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The New Behaviorism The New Behaviorism Behaviorism was the dominant movement in American psychology in the first half of the twentieth century, culminating in the radical movement of B. F. Skinner—the most influential psychologist since Freud. This book begins with a brief history of behavior- ism and goes on to explain and criticize radical behaviorism, its philosophy and its applications to social issues. The mission of the book is to help steer experimental psychology away from its current undisciplined indulgence in “mental life” toward the core of science, which is an economical description of nature. The author argues that parsimony, the elementary philosophical distinction between private and public events, even biology, evolution and animal psychology—all are ignored by much contempo- rary cognitive psychology. The failings of a theoretical radical behaviorism as well as a philosophically defective cognitive psychology point to the need for a new theoretical behaviorism, which can deal with problems such as “consciousness” that have been either ignored, evaded or muddled by existing approaches. This second edition, which will be published nearly fifteen years after the first edi- tion, surveys what, if any, changes have occurred within behaviorism and whether it has maintained its influence on experimental cognitive psychology or other fields. Since publication of the first edition, John Staddon has published extensively in journals and magazines, offering insightful commentary on everyday events, usually exposing how our preconceptions are often illogical and inaccurate, yet have become deeply entrenched in our collective conscience. In 2012, he published a successful trade book called The Malign Hand of the Markets, which exposed the insidious forces affecting our financial markets. John intends to use his developed writing skills to make the second edition of The New Behaviorism richer and more accessible, with illuminat- ing and engaging examples to illustrate his points. The book will appeal to scientists in fields that are influenced by or eschew behav- iorism, graduate students and advanced undergraduates interested in the psychology of learning, curious about the history and philosophy of the behavioral approach and wanting a glimpse of current developments in the behaviorist tradition. John Staddon is James B. Duke Professor of Psychology, and Professor of Biology and Neurobiology, Emeritus, at Duke University, and an honorary visiting professor at the University of York (United Kingdom). He is a fellow of the AAAS and the Society of Experimental Psychologists, and has a Docteur, Honoris Causa, from the Université Charles de Gaulle, Lille 3, France. His research is on the evolution and mechanisms of learning in humans and animals and the history and philosophy of psychology, econom- ics and biology. He is past editor of Behavioural Processes and Behavior & Philosophy, and is the author of more than 200 research papers and five books. He writes and lec- tures on a wide range of important public policy issues. 6241-0270.indb 1 12/26/2013 3:10:41 PM 6241-0270.indb 2 12/26/2013 3:10:41 PM The New Behaviorism Second Edition John Staddon 6241-0270.indb 3 12/26/2013 3:10:42 PM Second edition published 2014 by Psychology Press 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Psychology Press 27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA Psychology Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 Taylor & Francis The right of John Staddon to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him/her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Psychology Press 2001 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data [CIP data] ISBN: 978-1-84872-687-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-84872-688-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-79817-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times by Apex CoVantage, LLC 6241-0270.indb 4 12/26/2013 3:10:42 PM Contents Preface vii Acknowledgments xi PART I History 1 1 Early Behaviorism 3 2 Behaviorism and Learning Psychology 15 PART II Radical Behaviorism 35 3 Radical Behaviorism, I: Method 37 4 Radical Behaviorism, II: Explanation 49 5 Skinner and Theory 62 6 Variation and Selection 73 7 Behavior-Evolution Parallels 90 8 Rationality 98 9 Truth, Science and Behaviorism 110 10 Free Will and Utopia 122 11 Values 135 12 Skinner and Mental Life 142 6241-0270.indb 5 12/26/2013 3:10:42 PM vi Contents PART III The New Behaviorism 147 13 Cognitivism and the New Behaviorism 149 14 Theoretical Behaviorism 166 15 Internal States: The Logic of Historical Systems 176 16 Consciousness and Theoretical Behaviorism 189 Postscript to Parts I–III: Alchemy of the Mind 208 PART IV Behaviorism and Society 213 17 Law, Punishment and Behaviorism 215 18 Health Care, I: The Schedule 233 19 Health Care, II: The Context 249 20 Reinforcement and “Socialized” Medicine 259 21 Teaching 268 Index 273 6241-0270.indb 6 12/26/2013 3:10:42 PM Preface This edition is almost completely rewritten and about twice as long as the first. I cover two new social issues and also devote more space to the philosophy of cognitivism and the science behind theoretical behaviorism. B. F. Skinner figures less prominently in this edition than the previous, but his work is a theme that still runs through many chapters because his influence has been so great and his writings raise so many provocative issues that are identified with behaviorism. But, as readers of the first edition detected, my position is far from Skinnerian. Many reviewers thought well of the first edition but, naturally, I want to attend to those who did not. Some felt I was too hard on Skinner. One even accused me of an ad hominem attack. Several thought that I did not present a favorable enough view of behaviorism and that my own position was lit- tle short of . cognitive. One otherwise sympathetic critic thought the book “conservative”—not a term that will endear it to most psychologists. The critics are right to this extent. The book was not and is not an advertise- ment for radical behaviorism. It is, first, a short history of a fascinating move- ment in psychology. Second, it is an analysis of what I think went wrong with behaviorism as time went on. Third, it is a proposal for a theoretical behav- iorism. I describe the philosophy behind theoretical behaviorism as well as some more or less detailed applications of the approach to laboratory phenom- ena, ranging from choice behavior in animals to human perception. I believe that theoretical behaviorism can provide a unified framework for a science of behavior that is now fragmented. And finally, I suggest how it can provide insights into broader practical issues such as law and punishment, the health care system and teaching. Behaviorism began with a healthy skepticism about introspection. Con- scious thought tells us very little about the springs of action. Behaviorism of all types is right about that. It is right to emphasize action over information and representation, which is the theme, even the preoccupation, of cognitive psychology. On the other hand, not all cognitive psychology is philosophically or experimentally flawed. It should not be ignored. Behaviorism is right also to emphasize biology and evolution, which is driven not by thought but by action. And radical behaviorism, as advanced by Skinner and his students, was 6241-0270.indb 7 12/26/2013 3:10:42 PM viii Preface wonderfully right in developing new experimental methods for studying the behavior of individual organisms in real time. The discovery of reinforcement schedules was a great advance and opened up a huge new field to be explored. But behaviorism also lost its way in several respects. Methodological behaviorism, Skinner’s term—neo-behaviorism was their own term—went along with the standard methods of psychology: between-group comparisons rather than the study of individuals, and settling for statistical significance as a measure of scientific success. I have little to say about it. I do discuss the seri- ous flaws of null-hypothesis statistical testing in Chapter 9. Although radical behaviorism accepts evolutionary continuity between man and animals, it has consistently neglected the nature part of the nature- nurture dyad. It also imposed ridiculous strictures on theoretical development, to the point that behaviorist theory became an oxymoron. Radical behavior- ism also became increasingly isolated from the rest of psychology through a self-consciously idiosyncratic vocabulary and a naïve epistemology (theory of knowledge) that caused many philosophers to dismiss the whole field. Skinner bears much responsibility for that and for the limits he placed on theory. And finally, Skinner’s pronouncements on society and its reform led him to extrapolate an infant laboratory science to social realms far beyond its reach. My response to this is not so much “conservative” as just cautious. Human society is immensely complex. Political decisions involve values as much as techniques. Much has been written on the organization of society. Not all of it is worthless. Almost none was addressed by Skinner. To “design a culture” as one might design a lawnmower is to confuse “culture” with contraption, and place oneself far above humanity in general as a sort of all-wise, all-knowing philosopher king.
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