DOCSLIB.ORG

More Urgent Need for Political Initiatives

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
More Urgent Need for Political Initiatives A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kröger, Bernd Article — Digitized Version More urgent need for political initiatives Intereconomics Suggested Citation: Kröger, Bernd (1976) : More urgent need for political initiatives, Intereconomics, ISSN 0020-5346, Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg, Vol. 11, Iss. 4, pp. 100-104, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02928666 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/139359 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu FORUM Competition from East Bloc Fleets East European merchant fleets have been undercutting the conference rates of western liner companies by as much as 60 p.c. and are engaging in major expansion programmes, thereby causing great concern to shipowners in the western countries and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. Are the privately operated western merchant fleets in danger of being ousted by the East bloc fleets? More Urgent Need for Political Initiatives by Dr Bernd KrSger, Hamburg * restern shipping circles are about "transparent anti-commu- own cargo monopoly and "in W referring more often and nist indoctrination", they denied the interest of the socialist ex- more insistently to perilous that there had been any dump- ternal economy" making prefer- competitive pressure by the ing and remarked that the USSR ential use of their own tonnages. fleets of the COMECON states and other COMECON states to- and, more especially, the USSR. gether owned no more than Intrinsic Cost Advantages In the Federal Republic, Great 7.5 p.c. of the world's merchant Britain, Holland and Norway fleet at the middle of 1975. The East bloc fleets are prof- this discussion about the policy iting from cost advantages in- of the state-owned shipping What are the relevant facts? herent in the economic system enterprises of the eastern coun- The state-owned shipping enter- of their countries. The state tries and their growing influ- prises of the socialist countries shipping enterprises of the so- ence on the liner markets is and the USSR in particular are cialist economies have a place now conducted more and more developing an increasing activ- in the wage-incentive and per- often in public. The problems ity in the cross trade between formance-control systems of the involved have even been raised western countries. They are state-directed economic group- in the Deutscher Bundestag forcing their way into the liner ings but their investments are (Lower House of the German markets by undercutting the largely financed from budget Parliament) through a question conference rates by varying allocations, amortization rates tabled by the opposition parties. margins and methods. The are low and interest charges on The East bloc media reacted OECD liberalization code en- capital mostly a formality be- immediately with fierce attacks sures free access to the mar- cause - as BOhme 'in particular on western shipping represen- kets and ports of the western recently pointed out correctly tatives. Apart from complaining countries for all fleets. The East in "Die Weltwirtschaft" (2/1975, * General Manager of the German Ship- bloc states are however at the p. 138) - sea-going shipping owners' Association. same time holding on to their has been zero-rated for the per- 100 INTERECONOMICS, No. 4, 1976 FORUM tinent interest charge. Moreover, Anybody who enjoys the cost ventional general-cargo vessels special accounting systems ap- advantages of a system which in the world. ply to sea freight earnings in refuses to accept the competi- foreign currency instead of the tive methods of the market If all sea-ships on order in the world are taken into account, it cost-earnings ratio pertaining in economy within the compass of becomes clear that the state general, with the result that its own system but at the same trading countries - foremost even low rates can yield a profit. time claims for himself a right amongst them again the USSR The shipping enterprises in the to avail himself of the liberal East bloc countries can there- - have the intention of engag- competitive methods of another fore gear their business policy ing also in future predominantly system without accepting the to factors in no way comparable in liner shipping. Inquiries last to the profitability considera- cost conditions of this other year showed the COMECON tions applying in market econ- system is capable of underbid- countries to account for 4.7 p.c. omies where firms must calcu- ding the cheapest bidder from of the orders on the books of late according to commercial the industrialized countries by the world shipbuilding industry; criteria. 20 points or more whatever the for the liner tonnage alone their rate level may be. Since the proportion was 16.9 p.c. It is hardly surprising that this conditions underlying the bid basic difference is reflected by are different, it goes without An inquiry into the reasons an aggressive rate policy of saying that he can align his for this policy of fleet expansion East bloc shipping enterprises offer of services to his own shows a number of disparate on routes where they find free supply potential and his own and mostly general economic scope. The Council of European aims and adhere to this policy criteria to play a part. There is & Japanese National Ship- for many a long day, if neces- the aim of carrying the foreign owners' Associations (CENSA) sary until he has ousted his trade merchandise and the eco- has carried out investigations nomic and military aid deliv- competitors. Decisive from his showing that the COMECON eries to socialist countries and point of view is not primarily fleets, and especially the USSR "friendly" states in Africa, Latin the ratio of costs and earnings fleet, have undercut the rates America and Asia as far as pos- in various routes by between which is crucial to his rivals in sible in own vessels. Besides, 10 and 60 p.c. the "competitive markets" but the outlays in foreign currencies the market share which he has are to be kept down and earn- Threat of Overwhelming independently determined as ings in foreign currencies to be Competition his target. increased; the latter in partic- ular are to develop into a copi- The East bloc shipping com- Largest General Cargo Tonnage ous source of revenue over the panies reject the charge of rate long term. Last not least, the dumping. Nevertheless it must Starting from this basic point merchant fleet is to be employ- be said that no matter what eco- and bearing in mind the quanti- ed as an instrument of foreign nomic theory is accepted as tative relations of the supply and security policy and to be valid for a definition of the potential of the East bloc fleets, made use of for establishing term "dumping", it makes little their growth rates and espe- and developing an economic- change for those directly affect- cially that of the Soviet mer- strategic presence on the ed. It is not to be denied that chant fleet must be a matter of oceans of the world. price differentiation and rate concern even for heedless op- undercutting are practised as timists. Many figures have been How greatly such arguments instruments of market economy quoted in the discussion, and influence the East bloc shipping competition, that they are part these can of course be arranged policy is indicated by the struc- of the free scope allowed in in various ways. The often quot- ture of merchant fleet, especially market economies. But as far ed ratio of the total COMECON in the USSR. Roll-on/roll-off and as the competition from the fleet to the world merchant fleet container ships and conven- COMECON and the USSR in (of "only" 7.5 p.c.), for instance, tional general-cargo vessels are particular is'concerned, at is- bears no relevance to the com- playing a much greater logistic sue is not the method as such petitive pressure of eastern role than bulk carriers. The fact but the extent to which it is shipping enterprises on liner that the USSR is largely self- being used - competitors may shipping, for the East bloc ratio sufficient in regard to raw ma- be ousted from the market com- on the liner routes was 12.8 p.c. terial supplies explains why in pletely - and the conditions at the middle of 1975; with 7.3 intra-Soviet sea shipping also under which the parties engage mn grt the USSR on its own has more bulk carriers are being in the competition. today the largest fleet of con- used than liner tonnage. About INTERECONOMICS, No. 4, 1976 101 FORUM 40 p.c. of the Soviet fleet are These developments have pro- eventually lead, can only be reportedly plying between USSR voked the mentioned reactions effective if several countries or COMECON ports, but this is from the affected shipping com- take them at the same time and certainly not the figure for liner panies and the political authori- move on substantially parallel shipping.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Active Measures: the Secret History of Disinformation & Political
    Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation & Political Warfare | Thomas Rid Philosophers have only interpreted the world. The point, May 25th, 2020 however, is to change it. — Karl Marx INTRODUCTION Thomas Rid is Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Rid’s latest book, Active Measures, a startling history of disinformation, was published in late April 2020 with Farrar, Straus and Giroux (also in Russian, Japanese, Polish). His most recent book, Rise of the Machines (2016), tells the sweeping story of how cybernetics, a late- 1940s theory of machines, came to incite anarchy and war (also in Chinese, Russian, German, Japanese, Turkish). His 2015 article “Attributing Cyber Attacks” was designed to explain, guide, and improve the identification of network breaches (Journal of Strategic Studies 2015). In 2013 he published the widely-read book Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Rid’s Ph.D. thesis, “War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq,” was the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam. Rid testified on information security in front of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as in the German Bundestag and the UK Parliament. From 2011 to 2016, Rid was a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Between 2003 and 2010, he worked at major think tanks in Berlin, Paris, Jerusalem, and Washington, DC. Rid holds a PhD from Humboldt University in Berlin.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Active Measures an Update Jul 1982.P65
    Special Report No. 101 Soviet Active Measures: An Update July 1982 United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C. This report describes Soviet active Forgeries After an initial mailing to Spanish measures which have come to light since journalists failed to obtain publication, the the publication of Special Report No. 88, Forgeries are a frequently used active forgery was circulated on November 11 to Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, measures technique. Several have come to all delegations (except the U.S and Spanish) Disinformation, Political Operations, in light in recent months. Their appearance has to the Conference of Security and Coopera- October 1981. been timed to influence Western opinion on tion in Europe (CSCE), then meeting in current sensitive issues. As far as we are Madrid. This time several Madrid newspa- The Soviet Union uses the term active aware, only one of these recent forgeries pers ran stories that exposed the letter as a measures (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to achieved uncritical publication. fabrication probably of Soviet origin. cover a broad range of activities designed to Forgeries are usually sent through the promote Soviet foreign policy goals, mail to journalists, officials, or other persons The Clark-Stearns Letter. In January including undercutting opponents of the who might make them available to the 1982, a forged letter and an accompanying U.S.S.R. Active measures include media. Forgeries normally do not carry a research analysis dated September 23, 1981, disinformation, manipulating the media in return address, nor is the sender identified in from Judge William Clark, then Deputy foreign countries, the use of Communist a way that can be checked.
    [Show full text]
  • Disinformation in the Reagan Years and Lessons For
    CONTENTS Introduction 1 Disinformation in Perspective 2 Declassified: The Reagan Years 3 What’s Old is New Again 7 About the Author 8 America is an enemy; and second, that Russia is a “besieged fortress, surrounded by enemies.”3 At least partially, Russian eforts to undermine the United States and the West in general are a predictable consequence of those narratives. With respect to the 2016 election, using disinformation as a primary means to sow derision has clear benefits for Russia in that it is efective and remarkably low cost.4 And, perhaps more importantly, modern Russia does not need to develop a new strategy for this kind of attack, as its Soviet predecessors left a well-developed playbook from which to borrow many methods and objectives. R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 164 February 2019 Using these low-cost disinformation campaigns to divide America, undermine the West and undercut the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efectively serves the greater purpose of increasing Russia’s power relative to the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his circle are making use of the underlying nature of democracy to turn DISINFORMATION IN THE REAGAN these objectives into reality. For example, people within YEARS AND LESSONS FOR TODAY1 democracies ultimately decide what happens in their soci- eties, including the future of foreign and military policy.5 By Megan Reiss Accordingly, if it can successfully divide the people or per- suade them to push for what are, in fact, Russian policy pref- INTRODUCTION erences, Russia may be able to gain power while weakening elatively speaking, after the end of the Cold War, the the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign
    Operation INFEKTION Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign Thomas Boghardt The practice of intelligence dif- weaken the USSR’s opponents— fered considerably between East first and foremost the “main and West during the Cold War. enemy” (glavny protivnik), the Western intelligence services were United States—and to create a most commonly tasked with gath- favorable environment for ering information, but their advancing Moscow’s views and Soviet bloc counterparts placed international objectives much greater emphasis on decep- worldwide. Our friends in Moscow tion operations to influence “ opinions or actions of individu- This is the story of one such mea- call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ als and governments. 2 sure—a campaign to implicate Our enemies in America the United States in the emer- call it ‘active measures,’ These “active measures” (aktiv- gence of the AIDS pandemic that and I, dear friends, call it inyye meropriatia, as the Soviets appeared in the early 1980s. The ‘my favorite pastime.’ called them) included manipula- story both illustrates the nature of tion and media control, written Soviet and communist bloc disin- and oral disinformation, use of formation programs and foreign communist parties and demonstrates the potential long- front organizations, clandestine term consequences. —Col.” Rolf Wagenbreth, radio broadcasting, manipula- director of Department X (dis- tion of the economy, kidnappings, Editor’s Note: This article was the information) of East German paramilitary operations, and sup- recipient of an Annual Studies in foreign intelligence1 port of guerrilla groups and Intelligence Award in 2009. The terrorist organizations. Under references to end notes seen in Joseph Stalin, active measures this text are included only in the also included political article’s .PDF versions posted in assassinations.
    [Show full text]
  • Formative Battles: Megan Ward Shannon Pierson Cold War Disinformation and Jessica Beyer Campaigns and Mitigation Strategies
    Science Technology Innovation Program Authors Formative Battles: Megan Ward Shannon Pierson Cold War Disinformation and Jessica Beyer Campaigns and Mitigation Strategies August 2019 Formative Battles: Cold War Disinformation Campaigns and Mitigation Strategies During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union refined covert methods of political intervention and conflict, making use of proxy wars, election interference, and disinformation campaigns to advance their respective interests. Work such as Dov H. Levin’s research tracking election interference (2016) illustrates that both superpowers used disinformation as a core tactic throughout the Cold War and the subsequent decade. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR competed in an arms race of fictions, attempting to cultivate ideological support internationally and domestically. In response, presented with sophisticated and widespread Soviet disinformation, the U.S. created a then- groundbreaking interagency organization called the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG). The AMWG operated using a “Report-Analyze-Publicize” strategy that prioritized overt disinformation and successfully challenged Soviet active measures in the 1980s (Bailey, 1998). At the international level, both the Non-Aligned Movement, with its focus on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and the United Nations’ General Assembly more generally attempted to address the issue. Some have posited Cold War mitigation strategies could be used to combat the newest itineration of harmful propaganda and disinformation (Cull, et al, 2017; Neal, 2019; Selga & Rasmussen, 2017; Deeks, McCubbin, & Poplin, 2017), but while Cold War disinformation mitigation tactics may provide aspirational frameworks for modern efforts, they are largely inapplicable in a modern disinformation battlefield.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone
    C O R P O R A T I O N BEN CONNABLE, STEPHANIE YOUNG, STEPHANIE PEZARD, ANDREW RADIN, RAPHAEL S. COHEN, KATYA MIGACHEVA, JAMES SLADDEN Russia’s Hostile Measures Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2539 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0199-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover image design: Rick Penn-Kraus Map illustration: Harvepino/Getty Images/iStockphoto Abstract spiral: Serdarbayraktar/Getty Images/iStockphoto Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Russia challenges the security and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and many of its member states.
    [Show full text]
  • SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES 01/21/09, Loj F02-083/1 WHITE
    SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES 01/21/09, loj F02-083/1 WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND OFFICE FILES deGraffenreid, Kenneth: Files Box 91786 Soviet “Active Measures” Working Group Soviet “Active Measures” 04/02/1981-09/21/1981 Soviet “Active Measures” 09/22/1981 Soviet “Active Measures” 09/23/1981-12/31/1981 Soviet “Active Measures” 01/01/1982-01/21/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 01/22/1982-01/31/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 02/01/1982-03/16/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 03/17/1982-04/31/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 05/01/1982-05/14/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 05/15/1982-12/31/1982 HPSCI (House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Report on Active Measures Published December 1982 DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES, 1981-1987 Intelligence Directorate, NSC: Senior Director and Staff Member This collection consists of two series. The series are SERIES I: Subject File and SERIES II: Chronological File. CONTAINER LIST SERIES I: Subject File RAC Box 1 "Active Measures" Working File 01/01/1981-09/30/1981 "Active Measures" Working File 10/01/1981-12/31/1981 "Active Measures" Working File 01/01/1982-04/30/1982 "Active Measures" Working File 05/01/1982-09/15/1982 "Active Measures" Working File 09/16/1982-12/31/1982 "Active Measures" Working File 01/01/1983-06/30/1983 "Active Measures" Working File 07/01/1983-08/31/1983 "Active Measures" Working File 09/01/1983-11/07/1983 "Active Measures" Working File 11/08/1983-12/31/1983 "Active Measures" Working Group 01/01/1984-01/04/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group 01/05/1984-01/31/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group
    [Show full text]
  • Active Measures
    ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVE MEASURES Spring 2018 – Volume III Growing Challenges in the Republic of Serbia Towards European Union Accession Kelly Zug 4 Beijing’s Hegemonic Inhibition: Asia’s Foreboding Geopolitics and China’s Grand Strategy David Stoffey 19 The Successes of the Islamic State in Comparison to Al Qaeda: Near Enemy Focus and Social Media Persuasion Brooke Kuminski 35 The United States’ Response to Corruption in Afghanistan Samuel Read 49 ACTIVE MEASURES – Spring 2018 – 2 ACTIVE MEASURES Spring 2018 – Volume III Founding Editors Daniel Acheson – Michael Webber Editor-in-Chief David Stoffey Contributing Editors Brooke Kuminski – Daniel Acheson – Erin Cook James Rice – Kelly Zug – Ryan Hauser Active Measures is a not-for-profit scholarly journal published and administered by students of The Institute of World Politics. The views presented in Active Measures are those of the authors alone and are not the views of the United States government, the Institute of World Politics, or any other entity. All essays published herein are property of their respective authors and are used with permission. All rights reserved. Design ©2013 The Institute of World Politics. All rights reserved. “Active Measures Man” ©2012 Mark Beauchamp. Used with Permission. All rights reserved. Inquiries should be directed to [email protected] or: Active Measures, c/o The Institute of World Politics 1521 16th Street NW Washington, D.C. 2003 ACTIVE MEASURES – Spring 2018 – 3 Kelly Zug Growing Challenges in the Republic of Serbia Towards European Union Accession Kelly Zug This essay will analyze the accession steps of the Republic of Serbia towards European Union membership and the emerging challenges that may undermine Serbia’s commitment to this objective.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 3, Issue 2: November 2020 56 the Solzhenitsyn Affair: Yuri
    Volume 3, Issue 2: November 2020 The Solzhenitsyn Affair: Yuri Andropov’s Personal Obsesssion Christian Orr (USPIS Intelligence) Introduction When the general public thinks of Soviet assassination and kidnapping, they typically conjure up images from fictional espionage—especially of James Bond, AKA Agent 007. Yet, the real-world history of the Soviet Union in general and of the Komitet Gozudarstevennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB, the Committee for State Security and so-called “Sword and Shield” of the Communist Party of the CCCP) in particular, as well as of the KGB’s predecessor organizations, is replete with real-life examples of murder, kidnapping, and other forms of mayhem. Assassinations were specifically handled by KGB’s Department 13, tasked with the grimly euphemistic mokryie dela—translated as either “liquid affairs” or “wet work.”1 The earliest example that comes to mind is the murder of Leon Trotsky. Fallen far from grace from his heyday as a key participant in the Bolshevik Revolution, the exiled Trotsky was stabbed in the head with an ice pick in 1940 in Mexico.2 Fast-forward to the Cold War, and the list of Soviet assassination victims runs the gamut from Ukrainian emigré leader Stepan Bandera, to Liv Rebet in the 1950s, to Bulgarian defector Giorgi Markov in 1978 (the latter was killed in the streets of London with an umbrella that discharged a poison pellet into his leg). The KGB was even responsible for kidnappings in such far-flung places as Calcutta and Rangoon.3 1 Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping,” Unclassified document, CIA Historical Review Program, September 22, 1993, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study- ofintelligence/kent-csi/vol19no3/html/v19i3a01p_0001.htm.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Russian Subversion Patterns, Threats, and Responses
    February 2020 Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE ANDREW RADIN, ALYSSA DEMUS, KRYSTYNA MARCINEK Understanding Russian Subversion Patterns, Threats, and Responses ussia is suspected of having undertaken a wide range of subversive activities against the United States and its partners and allies since 2014—examples include military support for the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, Ran attempted coup in Montenegro, and influence campaigns in the 2016 U.S. and 2017 French elections. Responding to Russian subversion is difficult, in part because the threat is, by its very nature, not clearly known. In this Perspective, we review past RAND Corporation and other relevant work and synthesize overall insights about why and how Russia undertakes subversion. This review and synthe- sis offer insights about the likely threat of Russian subversion to the United States and its partners and allies. Russia likely finds subversion—which we define as efforts intended to influence the domestic politics of other countries—attractive because it could help achieve multiple Russian foreign policy interests at relatively low cost. The threat of Russian subversion to different countries varies based on the intensity of Russia’s interests and the resources available to undertake subversion. In western Europe and the C O R P O R A T I O N United States, Russian subversive tools appear to be limited political warfare, or sharp power (Cardenal et al., 2017; to information, cyber, and political ones. In neighboring Cohen and Radin, 2019; Robinson et al., 2018). There is former communist countries, Russia uses a wider range substantial debate about these terms—for example, crit- of military and economic tools.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet Subversion and Propaganda, How the West Thought Against It
    SUMMARY REPORT October 2017 Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against it An Analytic History, with Lessons for the Present Nicholas J. Cull, Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum and Alistair Shawcross 2 Abstract What were Soviet influence and disinformation campaigns? What did the West do about them? This study answers these questions, explaining the Cold War strategies followed by the USSR, as well as the Western response. Eleven case studies follow, each one examining a counter-disinformation tactic in depth, with comments on the relevance of that tactic today. The first seven case studies focus on defensive tactics aimed at stopping Soviet propaganda in the West, while the latter four focus on offensive tactics used to promote accurate information and democratic messages to the USSR and beyond. The conclusion features a deeper examination of the difference between modern Russian propaganda and its Soviet antecedents. 3 Executive Summary What were Soviet influence and disinformation campaigns? What did the West do about them? This study answers these questions, explaining the Cold War strategies followed by the USSR, as well as the Western response. The full report contains eleven case studies, each one examining a counter-disinformation and counter-propaganda tactic in depth, with comments on the relevance of that tactic today. Here is a brief precis of each one of them. What Were Soviet Active Measures? Case Studies of Cold War The term “Active Measures’ came into use in the USSR Counter-Propaganda in the 1950s to describe overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behaviour in foreign countries.
    [Show full text]