U. s. IVrroy MWary Ds 55 i 70 1970 STAFF STUDY
JHE IMPACT of MILITARY BUILD-UP on the ADVISORY FUNCTION
300th CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP Riverdale, Maryland
PROPERTY OF US ARMY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS. 300TH CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY MEMORIAL USAR CENTER 66Ot BALTIMORE AVENUE. RIVERDALE. MARYLAND 2O84O 5 April 1970 Staff Study nTfc0 Inpwrt of a Eiiitaay Build-up on the Function. "
TlffiUt Conaaanaii^f General 352d Civil Aff--ii3?a Area A Aveauo 20340
TOt CoEsaasdiBs Officer United States Ay«sy Combat BavelopEautt AK'Bs CA A^mcy soar GORDON, GEORGIA, 30905
1* iloferences* $ Letfces*, BQ,> UJ5COK&RG, ATCPS-ST.'CA, subject j^In of Civil Affairs C<^ability(U5AR training) $ dated 24 S SQ Pir0t US Ajt?yf AH&REWPU, subject 5 ali^>v0veis£mt of 'Civil Affeirs Ce,pability(USAR TraStiing),*1 date-d 24 Ootolser iS4^8» c* I«ttort Ho. 35^d CA Araa (/,) , AHMMF, HCOKABC Civil ts dcted 4 Doccscsber 2« la rasponoa to the abcvo roferer.ecsj this unit has prepfirei t&j enclosed etaff etudy entitlea !<,o Impassi of riXitaiy Eui5.d.~ap oa the /-dviaory ?uaa- cn*" Tko study was prepared d«rli^ the 'training year 1969 » in addJ.tioa to otliei? traini»g 3» Tlie staff ctudy conolugion« ead rocoti»endatior!s were dovolojed eftei* es>- tenslvc- reae* tIBRAHY COLLEGE , PA, OUTLIKE I. Staff Study: The Impact of Military Build-up On the Advisory Function II. Annex A - Historical Development of United States Involvement in Vietnam A, Appendix 1 - Chronology of Events B. Appendix 2 - Pacification ?ro~rams III. Annex B - Analysis of Available Information A. Appendix 1 - Summary of Questionnaire Response B. Appendix 2 - Susimary of Interview Pirdings IV. Annex C - Bibliography V. Annex D - Sample Questionnaire VI. Annex E - Sample of Letter Requesting IniornLacion VII. Annex P - Response to ReqiTests for Information Headquarters 300th CA Group Eiverdale, I'd.. 3 Karch 1970 SUBJECT: The Inpact of ililitary Buildup on the Advisory Function. 1. PROBLEM a. To determine how the civil affairs responsibilities of U. S. Military advisors are affected by the introduction of large numbers of U. S. or Allied forces to conduct military operations. b. Based on findings, to suggest changes in doctrine or organization. 2. ASSUMPTIONS a. The U. S. experience in Vietnam is typical of any future situation involving large numbers of advisors in a country facing insurgency prior to and following the introduc tion of U. S. and Allied conbat forces to conduct military operations, 3. PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM a. U. S. advisors, first assigned to South Vietnam in 1955) grew in number to 21,500 by 1965 v/hen U. S. tactical units were introduced. An advisory network was progressively extended throughout the RVtl political and military establish ment. The primary mission of the advisors evolved from one of assisting South Vietnam by providing planning, training and logistic support to dealing with internal development and paci fication programs. (See AUNEX A -for a more detailed discussion) b. Initially suffering from a variety of ills, pacifi cation program performance became more effective after the U,S. introduced large numbers of troops and other measures were taken to improve security. (See Appendix 2, AN5TEX A) c« After the introduction of U. S. military forces, military advisors and U. S. and Allied troops performed essen tially separate missions often in proximity to each other and reported through different chains of d. The introduction of tactical forces brought the advisor both benefits and problems. (!) Benefits (a) ^ecurlt.^ U. S. Troops provided better pro tection for the advisor, his Vietnamese counterpart, their projects, and to the friendly populace. (b) Assistance_. U, S. Troops provided equipment, material and skilled personnel not previously available for local projects and initiated beneficial civic action projects. (2) Problems ( a ) Conflicts between troop corrimanders and advisors . 1 ) g_oc trinal _ga? . Advisory responsibilities were well defined; however, doctrine did not take into account changes in the advisor's situation caused by the presence of a U, S. tactical unit in .his area. This lack was a basic cause of misunderstanding and conflict between the commander and advisor. 2) Poor Rapport . .Some tactical commanders did not understand the advisor's role. They regarded the advisor as their liaison to Vietnamese officials and expected him to relay th^ir desires to the Vietnamese and insure compliance. Other conffi'-onclers ignored the advisor completely, often to great disad vantage to both. Such rapport as existed was due more to individ ual ability acid initiative than to doctrinal guidelines. 5) Li is trust. U. S. Commanders have been known to withhold operational information from advisors for fear of compromising security. This resulted in incidents 7/hich adversely affected pacification efforts and created bad feelings. 4) Duplication of civic action projects. In many cases tactical troop commanders initiated their own civic action projects without coordinating with the area advisor. Wasteful duplication often resulted. problems . 1 ) Inappropriate behavior of_ troops . The behavior of occidental troops created some animosities, as it did nox conform tc typical Asian behavior. These animosities made it more difficult for the advisor to obtain the cooperation of Vietnamese officials and populace » 2) Inflation and disruption of economic patterns. U. S. troops demanded services and were willing to pay high prices for them. Prices of many items became too high for the average South Vietnamese. Normal earning patterns were changed. Black market activities and corruption increased, 3) Hes^riction of civJlian movement. Restriction of movement of civilians by tactical units imposed hardships on the civilians and obliged the advisor to help set up movement controls and issue travel permits. 4) The increased scale of combat operations after U. S. tactical units were introduced resulted in increased civilian casualties and property destruction. (c) differences in attitude toward the war. ARV¥ and KVJT officials had lived for years with the war and accepted it as a normal condition of life» They felt a prudent attitude towards the war would keep them alive longer and afford them the chance to enjoy a noinial life after 1700 hours. The U. S, tactical commanders felt they had come to Vietnam to win the war after ARVH and the advisors had failed. They were determined to make a contribution to victor;/ during their 12 months tour and establish a creditable record essential to their military careers. Functioning in an American environment and subject to its pres sures, they often had difficulty in appreciating ths attitude of the Vietnamese and the U.. S. advisor whose attitude often tended to parallel that of the Vietnamese. (d) Increased workload and Liaison functjLons. The introduction of U. S. troops and the attendant expansion of the U. S. establishment in Vietnam reduced the time the advisor had available to execute his mission, More visitors were guided on tours, more meetings were attended, and in many cases additional operational requirements had to be satisfied. (A more comprehen sive treatment of this topic may be found in ANKEX B) 4. DISCUSSION •? [Alternative courses of action re J;he Advisor/Troop Commander Relationship» The absence of doctrine defining the advisor/cororaander relationship, and instances of conflict and lack of coordination bet-yaen the two in Vietnam, point to a need for clearer delineation of this relationship. Three possible courses of action nay be considered: (1) Give the advisor authority to veto tactical operations which he considers detrimental to Civil Affairs objectives. This authority might permit; him to countermand tactical operations undertaken in his immediate area subject of course to approval by higher headquarters. It appears that any advantage gained by this course of action nay be outweighed by the adverse effects of such a procedure. For exsnple, confusion may be introduced into operations, planning and staff procedures in tactical operations may be disrupted, and the essential principle of unity of command may be compromised. » (2) Increase the authority of the U. S. tactical commander over the advisor. This may take the form of the advisor being responsive to the wishes of the coriander in combined U. S. - AR71T operations, or of bringing the advisor into a quasi-staff relation ship to the U. S. commander, making him, in effect, the commander's S-5. ^hs record indicates that many commanders attempt to bring the local advisor under their control and perceive advantages in such a relationship. Formalizing this practice would permit com manders to use advisors for the transmission of what amounts to orders to commanders of ARVN units, thereby compromising the AEVTT chain of command. It may also place advisors under the control of officers who do not understand the primary dxities of advisors. These same officers may each lack a proper appreciation of politi cal factors and of Vietnamese methods and operations. Finally, advisory and S-5 functions are essentially separate. Any effort to combine then would compromise the effective performance of each function. (3) Improve coordination between the advisor and the com mander and establish a formal relationship between the two short of a command relationship. This -night take the form of bringing the advisor into the planning phases of tactical operations to be undertaken in his area. It could also be made mandatory that the commander maintain regular liaison with the advisor whenever his troops enter the advisor's area. Such an arrangement avoids the disadvantages of the first two alternatives while alleviating the problems implicit in the present ambiguous advisor/commander relationship. This study points to the need for lie?; procedures and guidelines. One possible procedure v/ould provide for rapid resolution by higher headquarters of conflicts between the advisor and the commander. A special provision night also ensure that the pol itical realities of the pacification effort receives at least equal consideration if not higher priority than the narroy/, tactical objectives. 5. conclusions a. The massive influx of U. S. combat troops in Vietnam had an essentially negative effect on the civil affairs role of the ac'.visor. Tha advantage provided the advisor in terms' of improved local security and support capability 7/as more than offset by the adverse impact of these troops on the indigenous econony and culture. b. Existing doctrine pertaining to civil affairs responsi bilities of the U. S. military advisor does not recognize the special problems experienced by him r/hen TJ. S. or allied tactical troops with a combat mission are operating in his area. c. The problems attendant on the presence of non-indigenotis troops ir.crer.ss the civil affaire vorkioad of the U. S. military advisor, but do not change the essential character of his duties. d. The relationship betv/een the U. S. military advisor and the coiiznander of U. S. tactical forces operating in his area is ambiguous. The failure to define responsibilities causes consid erable friction between them to the detriment of their respective missions. The relationship is ambiguous for two reasons: (1) The conaiand and staff structure in Vietnam does not establish a formal relationship befr.veen the advisor and the U, S. Commander,- but depends on coordination ana cooperation between the two for the resolution of differences. There is room for improvement even though successive organizational and procedural changes, and greater emphasis on coordination, have had a palliative effect. (2) Continuing problems betv?een the advisor and the U. S. commander reflect a more fundamental conflict betv/een two distinct policies simultaneously pursued by the United States in Vietnam. On the one hand, the U. S. seeks to strengthen the authority and political effectiveness of the Government of South Vietnam a policy to which the advisor is committed by virtue of his assignment. On the other hand, the U. S. decision to commit combat fqrces and assume primary responsibility for military operations set in motion contrary trends. It tended to dilute the Government of South Vietnam's responsibility in determining policy and limited its freedom of action. It reduced its self- reliance in conducting the military and pacification effort. The difficulties of the advisor caught in this dilenna cannot be corrected by organizational or procedural changes alone. To be effective, such changes must be preceded by a rearrangement of priori ties v 6 . ISCCI'.IMKDATIONS a. Amy doctrine should clearly define the respective responsibilities of U. S. advisors attached to indigenous Civil/ Military organisations, and those of the U. S. tactical commander operating in the advisor's assigned area. b. In any future situation involving advisor/tactical command relations, army doctrine should require integration of advisor recommendations in tactical staff /planning. c. The next edition of M.I 4-1-10 "Department of Army Field Manual" (CA l.ianual) should incorporate a more detailed discussion of the problems likely to confront the U. S. advisor in similar situations, d. Tactical troop commanders should be directed to enforce standards of troop behavior and stress programs to improve troop relations with the civilian populace. e. The money available to U. S. troops should be regulated and other steps taken to reduce the adverse impact of the U e S. presence on the economy of the host country. f . Further work should be undertaken along the lines of the present study to avoid repetition of current problems, A - Historical Development of U. S. Involvement in Vietnam Appendix 1 - Chronology of Events Appendix 2 - Pacification Programs B " Analysis of Available Information "Appendix 1 - Analysis of Questionnaires Appendix 2 - Analysis of Interviews C - Bibliography D - Sample Questionnaire E - Letters Hequesting Information Annex A (Historical Development of U. S. Involvement in Vietnam), to STAFF STUDY (TIE IIIPACT OF MILITARY BUILD-UP Oil THE ADVISORY FUIICTION) ' The United States has been involved in Vietnam since the early 1950's. Initial support consisted of material and direct financial aid. Following the French decision to withdraw, support was, ex panded to include U. S. advisory personnel. The first advisors arrived in South Vietnam in February 1955, and were assigned the mission to help build a competent South Vietnamese araed force. The arrival of these advisors preceded by more than a year the departure of the last French elements. On 12 February 1955, the United States I/Iilitary Assistance Advisory Group (lIAAG) was established to assume operational control of the newly-arrived advisors (Figure l). Under the command of Lt. General John W. 0'Daniels the number of advisors gradually increased from the initial 300 to some 692 by mid-Hay 1957. 3 Although I.IAA3- had a limited Civil Affairs (CA) function little effort was devoted to CA activity at this time. U. S. advisors v/ere rarely employed in units below division level and, for the most part, concentrated their efforts in assisting the Vietnamese to develop high-level planning, training, and logistic support. Although some limited civil affairs activity took place at the grass roots level before 1961, these efforts v/ere accomplished by mobile training teams brought in iron Okinawa, not by personnel of the tIAAGr mission. Shortly after the 1954 Geneva Accords were ratified, the United States persuaded the Hgo Dinh Diem regime to assign the job of pacification to the Army of the P.epublic of Vietnam (ARW). Bmploying techniques used successfully against communist guerril las in the Phillipines, the ARVIT achieved encouraging initial results. This program became inadequate in 1956 when regular Horth Vietnamese forces began infiltration of the South. Pac ification was then turned over to civilians, and. control of the countryside passed to the Vietcong by default. Until early I960, the Viet Gong confined their activities to acts of terror and sabotage. As the scale of violence increased, U. S. efforts v/ere directed toward developing a counter-insurgency capability in the South Vietnamese army. Accordingly, the chief of LIAAG was authorized to assign advisors down to battalion-sized units. As LIAAG strength was under 1000 at this time, few such assignments were possible. The strength of this small group of A-l MAAG VIETNAM COMMANDER CHIEF OF STAFF ACS ACS ACS ACS PERSONNEL & Operations CommunicatioEE Adrainistratio: i Training Logistics & Electronics ACS Plans & COMPTROLLER Programs Psy Ops/CA Section NAVY ARMY AIR FORCE SECTION SECTION SECTION FIELD ADVISORY DETACHMENT Figure 1. U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 12 February 1955 A-2 advisors was further depleted by the requirement^of providing advisory assistance to the paramilitary forces. o In I960, the U. S. Army sent operational detachments from the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Vietnam to set up camps near villages threatened by the Viet Cong. These detachments:^(J1I.-1CI1 UO trainedtiic.U-iJ.CU theUilC local-LUUa.-L villagersVXJ-XcigC J-O and6UJ.U developedU.C V CJ-UpCU, and CU 1U. organised Civilian Irregular Defense Groxips (GIDG), whose mission was to stren.c rengthen local villages militarily and economically. In liay 1961, additional personnel were authorized for service in South Vietnam. The increased strength allowed assignment of advisors to battalion-sized units of the Army, Havy and para military forces. By midsummer of 1961, the number of U. S. troops in Vietnam had risen still further to 4,300 men, and advisors began operating with company-sized units. Americans, however, were still instructed not to engage in coabat except in self- defense, '^he continuing troop increase in 1961 created a need for an even more sophisticated command and control organization. Thus on February 8, 1962, the U.S. llilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAW) was established. LLACV (Figure 2) remains virtually unchanged today, except for the addition of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) (Figure 3). In 1962, as a part of the intensified counterinsurgency effort, two new categories of advisors were created: (1) Sector Advisors (Figure 4) and subsector advisors (Figure 5), assigned to assist the province chiefs, the majority of whom were military men. (2) U. S. Special Forces Advisors assigned to aid the Vietnamese Special Forces (VSF) in organizing the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). The primary function of the VSP was to establish camps in remote areas and recruit local personnel. Their secondary function was to conduct programs to aid the local population. By the end of 1962, there were approximately 11,000 American advisors and support personnel in South Vietnam, including 26 Special Forces "A" detachments and 3 "3" detachments to provide the required command and control. These teams were assigned initially to the,American Embassy but reverted to U. S. Army Control in 1963. A-3 U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM (MACV) Info Commander DDR&E Officer (spec assist) Liaison (Liaison to RVN Joint Gen. Staff) ScA. Adv Deputy Commander Inspector Deputy to Commander for CORDS DOD Special General DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS Representa tive_____ Secretary Joint STF Combined Chief of Staff Studies Staff Jud Advocate Assistant Chiefs of Staff Personnel Comptroller MAP Intelligenci Directorate Component Commands U. S. Army 7th Air Construction Operations Vietnam Force Directorate III Marine US Naval Studies & Obs! Logistics Amphibious Force Viet Group (SOG) I Plans Comm Electronics Under operational^ control T" Civ Ops and Rev) Dev Supp (CORDsb I Field Force Air Force Republic II Field Force Vietnam of Korea Army Advis Gp Forces Air Force Ad Gp Vietnam 1st Phil Civ Act RVN 5th Spe Fore Gp RAAF Element 6th Psy Ops Bn Vietnam 509th Red Res Gp Mil Ad Gp of ROC Vt 525th Mil Int GP New Zealand Army Fee Vt [Roy Thai Mil Asst Gp Command ___ Operational Control...... Administration/Liaison Figure 2. U. S. Military Assistance Command^ Vietnam, February 8, 1962 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT ACofS, CORDS DEPUTY ACofS, CORDS Assistant for Executive Operations Secretariat MANAGEMENT RESEARCH & PLANS & REPORTS & SUPPORT ANALYSIS PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION Chieu Hoi RD Refugee Public Divis ion Workers Division Safety Division "Division New Life Pay Ops Development Division Division Figure 3 . CORDS Organization National Level A-5 ADVISORY TEAM PROVINCE (CHIEF) GOVERNOR Advisors of Military Units Other Area Representatives Operating SECTOR in Area ADVISOR of US Country Team: Naval USAID, USIS, Others Marine Personnel from US and Free Infantry World voluntary agencies Ranger . and other organizations. Artillery : Engineer ' Others ; : PARAMILITARY PSYOP/CIVIL. Housekeeping ADVISOR AFFAIRS 1st Sgt SECTION ADVISOR Comm NC SECTION Others as required INTELLIGENCE Advisors as ADVISOR required Artiller y SECTION Liaison, Medical Mobile, Tng Team Others OPNS x-Subsector Advisor Similar Organization, Smaller Staff Command -Coordination Advice Figure h. Type Advisory Team Structure (Sector) A-6 MAGV, r;. Military Assistance Command^ Vietnam SUBSECTOR ADVISOR ASSISTANT SUBSECTOR ADVISOR OPERATIONS/ LIGHT WEAPONS MEDICAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE INFANTRY ADVISOR OPERATOR ADVISOR ADVISOR *HEAVY WEAPONS ^-ENGINEER -x-PSYOP/ INFANTRY ADVISOR CIVIL AFFAIRS ADVISOR ADVISOR ^-Augmentation Depending on Requirements Figure 5. Type advisory structure, MACV, Military Assistance Command, MILGP subsector. A-7 During this period the South Vietnamese tried in vain to establish a workable pacification program. Early attempts failed due to the inability of the ARY1T to provide ax^a security and to the constant political turnoil v/ithin the South Vietnamese Government. The failure nay also havs been due in part to the fact that few advi sors were trained in Civil Affairs. By 1964, three somewhat overlapping U. S. advisory organizations, were functioning in Vietnam: Ths U. S. Information Service (USIS), the U. S. Operations Ilission (USGIl), and 1IACV. I.-1ACV personnel were military advisors, '.vliile the US CM (later the OCO, or Office of Civil Operations) provided civilian advice and assistance. 3y July..~U. S. troop strength had increased to 21,500 officers and raen. One hundred additional five-man sub-sector (district) advisory teams were- deployed during the period September-December 1964. Even with the continuing build up of U. 3. advisory personnel and strenuous efforts by the South Vietnamese goverment, the over all situation deteriorated markedly in 19&4. In an effort to counter this trend, the governmsnt instituted the HO? TAG (Cooperation and Coordination) program. The purpose of HOP TAC was to establish government control over the sire provinces around Saigon. Although the program did not achieve complete success because of the weakness of the government, it is credited with having saved Saigon. The EC? TAC concept was also applied in the other three corps areas, but was unsuccessful until after the 1965 buildup. Pacification efforts v/ere severely handicapped during 1965 by political instability. Leadership of the South Vietnamese govern ment actually changed hands nine times between 30 January 1964 and 19 June 1965. Ill-defined government policies and shortages of qualified personnel hampered the pacification effort. As a result, the government experienced a significant loss of poptilar support and serious doubts arose concerning the ability of South, Vietnam to withstand the pressure. A further sign of deterioration at that time was the failure of the .Revolutionary Development (PD) effort. This campaign, designed to rid the countryside of the insurgents, failed due to an insufficient number of ?J3 teams. Hot only were there too few tesias, but the existing ones received insuf ficient military protection and political support. What resxilts they achieved were quickly dissipated by subsequent fighting. Two near-simultaneous events in mid 1965, narked a major turning point-in the y/ar. One was the installation of the Thieu government. A-8 The other, the beginning of the accelerated U. S, military build up with, the entry of the 1st Infantry Division at Long Binh, the 101st Airborne at Cam Earth Bay, and two I-Iarine battalions at Da Hang and Qui Nhon. In 1965-6, subsector advisory teams were assigned to additional districts and Special 5'orces "A" Detachments assumed the advisory mission in many areas. Ey February 1, 1968, there were U.--S.. '' advisory teams in all 44 provinces. I.IACV teans operated in 33 provinces and Special Forces Teams in 6.-.provinces. There were also over 220 district advisory tear.s. Despite all efforts pacification was a disappointment and vsry little progress was achieved during the early part of 1965. ^ By July, however, after an input of alraost 300,000 U. S. troops a degree of political stability had been restored. This respite afforded the Vietnamese Government asuopportunity to redirect its attention to the pacifica tion effort. In parallel with the troop buildup, efforts were begun to bring some coherence into the "jumbled" organization of U. S. Llilitary and civilian units. Prior to llovember 1966 U. S. efforts to support the South Vietnamese pacification programs wore controlled and coordinated by the U. S ?1 Embassy in Saigon under the personal guidance of the Ambassador. ~As head of the "Country Teanr', he coordinated the efforts of three independent organizations: (1) USAID (forr.erly called U30!.l), which reported to the Agency for International Development and handled economic dev elopment programs. (2) IIA.CY, v;hich reported through the Pacific Command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (5) Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). 22This was a joint military-civilian mission, composed of personnel from the United States Information Agecny Vietnam, military personnel responsible for planning and other tasks, and a former USAID Division, which developed psyops policy and advised the Viet namese civilian psyops agencies. The organisational problem wea'-cened the AmbassadorJs control and direction of the overall U. 8. pacification effort since USAID, JUSPAO and I1ACV could bypass him in co.-3~s.uriieating with 7/ashington. To correct thiy situation, the Office of Civil Operations (CGO) was created in ITovember 1966 to coordinate field operations of all U. S. civilian agencies in Vietnam. CCO provincial teams were created in 1966. Previously, each civilian agency had its own representatives in the provinces with each representative working A-9 separately with the province chief to implement his agency's programs. With the creation of OGO, all contact with the province chief was "handled by the senior civilian representing OCO. IIA.CY' in turn, created the Revolutionary Development Division to coordin ate the military aspects of pacification. ^ On 9 I^ay 1S67, shortly after his arrival in South Vietnam, Ambassador Sllsworth Bunker established nev/ organisational relation ships. Responsibility for U. S. advice -and assistance in the field for pacification and HD support v/as assigned to I.IACV. A military- civilian structure, (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (COHD3) 7/as established to conduct the necessary planning, management, supervision, and advisory taslcs. The COHDS structure consisted of military and civilian staffs involved in field operations Ambassador Robert Komc-r became the senior civilian official, heading a small staff as Deputy to COI1U3I1ACV FOR CORDS (D3PCOHDS) (Figure 3). The U3ARV G-5 (Civil Affairs) officer's title was changed to Assistant Chief of Staff for C03DS. Less than a year later, the OCO provincial teams were joined with' "i;he ILA.CV teams into integrated provincial ILACV teay.3. (Figure 7) and a complex relationship between CG?2)3 and RVN organizations established (Figure 8). The corps level staffs were also modified. The most significant changes in the advisory organizational structure however.occurred at the province level. The sector advisory team v/as removed from the military (divisional) chain of command, and assigned to the corps staff organization for COHDS. The Province Senior Advisor could be a civilian v/ith a military deputy or vice versa. However, for security reasons most .of the advisors at the dt.strict level were military personnel. ' At each level, U. S. advisors worked daily with Vietnamese counter parts on all matters concerning the pacification effort. However, the relationship between the American advisor and his Vietnamese colleague v/as not clearly defined. >he advisor had no authority over Vietnamese officials arid military commanders, as there v/as'no agreement between the Government of South Vietnam and the United States on the role and responsibilities of the U. S. advisors. The only influence that an American civilian advisor could exert was through his authority to release USAID-provided goods at the provincial level. She sole'leverage of the U. S. military advisor lay in his ability to retain control over civic action funds. INTEGRATED PROVINCE ADVISORY TEAM Province Senior XXXXXXSC Advisor _L Deputy Province Advisors w/ARVN Senior Advisor Units"OPCON of Sector Administration Volunteer L Agencies Assistant Senior Advisor Asst Senior Advisor Civil Operations For Security J OIC QIC OIC OIC APA of Opns Trng Logistics PsyOps/Psy Ctr RF/PF Maint War 32 - S3 New Life Dev Agriculture Mil NPFF Supply Refugees OIC Intel Public Health Detachment Chieu Hoi Commander Deputy District District Deputy Senior Advisors Senior Advisors Senior Advisor Senior Advisor Figure ?. Integrated Provincial MA.CV Team A-ll 1 US ADVISORY ORGANIZATION Other Ministry Ministry Ministries for RD for Defense i JGS MACV I Corps Senior Adviso I Region CTZ (Force Cmdr) I Corps Dep Senio: Dep Advisor CORDS Div DTA/SZ Senior Advisor Command T Advise i OPCON Province Sector Province Senior Advisor LL V \ Adv f NPFF Xh- Adv is ) __.J Adv ___>> - f V s PRU RF/PF X. Adv District Senior District Sub sec tor e 1 Advisor T> 1 Figure 8. Advisory Interface Between CORDS and RVN Organizations A-12 The pacification effort sxiffercd temporary setbacks during the Tet and tlay offensives of 1968, both of \yhich seriously dacaged civilian property, cut lines of communication, disrupted , transportation, ant frustrated pacification efforts in outlying areas. To meet the challenge, the Government of South Vietnam and the U. 3. Govsrnn.-jnt formed the Central Recovery Committee. - The encouraging response subsequently sho-.vn by the Vietnanese people suj^ests that this quid:, reaction kept the pacification effort alive. Recent U. S. policy has encouraged increased participation and responsibility in the pacification effort among Vietnamese military and civilian authorities. It is too soon, hov.'ever, to ascertain the success of this policy of "Viet- naraizin^" the conflict. 'Appendix 2 sets forth a more detailed discussion of pacification programs for those '.?ho are interested in reading further into this problem. See Figure 9 for a representation of the advisory infrastructure. A-13 ADVISORY INFRASTRUCTURE MARCH 69 US I RVN Ambassador | "''President COMUSMACV wmtMM a IM-ITT HIT"'" RVN Joint DEPCOMUSMACV __,_.....'_ E General Sta _J IMiniMinistries ARVN USCORPS Senior Advisor Corps Co Field Force Command r ARVN DIV ARVN US DIV CO DIV CO ADVISOR ARVN REGT PROVINCE SENIOR ARVN LUS BDE CO RBGT CO ADVISOR ADVISOR SECTOR PROVINCE CHIEF CHIEF ARVN ARVN BN DISTRICT SENIOR BN CO ADVISOR ADVISOR US CMD/CONTROL SUBSECTOR DISTRICT CO CHIEF - RVN CMD/CONTROL MILITARY RVN CMD/CONTROL CIVILIAN ADVISORY FUNCTION VILLAGE CHIEF LIAISON HAMLET CHIEF Figure 9 Annex A FOOTNOTES 1. Virgil Key, The jJnitedStates Soldier in a rTonviplent Sole: An Historical Overviev/ (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Combat Operations Research Group, July, 1967), p. 83. 2. Colonel Joseph E. O'Leary, The Hole of the Llilitary Advisor in Counterinsurgency The Military Advisory Effort at Province andPistriet (Carlisle: U. S. Army 7/ar CollegeT" April, 1966) p.7. 3. See Chronology, Annex A, Appendix 1, p A-l-12. 4. O'Leary, op. cit. ? p, 8= 5. John I'ecklin, "The Struggle to Rescue the People," Fortune (April 1967), p. 130-31 6. O'Leary, op. cit., p. 8 7. Lieutenant IS.. L, '.Vinkler, "The Army's Special Forces." Array Diges (October, 1966), p. 27-31. 8. O'Leary, op. cit., p. 8. 9. Committee on Foreign Relations, op, cit., p. 9 10. Headquarters L1ACV "Guide for Province and District Advisors" (Draft 1 February 1968), Ch. 12. 11. AD1I U.S.G. Sharp and GEH W.C. Westnoreland, Report on the V/'ar in Vietnaa, (.Washington, D, C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969). 12. See chronology, Annex A, Appendix 1, p A-l - 12 13. Sharp and v'/estmoreland, ^£i__P_it_5 P« 89 14. Ibid, p. 89 15. "Vietnam: The V/ar Inside the ',Var," The Econoiuist, January 13, 1969, p. 36. 16. Sharp and WestBioreland, ££x_£it.«» P« 109 17. Eq. 11ACV, op. cit., p. iii. 18. Ibid., p. iii 19. Sharp and V/estiaoreland, op. cit., p. 116 20. Ibid., p. 126. A-15 21. Ibid. p. 233 22. Ibid. p. 233 23. Ibid. p. 233 24. Ibid. p. 233 25. Ibid. p. 233 26. Dennis J. Duncanson, G^overmnent and Revolution in Vietnam , (llevv York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 278. A-16 January 1970 APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX - A CHRONOLOGY OP EVENTS RELATIVE TO VIETNAM 1954 1968 In preparing this chronology the following source materials were employed: (A) Chronology of Events Relative to Vietnam, Vietnam Perspective, American Friends of Vietnam Inc. (August 1965); (B) Chronology of United States - Vietnam Relations 1949 1964, Department of State-unpublished;"and (C) Background^Infor mation relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (5th EeYised^dition), Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate; 91st Congress, 1st Session (March 1969). The source reference for each item is identified by the letters (A), (B) or (C). Troop introduction, movement and operation reports are based on articles appearing in the New York Times. In some cases the news item followed the event by several days. 1954 May 8 - July 21, Geneva Conference on Indochina. Joint chairman: Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. Conference mem bers: Prance, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia,Laos, Vietnam, and the Vietminh regime. Agreements signed July 20 and 21. Provisions: (1) Partition of Vietnam into the Forth and South at 17th parallel. (2) Restrictions on foreign military bases, personnel, and increased armaments. (3) Elections in North and South Vietnam to be held July 20, 1956 leading'to unification, and; (4) Establishment of an International Commission (ICC) to implement the Agreements. Neither the Government of South Vietnam nor the United States were signatory to the Agreements. (A) (B) (C) October 11. The Vietminh Communist regime takes official control of Hanoi and North Vietnam. (A), (c) 1955 January 1. Based on the pentalateral agreements of December 1950, United States promises direct A-l-1 1.955 aid for support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. (A), (B), (C) February 12. U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAA&) assumes training of South Vietnamese Army after command authority by French is relinquished. (A), (C) February 19. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) with its protocol covering Vietnam. Cambodia, and Laos, comes into effect. (A), (B), (c) July First appearance in South Vietnam of communist propaganda literature signed by North Vietnam*s "National United Front." (A) October 26. Republic of Vietnam proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem who becomes its first President. (A), (B), (c) 1957 May 5-19. President Diem visits the United States, address ing a joint session of Congress on May 9. Joint communique issued by President Eisenhower and President Diem, May 11, declares that both countries will work toward a "peaceful unificatio] of Vietnam. (A), (B), (c) October 22. U. S. L1AAG- and USIS installations bombed in Saigon; U. S. personnel injured. (A), (c) 195§ January 4. large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantation north of Saigon, showing the steady increase ( of Communist armed activity in South Vietnam since mid-1957. (A), (C) 1959 Viet Cong and bandit unrest, political and religious insurrection grow steadily in country side. (A), (B), (C) U. S. strength estimated at 700. A-l-2 1960 April 17. North Vietnam protests American presence in South Vietnam. (A), (c) November 10. South Vietnam charges regular azmy forces from North Vietnam attacking in Central Highlands. (A), (B), (C) 1961 April 3. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed in Saigon between Republic of Vietnam and the United States. Treaty ratified by Vietnamese National Assembly, June 14. (A), (B), (c) September 18. Communist forces seize provincial capitol. (c) October 18. President Diem declares a state of emergency, in South Vietnam; begins a series of consultations with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. (A), (C) November 16, With the approval of the National Security Council, and following the recommendations in Gen. Taylor's report, President Kennedy decides to bolster military strength of South Vietnam but not to commit'United States combat forces at this time. (A), (C) Two U. S. Army air support companies totaling 300 men arrive in Saigon, bringing U. S. total to 4,000. (C) February 8. U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, established under Gen. Paul D. HarfcLns. (A), (B), (C) , October. Disclosed U. S. forces in South Vietnam now risen to 10,000. December 29. Saigon announces that of a total of 11,182 strategic hamlets to be built, 4,077 have been completed, housing 39 percent of South Vietnam's population. (A), (c) A-l-3 1963. May 8. Buddidst riots erupt in Hue. (A), (B), (C) August 21. Diem proclaims martial law throughout South Vietnam to quiet unrest. (A), (C) September 14. Presidential decree brings end of martial law in Vietnam effective September 16. . (A), (c) November 2. Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, assassinated, Constitution suspended, National Assembly dis solved, .first of several military governments is set up. U. S. recognizes it. (A), (C) * November 22, President Kennedy assassinated. (A), (c) December 31, U. S. troop strength in South Vietnam novy 16,500. 1964 March 7. Maj. Gen. Khanh announces a'l-year reform program to rebuild South Vietnam's political and admin istrative structure and raise standard of living. (A), (C) April 15. SEATO declares defeat of Viet Gong is essential to security of Southeast Asia. (A), (C) April 25. Gen. William C. Westnoreland to replace Gen. Harkins. (A), (c) August 2. North Vietnamese torpedo boats attack U. S. destroyer Maddox in Gulf of Tonkin. (A), (C) August 4. Two U. S. destroyers reported attacked in Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson approves air v attack on North Vietnamese gunboats and bases. (A), (C) August 7. Congress approves Southeast Asia Resolution, authorizing aid to South Vietnam. (A), (C) August 16, Gen. Khanh elected President by Military Revolutionary Council; installs new constitution and ousts Gen. Duong Van Hinh as Chief of State. (A), (C) A-l-4 August 27. Revolutionary Council disbands; new Constitution'withdrawn. Gen. Khanh, Duong Van Minh, and T ran Thien Khiem named pro visional leaders. (A), (C) 1965 January 8. South Korea sends 2,000 troops to South Vietnam. (A), (C) February 7. Viet Cong attacks U. S. installations at Pleiku, President Johnson orders retaliatory raids against Communist bases, bridges, supply areas in North Vietnam. U. S. dependents ordered home. (A), (C) March 6. 3,500 Marines land at Da Nang. First commit ment of U. S. combat units. U. S. forces now total 27,000. (C) May 13. U. S. halts bombing of North Vietnam. (A) May 19. U. S. resumes bombing. (A) June. 173rd Airborne Brigade arrives in South Vietnam. (New York Times) June 16. U. S. announces additional 21,000 troops for South Vietnam, making total 70,000. (A), (c) June 20. Military junta headed by Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky comes to power. (A) June 28-29. U. 'S, Army troops in first major operation, in Zone D. (A), (C) i July. 101st Airborne Division arrives in South Vietnam. (New York Times) July 8. lodge replaces Gen. Taylor as ambassador. (A), (C) . July 28. President Johnson orders U. S. forces in South Vietnam increased to 125,000 promises more if necessary. (A), (C) August 18. Marines launch first big operation, at Chu Lai. (New.York Times) A-l-5 September. 1st Cavalry Division arrives in South Vietnam. (New York Times) September 18. Helicopters of U. S. 1st Cavalry Division committed to battle for first time, in Central Highlands. (New York Times) October. 1st Infantry Division arrives in South Viet nam. (New York Times) October 4. U. S. 173rd Airborne Brigade moves into Iron Triangle. (New York Times) December. 25th Infantry Division arrives in South Vietnam. (New York Times) December 24. Bombing of North Vietnam suspended as U. S. and allies begin "peace offensive." (C) 1966 January 1. U. S., Australian and New Zealand troops move into Mekong Delta for first operation. (New York Times) January 31. U. S. peace offensive fails, bombing of North Vietnam resumed after 37-day respite. (C) February 4. Operation Masher-7/hite Wing winds up in Binh Dinh province 1,047 Viet Gong killed. (New York Times) February 20. After three weeks, 4,000 Marines wind up Operation Double Eagle south of Quang Nang, Mil 210 Viet Cong. (New York Times) February 21. Americans and Koreans complete Operation, Van Buren in Phu Yen Province, kill 679 Viet Cong. (New York Times) March 25. Marine force lands at Rung Sat in delta south of Saigon. (New York Times) April 8. Operation Lincoln kills 453 Viet Cong in Pleiku, Phu Bon and Dariac Provinces. (New York Times) A-l-6 fiay 10. First of four Paul Revere operations begins west of Pleifcu along Cambodian border. Ends late November with 1,500 Viet Gong killed. "(New York Times) May 16. Operation Davy Crockett kills 374 Viet Gong in Rinh Dinh province. (New York Times) May 17. Operation Birmingham,, first major drive in Zone C along Cambodian border winds up with 119 Viet Gong killed, huge supply caches captured. (New York Times) June 2. 101st Airborne begins battle in mountains around Dak To, completed 20 June with 531 enemy killed. (New York Times) June 2. Operation El Paso 11 begins in Binh long Province. Ends July 13 with 855 Viet Gong killed, 1,500 tons of rice captured. (New York Times) June 29. First air raids on Hanoi-Haiphong area. Oil storage first targets, but quickly expanded to include factories, highways, railroads, trucks. World opinion-inflamed, (c) (New York Times) July 30. Bombing of DMZ begins. (New York Times) August. 4th Infantry Division and 196th Brigade arrive in South Vietnam, bringing U. S. forces to 300,000. (New York Times) September. llth Armored Cavalry Regiment arrives in South Vietnam. (New York Times) i September 11. South Vietnamese voters choose an assembly to draft civilian constitution for the country. (( September 15. U. S. troops move into Mekong Delta. (New York Times,.) October 24-25. Manila Conference of allied powers fighting in South Vietnam. President Johnson attends. Conference pledges to win war and then build better Asia, (c) A-l-7 December. 9th Infantry Division and 199th Brigade arrive, (New York Times) December 31. U. S. troop strength in South Vietnam reaches 389,000. U. S. battle deaths in Vietnam reached 6,644 while total wounded reached 37,738. (C) ^ 1967 January 1. Year opened with heavy fighting from the DMZ to the Delta. 177 clashes had occurred during the 48-hour New Year truce, (New York Times) January 7. Operation Cedar Falls begins to clean out the Iron Triangle. (Few York Times) February. U. S. 9th Division opens campaign from Dong Tarn to clear Mekong Delta. (New York Times) February 23. 45,000 troops open "Junction City" operation, war's biggest, to clear Zone C. (New York Times) March 15. Lodge retires as ambassador to South Vietnam, succeeded by Ellsworth Bunker, (c) May 14. 15,000 U. S. troops sent north to bolster forces in heavy fighting along DMZ. (New York Times) May 18. Marines move'- into DMZ for first time. (New York Times) May 23. Marines withdraw from DMZ, announce it is now a "free fire zone," and anything moving in it will be fired upon. (New York Times) June 15. Premier Ky says he believes 600,000 U. Si troops will be needed to defeat the Communists in South Vietnam, (c) July 1. Premier Ky withdraws from presidential race and agrees to run for vice president on the ticket of his rival, Chief of State Thieu. (New York Times) A-l-8 August 3. President Johnson announces plans to send 45 } 000 to 50,000 more men to Vietnam, to bring the total to 525,000 by June 1968. (c) August 8. New U. S, command headquarters, dubbed "Pentagon East," opens at Tan Son Hhut airfield. The $24 million complex houses 2,000 officers and en listed men, including Gen. Westmoreland and 15 other generals and Ambassador Robert Komer, special deputy to ?/estmoreland for pacification. (Few York Times) August 18. President Johnson tells news conference, in effect, that if Congress doesn't like what's happening in Vietnam it can repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. (Few York Times) September 3. Gen. Fguyen Van Thieu and Premier Ky elected president and vice-president of South Vietnam. American observers say voting was fair and turnout exceeded predictions, (c) September 4-5. Fighting breaks out from Delta to northern provinces. (New York Times) September 6. U. S. proposes that U. II. Security Council call for International peace conference in Southeast Asia. (New York Times) September 25. The Army's former Task Force Oregon, now the Americal Division, is operating in Vietnam. (Few York Times) October 3. North Vietnam rejects Johnson's latest offer of peace talks, (c) October 6. American casualties in Vietnam now exceed 100,000. (Few York Times) i October 10. 3,000 more Marines sent to DMZ. First bombing of area in Haiphong suburbs where helicopters and missiles stored and assembled. (Few York Times) October 30. Thieu takes oath as first president of South Vietnam's Second Republic. (Few York Times) A-l-9 November 6. U. S, bombers from Thailand, for first time, hit North Vietnam's largest military supply area at Giathuong. (New York Times) November 14. Thailand announces it will send 10,000 volun teers to South Vietnam. Marine Gen. Bruno A. Hochmuth killed in Vietnam helicopter crash, (c) November 20. 750th U. S. plane lost in the North. (New York Times) December 12. The largest and longest airlift undertaken of 6,500 members of the 101st Airborne Division brings the total number of American forces in South Vietnam to 475,000. (New York Times) Radio Hanoi broadcasts a December 24 statement by North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh that Hanoi "will hold talks with the United States on relevant questions" after the United States has "unconditionally" halted the Northern bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam. (C) January 30-31. The communists launch simultaneous attacks on major South Vietnamese cities, including Saigon, where they temporarily invade the grounds of the U. S. Embassy. President Thieu announces a total cancellation of the 36-hour Allied Tet truce. (C) January 31. President Thieu declares martial law throughout South Vietnam as the Communists continue their attacks on Allied bases and major cities. U. S. officials in Saigon state that the Communists had attacked more than half of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals plus 25 airfields, (c) February 13. Pentagon announces that the U. S. will airlift 10,500 additional troops to Vietnam in compliance with General Y/estmoreland's request. Assistant Secretary of Defense Goulding tells newsmen that no decision has been made to increase the author ized minimum level of U. S. troop strength beyond the current limit of 525,000. (c) A-l-10 February 24. U. IT. Secretary General Thant issues a report on his February 8-21 peace mission to various world capitals. He states that if the United States ended the bombing and other acts of war against North Vietnam, "I am more than convinced that meaningful talks will take place much earlier than is generally supposed, even per haps within a matter of a few days." He also says that it could be "reasonably assumed" that the question of Hanoi's not taking advan tage of a bombing halt "will be dealt with in good faith" at the ensuing talks. (C) March 4. According to Defense Department figures total U. S. troop strength in South Vietnam as of February 24, 1968, was 495,000. U. S. combat deaths stood at 18,799 (Jan. 1, 1961-Feb. 24, 1968) and wounded totaled 115,114, and 983 U.S. servicemen were missing and 238 were listed as captured. U. S. noncoiabat numbered 3,408. Total South Vietnamese Armed Forces strength was over 600,000 (this figure includes only the regular forces), and South Vietnamese combat deaths since January 1, 1961, numbered 56,966. Other free world forces totaled 61,000. Com munist strength was estimated at 223,000-248,000 plus 75,000-85,000 political cadres. Communists killed since January 1, 1961, totaled 300,262. (c) March/April U. S. announces unconditional cessation of the bombing of the North. "Peace Talks" agreement finalized, (c) (Hew York Times) November. President llixon elected; promised "honorable end to war". (C) (New York Times) Nixon, during meeting with Thieu, announces 25,000 U.S. Troops will be withdrawn from S. Vietnam by end of August. September 16 Nixon Announces 35,000 additional men to be with drawn by December 15. November 15-16 "Anti-war demonstration is held in Washington, D.C. Story breaks of massacre in March 1968 of several hundred S. Vietnames3in Mylai by U.S. Army infantry platoon. A-l-11 December 8 Nixon pledges that anyone charged with murdering civilians will be punished. December 15 Nixon announces an additional cut of 50,000 U.S. Troops by April 15, 1970. - A-l-12 U.S. THOOF3 IN VI3TMM EISENHOWSR Peb 12, 1955, It Gen John \7. 0'Daniel takes charge of training South Vietnamese Army...... 300 May 15, 1957, Defense Department states U.S. strength is now...... 692 KEMgDY Peb 1962, When Gen. Paul Harkins takes over new U.S. Military Assistance Command...... 4,000 October 1962...... i...... 10,000 Late Jan 1963...... 12,000 October 1963...... 14,000 JOHNSON End of 1963...... 16,500 July 1964...... 21,500 March 1965 Pirst Marines to Da Nang...... 24,000 May 1965...... 45,000 July 1965...... '..... 75,000 September 1965...... 125,000 November 1965...... 161,000 February...... 201,000 September 1966...... 305,000 End of 1966...... 400,000 End of 1967...... 475,000 End of 1968...... 530,000 Mid 1969, Maximum U.S. Troop strength...... 549,000 i Note: Above figures are made available by Associated Press A-l-13 Appendix 2 f (Pacification Programs) to Annex A (Historical Develop ment of U. S. Involvement in Vietnam) to STAFF -STUDY (THE IMPACT OP MILITARY BUILDUP Oft THE ADVISORY FUNCTION) 1. Introduction The subject matter of the staff study is not concerned directly with the nature, success, or failure of the various pacification programs participated in by U. S. military advi sors in Vietnam. However, a short description of some of the major pacification activities will contribute to an understanding of the role of the military advisor and the impact upon his role of the presence of large numbers of U. S. troops in Vietnam. Before proceeding further it may be helpful to define the term "pacification," as used in this staff study. Pacification may be defined as: The use of military and civilian personnel to restore law and order and the basic functions of government- education, administration, public health, etc. - in a region recently freed from guerrilla control. One im portant aspect of pacification is the uprooting of 'dormant' political agents and secret cells left behind by guerrilla fighters. The task requires close cooper ation between civilian police forces, administration personnel, and the military units assigned to pacifi cation. 2. Early Programs a. After the division of Vietnam in 1954, the Diem regime under took: to provide a viable government in South Vietnam. Barly efforts included resettlement of refugees from the north, re-btxild- ing of the economy and development of a political base of support for the government. As part of the latter action was taken against possible threats to Diem's rule, by the Hoa Kao in the south, the Cao Dai in the west and the Binh Xuyen, or so-called "river pirates. b 0 Between 1954 and 1959 the insurgency movement was involved in planning, organising, and establishing a clandestine infra structure T Much of this effort took place in the countryside where the insurgents hoped to retain freedom of movement, to establish bases at which they could recruit and train followers, and to-form resupply points and rest centers. c. Prior to mid-1961 U.S. forces in Vietnam consisted mainly of military advisors. Their primary mission was to advise the French and later, the Vietnamese in the use of U.S. equipment. During this period U.S. military advisors bad no overall political or economic mission in the country. Civic action .programs initiated by or participated in by U.S. military advisors resulted from indi vidual action. There was no overall or continuous American military civil affairs presence in Vietnam. The C.A. effort consisted pri marily of mobile training teams sent to Vietnam on specific .projects of short duration. The teams remained in the country only for short periods of time. d. It was initially assumed that civic action projects would be accomplished by ART/IT units since U.S. military advisors were located primarily at Cholon or with major ARVN units and not at sector (province), subsector (district), or small unit commands. To the extent the ARVN units were involved in pacification (i.e., an analgam of security, political, economic and psychological oper ations directed towards the civilians), the advisor to those units had a dual role. He was committed to advise the ARVN commander in accomplishing the military mission. Assumption of a pacification role added to the advisors' duties the additional burden of assist ing the ARVN commander in assisting the province, district, village and hamlet chiefs in various civic action endeavors. Civic Action activity included protection of the rice harvest and its delivery to market, construction of schools, operation of temporary medical dis pensaries, building market places, rebuilding the Mekong River area following the 1961 flood, etc. 3. Strategic Hamlet Program a. One of the first pacification programs undertaken by the Republic of Vietnam was the strategic hamlet program. This derived in part from the lesson of successful efforts undertaken by the British in Malaya to isolate terrorists from the population and to cut off their sources of food and supplies. This program was based on the prenise that government forces could cope more easily with guerrilla bands isolated from their supply base and ultimately could reduce insurgent activities to a low level. The plan fol lowed in Malaya v/as to gather the population from remote, insecure areas. They were then relocated in newly cre'ated villages in which they could be easily controlled. An important element in the Ualayan plan was to provide the people in these new villages with better housing, utilities, schools, health and sanitation and security than they previously had enjoyed. Another purpose was job retraining, particularly of refugees. In Malaya the military and civilian police forces were able to success A-2-2 fully coordinate security for the new villages. Pacification forces were also able to prevent supplies from leaving -the villages and reaching the terrorists, and to isolate the enemy mainly in the jun gles and to destroy him there. Many reasons are given for the success of the program in Malaya. Lack of a sanctuary across the border in a communist or neutral country, assistance provided by Thailand in pol icing LHalaya's short northern border, and the ethnic Chinese compo sition of the insurgents who could be easily identified, are examples. b. The immediate predecessor of the strategic hamlet program in Vietnam was an agroville program undertaken in 1959 and intended to create densely populated settlement areas in the countryside. These areas would be isolated from the insurgents and large scale military operations through the countryside, made possible. The program, carried on with U. S. advice and assistance in such matters as train ing village officials, pest eradication, health inoculation, and construction of schools and roads, failed for many reasons. Ho broad counterinsurgency plan was developed. The government lacked both tlie means to re-locate half a million persons and to improve the economic conditions of those who were moved. The Viet Gong inhibited construe^ tion of the agrovilles and rural people bitterly opposed being up rooted from their ancestral homes and subjected to an enforced labor system. c. Between 1961 and 1962 the agroville program was succeeded by the strategic hanlet program. As proposed by R. S. K.-Thompson, Dieia's British advisor and a former official in Llalaya, this program was intended to provide a total plan for combatting the insurgents. Basic elements of the plan included: (1) Intensive military operations to prevent the_ concentration of enemy main forces (2) Activation of carefully planned strategic hamlets at a rate consistent with the government's capabilities to support and protect them (3) Expansion of the area of government control by "clear and hold" operations intended to destroy the insur gent's political - military infrastructure (4) Organization of anti-guerrilla type operations in guerrilla controlled areas to harass the enemy (5) Control of the insurgents' communications and supply lines (6) Avoidance of large "fix and destroy" or "sweep" operations A-2-3 d. As announced, the plan was intended to carry out a political, economic.and social revolution to solve the problems of underdevelop- ment, division and "Coinnunism." The rural areas were the major objectives," and the strategic hamlets were the means of implementing the revolution. One assignment given United States military advisors was to help ARVU units implement the program. e. The strategic hamlet concept failed for many of the same reasons which led to the downfall of the agroville plan. One reason was the lack of an overall political concept of what was intended; another was the lack of effective organization and planning. For example, the Government did not prepare the peasants and local leaders for the program. Government simply imposed the program from Saigon through the channel of corps and division commanders to the provinces, districts, villages and hamlets. The relocation of people to newly built hamlets was another source of friction since it was frequently accomplished under conditions of duress and resulted in much loss of property. In many cases insufficient time was allowed to permit people to remove private property. Funds made available for construe- tion,for furnishing of dwellings in the new locations, for the purchase of seed or similar purposes often were insufficient or misappropriated. Social services designed to make life in the new villages appealing, were generally not made available in sufficient quantities. Instead of moving slov/ly and expanding the hamlets from relatively secure areas into neighboring less secure areas, the South Vietnamese Government attempted too much too soon. It embarked on a program to construct 17,000 strategic hamlets in a short period of time. Many of these were to be located in guerrilla-infested areas. The inhabitants of each hamlet were expected to build defences and to prevent nightly infiltration of guerrillas seeking food or recruits or to propagandize the inhabitants. By 1963 over 8,000 hamlets were allegedly completed. The speed with which many were built and the lack of sufficient planning, resources and trained administrators led to the creation of many partially completed or "paper" villages. f. Although the villages were meant to be anti-communist centers of resistance, many turned out to be anti-government. The-villagers often lacked motivation to resist Viet Cong infiltration. Many even harbored Viet Cong sympathizers. In some areas local Viet Cong cells were fenced in with the villagers. As soon as the government force left the area, the Viet Cong cells mobilized the people to destroy the fortifications. Many of the political cadres mobilized by the government party to indoctrinate the strategic hamlets were not suf ficiently qualified. They used their position for personal gain and failed to correct various injustices imposed upon the inhabitants. All too often, promised supplies were not forthcoming. A-2-4 g. The Viet Gong seized upon these failures. In response to the fenced-in hamlets, the Viet Cong countered with its own scheme of "combat hamlets," which minimized any forced relocation of persons and used locally-available materials to transform peaceful-looking rural settlements into fortresses. The Viet Cong also seized upon injustices perpetrated by the government's political cadres or ignored by the government. The Viet Cong not only eliminated many causes of injustice in areas controlled by them, but also removed the local government organization and corrupt local leaders. The Yiet Cong promised brotherhood and justice to the villagers once victory was achieved. h. The strategic hanlet program was also hampered by other serious flaws - lack of coordination within the civil-paramilitary effort to develop hamlets, and a lack of national campaign plans governing the employment of the ARVH. Civilian, leaders and military commanders did not pursue the same strategic objectives. Thus they were unable to provide coordinated direction to the country's efforts 4. Chien Thang Plan and Few Life Hamlet Program, 1964-1965 a. Following the November 1963 coup against the Diem regime, the strategic hamlet program was allowed to lat>se. Protection of . villages and hamlets was left to local, and provincial authorities. b. In 1964 the government of South Vietnam-proclaimed a victory or "Chien Thang" Plan. The concept was analogous to a spreading oil spot, ie., secure areas would first be strengthened to become .viable bases. Then control would be gradually extended along major lines of communication to less secure areas. More important, this was the first comprehensive Vietnamese program to combine civil and military efforts and resources. To implement this plan a high-level council was established in Saigon. The council was to determine policy, establish priorities, and allocate resources. MACV military advisory teams were established at province and district le"-}ls. Province councils were also established, composed of Vietnamese military and civilian members, United States military advisors, and representative of the U. S. AID mission and the JUSPAO (joint U. S. Public Affairs Office), a joint military-civil organisation representing the U. S. Information Service in Vietnam. c. The plan was put into effect hastily and was not effective but some lessons were learned, including the following: (l) Areas controlled by the government should be strengthened before attempting to expand the zone of control. A-2-5 (2) Strategic outposts which are difficult to protect or are liabilities in other ways should be abandoned.' Mobile military forces should be free to wrest the offensive from the-Viet Gong. (3) Extension of the area of control should be gradual. (4) Civilian and military pacification forces should identify themselves with the peasants whom, they are protecting. (5) Resources for pacification should be allocated from higher headquarters but detailed planning for the use of these resources should be accomplished locally. (6) Strict attention should be given to the adoption of mean ingful priorities. d. The central government was either unwilling or unable to allo cate sufficient resources to these programs in 1964- and 1865. Likewise, military reserves and, particularly, troops assigned a mobile force role, were diverted in 1965 to meet the expanding Viet Gong military threat in the Central Highlands. 5. RuralReconstruction or Rural Pacification, 1955; Revolutionary Development, 1966 to Present a. As early as 1864} a program hsd been started to train six-man covert groups, known as Advanced Political Action Teams. These consisted mostly of ex-Viet Gong agents. The teams were to enter communist-controlled hamlets to engage in counterinsurgency acti vities. Once they had killed or dispersed the communists, team members were to remain in the hamlet to help the people harvest rice and repair the damages of r/ar. b. The plan was subsequently expanded. Young men were selected from hamlets to undergo training, after which they were returned to their home villages to conduct political and development programs as members of Political or People's Action Teams, By 1969 there were some fifty thousand individual PJ) workers. Host were assigned to priority areas around Saigon, along the central coast in Binh Dinh, around Danang and in some areas of the Delta. It was contemplated that each RD team. 7/ould remain in its assigned hamlet for three to six months, then move on to another hamlet. Some teams were able to accomplish their goals quickly and nove on. More often teams had to stay in a hanlet for a year or longer. Many teams were able to achieve positive results and to instill a spirit and morale where it had been lacking previously. Others were mistrusted by the local populace, some even by their own villagers, particularly in contested places where cosmunist reprisals for cooperating with the government were coomon. A-2-6 c. An RD Team generally consisted of three main elements: (l") a staff of seven men responsible for command activities; (2) a Recon struction Inter-Team of 18 men responsible for determining the aspirations' of the people, motivating and assisting the people to build their own hamlets, planning self - help projects, and improv ing political, cultural, social and economic conditions; and (3) a Militia Inter-Team of 34 men responsible for security. When needed the basic RD Team was augmented from a province or GVN ministry and by other tailored groups to provide technical assistance or spec ialized skills. d. In November 1965 the Government of Vietnam published a Revo lutionary Development Plan directing provinces to develop integrated plans under the aegis of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and in coordination with, and approved by, ARVN division and corps commanders. Provincial plans also required the signatures of I.1ACV and USAID representatives. Thus in early 1966, the Vietnamese Armed Forces accepted for the first time a formal role in civic action. The plan, published by the RV1TAF, directed corps commanders to con centrate their efforts to support rural construction. In 1966 MACV likewise assumed responsibility for advising the RV1TAF on civic action as part of its mission. JIA.CV helped the Vietnamese Govern ment develop guidelines which became the basis for individual province plans, and it established an organisation within MACV to help carry out province plans. e. Civil Revolutionary Development activities began slowly in 1966 due to a shortage of trained RD cadres, delays in staffing various regional and provincial revolutionary development councils, and a shortage of local officials experienced in executing plans. The Vietnamese Armed Forces also failed to support RD 'to the extent planned. It became necessary to -give ARVil commanders and troops special training to enable them to carry out this function. By 1968 there were approximately 777 RD teams and 53,000 Vietnamese involved in this program. In 1966 after large numbers of United States and Allied Troops had entered Vietnam and were committed to military operations, more ARVU units were committed to RD activities. f. In 1967 a joint agreement between the United States and the Republic of Vietnam first established RD missions for ARVN and U.S. forces. ARVN'S primary responsibility was to provide military sup port to RD, whereas the primary responsibility of U. 3. and allied forces was to seek out and destroy VC/MVA main force units, base areas and lines of communication. The allies had a secondary mission to assist RD by providing security within and around their tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) and bases. A further refine ment in 1968 required subordinate headquarters to coordinate their military plans with provincial plans. Province chiefs were expected to develop their own plans using guidelines from above, but basing programs on anticipated available civilian and military resources within the province. In effect, the National Revolutionary Develop ment plan consistsd of 44 province plans and supporting military plans. Thus the concept of pacification was further refined.by combining priorities determined at the national level with programs developed and implemented at the local level. g. The increase in the number of ED plans and the delegation of planning and execution to the provinces complicated the v/ork of participating U. S. agencies. To some, the American effort became over-structured, over-computerized, and unrealistic in the use of criteria for estimating the progress of pacification. Through mid- 196? there were at least four independent U. S. agencies involved in civic action - the Embassy, MACV, USAID, and JUSPAO. Coordination among these was attempted by the establishment of a high level Mission Council and a lower ranking Mission Working Group. Prior to 1966 each agency operated individually in the provinces and each had direct access to the province chief. In 1966 the field operations of the U. S. civil agencies were conducted through the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). OCO placed all civilians in a province into a single organization headed by a senior civilian who had sole access to the province chief. OCO also existed at corps levels and had its headquarters in Saigon, where it provided advice directly to the Vietnamese Ministry of Revolutionary Development. h. A lack of sufficient coordination continued to exist between the U. S. civilian and military organizations. However, in mid- 1967, MACV assumed responsibility for U. S. advice and assistance on pacification and Revolutionary Development support. A military civil organization structure (CORDS) was established within MACV 1 to perform the necessary planning, management, supervision and advisory tasks. Briefly LIACV assumed responsibility for the manage ment and coordination of pacification programs. Although the separate U. S. civilian agencies continued to deal with their Vietnamese functional equivalents at the national level, pacifi cation support and direction ran to field agencies and commands through IIACV channels. Thus all aspects of the advisory effort below the national level came under the supervision and operational control of UACV. For example the Civic Action Branch at MACV was transferred to the Hew Life Development Division of MACCOHDS: the province advisory team at the province level reported directly to the corps staff organization for CORD5; and at the district level the subsector advisory team v/as removed from the division chain of command and merged with the OCO field Staff. High priority in the pacification effort was given at this time to the destruction of the A-2-8 Viet Cong infrastructure. Priority was also given to improving roads and highways to facilitate the flow of consumer products. The Tet offensive conducted by the VG and FVA at the beginning of 1968 was successful to the extent that all of the larger cities and towns suffered extensive damage and there were over 800,000 evacuees. There was a widespread withdrawal of Vietnamese security forces from the countryside to defend the cities and towns. These factors dealt the pacification program a. substantial setback, from which it did not regain its pre-Tet scope until the middle of 1968. However, changes were made in pacification plans to concentrate upon the nost pressing problems - the restoration of government control in the largest population centers and in areas which appeared to afford greatest expectation of success. 6. Summary .Some of the difficulties in achieving an effective pacification program have resulted from the fact that the insurgency was only the external manifestation of a political revolutionary movement. Historically, .Vietnam has not had effective national political institutions. This has been true particularly of the Republic of Vietnam since 1954. The government found it difficult to con solidate purely military achievements into a viable political order in the countryside because it was unable to knit together by political means the villages, hamlets and rural population with the central government and to develop widespread and favorable popular commitment. At the same time, The Republic of Vietnam has baen trying by force to stop the Communist expansion of their poli tical structure. The various pacification programs have been part of this effort, and have been used to gain control over rural areas cleared of enemy regular units. Force alone, however, has not been effective, and it has not prevented portions of the rural areas from slipping away from Saigon's authority. Whether or not clearly understood, political goals form the core of the pacification effort. However not much recognition has been given to the fact that the development of the various pacification programs have themselves formed the basis of a rev olution in the countryside. This is particularly true because the political structure of the villages and hamlets is rigid and resistant to change. The central government (in apparent recog nition of this) has attempted to impose a super-structure on the countryside in the hope that this would bring about security and order. It is still unclear, however, whether such efforts will give the villagers sufficient motivation to support the national government or, at. the very least, make them feel that they have a direct interest in national policies. A-2-S 1 Prancois Sully, Age of the Guerrilla, The Hew Warfare (New York; Parent Magazine Press, 1968), pp. 182-218. 2 lev/is Gulick, "Viet Village Lfopup Plans Laid", The Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1966 3 Robert Shaplen, Tiiae Out of Hanoi t Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia (Mew York: Harper and Row, 19691 4 John T. I/IcAlister, Jr., Viet Ham, The Origins of Revolution (iTew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 196S), pp. 1-14, 351-64. A-2-10 Annex B (Analysis of Available Information) TO STAFF STUDY (THE ' IMPACT OF MILITARY BUILDUP ON THE ADVISORY PUIICTICKl) The study team employed several techniques to determine the effect on the advisor's role of the introduction of large con tingents of non-indigneous troops. Questionnaires were dis tributed to former advisors, personal interviews were conducted and- an extensive literature search was made. In addition, two unit officers were able to contribute directly to the study based on recent experience in South Vietnam. The least productive information source: v/as the literature search. There are numerous books and articles about Vietnam, but few dis cuss the advisor's role. Some classified literature was reviewed at the U.S. Amy V/ar College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The study team concluded that the topic could be adequately covered without the use of these sources and that a more useful paper would result if v/ork continued at the unclassified level. A detailed discussion and analysis of the questionnaires, interviews, and literature follows: a. Results and Analysis of the Questionnaires Of the one hundred eightyr-seven questionnaires (Annex D) mailed to former advisors, seventy were returned to this unit. Twenty-seven of the seventy were incomplete or returned with the comment that the recipient either was not an advisor or was in South Vietnam before the introduction of non-indigenous troops in June 1965. Forty-three of the officers responding had served at some time as Sector or Subsector advisors or had had. command authority over sector advisors. Of the latter group,-nine'had had experience prior to June 19S5 and seventeen had served in the IV Corps or other areas where they had had no contact with non-indigenous forces Of the remaining eighteen officer's, three had had two tours of duty in Vietnam, serving both before and after the.introduction of non-indigenous troops and one had had three tours, the last in a civilian capacity. * Despite the rather snail number of respondents who had had the full range of experience, i.e., both before aid. after the introduction of large numbers of U.S. and Allied combat troops, the questionnaires did provoke a great deal of interest on the part of the respondents. This became apparent after a review of the answers. Many respon dents devoted a great deal of time and effort to answering indi vidual questions. Some answers could almost be classified as complete essays. A sample tabulation of questionnaire responses (Appendix 1 to this Annex) will give the reader some idea of the responses received and the difficulty of tabulating them. One of the most significant problems noted by respondents was the lack of formal doctrine governing relations between the advisor and the commander of the non-indigenous troops operating in the advisor's area. Each man responded to a different chain of com mand and much needed lateral relations were poorly defined. Tactical battalion or regimental commanders were expected to maintain contact with ARVTT forces. In actual practice, close coordination appeared to exist only during periods of joint operations. At other times coordination was almost non-existent. U. S. commanders have even been reported as withholding informa tion from AHYiJ coritaanders and from advisors for fear of compromi- . sing security. Consequently, the advisor was often left in the dark about planned tactical operations. This lack of communica tion also affected the U. S. tactical force conmandsr by depriving him of the wealth of local information that could have been sup plied by the U. S. Advisor. Advisors also complained that U. S. troop comr.anders tended to use them improperly as instruments for transmitting orders or instructions to their counterparts. Admittedly, some advisors indicated that excellent rapport ?;as established with the tactical troop cornmander, but such rapport depended more on the personal characteristics of the individuals involved than on the almost non-existent doctrine. The basis of this problem appears to be the inherent contrad ictions between the objectives of tactical "search & destroy" type missions and the civic action building .programs. The advisor 'considered himself better qualified to assess the over all value of a tactical operation, i.e. to determine whether it is likely to inflict greater damage on the enemy or on the local South Vietnamese population. Tactical commanders usually held a narrower "combat-oriented" view of the overall operational re quirements f The attitudes were reflected in the questionnaire responses as is evident in the direct quotes given below: "Tactical units had a kill VG mission which determined all actions, The advisory mission was pacification. The perceived requirements B-2 of these_two missions were frequently conflicting," "No official relationship (versus tactical coasaander). All relations were based on coordination and personality." "The U. S. tactical forces coordinated with advisory team only when our services were thought important to success of their raission« Our recommendations at other times were for the most part disregarded." "The U. S. Tactical Commander or his staff tend to direct that certain things do or do not take place. This puts a bux*den on advisors..to coae up with an answer, but it will not always be fact. The advisor is still an advisor, is an advisor, is an advisor. This fact apparently eludes U. S. Commanders..." "...many U. S. Commanders began a military operation within our area without any prior coordination with us, completely ignorant of the situation." "I was held responsible for what was or was not accomplished by the Vietnamese, but had no authority." "U. S. Forces totally usurped the offensive operational aspects and pushed the Vi' units into the backgrounds to serve as "rear guards". This damaged morale and pride of my unit which had operated with considerable tactical success." "Senior officers unaware of basic problems. .Tactics taught to Jr. officers at basic school were not even utilized. Before going to TO I read S^treet Without Jog & other books. I thought there v/as a lesson to be learned - instead I found my superiors following the example set by the French." "U. S. MACV & U. S. Tactical Commanders consistently attempted to implement U. S. plans"and policies through the advisory chain. Higher officers in the advisory chain, including U. S. tactical commanders were hesitant to push their Vietnamese counterparts. Instead they relied on lov/er level advisors to implant their ideas." "I had no authority except over U. S. field advisors; however, Senior MACV & Corps Advisors and U. S. tactical commanders at tempted to hold me (and other advisors) accountable for Vietnam ese units even though we had no authority over them." "They were out to van their spurs, lacked understanding of the Vietnamese and the advisory effort - more important, they didn't Another significant problem concerned the relationship beWeen the U« S. troops and the Vietnamese population. Besponses refer to specific cases of overreaction by tactical forces to hostile fire from an ordinarily friendly hamlet, killing or wounding of aniirals and nuaerous traffic accidents in built-up areas. Im proper or undisciplined behavior of U. S. troops in -"their relations with the Vietnamese people, losses of crops during tactical oper ations and problens arising out of combat operations % in' populated areas all were matters of continuing concern. In those cases arid many others, the advisor was required to explain, apologize for, repay, or repair the danage. Such activity by U. S. troops generated hostility towards all Americans, and particularly the U. S. military. Hot all of the feelings generated were bad. In a few instances soae advisors reported a favorable reaction to wards the U. S. Troops. For Example: "Lly reaction v/as that the Vietnamese reacted favorably to the larger involvement of the U.S. troops, especially in our (U. S,) cornnittnent to tactical operations." In general, though, advisors comments on U. S. troop behavior were negative: "Off-duty Marines in Hue and Da Hang were disgraceful and caused much friction." Host Vietnamese view entry of largs scale U. S. forces as disruptive and the security benefit short lived since the forces normally pulled out after accomplishing . the mission - I'he VC returned with vengeance." "U. S. troops solidified the hold of a less than popular govern ment on the lives of the rural population." "U. S. Marines treated Vietnamese, military and civilians, cavalierly, (as did the 101st Airbom^." "Arrogance of ROK troops towards Vietnamese created problems." Many of the probleas were economic in nature, ' 'he introduction into the South Vietnamese economy, already in a perilous state after long years of war, of many free-spending U, S, troops armed with what the Vietnamese considered vast quantities of money r/as a nsar-disaster. Since the U e S. troops were the pri mary source of demand for many iteas, local merchants pushed prices steadily upward until they were far above the buying power of the B-4 average Vietnamese. Often this caused resentment towards the Americans in the local community and sone doubt as to the sincer ity of their intent to help the local people. In many areas a double standard of prices v/ent into effect, one for the Americans and a lov.'er one for the Vietnamese. This occasionally helped to counteract the inflationary effect of the U, S. troops upon the economy. Another unpleasant sociological manifestation was that the normal earning patterns changed drastically. Thus, for example, a wife could earn more as a laundress, mess hall worker^ or PX employee than her husband in his everyday job. '. The advisor, in attempting to assist his counterpart' in creating a stable, viable economy, was faced with the problem of discover ing an outlet for a surfeit of currency. In addition, the mobile concept of U. S. force deployment produced a substantial number of "camp followers" who carried goods, services and the like to U. S. troops, thus adding to the economic headache that the advi sor had to cope with. Some of the specific comments on this problem that were encountered in the questionnaire are listed below: "The population generally became p-rfcerialistically inclined - pre cipitated in part by large scale £1 giveaway: VII men disliked Americans because of prostitution activities - everyone was out to get the dollar'." "The arrival of the USI.1C had caused financial inflation that had driven many commodities out of sight for Vietnamese^," "Among the major problems....was one.of monetary inflation. This caused untold resentment and confusion among the poor people near Da Hang." "Local business and merchants took advantage of U. S. troops' free spending habits and the peasantry found all items priced out of their .income level." ~ " * '> "Inflation played havoc with local population and particularly with fixed salary government employees, civil and military." "Everyone (VIT's) turned to give hot pursuit of the G-.I. dollar - by hook & crook." "..the local farmers could not meet the price increase of their basic needs." "Inflation became rampant, cost of living too high; most VN suf fered to some degree." B-5 "Economically, inflation 'guillotined 1 Vietnamese bourgeoisie, including uy counterpart. U. S. troops bought up all ice in Bin Dinh Province. The local fishing industry suffered accordingly." In a few instances, the ex-advisors felt that the introduction of the troops had been beneficial to the economy. However, this feeling was not borne out by other questionnaires, interviews, and literature, and therefore must be considered as a minority opinion. The questionnaires covered a broad spectrum of other comments and opinions. In the field of civic action, one conm'ent was that the arrival of U. S. forces in an area meant an increase in G 5/ S-5 assistance. However, this often caused coordination problems for the advisor due to a disorganized, overlapping, as one advisor put it "overexuberant civic action program.." Some specific quotes follow: "Were provided with civil affairs personnel to assist in control- ing overexuberant and misdirected U. S. Civic action activities." "...the long range solution to the problem will not be furthered by having U. S. Officers do things for the Vietnamese - that their officials must learn to make their government machinery function." One advisor responded that the introduction of U. S, forces .into his area resulted in a restriction of movement for the civilian populace. Other advisors reflected the idea that non-advisory personnel did not understand the Vietnamese government, customs, or psychology. This resulted in many problems arising in cases requiring coordi nated effort. Specifically: "The next cost serious problems were the requirements to accept the conceptual 'differences between II. S. and VN systems of disci pline, troop welfare, and training." "Only basic problem was one of educating U, S. unit personnel to the complexities of Vietnamese political, social cc military affairs and attitudes. This lack of appreciation and understanding pro duced some needless casualties." Lastly, several advisors commented that the influx of non-indig enous troops in their area boosted the.morale of tha civilian population and gave additional confidence to the AHVM and KP/P3? forces. E-5 k* Analysis of the Interviews Fifteen (15) interviews v/ere conducted v/ith former advisors at the U. S. Army V/ar College, Carlisle, Pa.; the Institute for Stability and Strategic Operations, Ft. Brags, Horth Carolina; and the U. S. Army Intelligence School, Ift. Holabird, Maryland. Those interviewed included one I la j or General, Four Colonels, three Lieutenant Colonels, four Majors, one Captain, and two Lieutenants. Their assignments were as follows: four corps advisors, two Sector Advisors, two sub-sector advisors, one ARVU Unit Advisor, and one KOIC Corps Advisor. In general5 the interviews supported the information obtained from the questionnaires. As the interviews were conducted at different locations and by different team members, the questions asked -;ere not identical. This fact makes a statistical tabulation of the results difficult. A sutanary of the interviews is presented in Appendix 2 of this ANITBX. Study Team members conducting the interviews were impressed by the frequent enotional responses of those interviewed about problems they encountered as advisors. Host often these occured during dis cussion of their relationship with, local commanders of U. S.. combat units. Five advisors expressed themselves on the clarity of definition of their roles. Of these, only one stated that his role was clearly defined. Seven of the respondents stated that there was a lack of coordina tion between U. S. tactical conmanders and the advisor. On the other hand, three of the more senior advisors maintained that the relations v/ere good to excellent. Six of the interviewees indicated that their relations with U. S. civilians were not good. Five advisors indicated that -their relations with the military tactical commanders were strained, while two thought that these relations were good. One of the advisors made the following specific statement: "Civic action conducted by tactical U. S. ccr.bat forces is designed to complement the on-going national development programs concerned v/ith institution and nation building. In Vietnam, the Govern ment's Revolutionary Development Program is the vehicle for 3-7 change,. -The U. S. advisors at all levels assist the Revolutionary Development Process, Since this is a long-range nationvri.de program, all facets of budgeting, planning and establishing priorities must be considered. U..3. tactical elements are not nonaally concerned with the revolutionary development program of the South Vietnamese Government. They conduct operations in areas that are considered insecure and therefore have not been marked for revolutionary de velopment. In these areas, civic action is conducted. Doctrinally, all civic actions are coordinated with local indigenous officials through, the advisory elements. Difficulties arise whc;n tactical units fail to coordinate their activities (this require)? contact between S-5 and advisors). At times military units may'provide civic actions support in areas marked for RD but this must be closely coordinated. 15 One of the ex-advisors criticised the proliferation of uncoordi nated civic action projects initiated by tactical units. He stated that in his area a large number of orphanages were built by the tactical units. As there were not enough orphans to fill these newly created establishments, they v/ere bussed from orphanage to orphanage during various inspection trips by VI?'s. This was done to forestall criticism of the programs. The introduction of the troop units also detracted from the ef fectiveness of the advisor. Tactical coonanders often felt that the ARV2T Commanders and the D. S, advisors had failed, and that they were there to bail theia out and win the war. The interviews with both middle and lower grade officers disclosed their feelings that too many officials and YIP'S visited Vietnam. The visits required time, materials, and resources, and also de tracted, from the time available to fulfill the advisory function. There appears to be a dichotomy of opinion between the senior officers int'ervie'.ved and .those in a middle and lower advisory capacity, 1" ^he corps level advisors felt that all was well between the civilian and military efforts 5 and that there was no conflict between pacification and tactical operations* The lower level advisoL-s stated that problems existed in both areas. All advisors interviey/ed agreed, however, that CORDS provided a better solution than the previous systems of duplicate and competitive military and civilian organizations. At one installation where five ex-advisors v/ere interviewed, a most interesting; disagreement arose between the interviewees about 3-8 the adequacy of doctrine. One officer felt that present doctrine was adequate, merely unreadj another felt that these complex relationships cannot be reduced to doctrine. The three others felt that some doctrine should be formulated to relieve the situation and reduce con flicts. They envisioned a document which would give the advisor more authority, better understanding of his work, and a tool with which to carry out his work. Another comment heard several times was that U.S. personnel tried too hard. Used to the American way of getting a Job done, they failed to understand that other societies had ways of doing things that differed markedly from their own. All of the interviewees felt that the ARW was doing a-.basically good job, but that it could not do the whole job without assistance. Several officers felt that we were doing too much and tha't ARW should be left a larger share of common tasks. c. Analysis of. Literature Although many books and articles have been written on the Vietnam con flict, few discuss the advisor's role. Even fewer consider the relations of the advisor with the U.S. and Allied tactical commanders in his area. A discussion of some of the pertinent literature follows. 1 FM 31-73 "Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations," published in October 1967, provides considerable guidance to the advisor on dealing with his HC counterpart and with representatives of U.S. and interna tional agencies. It also provides a wealth of information on how to conduct a vide variety of combat and related operations. It does not, however, provide him with procedure or authority to assure that his knowledge is taken into account by U.S. or Allied tactical commanders in the planning and conduct of operations in his area, regardless of how important this knowledge may be in achieving the U.S. long range objectives. 2 FM 31-25 "Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine," published in December..1967, provides considerable guidance to the advisor and some authority.'' For example s it says that "When the U.S. provides combat support and combat service support units to the HC, U.S. advisors normally will exercise operational control over these forces." But it too fails to clarify the relationship of the Advisor to the U.S. and Allied tactical commanders. FM. 41-10 "Civil Affairs Operations,"published in October 1969, re quires that U.S. tactical commanders inform the advisor of plans for operations in his area, but like the others, it does not provide a means' for assuring that his knowledge and recommendations are considered. B-9 A semi-official manual; "_A_ Guide to Military; Civic Action" discusses the civic action problems encountered by the U.S. military and attempts to outline methods for their solution. ..^L _ Among other things it states: "The xlnerican soldier performing a civic action mission in a foreign country is confronted with the challenge of convincing unfamiliar people to accept his assistance and advice in undertaking projects which he hopes will be beneficial to them." "In confronting people with different cultural and social values. Americans bring with them values acquired over a lifetime. Americans can easily fall into, the trap of attempting to iuposG rAmerican ideas and beliefs on the host country people.,." ' This manual also attempts to provide guidance to he American soldier by outlining rules for effective behavior and in general supple:lento the U.S. Army doctrine established by F:I 41-10. In addition, the Department of Defense EL! 31-73, "Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency" provides a ready pocket-size reference manual for the advisor. This document, however, does not en vision a large-scale U.S. tactical force as being present in the host country. It does clearly state that the advisor is only an advisor: "Orders to host country forces or agencies cannot be given by U.S. advisors. Senior advisors, when conducting in spection trips wit/lout their counterparts, cannot usc,,3ubordinate advisory personnel to order his unit to take action," In spite of r - the above mentioned doctrine and semi-official, guidar.ce, the non-of.7i.cial literature indicates that the advisory role is plagued v/ith contradictions. As early as 1S65; Col, B,P» Denno recognized the problems and attempted c to describe them in an article published in "Army" magazine."' One interesting aspect discussed is the different at titude' that the local personnel may have toward the conflict. Col. Denno states: "To the counterinsurgent, war becomes .not B-10 merely an unpleasant interlude but a way of life - perhaps the only life he's ever known. Adjusting to this life he has learned to pace himself for the long pull he is certain lies ahead. He attempts to enjoy as many as possible of the delights of normal living (such as marrying and rearing a family). He does not re gard "wartime service" as a temporary suspension of normal living as his U. S, advisor does. His resulting attitude is not always appreciated by an American advisor who resents what sometimes strikes him as his counterpart's eight-to-five-o'clock attitude towards his nations' supposedly life-or-death struggle." The author also quotes a Philippine report that states: '"It is also quits evident that the rush-rush nature of the American , 3.Yay of doing things simply is far out of mesh with the slor/ and delib erate Asian way of getting things, done." The author goes on to make iuany excellent points about the relations between the advi sor and his indigenous counterpart. One must realize that the conditions described by the author are very pertinent to the present situation, and are equally well applicable to the tac tical troop commander and to the advisor. Failure to take these conditions into account will definitely lead to the problem conditions described by the questionnaire respondents and inter viewees, A Rand Corporation paper, presented by Mr. Daniel Ellsberg ? discusses some of the lessons that can be learned from our experience in Vietnam. One of them is: "To give advice in the hope that all of one's ovm preferred tactics or instruments can and will in fact be adopted is often terribly unrealistic; and it can be dangerous and even irresponsible if we know that this is not the way it is going to be. It is very important in design ing and giving advice*..to ask oneself how likely that advice is to be carried out." Mr. Ellsberg continues: "As we have increased our presence mili tarily, economically, politically and in every other way, we have, of course, demolished the society of Vietnam."13 In addition, Mr. Ellsberg states that a great deal of the destruction caused by U. S. tropp presence in' South Vietnam is unavoidable, as it is our military doctrine to employ armed artillery and heavy bombing to avoid casualties. "The lesson which can be drawn here is one the rest of the world...has drawn more quickly than Americans have: that, to paraphrase H. Hap Brown, bom'iing is as American as cherry pie. If you invite us in to do your hard fighting for , . you then you get bombing and heavy shelling along with our troops." In May of 1968, a Washington Post reporter, Ur. Ted Sell, wrote an article entitled: "Younger Military Critics of Viet Policy Emerging into Position of Pov/er." In his article, Mr. Sell implies that "There is no monolithic unity in military thinking on Vietnam." He further states that the divisions run along age lines, and concludes as follows: "...if the advisors were to make the army a good one, the society v;hich produced the soldiers would have to be improved to provide a motivation for good soldiering." He feels that the younger officers were attempting to bring about radical improvements in the Vietnamese scene more rapidly than the present U. S. doctrine of gradual persuasion would permit. As nany of these junior officers reach higher positions, Hr. Sell believes that they will have more impact on the politico military scene in South Vietnam. ' < i Another 'Washington post article "Boredom is U. S. Teams' Other Foe," by Mr. Lee Lessage states that: "Llore often, three or four military operations are run each week and the advisor joins them only if M.s Vietnamese counterpart, the district chief or a top aide, does. In some districts this means never." A January 1969 article in the T/asnington Post "Pacification: Merely a 'numbers Game' by Llr. David Hoffman implies that the U. S. tactical coraraander and the U. S. area advisor do not see eye-to-eye on the subject of pacification (i.e c civic action). In "ir. Hoffman's words: "The U. S. 25th Infantry Division and local U. S. advisors in HaungMa, Tayninh and Binh-cloung Provinces do not see eye-to-eye to put it politely. And the liind of friction between them exists-though to a uuch lesser degree throughout South Vietnam according to U. S, sources. Pacification officials pri vately complain that the 25th does not understand their effort to implant democratic institutions at the rice-roots level, \7hile praising the Division's battlefield agressiveness, U. S. province and district advisors say the 25th views pacification as a charade? a kind of numbers game tied to the Paris Peace Talks...There are ten South Vietnamese districts in the 25th's 2000 square mile tactical area of responsibility and within the confines of each the division has anchored a full battalion to support the local pacification'program. The.pressure is to upgrade hanlets class ified by the'much maligned lamlet Evaluation Systec-from "contested" (by the Vietcong) to "relatively secure," or from VC-controlled to contested....American field grade advisors are under considerable pressure to produce positive results in their districts and prov inces, They complain that failure to do so sometimes is reflected in their periodic fitness report, which weighs heavily at promotion time." A former U, S. Aray medical officer who served in Vietnam, Dr. Gordon S. Livingston, wrote a highly critical article on the U. S. effort in the September 20, 1969 issue of Saturday Heviev/. Some B-1S excerpts of this article are given below: "...at an operational level most Americans simply do not care about the Vietnamese... This arrogant feeling is manifested in a variety of ways, from indiscriminate destruction of lives and property to the demeaning handouts that pass for civic action...In the area of medical civic action it was policy to give no more than a tv/o-day supply of medicine to any patient lest the excess fall into Vietcong hands. Since visits to any given village are generally infrequent, this meant that the illusion of medical care was just that...Colonel Patton...received numerous decorations while pursuing unrelent ingly the one major criterion by which a commanders' performance is judged: the body count. He v/as able to make the appropriate public noises about the importance of civic action, but ( ihe v/as never more honest than the night he told his staff that the present ratio of 90 per cent killing to 10 per cent pacification is just about right: "Obviously, the above statements are colored by personal feelings, nor/ever they do reveal that there are deep conflicts between civic action and military objectives. A similar topic is covered in a V/ashington Post article byJ.tr. Robert G. Kaiser titled "I.Iany GI's Dislike Viet Allies." y This article - observes that not only do many Americans dislike theVietnamese, but that this feeling is reciprocated by the latter. On the other hand, the article states: "Soldiers working with the Vietnamese in advisory jobs seen much more likely to like the locals than GI's in American units." Recently, however, the emphasis has shifted towards "Vietnamization". This has been generally de fined as an ever-increasing effort to place more of the total burden on the South Vietnamese, with the U. S. doing less actual fighting. Before this effort began, the American presence in Vietnam had almost become oppressive. As former Secretary of Defense Mr. Clifford stated, after his latest tour of South Viet nam: "I returned home oppressed by the pervasive Americanization of the war..." 21 A "Time" article describes this approach quite well. The article states: "From 1965 until last year, most ARVK units were"engaged largely'in 'pacification work, while the Americans took over the major combat role, 'naturally' said a U. S. General, we felt that we could do the job better and faster and of cotirse, ARV1T worked less and less. Unfortunately, once you imply that a fight ing force is second-rate, and treat it that way, it becomes pretty hard to reverse the trend." The article concludes that only time will tell if Vietnanization is successful. However, if there is a miscalculation, there is no second chance. This is the gamble that the U. S, is presently taking. In the meantime, U. S. units in Vietnam are emphasizing civic action; , 3-13 The irapetus to this policy was given by General Abrans and it has been "quite successful. An article by Richard Eoraan in the Washington Post. "Brigade spurns killing, finds pacification vans results." describes the new emphasis on pacification efforts made by the 173rd Air borne Brigade to devote 100 percent of its tine to purely paci fication type tasks. Brigadier General John W. Bames, the C.O. of the unit, stated that freed from, combat, "several thousand soldiers from the brigade became advisors to the Vietnamese militia." The end result was that after three months'^ 72 percent of the population v/ere under government control, Vietnamese militia units were carrying out successful military operations, and civic actions projects were flourishing. As BG- Bames stated: " O ..the United States is not a nation of killers." Thus pacifica tion appeared to be the best way to achieve success. d. Summary We have attempted in this section to give the reader some idea of the problems encountered by the study team during the course of this project, V/e would, like to point out that the questionnaire drew strong opinions fron the many respondents. Interviews too resulted in equally strong opinions on the topic of this paper. Available literature mirrored the conflicting opinions on the conduct of the wax expressed in the questionnaires and interviews. We feel this section will give the reader considerable insight into the croblenis of the advisor in Vietnam. B-14 ANNEX B 1. Department of Army FM 31-73* Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency Washington, D 0 C«, April 19^9 2. Department of the Arrny FM 31-25 Stability Operations U. S. Army Doctrine, December 19^7 3. Department of the Army FM ^1-10 Civil Affairs Operations, October 1969. k. 300th Civil Affairs Group A Guide to Military Civic Action Washington, D. C., July 1969 5. Ibid, p. 53 6. Ibid, p. 57 7. Ibid, pp 62-61* 8. FM 31-73 op. cit. 9' Bryer F. Denno, Advisor and Counterpart Array, July 1965* 10. Ibid, p. 26 11. Ibid, p. 27 12. Daniel Ellsberg, SomeLe ss ons^_F_ro m Failure in Vietnam RATJD Corporation Paper p-^3067~July~~19^9~ 13- Ibid Ik. Ibid 15. Ted Sell, "Younger Military Critics of Viet Policy Emerging Into Positions of Power" The Washington Post, I]5 March 1969. 16. Lee Lessage, "Boredom is U. S. Teams Other Foe., The Washington Post. 17. David Hoffman "Pacification Merely a Numbers' Game", Washington Post, 18. Gordon S. Ivington, MD, "Letter from a Vietnam Veteran" Saturday Review, September 20, 1969, pages 22 & 23. 19. Robert G. Kaiser, "Many GI's Dislike Viet Allies", The Washington Post. 20. Clark M. Clifford, "Cliffords' Conversion From Hawk." The Washington Post, June 22, 1969. 21. "Can Vietnaraization Work. "Tims" p. 25. 22. Richard Hofman "Brigade Spurns Killing, Finds Pacification, Washington Post, October 11, 1969. B-15 January 1970 Appendix 1 (Sample Tabulation of Questionnaires) To ANH3X B (Analysis of Available Information) To STAFF STUDY (THE IMPACT 0? MILITARY BUILDUP ON TIffi ADVISOHY FUNCTION) Question A-3: "Was the advisory function tinder the control of the U. S. tactical commander in the Area?" Yes - 7; No-11. ARVI'T Advisor replies not tabulated. Comment: Of those answering "yes," one was unclear about the situation in September, 1955, when he departed Vietnam, and one indicated "nominally." It was expected that only those "Sector Advisors" who were special forces tescu members or those who were indicating actual influence of a senior U. S. Tactical force Com mander, would answer yes. But some respondents advised they answered "yes" because, after COEDS was established, the' Uti S. Field Force Commander-a tactical commander-was also in command of all "sector advisors" through the COEDS chain of command. Others explicitly ignored this technicality. The question, therefore, contributes little to this study. Question A-4: "If not, do you think the function would have been more effectively performed if it had been placed under the control of the tactical corsaander?" Yes~3; ITo-O. ARVil Advisor replies not tabulated. Pre-U. S s Entry Advisor replies not tabulated.. Question A-5: "Do you think you should have had more authority to call upon the tactical cornaander for support?" Yes-11; No-6 Question B-2: "Did the training you received adequately prepare you for your duties in Vietnam?" Yes-8; No-9. Question D-2: "Did tactical commanders consider your advisory function as: "a. Part of their tactical mission?; b. A separate mis sion? c. Attitude of tactical commanders unknown?"' Sector Advisor: a-6; b-10; c-3. ABYIT Advisor and Pre-U. S. Entry Advisors were not tabulated. Comment: No conclusions can be drawn on this response but it does seem significant that many commanders fail to see a relation be tween the advisory function and their tactical mission, Question D-3: "Do you feel that tactical unit comnanders regarded your advisory function as making a contribution to their mission? a. Substantial; 3. Marginal" B-l-1 Sector Advisor: a-5; b-12. A.RV1T Advisor - not tabulated. Comment; the response to D~3 seems to confirm response to D-2. Question"D-5: "Did you feel that tactical unit conmanders and their staffs had a narrower view of U. S. policies, tactics, objectives than you did?" Sector Advisors Yes-15; Wo-1, No comment-1; A3VN Advisors yes-2; no-6 n/a-1. Comment: Ono "Sector Advisor 1 ' marked this question "yes" with five check marks and an exclamation point. In comparing the replies of "Sector Advisors" with "AHVrJ Advisors" there is a marked difference of attitvi.de or experience between the two groups. The heavy"yes" response of the Sector Advisors seems to indicate that tactical coBioanders are blinded by the importance of the tactical mission. Question D-6 "Did you experience any occasion when the tactical commander revised or aborted the planned mission because he re cognized that your mission had a higher priority than his own?" Sector Advisor Yes-1; lTo-16; AIWIT Advisor Yes-1; No-7. Comment: Some Sector Advisors, in comments, reflected sarcasm or bitterness about this, but AIW1-T advisors did not. In a fevr cases ARVIT advisors noted that close and friendly liaison between the two tactical commands precluded such problems. The response to this question is consistent v.dth D-5. Question D-7 "Did you experience difficulties when recommendations made by you in an advisory function conflicted with the objectives of tactical D. S. or indigenous or allied unit commanders?" Sector Advisors, Yes-9; lTo-5, Hot specified 1; AUVIT Advisor Yes-1; No-8. Comment: there is a claar, if not statistically verifiable, difference--between the response fron the two groups. "Sector Advi sors" consider this issue to be centraltd the entire progress of the war in Vietnam. I.Iost "ARVItf Advisors" did not have a conflict with commanders of other tactical forces* Question D-9 "If you experienced difficulties in performing your advisory function, did you receive support when you dealt with G-5 of U. S. tactical forces?" Sector Advisor: Yes-7; JTo-7; Sometimes-2. AHW Advisor Yes-5. Comment: Replies to this question are interesting b^catise none of .1-1-2 the AHVJT advisors failed to get needed help from G-5, v/hile nearly half of the "Sector Advisors" failed to get such support. Question E-l "How "would you characterize the understanding of your advisory function shov/n by U. S. Tactical Forces: a. Understood the importance of your mission, b. Did not understand the importance of your mission?" Answers: a-5 i b-13 Comment: This response reinforces the feeling that tactical commanders assign secondary importance to advisory functions. Question 3-7 "Did you receive greater understanding of your problems, duties and responsibilities from U. S. civilian officials or from U. S. military?" Sector Advisor Civilians - 8; Military -6, Both 2. Comment: One would expect greater understanding from military personnel. It is especially interesting that so many military advisors found greater understanding of their problems, duties and responsibilities from civilian U. S. officials. One respondent noted that a number of the civilians were retired military personnel. Question E-ll "Was the area tactical unit commander required to coordinate with the advisory commander prior to planning or ex ecuting tactical operations?" Yes-6; No-6; No comments. Question F-7 "Were you required to change your recommendations on civil advisory matters to accomodate the desires of'the U. S. (or AHVll) tactical commanders?" Sector Advisor Yes-1; No-11, Sometimes-J; 1T/A-2. Comment: Many- respondents chose to interpret the question as a possible threat to their independence. -.Several emphasised that they were subject to great pressure by some senior officer, but did not switch their opinions. January 1970 Appendix 2, (Suriniary of Interviews) to AI.1T3X B (Analysis of Available Information.) to STAZ? STUDY (TIE IKPACT OF MILITARY BUILDUP Oil THE ADVISORY rUKCTIQN. A limited number of personal interviews were conducted, thereby eliminating the possibility of conducting a precise statistical analysis. However, sone tabulation of the results is provided below: Fifteen (15) ex-advisors were interviewed. Their ranks included: Major General 1; Colonel 4; Lieutenant Colonel 3; Kajor 4; Captain 1; Lieutenant 2. Their assignments had been Corps advisor 4; Sector advisor 2; Sub-sector advisor 2; ASW'Unit Advisor 1; RGX Unit Advisor 1. Only five advisors expressed opinions as to whether thoir roles were clearly defined. Of these, only one stated that his role was clearly defined, while the other four said it was not. Seven of the interviewees stated that there was a lack of coordin ation between United States tactical coovaanders and advisors, while three maintained that coordination was good. Six of the interviewees specifically indicated that their relations with U. S« civilians were not good. Hone made reference to good relationse Pive advisors indicated that their relations with the tactical coirmanders were strained, while only two thought these re lations were good. Three advisors expressed the belief that their association with their Vietnamese counterparts was good, while five felt the opposite. Although there are no consistent patterns the interviews did pin point severe! problem areas. One officer noted that in the area of personal relationships military and civilian components were "jealous" of each other. Another cited a lack of trust, i.e., from the ARViT dovrn to the national Police there was a lack of faith in the ability of some other element"to perform its job. A nunber of.. those interviewed felt that the re "was a communication problem between tactical forces and advisors. This was attributed to the fact that the advisor was often ignored, circumvented, or made to feel that he was under the control of the tactical com mander. Better conuunication might have helped the tactical commander to properly understand the advisor's role and its basic limitations. Tactical forces, according to some of those interviewed, were often ineffective in the implementation of the pacification program. This v/as partly due to the disturbances caused by U. S. troops i.e., dislocations of the populace caused by U. S. operations, and partly to the tactical commander's impression that his troops v/ere brought B-2-1 in to fill a void created by the failure of the AP.VN and the U. S. advisory effort. Conflicts also arose betv/een the goals estab lished for the pacification program and those established by the tactical commander. In one instance an advisor resisted the civic action program of a troop commander attempting to achieve some rear area security through civic action, because the former wanted to maintain his own position vis-a-vis the local populace. Low level field grade and company grade officers felt that too many officials were visiting South Vietnam. They stated that visitors required too much valuable time, material and other resources that could 'be employed more profitably elsewhere. One officer indicated that until 1S65 or 1966 an advisory assignment aided a 'military career. Thus nsny '.Vest Pointers volunteered for this du^y. After the buildup this situation deteriorated. The neocl for advisors increased in absolute terns and. the caliber of the advisors de clined as a consequence. There appears to be a dichotomy of opinion between high level officers and those in the raddle and lower ranks. The interviews left the impression that at Corps level all was functioning well and there vras no conflict between pacification activities and tactical operations. On the other hand, interviews with junior and middle level advisors revealed a great many probler.s. However, all ranks agreed that COPDS provided, an operational framework that was better than the previous organisati on. Another cora.:ent offered was that the United States was trying too hard to accomplish too much too fast. It was felt that the ART1T was doing an effective job, but that it could not do the whole job by itself. The implication was that too much is being done for the ARVTT, and that it should be left to fight its own battles. The advisors felt that the Vietnamese 'people resisted- attempts to change their customs. The above statements represent some of the problems discovered during the interviews but are not a complete list of the problems encountered by the introduction of non-indig enous forces into an area. B-2-2 January 1970 Annex C (Bibliography) to STAPP STUDY (THE IMPACT OP MILITARY BUILDUP 01! THE ADVISORY FUHCTIOIT). BOOKS. Duncanson, Denis J. Government.and Revolution inL Vietnam. Hey/ York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Lederer, V/illian J. Our Own Yforst Enemy. Hew York: \Y. W. Norton, 1968. IvIcAlister, John T., Jr. Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution. New York: Alfred "A. Knopf, 1969. Shaplen, Robert. Time Cut of Hanoi: Revolution qad Reaction in Southeast Asia. Hew York: Harper & Row, 1969. Sully, Francois. Age^ of the Guerrilla, The Hew Warfa_re « New York: Parents I.la5a2ine Press, 1968. MAGAZINES AND JOURITALS Carpenter, Archie Eldon. "The Advisor's Personal Commitment" Infantry de Shazo, Thomas B., Jr 8 "U. S. Counterinsurgency Assistance to Rural Vietnam in 1964." ITaval War C_olle^e_ Reviey/ (1967). Denno, Bi-yerP., Col. "Advisor and Counterpart." A_ray(july ; 1965) Glick, SdY/ard Bernard. "Conflict, Civic Action and Counterinsurgency." Orbis (Pall, 1966). !vington s Gordon S., H.D. "Letter from a Vietnam Veteran." Satu-rday Reviev/ (September 20, 1969). Jones, Richard1964).; A.-- "To My -Replacement."- Infantry (July-August, * ' V Kent. Irvin 11. "The Commander and Civil-! lilitary Relations." Kllitary Review (April, 196?). Lewis, J. P.. "One Response." Marine Corps Gazette (March, 1968). McGrath, Vincent J. "Rock Bottom Human Relations in l-IAAG." Infantry (September-October, 1964). Heckl'in, John. "The Struggle to Rescue the People." Portune (April, 1967). Sehwarts, David C. "Toward a Hew Knowledge Base for Military Development Operations during Insurgencies." Orbis (Spring. 1968). C-l Shelton, Ralph W. "Advice for Advisors " Infantry (July- August, 1966). Snyder, K.J. "Friendship A Principle of Y/ar." Marine _Corps Gazette (llarch, 1S-68). U.S. Department of Defense. "Guerrilla Vulnerabilities." Kili tary Revi ev; (Augus t, 1968), Y/agner, David H. "A Handful of Marines." Marine Corps Gazette (Llarch, 1968). Watson, Francis 1.1., Jr. and Livings ton, Hoyt R. "Civic : Action: Purpose and Pitfalls." Military Review (December, 196?). Williaris, R.3. "A Briefing for Combined Action." Gazette (Llarch, 1958). Willoughby, William H. "Revolutionary Development." Infantry (November-December, 1968). Young, Kenneth T. "U.S. Policy and Vietnamese Political Viability, 1954-1967." Asian Survey (August, 1S67). "Yietnan: The Y/ar Inside the War." The Economist., January 13, 1969. "Can Vietnamization Work?" Time, September 26, 1969. IKWSPAPdR ARTICLES Clifford, Clark. "Clifford's Conversion from Ha\vk." The Washing ton Post, June 22j 1969. Gulick, Lev/is £ "Viet Village LIopup Plans Laid." The Washington Post, January 13, 1965. Hoffnan, David. "Pacification Merely a numbers Game." ^The Washington Post, January 28, 1969. "' Hojasjij Richard. "Brigade Spurns Killing, Finds Pacification," The \^a3jhingtpn__Pqst, October 11, 1969. Kaiser, Robert G. "Ilany GI's Dislike Viet Allies." The Washington Post, October 18, 1969. Lescage, Lee. "Boredom is U.S. Team's Other Foe." The Y/ashington ' Post, September 8, 1968. Mason, David. "Too I-.Iuch U.S. Kelp, S. Yiet Colonel Says." The Washington Post^ August 17, 1968. Sell, Ted. "Younger Military Critics of Viet Policy Emerging into Positions of Power." The ^Washington Post, March 25 S 1969. ir._ S. Government Publications; Other Reports Colby, W. E. "Guide for Province and District Advisors." Headquarters, U 0 S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1968 Ellsberg, David. "Some Lessons from Failure in Vietnam. "Hand Corporation Paper (P-4036), July, 1968. «' Porrest, John Benedict, Jr. "The Civic Action Advisory Effort: Republic of Vietnam." Unpublished I.!.A. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969* Hickey, G. C. "The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Count er Part: The Case for Vietnam. Appendix A: Redevelopment of the Advisory Roll in Counter-insurgency." Rand Corporation Report (Memorandum 4482-ARPA), March, 1965. Montague, Robert I.I. Jr., LTC, "Pacification: The Overall Strategy in South Vietnam/ 1 Unpublished Research Thesis, U. S. Army War College, 1966. Hey, Virgil. "The United States Soldier in a lion-Violent Role. An Historical Overview." Combat Operations Research Group Port Belvoir ; Virginia, 1967. O'Leary, Joseph 'S., COL. "The Role of-the Military Advisory in Counterinsurgency: The Military Advisory Effort at Province and District." Unpublished Research Thesis, U.S. Army War College, 1966. U, S. Department of the Army. "A Guide to Military Civic Action." 30Qth-Civil Affairs'Group, Washington, D. G", 1969. Advisor Handbook for Counterinsursency (FM 31-73). Washington, D. C, April 1S'69« Civil Affairs Operations (E.I 41-10). Washington, B.C. October 1969. U.-S. Department of Defense. "Past Sheet-. The U. S. Mission, Viet nam Armed Forces Information and Education," Washington, D. C. 1967. "The Advisor and His Counterpart." U. S. Army Civil Officers School, Port Gordon, Georgia, 1968. "The Country Team." U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Port Gordon, Georgia, 1968. . Advisor Flaridbook fo_r Stability Operations (_FM31-7.5_1. Washington, D, C., 1967. _ "LIACV Guide for Province and District Advisors: Draft One." February 1968. __. "I.IACV Handbook for Military Support of Pacification." February 1968. : , i _. "Civil Affairs Area Study of the Republic of Vietnam ~(SP 41-182)." U. S. Army Civil Affairs School, Port Gordon, Ga., January 1968. ____. "Operation Report." 29th Civil Affairs Company, 1968, _. "Vietnam: A Bibliography." Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C 0 1966. U. S. Department of State. ''Report to the Ambassador." Agency for International Development, Washington', D. C. 1967. ______. "Legal Basis for U. 3. Military Aid to South Vietnam." Vietnam Information Xotes, August 1967. U. S. Senate, Coinmittee on Foreign Relations. "Background Informa tion Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam." Fifth ed. revised. V/ashington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969. Westmoreland, V/. C. } Gen., and Sharp, U.S.G., Adin. "Report on the V/ar in Vietnam (as of June, 1964)." V/ashington, D. C., U.-S.." Government Printing Office, 1969. C-4 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 300TH CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY MEMORIAL USAR CENTER 66O1 BALTIMORE AVENUE. RIVERDALE. MARYLAND 2O84O 22 May 1969 Dear Former Advisor: Because of your former role as U.S. Advisor in Vietnam, you are asked to provide information which will aid in the development of a study directed by the U.S. Continental Army Command. In a letter to the five CONUS Armies, USCONARC identified nine studies in the field of civil affairs required for the CA - Agency of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. One such study assigned to this unit by First U.S. Army deals with the civil affairs advisory function in internal defense and internal development following entry of major U.S. or non-indigenous friendly forces into a country. Published sources of information will be used extensively by this unit in the development of the study. Experience thus far however indicates that much useful data can come only from those military personnel who have actually served as advisors in^the field. The tight deadline under which this unit is working precludes extensive personal interviews with return ing advisors. For this reason the attached questionnaire has been developed as a vehicle for collecting and assembling pertinent data. Although it is designed primarily for simple yes-no response, provision has been made for narrative comments If.you feel the short answer type question is too restrictive and wish to elaborate on the answer, please do so on a separate sheet of paper with your answer numbered to correspond to the appropriate section and question. As a former advisor in Vietnam your considered response to this questionnaire will provide invaluable assistance to the members of this command in the preparation of the required study. A small number of those responding to the questionnaire, prin cipally from the Washington, D.C. area, will be asked to participate in follow-up interview sessions with personnel from this group. Those selected for interviews will be con- ' tacted following review and analysis of the questionnaire re sponses . -2 Although space has been provided, you need not enter your name since personal identification would add little of im portance to the study paper. You are encouraged to do so, however, since names will be needed to arrange follow-up interviews. Names will not be used in the final report and responses to questionnaires will be considered as priviledged information. Questionnaires will be held in strict confidence by this unit. The results of this study can be extremely useful in future planning. Its value however will be directly proportional to the degree of response to these questionnaires. You are urged to give careful and thoughtful consideration to its completion. Please return the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope provided for this purpose. We would appreciate return of these questionnaires within fifteen days of receipt. EUGENE ROGERS LTC CA-USAR Project Director SURVEY OF FORMER U. S. ADVISORS IN VIETNAM A. AUTHORITY 1. In your role as an advisor, was your relationship with the ( ) Yes U. S. Military Forces in the area officially defined? ( ) No 2. Were some aspects of your relationship undefined or ambiguous? ( ) Yes ( ) Undefined ( ) Ambiguous ( ) No 3. Was the advisory function under the control of the U. S. tactical ( ) Yes commander in the area? ( ) No 4. If no, do you think the function would have been more effec- ( ) Yes tively performed if it had been placed under the control of ( ) No the tactical commander? 5. Do you think you should have had more authority to call upon ( ) Yes the tactical commander for support? ( ) No \ 6. Did conflicting directives, instructions, or policies complicate ( ) Yes your work or reduce your effectiveness? ( ) No If yes, explain: 7. Was your authority commensurate with your responsibilities for accomplishing your advisory mission? a. Had sufficient authority: ( ) b. Authority restricted because of the presence of ( ) U. S. tactical forces: c. Other restrictions (explain): ( ) 8. Describe the military structure in which you worked as an ad visor. Identify your own position in, and explain your relationship to that structure (e.g. advisor/instructor to ARVN 29th Div., or senior province advisor: Kontum Province etc.): - 2 9. Describe the relationship, official and/or unofficial, between the U. S. Advisory activity in which you participated and the tactical operations in your area: . B. TRAINING AND CAREER 1. Describe the advisory training you received prior to going to Vietnam: 2. Did the training you received adequately prepare you for your duties ( ) Yes in Vietnam? Explain: ( ) No 3. Do you feel that your assignment as an advisor helped or hindered your career? ( ) Helped ( ) Hindered a. If helped, in 'what way? b. If hindered, how? - 3 C. DUTY 1. When did you serve as an advisor in Vietnam? If you served more than one tour of duty enter inclusive dates for all tours. Date from To Date from To Date from To Date from To 2. At what governmental level were your advisory activities conducted? ( ) National ( ) Province ( ) District ' .( ) Sub-district 3. Name of territorial or governmental unit:______4. Were your duties as an advisor clearly defined? If you remember, give the citation of the official document(s) which defined your duties: 5. Of the following terms which one(s) best describes the duties you performed in your advisory role? If more than one applies rank them in descending order of importance: a. Tactical military ( ) b. Socio-military ( ) c. Economic development ( ) d. Social and protocol ( ) e. Political ( ) f. Administrative ( ) g. Other (explain): ( ) 6. Were your subjected to conflicting pressures in the execution of ( ) Yes your advisory duties? If yes, explain: ( ) No - 4 7. Describe the one greatest frustration you experienced in your advisory work: 8. Indicate, in percentages, the time devoted to the following areas of your advisory work: a. Work with indigenous officials (other than host country) ( )% b. Working with indigenous civilians ( )% c. Administrative procedures, e.g., filing reports, filling out forms etc. ( )% d. Working with counterpart ( )% \ e. Other major duties. Explain: ( )% D. ADVISOR RELATIONS WITH MILITARY 1. Describe your relationship with: a. Local U. S. Tactical Commanders - 5 b. ARVN tactical commanders you ware advising: c. Province or district chiefs: d. USAID and other U. S. civilian officials: e. The local population: 2. Did tactical commanders consider your advisory function as: a. Part of their tactical mission? ( ) b. A separate mission? ( ) c. Attitude of tactical commanders unknown: ( ) 3. Do you feel that tactical unit commanders regarded your advisory function as making a contribution to their mission? a. Substantial ( ) b. Marginal ( ) - 6 4. Which of the following phrases best describe the attitude of U. S. Military Commanders? If more than one applies list in descending order of importance: a.. Only interested in tactical victory: ( ) b. Recognized role of advisory function and made effort to establish mutually satisfactory relations with advisors: ( ) c. Tended to regard advisors as messenger boys or nuisances: ( ) d. Expected too much of advisors: ( ) e. Started out ignorant of, or with in correct understanding of advisor's duties, but le'arned from experience: ( ) f. Tended to use advisor in support of combat operations, to the detriment of the latter's primary duties: ( ) g. Cannot be categorized: ( ) 5. Did you feel that tactical unit commanders and their ( ) Yes staffs had a narrower view of U. S. policies, tactics, ob jectives than you did? ( ) No 6. Did you experience any occasion when the tactical commaner revised or aborted his planned mission because he recognized ( ) Yes that your mission had a higher priority than his own? ( ) No If yes, describe the situation and explain-how the tactical commander arrived at this decision: 7. Did you experience difficulties when recommendations made by you in an advisory function conflicted with the objectives of tactical U.S., or indigenous or allied unit commanders? 8. How were conflicts between you and the tactical unit commander resolved? Select the phrase(s) which best describe the method used. Rank in descending order of importance: a. Personal discussions with the commander; ( ) b. Appeal to higher tactical commander: ( ) c. Through support from indigenous officials: ( ) - 7 d. Through support from U. S. Civilian ( ) Officials 9. If you experienced difficulties in performing your advisory ( ) Yes function, did you receive support when you dealt with G-5 (or G-3 equivalent) of U. S. tactical forces? ( ) No 10. Did Vietnamese civilian government agencies assist you in ( ) Yes accomplishing your mission? ( ) No If yes, explain: 11. Were special forces located in your area of responsibility? ( ) Yes ( ) No 12. If special forces were located in your area what was your understanding of their mission? Explain: E. SUPPORT 1. How would you characterize the understanding of your advisory function shown by U. S. tactical forces? a. Understood the importance of your mission: ( ) b. Did not understand the importance of your mission ( ) 2. In your opinion, was the support you received from U. S. tactical forces: a. Insufficient ( ) b. Adequate ( ) c. Optimum ( ) d» Too much, (Uncontrollable or misdirected) ( ) - 8 - 3. Describe the support you received from tactical units: 4. If the support received from U. S. tactical units was in ( ) Yes adequate, did other organizations furnish assistance? ( ) No If yes, who provided that support? What was the nature of support received from these organizations? 5. If your workload increased with the buildup of U. S. tactical ( ) Yes troop strength were you provided with additional personnel or ( ) No support Describe any change in support provided: 6. Was this, additional support provided as part of tha formal res ( )Formal ponsibilities of the tactical force commander or informally on an ( ) Informally ad hoc basis? 7. Did you receive greater understanding of your problems, duties and ( ) Civilians responsibilities from U. S. civilian officials or from the U. S. ( ) Military military establishment 8. Did nearby Vietnamese tactical forces have any capability that ( ) Yes could have assisted you and your counterpart in achieving your ( ) No advisory function and his mission? If yes, explain: - 9 - ' *» 9. Did you receive any such assistance from Vietnamese tactical forces? ( ) Yes ( ) No 10. Did Vietnamese civilian government agencies assist you in accom- ( ) Yes plishing your mission? ( ) No If yes, what organization or organizations? 11. Was the area tactical unit commander required to coordinate with ( ) Yes the advisory commander prior to planning or executing tactical ( ) No operations? F. PROBLEMS 1. How was the attitude of the indigenous civilian population toward you affected by the presence in the area of U. S» tactical forces? a. Received greater cooperation. ( ) b. Received less cooperation. ( ) c. Extent of cooperation remained the same. ( ) 2. Did the behavior of U. S. troops present any major problems for ( ) Yes you or other advisors? ( ) No 3. Did the presence of large scale U. S. tactical forces change the ( ) Yes nature or scope, or both, of your advisory functions? ( ) No ; If yes, explain: 4. Were there overlapping responsibilities or conflicts between ( ) Yes advisory command and tactical command? £ ) No 5. How was your work affected by the buildup of U. S. tactical troop strength in the country ( not in your immediate area)? - 10 6. Did the presence of U. S. tactical forces in the immediate area ( ) Adversely affect your activities? ( ) Favorably Explain: 7. Were you required to change your recommendations on civil advisory matters to accomodate the desires of the U. S. (or ARVN) tactical commanders? 8. If you were an advisor in Vietnam during the buildup of U. S. tactical forces in your geographical area, explain the following: a. Did it increase your responsibilities? ( ) Yes If yes, how? ( ) No b. Did it change your responsibilities? ( ) Yes ( ) No / c. Did it increase the time you devoted to ( ) Yes tactical as opposed to advisory matters? ( ) No If yes, explain: - 11 •» Did the appearance of U. S. Tactical Troops create any conflict ( ) Yes between your responsibilities as advisor to ARVN or Vietnamese officials and the requirements levied on you by the Commander of ( ) No U. S. troops in your area? If yes, explain: 10. If you served more than one tour as an advisor, explain briefly the major differences in the problems you experienced on each tour. (Supply dates) 11. Describe in a few words the most challenging problems you faced ~~ as an advisor: 12. Describe in your own words the reaction (political, economic, sociological etc) of the Vietnamese to the entry of large scale U. S. Forces into the country or locality: 13. Describe the most serious problems you faced as the advisor to indigneous forces: - 12 G RECOMMENDATIONS 1. What changes (if any) in doctrine would you recommend in conducting possible future U. S. advisory activities? a. Before the entry of non-indigenous military forces: b. After the entry of non-indigenous military forces: 2. What other recommendations would you make with respect to the role of an advisor in situations similar to Vietnarf NAME:_ ADDRESS: ANNEX E DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS. 300TH CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY MEMORIAL USAR CENTER 66O1 BALTIMORE AVENUE. RIVERDALE. MARYLAND 2O84O J> March 1969 SUBJECT: Special Study of Advisory Function Commanding General Third U. S. Army Port McPherson, Georgia 30330 1. Pursuant to Letter, ATOPS-SWCA, HQ USCOMRC, 24 September 1968, this headquarters has been directed to prepare a study on the military advisory function in Internal Defense and Internal Development, ^he proposed study will utilize Vietnam experiences and will compare the role and activities of the U. S. Advisor before and after entry of major U. S. military forces into that country, ^he study will relate primarily to those advisory functions which have an impact upon the civilian population and the civil and military authorities. It will.exclude those advisory functions which are concerned primarily v;ith combat activities. The study will focus on advisory activities at the province and district levels and will consider activities at the national level only insofar as these may have a bearing on activities at lower levels. Results of the study will be useful in formulating future policy. 2. Request that this Headquarters be furnished v/hatever information you.may have pertinent to the above study. Information should included special reports, studies, assessments, special sections, texts, after-action reports, etc. Please identify thematerials which you wish returned. 3. It is further requested that names and addresses of any personnel known to have experience in the military advisory function at the local level be forwarded along with study material. It is intended that selected individuals will be con tacted in the course of the study to obtain the add tional insight and understanding of the advisory function that can come only from those who have participated in the activity. 4. This unit is working under tight deadlines. Accordingly, early receipt of materials would be appreciated, preferably by 1 April 1969. The information should be sent to this Headquarters, attention Major John Lally. FOR THE COMMANDER: HENRY R. WILIIAMS Major CA-USAR Adjutant DISTRIBUTION CG, 352d CA Hq (Area A) January 1970 X 31 (Response to Requests for Information), TO STAFF STUDY (THE IMPACT OF MILITARY BUILDUP ON -THE ADVISORY FUNCTION). The staff study working group sent letters of inquiry and requests for information and assistance to a number of military commands and organizations whose activities had some relevance to the subject of the study. Many positive responses were received, con sisting of invitations to inspect available holdings of records and literature, offers to set up inter views with knowledgeable personnel, leads for research and copies of material sent on a loan or retention basis. The Army War College proved most helpful in providing several members of the working group with an opportunity to have lengthy and candid discussions with senior officers and in furnishing valuable written material. A series of visits to other commands also resulted in valuable interviews and a large quan tity of literature. Headquarters and Commands contacted included: . y John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare Fort Bragg, H. C. U. S. Army Intelligence School Fort Holabird, Md. U. S. Army Civil Affairs School Fort Gordon, Ga, U. S. Army Combat Development ^ornmand Fort Belvoir, Va. Vietnam Training Center Department of State, Washington, D. C. U. S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, Pa. Judge Advocate General School Charlottesville, Va. U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leaveiiworth, Kansas F-l First U. S. Army Fort George G. Meade, Md. Third U." S. Army Fort McPherson, Ga. Fourth U. S. Army Fort Sam Houston, Texas Fifth U. S. Army Fort Sheridan, 111. Sixth U. S. Army Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. F-2