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SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES 01/21/09, Loj F02-083/1 WHITE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES 01/21/09, loj F02-083/1 WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND OFFICE FILES deGraffenreid, Kenneth: Files Box 91786 Soviet “Active Measures” Working Group Soviet “Active Measures” 04/02/1981-09/21/1981 Soviet “Active Measures” 09/22/1981 Soviet “Active Measures” 09/23/1981-12/31/1981 Soviet “Active Measures” 01/01/1982-01/21/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 01/22/1982-01/31/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 02/01/1982-03/16/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 03/17/1982-04/31/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 05/01/1982-05/14/1982 Soviet “Active Measures” 05/15/1982-12/31/1982 HPSCI (House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Report on Active Measures Published December 1982 DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES, 1981-1987 Intelligence Directorate, NSC: Senior Director and Staff Member This collection consists of two series. The series are SERIES I: Subject File and SERIES II: Chronological File. CONTAINER LIST SERIES I: Subject File RAC Box 1 "Active Measures" Working File 01/01/1981-09/30/1981 "Active Measures" Working File 10/01/1981-12/31/1981 "Active Measures" Working File 01/01/1982-04/30/1982 "Active Measures" Working File 05/01/1982-09/15/1982 "Active Measures" Working File 09/16/1982-12/31/1982 "Active Measures" Working File 01/01/1983-06/30/1983 "Active Measures" Working File 07/01/1983-08/31/1983 "Active Measures" Working File 09/01/1983-11/07/1983 "Active Measures" Working File 11/08/1983-12/31/1983 "Active Measures" Working Group 01/01/1984-01/04/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group 01/05/1984-01/31/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group 02/01/1984-02/29/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group 03/01/1984-06/30/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group 07/01/1984-09/30/1984 "Active Measures" Working Group 10/01/1984-12/31/1984 [Active Measures: 1983-1985] [Active Measures:] President's Speech on Soviet Active Measures [Active Measures:] Active Measures Speech [Active Measures: Miscellaneous 1984] Active Measures and INF Active Measures and Nuclear Freeze 07/01/1982-09/30/1982 Active Measures and Nuclear Freeze 10/01/1982-11/11/1982 Active Measures and Nuclear Freeze 11/12/1982-01/25/1983 Active Measures/Peace Movement 1982 Active Measures/Peace Movement 01/13/1983-02/28/1983 Active Measures/Peace Movement 03/01/1983-03/31/1983 Active Measures Working Group 01/01/1986-06/30/1986 Active Measures Working Group 07/01/1986-12/31/1986 Activities I Activities II Philip Agee American Security Council Yuri Andropov 01/01/1980-06/30/1982 Yuri Andropov 07/01/1982-11/24/1982 Yuri Andropov 11/25/1982-12/31/1982 Yuri Andropov 1983-1984 8/2/2017. Bolded folders are available for research use today. No need to FOIA deGraffenreid-2 [Appointment Book-1981: deGraffenreid] [Appointment Book-1981: June Bartlett] [Appointment Book-1982: deGraffenreid I] [Appointment Book-1982: deGraffenreid II] [Appointment Book-1983: deGraffenreid] [Appointment Book-1983: June Bartlett for Ken deGraffenreid] RAC Box 2 [Appointment Book-1984: deGraffenreid I] (1)(2) [Appointment Book-1984: deGraffenreid II] (1)(2) [Appointment Book-1985: deGraffenreid I] (1)(2) [Appointment Book-1985: deGraffenreid II] (1)(2) [Appointment Book-1986: deGraffenreid] (1)(2) [Appointment Book-1986: deGraffenreid (June Bartlett)] (1)(2) [Appointment Book-1987: deGraffenreid (June Bartlett)] [Arms Control, Compliance, Verification] (1)-(6) Arms Control Compliance: GAC Report November 1983 – A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 Volume I – [Binder] (1)-(4) Arms Control Compliance: GAC Report November 1983 – A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 Volume II– [Binder] (1)-(3) Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 1978-1979 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 01/01/1981-06/30/1981 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 07/01/1981-12/31/1981 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 1982 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 01/01/1983-03/31/1983 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 04/01/1983-12/31/1983 Barbie, Klaus Case Budget 1981 Budget 1982 Budget 01/01/1983-09/30/1983 Budget 10/01/1983-10/31/1983 Budget 11/01/1983-12/31/1983 Budget: Budget Hearings 1985 [Budget 1986] RAC Box 3 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: FY87 Intelligence Authorization Bill Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: FY87 Intelligence Authorization Bill 1982-1985 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: FY87 Intelligence Authorization Bill 02/13/1986 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: FY87 Intelligence Authorization Bill 02/19/1986 (1)-(3) deGraffenreid-3 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: FY87 Intelligence Authorization Bill 02/20/1986-03/06/1986 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: H.R. 2419 Enrolled Bill – FY86 Intelligence Authorization Act 05/24/1985-11/14/1985 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: H.R. 2419 Enrolled Bill – FY86 Intelligence Authorization Act 11/15/1985 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: H.R. 2419 Enrolled Bill – FY86 Intelligence Authorization Act 11/16/1985-12/31/1985 Budget FY87: Intelligence Authorization Act: KD to JMP – Prof Note Intelligence Authorization Bill 03/17/1986 Action: Review for Comments Draft FY88 Intelligence Authorization Bill [FY88 Congressional Budget Justification Volume X DOJ: FBI] (1)-(3) [FY88 Congressional Budget Justification Volume X DOJ: FBI] (Copies for Ermath) [FY88 Congressional Budget Justification Volume X DOJ: FBI] (Copies for Kelly and Sorzono) [FY88 Congressional Budget Justification Volume X DOJ: FBI] (Copies for Cohen) Intelligence Budget Summaries Canada and the Orlikow Case August 1985 Collection: FBI Reports – Soviet Correspondents Case 10/20/1983-10/21/1983 Case 11/16/1983-04/30/1986 TOR and Outline – DCI Study of Intelligence Community CI Analytical Efforts [Congressional Briefing re Unauthorized Disclosures] CONTRA [Correspondence, Incoming on Presentations/Remarks] 1982-1984 [Correspondence, Incoming on Presentations/Remarks] 1985 [Correspondence, Incoming on Presentations/Remarks] 1986 [Correspondence, Outgoing] 1984-1986 Counterintelligence Accomplishments Counterintelligence (empty) CI-Larry Wu-Tai Chin Counterintelligence – Cyprus [Counterintelligence]: Espionage Reports CI Report (Meeting with Admiral Poindexter 10/03/1983) CI Report (Meeting with Admiral Poindexter 10/03/1983): [Optimizing Counterintelligence Activities] CI Report (Meeting with Admiral Poindexter 10/03/1983): [Optimizing Counterintelligence Activities – Copy #1] CI Report (Meeting with Admiral Poindexter 10/03/1983): [Optimizing Counterintelligence Activities – Copy #2] [Counterintelligence, 1978-1980] (1)-(3) CI – Harper (empty) Counterintelligence - I [Counterintelligence] Kampiles Espionage Case 1978 Counterintelligence – Koecher (empty) Counterintelligence – Kostadinov deGraffenreid-4 Counterintelligence – L (I) 12/01/1981-12/15/1981 Counterintelligence – L (I) 12/16/1981-02/02/1982 Counterintelligence – L (II) CI – MDCI Assessments: Minutes form 10/02/1964 PFIAB Meeting CI – MDCI Assessments: Baseline Report 01/05/1978 (1)(2) CI – MDCI Assessments: Executive Summary to Baseline Report 05/01/1978 CI – MDCI Assessments: Issue Appendix to Baseline Report 05/01/1978 CI – MDCI Assessments 01/12/1979 CI – MDCI Assessments: Journal, December 1979 CI – MDCI Assessments: Journal, December 1980 CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment – Summary: January 1981] CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment – Basic Report – January 1981, Copy 001] CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment – Basic Report – January 1981, Copy 003] CI – MDCI Assessments: March 1982 CI – MDCI Assessments: [Capabilities against the Threat 1983-1988, Copy 017] CI – MDCI Assessments: [Capabilities against the Hostile Intelligence Threat 1983-1988, Copy 19] CI – MDCI Assessments: [Capabilities against the Threat 1983-1988, Copy 022, July 1982] CI – MDCI Assessments: 07/15/1982 CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment for the NSC 12/1983, Copy 003] CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment for the NSC 12/1983, Copy 010] CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment for the NSC 12/1983, Copy 012] CI – MDCI Assessments: [A National Assessment for the NSC 12/1983, Copy 013] CI – MDCI Assessments: January 1984 CI – MDCI Assessments: 05/17/1984 CI– Samuel Morison (empty) CI –N [CI – Criminal Complaint-Ronald W. Pelton] CI – P 1982 CI – P 1983 CI – P 1985 Counterintelligence – P CI – Jonathan Pollard (espionage case) CI – Remedies CI – S (I) RAC Box 4 CI – Soviet Knowledge of US NTM Systems CI – Spy Swap: June 1985 [CI:] System II 90636 Press Guidance on Prisoner Exchange [CI – Your Query] CI – Tiedge (West Germany) CI – Treholt-Press Clips (empty) deGraffenreid-5 CI – Yurchenko CI – Yurchenko: NSDD 199 PFIAB Review – Yurchenko Defection and Related Espionage Cases CI – Yurchenko: Press Statements – Yurchenko November 1985 CI – Yurchenko: [Press Clips 11/5/1985-11/11/1985] CI– Yurchenko: Yurchenko Press Conference – Moscow 11/14/1985 Counterterrorism – Subject: Buckley Kidnapping Counterterrorism 1986 Deception 1983 Deception July 1985 Deception December 1985 [Deception] [Binder] (1)( 2) DOD Project (Horton Study) 1986 DOD Project (Horton Study) 1987 DOD Project (Horton Study): [JCS Command and Control Study] DCI Annual Report to Congress 1985 [Joint IC/DOD Electronic Information Security Steering Group Meeting 06/27/1983] (Binder) (1)(2) [Espionage Case] I Espionage Case II Talking Points – Cabinet Meeting Robert C. McFarlane-Espionage and Security 07/01/1985 FBI FBI: FBI-Defectors FBI: FBI Espionage Arrests FBI: FBI Thank
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