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IDEAS. INFLUENCE. IMPACT. ISSUEBRIEF Boyko Noev & Harlan Ullman STRATEGIC ADVISORS GROUP

Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO’s Strategic Concept: Ignore, Finesse or Confront?

ATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is overseeing the drafting of NATO’s latest Strategic The Strategic Advisors Group N Concept, set to replace the current version To tackle the tough issues facing NATO and the approved in 1999. Even though only a decade has passed, transatlantic community, the created changes across the globe have been stunning and in some the Strategic Advisors Group (SAG). Co-chaired cases revolutionary. For NATO, we believe the challenge of by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator the Strategic Concept is to address the question of whether and Airbus CEO Tom Enders, the SAG is comprised NATO is still relevant or whether it has become a relic. We of North American and European preeminent strongly believe the former. However, that can no longer be defense experts. Founded in 2007 by then-Atlantic taken for granted. Twenty years after the Council Chairman General James L. Jones, General imploded, the Alliance must finally find a new strategic Brent Scowcroft and former Norwegian Minister of anchor for its raison d’être or deal with the implications Defense Kristin Krohn Devold, the SAG provides of becoming a relic or an Alliance that may have served timely insights and analysis to policymakers and the its purpose. public on strategic issues in the transatlantic security In that regard and by extension Pakistan play partnership through issuing policy briefs and reports, critical roles. It is self-evident that the future of the Alliance hosting strategy sessions for senior civilian and very much hangs in the balance over how the conflict in military officials and providing informal expert advice Afghanistan is resolved. After all, NATO has become more to decision-makers.

expeditionary and designed to operate “out of area.” The SAG and its activities are generously sponsored Afghanistan is THE test case for this proposition. by , EADS North America, “Victory,” however – defined as NATO action leading to a and Airbus. more secure and more stable Afghanistan – will give the Alliance a huge political boost. “Failure,” meaning that Hence, a key question is how the Strategic Concept should NATO cannot bring stability and security to Afghanistan, deal with Afghanistan, if at all. Clearly, there are three could, and we repeat could, pose a profound danger to options: ignore and defer; finesse; and confront. This brief Alliance cohesion and integrity. But make no mistake: what analyzes each option and proposes a way ahead. happens in Afghanistan is almost certainly going to have a profound impact on the Alliance and its future.

Ambassador Boyko Noev is a Senior Fellow at the European Program at the Center for the Study of Democracy and is a former Minister of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria.

Dr. Harlan Ullman is a Senior Advisor to the Atlantic Council.

Both authors serve on the Atlantic Council Strategic Advisors Group. The views expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Council. Ignore and Defer defense or on forces designed to defend national borders, it is living in a distant past. Even a rejuvenated and hostile While NATO forces are fighting in Afghanistan, the Strategic Russia is unlikely to present a real military threat for some Concept could focus on the future and a time when NATO time to come, if at all. Indeed, energy is a far more potent will not be so engaged in combat. Interestingly, as the point of potential leverage for Moscow. Vietnam War drew down, the then-President of the U.S. Naval War College, Admiral Stansfield Turner, made the Third, as long as the use of terror in an era of capacities for decision not to include study of that war in the curriculum mass disruption remains a threat, NATO cannot ignore it. on the grounds that it was too emotional and too recent to Homegrown terrorists are real. The attacks in London in warrant objective study. The Strategic Concept could make 2005, Madrid in 2004 and more recently in the United a similar presumption. States last year on Christmas Day underscore this reality. However, the breeding grounds are the Internet and The advantage of this “ignore and defer” approach would unsettled regions such as Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and, of be to eliminate the obvious strains in the Alliance over course, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. NATO thus has a Afghanistan and the role of expeditionary capability. But much broader, if not global, vista. the disadvantages in deferring any consideration of Afghanistan are more numerous and we believe more Of course, because failure in Afghanistan could potentially powerful. The major disadvantage of deferral is the obvious pose an existential or at least very serious threat to Alliance reality that many or most of the threats and dangers to credibility, cohesion and its future viability, the allies could NATO emanate from “out of area.” The shift to more defer or ignore that conflict in developing the new Strategic expeditionary-like force structure and capability has been a Concept. This ostrich-like position could be one of default. logical conclusion. To ignore these realities by dismissing Of all the options, however, we believe this one is the least Afghanistan will prove short-sighted. Yet, the attraction of desirable and potentially the most reckless. After all, to this option, albeit tactical in essence, exists and could be NATO publics, how can NATO be engaged in Afghanistan seen as doing the least political damage to the Alliance and make no mention of it in its first strategic review in over at present. a decade?

Finesse “If NATO is fixated mainly That said, as the most unfortunate development, NATO on territorial defense or on nations could choose to follow the path of least resistance, as they have done in the recent past. In this case, that forces designed to defend would mean finessing Afghanistan in developing the new national borders, it is living Strategic Concept. One way to do this is to focus on “lessons learned” or a narrower slice of the conflict and in a distant past.” incorporate that into the concept. For example, in laying out future capabilities and strategic direction, phrases such as “NATO must be prepared for both conventional and Second, during the last decade, defense and security have asymmetric or ‘hybrid’ forms of conflict” could be used. shifted from protection of national sovereignty from direct From there, specific “lessons learned” about tactics, or threatened use of military force to respond to more logistics, strategic communications and doctrine can be nontraditional and indirect threats, including the protection drawn. As a result, Afghanistan would be raised in a of individuals. And war has morphed such that conflict is seemingly central way. But in fact the fundamental issues now about non-state actors and people and not about of where, when or how NATO might next intervene in similar destroying conventional armies, navies and air forces. scenarios and the whole matter of expeditionary capability Afghanistan and Iraq post-invasion are classic examples to is left for other venues. make this point. If NATO is fixated mainly on territorial

2 Atlantic Council We fully appreciate the attractiveness of this approach. No matter what the Alliance chooses or does, it seems that While far better than “ignore and defer,” at some stage, the its future is inextricably linked with Afghanistan. Alliance must come to grips with the question of whether it Not confronting Afghanistan as an important aspect of the is relevant or a relic of a past era. With 28 members and Strategic Concept would be irresponsible and even foolish. the requirement for consensus, making major change absent a powerful or even overwhelming reason to do so is That said, the question is whether or not NATO members by definition a formidable task. That this was done in 1968 have the stomach and the resolve to confront Afghanistan following the Harmel Report, the shift to MC 14/3 and the frontally. Given the difficulty in gaining consensus on new strategy of “flexible response” was because of direct missions or possible tasks such as energy and cyber response to a combination of growing Soviet conventional security; proliferation; infrastructure protection and and nuclear strength underscored by the brutal repression resilience; terrorism; piracy; instability; and a host of other in Czechoslovakia and then Poland. No such forcing well-known issues, coming up with a way of dealing with function exists today. Afghanistan may simply be in the “bridge-too-far” category.

Confront While the operations in Afghanistan are being conducted “Not confronting Afghanistan under Article 4, not Article 5, of the Washington Treaty – as an important aspect of the meaning this campaign was not declared as a response to an attack on any member – it is the first sustained ground Strategic Concept would be operation in NATO’s history. Very few of the citizens of irresponsible and even foolish.” member states are unaware of this conflict, especially as casualties mount. And many publics are divided, if not opposed, to fighting in Afghanistan, as they have not been convinced of the rationale behind the mission and have What to Do not been given any definition of victory. This opposition is likely to build as casualties mount and the Karzai We believe and argue that the Strategic Concept is the government continues along a path of incompetence, venue for a serious, searching, rigorous and honest nepotism and corruption. assessment of NATO and its future, examining not merely Afghanistan, but the range of issues that confront the Further, much of NATO’s future rests in the outcome. If Alliance from consensus, expansion, out of area, burden- NATO is successful in Afghanistan, will it rest on its laurels sharing, reform, Russia and the litany of issues that and say never again? Or will it prepare for future conflicts pressure NATO to move from a defensive military alliance that will be “irregular” or asymmetric in nature and require to one based on the broader basis of security. We also non-military solutions to achieve success? recognize that there are four or five distinctly different If NATO does not succeed in Afghanistan, will that make points of view among the members over threats and roles. the Alliance moribund or even unravel it? Will the Alliance Concern or even fear of Russia motivates many of the regroup, lick its wounds and determine where and how it newer members. Others view expeditionary and out of area has a future? Or will the significant political and military responsibilities, as well as broader security responsibilities, experience derived from the International Security as pressing and of growing importance. A third group Assistance Force (ISAF) operation be wasted and the prefers to keep its powder dry and considers the Alliance valuable practical lessons being learned, both in terms of an insurance policy. Others are uncertain or care less. the utility and setbacks in using military power to achieve Cutting across all members, however, is the fiscal political objectives, be ignored? Damoclean sword. Outside the and France, defense capacity will contract and probably substantially. The economic outlook is not good and people are more concerned understandably with domestic

3 Atlantic Council and not international problems. This is not a 21st century variant of isolationism. Ironically, globalization has made STRATCON 2010 more people more conscious of international events and The Strategic Advisors Group’s STRATCON 2010 realities especially in business and trade. project seeks to shape and inform the transatlantic The simple and perhaps naïve conclusion is that NATO debate over NATO’s new Strategic Concept. needs (and may lack) powerful leadership. This is STRATCON 2010 will issue publications to define beyond the pay grade of even the most dynamic Secretary the critical issues NATO must confront in drafting a General or the strategic commanders and Chairman of the new Strategic Concept. For more information about Military Committee. It is up to the political elites in allied the SAG or STRATCON 2010, please contact Vice states and their heads of state and government. President and Director of the Program on Interna- tional Security Damon Wilson at [email protected] This year’s World Economic Forum at Davos had an or Program Associate Director Jeff Lightfoot at interesting subtext. Many of the non-U.S. participants took [email protected]. for granted or concluded that the United States was simply not the power or force it once was. Perhaps that was seen by many Europeans, will not contribute to a stronger because the U.S. delegation was not as senior as it had transatlantic relationship, so much needed for a meaningful been in the past and was guarded in making comments NATO Strategic Concept. that could be seen as provocative or debate-worthy. Given the Obama administration’s current focus on the economy Hence, our plea is for strong and united leadership at and domestic issues, such a posture is understandable. the heads of state and government level for a Strategic However, if it is symptomatic or a precursor of things to Concept that has the courage and substance to come, it is difficult to envision where real leadership will examine all of the key issues confronting the Alliance. come from. (As an aside, in the U.S. Quadrennial Defense That concept may not be able to resolve all or even some Review (QDR), NATO is not mentioned until page 54, of them. But now is the time for the Alliance to be honest something that will not go unnoticed abroad.) Despite and assess the present and the future without precondition. numerous trips to Europe, the decision by President Obama not to participate in a U.S.-EU Summit in Spain, as March 2010

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4 Atlantic Council The Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors

CHAIRMAN John Craddock L. Kevin Kelly *Paula Stern *Chuck Hagel *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *James V. Kimsey John Studzinski CHAIRMAN, Thomas M. Culligan *Roger Kirk William H. Taft, IV INTERNATIONAL W. Bowman Cutter Henry A. Kissinger Peter J. Tanous ADVISORY BOARD Brian D. Dailey Philip Lader Peter Thomas Brent Scowcroft Kenneth W. Dam Paul Twomey PRESIDENT AND CEO Robert E. Diamond, Jr. Muslim Lakhani Henry G. Ulrich, III *Frederick Kempe Paula Dobriansky Robert G. Liberatore Enzo Viscusi Lacey Neuhaus Dorn Henrik Liljegren Carl E. Vuono CHAIRMAN EMERITUS Conrado Dornier *Jan M. Lodal Charles F. Wald *Henry E. Catto Stanley Ebner Izzat Majeed Jay Walker VICE CHAIRS Eric S. Edelman Wendy W. Makins Mark R. Warner *Richard Edelman Thomas J. Edelman William E. Mayer J. Robinson West *Brian C. McK. Henderson Stuart E. Eizenstat Barry R. McCaffrey John C. Whitehead *Franklin D. Kramer Robert F. Ellsworth James P. McCarthy David A. Wilson *Richard L. Lawson Julie Finley Eric D.K. Melby Maciej Witucki * A. Mulberger Lawrence P. Fisher, II Jack N. Merritt R. James Woolsey *W. DeVier Pierson Lucy Reilly Fitch Franklin C. Miller Dov S. Zakheim TREASURERS Barbara Hackman Franklin *Judith A. Miller Anthony C. Zinni *Ronald M. Freeman *Chas W. Freeman Alexander V. Mirtchev HONORARY DIRECTORS *John D. Macomber *John L. Fugh *George E. Moose David C. Acheson Carlton W. Fulford William A. Nitze SECRETARY Madeleine K. Albright Jacques S. Gansler Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg *Walter B. Slocombe James A. Baker, III *Robert Gelbard Philip A. Odeen Frank C. Carlucci, III DIRECTORS Richard L. Gelfond Ana Palacio Warren Christopher *Robert J. Abernethy *Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr. Torkel L. Patterson Colin L. Powell Timothy D. Adams *Sherri W. Goodman William J. Perry Carol C. Adelman John A. Gordon *Thomas R. Pickering Edward L. Rowny Michael A. Almond C. Boyden Gray Andrew Prozes James R. Schlesinger *Michael Ansari Marc Grossman Arnold L. Punaro George P. Shultz *David D. Aufhauser Stephen J. Hadley Joseph W. Ralston John Warner Nancy Kassebaum Baker Ian Hague Norman W. Ray William H. Webster Donald K. Bandler Harry Harding Teresa M. Ressel LIFETIME DIRECTORS Lisa B. Barry Rita E. Hauser Joseph E. Robert, Jr. Lucy Wilson Benson Thomas L. Blair Marten H.A. van Heuven Jeffrey A. Rosen Daniel J. Callahan, III Susan M. Blaustein Richard C. Holbrooke Charles O. Rossotti Geraldine S. Kunstadter *Julia Chang Bloch Mary L. Howell Stanley Roth Steven Muller Harold Brown Benjamin Huberman Michael L. Ryan Stanley R. Resor Dan W. Burns *Robert E. Hunter Marjorie M. Scardino William Y. Smith R. Nicholas Burns Robert L. Hutchings William O. Schmieder Ronald P. Verdicchio *Richard R. Burt Mansoor Ijaz John P. Schmitz Togo D. West, Jr. Michael Calvey William Inglee Jill A. Schuker Sarah C. Carey Wolfgang Ischinger Matthew R. Simmons Michael P.C. Carns Robert Jeffrey Kiron K. Skinner ­*members of the *Daniel W. Christman *A. Elizabeth Jones *Helmut Sonnenfeldt Executive Committee Wesley K. Clark Richard J.A. Steele Curtis M. Coward Francis J. Kelly Philip Stephenson as of March 10, 2010 Strategic Advisors Group

Senator Chuck Hagel – U.S. SAG Co-Chairman Chairman, Atlantic Council Co-Chair, President’s Intelligence Advisory Board

Thomas Enders – European SAG Co-Chairman President and CEO, Airbus S.A.S.

Frederick Kempe – President and CEO Atlantic Council

General Brent Scowcroft – Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board President and Founder, The Scowcroft Group

Damon Wilson – Vice President and Program Director Paul Gebhard - Rapporteur Atlantic Council The Cohen Group

Ian Brzezinski – Rapporteur Mike Durkee – Rapporteur Booz Allen Hamilton Former Special Advisor to SACEUR

Neyla Arnas – Rapporteur Jeff Lightfoot – Secretariat National Defense University Atlantic Council

Rafael L. Bardají Ashraf Ghani Fabrizio W. Luciolli Strategic Studies Group Institute for State Effectiveness Atlantic Council of Italy Marshall Billingslea Edmund Giambastiani Alexander Mirtchev Deloitte Former Vice Chairman of the Krull Corporation Hans Binnendijk Boyko Noev CTNSP Sebastian L. Gorka Center for the Study of Democracy Sven Biscop National Defense University Ioan Mircea Pascu The Royal Institute for Marc Grossman Member of the European Parliament The Cohen Group Jean-Paul Perruche Charles Boyd Annette Heuser Former Director-General, EU Military Staff Business Executives for National Security Bertelsmann Stiftung Thomas R. Pickering Yves Boyer Robert Hunter Hills & Company Ecole Polytechnique RAND Corporaton Norman Ray Edgar Buckley Robert Hutchings The Spectrum Group Thales Woodrow Wilson School Tomas Ries Richard Burt Josef Janning Swedish National McLarty Associates Bertelsmann Stiftung Defense College Ralph Crosby Karl Heinz Kamp Walter Slocombe EADS North America NATO Defense College Caplin & Drysdale Brian Dailey Arnold Kanter Harlan K. Ullman Atlantic Council Board Director The Scowcroft Group Atlantic Council Chris Donnelly Franklin D. Kramer Kurt Volker UK Defence Academy Atlantic Council Vice Chair Atlantic Council/Center for Conrado Dornier Harald Kujat Transatlantic Relations Dornier Aircraft Former Chairman of Chuck Wald Julian Lindley-French NATO Military Committee Deloitte Netherlands Defence Academy Rob de Wijk Hague Centre for Strategic Studies