Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign

Operation INFEKTION Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign Thomas Boghardt The practice of intelligence dif- weaken the USSR’s opponents— fered considerably between East first and foremost the “main and West during the Cold War. enemy” (glavny protivnik), the Western intelligence services were United States—and to create a most commonly tasked with gath- favorable environment for ering information, but their advancing Moscow’s views and Soviet bloc counterparts placed international objectives much greater emphasis on decep- worldwide. Our friends in Moscow tion operations to influence “ opinions or actions of individu- This is the story of one such mea- call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ als and governments. 2 sure—a campaign to implicate Our enemies in America the United States in the emer- call it ‘active measures,’ These “active measures” (aktiv- gence of the AIDS pandemic that and I, dear friends, call it inyye meropriatia, as the Soviets appeared in the early 1980s. The ‘my favorite pastime.’ called them) included manipula- story both illustrates the nature of tion and media control, written Soviet and communist bloc disin- and oral disinformation, use of formation programs and foreign communist parties and demonstrates the potential long- front organizations, clandestine term consequences. —Col.” Rolf Wagenbreth, radio broadcasting, manipula- director of Department X (dis- tion of the economy, kidnappings, Editor’s Note: This article was the information) of East German paramilitary operations, and sup- recipient of an Annual Studies in foreign intelligence1 port of guerrilla groups and Intelligence Award in 2009. The terrorist organizations. Under references to end notes seen in Joseph Stalin, active measures this text are included only in the also included political article’s .PDF versions posted in assassinations. 3 The basic goal of the Studies in Intelligence collec- Soviet active measures was to tion in www.cia.gov. Organizational Basics Directorate (foreign intelligence) was expected to spend 25 The KGB’s Service A was the percent of his time conceiving unit tasked with conducting and implementing them. 4 But active measures, and numerous active measures were well inte- KGB residencies abroad were grated into Soviet policy and assigned officers dealing exclu- involved virtually every ele- sively with them. Moreover, ment of the Soviet party and each officer of the First Chief All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov- ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 1 The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Mos- cow’s decision to embark on an aggressive active measures of Germany was merely an campaign. incarnation of the Third Reich.8 In conducting disinformation state structure, not only the Moscow’s “total” approach to campaigns, Soviet bloc intelli- KGB. influence and deception opera- gence had to be mindful of the tions contrasted starkly with concerns, fears, and expecta- Active measures specialists the American concept of covert tions of their target audience. used newspapers, radio sta- action, which was carried out As Ladislav Bittman, deputy tions, embassies, and other offi- by a single agency—the CIA— chief of the Czechoslovak intel- cial institutions for whose budget for such opera- ligence service’s disinformation implementation and diffusion. tions made up a fraction of its department from 1964 to 1966, Services allied to the Soviets, overall expenditure and paled pointed out: in order to succeed such as East Germany’s Minis- in comparison to what the Sovi- “every disinformation message try for State Security (MfS), ets spent on active measures.7 must at least partially corre- were frequently enlisted as spond to reality or generally well. In 1980, a conservative Disinformation (dezinfor- accepted views.” 9 CIA estimate put the annual matsiya) was a particularly cost of Soviet active measures effective weapon in the armory at $3 billion. 6 of Soviet bloc active measures. The AIDS Campaign’s The term dezinformatsiya Backdrop and Origins denoted a variety of techniques A Note about Intelligence and activities to purvey false or Deteriorating East-West rela- Sources misleading information that tions formed the backdrop to Soviet bloc active measures spe- Moscow’s decision to embark on With the end of the Cold War, cialists sought to leak into the an aggressive active measures former Soviet and East German campaign in the 1980s. The intelligence officers confirmed foreign media. From the West- ern perspective, disinformation Soviet invasion of Afghanistan their services’ sponsorship of the in 1979 ended what was left of AIDS disinformation campaign. was a politically motivated lie, In 1990, the German TV news but Soviet bloc propagandists détente, and the newly elected magazine Panorama featured an believed their disinformation US president, Ronald Reagan, anonymous former intelligence campaigns merely highlighted adopted a hard line against the officer—probably Günter greater truths by exposing the USSR. At his first press confer- Bohnsack—who revealed his real nature of capitalism. ence, Reagan declared: “They department’s participation in the [the Soviets] reserve unto them- campaign. Later that year, selves the right to commit any Bohnsack and a fellow retired For example, the KGB began intelligence officer published more spreading rumors about FBI crime, to lie, to cheat in order to details of their department’s activ- and CIA involvement in the attain [world revolution].” ities against the West, including assassination of President John the AIDS disinformation F. Kennedy because the Soviets In short order, the new presi- campaign. 5 And in 1992, SVR earnestly believed the US mili- dent increased the defense bud- (Russian foreign intelligence) tary-industrial complex was get by 10 percent, suspended director Yevgeny Primakov con- involved in Kennedy’s murder. arms reduction talks, and rein- firmed the KGB’s participation. Likewise, East German intelli- stated work on MX missiles and Over the next years, the European B-1 bombers. The Reagan and the North American media gence routinely floated disinfor- repeatedly reported on Soviet bloc mation depicting West German administration’s hawkish intelligence sponsorship of the politicians as former Nazis, stance, in turn, stoked Soviet AIDS conspiracy theory. Archival because, from East Berlin’s per- paranoia, especially after Yuri sources, interviews, and other spective, the Federal Republic Andropov’s election as general material were used in this article secretary of the Communist as well. 2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth Party of the Soviet Union in The Soviet Active Measures Process 1982. A former KGB chairman, Andropov was intelligent and Center gives strategic go-ahead for a disinformation campaign. well-versed in foreign affairs, Ideas would be generated by residency officers assigned to read local press, but he was also a hardliner books, and magazines for material that could be used for disinformation with a proclivity for conspiracy purposes.12 theories, a trait perhaps exacer- Center would evaluate the ideas. According to a senior East European intel- bated by his terminal illness. ligence officer who defected in 1968, During his short reign, Individual suggestions for special operations [active measures] which came from stations abroad were submitted for preliminary assess- Andropov became convinced ment.…the majority of the suggestions were discarded in the first stage that the United States planned of the selection process, leaving only those whose conception corre- sponded with our long-range plans and whose projected consequences for nuclear war, and KGB resi- suggested positive results. The suggestions were then transmitted to a dencies in Western capitals panel…where the author of the proposal faced many questions and were instructed to look for signs much criticism in an attempt to uncover any weakness. The composition of the critical board varied from case to case although several Depart- of a first strike. In keeping with ment D employees and experts on particular regions were permanent Andropov’s hostility toward the members. Further supplemented and polished, the proposal was then 13 Reagan administration, the submitted to the intelligence chief for approval. KGB’s First Chief Directorate Still at the Center, preparation involved disinformation specialists writing on 30 September 1982 in their native language, approvals by managers, and translation. instructed its residencies in the Targeting followed. The Center typically sought to launch a story outside United States to counterattack the Soviet bloc-controlled press to conceal Moscow’s hand. This was done Washington’s aggressive stance frequently through anonymous letters and newspaper articles in the with active measures.10 Third World. 14 Once published abroad, the Soviet media might pick up and further prop- Soviet active measures agate the item by referring to its non-Soviet source. worked best when pre-existing plans fit neatly into political- Types of Active Measures cultural environments and spe- According to the defector, two types of active measures existed: cific events. 11 In this case, Mos- The first category includes

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