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On the Frontline of Cold War Espionage

On the Frontline of Cold War Espionage

Kristie Macrakis, Thomas Wegener Friis, Helmut Muller-Enbergs, eds.. East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy. : Routledge, 2010. xii + 247 pp. $120.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-415-48442-8.

Reviewed by Thomas Boghardt

Published on H-German (November, 2010)

Commissioned by Benita Blessing (Oregon State University)

Few institutions have become more striking MfS ofcers who droned on about the successful symbols of Soviet-style than East operations of their agency, brushed 's Ministry for State Security (MfS, or critical questions aside, and "became louder, less ). Like its archetype, the Soviet KGB, the noto‐ restrained, fnally banging on the benches with rious Stasi combined foreign espionage and do‐ abandon and dominating the venue."[1] To add in‐ mestic security functions under one administra‐ sult to injury, the MfS retirees quickly published tive roof. But while MfS domestic security opera‐ their own papers in an edited volume, without tions have generated sustained academic and consulting the dumbfounded Danish conference popular interest--witness the Oscar-winning organizers.[2] East German Foreign Intelligence is movie (dir. Florian Henckel the academics' response to what many of them von Donnersmarck, 2006)--the same cannot be considered a rose-tinted view of the HVA. said about the operations of the Stasi's foreign in‐ The volume reproduces papers by several telligence arm, the HVA (Hauptverwaltung A, or Odense participants but includes a number of main department A). Knowledgeable publications contributions from other and intelli‐ in English are particularly rare. This collection of gence historians as well. The thirteen articles are articles therefore constitutes a welcome efort to grouped thematically in three sections, "Intelli‐ add to our understanding of an important Cold gence and Counter-Intelligence," "Political Intelli‐ War . gence," and "Scientifc-Technical and Military In‐ The origins of East German Foreign Intelli‐ telligence." While the introduction contends that gence lie in a conference on the same subject in the volume "examine[s] East German foreign in‐ Odense, Denmark in November 2007. Intended as telligence as a historical problem" (p. 6), this state‐ a forum for historians and former practitioners, ment is somewhat misleading, since only six of the conference was quickly hijacked by retired the thirteen chapters deal with HVA espionage. H-Net Reviews

The others explore a variety of loosely related Maddrell concludes that Western (U.S., British, subjects, ranging from KGB West German, and French) agencies operated during the Crisis to CIA operations in East thousands of spies in during that Germany. time period. "Save for the Federal Republic of Ger‐ The frst chapter, "Counter-Intelligence in many," he writes, "no other state has been so Post-War Europe, 1945-1965" by renowned espi‐ deeply penetrated by spies" (p. 25). Since recruit‐ onage writer Nigel West, is a case in point. West ment and communication between Western intel‐ provides an eloquent overview of KGB penetra‐ ligence and their agents in the GDR depended on tion eforts of Western agencies, yet his contribu‐ the steady fow of East German refugees into West tion has little bearing on East German foreign in‐ Germany, and uninhibited transit between East telligence, which is referenced merely in one and , the erection of the paragraph. The author concludes with a curious abruptly ended this espionage bonanza. Although digression on KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn. Fol‐ "not built to suppress Western espionage," the lowing his defection in 1961, Golitsyn made a se‐ wall "still benefted the Stasi's counter-intelligence ries of fantastic claims, such as British prime min‐ divisions" (p. 31f). ister Harold Wilson being a KGB informer, the Based largely on secondary sources, Erich Sino-Soviet split being a charade intended to de‐ Schmidt-Eenboom's article, "The Rise and Fall of ceive the West, and several other Soviet defectors West German Intelligence Operations against East being KGB plants. Most of Golitsyn's assertions Germany," explores the same subject--Western in‐ were eventually debunked, and the eminent intel‐ telligence operations against East Germany--but it ligence historian Christopher Andrew has called addresses human intelligence or HUMINT (infor‐ him an "unreliable conspiracy theorist."[3] West, mation gathered by agents or spies) as well as sig‐ however, considers many of Golitsyn's far-fetched nals intelligence or SIGINT (interception of com‐ theories true. For example, he writes that Golitsyn munication), and covers the entire Cold War peri‐ "made a compelling argument for suggesting that od. Like Maddrell, he concludes that the Bun‐ (Soviet military intelligence colonel Oleg desnachrichtendiest (BND, West German intelli‐ Penkovsky), too, had been a dispatched agent, gence) by and large succeeded in gathering mili‐ working throughout under KGB control" (p. 17). In tary and economic information on East Germany, fact, Penkovsky had provided CIA and SIS (British periodic setbacks notwithstanding. Although the intelligence) with critical information on Soviet eight years immediately following 1945 proved a intentions and military capabilities during the "golden age" for West German spies, by the late Berlin and Cuban Missile crises. He was eventual‐ 1980s, 90 percent of BND agents in the GDR were ly captured by KGB , paraded MfS double agents. By that time, however, BND at a show trial, found guilty of espionage, SIGINT, working closely with the U.S. Defense In‐ and executed. Penkovsky's case has been studied telligence Agency (DIA) and National Reconnais‐ in depth, and the evidence comes down frmly on sance Ofce (NRO), made up for this HUMINT fail‐ the side of those who argue that he was a genuine ure. Maddrell's and Schmidt-Eenboom's fndings agent as well as a courageous man.[4] are noteworthy since Western intelligence opera‐ The second chapter, by Paul Maddrell, ex‐ tions against East Germany are traditionally per‐ plores "Western Espionage and Stasi Counter-Es‐ ceived as unsuccessful. pionage in East Germany, 1953-1961," i.e., in the The title of Benjamin Fischer's contribution, years leading up to the erection of the Berlin Wall. "Deaf, Dumb, and Blind: The CIA in East Ger‐ Based on the records of MfS counterintelligence, many," is an accurate summary of the author's

2 H-Net Reviews central thesis. According to Fischer, a former CIA German authorities. There has been much specu‐ chief historian, the MfS inficted "one of the great‐ lation as to how the CIA managed to get their est defeats in intelligence history" on the CIA. (p. hands on Rosenholz. Based on interviews with 48) By the end of the Cold War, Fischer contends, fve retired CIA ofcers, Livingston concludes that virtually all East German spies run by the CIA the HVA turned over the Rosenholz material to were double-agents whose true loyalty lay with the KGB at the end of the Cold War, and a KGB ar‐ the MfS. According to Fischer, an essential ingre‐ chivist then walked into the U.S. embassy in War‐ dient for the Stasi's success was CIA incompe‐ saw and ofered them to the Americans in 1992. tence. In the words of HVA director Markus Wolf, The CIA purchased the material for $75,000. Liv‐ identifying undercover CIA ofcers was "ridicu‐ ingston's reconstruction of events is plausible, lously easy" due to their garrulousness and pen‐ though fnal verifcation will have to await the chant to share details of their true identities with opening of the relevant CIA fles. While Rosenholz their agents, and the MfS would routinely send contributed to the arrest and conviction of top their American counterparts "dangles" (agents spies like Rainer Rupp ("Topas") at NATO head‐ provocateurs) in an efort to create double agents quarters and ("Gisela") at the BND, and penetrate the American agency. Successfully the overall judicial impact was limited: from 1993 recruiting agents or spies is widely considered an to 1995, 2,928 judicial inquiries on espionage or intelligence ofcer's most important feat, and Fis‐ treason charges were launched in Germany cher suggests that CIA ofcers occasionally subor‐ against West German citizens, many of them on dinated professional judgment to personal ad‐ the basis of information from the Rozenholz fles. vancement in the pursuit of this goal: "The evi‐ In the end, the courts handed down merely 252 dence suggests that some [CIA ofcers] were fools convictions. Still, for historians, Rozenholz's work but most were knaves. They covered up their fail‐ constitutes a treasure trove of information. For ure by fraud and deceit, continuing to recruit dou‐ example, the material reveals that 60 percent of ble agents and disseminating a steady stream of East German agents were ideologically motivat‐ tainted intelligence reports to their 'consumers.' ed--a fairly high number for the late Cold War era By doing so, they compromised the intelligence when many spies worked primarily for money-- process, their agency, and fnally themselves" (p. and that as much as 80 percent of in‐ 64). telligence on was collected by the Robert Livingston's article, "Rosenholz: Mis‐ HVA. The Rosenholz fles will doubtlessly continue cha's Files, CIA's Booty," examines the source ma‐ to shed a fascinating light on HVA operations. terial for most research into HVA operations. As Helmut Müller-Enberg's article, "Political In‐ the GDR was nearing its end, East German civil telligence: Foci and Sources, 1969-1989," is pre‐ rights leaders, in "unsurpassed naiveté," put the cisely the kind of contribution one would hope to HVA in charge of its own dissolution. In order to fnd in a volume titled East German Foreign Intel‐ protect its agents, the agency set out to meticu‐ ligence. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the lously destroy its own records, but overlooked a author sets out to methodically examine HVA op‐ large set of microflmed records, including micro‐ erations. In West Germany, the HVA successfully flmed copies of nearly 300,000 index cards of penetrated a host of target organizations, includ‐ people in which the HVA had an interest. Termed ing the federal chancellery, the foreign ofce, the "Rosenholz" by West German counterintelligence, ministries of interior and economic afairs, as these records cover the years 1973-88. In the early well as political parties and political foundations. 1990s, the CIA obtained the Rosenholz fles, and HVA also carried an impressive "wish list" of U.S. eventually made most of them available to West targets, including the White House, the depart‐

3 H-Net Reviews ments of state and defense, and many high-profle thor, Soviet bloc ended abruptly private and semi-private organizations, such as in 1973, because of détente, and "because the Wa‐ the RAND Corporation, Harvard, and Georgetown tergate scandal delivered enough real ... material University. And even though the HVA hardly ever for the war (p. 128). While Scholz's succeeded in penetrating U.S.-based institutions, article addresses an important subject, the gener‐ they successfully planted spies at the headquar‐ al outlines of the East German active measures ters of U.S. forces in Europe (USEUCOM) in Stutt‐ apparatus and operations are already known.[5] gart and U.S. land forces in Europe (USAREUR) in His focus on Sweden is novel, although a diferent Heidelberg. In a fascinating case study, Müller-En‐ case study might have been better suited for the bergs reconstructs the story of an East German purpose of an article set up as an introduction on agent whom HVA initially sent to West Germany active measures, since Sweden was very much a as a "sleeper," and then, in 1973, to New York City, sideshow for HVA X, as Scholz makes clear. One where he found work at Schenker Logistics. Inter‐ might also add that active measures experienced estingly, this agent still "lives in the " a renaissance of sorts in the late 1980s, when KGB but "has not yet responded to an interview re‐ and HVA launched some of the most vicious disin‐ quest" (p. 109). This case study is testimony to the formation campaigns of the Cold War.[6] patience and long-term planning eforts HVA in‐ Bernd Lippmann's article, "Foreign Intelli‐ vested in their agents. In spite of such tactical ac‐ gence under the Roof of the Ministry for State Se‐ complishments, the author concludes that "the curity," examines an important organizational HVA of the GDR could not procure strategic ad‐ feature of the HVA, which was characteristic of vantages, namely secure the existence of the state. most Soviet bloc intelligence agencies and struc‐ In this respect, they failed to accomplish their turally set it apart from its Western counterparts: mission" (p. 111). the HVA was fully integrated into and widely par‐ Michael F. Scholz's contribution, "Active Mea‐ ticipated in the GDR's repressive security appara‐ sures and as Part of East Ger‐ tus. As Lippmann demonstrates, personnel moved many's Propaganda War, 1953-1972," examines an freely between the HVA and other MfS compo‐ integral element of HVA operations: covert eforts nents, and HVA and MfS ofcers worked hand in to infuence individuals and organizations outside hand, especially when it came to active measures the Warsaw Pact. In East Germany, such "active against human rights and political groups. Lipp‐ measures" were carried out by the tenth depart‐ mann's analysis provides an important counter‐ ment of foreign intelligence (HVA X) under Col. point to the memoirs of many HVA ofcers, in‐ Ralf Wagenbreth. One of the most efective and cluding former HVA directors Markus Wolf and enduring active measure campaigns run by HVA Werner Groβmann, who have long insisted that X consisted of eforts to taint West German of‐ the HVA was an intelligence gathering agency cials as former Nazis, and thus besmirch the Fed‐ akin to the CIA or BND, and consequently largely eral Republic in the eyes of its Western partners. removed from the dirty work carried out by the An early example of this type of MfS's domestic security apparatus. was a series of anti-Semitic grafti at a synagogue According to Thomas Wegener-Friis's article, in Cologne and other West German cities, at the "East German Espionage in Denmark," that nation time viewed as perpetrated by neo-Nazis, but in was never high on the HVA's target list. Nonethe‐ reality originating with the KGB. In a similar vein, less, it carried some signifcance for the Warsaw HVA X attempted to expose Swedish links with the Pact due to its NATO membership. The task of es‐ Third Reich during World War II, but the efect of pionage in Denmark therefore fell largely to East this operation was limited. According to the au‐

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German military intelligence, rather than the blinkers. Therefore, the "regime remained blind HVA. obtained much of the desired to the dynamics of the real enmity that threatened military intelligence on Denmark from their spies the GDR--that of the GDR citizens against the party at NATO headquarters ("Topas") and the West Ger‐ leadership." [p. 177] man defense ministry. East German agents in In her contribution, "The Crown Jewels and Denmark--there were eight by the end of the the Importance of Scientifc-Technical Intelli‐ 1980s--were able to confrm much of this informa‐ gence," Kristie Macrakis examines the HVA's "Sek‐ tion on the ground. Denmark also served as a tor Wissenschaft und Technik" (SWT), the depart‐ base for East German foreign intelligence to build ment responsible for gathering scientifc and up agents for subsequent use elsewhere. Overall, technological information in the West. Almost half Wegener-Friis judges East German intelligence ac‐ of the HVA's agents in the West worked for SWT; tivities against Denmark "quite successful, since by 1988, the department ran roughly two hundred only a few of the agents were caught and the ma‐ spies. Most were male, salaried employees at com‐ jority of agents exposed after the end of the Cold panies where electronics played a role, including War were, to a large extent, unknown, not only to IBM, Siemens, Texas Instruments, and the defense the public, but also to the security authorities" (p. contractor MBB. For many agents, ideology was 159). an important motivation for their espionage Beatrice de Graaf uses HVA operations in the work. But while SWT penetrated Western compa‐ Netherlands as a case study to examine "How the nies with comparative ease, the resulting fow of MfS' Worldview Afected the Intelligence Cycle." scientifc-technological intelligence to the GDR did The intelligence cycle is a model frequently used not contribute to a modernized, competitive East to describe the intelligence process. Steps include German economy. "The Stasi," Macrakis con‐ determination of information requirements, gath‐ cludes, "simply overestimated the power of stolen ering of raw intelligence, assembling a fnished technological secrets to solve its economic prob‐ product or report, and dissemination of the latter lems, and the enormous spy infrastructure invest‐ to end-consumers, such as the political leadership. ed produced very small return"(p. 201). It is widely agreed that the Communist Party's Macrakis's article provides a useful overview of worldview afected Soviet bloc intelligence opera‐ East German "tech spies," although interested tions,[7] but with regard to the MfS de Graaf right‐ readers may want to refer directly to her excel‐ ly asks "to what extent this Manichean worldview lent book, Seduced by Secrets, which covers this dictated intelligence outcomes, supported already subject in more depth.[8] fxed opinions, and infuenced the political orien‐ Based on extensive research in the archives tation and situation assessment of the political of the Central Committee of the Communist Party leadership" (emphasis in original, p. 163). Her an‐ (CPSU) of the , Matthias Uhl examines swer is nuanced. While the HVA often recruited "The Professionalization of Soviet Military Intelli‐ agents in the Netherlands on an ideological basis, gence [GRU] and Its Infuence on the Berlin Crisis the resulting intelligence reports were mostly dis‐ under Khrushchev." The author argues that the passionate and professional. However, the GDR's GRU underestimated Western and Berliners' communist regime discouraged intelligence re‐ readiness to stand up to Soviet premier Nikita ports that could be "damaging to the party." In the Khrushchev's 1958 ultimatum, which gave the few instances when the MfS ventured to produce Western powers six months to withdraw from realistic assessments and recommendations, these Berlin. This assessment failure resulted in the re‐ were usually ignored by the ruling party, the SED, placement of the GRU director and consequently a due to the communist leadership's ideological

5 H-Net Reviews professionalization of the agency. Over the next of keeping peace on both sides of the , years, the GRU ran several key spies in the West, one must reply that only the East and West Ger‐ including "Murat" at NATO headquarters in the man spies of the BND could regard themselves as 1960s, whose identity remains unknown to the agents in the service of freedom" (emphasis in present day. Even though the GRU sufered original, p. 232). painful setbacks, such as the recruitment of GRU Edited volumes are, by their very nature, typi‐ colonel Oleg Penkovsky by Western intelligence in cally less coherent than monographs by a single 1960, overall the agency injected a degree of prag‐ author, and East German Foreign Intelligence is matism into Khrushchev's adventure-prone poli‐ no exception. The book title suggests a compre‐ cies: "The 'pragmatic, clear-headed orientation of hensive analysis of HVA operations and structure, KGB and GRU' made the 'passionate and slightly but the volume delivers only partially on this foolhardy' Khrushchev shy away from any adven‐ promise. As mentioned earlier, just under half of turous decisions at the climax of the crisis and re‐ the thirteen chapters deal with East German for‐ alistically assess the situation. This led to the with‐ eign intelligence proper. And while the book ex‐ drawal of the tanks at Checkpoint Charlie and lat‐ plores several issues of tangential relevance to er in the to the withdrawal East German foreign intelligence (e.g., active mea‐ from the island" (p. 215). sures in Sweden, Soviet military intelligence un‐ Based on secondary sources and signifcant der Khrushchev), readers will search in vain for archival research, Armin Wagner examines "BND subjects that one might expect to fnd in a volume Military Espionage in East Germany, 1946-1994." with this title, such as HVA active measures in Gathering information on Soviet forces in East West Germany, or HVA operations in the Third Germany was one of the main tasks of West Ger‐ World (Cuba, Yemen). man intelligence (since 1956 formally known as Moreover, some contributors contradict one BND), which could draw on the extensive archives another when passing judgment on the MfS's of the German World War II army's intelligence overall performance. Fischer, for one, makes a division. Wagner distinguishes three phases of strong case for HVA counterintelligence excel‐ BND HUMINT operations in East Germany: While lence in thwarting CIA espionage in the GDR, and in the 1950s and early 1960s, the BND successfully Wegener-Friis likewise judges HVA operations in reconnoitered Soviet troops in the GDR, MfS coun‐ Denmark "quite successful." On the other hand, terintelligence gained the upper hand in the Lippmann contends the HVA was an "absolute 1960s, mostly due to the building of the Berlin failure" because it was unable to save the SED Wall in 1961, which greatly handicapped infltra‐ regime, and Müller-Enberg makes the same point. tion from West to East Germany. Only in the 1980s The volume does not develop a formula as to was the BND able to launch new initiatives that what constitutes intelligence success or failure, posed signifcant problems to MfS counterintelli‐ and consequently this contradiction is never re‐ gence. Comparing East and West German intelli‐ solved. gence, the author concludes: "Intelligence activi‐ Given the scarcity of English-language studies ties are always bound to the intended purpose of of the HVA, an in-depth overview in English on their political leaders. Thus, the two German intel‐ this subject is highly desirable. While East Ger‐ ligence systems have to be strictly distinguished man Foreign Intelligence does not quite fll this from each other in their historical evaluation, gap, the various contributions address important even though there was some sort of interlacing at aspects of Cold War intelligence and reveal much the actual operational level. When former MfS that is noteworthy about an important Soviet bloc and HVA ofcers argue espionage had been a way

6 H-Net Reviews intelligence service. Though more "raw intelli‐ gence" than "fnished product," East German For‐ eign Intelligence will serve as a useful resource for those interested in the HVA and Cold War espi‐ onage, and should stimulate further research. Notes [1]. "Die Butterfahrt der Stasi-Ofziere," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 20, 2007. [2]. Klaus Eichner, ed., Hauptabteilung A: Geschichte, Aufgaben, Einsichten (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2008). [3]. The Sunday Times, June 24, 2007. [4]. Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (New York: Scribner, 1990). [5]. See, for example, Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung: Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte (Hamburg: Carlsen, 1992). [6]. Thomas Boghardt, "Operation Infektion: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinforma‐ tion Campaign," Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (December 2009). [7]. Christopher Andrew and , KGB: The Inside Story (New York: Harper Perenni‐ al, 1990). [8]. Kristie Macrakis, Seduced by Secrets: In‐ side the Stasi's Spy-Tech World (Cambridge: Cam‐ bridge University Press, 2008).

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Citation: Thomas Boghardt. Review of Macrakis, Kristie; Friis, Thomas Wegener; Muller-Enbergs, Helmut, eds. East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy. H-German, H-Net Reviews. November, 2010.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=31528

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