The Quality of Bureaucracy and Public Sector Performance. A Comparative Study in South-Eastern Europe

∗ Prof.Dr. Ani Matei , National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania Prof.Dr. Panagiotis Grigoriou, University of the Aegean, Mytilene, Greece Prof.Dr. Margarita Shivergueva, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria Dr.Sc.Davor Vaši ček, University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia

∗ Prof. Dr. Ani Matei, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Faculty of Public Administration, Povernei str., no. 6, sector 1, Bucharest, Romania, telephone: +40213180894, fax: +40213146507, e-mail: [email protected]

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695076 Introduction

The issue of public sector performance is more and more present in the field literature. Regarded as a finality of a complex public management process, referring either to the central or to the local government, the public sector performance acquires systemic characteristics and, according to the level, the governors establish the feedback that is carried out through new public decisions meant to lead towards a performance improvement.

Kearney and Berman (1999, 5) show that “the concern with improving the performance of government organizations has existed since the Scientific Management Movement”. Relating to public organization management by outcomes, the mentioned authors approach public sector performance in various dimensions, such as: organizing work, managing workers, measuring performance and overcoming resistance to performance-enhancing innovations.

In this context, Smith (1990, 53) reveals the fact that “the performance indicators have become ubiquitous in the public sector” and that “the lines of accountability are far more complex in the public sector”.

The perspective of direct and mutual correlations and determinations between the public sector performance and quality of bureaucracy is supported both by studies and analyses of important international institutions: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD or UNDP etc. and by contributions of recognised authors: Rauch and Evans (1999), Brignall and Modell (2000).

Meyer and Zucker (1989, 111) provide a framework conception, substantiating the opinion above expressed, asserting “generally, performance will be defined narrowly to the extent that a) elites dominate organization, b) a high degree of professionalization exists, and c) the organization performs a technical function, outputs of which are measurable”.

The specificity in the public sector does not always favour its performance, especially when “the norm of participative democratic governance operates, sometimes in the formal structure or rules of an organization; the interests of multiple constituencies are given recognition; the organization’s function is non-technical and outputs elude measurement”. Extending the above approach, more than a decade ago, the World Bank (WDR, 1997) concluded: “government effectiveness is the cause of higher economic growth” and “human resource management is a determinant of organizational performance” (WPSR, 2005, 27).

In this context, the World Bank included the quality of public bureaucracy, of policy-making and public service provision in the index on “government effectiveness”. Moreover, on the basis of an analysis achieved in 175 states, Kaufmann (1999) emphasised the fact that it was confirmed the close link of governmental effectiveness with the economic growth as well as the fact that “government effectiveness contributed to higher national income” (WPSR, 2005, 27). We find additional arguments in the same document, asserting, on the ground of consistent studies in private companies in industrialised states and then in developing and transition states, that the quality of bureaucracy and human resource management are closely linked to their global performance.

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695076

For our research approach, the studies of Evans and Rauch (1999), respectively Rauch and Evans (1999), and other studies are relevant, determining the adequate social and statistic instruments of assessing the quality of bureaucracy. Based on the above studies, with special reference to the scale of “analysis of the economic bureaucracy”, (Rauch and Evans, 1999, App.), all empirical investigations as well as the indicators of quality of bureaucracy were achieved.

Concerning some adjacent issues about the evolution of meritocracy, in South-Eastern Europe, relevant researches are comprised in Matei and Matei (2010), Matei and Popa (2010), etc.

The finality of our current study refers to determining the correlations between the quality of bureaucracy and public sector performance. For the second process analysed, the public sector performance, we took into consideration, some indicators used by the World Bank: Government Effectiveness (Gov Eff), Regulatory Quality (Reg Qual), Rule of Law (Rule Law), Control of Corruption (Con Cor), and also the Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP).

The sociological investigation was developed in four South-Eastern European states: Romania (RO), Greece (GR), Bulgaria (BG) and Croatia (HR), on a sample of 125 stakeholders, determined for every state, on the basis of rigorous criteria of representativeness at the level of central governments. The empirical data are obtained within the framework of the Jean Monnet project “South-Eastern European developments on the administrative convergence and enlargement of the European Administrative Space in Balkan states“ and they are available on the website: http://www.balcannet.eu.

I. Theoretical approaches

I.1 Governance performance

Bouckaert and Halligan (2008), as well as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) achieve an international comparison related to “managing performance” and “public management reform”. The statistical ratios and/or connections between performance management, in the context of the public sector, become determinant both for the understanding of the processes of performance management, and for the governance performance.

The general approach framework of this issue is delivered by the New Public Management (Hood, 1995) or by “reinventing government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).

A broad and generic definition of performance – based public management is taking/allocating responsibility for the performance of the system, being accountable for its results (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008, 32).

Hannagan (2008), referring to performance management in an organisation, states that “the term performance management means different practices to different managers but usually includes the following elements:

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695076
The organisation has shared objectives, or a mission statement or corporate objectives, which it communicates to its employees.
Individual performance management targets are set, which are related to the organisational objectives.
A regular, formal review is carried out to monitor progress toward the objectives.
The review process is used to identify training needs, career development and possible rewards.
The effectiveness of the whole process is evaluated against the overall performance of the organisation” (Hannagan, 2008, 294).

Matei (2009, 141-220) presents an interesting theoretical and empirical analysis concerning meritocracy and professionalization of civil service, as pillar for increasing performance in the public sector.

Important and constant concerns this time with regard to the public sector performance can be also found in the UN Public Administration Programme, which in the 2005 and 2008 reports, presents both the public sector performance (WPSR, 2005), and the issue of the public governance (WPSR, 2008). Thus, WPSR (2005) focuses upon the way in which the human potential will be transformed in order to improve the public sector performance. The general context in which the stated issue is approached is characterised, on one hand, by the complexity of the policy making processes and of the public strategies and, on the other hand, by the deterioration of the human resources capacities of accomplishing these functions. The aspects set forth render difficult, for many states, the application of the national objectives and strategies for increasing the governance performance through poverty and corruption reduction, promoting the sustainable human development, as it is underlined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

WPRS (2008) emphasizes the role of the civic engagement in the public governance process. By presenting several case studies, it is being emphasised, in a real manner, the role of the different practices in consolidating the governance capacity through transparency and responsibility. In the context, the relations between the power and the civil society organisations are tackled, as well as the necessity of adopting methodologies and strategies proper for each state’s condition for a successful civic engagement in the public governance. The mentioned technical support is also offered by the analysis made by Willmore (2005).

I.2 Aggregated governance indicators

The World Bank has achieved comprehensive theoretical and experimental studies in the last decades. In view of our study, the papers of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, 2), as well as the previous ones approaching the so called “governance matters” are relevant. The above papers comprise “six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance that provide new evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes”.

4 The six indicators correspond to six basic governance concepts: voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft. The six mentioned indicators are developed in studies of synthesis of the World Bank Research Group “Macroeconomic and Growth” and World Bank Institute “Governance, Regulation and Finance”. They refer to aspects concerning:  the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced;  the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies;  the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999, 1). Concerning the public sector performance and its assessment, we find a comprehensive synthesis in Van Dooren and Van de Walle (2008). From those three major dimensions characterising the governance process for the public sector performance, we selected four indicators describing, on the basis of statistic aggregated variables, the last two sets of major topics. Following the conception presented by the World Bank, the four indicators will describe: • “Government Effectiveness”, combining the perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from potential pressures and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies. • “Regulatory Burden” includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. • “Rule of Law” includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions. • “Control of Corruption” describes the measures of perception of corruption.

5 II. Empirical approach

II.1 Collecting the original data Several steps have been successively achieved in view to accomplish the empirical investigation. The investigation instrument used was designed as a questionnaire with 20 questions following closely “Analysing Economic Bureaucracy” (Rauch and Evans, 1999, Appendix). Our complete survey is reproduced in Annex 1. According to its structure, the variables that will model the quality of bureaucracy, respectively its connections with the economic environment can be synthesised according to Table 1.

Table 1. Structure and expected finality of the questionnaire

Questions Content and expected finality Description q1 – q3 Core Economic Agencies Identifying the important agencies/public institutions for economic policy making q4 – q13 Recruitment and Careers Applying the meritocratic criteria in recruitment (q4, q5) Measuring the importance of career- building (q6 – q11) Rather the “blurring” of public/private boundaries that is one gauge of the extent to which the state is “embedded” in society (q12, q13). q14 – q16 Salaries Bureaucratic compensation and socio- economic status q17 – q20 Civil Service Exams Measuring the extent to which recruitment is meritocratic for the bureaucracy as a whole (q17, q18) Measuring socio-economic status for the bureaucracy as a whole (q19, q20).

Source: Synthesis after Rauch and Evans (1999, 9, 10)

6 The target group of the empirical research comprises four South-Eastern European states: Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Romania, relevant for the developments recorded in the administrative and public sector reforms. Their status related to the European Union represents the most relevant perspective for the current research. The above group comprises older EU Member State (Greece), new ones (Bulgaria and Romania) and an acceding one (Croatia). The experts who achieved the empirical investigation are teaching staff or researchers from New Bulgarian University (BG), University of Rijeka (HR), University of the Aegean and European Public Law Organization (EPLO) (GR), National School of Political Studies and Public Administration (NSPSPA) (RO). The questionnaires were distributed to high civil servants and representatives of central governmental authorities in various decentralized structures in regions of the states analysed. Table 2 presents the structure of the target group, the experts used and the number of the responders. Table 2. Structure of the target group

State ID Experts used Number of questionnaires applied Bulgaria (BG) BG 2 25 Croatia (HR) HR 3 25 Greece (GR) GR 4 48 Romania (RO) RO 3 26 Source: The authors

II.2 Statistic indices used

II.2.1 Building the indices of the bureaucratic structure

In view to be compatible with other researches with similar objective (Rauch and Evans (1999), Hyden, Court and Mease (2003), Court, Kristen and Weder (1999)), in the current paper we used the same indices concerning the quality of bureaucracy.

Thus, according to the description proposed in the mentioned papers:

MERIT Index = [(q4 – 1)/3 + (q5 – 1)/3] / 2

CAREER Index = [(4 – q6)/3 + (q7 – 1)/2 +(q8 – 1)/3 + (q10 – 1)/3 +(q11 – 1)] / 5

SALARY Index = [(q14 – 1)/4 + (q16 – 1)/3] / 2

7 We remark that the variables used do not cover the whole content of the questionnaire and database. This is due to the fact that we aimed to achieve the research objective, and the other data can be used for extending the investigations to adjacent objectives. Processing the empirical data described in sub chapter II.1, we shall obtain the situation from Table 3.

Table 3. Indices of the bureaucratic structure

ID MERIT CAREER SALARY Index Index Index

BG 0.39 0.44 0.41

HR 0.28 0.36 0.33

GR 0.45 0.54 0.44

RO 0.51 0.59 0.56 Source: The authors

II.2.2 Indices of the public sector performance

Taking into account the period of the current research, we have considered that it is more proper to use the values of the indices of governance performance calculated by the World Bank. We took into consideration the following ones: government effectiveness (Gov Eff), regulatory quality (Reg Qual), rule of law (Rule Law) and control of corruption (Con Cor). Their description, the modality of calculation and the relevance concerning public sector performance can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). Description of indicators in view of public sector performance.

Table 4 presents the values of the indices mentioned for 2008.

Table 4. Indicators of public sector performance (2008)

ID Gov Eff Reg Qual Rule Law ConCor RGDP (USD)

BG 0.10 0.75 -0.12 -0.17 9521

HR 0.52 0.50 0.08 0.12 13911

GR 0.56 0.81 0.75 0.10 28829

RO -0.14 0.53 -0.05 -0.06 9337 Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009)

8 III. Interpretation and conclusions

As it will be further seen, the empirical data mentioned will confirm the connections, correlations and mutual determinations between various statistic variables modelling the bureaucratic processes and the processes concerning the economic and public sector performance.

III.1 Merit, Career and Salary

Table 5 describes Pearson correlations among the three variables. We remark that at least from statistic point of view, the three variables do not have a very powerful correlation. However, all coefficients of correlation are positive, ranging from 0.043 (Merit/Salary) to 0.265 (Salary/Career).

Table 5. Statistic correlations between variables of quality of bureaucracy

Merit Career Salary

Pearson Correlation 1 0.168 0.043 Merit Sig (2-tailed) 0.061 0.635 N 124 124 124 Pearson Correlation 0.168 1 0.265** Career Sig (2-tailed) 0.061 0.003 N 124 124 124 Pearson Correlation 0.043 0.265 1 Salary Sig (2-tailed) 0.635 0.003 N 124 124 124 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 – tailed)

Source: The authors

The regression of the three variables, establishing a direct determination between Career and Merit and an independence of the variables Merit and Salary, triggers similar conclusions. The explanations of these results consist in the complexity and diversity of the civil service reform processes in South-Eastern European states and their insufficient development.

Merit = 0.339 + 0.160 Career – 0.002 Salary (0.072) (0.984)

F = 1.768 R2 = 0.028

More conclusive explanations could be obtained if we analyse data for every state. The correlations between them reveal situations, sometimes contradictory and anyway the lack of convergence in the meritocratic bureaucratic processes.

Annex 2 presents the above mentioned correlations.

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III.2 Developments of the processes corresponding to public sector performance

The statistic analysis of the correlations between the indicators of public sector performance for the states analysed reveals a relevant situation (Table 6).

Table 6. Statistic correlations of the indicators of public sector performance

Gov Eff Reg Qual Rule Con Ln Law Cor RGDP Pearson Correlation 1 0.260 0.704 0.805 0.821 Gov Eff Sig (2-tailed) 0.740 0.296 0.195 0.179 N 4 4 4 4 4 Pearson Correlation 1 0.558 -0.184 0.514 Reg Qual Sig (2-tailed) 0.442 0.816 0.486 N 4 4 4 4 Pearson Correlation 1 0.666 0.984 Rule Law Sig (2-tailed) 0.334 0.016 N 4 4 4 Pearson Correlation 1 0.740 ConCor Sig (2-tailed) 0.260 N 4 4 Pearson Correlation 1 Ln RGDP Sig (2-tailed) N 4

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 – tailed)

Source: The authors

We remark that for Gov Eff, respectively RGDP and Rule Law, all coefficients of correlation are positive, revealing powerful direct determinations between them. The only exception is for Reg Qual and ConCor, the correlation being negative. This situation is determined, as shown by many studies concerning the public sector reform, in South-Eastern Europe by the discrepancies between the regulatory framework and inadequate modalities of enforcement.

III.3 Quality of bureaucracy and public sector performance

Considering Merit, Career and Salary as indicators of the quality of bureaucracy, Table 7 presents the correlations between them and the indicators of economic performance (RGDP) and public sector performance (Gov Eff, Reg Qual, Rule Law and ConCor).

10 Table 7. Statistic correlations concerning the quality of bureaucracy and governance performance

Merit Career Salary

Pearson Correlation -0.589 -0.487 -0.742 Gov Eff Sig (2-tailed) 0.411 0.513 0.258

Pearson Correlation 0.260 0.218 -0.021

Reg Qual Sig (2-tailed) 0.740 0.782 0.979

Pearson Correlation 0.159 0.269 -0.069 Rule Law Sig (2-tailed) 0.841 0.731 0.931

Pearson Correlation -0.351 -0.193 -0.390

Con Cor Sig (2-tailed) 0.649 0.807 0.610

Pearson Correlation -0.021 0.093 -0.243

Ln RGDP Sig (2-tailed) 0.979 0.907 0.757

Source: The authors

In this case, from statistic point of view, reality provides different evolutions of public sector performance and specific processes taken into calculation for the quality of bureaucracy. The explanations derive from inconsistence of statistic data, contradictory evolutions between the economic and bureaucratic processes, specific for the public sector. The linear regressions establish situations of statistic co-linearity for a series of variables and direct or indirect significant determinations. The following relations highlight this situation.

Merit = 0.118 – 0.625 Gov Eff + 0.702 Reg Qual +1,131 Con Cor

Career = 0.174 – 0.689 Gov Eff + 0.758 Reg Qual +1,376 Con Cor

Salary = 0.272 – 0.608 Gov Eff + 0.500 Reg Qual +1,037 Con Cor

The above relations demonstrate powerful determinations of Con Cor on bureaucracy, determinations of average intensity of Reg Qual and negative determinations of Gov Eff.

This last conclusion may have as cause the fact that the statistic investigation has been achieved in the top period of the economic crisis, expressed for the respective states in powerful measures of reducing the bureaucratic apparatus.

11 References

Bouckaert, G., Halligan, J., 2008, “Managing Performance. International Comparisons”, Routledge, London and New York; Brignall, S., Modell, S., 2000, “An institutional perspective on performance measurement and management in the “new public sector””, Management Accounting Research, 2000, No.11, pp.281-306. Available at http://www.ideallibrary.com; Court, J., Kristen, P., Weder, B., 1999, “Bureaucratic Structure and Performance: First Africa Survey Results”, United Nations University, http://www.unu.edu/; Drori, G.S., Iang, Y.S., Meyer, J.W., 2004, “Sources of Rationalized Governance: Cross- National Longitudinal Analysis, 1985-2002”, CDDRL, Stanford Institute for International Studies; Evans, P., 1995, “Studies and Industrial Transformation”, Princeton University Press; Evans, P., Rauch, J.E., 1999, “Bureaucracy and Growth: a cross-national analysis of the effects of “weberian” state structures on economic growth”, American Sociological Review, 64(5), pp.748-765; Hannagan, T., 2008, “Management. Concepts &Practices”, 5 th edition, Prentice Hall; Hood, Ch., 1995, “The “New Public Management” in the 1980`s. Variations on a theme”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(2/3), pp.93-109; Hyden, G., Court, J., Mease, K., 2003, “The Bureaucracy and Governance in the 16 Developing Countries”, World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 7, 2003, Overseas Development Institute, (ODI), http://www.odi.org.uk; Kaufmann, D., 1999, “Governance redux: the empirical challenge” in “The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004”, Porter, M. and all., 2004, World Economic Forum, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press; Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Zoido-Lobaton, P., 1999, “Governance Matters”, Policy Research Working Paper 2196, The World Bank Development Research Group, “Macroeconomics and Growth” and World Bank Institute Governance, “Regulation and Finance”; Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2009, “Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.4978. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424591 Kearney, R., Berman, E., 1999, “Public Sector Performance: management, motivation, and measurement”, West view Press; Matei, A., Popa, F., 2010, “Meritocratic Aspects Concerning Civil Servant Career- Comparative Study in Central and Eastern European Countries”, NISPAcee Annual Conference, Warsaw, Poland. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597849; Matei, L., 2009, “Romanian Public Management Reform. Theoretical and Empirical Studies”, vol.II, “Civil Service”, The Economica Publishing House, Bucharest, Romania;

12 Matei, L., Matei, A., 2010, “Meritocratic Aspects Concerning Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector-A Case Study for Romania”, The Journal of Institute of Public Enterprise, Vol.33, No.1&2, pp.35-62, Hyderabad, India. Available on: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313085 ; Meyer, J.W., Zucker, L.G., 1989, “Permanently Failing Organizations”, Newbury Park, Sage; Osborne, D., Gaebler, T., 1992, “Reinventing Government”, New York: Plume; Pollitt, Ch., Bouckaert, G., 2000, “Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis”, Oxford University Press, Romanian language edition, Epigraf Publishing House, Chisinau; Rauch, J.E., Evans, P., 1999, “Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries”, UC San Diego: Department of Economies, UCSD. Retrieved from: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/OsbOw38d; Smith, P., 1990, “The Use of Performance Indicators in the Public Sector”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), Vol.153, No 1(1990), pp.53-72; UNPAN, 2005, “World Public Sector Report (WPSR)- Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Performance”, United Nations, New York; UNPAN, 2008, “World Public Sector Report (WPSR)-People Matter: Civic Engagement in Public Governance”, United Nations, New York; Van Dooren, W., Van de Walle, S., (eds.), 2008, “Performance Information in the Public Sector. How it is used”, Governance and Public Management series, Palgrave Macmillan, N.Y. Willmore, L., 2005, “Public Sector Performance, Prestige and Promotion (background paper), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891922; World Bank, 1997, “World Development Report (WDR) - The State in a Changing World”, http://econ.worldbank.org.

13 Annex 1

Questionnaire

A sociological research concerning the degree of administrative rationalisation is achieved on the basis of this questionnaire. The research aims to investigate the mechanisms in order to support and apply standards of meritocratic recruitment, predictability of career and rewarding, for the bureaucratic apparatus. The quality of our research depends on a high extent on the sincerity of your answers.

q1. List the four most important agencies in the central state bureaucracy order of their power to shape overall economic policy. (e.g. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and/or Trade and/or Commerce, Planning Board, agency or Ministry)?

Codes Agency 1 2 3 4

q2. Which of the following descriptions best fits the role of these agencies in the formulation of economic policy?

Codes 1 Many new economic policies originate inside them. 2 Some new policies originate inside them and they are important “filters” for policy ideas that come from political parties, private elites and the chief executive, often reshaping these ideas in the process. 3 They rarely originate new policies, but are important in turning policies that originate in the political arena into programs that can be implemented.

14 q3. How likely are ideas and policies initiated by these agencies to prevail?

Codes

1 No more likely than ideas coming out of other parts of the state bureaucracy. 2 Quite likely, even in the face of opposition from other parts of the bureaucracy, as long as the chief executive is neutral or supportive. 3 Under the circumstances above and also sometimes even in the face of opposition from the chief executive.

q4. Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these agencies enters the civil service via a formal examination system?

Codes 1 Less than 30% 2 30 – 60% 3 60% - 90% 4 More than 90%

q5. Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion has university or postgraduate degrees.

Codes 1 Less than 30% 2 30 – 60% 3 60% - 90% 4 More than 90% q6. Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political appointees (e.g. appointed by the President or Chief Executive)

Codes 1 None 2 Just agency chiefs 3 Agency chiefs and vice-chiefs. 4 All of top 2 or 3 levels.

15 q7. Of political appointees to these positions, what proportion is likely to already be members of the higher civil service?

Codes 1 Less than 30% 2 30 – 70% 3 More than 70% q8. Of those promoted to the top 2 or 2 levels in these agencies (whether or not they are political appointees), what proportion come from within the agency itself or (its associated ministry(ies) if the agency is not itself a ministry)?

Codes 1 Less than 50% 2 50 – 70% 3 70% - 90% 4 Over 90% q9. Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to positions of lesser importance when political leadership changes?

Codes 1 Almost always. 2 Usually. 3 Sometimes. 4 Rarely. q10. What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level official in one of these agencies during his career?

Codes 1 1-5 years 2 5 – 10 years 3 10 – 20 years 4 Entire career

q11. What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies through a higher civil service examination early in his/her career reasonably expect? Assuming that there are at least half dozen steps or levels between and entry-level position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for moving up in the agency? [ NB. More than one may apply.]

Codes 1 In most cases, will move up one or two levels but no more.

16 2 In most cases, will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just below political appointees 3 If performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political appointees is not an unreasonable expectation 4 In at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments q12. How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector, interspersing private and public sector activity?

Codes 1 Normal 2 Frequent but not modal 3 Unusual 4 Almost never q13. How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to have significant post- retirement careers in the private sector?

Codes 1 Normal 2 Frequent but not modal 3 Unusual 4 Almost never

q14. How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not including bribes or other extra legal sources of income) of higher officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities?

Codes 1 Less than 50% 2 50 –80% 3 80% - 90% 4 Comparable 5 Higher

17 q15. If bribes and other extra legal perquisites are included what would the proportion be?

Codes 1 Less than 50% 2 50 – 80% 3 80% - 90% 4 Comparable 5 Higher q16. Over the period in question (roughly 2005 – 2009) what was the movement of legal income in these agencies relative to salaries in the private sector?

Codes 1 Declined dramatically 2 Declined slightly 3 Maintained the same position 4 Improved their position

q17. Since roughly what date have civil service examinations been in place?

Codes 1 Pre – 1900 2 1900 – 1949 3 1950 – 1969 4 1970 – 1979 5 1980 – 1989 6 1990 - q18. Roughly what proportion of those who take the higher civil service exam pass?

Codes 1 Less than 2% 2 2 – 5% 3 6 – 10% 4 10% - 30% 5 30 – 50% 6 More than 50%

18 q19. Among graduates of the country’s most elite university(ies), is a public sector career considered:

Codes 1 The best possible career option 2 The best possible option for those whose families are not already owners of substantial private enterprises 3 The best option for those who are risk averse 4 Definitely a second best option relative to a private sector career q20. Among members of the educated middle class who are not in a position to attend the most elite universities is a public sector career considered:

Codes 1 The best possible career option 2 The best possible option for those whose families are not already owners of substantial private enterprises 3 The best option for those who are risk averse 4 Definitely a second best option relative to a private sector career

19 Annex 2

Statistic correlations between the variables Merit, Career and Salary in the four states

Merit_BG Merit_GR Merit_ HR Merit_ RO Pearson Correlation 1 0.002 0.220 0.300 Merit_BG Sig (2-tailed) 0.994 0.292 0.146 N 25 25 25 25 Pearson Correlation 1 -0.091 -0.004 Merit_GR Sig (2-tailed) 0.666 0.983 N 49 25 26 Pearson Correlation 1 -0.213 Merit_HR Sig (2-tailed) 0.307 N 25 25 Pearson Correlation 1 Merit_RO Sig (2-tailed) N 26

Career_BG Career_GR Career_HR Career_RO Pearson Correlation 1 - 0.071 - 0.070 - 0.356 Career_BG Sig (2-tailed) 0.737 0.741 0.081 N 25 25 25 25 Pearson Correlation 1 0.493* 0.166 Career_GR Sig (2-tailed) 0.012 0.418 N 48 25 26 Pearson Correlation 1 0.092 Career_HR Sig (2-tailed) 0.663 N 25 25 Pearson Correlation 1 Career_RO Sig (2-tailed) N 26 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

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Salary_BG Salary_GR Salary_HR Salary_RO Pearson Correlation 1 0.215 0.094 0.070 Salary_BG Sig (2-tailed) 0.301 0.654 0.740 N 25 25 25 25 Pearson Correlation 1 0.092 - 0.159 Salary_GR Sig (2-tailed) 0.661 0.438 N 48 25 26 Pearson Correlation 1 0.045 Salary_HR Sig (2-tailed) 0.830 N 25 25 Pearson Correlation 1 Salary_RO Sig (2-tailed) N 26

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