalisation of spondents from the civil sector, “The local community in Chumphon is CSR3 in Thailand coincided with increased awareness of the plight of strong (not poor or rich), but not too strong because if they’re too strong they mangroves in the 2000s, it is understandable that corporations began can’t be controlled. They find it easier to understand. All the money goes to playing a more prominent role in financing mangrove rehabilitation good communities” (NL5). Incidentally, the focal villages in Samut attempts. Respondents in Samut Sakhon described their account of an Sakhon and Chumphon had established mangrove conservation asso- early CSR effort involving petrochemical firm, AKRA, “About 10-years ciations, in 1982 and 2011, respectively – well before the influx of ago AKRA supported the construction of a boardwalk towards the sightseeing corporate aid. Like elsewhere in Thailand (Sudtongkong and Webb, spot, and they built a conference room to help DMCR. I think DMCR con- 2008) these associations were proactively established, and consist of tacted AKRA for financial support. The government didn’t have a budget for likeminded environmental stewards that meet on an ad-hoc basis to these buildings” (SS3). Other Samut Sakhon respondents alluded to the discuss and act on mangrove management issues. They have devised on-going need for external support, “We just wish the government could village-specific rules on mangrove management and maintained a re- do more to help us, but now FLOW has come in as a substitute to fill the lationship with their respective DMCR MMU. Community associations void”. are increasingly promoted as important actors that strengthen social Nowadays, DMCR actively appeal for financial assistance from the capital and facilitate natural resource management and development Thai private sector, as their Strategy and Planning Director explained, activities in a democratic manner (Titeca and Vervisch, 2008) – and, “DMCR send letters to companies on the Thai Stock Exchange. We ask, ‘are although their main purpose is not to cooperate with the private sector, you interested to help rehabilitate?’ The willing companies can either do it by the mangrove conservation associations are examples of institutions themselves or do it with DMCR, in which case they pay and have their logo that are ready and waiting for corporations to utilise in their mangrove on a signboard and take pictures” (NL2). This quote resonates with lit- rehabilitation activities. eratures on ‘greenwashing’ (Delmas and Burbano, 2011), whereby The above themes however, have implications for the prudence, fairness, and equity of mangrove rehabilitation, and of CSR in general. An academic consultant elucidated this point, drawing on AKRA’s ’ “ 2 The baht is the official currency of Thailand. previous mangrove restoration initiatives prior to FLOW s arrival, I was 3 Corporate philanthropy has long been practiced in Thailand, but over the totally discouraged by AKRA; they have a list of communities they work last decade strategic approaches to CSR have increased, which may aim to with, good communities that can guarantee good PR. If you approach them enhance public relations, apply a long-term vision, and seek a return-on-in- regarding a community on the list, they’ll work with you, if they’re not on the vestment (ROI) (Sthapitanonda and Watson, 2016). list, they won’t” (NL8). This can be though of as a “controlled” effort at

508 B.S. Thompson Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514 putting CSR into practice (sensu Haalboom, 2012), which produces a with whom to conduct mangrove rehabilitation, but the community still selection bias whereby good communities gain ever-increasing CSR reserves their own power to accept this offer of CSR assistance. support, possibly leading to a situation where ‘the rich get richer’. This Since mangrove rehabilitation is “risky for FLOW” it is important to could neglect more deprived communities that lie beyond the stipulated clarify that corporations do not aim to achieve low survival rates, which CSR zones. However, it is noted here that this situation is not ne- would be illogical. CSR project spending is closely monitored by cor- cessarily the fault of the corporation, but really a fault of the circum- porate boards, and null results will likely undergo intense scrutiny stances (discussed in section 4.1) that makes the process of mangrove (Larson et al., 2015). Hence, while a political ecology view might rehabilitation so reliant upon them in the first place; corporations will question the controlled selection and re-selection of ‘good’ communities follow their own strategic agendas, particularly with CSR departments (i.e. wider fairness and equity considerations), it could be argued that accountable to their board of directors (Haalboom, 2012). Choice of the this process makes sense. It is widely held that mangrove rehabilitation planting site within a community however, could be more influenced by can be inhibited without local institutional strength (Dale et al., 2014; envisaged CSR outputs. For instance, at low tides, mudflats present vast Friess et al., 2016; Mangora, 2011), and indeed, NGOs may also target open spaces that are easy for mapping and conducting planting, while and re-target cooperative and interested communities where trust is the visibility of ‘turning brown to green’ presents effective photo op- already established, in order to give their interventions the greatest portunities. As such, more suitable rehabilitation sites and approaches chances of success (Bouma et al., 2008). (e.g. conducting enrichment planting within existing mangroves) may be overlooked. 4.3. No long-term monitoring leads to ‘false successes’ (phase 3) The ramifications for DMCR are also apparent. DMCR may be the official chief implementing agent of mangrove rehabilitation in Primavera and Esteban (2008) characterise successful mangrove Thailand, but the receipt of corporate funding can create a power rehabilitation to have moderate budgets, community involvement, and asymmetry regarding how, where, and when this implementation is co-management with local government (see also, Bosire et al., 2008; realised. The negative consequence of this is that the government Dale et al., 2014). However, the findings here suggest these criteria may agency may become submissive to private sector actors, with their role be inapt predictors of success, since in Thailand, moderate budgets can reduced to technical assistance, and (in the case of Chumphon, for be covered by corporations, community involvement is common, and example) assisting with legalities of land tenure as these quotes de- local government in the form of DMCR MMUs can foster co-manage- monstrate, “DMCR bring knowledge; they’re our coach” (CH5); “DMCR ment through technical and legal support (despite a lack of co-man- know the mangrove laws, have knowledge for restoration, and provide the agement legislation). Hence, this constellation of actors and their seedlings” (CH3). A DMCR Director even conceded, “DMCR have his- complementary roles may be characteristic of success, but anecdotal torically been a department to support, train, and build capacity only, with evidence suggests that outcomes in Thailand (in terms of mangrove no power to directly dictate and implement action – this was only for survival rates relative to plantation rates) have historically been un- MONRE, RFD, and DNP in protected areas”. Hence, while governments successful – the question is why? can exert power through the rules and policies they put in place, this Literature notes the importance of links between multi-sectoral ac- research provides a pertinent example of how unequal actor relations tors in environmental governance and policy implementation; for ex- can create institutions that may lead to state dependency on the private ample, among government agencies and local people (Ren et al., 2009), sector. This then leads to sub-optimal and potentially unjust site se- government agencies and corporations (Kuswanto et al., 2017), and lection for mangrove rehabilitation – leading to ineffective policy im- corporations and local people (Haalboom, 2012). In the context of plementation. These findings also resonate with broader insights from mangrove rehabilitation in Thailand, histories of these inter-actor re- Sadler and Lloyd (2009) on how CSR is indicative of a reliance of the lations are again evident, and able to produce a mangrove planting state upon corporations to fulfil state policies – resulting in a neoliberal event. In this regard, the institutional arrangement is well equipped to “re-casting of the boundaries between corporate- and state-centred achieve phases 1 and 2. However, in designing and implementing any regulation” (Sadler and Lloyd, 2009: 613). mangrove rehabilitation attempt, it is important to clarify the priorities Undoubtedly CSR represents an “experimental mode of social and (or goals) (Biswas et al., 2009; Powell and Osbeck, 2010), the metrics environmental governance” that is “subject to political struggle and and timeframe used to monitor achievement of those goals (Dale et al., power dynamics” (Haalboom, 2012: 969). It is conceivable that partner 2014), and actors responsible for monitoring (Mangora, 2011). It is communities chosen by the corporation could also experience a degree here – at the intersection of phases 2 and 3 – that the institutional ar- of subordination. For example, community–corporate conflict over CSR rangement becomes less well equipped. projects can prove challenging for corporate interests (Haalboom, Partly due to the loosely-defined rehabilitation targets stated in 2012), and could lead to that community not being selected as a re- NESDPs, it was revealed that prior to the current FLOW projects, actors cipient of CSR efforts in the future. Yet, the case study findings suggest appeared satisfied with – or were accustomed to – using the superficial that power may actually be shared between the corporation and the metric of ‘area planted’ rather than the ‘survival rate’ of planted man- local community, as epitomized by this quote, “It’s risky for FLOW, [i.e.] groves, and may not even have been overly concerned about failed failed plantings, because at the end of the project the locals have reaped the rehabilitation attempts. Historically, no stakeholders appear to have CSR benefits, so they might not care anymore [about managing their en- taken the lead with monitoring survival rates; in other words, public vironment]. But it’s not risky for locals – they’re always needed” (NL5). and private sector actors have been content with merely completing These ‘CSR benefits’ may be direct (e.g., capacity building and training) and reporting on the planting event itself. This allows ‘false successes’ or indirect (e.g., a new road in Chumphon that was constructed not by to be recorded on paper, when on the ground, most of the planted FLOW, but due to their presence). Thus, coastal communities may in- mangroves may be dead within the days, weeks, and months following creasingly be taking advantage of weak institutional settings to further the planting event. The DMCR MMU at Chumphon explained, “Before their own interests regarding mangrove management (sensu Mangora, FLOW, the police, military, and other companies, would do one-off planting 2011). The same respondent continued, “Changing companies causes events on public holidays e.g., the King’s birthday; maybe the survival rate disruption, so if the community like FLOW, they’ll keep other companies was 10%, but more important was that the idea of conservation was planted away from the site. Equally, the locals have the power to turn FLOW away – in their hearts – this was more important than the survival rate” (CH1). because there are plenty of other companies happy to come in” (NL5). This Indeed, as asserted by Dale et al. (2014), “the greatest practical is indicative of a mutual attraction between corporation and commu- weakness is in the area of monitoring. It often lacks standard proce- nity – in which each must be satisfied with the other. The corporation dures and is time and resource limited”. There may also be a lack of may have absolute power when choosing their preferred community accountability or, “self-commitment”, among key actors to monitor

509 B.S. Thompson Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514 outcomes (Mangora, 2011) – which appears to be the case in Thailand. who have historically supported many successful mangrove re- Under pressure to meet their allocated rehabilitation targets, DMCR habilitation initiatives, for example at Pak Nam Pran in the Province of MMUs may be content with ‘area planted’ figures and may not possess Prachuap Khiri Khan, which borders Chumphon to the South (Bangkok the manpower to monitor vast swathes of rehabilitated mangroves amid Post, 2016). Such occasions appear to nullify scepticism and motivate other duties. Meanwhile, corporations often display “limited” effort in stakeholders to make further rehabilitation attempts in order to honour their CSR activities by neglecting long-term monitoring of project the King and Queen, as this quote testifies, “The King and Queen’s outcomes (Haalboom, 2012). Furthermore, it seems that local com- birthdays motivate people to try again; DMCR, RFD, companies, they all munities are also indifferent to long-term success because even if the want to do something on these days” (CH4). It was also suggested that planted mangroves do survive then the ecological and socioeconomic corporations may leverage on these occasions, gaining extra acclaim for benefits may be indefinite and certainly not immediate, while if they do ‘doing good’ in honour of the Royal Family, “The companies that come to not survive their association with a major corporation will be pro- plant here are important for us. I think they help us plant because they have longed, which can also bring additional tangible benefits, as ex- to do ‘good deeds’ around the time of the King and Queen’s birthdays – there emplified by this quote from a mangrove association member in is always more activity then” (SS6). These quotes demonstrate the pow- Chumphon, “Since FLOW arrived, we now have a new road leading into this erful symbology of the Thai Royal Family, which is capable of re-mo- area – but that money didn’t come from FLOW, it came from the government tivating DMCR, corporations, and potentially discouraged local com- but only because FLOW are now involved in this area” (CH5). A respondent munities to pursue further rehabilitation attempts. from BEDO stated, “In general, coastal communities don’t care if they [planted mangroves] survive or not because the next company will just come 5. Breaking the cycle in, and then the next” (NL5). This subsection has demonstrated how and why inter-actor relations are seldom maintained long-term due to ab- Several drivers of restoration failure, and their relation to institu- sent rules and unassigned responsibilities for aftercare and monitoring, tional arrangements and power dynamics, are expounded above. In thus creating phase 3 of the cycle of failure. phase 1, the government agency is financially incapacitated to imple- ment mangrove restoration policies, which underpins the subsequent 4.4. Re-motivation via royal and philanthropic ideologies (phase 4) shift in power, by forming an institution between the government and corporate financiers. In phase 2, corporations seize decision-making Young (2010: 378) aptly notes, “a particularly puzzling feature of power, and finance mangrove rehabilitation on land managed by their institutional dynamics arises from the fact that some [environmental preferred community partners, and prioritising the simple method of governance] regimes linger on relatively unchanged even after they planting propagules. While this does lead to a restoration attempt, the have become ineffective”, and evidence suggests this to be the case institutions that shape phase 3 are insufficient for long-term success, here. The reason for this can be explained by phase 4 of the cycle of due to limited coordination regarding which actors will manage and failure, in which prevalent Thai ideologies – namely corporate philan- monitor the afforested/reforested mangroves. This maintains en- thropy, and public holidays associated with the Thai Royal Family – trenched norms of only reporting the initial restoration attempt, fos- lead to the re-financing of, and re-motivation for, subsequent re- tering a ‘plant and forget’ mentality. National ideologies shape phase 4 habilitation attempts. of the institutional arrangement, spurring subsequent restoration efforts Corporate philanthropy is a strong informal institution in Thailand, because CSR money is often available ad-hoc, and the influence of the entrenched in pre-existing Buddhist values such as Karma Royal Family effectively designates community plantation days on their (Sthapitanonda and Watson, 2016). Related to arguments in subsection birthdays. 4.3, traditional CSR activities comprise one-day tree planting events, in The two field sites featured in this article currently serve as ex- which corporations, at most, may seek to build relations with local amples of more progressive rehabilitation programs, relative to (1) stakeholders (Sthapitanonda and Watson, 2016), or gain wider positive previous rehabilitation events at these sites, and (2) what has histori- publicity – for which stating an ‘area planted’ figure will suffice for their cally been reported across the country (e.g., Memon and Chandio, sustainability reports. The upshot is that corporations are unlikely to 2011). As is explained below, while improvements to phases 1 and 2 are seek a direct return on investment (ROI) from the planted mangroves limited, the institutional arrangement is strengthened by overcoming (sensu Dempsey and Suarez, 2017; Thompson, 2018) and therefore are key issues identified in phases 3 and 4 of the cycle of failure; these are unlikely to finance monitoring, or upfront technical assessments that particularly important for ending the duplication of failed rehabilita- could lead to more strategic planting (i.e., species, locations, timings) tion attempts. A key reason for this achievement is that the FLOW (sensu Thompson, 2018). Yet, a low mangrove survival rate does not business unit at each site has signed a five-year memorandum of un- necessarily equate to a wasted CSR project for the corporation, which derstanding (MoU) with the related DMCR MMU and local community, may be satisfied with an array of ‘CSR co-benefits’ that mangrove re- as exemplified by this quote from a DMCR staff member: habilitation offers them such as positive media attention, local support, “The difference with FLOW compared to other private companies is the and quantitative figures on planted area for their sustainability reports. MoU, which means a long-term commitment and relationship. The AKRA In other words, corporations have little interest in ecological outcomes, boardwalk was just a one-off project. In 2014, FLOW was doing a one- but are keen to engage in such CSR activities for LTO and reputational day planting event but learned about the place and contacted our former enhancement. This means corporations may be willing to finance ad- boss. People from FLOW visited us and there was an evaluation, before ditional mangrove planting events, which means CSR monies are the signing of the MoU” (SS1). readily available; an NGO project manager set this issue in national context, “In Thailand, government departments are reluctant to change The MoUs signify the long-term commitment of the corporate fi- [rehabilitation approaches] because if they need more money they can get it nancier, as noted by FLOW representatives, “This MoU and long-term from reaching out via CSR and philanthropy” (NL7). This leads to dupli- activity actually shows that FLOW cares; we are not just doing the same old cated efforts, and resonates with the quote positioned at the start of this CSR” (SS2). Beyond a long-term supply of CSR funds and a systematic article. planting schedule, the arrangement also strengthens the quality of re- Even despite the co-benefits available for participating communities habilitation, as noted by a village head in Samut Sakhon, “We have a and corporations, it is conceivable that, amid repeat rehabilitation long history of planting mangroves independently. With DMCR and FLOW it failures, other reasons must help explain the seemingly blind im- is not just the funding [that is important] – they have better tools that speeds- plementation of mangrove plantings. A strong formal institution in up the quantity and quality of the planting ” (SS4). Different zones are Thailand is the Public holidays associated with the Thai Royal Family – designated to be planted at different times throughout the five-year

510 B.S. Thompson Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514 period, selected by better utilizing the knowledge of local villagers and targeted in areas where it can be most successful, and is most urgently ensuring all stakeholders are embedded in decision-making. Since their needed – as determined by robust feasibility assessments that consider CSR has become a more significant investment, FLOW have been keen ecology, hydrology, and topography. This and other recommendations to strengthen relations with other actors involved, and explained that that stem from the findings of both Sections 4 and 5 are now discussed. they now take responsibility for monitoring and aftercare, “Because we Most importantly, what is required for multi-actor mangrove re- check the survival rate of the mangroves, the community see this and it habilitation efforts is a long-term institutional arrangement that fosters creates a tighter collaboration – they can feel our good intentions” (CH2). In collaboration and cooperation among all actors, and reduces power relation to the cycle of failure, the MoU overwrites the ideological asymmetries by resolving financial incapacities (as partly demonstrated motivators described in phase 4, because money from corporate phi- by these Chumphon and Samut Sakhon projects). Many of these re- lanthropy is now no longer made available in an ad-hoc manner, but commendations with have relevance beyond Thailand. allocated to the mangrove rehabilitation project well in advance. This enables the institutional arrangement to be strengthened by a man- 6. Recommendations to improve mangrove restoration agement plan that details a systematic approach to planting, consisting of regular efforts throughout the year that factor in seasonality and tidal 6.1. Budget reform within government agencies regimes. This approach is far more strategic than the largely makeshift and superficial attempts made only to coincide with monumental days Mangrove rehabilitation in Thailand does benefit from the existence in the Thai calendar. of state level policies unlike for example, Sri Lanka where “no political FLOW shared their latest data on planted mangrove survival rates, support exists for mangrove planting” (Kodikara et al., 2017: 713). with the assessment having been conducted eight months after Equally, thanks in part to the recent Marine and Coastal Resource planting. While, too short to demonstrate long-term survival, it was the Management Act 2015, agency roles appear quite clear with little evi- most recent data available, showing survival rates at Chumphon of 85% dence of overlapping bureaucracy between DMCR’s remit and that of – with most mortality being seen on the mud flat site (Fig. 2c). In Samut other government departments, unlike the case for example, in the Sakhon survival was between 26–61%; it was noted that planting at this Philippines (Calicdan et al., 2016). However, state policies may be in- site is proving to be more difficult due to erosion and physical pollution effective if the administrative and financial priority afforded to enact (i.e. trash). By comparison, Hashim et al., (2010) reported 30% survival them is insufficient (Blaikie and Muldavin, 2014). With this in mind, (also after eight months) for a project in Malaysia, considering this results suggest that the present budget allocation within DMCR could be survivorship to be “moderately successful”. FLOW had also commis- more evenly split between the ‘restoration forests’ and ‘protection for- sioned a local wildlife centre to perform baselines assessments of ests’ divisions, reducing the former’s burden associated with sourcing marine benthos (#m2), marine animals (#m3), and wildlife animals additional funds. With increased budget, the reliance that some MMUs (#100m2). Field observations and project documents also testify to have on CSR for implementing the nations mangrove rehabilitation activities beyond the fundamentals of mangrove planting; for example, policies could also be reduced. This would allow these MMUs to the project’s strategic plan has led to the: drafting of village-specific maintain their autonomy as the chief implementer of mangrove re- rules on mangrove management which are clearly signposted at the habilitation initiatives, enabling them to decide upon sites with the best site; construction of a community/education centre proximal to the ecological potential for success. Irrespectively, DMCR could also mangroves; and the development of a tentative Payments for Ecosystem prioritise spending re-allocated monies on technical feasibility assess- Services (PES) scheme with support from BEDO. This demonstrates how ments that corporations often dislike to fund (Thompson, 2018). The phase 3 of the cycle of failure can be overcome. The MoU represents a crux is that at present, the Marine and Coastal Resource Management long-term financial commitment from FLOW. This is a driver of success Act 2015 affords DMCR greater legal power to create change, but unless because it propels FLOW to strengthen relations with the other actors. their financial capacity is strengthened, the temporary and asymmetric In particular, this gives greater project ownership to the community, power relations with corporations may remain, and in the absence of which compelled them to create formal institutions in the form of the MoUs, the cycle of failure may not be broken. aforementioned laws. It also endears FLOW to coordinate and lead monitoring efforts, since FLOW want to see an environmental return on 6.2. Promote a return on investment (ROI) investment from what has now become a significant outlay. Hence, the fraught institution of reporting planted area is overwritten with the The MoUs at the sites in Chumphon and Samut Sakhon represent a stronger institution of monitoring, evaluating, and reporting survival blueprint for future mangrove rehabilitation projects in Thailand, and rates. can support lasting collaboration and cooperation. Shifting from one- Despite these project-specific improvements to the institutional ar- day planting events to multi-year projects with MoUs signed between rangements of phases 3 and 4, it can of course be questioned as to what stakeholders, can ensure the aforementioned policy challenges related extent these relatively successful cases can be replicated nationwide. to monitoring, aftercare, and knowledge retention can be overcome. The signing of the MoU was made possible largely due to FLOWs stra- Thai CSR is in the process of transitioning from corporate philanthropy, tegic CSR strategy that enables them to implement projects over 5-year to a more advanced concept which advocates a long-term vision and timeframes (rather than for example, one-day events). The rationale for seeks return-on-investment (ROI) (Sthapitanonda and Watson, 2016). FLOWs participation in mangrove restoration is clear, because the ac- Mechanisms to engage Thai corporations to invest long-term may be tivity is linked to their business operations, namely shrimp aquaculture. required. ROI could be gained through conducting rehabilitation as part Hence, although the CSR landscape in Thailand is becoming more of a mangrove PES scheme in which the corporation could for example, strategic and long-term (Sthapitanonda and Watson, 2016), it cannot be offset carbon emissions based on the mangrove sequestration and sto- said how many other corporations apply such protocols, nor wish to rage capacities of planted mangroves (see Locatelli et al., 2014; fund mangrove restoration. Scaling a more progressive model for Thompson et al., 2014, 2017). This would promote baseline assess- mangrove restoration in Thailand will require overcoming the issues ments and regular monitoring, and again necessitate an MoU or PES exposed by phases 1 and 2 of the cycle of failure. For instance, even at contract. Chumphon and Samut Sakhon, decision-making power over the choice of restoration sites and partner communities still sits with the cor- 6.3. Equitable socio-economic outcomes for communities poration; the projects were corporate-funded because DMCR’s MMUs had insufficient funds. Financial capacities within government will Rönnbäck et al., (2007) stipulate that mangrove rehabilitation need to be overcome to resolve this and ensure that restoration is programs should go beyond utilizing the manpower of coastal

511 B.S. Thompson Land Use Policy 78 (2018) 503–514 communities for planting and involve them in long-term decision- plan. Briefly, it is important to note that ‘passive recovery’ (Ferreira making and management of the restored forest. In such cases, estab- et al., 2015), ‘natural regeneration’ (Zaldívar-Jiménez et al., 2017), and lished village-level informal institutions will likely be pre-requisite, as ‘ecological mangrove rehabilitation’, which involves scattering seeds on will high social capital such as local norms of trust, respect, and co- an incoming neap tide with zero planting (Brown et al., 2014; Lewis, operation (Sudtongkong and Webb, 2008). Sustainable financial me- 2005) can all offer low cost alternatives that restore mangrove biodi- chanisms such as PES (and also mangrove ecotourism – Thompson versity (i.e., do not focus on only one or two species). et al., 2018) could be useful to help projects achieve economic self- sufficiency (Biswas et al., 2009; Mangora, 2011) – enabling re- 7. Conclusion habilitation to continue beyond the life of an MoU. Bosire et al. (2008: 257) recommend that the “potential for sustainable exploitation” could This article has critically examined mangrove rehabilitation policies be considered once rehabilitated mangroves have matured. Establishing and practices in Thailand. While there are specificities to this Thai case, shrimp/crab polyculture and community mangrove nurseries could also as there would be with any such study, it speaks to a broader set of increase local engagement long-term. While present at the sites in policy issues regarding environmental governance. Firstly, regarding Chumphon and Samut Sakhon, the broader findings highlight how objective 1 the article demonstrates how weak and unequal actor re- villages with established mangrove conservation associations may be lations – resulting from capacity limitations, power asymmetries, and less needy than those without such institutions. Although corporations cultural ideologies – creates gaps between policy design and policy are unlikely to consider this in their site choices (see Section 4.2), implementation, thus producing an ineffective environmental govern- DMCR (or NGOs) might do – were they to have sufficient funding to ance regime with little institutional learning. These findings resonate make the decisions. Relatedly, while it was beyond the scope of this with numerous empirical and conceptual studies on institutions in en- study to explore intra-village equity issues, it is obvious that further vironmental management (e.g., Ayana et al., 2017; Nigussie et al., 2018 work will be necessary if such mechanisms are pursued, in order to Tiwari and Joshi, 2015; Young, 2010). manage potential class and gender differences can that exist in coastal Secondly, the study has important connotations for mangrove en- villages (Thompson et al., 2017); for example, villagers on Tanakeke vironmental science and coastal land use planning. It complements the Island in Indonesia have established ‘womangrove groups’ (Brown work of Biswas et al. (2009) and Dale et al. (2014) to show that while et al., 2014). mangrove rehabilitation success may be fundamentally based on eco- logical factors, it is institutions that pre-determine how astutely eco- 6.4. Long-term collaboration and monitoring logical knowledge is used and how credibly rehabilitation decisions are made. Considering objective 1, during the implementation phase (i.e. While it is encouraging that FLOW provided mangrove survival post-planting) there is not the inter-actor relations in place to ensure the data, it is of insufficient length (eight months) to draw robust inferences success of the project, i.e., through robust monitoring protocols. about the true success of the current projects. Monitoring of survival Thirdly, the article accentuates how bottom-up environmental in- rates should continue for many years after planting (Hashim et al., itiatives may be impeded by top-down environmental policies, sup- 2010); even fast-growing mangrove species may take 5–10 years to porting other recent studies (e.g., Afroz et al., 2016). The prevailing establish (Kaly and Jones, 1998), while some restoration attempts fail institutional arrangement began its development through radical several years afterwards (Ellison, 2000). Monitoring should be done formal changes including the 1992 Reforestation Act that encouraged systematically and involve permanent plots that are revisited (Brown CSR for forest restoration, the formation of DMCR in 2004 that led to et al., 2014). Hence, it is important that MoUs are not ‘paper commit- inhibiting budget realignments, and more recently, the coercive ‘Get ments’ but genuinely help ensure that monitoring continues by allo- Back Forest’ policy (phase 1). Although satisfactorily equipped to pro- cating monitors and aftrecare providers, and sharing these responsi- duce a mangrove rehabilitation attempt, the residual institutional issues bilities. Long-term collaboration is also important so that actors know from phases 1 and 2 manifest latter phases through the creation of that financial assistance will be provided for a set amount of time and flawed informal institutions that may better reflect ‘improvisation’ by can plan accordingly, ideally so that the project can reach a level of self- key actors to address these top-down institutional challenges (sensu sufficiency (Mangora, 2011). Ishihara et al., 2017); for example, the metrics used to measure ‘suc- Dale et al. (2014) conclude their review on mangrove rehabilitation cess’, the lack of institutional learning, and duplication of rehabilitation by recommending that governments work with communities to develop effort (phases 3 and 4). policies and strategies for rehabilitating mangroves. While it is true that Fourthly, the study adds to the literature on the roles and goals of environmental policy formulation has typically been conducted in a new actors in environmental governance (e.g., Armitage et al., 2012). top-down manner and could benefit from local input – in Thailand, and Findings for objectives 1 and 2, show that the emergence of corpora- much of Southeast Asia (Friess et al., 2016) – the findings here highlight tions playing a crucial role in financing mangrove rehabilitation, has that just because national policies and strategies are in place, strong effectively transferred decision-making power away from central gov- relations between actors across multiple scales and sectors are still re- ernment. This has created a hybrid and increasingly neoliberal gov- quired to shape institutional arrangements that enable the designed ernance network which has implications for the accountability and le- policy to be effectively implemented (irrespective of whether they were gitimacy of policy implementation (Armitage et al., 2012), for example drafted by government officials, local people, or both). in the form of greenwashing. These findings resonate with a broader literature on public-private partnerships (PPPs) that note shifts in 6.5. Consider rehabilitation approaches beyond planting power between the state and corporations (e.g., Shaoul, 2011). For example, De Schepper et al. (2014) note how PPPs make the stake- Overcoming the normalised – and perhaps even, institutionalised – holder environment more complex to manage due to power dynamics policy implementation approach of ‘planting mangroves’, and con- and unequal division of responsibilities and risks between actors. As sidering potentially more suitable rehabilitation methods is also re- Polasky et al. (2011: 402) assert with regard to environmental man- commended. During interviews, no respondent referred to methods agement, “groups with different agendas have incentives to misuse, beyond mangrove planting – with the exception of hydrological re- obfuscate, or ignore information”. Relatedly, the current study high- storation at the Chumphon shrimp pond (which was still planted pre- lights historical difficulties with identifying where the accountability dominantly with Rhizophora spp.). Concerningly, it is possible that for rehabilitation outcomes lies – with public, private, and civil sector DMCR promote planting because their annual budget is based on the stakeholders all apathetic to verifying long-term success. With com- number of seedlings estimated to be required in each MMU’s annual munities expectant of further support in the event of failed restoration,

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DMCR MMUs hastily planting mangroves under pressure to Bouma, J., Bulte, E., Van Soest, D., 2008. Trust and cooperation: social capital and meet allocated targets, and corporations historically content with re- community resource management. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 56, 155–166. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.03.004. porting the area planted in sustainability reports, the crucial ecological Brown, B., Fadilla, R., Nurdin, Y., Soulsby, I., Ahmad, R., 2014. Community based eco- reasons for failure may be overlooked. This could lead actors to forgo logical mangrove rehabilitation (CBEMR) in Indonesia. SAPIENS 7, 53–64. advice and, for example, plant on mud flats, or without determining Calicdan, M.A., Rebancos, C.M., Baguinon, N.T., 2016. Institutional arrangements in mangrove rehabilitation management of Palaui Island protected landscape and why natural recovery has not occurred at a particular site (Lewis, seascape (PIPLS), Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Philippines. J. Environ. Sci. Manag. 19, 19–26. 2005), and may lead to repeat rehabilitation attempts that better re- Cole, R., Wong, G., Brockhaus, M., Moeliono, M., Kallio, M., 2017. Objectives, ownership semble ‘trial and error’ (Biswas et al., 2009). and engagement in Lao PDR’s REDD+ policy landscape. Geoforum 83, 91–100. Finally, while the conceptualised ‘cycle of failure’ (Fig. 2) may de- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.05.006. Dale, P.E.R., Knight, J.M., Dwyer, P.G., 2014. Mangrove rehabilitation: a review focusing pict ‘institutional lock-in’ (when routines persist and there is a lack of on ecological and institutional issues. Wetl. Ecol. Manag. 22, 587–604. https://doi. further institutional creation), there is evidence of recent improvements org/10.1007/s11273-014-9383-1. – De Schepper, S., Dooms, M., Haezendonck, E., 2014. Stakeholder dynamics and respon- in mangrove rehabilitation initiatives demonstrated by the two FLOW – – ffi sibilities in public private partnerships: a mixed experience. 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