Arresting Insurgencytheory and Practice by K Y L E B
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U.S. Soldiers discuss tactics during counterinsurgency raids in Husiniyah Under the best circumstances, the police action [arrests] cannot fail to have negative aspects for both the population and the counterinsurgent living with it. These reasons demand the operation be conducted by professionals. —David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: 1 Arresting InsurgencyTheory and Practice By K Y L E B. T E A M E Y Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Michael Larson) Fleet Combat Camera Group, ne of the primary goals of the with difficult security situations, authorities will Arrests of innocent personnel may occur counterinsurgent is to reestablish often feel a strong impetus to use illiberal arrest for a number of reasons, including: security and rule of law. An and internment techniques or to ignore political O effective arrest and intern- or cultural expectations. Security forces and n inaccurate or poorly developed ment system is an essential part of a successful governments often make mistakes in the use of intelligence counterinsurgency effort, providing a nonlethal arrests and internment. Historically, there are n inability of troops to communicate effec- means of separating insurgents from the general five common errors: arresting innocent individ- tively with locals populace and thereby securing the populace. uals, releasing insurgents who are still a danger n innocent personnel arrested as witnesses The capture of insurgents and their equipment to the counterinsurgency effort, mistreating or for questioning provides valuable intelligence to counterinsur- arrested individuals, failing to anticipate the n arbitrary arrests or “fishing expeditions” gents and allows the option of rehabilitating effects of arrests and internment on the informa- used to try to identify insurgents insurgents and later releasing them back into tion campaign, and allowing prisons to serve as n collective punishment of a community. society. Mistakes made by counterinsurgents training areas for insurgents. in arresting or holding detainees may reinforce Authorities may also combine aspects of insurgent propaganda and otherwise undermine Arresting Innocents these errors. In Aden in the 1960s, for instance, the overall counterinsurgency effort. Simply Arresting innocent personnel makes the British forces lacked intelligence on insurgents, stated, a well-run system for arresting insurgents actions of counterinsurgents appear arbitrary, so they relied on mass arrests and interrogation will greatly aid a counterinsurgency effort while unjust, or repressive. It aids insurgent propa- as a means of developing intelligence. The poli- a poorly run system will retard it. ganda by providing a real error to exploit and cies led to international condemnation of British Policies governing the arrest and intern- can alienate segments of the populace, partic- tactics and greatly reduced public support ment of insurgents should contribute to ending ularly the individuals wrongly detained, their within Britain for the counterinsurgency effort, the insurgency while minimizing or eliminating families, friends, and neighbors. Individuals contributing to the failure of British initiatives the potential for political damage to the authori- alienated by wrongful arrest are susceptible to in Aden.3 ties involved. They should be developed and recruitment into the insurgency, and unwar- There are many examples of arrests and enacted with an eye toward the responses of ranted arrest may compel otherwise ambiva- internment of innocents leading to the creation local nationals, international observers, and the lent individuals to volunteer. A common of more insurgents than the arrests neutralize. In U.S. populace. Achieving a balance between the tactic of insurgents is to encourage the arrest Northern Ireland in the 1970s, British and Ulster need to provide security and the need to main- of innocent individuals to increase support security forces used inaccurate intelligence tain legitimacy is difficult. When confronted for their cause.2 to conduct mass arrests. Innocents were held in jails with members of the Provisional Irish Captain Kyle B. Teamey, USAR, is a consultant for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. He served Republican Army, who used their internment to with 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, from August 2003 to September 2004, recruit new members.4 Likewise, mass arrests of and was a coauthor of Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency. civilians under the Phoenix Program in Vietnam ndupress.ndu.edu issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ 117 FEATURES | Arresting Insurgency allowed the Viet Cong to recruit members from authorities and allows insurgents to argue that macy of counterinsurgents both among the jails and holding areas.5 they are innocent and unfairly targeted. local populace and in the international arena.7 There are additional second- and third- There are numerous historical examples of Releasing Insurgents order effects from the improper release of insur- prisoner mistreatment hindering the efforts of Amnesties and prisoner releases are gents. If internees are regularly or arbitrarily counterinsurgents.8 often part of the political bartering that ends an released, those still in prison may be less willing The use of torture by the French in Algeria insurgency. However, the release of insurgents to provide information. The insurgent learns affected thousands of people and benefited who still pose a threat can make the task of that simply by waiting out his sentence, he can insurgent recruiting. The institutionalization of the counterinsurgent more difficult. Captured avoid having to negotiate or trade information torture and other illiberal practices also reduced insurgents pose a threat if they are still dedicated to procure his release. the support of the French people for counter- to the insurgency, especially if it is ongoing and More importantly, release of insurgents insurgency efforts in Algeria and may have the released insurgents can rejoin. There are makes intelligence collection more difficult contributed to the attempted coup by French several reasons release of dangerous insurgents within the populace. People may be less willing officers against their government in 1958.9 may occur: to risk their lives to provide information on sus- The second- and third-order effects of pects if insurgents will return from prison. The mistreatment of arrested individuals are not n clerical errors people may also come to see the counterinsur- always predictable. The execution of Irish insur- n mistaken identity gents as incompetent and unable to protect them gents in 1916, particularly the wheelchair-bound n escape if insurgents routinely regain their freedom. This James Connolly, helped spark the 1919–1921 n lack of evidence or intelligence to warrant contributes to the rise and spread of rumors of Irish War of Independence against British rule.10 further internment corruption within the counterinsurgent legal London was surprised by the uprising as the n underestimating or not assessing the system, such as the efficacy of bribes or power of insurgency had little public support prior to the effects of releasing insurgents insurgent leaders over the system. Finally, release executions. n public pressure on counterinsurgents. of insurgents may be harmful to the morale A further compounding factor is that the of counterinsurgents, who must capture the understanding of what comprises mistreatment Released insurgents may be difficult to same insurgents multiple times, or who suffer changes over time and is dependent on cultural recapture because they have learned from their repeated attacks from released insurgents. attitudes and perceptions. For instance, in the mistakes and have a thorough understanding of late 19th century, the suspension of civil rights the process of arrest, prosecution, and intern- Mistreating Detainees and use of summary execution were acceptable ment. Freed insurgents may become more dan- Mistreatment of arrested individuals tools for U.S. forces serving in the Philippines, gerous and better connected due to interactions generally means not treating them in accordance while neither is generally allowable today.11 with other detainees.6 In addition, they may gain with established rules of engagement, laws, or status among other insurgents for having been operating procedures. It can be expanded to Failing to Anticipate Effects arrested. mean not treating internees consistently with By its nature, “internment is such an illib- In most cases, counterinsurgents will be local culture or international norms. Mistreat- eral method that it will always give rise to wide- worse off when insurgents are released at inap- ment may occur while individuals are taken into spread international criticism and allegations propriate times and for inappropriate reasons. custody, while they are in a holding facility, or at of brutality, many of which will be believed.”12 There are circumstances where counterinsur- the time of their release. A wide variety of actors will scrutinize the way gents may arrest an insurgent knowing they Arrest and internment have additional arrests occur, the treatment of prisoners, inter- can only keep him in custody a short time, for importance in counterinsurgency because of rogation of prisoners, and release of prisoners. instance, to disrupt an impending insurgent the proximity of insurgents to counterinsur- Negative perceptions of these activities will aid operation. The use of such tactics