U. s. IVrroy MWary Ds 55 i 70 1970 STAFF STUDY JHE IMPACT of MILITARY BUILD-UP on the ADVISORY FUNCTION 300th CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP Riverdale, Maryland PROPERTY OF US ARMY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS. 300TH CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY MEMORIAL USAR CENTER 66Ot BALTIMORE AVENUE. RIVERDALE. MARYLAND 2O84O 5 April 1970 Staff Study nTfc0 Inpwrt of a Eiiitaay Build-up on the Function. " TlffiUt Conaaanaii^f General 352d Civil Aff--ii3?a Area A Aveauo 20340 TOt CoEsaasdiBs Officer United States Ay«sy Combat BavelopEautt AK'Bs CA A^mcy soar GORDON, GEORGIA, 30905 1* iloferences* $ Letfces*, BQ,> UJ5COK&RG, ATCPS-ST.'CA, subject j^In of Civil Affairs C<^ability(U5AR training) $ dated 24 S SQ Pir0t US Ajt?yf AH&REWPU, subject 5 ali^>v0veis£mt of 'Civil Affeirs Ce,pability(USAR TraStiing),*1 date-d 24 Ootolser iS4^8» c* I«ttort Ho. 35^d CA Araa (/,) , AHMMF, HCOKABC Civil ts dcted 4 Doccscsber 2« la rasponoa to the abcvo roferer.ecsj this unit has prepfirei t&j enclosed etaff etudy entitlea !<<?i>,o Impassi of riXitaiy Eui5.d.~ap oa the /-dviaory ?uaa- cn*" Tko study was prepared d«rli^ the 'training year 1969 » in addJ.tioa to otliei? traini»g 3» Tlie staff ctudy conolugion« ead rocoti»endatior!s were dovolojed eftei* es>- tenslvc- reae*<rci> of existins* literat«ro» valuatic-n of sai^or-oias opinions y coived in response to our <jweatio*maire 9 e»d pwsonal Intarviewe with Advisors* 4» *rhie project arjsi^Tsment provided tin interesting &nd ebnlle«si»£f tcslt to r- largcs sogiteont of taiit pcs'senKe-is. \*e hopo th attached clooxmcnt will bo of 0OK vftlus to the Aro\y and x-cccrriaeiad that additicsfel studies DJ? eusvey-t./ps B 'be DKsdo to this unit* furnished* rARC ATTUi A^ UaA f /I'.^Ecil .X csunttdat.t," USA v;u COL. tIBRAHY COLLEGE , PA, OUTLIKE I. Staff Study: The Impact of Military Build-up On the Advisory Function II. Annex A - Historical Development of United States Involvement in Vietnam A, Appendix 1 - Chronology of Events B. Appendix 2 - Pacification ?ro~rams III. Annex B - Analysis of Available Information A. Appendix 1 - Summary of Questionnaire Response B. Appendix 2 - Susimary of Interview Pirdings IV. Annex C - Bibliography V. Annex D - Sample Questionnaire VI. Annex E - Sample of Letter Requesting IniornLacion VII. Annex P - Response to ReqiTests for Information Headquarters 300th CA Group Eiverdale, I'd.. 3 Karch 1970 SUBJECT: The Inpact of ililitary Buildup on the Advisory Function. 1. PROBLEM a. To determine how the civil affairs responsibilities of U. S. Military advisors are affected by the introduction of large numbers of U. S. or Allied forces to conduct military operations. b. Based on findings, to suggest changes in doctrine or organization. 2. ASSUMPTIONS a. The U. S. experience in Vietnam is typical of any future situation involving large numbers of advisors in a country facing insurgency prior to and following the introduc tion of U. S. and Allied conbat forces to conduct military operations, 3. PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM a. U. S. advisors, first assigned to South Vietnam in 1955) grew in number to 21,500 by 1965 v/hen U. S. tactical units were introduced. An advisory network was progressively extended throughout the RVtl political and military establish ment. The primary mission of the advisors evolved from one of assisting South Vietnam by providing planning, training and logistic support to dealing with internal development and paci fication programs. (See AUNEX A -for a more detailed discussion) b. Initially suffering from a variety of ills, pacifi cation program performance became more effective after the U,S. introduced large numbers of troops and other measures were taken to improve security. (See Appendix 2, AN5TEX A) c« After the introduction of U. S. military forces, military advisors and U. S. and Allied troops performed essen tially separate missions often in proximity to each other and reported through different chains of d. The introduction of tactical forces brought the advisor both benefits and problems. (!) Benefits (a) ^ecurlt.^ U. S. Troops provided better pro tection for the advisor, his Vietnamese counterpart, their projects, and to the friendly populace. (b) Assistance_. U, S. Troops provided equipment, material and skilled personnel not previously available for local projects and initiated beneficial civic action projects. (2) Problems ( a ) Conflicts between troop corrimanders and advisors . 1 ) g_oc trinal _ga? . Advisory responsibilities were well defined; however, doctrine did not take into account changes in the advisor's situation caused by the presence of a U, S. tactical unit in .his area. This lack was a basic cause of misunderstanding and conflict between the commander and advisor. 2) Poor Rapport . .Some tactical commanders did not understand the advisor's role. They regarded the advisor as their liaison to Vietnamese officials and expected him to relay th^ir desires to the Vietnamese and insure compliance. Other conffi'-onclers ignored the advisor completely, often to great disad vantage to both. Such rapport as existed was due more to individ ual ability acid initiative than to doctrinal guidelines. 5) Li is trust. U. S. Commanders have been known to withhold operational information from advisors for fear of compromising security. This resulted in incidents 7/hich adversely affected pacification efforts and created bad feelings. 4) Duplication of civic action projects. In many cases tactical troop commanders initiated their own civic action projects without coordinating with the area advisor. Wasteful duplication often resulted. problems . 1 ) Inappropriate behavior of_ troops . The behavior of occidental troops created some animosities, as it did nox conform tc typical Asian behavior. These animosities made it more difficult for the advisor to obtain the cooperation of Vietnamese officials and populace » 2) Inflation and disruption of economic patterns. U. S. troops demanded services and were willing to pay high prices for them. Prices of many items became too high for the average South Vietnamese. Normal earning patterns were changed. Black market activities and corruption increased, 3) Hes^riction of civJlian movement. Restriction of movement of civilians by tactical units imposed hardships on the civilians and obliged the advisor to help set up movement controls and issue travel permits. 4) The increased scale of combat operations after U. S. tactical units were introduced resulted in increased civilian casualties and property destruction. (c) differences in attitude toward the war. ARV¥ and KVJT officials had lived for years with the war and accepted it as a normal condition of life» They felt a prudent attitude towards the war would keep them alive longer and afford them the chance to enjoy a noinial life after 1700 hours. The U. S, tactical commanders felt they had come to Vietnam to win the war after ARVH and the advisors had failed. They were determined to make a contribution to victor;/ during their 12 months tour and establish a creditable record essential to their military careers. Functioning in an American environment and subject to its pres sures, they often had difficulty in appreciating ths attitude of the Vietnamese and the U.. S. advisor whose attitude often tended to parallel that of the Vietnamese. (d) Increased workload and Liaison functjLons. The introduction of U. S. troops and the attendant expansion of the U. S. establishment in Vietnam reduced the time the advisor had available to execute his mission, More visitors were guided on tours, more meetings were attended, and in many cases additional operational requirements had to be satisfied. (A more comprehen sive treatment of this topic may be found in ANKEX B) 4. DISCUSSION •? [Alternative courses of action re J;he Advisor/Troop Commander Relationship» The absence of doctrine defining the advisor/cororaander relationship, and instances of conflict and lack of coordination bet-yaen the two in Vietnam, point to a need for clearer delineation of this relationship. Three possible courses of action nay be considered: (1) Give the advisor authority to veto tactical operations which he considers detrimental to Civil Affairs objectives. This authority might permit; him to countermand tactical operations undertaken in his immediate area subject of course to approval by higher headquarters. It appears that any advantage gained by this course of action nay be outweighed by the adverse effects of such a procedure. For exsnple, confusion may be introduced into operations, planning and staff procedures in tactical operations may be disrupted, and the essential principle of unity of command may be compromised. » (2) Increase the authority of the U. S. tactical commander over the advisor. This may take the form of the advisor being responsive to the wishes of the coriander in combined U. S. - AR71T operations, or of bringing the advisor into a quasi-staff relation ship to the U. S. commander, making him, in effect, the commander's S-5. ^hs record indicates that many commanders attempt to bring the local advisor under their control and perceive advantages in such a relationship. Formalizing this practice would permit com manders to use advisors for the transmission of what amounts to orders to commanders of ARVN units, thereby compromising the AEVTT chain of command. It may also place advisors under the control of officers who do not understand the primary dxities of advisors. These same officers may each lack a proper appreciation of politi cal factors and of Vietnamese methods and operations. Finally, advisory and S-5 functions are essentially separate. Any effort to combine then would compromise the effective performance of each function. (3) Improve coordination between the advisor and the com mander and establish a formal relationship between the two short of a command relationship. This -night take the form of bringing the advisor into the planning phases of tactical operations to be undertaken in his area.