Strategic Studies Quarterly an Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum for Military, Government, and Academic Professionals
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Strategic Studies Quarterly An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum for Military, Government, and Academic Professionals VOLUME 2 WINTER 2008 NUMBER 4 Editorial Charting a Strategic Course in Interesting Times . 3 Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF Feature Articles Transformation in the French Air Force in an Era of Change . 6 Général d’armée aérienne Stéphane Abrial, chef d’etat-major de l’armée de l’air In Service to the Nation . Air Force Research Institute Strategic Concept for 2018–2023 . 14 Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired Understanding Airpower: Bonfire of the Fallacies . 43 Colin S. Gray Living in Interesting Times: The Economics of a Chinese Currency Attack . 84 Col Jeffrey E. Haymond, USAF A Strategic Conversation about National Missile Defense . 106 1st Lt Alexi A. LeFevre, USAF Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq . 119 Warren Chin Book Reviews Why the Middle East Lagged Behind: The Case of Iran . 136 Kazem Alamdari Reviewed by: Robert B. Kane, PhD 01-Contents.indd 1 10/30/08 1:13:48 PM War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941 . 138 Geoffrey P. Megargee Reviewed by: Douglas Peifer, PhD Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics . 140 Mark Haugaard and Howard H. Lentner Reviewed by: Maj Rhett Champagne, USAF Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win . 142 Jeffrey Record Reviewed by: Anthony C. Cain, PhD Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State . 144 Edited by: Miguel Glatzer and Dietrich Rueschemeyer Reviewed by: David A. Anderson, PhD Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A .Q . Khan Network . 146 Gordon Corera Reviewed by: William Thayer Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia . 147 Scott W. Palmer Reviewed by: Lt Col Winston A. Gould, USAF Regime Change: A U .S . Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 . 148 Robert Litwak Reviewed by: Aliyu Bello Making Sense of War: Strategy for the 21st Century . 151 Alan Stephens and Nicola Baker Reviewed by: John R. Reese, PhD 01-Contents.indd 2 10/30/08 1:13:48 PM Charting a Strategic Course in Interesting Times May you live in interesting times. —Chinese proverb (and curse) We live in an era of strategically dislocating events. On national and inter national levels, faith in the global economic system has been shaken to the point that even some of the free market’s most ardent advocates have sup ported government intervention to restore faith and confidence in the sys tem. For today’s Airmen, times are similarly interesting—at seemingly every turn, challenges have appeared to long-held, previously irrefutable beliefs in the goodness of airpower and how best to employ its capabilities in the joint fight. While individually each challenge may seem somewhat tactical in nature, combined they suggest the US Air Force is at a strategic inflection point. A few examples of the airpower axioms under fire include: • “Centralized control, decentralized execution,” a basic tenet of Air Force doctrine, faces withering fire from some military leaders who have been vocal in extolling the virtues of decentralization, particu larly in irregular warfare (IW). For in IW, the distinctions—which at their essence reflect the reality that ground commanders tend to con duct scalable, bottom-up planning, whereas air components conduct planning at the operational level (e.g., at a combined air operations center), with mission planning and execution details done at lower, tactical levels—become glaringly obvious. This disconnect has led to a perception, on the one hand, of distance and lack of commitment, and on the other hand resentment at being viewed as merely an after thought and supporting arm. • “Effects-based approach to operations (EBAO),” an organizing prin ciple for planning within the combined air operations center, has been essentially declared null and void in one of our key unified com mands. Admittedly, the notion of “beginning with the end in mind” had been pushed in some circles to a form of science in which warfare could be perhaps viewed as a battle of mathematical formulae. But tarring all forms of EBAO with the same brush risks “throwing out STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2008 [ ] 02-Peck.indd 3 10/30/08 1:14:37 PM the baby with the bathwater,” at least from the viewpoint of many Airmen. • Once the gold standard for nuclear surety, concerns have been raised about the USAF commitment to the nuclear operations business. Of note, these concerns were cited as the proximate cause for another strategically dislocating event, the simultaneous removal of the two most senior officials in the Department of the Air Force. Addressing shortcomings highlighted in various reports following the Minot and Taiwan incidents will require focus, resources, and time . each of which is in critically short supply. • Despite demonstrating adaptability and flexibility across the spec trum of warfare, critics question the Air Force’s efficacy in and com mitment to a future awash in irregular warfare. Airpower provides (as articulated in, among other places, AFDD 2-, Irregular Warfare) an asymmetric capability for the joint force commander—our IW adversaries can battle us on the ground but are continually vulner able to the effects that airpower can bring to bear. These adversaries have learned that the most effective counters to the advantages that our superiority in the air provides are to violate laws of armed con flict by hiding among the population and exploiting media coverage of collateral damage—both actual and contrived—attacking not our ability but our willingness to use the asymmetric capabilities that air- power brings to the fight. The list goes on, but this suffices to provide a few examples without engaging in an exercise in self-flagellation. This too shall pass—but only with the right vision and leadership. In times like these even Airmen may need an occasional reminder of the inherent greatness in what our Air Force provides for the Department of Defense and the nation. There is a passage in Tom Ricks’ Fiasco in which senior US civilian leaders express incredulity that it would take a larger ground force to control a popula tion than the force required to defeat its land forces. A large part of that answer should have been obvious—airpower, which can attack an adver sary simultaneously at its tactical, operational, and strategic levels, enabled the decisive defeat of the Iraqi military despite our ground forces being numerically outnumbered. [ ] STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2008 02-Peck.indd 4 10/30/08 1:14:37 PM In the end, the occasional scrutiny of “axioms of airpower” can be healthy to ensure our tenets do not become empty bumper stickers. At Air University we are proud to provide a variety of forums encouraging just such an expansion of our intellectual perspectives. These include: Sym posia, Blue Darts (op-eds), The Wright Stuff, Air and Space Power Journal (available in six languages), and Strategic Studies Quarterly. In this edition of SSQ, I especially commend to you Gen (ret) John Shaud’s article entitled “In Service to the Nation . Air Force Research Institute Strategic Concept for 2018–202.” General Shaud addresses many of the strategically dislocating constructs I have mentioned in this short editorial. While it is likely no one will agree with all of the article’s points, it (and the study from which it is excerpted) provides elements of a solid strategic vision for navigating from our Air Force’s present position, through interesting times, into the uncertain future. ALLEN G. PECK Lieutenant General, USAF Commander, Air University STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2008 [ ] 02-Peck.indd 5 10/30/08 1:14:38 PM Transformation in the French Air Force in an Era of Change Général d’armée aérienne Stéphane Abrial, chef d’etat-major de l’armée de l’air Editor’s Note: This article is a translation and expansion of an address given at “Les défis de la Transformation pour l’armée l’air,” sponsored by the Centre d’études stratégiques aérospatiales, 3 June 2008. The French Air Force, like all defense organizations, will of course take into account the changes of our military strategy reflected in the re lease of the White Paper of 17 June 2008.1 By implementing the various reforms directed in that document, it will thus continue to transform. But what exactly do we mean by transformation? Why employ this term when, as our history shows, the Air Force has not ceased evolving since its creation? For example, the Air Force of 1945 did not resemble in any way that of 1939. It had barely reconstituted its fleet of propeller-driven planes after the world war when it found itself passing into the jet era. At the be ginning of the 190s, it was engaged in the last colonial conflict using old, propeller-driven fighter planes; two years later, however, it fielded strategic bombers at the leading edge of technology that were designed to penetrate the densest air defenses. Its focus was on Eastern Europe and halting the anticipated waves of Soviet armored formations during the Cold War, but it was also engaged in Africa, containing the expansionist inclinations of various state and nonstate actors. Things were never simple. We depended in 1945 on the good will of our allies for all that related to our equipment, because the French aircraft Gen Stéphane Abrial is the chief of staff of the French Air Force. He completed the French Air Force Academy in 1973 and was an exchange cadet at the US Air Force Academy in 1974. He is a fighter pilot with command assignments at the squadron, operations group, and wing levels and served as the com mander, Air Defense Operations Command.