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Home , Platonic realism

10/26/09

Genesis 2:19‐20

Naming the animals formed out of the ground all the wild animals and all the birds of heaven. He (and everything else) brought them to the man to see what he would call them, and whatever the man called each living creature, that was its name. Thus Samuel Ruhmkorff the man gave names to all cattle, to the birds Bard College at Simon’s Rock of heaven, and to every wild animal. www.simons‐rock.edu/sruhmkorff/platolecture • Proper names vs. kinds (tokens vs. types)

Adam’s Task, John Hollander Philosophical questions Thou, paw‐paw‐paw; thou, glurd; • Genesis (among other things) gives an thou, spotted for the existence of the universe, Glurd; thou whitestap, lurching the necessity of agriculture, the of through childbirth, and the mortality of humans. The high‐grown bush; thou, pliant‐footed • Gilgamesh (among other things) is an Implex, thou, awagabu… into friendship, grief, and the connections among humans, the , and nature. Thou, pambler; thou, rivarn; thou, greater • The Oedipus Cycle (among other things) looks Wherret, and thou, lesser one; at culpability, shame, fate, and duty. Thou, sproal; thou, zant; thou, • applies a distinctive methodology lily‐eater. to these and other topics, some perhaps less Naming’s over. Day is done. immediately gripping than others.

Some philosophical issues in naming I. and the the animals • S: While I am looking for one virtue, I have found you I. The problem of “one over many,” or the problem of to have a whole swarm of them. But, ,…if I were universals: how can two different things be of the asking you what is the nature of bees, and you said that they are many and of all kinds, what would you same type? answer if I asked you: “Do you mean that they are many and varied and different from one another in so far as they are bees? Or are they no different in that THE THE regard, but in some other respect, in their beauty, for example, or their size or in some other such way?” • M: I would say that they do not differ from one II. Natural kinds vs. kinds: is there an objective another in being bees. • S: If I went on to say: “Tell me, what is this very thing, classification of the world? Meno, in which they are all the same and do not differ from one another?” Would you be able to tell me? •In this t alk, I will explore the way that Plato’s theory • M: I would. (Meno 72a‐c) of forms addresses these two philosophical issues.

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Bee‐ness The form of a bee • Unfortunately, Meno doesn’t tell us what the • Leave alone virtue, essence of bee‐ness is. continues: piety, and the good for – Even if [the virtues] are many and various, all of a while. them have one and the same form which makes • Can we solve the them virtues, and it is right to look to this when problem of one over one is asked to make clear what virtue is. (Meno many for bees? 72c) • Herbert and Leo are of the type bee if and only if Herbert has the form of a bee and Leo has the form of a bee. • In other words, they have one and the same form.

What is the form of a bee? Plato’s answer • Bracketing the question of what Socrates may • Socrates consistently asks to be told what have been looking for…. various things (e.g., piety, virtue) are. Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just • He demands that answers to these questions: itself, or not? (We do say so, by Zeus.) And the Beautiful, and the Good? (Of course.) And have – are complete. you ever seen any of these things with your eyes? – are not lists of examples. (In no way.) I am speaking of all things such as – are not circular. Size, Health, Strength, and in a word, the of – be able to be substituted for the term in all other things, that which each of them . essentially is. ( 65d) – are not susceptible to counterexample. • Plato holds that the forms are immaterial, transcendent objects in which material objects may participate.

Transcendent Universals Levels of spookiness… • A common view is that for Plato there are two worlds, the material world and the transcendent world of the • The forms: forms. This may suggest a certain kind of spookiness, – are not located in the material world as if the world of the forms is a place you can visit in – can be fully participated in by material objects at some sublime mystical experience. different spatial locations • But a less spooky interpretation is possible. The so‐ – cannot change called world of the forms isn’t a world at all. The forms don’t exist anywhere, since abstract objects by – exist necessarily (and thus exist whether or not any definition do not exist in the material world. We might objects participate in them) say that abstract objects exist in logical space, so long – are not causally linked to material entities as we don’t think of logical space as a place you can go. – are graspable • If one truly thinks of abstract objects as abstract, then perhaps positing their existence isn’t such a big deal. – are metaphysically and epistemically privileged

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How do we grasp the forms? Knowing the forms… • Elenchus: dialectical inquiry into the nature of • If those that we are always talking about exist, the things. Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering • It can end in aporia, a state of confusion that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these – But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward before we are born. (Phaedo 76d‐e) goes around and refuses to stay put where we • He will [grasp the forms] most perfectly who approaches establish it (, 11b) the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense • The ability of the elenchus to lead to knowledge with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries of forms led Plato to defend the theory of to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing recollection (Meno, 81b‐86b, Phaedo 72e‐77a). himself as far as possible from….the whole body, because • the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire According to Plato, Socratic questioning is and wisdom whenever it is associated with it. Will not successful because it helps us remember what we that man reach reality, Simmias, if anyone does? (Phaedo knew before birth. 65e‐66a)

II. Carving nature at the joints What forms are there? • Plato’s theory of transcendent forms usually gets top billing. – Piety, Virtue, The Just • He is also a proponent of objective natural – Equality, Inequality, Odd, Even, Numbers kinds: he thinks there is a way that nature – Geometric shapes prefers to be described. – Large, Small • “…whereby we are enabled to divide into – Size, Health, Strength forms, following the objective articulation; we – The Beautiful, The Good are not to attempt to hack off parts like a clumsy butcher.” 265e – Animal species(?) • This seems to follow from the transcendence of the forms.

And Couch and Table… 130b‐d • Do you believe that there is such a thing as likeness • Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point itself apart from the likeness we possess, and so on by our customary procedure? We are in the with unity and plurality… habit, I take it, of positing a single or form • Certainly I do, said Socrates. in the case of the various multiplicities to • And also in cases like these, asked Parmenides, is there, for example, a form of rightness or of beauty or which we give the same name…for example, of goodness, and of all such things? there are many couches and tables. (Of • Yes. course.) But these utensils imply, I suppose, • And again, a form of man, apart from ourselves and all other men like us—a form of man as something by only two or forms, one of a couch and itself? Or a form of fire or of water? one of a table. ( X, 596a‐b) • I have often been puzzled about those things, Parmenides, whether one should say that the same • Does Plato think that there is a form for any thing is true in their case or not. name we invent?

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• Are you also puzzled, Socrates, about cases that might be thought absurd, such as hair or mud or Other tough predicates dirt or any other trivial and undignified objects? Are you doubtful whether or not to assert that • Cute each of these has a separate form distinct from things like those we handle? • Cool • • Not at all, said Socrates. In these cases, the things Fashionable are just the things we see; it would be absurd to • Masculine suppose that they have a form. • Impolite • Democratic • Virtuous • Just

A sparse theory of universals

• How does a sparse theory of universals handle • Plato is a realist about universals. the problem of one over many for things for • Nominalists hold that only particulars exist. which there is no (whether • Predicate nominalism: Harold and Leo are bees if undignified or socially constructed?)? and only if Harold and Leo are called ‘bees’ • In some cases, sameness of type can be • Predicate nominalism seems to deal well with explained in terms of Boolean combinations of socially constructed properties… universals. • …but at the cost of holding that Adam could have reasonably used ‘glurd’ to mean ‘zebras with an odd number of stripes or hawks with an even number of feathers’; and so on.

Class nominalism Some conclusions • An alternative over predicate nominalism is • Platonic is sparse about universals and class nominalism, which holds that Harold and must cleverly account for non‐natural types by Leo are of the type bees if and only if they some combination of forms. belong to the class of all and only bees. • Class nominalism is permissive about classes; • There are lots of classes! it looks like it needs to posit some distinction • Some class nominalists hold that some classes between natural and non‐natural classes in are more natural than others. Our terms pick order to make sense of natural types. out the most natural class that makes the • Both of these approaches are committed to a most sense out of our linguistic practice. way the world is independent of human linguistic and conceptual practices.

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Thank you.

www.simons‐rock.edu/sruhmkorff/platolecture

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