AQUARIUM LEAKS Inside the GRU’S Psychological Warfare Program

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

AQUARIUM LEAKS Inside the GRU’S Psychological Warfare Program EDITED AND CURATED BY MICHAEL WEISS IUM UAR AQ KS INSIDE THE GRU’S LEA PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM FREE RUSSIA FOUNDATION WASHINGTON, DC 2020 AQUARIUM LEAKS Inside the GRU’s Psychological Warfare Program Edited and Curated by Michael Weiss Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick WASHINGTON, DC 2020 Free Russia Foundation Washington, DC, 2020 Edited and Curated by Michael Weiss Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick Proofreading by Courtney Dobson Contents Inside Russia’s Secret Propaganda Unit 3 My Life as a Propagandist: The Memoirs of Col. Aleksandr Golyev 9 Russian Dolls: How the GRU’s Psychological Warfare is Organized 39 “Will This Be on the Test?” 70 Know Thine Enemy 72 The Lingo of Tradecraft: A Layman’s Guide to GRU Terminology 104 INTRODUCTION Inside Russia’s Secret Propaganda Unit By Andrei Soldatov and Michael Weiss In the late 2000s, former deputy head atrocities committed by Chechen separatist of Moscow’s spy station in New York Sergei militants. He also noted screenings before Tretyakov, who defected, was explaining U.S. and NATO officials of state-produced how Russia’s foreign intelligence, or SVR, documentaries purporting to show that Rus- handled propaganda and disinformation. sia in Chechnya and the United States in the “Look, the department responsible for running Middle East were fighting a common jihadist active measures,” he told Andrei, referring to enemy, just on different fronts. The objective, the term of art used for influence operations, Tretyakov continued, was to signal to Wash- “was given a new name, but the methods, ington that it would be morally hypocritical structure, and employees were retained.” to kick up a fuss about Russian human rights When asked about specific operations, Tre- abuses in the Caucasus. It was part of con- tyakov indicated Russian photo exhibits at certed effort by the Kremlin government to the United Nations headquarters in Turtle pitch itself as America’s indispensable ally in Bay, a shocking collage depicting alleged the nascent war on terrorism. INTRODUCTION 3 Back then, Tretyakov did not volunteer side of the agency’s rarefied circles – which (and may not have even known) the prov- the Free Russia Foundation is releasing under enance of these exhibits and films, but now, the title, “Aquarium Leaks: Inside the GRU’s thanks to a tranche of documents obtained Psychological Warfare Program.” The collec- by Michael from within Russia’s military in- tion also includes two long lectures delivered telligence agency, or GRU, we can finally within the last decade by GRU faculty at the answer that question. The Chechnya propa- Military University (not to be confused with ganda was manufactured by a secret section the Military-Diplomatic Academy, where of the GRU known as Unit 54777 in a re- GRU operatives are trained), a definition of markable period of collaboration between terms used in one of those lectures, even a set two Russian spy agencies. of exam questions put to cadets at the univer- One of those documents is the personal sity. memoir of Col. Aleksandr Viktorovich Goly- The authenticity of these documents ev, a psyops and propaganda specialist in has been corroborated by a Western intel- the GRU who began his career in the ear- ligence agency Michael consulted. And the ly 1980s and was active in chronicling and story they tell will be of great use to historians trying to suppress various anti-Communist of the Cold War and analysts and scholars movements sweeping the Warsaw Pact na- trying to understand how Unit 54777’s on- tions. Golyev was sent to Poland at the start going influence operations are waged, not of Solidarity; then to Lithuania in 1990 after only against NATO, the United States, and the storming of the Vilnius television center, Europe, but against the Russian people. whereupon he launched a regime-loyalist newspaper, Soviet Lithuania, which was ac- *** tually printed in Minsk. His final foreign post- To understand Unit 54777’s remit, it’s ing as a Soviet special propagandist was first necessary to understand its provenance. East Germany, just as Russian troops began In the Soviet Union, psyops were con- withdrawing from the German Democratic ducted by the Special Propaganda Director- Republic. When the first Chechen war broke ate, incorporated in the massive directorate out, Golyev was seconded into the newly of the army, GLAVPUR (Glavnoye Politich- created Unit 54777 and, as he writes, had eskoye Upravlenie, or the Main Political De- a hand in the manufacture of “Dogs of War” partment). GLAVPUR was a powerful testi- and “Werewolves,” the anti-Chechen films mony to Bolsheviks’ constant fear of the army to which Tretyakov referred. going rogue or mutinying. In 2019 the Rus- His memoir is part of a remarkable col- sian army proudly celebrated the centenary lection of GRU texts – never before seen out- 4 AQUARIUM LEAKS of GLAVPUR, established by the Revolution- Languages, where Golyev studied, and for ary Military Council of Bolsheviks a year and the faculty of Journalism at Moscow State a half after the October Revolution as the po- University, the goals being to train officers in litical department to supervise thousands of psyops and create a reserve of Soviet jour- commissars, Communists attached to military nalists in the event of war mobilization, re- units to spy on and oversee their command- spectively. ers (the commissars had the final word in mil- The fidelity of the Soviet army remained itary operational planning). a primary objective of GLAVPUR. The Special The Communists never fully trusted their Propaganda Directorate was, in theory, busy soldiers since soldiers had played a decisive developing methods of subverting the hostile role in all attempted or successful seizures armies’ morale but was mostly focused on its of state power in Russian history. It was the own military personnel rather than on West- commissars who kept the Red Army loyal to ern soldiers. It was the body that played a the regime even during the first two disas- largely defensive, not offensive, role. trous years of war with Nazi Germany, when Unless, of course, actual war broke out millions had been killed or captured, thanks again. “As for special propaganda,” Arsen to the incompetence of the officers’ corps, Kasyuk, one of the top authorities on Sovi- which had been hollowed by Stalin’s purges. et-era special propaganda, told official Rus- (Hitler, inspired by Soviet experience, had sian Defense Ministry newspaper Krasnaya his own commissars and version of GLAVPUR Zvezda in June 2011, “it is present wherev- called the National Socialist Leadership Of- er there is a conflict, where active hostilities fice, or NSFO, whose officers embedded begin. Prior to that, the special propaganda with the Wehrmacht to kindle a fighting spirit bodies are, so to speak, in a waiting-prepa- at the late stage of World War II.) ratory mode, they assess the situation, im- After the war, ideological overseers in prove their methods, their technical base.” the Soviet military proliferated. By the late Whether by accident or design, this ex- 1980s, there were 20,000 political depart- act doctrine was articulated in a slightly more ments with 80,000 “political workers” – excitable fashion by Margarita Simonyan, the new designation for commissars – and the editor-in-chief of RT, the Kremlin’s En- all were supervised by the ubiquitous and glish-language propaganda channel. “Right all-powerful GLAVPUR. The Special Propa- now, we’re not fighting anyone,” Simonyan ganda Directorate was part of that empire. told the Russian newspaper Kommersant in a Then, in the early 1970s, the Soviet military 2012 interview. “But in 2008 we were fight- established special propaganda training ing. The Defense Ministry was fighting with facilities in the Military Institute of Foreign INTRODUCTION 5 Georgia, but we were conducting the infor- always been a full-scale intelligence service, mation war, and what’s more, against the running operations all over the world. Unlike whole Western world. It’s impossible to start the KGB, which was dissolved and then re- making a weapon only when the war [has] fashioned into several separate agencies, already started! That’s why the Defense Min- the GRU has remained a constant institution istry isn’t fighting anyone at the moment, but throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. it’s ready for defense. So are we.” It has recruited spies and run “illegals” from Except “Aquarium Leaks” definitively Manhattan to Tokyo; it’s stolen industrial, shows that the distinction between war and military, and atomic secrets; it’s attempt- peace was completely elided after 1991. ed coups and assassinations; it’s propped up disinformation portals masquerading as Golyev observes in his memoir that “news” agencies; and, as we’ve been am- when the Soviet Union collapsed, the new ply informed over the last five years of gov- Russian army, which was still very much the ernment reports and legitimate news investi- same as the old Red Army, was undergoing gations, it’s run ambitious cyber operations the trauma of depoliticization. With the al- that have inveigled or damaged democratic mighty Party gone, GLAVPUR was destined electorates, shut down national power grids, to follow it into oblivion. And yet, accord- and temporarily halted international com- ing to Golyev, the army wanted to salvage merce to the cost of billions of dollars. Unit at least some parts of GLAVPUR, especially 54777 has provided plausible deniability or the Special Propaganda Directorate. Where shaped the narrative of many of these more might it find a powerful and permanent new recent interventions, most spectacularly the patron? It was a difficult question for the mil- GRU-led invasion and occupation of Crimea itary bureaucracy to answer, although they in 2014. finally did by transferring the directorate to the GRU – to the second floor of the Aquari- The encompassing of military psyops by um, as the service’s Moscow headquarters is military intelligence forever changed the na- colloquially known, where it was rebranded ture, scope and character of the former.
Recommended publications
  • U.S. Department of Justice FARA
    :U.S. Department of Justice National Securify Division Coun1,rinl1lligt"" om E.xpQrt Control & cliO/'I WasM~on, DC 2QSJO August 17, 2017 BY FEDEX Mikhail Solodovnikov General Manager T &R Productions 1325 G Stre~t, NW, Suite 250 Washington, DC. 20005 Re: Obligation ofT&R Productions, LLC, lo Register Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act Dear Mr. Solodovnikov: Based upon infonnation known to this Qffice, we have determined that T &R Productions, LLC ("T&R"), has an obligation to register pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 ·u.s.C. §§ 611-621 (1995) ("FARA" or the "Act''). T&R' s obligalion to register arises from its political activities in the United States on behalf of RT and TV-Novosti, both foreign principals under the Act and proxies o f the Russian Government, and its related work within the United States as a publicity agent and infonnation-service employee of TV­ Novosti. FARA The purpose of FARA is to inform the American public of the activities of agents working for foreign principals to influence U.S. Government officials and/or the American public with reference to the domestic or foreign policies of the United States, or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign country or foreign political party. The term "foreign principal" includes "a government of a foreign country" and "a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other comhination of persons organized under the Jaws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country." 22 U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • FOR HUMAN RIGHTS All-Russia Public Movement
    FOR HUMAN RIGHTS All-Russia Public Movement Room 21, Building 1, House 7, Tel. /Fax +7(495)609-92-14, Tel. +7(495)291-62-33 Maly Kislovsky Pereulok, Moscow, 125009 E-mail: [email protected]; http://www.zaprava.ru/ THE FOUNDATION IN DEFENCE OF RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (State Registration No. 1057749410553 of 06.12.2005) Mailing address: Building 1, House 22, Bolshoy Golovin Pereulok, Moscow, 107045 Tel. /Fax +7 (495) 974-75-46 www.zashita-zk.org e-mail: [email protected] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Review: Human Rights Situation in the Russian Federation, 2004-2008. Prepared for the UN Human Rights Council by the All-Russia Public Movement “For Human Rights” jointly with the Foundation “In Defence of Rights of Prisoners” Brief information on the All-Russia Public Movement “For Human Rights” The All-Russia Public Movement “For Human Rights” was founded in November 1977 as a federation of human rights organizations. Currently over 120 regional and local human rights organizations are members of the movement. The aim of the All-Russia Public Movement “For Human Rights” is to establish the constitutional state and to develop the civil society in Russia. The movement has a diversified structure. It is headed by a board of 11 members representing regional human rights organizations. Lev Ponomarev, the Executive Director (Chairman of the Board) of the Movement, is a former deputy of the Russian Parliament, PhD in physics and mathematics. The Public Council of Experts has been created with the Movement. Brief information on the Foundation “In Defence of Rights of Prisoners” The Foundation “In Defence of Rights of Prisoners” was established in October 2006.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Hybrid Warfare
    Research Paper Research Division – NATO Defense College, Rome – No. 105 – November 2014 Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence by H. Reisinger and A. Golts1 “You can’t modernize a large country with a small war” Karl Schlögel The Research Division (RD) of the NATO De- fense College provides NATO’s senior leaders with “Ukraine is not even a state!” Putin reportedly advised former US President sound and timely analyses and recommendations on current issues of particular concern for the Al- George W. Bush during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. In 2014 this liance. Papers produced by the Research Division perception became reality. Russian behaviour during the current Ukraine convey NATO’s positions to the wider audience of the international strategic community and con- crisis was based on the traditional Russian idea of a “sphere of influence” and tribute to strengthening the Transatlantic Link. a special responsibility or, stated more bluntly, the “right to interfere” with The RD’s civil and military researchers come from countries in its “near abroad”. This perspective is also implied by the equally a variety of disciplines and interests covering a 2 broad spectrum of security-related issues. They misleading term “post-Soviet space.” The successor states of the Soviet conduct research on topics which are of interest to Union are sovereign countries that have developed differently and therefore the political and military decision-making bodies of the Alliance and its member states. no longer have much in common. Some of them are members of the European Union and NATO, while others are desperately trying to achieve The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the this goal.
    [Show full text]
  • Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch
    King’s Research Portal Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Fridman, O. (2019). On ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch. Prism, 8(2), 101- 112. Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Researching Soviet/Russian Intelligence in America: Bibliography (Last Updated: October 2018)
    Know Your FSB From Your KGB: Researching Soviet/Russian Intelligence in America: Bibliography (Last updated: October 2018) 1. Federal Government Sources A. The 2016 US Presidential Election Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. Office of the Director of National intelligence, January 6, 2017. Committee Findings on the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 3, 2018. Disinformation: Panel I, Panel II. A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, Thursday, March 30, 2017. (Y 4.IN 8/19: S.HRG.115-40/) Link: http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo86393 FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment. White House Office of the Press Secretary, December 29, 2016. Grand Jury Indicts 12 Russian Intelligence Officers for Hacking Offenses Related to the 2016 Election. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, July 13, 2018. Grizzly Steppe: Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 29, 2016. Information Warfare: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2018. Minority Views: The Minority Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 26, 2018, Submit the Following Minority Views to the Majority-Produced "Report on Russian active Measures, March 22, 2018." House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, March 26, 2018. Open Hearing: Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, Wednesday, November 1, 2017.
    [Show full text]
  • Policing in Federal States
    NEPAL STEPSTONES PROJECTS Policing in Federal States Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler (Eds.) Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) www.dcaf.ch The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assis- tance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security ser- vices and the military. 2011 Policing in Federal States Edited by Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler Geneva, 2011 Philipp Fluri and Marlene Urscheler, eds., Policing in Federal States, Nepal Stepstones Projects Series # 2 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011). Nepal Stepstones Projects Series no. 2 © Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011 Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., <www.procon.bg> Cover design: Angel Nedelchev ISBN 978-92-9222-149-2 PREFACE In this book we will be looking at specimens of federative police or- ganisations. As can be expected, the federative organisation of such states as Germany, Switzerland, the USA, India and Russia will be reflected in their police organisation, though the extremely decentralised approach of Switzerland with hardly any central man- agement structures can hardly serve as a paradigm of ‘the’ federal police organisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Demographic, Economic, Geospatial Data for Municipalities of the Central Federal District in Russia (Excluding the City of Moscow and the Moscow Oblast) in 2010-2016
    Population and Economics 3(4): 121–134 DOI 10.3897/popecon.3.e39152 DATA PAPER Demographic, economic, geospatial data for municipalities of the Central Federal District in Russia (excluding the city of Moscow and the Moscow oblast) in 2010-2016 Irina E. Kalabikhina1, Denis N. Mokrensky2, Aleksandr N. Panin3 1 Faculty of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 119991, Russia 2 Independent researcher 3 Faculty of Geography, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 119991, Russia Received 10 December 2019 ♦ Accepted 28 December 2019 ♦ Published 30 December 2019 Citation: Kalabikhina IE, Mokrensky DN, Panin AN (2019) Demographic, economic, geospatial data for munic- ipalities of the Central Federal District in Russia (excluding the city of Moscow and the Moscow oblast) in 2010- 2016. Population and Economics 3(4): 121–134. https://doi.org/10.3897/popecon.3.e39152 Keywords Data base, demographic, economic, geospatial data JEL Codes: J1, J3, R23, Y10, Y91 I. Brief description The database contains demographic, economic, geospatial data for 452 municipalities of the 16 administrative units of the Central Federal District (excluding the city of Moscow and the Moscow oblast) for 2010–2016 (Appendix, Table 1; Fig. 1). The sources of data are the municipal-level statistics of Rosstat, Google Maps data and calculated indicators. II. Data resources Data package title: Demographic, economic, geospatial data for municipalities of the Cen- tral Federal District in Russia (excluding the city of Moscow and the Moscow oblast) in 2010–2016. Copyright I.E. Kalabikhina, D.N.Mokrensky, A.N.Panin The article is publicly available and in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution license (CC-BY 4.0) can be used without limits, distributed and reproduced on any medium, pro- vided that the authors and the source are indicated.
    [Show full text]
  • Manpower Problems of the Russian Armed Forces
    Conflict Studies Research Centre D62 Manpower Problems of The Russian Armed Forces M J Orr Introduction On 15 January Lt Gen Vasiliy Smirnov, deputy head of the main organization- mobilization directorate of the Russian general staff, announced the preliminary results of the autumn 2001 conscription period. "The plan of the autumn call-up as laid down in the Russian Federation's President's decree No. 148 has been carried out. Between October and December 2001 more than 194,000 Russian citizens, aged from 18 to 27, were sent to the army and fleet … (T)he quality of the conscript contingent is getting worse. Out of every 100 potential conscripts last year the military commissariats were only able to draft 12 young men; the remainder had legal reasons for being excused military service. Today in Russia every third potential conscript proves unfit for service on health grounds … more than 50% of the conscripts sent to the forces have health limitations on their fitness for service."1 Such statements emerge from the organization-mobilization department twice a year, as a sort of ritual bringing the conscription campaign to a close. Each time the decreed quantity of recruits has been found and each time their quality has declined. Within these standardized announcements there is no suggestion that the whole system for recruiting the Russian armed forces is steadily collapsing. Last autumn, however, there were indications that, at long last, the Russian government has accepted that the system must be changed. Programmes to phase out conscription are being considered although it is not clear that the general staff has accepted that a professional army is desirable or practical.
    [Show full text]
  • Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions | Russian Cyber Strategies
    CHAILLOT PAPER Nº 148 — October 2018 Hacks, leaks and disruptions Russian cyber strategies EDITED BY Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM Siim Alatalu, Irina Borogan, Elena Chernenko, Sven Herpig, Oscar Jonsson, Xymena Kurowska, Jarno Limnell, Patryk Pawlak, Piret Pernik, Thomas Reinhold, Anatoly Reshetnikov, Andrei Soldatov and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Chaillot Papers HACKS, LEAKS AND DISRUPTIONS RUSSIAN CYBER STRATEGIES Edited by Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru CHAILLOT PAPERS October 2018 148 Disclaimer The views expressed in this Chaillot Paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or of the European Union. European Union Institute for Security Studies Paris Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2018. Reproduction is authorised, provided prior permission is sought from the Institute and the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. Contents Executive summary 5 Introduction: Russia’s cyber prowess – where, how and what for? 9 Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru Russia’s cyber posture Russia’s approach to cyber: the best defence is a good offence 15 1 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan Russia’s trolling complex at home and abroad 25 2 Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly Reshetnikov Spotting the bear: credible attribution and Russian 3 operations in cyberspace 33 Sven Herpig and Thomas Reinhold Russia’s cyber diplomacy 43 4 Elena Chernenko Case studies of Russian cyberattacks The early days of cyberattacks: 5 the cases of Estonia,
    [Show full text]
  • Active Measures: the Secret History of Disinformation & Political
    Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation & Political Warfare | Thomas Rid Philosophers have only interpreted the world. The point, May 25th, 2020 however, is to change it. — Karl Marx INTRODUCTION Thomas Rid is Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Rid’s latest book, Active Measures, a startling history of disinformation, was published in late April 2020 with Farrar, Straus and Giroux (also in Russian, Japanese, Polish). His most recent book, Rise of the Machines (2016), tells the sweeping story of how cybernetics, a late- 1940s theory of machines, came to incite anarchy and war (also in Chinese, Russian, German, Japanese, Turkish). His 2015 article “Attributing Cyber Attacks” was designed to explain, guide, and improve the identification of network breaches (Journal of Strategic Studies 2015). In 2013 he published the widely-read book Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Rid’s Ph.D. thesis, “War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq,” was the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam. Rid testified on information security in front of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as in the German Bundestag and the UK Parliament. From 2011 to 2016, Rid was a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Between 2003 and 2010, he worked at major think tanks in Berlin, Paris, Jerusalem, and Washington, DC. Rid holds a PhD from Humboldt University in Berlin.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism Prevention in Russia: One Year After Beslan
    Report of Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre / ASRC / http://studies.agentura.ru Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre /ASRC/ http://studies.agentura.ru September 2005 1 Report of Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre / ASRC / http://studies.agentura.ru Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre / ASRC / is a Russian non-profit non-government organization providing research, analysis and commentaries covering security and terrorism issues. Founded in 2005 Centre is a research department of Agentura.Ru project (www.agentura.ru) - internet- community of journalists who wrote about intelligence and security services. Centre experts are journalists, former security and intelligence agents, victims of espionage cases, lawyers, human rights activists. Andrei Soldatov is a director of ASRC – [email protected], Irina Borogan is a deputy director of ASRC – [email protected] Contents: 1. Introduction 2. System up to Beslan • Participants and structure of fight against terrorism, • Lack of system 3. Changes in system of coordination and information exchange • The Interdepartmental exchange, • Information exchange with special services of other states, • Coordination and information exchange on the North Caucasus, • Coordination on hostage crisis, subversive and terrorist attacks 4. Changes in system of information sharing on preparing terrorist attacks • In the central device of special services, • In the North-Caucasian region, 5. Terrorism prosecution reform and reflections on subversive and terrorist attacks • Tactics of special divisions, • Expansion of new divisions, • Changes in the punishment system 6. Conclusion 7. References 2 Report of Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre / ASRC / http://studies.agentura.ru 1.
    [Show full text]