Second-Party Counterinsurgency
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Second-party counterinsurgency Mark O’Neill A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy UNSW School of Humanities and Social Sciences 11 November 2013 Second-party counterinsurgency Abstract This dissertation examines the theory and conduct of counterinsurgency operations by interventionist states, defined and labelled herein as second-party counterinsurgency. The conduct of such second- party counterinsurgency has been (and is) commonplace in the contemporary era, yet a large proportion of extant counterinsurgency theory and practice – indeed much of the commonly accepted counterinsurgency paradigm – fails to meet the challenge of its subject adequately. In line with this assertion, contemporary Western counterinsurgency practice has all too often defaulted to a formulaic approach, characterised by an overly simplistic ‘hearts and minds’ archetype. This model has held the imagination of counterinsurgency theory and scholarship since the early 1960s. It is a basic argument of this dissertation that blind acceptance of the ‘hearts and minds’ paradigm has often led second-party counterinsurgents to adopt of inappropriate ways and means to attain their strategic objectives. This increases the risk of defeat in what is already a complex and difficult enterprise. The most important original contribution made by this study is to identify the need for, and propose, a suitable alternative framework for the conduct of second-party counterinsurgency. The central hypothesis is that the principles of counter violence, counter organisation, counter subversion and pre-emption, supported by the enabling concepts of intelligence and adaptation, provide a new and more appropriate theoretical framework to inform the successful conduct of second-party counterinsurgency. Central to the proposed framework is a method that seeks to focus and capitalise on the relative ubiquity of insurgent ways in order to create a defeat mechanism that invokes Clausewitz’s rational calculus. The research underpinning this study derives from a literature review and analysis of archival, primary and secondary source material, the conduct of personal interviews, the use of research questionnaires with select personnel, and the establishment and verification of the framework using three critical historical case studies. The key conclusion of this thesis is that i Second-party counterinsurgency strong correlation appears to exist between the dependent variables of the proposed second-party counterinsurgency framework and successful counterinsurgency operations. ii Second-party counterinsurgency Table of Contents Page Abstract i Originality Statement iv Copyright and Authenticity Statements v Dedication vi Acknowledgements vii List of Figures and Maps viii Abbreviations ix Chapter 1. Introduction 1 Chapter 2. Counterinsurgency thought, practice and paradigm 27 Chapter 3. Critical evaluation of the ‘hearts and minds’ paradigm 67 Chapter 4. A second-party counterinsurgency framework 97 Chapter 5. Case study – South West Africa 139 Chapter 6. Case study – Dhofar 189 Chapter 7. Case study – Iraq 231 Chapter 8. Comparative Analysis 259 Chapter 9. Conclusion 285 Bibliography 289 iii Second-party counterinsurgency Originality Statement I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. Signed Date 11 November 2013 iv Second-party counterinsurgency v Second-party counterinsurgency Dedication This work is dedicated to Lyn O’Neill (nee Coe), 1945 – 1997, for her love, support and belief. vi Second-party counterinsurgency Acknowledgments This dissertation required the help and goodwill of many people. Special thanks to my supervisory team: Jeff Grey for his advice over many years; Craig Stockings and Peter Dennis for seeing the project home, and David Lovell for his support and good humour. Also at UNSW Canberra I want to thank Bernadette McDermott, Clinton Fernandes, Luke Garner and Shirley Ramsay. Rita Parker, Mark Briskey and Bob Stevenson, thank you for the willing ears and the encouragement you always offered. Many other people generously gave of their time, knowledge, advice, effort or offered support at various stages and on various issues over the years. Thanks to: Alex Alderson, McGill Alexander, Deane–Peter Baker, John Blaxland, Mick Craig, Alex Crowther, Christian Enemark, Don Hanle, Victoria Hart, Jan Horvath, John Hutcheson, Evert Jordaan, Peter Leahy, Mick Mahy, Daniel Marston, Steve Metz, Doug Ollivant, Cate McGregor, Bob O’Neill, Marcus Simson, Niel Smith, Hew Strachan and JRT (Richard) Wood. Projects such as this invariably gain a great deal from primary source input by the people ‘who were there’. The South West Africa case study benefitted from enormously from the time, trust, advice and generosity offered by a range of former SADF/SANDF officers. I thank and acknowledge Generals Jannie Geldenhuys, Roland de Vries and Johann Jooste. My thanks and gratitude goes to Mike Gunther, Eric Haas and Will Clegg for assistance with primary sources for the Dhofar case study. Finally, but by no means least, my sincere thanks to the recent veterans of the Iraq war for their invaluable inputs via questionaries and / or interview: Alex Alderson, Mark Battjes, Tom Boccardi, Richard Iron, Antony Guess-Johnson, Peter Mansoor, Andy Morgado, Christian Senn and the MiTT Team leader who wished to remain anonymous. I am grateful to Jill Hazelton, Buddy Houston and Lacy Pejcinovic for reading and commenting on my draft chapters. I am deeply in debt to Nancy Owens for reading the complete draft and her invaluable advice on editing. Any flaws in the prose herein simply reflect where I did not listen to Nancy well enough. Special thanks to my examiners for their efforts, promptness and the detailed and constructive feedback. Heartfelt thanks to the Tig. Finally, but not at all least, special acknowledgement is due to my children, Grace and Roy, for their love, patience and kind of understanding as I pursued this project over all those long weekends, evenings and holidays over many years. I love you two. vii Second-party counterinsurgency List of Figures and Maps Page Map 5.1 South West Africa 146 Map 6.1 Oman 192 Map 6.2 The military situation in Dhofar, January 1975 220 Map 7.1 Iraq . 233 Figure 7.1. AQI schematic outline plan – ‘Battle of the Baghdad Belt’ 245 viii Second-party counterinsurgency Abbreviations ANC African National Congress AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq BATT British Army Training Team Bn Battalion BPTT Border Police Training Team CANU Caprivi African National Union CAT Civil Aid Team CERP Commander’s emergency relief program COIN Counterinsurgency CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CSAF Commander Sultan’s Armed Forces DLF Dhofar Liberation Front DTA Democratic Turnhalle Alliance FAPLA Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) GOI Government of Iraq GVN Government of (South) Vietnam HAM ‘hearts and minds’ ix Second-party counterinsurgency IED Improvised explosive device ISAF International Stabilisation and Assistance Force ISF Iraqi Security Forces JAM Jaish al-Mahdi JSOC Joint Special Operations Command JSS Joint Security Station JUSMAG Joint United States Military Advisory Group LSO Loan Service Officers LSP Loan Service Personnel MiTT Military Training Team MK Umkhonto we Sizwe MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq MND Multi-National Division MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq MoD Ministry of Defence (UK) MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDFLOAG National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf NPTT National Police Training Team x Second-party counterinsurgency OC Officer Commanding OIS Oman Intelligence Service ORD Oman Research Department OMS Office of the Martyr Sadr PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen PFLOAG People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. From January 1971: Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf PFLO People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman PLAN People’s Liberation Army of Namibia RAF Royal Air Force RENAMO Resistançia Naçional Moçambicana. RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces SACP South African Communist Party SADF South African Defence Force SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces SAP South African Police SAS Special Air Service SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel SOI Sons of Iraq xi Second-party counterinsurgency SWANU South West African National Union SWAPO South West African People’s Organisation SWATF South West African Territorial Force TTP Tactical technique and procedure, or Tactics, techniques and procedures UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola UNTAG United Nations Transitional Assistance Group WHAM Winning ‘hearts and minds’ xii Chapter one. Introduction This