Kristie Macrakis, Thomas Wegener Friis, Helmut Müller-Enbergs, eds.. East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy. London: Routledge, 2010. xii + 247 pp. $120.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-415-48442-8. Reviewed by Thomas Boghardt Published on H-German (November, 2010) Commissioned by Benita Blessing (Oregon State University) Few institutions have become more striking MfS officers who droned on about the successful symbols of Soviet-style totalitarianism than East espionage operations of their agency, brushed Germany's Ministry for State Security (MfS, or critical questions aside, and "became louder, less Stasi). Like its archetype, the Soviet KGB, the noto‐ restrained, fnally banging on the benches with rious Stasi combined foreign espionage and do‐ abandon and dominating the venue."[1] To add in‐ mestic security functions under one administra‐ sult to injury, the MfS retirees quickly published tive roof. But while MfS domestic security opera‐ their own papers in an edited volume, without tions have generated sustained academic and consulting the dumbfounded Danish conference popular interest--witness the Oscar-winning organizers.[2] East German Foreign Intelligence is movie The Lives of Others (dir. Florian Henckel the academics' response to what many of them von Donnersmarck, 2006)--the same cannot be considered a rose-tinted view of the HVA. said about the operations of the Stasi's foreign in‐ The volume reproduces papers by several telligence arm, the HVA (Hauptverwaltung A, or Odense participants but includes a number of main department A). Knowledgeable publications contributions from other Cold War and intelli‐ in English are particularly rare. This collection of gence historians as well. The thirteen articles are articles therefore constitutes a welcome effort to grouped thematically in three sections, "Intelli‐ add to our understanding of an important Cold gence and Counter-Intelligence," "Political Intelli‐ War intelligence agency. gence," and "Scientific-Technical and Military In‐ The origins of East German Foreign Intelli‐ telligence." While the introduction contends that gence lie in a conference on the same subject in the volume "examine[s] East German foreign in‐ Odense, Denmark in November 2007. Intended as telligence as a historical problem" (p. 6), this state‐ a forum for historians and former practitioners, ment is somewhat misleading, since only six of the conference was quickly hijacked by retired the thirteen chapters deal with HVA espionage. H-Net Reviews The others explore a variety of loosely related Maddrell concludes that Western (U.S., British, subjects, ranging from KGB military intelligence West German, and French) agencies operated during the Berlin Crisis to CIA operations in East thousands of spies in East Germany during that Germany. time period. "Save for the Federal Republic of Ger‐ The frst chapter, "Counter-Intelligence in many," he writes, "no other state has been so Post-War Europe, 1945-1965" by renowned espi‐ deeply penetrated by spies" (p. 25). Since recruit‐ onage writer Nigel West, is a case in point. West ment and communication between Western intel‐ provides an eloquent overview of KGB penetra‐ ligence and their agents in the GDR depended on tion efforts of Western agencies, yet his contribu‐ the steady fow of East German refugees into West tion has little bearing on East German foreign in‐ Germany, and uninhibited transit between East telligence, which is referenced merely in one and West Berlin, the erection of the Berlin Wall paragraph. The author concludes with a curious abruptly ended this espionage bonanza. Although digression on KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn. Fol‐ "not built to suppress Western espionage," the lowing his defection in 1961, Golitsyn made a se‐ wall "still benefted the Stasi's counter-intelligence ries of fantastic claims, such as British prime min‐ divisions" (p. 31ff). ister Harold Wilson being a KGB informer, the Based largely on secondary sources, Erich Sino-Soviet split being a charade intended to de‐ Schmidt-Eenboom's article, "The Rise and Fall of ceive the West, and several other Soviet defectors West German Intelligence Operations against East being KGB plants. Most of Golitsyn's assertions Germany," explores the same subject--Western in‐ were eventually debunked, and the eminent intel‐ telligence operations against East Germany--but it ligence historian Christopher Andrew has called addresses human intelligence or HUMINT (infor‐ him an "unreliable conspiracy theorist."[3] West, mation gathered by agents or spies) as well as sig‐ however, considers many of Golitsyn's far-fetched nals intelligence or SIGINT (interception of com‐ theories true. For example, he writes that Golitsyn munication), and covers the entire Cold War peri‐ "made a compelling argument for suggesting that od. Like Maddrell, he concludes that the Bun‐ (Soviet military intelligence colonel Oleg desnachrichtendiest (BND, West German intelli‐ Penkovsky), too, had been a dispatched agent, gence) by and large succeeded in gathering mili‐ working throughout under KGB control" (p. 17). In tary and economic information on East Germany, fact, Penkovsky had provided CIA and SIS (British periodic setbacks notwithstanding. Although the intelligence) with critical information on Soviet eight years immediately following 1945 proved a intentions and military capabilities during the "golden age" for West German spies, by the late Berlin and Cuban Missile crises. He was eventual‐ 1980s, 90 percent of BND agents in the GDR were ly captured by KGB counterintelligence, paraded MfS double agents. By that time, however, BND at a Moscow show trial, found guilty of espionage, SIGINT, working closely with the U.S. Defense In‐ and executed. Penkovsky's case has been studied telligence Agency (DIA) and National Reconnais‐ in depth, and the evidence comes down frmly on sance Office (NRO), made up for this HUMINT fail‐ the side of those who argue that he was a genuine ure. Maddrell's and Schmidt-Eenboom's fndings agent as well as a courageous man.[4] are noteworthy since Western intelligence opera‐ The second chapter, by Paul Maddrell, ex‐ tions against East Germany are traditionally per‐ plores "Western Espionage and Stasi Counter-Es‐ ceived as unsuccessful. pionage in East Germany, 1953-1961," i.e., in the The title of Benjamin Fischer's contribution, years leading up to the erection of the Berlin Wall. "Deaf, Dumb, and Blind: The CIA in East Ger‐ Based on the records of MfS counterintelligence, many," is an accurate summary of the author's 2 H-Net Reviews central thesis. According to Fischer, a former CIA German authorities. There has been much specu‐ chief historian, the MfS inflicted "one of the great‐ lation as to how the CIA managed to get their est defeats in intelligence history" on the CIA. (p. hands on Rosenholz. Based on interviews with 48) By the end of the Cold War, Fischer contends, five retired CIA officers, Livingston concludes that virtually all East German spies run by the CIA the HVA turned over the Rosenholz material to were double-agents whose true loyalty lay with the KGB at the end of the Cold War, and a KGB ar‐ the MfS. According to Fischer, an essential ingre‐ chivist then walked into the U.S. embassy in War‐ dient for the Stasi's success was CIA incompe‐ saw and offered them to the Americans in 1992. tence. In the words of HVA director Markus Wolf, The CIA purchased the material for $75,000. Liv‐ identifying undercover CIA officers was "ridicu‐ ingston's reconstruction of events is plausible, lously easy" due to their garrulousness and pen‐ though fnal verification will have to await the chant to share details of their true identities with opening of the relevant CIA fles. While Rosenholz their agents, and the MfS would routinely send contributed to the arrest and conviction of top their American counterparts "dangles" (agents spies like Rainer Rupp ("Topas") at NATO head‐ provocateurs) in an effort to create double agents quarters and Gabriele Gast ("Gisela") at the BND, and penetrate the American agency. Successfully the overall judicial impact was limited: from 1993 recruiting agents or spies is widely considered an to 1995, 2,928 judicial inquiries on espionage or intelligence officer's most important feat, and Fis‐ treason charges were launched in Germany cher suggests that CIA officers occasionally subor‐ against West German citizens, many of them on dinated professional judgment to personal ad‐ the basis of information from the Rozenholz fles. vancement in the pursuit of this goal: "The evi‐ In the end, the courts handed down merely 252 dence suggests that some [CIA officers] were fools convictions. Still, for historians, Rozenholz's work but most were knaves. They covered up their fail‐ constitutes a treasure trove of information. For ure by fraud and deceit, continuing to recruit dou‐ example, the material reveals that 60 percent of ble agents and disseminating a steady stream of East German agents were ideologically motivat‐ tainted intelligence reports to their 'consumers.' ed--a fairly high number for the late Cold War era By doing so, they compromised the intelligence when many spies worked primarily for money-- process, their agency, and fnally themselves" (p. and that as much as 80 percent of Warsaw Pact in‐ 64). telligence on West Germany was collected by the Robert Livingston's article, "Rosenholz: Mis‐ HVA. The Rosenholz fles will doubtlessly continue cha's Files, CIA's Booty," examines the source ma‐ to shed a fascinating light on HVA operations. terial for most research into HVA operations. As Helmut Müller-Enberg's article, "Political In‐ the GDR was nearing its end, East German civil telligence: Foci and Sources, 1969-1989," is pre‐ rights leaders, in "unsurpassed naiveté," put the cisely the kind of contribution one would hope to HVA in charge of its own dissolution. In order to find in a volume titled East German Foreign Intel‐ protect its agents, the agency set out to meticu‐ ligence. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the lously destroy its own records, but overlooked a author sets out to methodically examine HVA op‐ large set of microfilmed records, including micro‐ erations.